Abing v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Abing v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1217

LUZVIMINDA ABING v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N1340 of 1999

JUDGE:         BEAUMONT J
DATE:           29 AUGUST 2000
PLACE:         SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1340 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

LUZVIMINDA ABING
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 AUGUST 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        Application be dismissed, with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1340 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

LUZVIMINDA ABING
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE:

29 AUGUST 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) affirmed a decision of the Minister’s delegate refusing a “Special Need Relative” visa under subclass 806.213.  The applicant, a citizen of the Philippines, now seeks judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision, which was given on 18 October 1999.

  2. The relevant primary criteria are as follows:

    “806.213[That] (t)he applicant is a Special Need Relative of another person who:

    (a)   is a settled Australian citizen; and

    (b)   is usually resident in Australia; and

    (c)    has nominated the applicant for the grant of a visa.”(emphasis added)

  3. The applicant was nominated by her sister, Mrs Veronica Gonzales.

  4. Before the Tribunal, no issue arose in respect of (a), (b) or (c), above.  The area of contention centred on the definition of “Special Need Relative” in Reg 1.03 of the Migration Regulations, relevantly as follows:

    “special need relative
    in relation to an Australian citizen usually resident in Australia (“Special Need Relative”)…… means a relative who is willing and able to provide substantial and continuing assistance to the citizen ….. if:

    (a)the citizen … has a permanent or long- term need for assistance because of … disability, prolonged illness or other serious circumstances affecting the citizen …; and

    (b)       the assistance cannot reasonably be obtained from:

    (i)        …..

    (ii)       welfare, hospital, nursing or community services in Australia.”

    THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION

  5. The Tribunal referred to the evidence before it as follows:

    “9.       Mrs Gonzales gave evidence that she continues to have panic attacks whenever she is upset about something.  This problem has been ongoing since at least 4 August 1997, when she was seen by a counsellor at IPS Employee Assistance.

    10.Mrs Gonzales’s employer, Yellow Pages, sent her for counselling as her superiors were concerned that she could not continue in their employ if she had the attacks which were plaguing her.

    11.Despite her problems, Mrs Gonzales has held down the same job for 13 years.  Nevertheless, she fears she will not be able to cope if her sister leaves her alone in Australia.

    12.Mrs Gonzales has no relatives in Australia since her husband left.  She returned to the Philippines to be with her family and to…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1217
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Abing v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, Abing, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Tribunal regarding her eligibility for a visa under the Special Needs Relative category. The Tribunal had determined that Abing's assistance to her sister, who suffered from panic attacks, did not meet the criteria for a Special Needs Relative due to the availability of alternative support services in Australia. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had erred in law and failed to observe procedural requirements in making its decision.

The court examined two primary grounds for review: the alleged error of law in defining "Special Needs Relative" and the claimed failure to observe procedural requirements under the Migration Act. Regarding the first ground, the court found that the Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant legal criteria in assessing whether the applicant's assistance was necessary and could not be reasonably obtained from other services. The court held that the Tribunal had reasonably concluded that the applicant's assistance was more akin to companionship and reassurance rather than a permanent or long-term need due to serious circumstances.

On the second ground, the court considered whether the Tribunal had failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision, as required by the Migration Act. The court referenced a recent Full Court decision in Singh, which clarified that the Tribunal is not required to detail every piece of conflicting evidence but must set out its findings on material questions of fact and the basis for those findings. The court concluded that the Tribunal had met its obligations under the Act by providing a fair explanation of why the decision was made.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application, finding no merit in the applicant's grounds for review. The court ordered that the application be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application be dismissed, with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) regarding the applicant's eligibility for a special needs visa under the Migration Act. The applicant, who suffers from panic attacks, relies on her sister's assistance primarily for comfort and reassurance related to these attacks. The Tribunal found that the applicant's sister's involvement was more akin to companionship and comfort, rather than substantial and continuing assistance, and that the applicant's medical needs could be met through existing welfare, hospital, nursing, or community services in Australia. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not meet the criteria for a special needs visa as her sister's assistance did not address a permanent or long-term need due to prolonged illness or serious circumstances, and the assistance could reasonably be obtained from other services in Australia.

