Abdoo and Abdoo
[2011] FamCAFC 234
•14 December 2011
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ABDOO & ABDOO | [2011] FamCAFC 234 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PROPERTY SETTLEMENT – where the husband appealed against the Federal Magistrate’s order that the proceeds of sale from one of the properties owned by the parties be divided $238,000 to the wife and the balance to the husband – where the Federal Magistrate preferred the evidence of the wife and eldest daughter over the evidence of the husband and his current wife as to the identification and value of the parties’ assets – where the Federal Magistrate found that the husband had failed to make full and frank disclosure of his assets – where the husband sought on appeal an order that the proceeds of sale be divided with the husband to receive $238,000 and the wife to receive the remaining balance – where the husband was unable to persuade the Court that the Federal Magistrate erred in his findings – appeal dismissed. FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – APPLICATION TO ADDUCE FURTHER EVIDENCE – where it was not apparent on the face of all the documents in respect of which leave was sought what relevance they had to the appeal or the issues in dispute before the Federal Magistrate – where the Court considered very few if any of the documents would be admissible as evidence and was not persuaded that the documents would render erroneous the decision of the Federal Magistrate – application dismissed. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 93A(2) |
| CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 Mims & Green and Green (2008) FLC 93-359 State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) and Others (1999) 160 ALR 588 Weir and Weir (1993) FLC 92-338 |
| APPELLANT: | Mr Abdoo |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Abdoo |
| FILE NUMBER: | MLC | 4987 | of | 2007 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | SA | 86 | of | 2010 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 14 December 2011 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Adelaide |
| PLACE HEARD: | Melbourne |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Strickland J |
| HEARING DATE: | 28 April 2011 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Federal Magistrates Court |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 13 October 2010 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2010] FMCAfam 1117 |
REPRESENTATION
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPELLANT: | In person |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | In person |
Orders
The Application in a Case filed by the husband on 28 March 2011 be dismissed.
The appeal be dismissed.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Abdoo v Abdoo is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| IN THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
Appeal Number: SA 86 of 2010
File Number: MLC 4987 of 2007
| Mr Abdoo |
Appellant
And
| Ms Abdoo |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an appeal by Mr Abdoo (“the husband’) against property settlement orders made by Federal Magistrate Roberts on 13 October 2010 in proceedings between the husband and Ms Abdoo (“the wife”).
In summary, the Federal Magistrate ordered that the wife receive the sum of $238,000 from the proceeds of sale of the parties’ property in Melbourne suburb and the husband receive the balance. Apart from this each party was to retain any other property they had.
This appeal is being determined by me as a single judge, following a direction by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 94AAA(3) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
In effect the husband seeks that the orders of the Federal Magistrate be set aside and in lieu thereof orders be made that the balance of the proceeds from the sale of the parties’ property in Melbourne be divided with the sum of $238,000 to the husband and the remainder to the wife.
The wife opposes the appeal.
The husband appeared without legal representation. Despite the assistance of an interpreter it became readily apparent that the husband did not appreciate the nature of an appeal or what was required of him. I spent substantial time both at the hearing of the appeal and at the directions hearings in the lead up to the appeal attempting to explain these matters to him.
Background
The parties have been married to and divorced from each other twice.
The parties have three children, respectively born in 1984, 1986 and 1989.
At the time of the hearing before the Federal Magistrate the husband was 54 years old and the wife was 44 years old.
The wife arrived in Australia from Turkey at the age of 8 years in 1974 and at the age of 15 years the wife’s father took her back to Turkey for the purpose of an arranged marriage with the husband. The parties married and remained in Turkey to complete migration formalities and arrived in Australia in July 1982.
Upon arriving in Australia the wife worked in a shop and the husband, after initially being unemployed for several months, worked in a relatively unskilled capacity on a production line. The wife later obtained employment with the same employer.
In or about 1984 the parties purchased a property referred to as “the 3rd floor apartment” in Turkey using their savings and the proceeds of the sale of the wife’s gold dowry. That property was unencumbered and registered only in the husband’s name.
In 1986 the parties purchased the property in Melbourne (“the Melbourne property”) for $68,500. The deposit was paid using $25,000 compensation the wife had received as the result of a workplace accident.
Between 1987 and 1989 the parties separated, then reconciled for a short period of time and then separated again.
The parties were divorced for the first time in 1990, after which the wife and the three children continued to live at the Melbourne property.
In or about 1993 the husband and the wife reconciled again and resumed living together in the Melbourne property.
In 1994 the husband suffered a serious workplace injury and the wife looked after him as well as the children. During this time the family income consisted mainly of WorkCover payments.
