Abidin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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Abidin v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 54

Abidin v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 236

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The Federal Court adopted a new medium neutral citation (FCAFC) for Full Court judgments effective from 1 January 2002.  Single Judge judgments will not be affected and will retain the FCA medium neutral citation.

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Abidin v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2002] FCA 236

MIGRATION – lodgment of application for review – constructive lodgment – whether application “lodged” where applicant had done all that he was able to do – where applicant in detention and entirely dependent upon the executive for communication with the Court – validity of ss 478(1) and 478(2) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 478(1), 478(2)
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15A
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Nirmalan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 672
Hong Ye v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 82 FCR 468
Kucuk v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 535
Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297
Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
Francis v City of Ringwood (1978) 54 LGRA 323
Angus Fryer Armour Australia Pty Ltd v Corrective Customs(NSW) (1988) 19 FCR 477
Talbot v NRMA Holdings Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 590
Ghomrawi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 724
Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1
Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173
Hocine v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 99 FCR 269
Oguzhan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 99 FCR 285
Ayub v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 181 ALR 522
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1
Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501

Rahman v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 83

JOYNAL ABIDIN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
W 326 OF 2001

BRANSON, NORTH and GYLES JJ
SYDNEY (HEARD IN PERTH)
14 MARCH 2002


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 326 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

JOYNAL ABIDIN
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCAFC 54
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Abidin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved a detainee, Abidin, challenging the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs over the non-acceptance of his application for judicial review. The case was heard by the court, which had to determine the legal issues regarding the interpretation and application of the relevant statutory provisions, particularly in relation to the definition of "lodged" as it pertains to the timely submission of an application to the Federal Court. Abidin argued that his actions in placing the application in the designated box constituted a constructive lodging, and that the statute should be interpreted liberally to avoid unjust outcomes.

The court had to decide whether Abidin's act of placing the application in the box was sufficient to be considered "lodged" within the meaning of the statute, and whether the statutory provisions were valid in their application to detainees. The court considered the arguments that the term "lodged" should be interpreted in a manner that takes into account the practical difficulties faced by detainees in submitting applications, and whether the statutory provisions were consistent with the legislative powers of the Commonwealth under the Constitution. The court also examined whether section 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) could be used to alter the meaning of "lodged" in section 478(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in specific circumstances.

The court concluded that the act of placing an application in the box did not satisfy the statutory requirement of "lodged" as it did not involve receipt by the Registry of the Federal Court. The court found that the statutory provisions were consistent with the legislative powers of the Commonwealth and rejected the argument that section 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act could be used to alter the meaning of "lodged" in a specific context. The court held that the appeal was without merit.

The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the costs of the respondent. This decision underscores the importance of strict adherence to statutory requirements in the context of judicial review applications and the limited scope for judicial intervention in the interpretation of such provisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.