The matter came before the Federal Court of Australia for judicial review of the decision made by the RRT. The applicant sought review on the grounds of alleged errors of law and failure to observe procedures as outlined in the Migration Act. The case was heard and determined by the court, which examined the Tribunal's decision in light of the legal standards and procedural requirements set out in the Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal said:“33.The type of assistance she now receives is more in the nature of companionship and comfort or reassurance of a relative. The medical problems that arise as a result of the panic attacks, although they are frightening, may be met as they are at present, by counselling or attention from welfare, hospital, nursing or community services in Australia.”CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW Several grounds for review are sought to be relied on. It will be convenient to consider them in turn.THE FIRST GROUND RELIED ON: ALLEGED ERROR OF LAW [MIGRATION ACT, S 476(1)(e) By s 476(1)(e) it is provided that a decision is judicially reviewable where an error of law is involved. On behalf of the applicant, it is submitted that the Tribunal erred in law by wrongly restricting the definition of “Special Need Relative” so as to exclude a case of the present kind; that is to say, where, although there is no satisfactory professional treatment to prevent attacks, the applicant responds well to her sister’s involvement. I cannot accept the argument that any error of law was involved. Clearly, an exercise of judgment on the facts was called for. But, in my opinion, the Tribunal addressed the correct legal question, that is to say, whether the applicant was willing and able to provide substantial and continuing assistance where (a) there was “a permanent or long-term need for (that) assistance because of … prolonged illness or other serious circumstances affecting (the applicant) personally; and (b) that assistance cannot reasonably be obtained from welfare, hospital, nursing or community services in Australia.” In the present circumstances, a conclusion that either, or both, of these conditions had not been satisfied here was, in my opinion, reasonably open on the present facts. Nor, in my view, did the Tribunal err in law, as suggested, by not considering all of the Nominator’s medical complaints, noting that the applicant’s assistance related mainly to the Nominator’s panic attacks.THE SECOND GROUND RELIED ON: ALLEGED FAILURE TO OBSERVE PROCEDURES [MIGRATION ACT: S 368] By s 368 it is provided that the Tribunal must give reasons, and must refer to the evidence or other material on which its findings of fact were based. On behalf of the applicant, reference is made to the Tribunal’s description of the present situation as “more in the nature of companionship and comfort or reassurance of a relative”. It is said that, in breach of s 368, no reasons for this finding were given, and no reference made to the evidence or other material to base that finding. The meaning and operation of s 430 of the Act (the substantial equivalent of s 368) were considered by a recent Full Court in Singh [2000] FCA 845. The majority there decided:·a failure to comply with s 430(1) is a failure to observe procedures required by the Act to be observed in connection with the making of a decision and therefore constitutes a ground of review under s 476(1)(a): see [43];·s 430(1) does not impose any obligation on the RRT to prepare a statement disclosing a satisfactory process of reasoning leading to the decision it reached, although the RRT is obliged to set out its findings on any material questions of fact: see [44] and [47];·there is no specific requirement in s 430(1) for the RRT to give reasons for rejecting, or attaching no weight to, evidence or other material which would tend to undermine any finding it made, although if one of the reasons which actually induced the RRT to come to its decision was that it decided to reject or place no weight on particular material, then s 430(1)(b) would require disclosure of that element of the RRT’s actual reasoning process: see [46];·the RRT is under a duty to make, and to set out, findings on all matters of fact that are objectively material to the decision it is required to make. Consequently, it must make findings on questions of fact “that are central to the case raised by the material and evidence before it” or upon which the “decision, one way or the other, turns”, having regard to the process of reasoning the RRT has employed as the basis for its decision: see [48], [56] and [57];·a requirement to set out findings on material questions of fact, and refer to the material on which the findings are based, is not to be translated into a requirement that all pieces of conflicting evidence relating to a material fact must be dealt with: see [56]. Accordingly, a failure to comply with s 430 is not made out by reason only of the failure on the part of the RRT to explain why it had not accepted and acted upon material which was contrary to the findings which it had made on an issue: see [56] and [64];·fundamentally, on a fair reading, the reasons of the RRT need to reveal to the parties why the decision went the way it did: see [62].” (See Najarian [2000] FCA 933 at para 130).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Nor, in my view, did the Tribunal err in law, as suggested, by not considering all of the Nominator’s medical complaints, noting that the applicant’s assistance related mainly to the Nominator’s panic attacks.THE SECOND GROUND RELIED ON: ALLEGED FAILURE TO OBSERVE PROCEDURES [MIGRATION ACT: S 368] By s 368 it is provided that the Tribunal must give reasons, and must refer to the evidence or other material on which its findings of fact were based. On behalf of the applicant, reference is made to the Tribunal’s description of the present situation as “more in the nature of companionship and comfort or reassurance of a relative”. It is said that, in breach of s 368, no reasons for this finding were given, and no reference made to the evidence or other material to base that finding. The meaning and operation of s 430 of the Act (the substantial equivalent of s 368) were considered by a recent Full Court in Singh [2000] FCA 845. The majority there decided:·a failure to comply with s 430(1) is a failure to observe procedures required by the Act to be observed in connection with the making of a decision and therefore constitutes a ground of review under s 476(1)(a): see [43];·s 430(1) does not impose any obligation on the RRT to prepare a statement disclosing a satisfactory process of reasoning leading to the decision it reached, although the RRT is obliged to set out its findings on any material questions of fact: see [44] and [47];·there is no specific requirement in s 430(1) for the RRT to give reasons for rejecting, or attaching no weight to, evidence or other material which would tend to undermine any finding it made, although if one of the reasons which actually induced the RRT to come to its decision was that it decided to reject or place no weight on particular material, then s 430(1)(b) would require disclosure of that element of the RRT’s actual reasoning process: see [46];·the RRT is under a duty to make, and to set out, findings on all matters of fact that are objectively material to the decision it is required to make. Consequently, it must make findings on questions of fact “that are central to the case raised by the material and evidence before it” or upon which the “decision, one way or the other, turns”, having regard to the process of reasoning the RRT has employed as the basis for its decision: see [48], [56] and [57];·a requirement to set out findings on material questions of fact, and refer to the material on which the findings are based, is not to be translated into a requirement that all pieces of conflicting evidence relating to a material fact must be dealt with: see [56]. Accordingly, a failure to comply with s 430 is not made out by reason only of the failure on the part of the RRT to explain why it had not accepted and acted upon material which was contrary to the findings which it had made on an issue: see [56] and [64];·fundamentally, on a fair reading, the reasons of the RRT need to reveal to the parties why the decision went the way it did: see [62].” (See Najarian [2000] FCA 933 at para 130).