In 1996 the parties remarried and rented a property in north eastern Victoria. The Melbourne property was rented out.
In 1999 the husband received compensation of $437,032 for his workplace injury.
Shortly thereafter the family moved to Turkey again. While in Turkey the husband purchased a number of properties including those referred to as “the 13th floor apartment”, “the 10th floor apartment” and “the vineyard”.
In 2002 the parties separated again and the wife went to live with her parents before returning to Australia in 2003 without the children.
In 2004 the parties were divorced for the second time in Turkey. The Turkish Court awarded the husband custody of the children, however, all three children have since returned to Australia, with the youngest returning to live with the wife in 2006.
On 9 July 2007 the wife filed her application seeking property settlement orders. The husband ultimately filed a response on 21 May 2009.
By agreement, on 16 July 2009, the Melbourne property was sold and the net sale proceeds were $263,811.21.
The trial was heard by Federal Magistrate Roberts on 15, 16 March and 7 and 8 July 2010. His Honour made orders and delivered his reasons for judgment on 13 October 2010.
On 30 November 2010 the husband filed a Notice of Appeal.
On 28 March 2011 the husband filed an application for leave to adduce further evidence.
Reasons for judgment of the Federal Magistrate
The Federal Magistrate commenced his reasons for judgment by outlining the orders sought by the wife in her application filed 9 July 2007 and the orders sought by the husband in his response filed 21 May 2009. His Honour summarised that at the conclusion of the hearing on 8 July 2010, counsel for the wife had submitted that all remaining proceeds from the sale of the Melbourne property should be awarded to the wife, and counsel for the husband had submitted that the asset pool should be divided 75 per cent/ 25 per cent in favour of the husband.
His Honour firstly noted that the wife’s application filed on 9 July 2007 sought leave to proceed under s 44(3) of the Act. As this issue had not really been in dispute at the trial, his Honour found that the husband had consented to leave being granted.
After setting out the approach to be taken in s 79 proceedings, the Federal Magistrate summarised case authorities on the obligations of parties to make full and frank disclosure of all financial matters. His Honour did not believe that the husband had made full and frank disclosure, and indeed formed the conclusion that “he was deliberately trying to avoid such disclosure”.
As the parties had disagreed on many aspects of the matter, the Federal Magistrate went on to record his assessment of the witnesses. His Honour detailed a number of inconsistencies he found in the evidence of the husband and his current wife, concluding that they were “tailoring their evidence in a combined attempt to deprive the wife of her entitlement to a just and equitable property settlement”. His Honour thus preferred the evidence of the wife and the parties’ eldest child over the evidence of the husband and his current wife.
After setting out the background of the parties, as outlined above, his Honour recorded that both parties wanted to add back to the asset pool assets that may no longer be in existence, specifically $30,619 paid to the wife in accordance with previous Court orders (although the wife only received $12,500 of this amount and $5,619 was paid for a valuation of the 13th floor apartment in Turkey) and the value of the 13th floor apartment which had been transferred to the husband’s current wife.
The Federal Magistrate then considered in detail each of the properties potentially constituting the parties’ notional asset pool. His Honour firstly detailed the interest added to and the distributions made from the proceeds of sale of the Melbourne property. Both counsel agreed that the distribution of $2,200 paid as a brief fee for the wife should be added back to the pool, however, the Federal Magistrate declined to add back the $12,500 paid to the wife and the $5,619.12 paid for the valuation of the 13th floor apartment.
His Honour determined that, as a direct result of the husband’s failure to make full and frank disclosure of his assets, the wife used the $12,500 to travel to Turkey to ascertain the existence and value of assets there. The Federal Magistrate also determined that the husband’s statement that he had sold the 13th floor apartment was dishonest and therefore a proper valuation had to be carried out using the parties’ joint funds. He fixed the notional total of the remaining proceeds for the Melbourne property at $254,969.32 (rounded to $255,000).
In relation to the 13th floor apartment, his Honour accepted that the property had been purchased before the parties finally separated and that the husband and his current wife had arranged to transfer it to the current wife in late 2008 so as to remove it from the asset pool. Considering the valuation report and the evidence of the wife and the parties’ eldest child, his Honour held that the 13th floor apartment should be included in the notional asset pool at a value of $150,000.
In relation to the 3rd floor apartment, his Honour did not accept the husband’s claim that it was sold to an unidentified person for 11,500 Turkish lira in 2005, and determined that it should be included in the notional asset pool at a value of $50,000.