Decision

Reasons for decision

His Honour accepted that no facilities existed at the Port Hedland Detention Centre for a detainee to directly fax documents or otherwise have documents delivered to the Federal Court. Three boxes were provided, marked respectively “DIMA”, “ACN” and “Complaints”. If a detainee wished to have documents sent by mail or fax to the Court, he or she could leave it in the DIMA box. In the ordinary course of events, that box would be cleared once each day during the week, and the usual practice was to dispatch any application to the Federal Court on the same day that it was received by the DIMA officer. No records were kept of the date when a particular document was placed in the box by a detainee. His Honour accepted that the appellant put the completed application in a yellowish envelope addressed to the Federal Court and put the envelope in the box marked “DIMA” at about 11am on 30 November 2000. Decision below The appellant’s principal case did not directly challenge the considerable line of authority, including the decision of the Full Court in Nirmalan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 672, which establishes that the Court has no jurisdiction to extend time, irrespective of the merits of the application for extension in circumstances such as the present, but sought to outflank it by concentrating on the issue of lodgment. Contrary to the case of the appellant, it was held by the primary judge that the application had not been lodged with the Registry of the Federal Court within twenty eight days of the applicant being notified of the decision, as required by s 478(1)(b), applying the decision in Hong Ye v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 82 FCR 468 (“Hong Ye”), particularly at 471. Reference was also made to Kucuk v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 535. It was also argued that if s 478(1)(b) was to be construed as his Honour construed it then it was invalid. This argument was also rejected by reference to an existing line of authority. This point is not pursued as such on appeal, but the substance of it is used in relation to construction. As the arguments presented below are repeated on appeal (with an additional argument), it is convenient to deal with those arguments as we deal with the merits of the appeal.ordinary construction of section 478(1)(b) It is submitted for the appellant that he “lodged” his application when he had done all that he was able to do to achieve substantial compliance with the stipulated requirements within the relevant period or, to put it another way, his action in putting the application in the DIMA box on 30 November 2000 should be deemed to be a constructive lodging of his application with the Registry of the Federal Court. It is submitted that Parliament should be taken to have understood that s 478(1)(b) would operate in circumstances where some applicants are likely to be in detention, without direct access to a Registry of the Federal Court and, so, reliant upon officers of the executive government to effect dispatch and that the provision should be construed in a liberal fashion, consonant with commonsense and justice, given that the issues of the liberty and personal safety of applicants may depend on a favourable review of a decision. It was submitted that, at least where the appropriate steps available to the individual in detention are taken, it should be held that the document has been lodged, to avoid an unfair and arbitrary conclusion. Counsel referred to Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297, per Gibbs CJ at 305; Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 at 436-437; and Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, at 390-391. In support of the argument for liberal interpretation, it was put that the words are “lodged with” and not “lodged at”. The latter would imply physical receipt of the application at the relevant site. The former is capable of a rational construction which would have regard to the relevant act of an applicant rather than the occasion of receipt.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is correct that the precise point at issue here did not arise for decision in Hong Ye. Indeed, that decision was very favourable to applicants in construing “lodged” as a sui generis concept, different from the filing of an application to commence proceedings. Nonetheless, the substratum of that decision was that lodgment involved at least receipt at the Registry and this was in accord both with the authorities referred to in Hong Ye and with the numerous later decisions of single judges to which the respondent referred. effect of constitutional considerations upon the construction of s 478(1)(b) As we have noted, it was argued at first instance that s 478(1)(b), construed as it was, was invalid. That argument was rejected and there is no appeal against that rejection. However, the appellant seeks to argue that if the question as to whether an application has been “lodged” within the meaning of s 478(1)(b) depends on actions by officers of the executive government, the provision takes on a meaning which would be in excess of the legislative power of the Commonwealth under the Commonwealth Constitution and should be read down by virtue of s 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) which provides:“Construction of Acts to be subject to Constitution15A Every Act shall be read and construed subject to the Constitution, and so as not to exceed the legislative power of the Commonwealth, to the intent that where any enactment thereof would, but for this section, have been construed as being in excess of that power, it shall nevertheless be a valid enactment to the extent to which it is not in excess of that power.” Counsel for the appellant developed various arguments the end point of which was that if s 478(1)(b) is not read down so as to be capable of sufficient compliance when a detainee has done all that he or she can do, then it is invalid and s 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act should be invoked to lead to the construction favoured by the appellant. Counsel for the respondent both contests the arguments for constitutional invalidity and submits that, in any event, s 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act would not have the result contended for by the appellant. It should be noted that no argument that the appellant should be estopped from relying upon the submissions as to invalidity by reason of the judgment below on that point was addressed. It is convenient to deal with the argument as to the effect of s 15A first, since if the submission for the respondent is correct, the constitutional arguments arising under this heading are ultimately irrelevant. Counsel for the respondent submits that, even if the constitutional argument is correct, s 15A would provide no basis for reading “lodged” in s 478(1)(b) in any special way. Counsel for the appellant has limited his argument to invalidity in relation to those who are in detention and who are entirely dependent upon the executive for communication to the Court. This was inevitable, because of the lack of any semblance of a constitutional argument in relation to the myriad of situations where persons miss deadlines for all manner of reasons. Counsel for the appellant has not cited any authority for the proposition that s 15A can be utilised to read one word in a statutory provision differently according to the different factual situations to which it may relate. In our opinion, that proposition is unsound. Counsel for the respondent then submits that there can be no editing of s 478(1)(b) to remove those parts of it which are said to be beyond power. Counsel for the appellant did not suggest how this could be done. The submission for the respondent is plainly correct.