In relation to the 10th floor apartment, his Honour again considered the evidence of the wife and the parties’ eldest child and was satisfied that despite his denials the husband had an entitlement to have the property registered upon its completion. On the limited evidence available, his Honour considered the value of the property to be at least $50,000 and thus included it at $50,000 in the notional asset pool.
Lastly in relation to the vineyard, his Honour was satisfied that the husband had an interest in that property. However, as a direct result of the husband’s failure to make full and frank disclosure of his interest and the more unusual nature of the property, his Honour was unable to attribute a value to the vineyard and therefore it was not included in the notional asset pool. Instead his Honour said that he would take it into account as a factor under s 75(2).
Therefore the Federal Magistrate determined the total value of the notional asset pool to be $505,000.
Turning to contributions, his Honour noted that the husband tried to substantially minimise the contributions of the wife but in doing so contradicted the evidence he had previously given. The Federal Magistrate accepted that the husband worked in paid employment for a significant period between 1982 and 1994 and that the wife worked in paid employment for a significant period before and after their eldest child was born. His Honour also accepted the wife’s evidence that after the husband’s workplace injury she made and sold Turkish delicacies to restaurants to supplement the household income.
The Federal Magistrate determined that the wife was the primary carer of the children between 1986 and 2002 and during that time was the sole carer from the end of 1988 until the parties reconciled in 1993. The husband was the sole carer of one or more of the children in Turkey between 2002 and when the youngest child returned to the wife in 2006. His Honour found that the husband did little after his workplace injury because he was “significantly incapacitated” and during that time the wife’s contributions to the welfare of the family were more arduous as a result of caring for the husband. The wife also assisted the husband in various ways with his WorkCover claim and
his Honour determined that in doing so the wife probably assisted the husband to acquire and possibly improve the quantum of compensation awarded.
The Federal Magistrate concluded that the husband made significantly greater direct financial contributions than the wife, but that the wife’s contributions to the welfare of the family as homemaker and parent were considerably greater than the husband. His Honour therefore assessed the relative weight of the parties’ contributions during their relationship and post-separation as being
60 per cent in favour of the husband and 40 per cent in favour of the wife.
Turning to the relevant s 75(2) factors, his Honour noted that neither party was employed, both parties had medical conditions preventing them from seeking paid employment and both were recipients of disability support pensions from Centrelink. Evidence presented by the wife suggested that the husband may have been receiving a Turkish pension but his Honour was not satisfied to the requisite standard that the husband had committed social security fraud.
In relation to the husband and his current wife, the Federal Magistrate noted the current wife’s evidence that she was pregnant with their second child but would consider returning to work and letting the husband look after the children.
His Honour also found that the 13th floor apartment was being rented out, although no rental income had been declared to the Court. Lastly his Honour took account of the husband’s interest in the vineyard. As there was very little information in relation to the vineyard his Honour was unable to quantify the value of the interest, but concluded that at the very least the husband could sell his interest and receive some payment.
Ultimately, the Federal Magistrate determined there should be 7.5 per cent adjustment in favour of the wife and therefore the division of the notional asset pool should be 52.5 per cent to the husband and 47.5 per cent to the wife.
His Honour concluded the wife should therefore receive a rounded figure of $238,000 from the remaining proceeds of the sale of the Melbourne property and that the husband should receive the remaining balance inclusive of any interest accrued since 3 July 2010.
Orders made on 13 October 2010
The Federal Magistrate made the following orders on 13 October 2011:
(1)That pursuant to sub-section 44(3) of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”) [MS ABDOO] (“the wife”) is granted leave to institute proceedings for alteration of property interests as between herself and [MR ABDOO] (“the husband”) pursuant Part VIII of the Act.
(2)That the balance proceeds from the sale of the parties’ property at
[Melbourne] in Victoria inclusive of interest (“the balance proceeds”) be divided as follows:(a)sum of $238,000 to the wife; and
(b)the entirety of the remaining balance to the husband.
(3)That the wife’s solicitors are hereby authorised to distribute the balance proceeds in accordance with Order No. 2 hereof.
(4)That other than as is specifically provided for in these Orders the husband and the wife are each solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all other property and chattels in the possession of each of the parties as at the date of these Orders.
The husband appeals only against order (2).
Grounds of appeal
The husband’s Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 30 November 2010 contains the following grounds of appeal:
1.That the Applicant did not purchase an entitlement to a 10th floor apartment and the estimated value given to this apartment of $50,000.00 should not be included in the notional asset pool.
2.That the Applicant does not own or have an interest in vineyard and the vineyard mentioned should not be considered as a factor taken into account under sub-section 75(2) of the Act.
3.That the Respondent wife did not work in paid employment for significant periods before and after their eldest child was born.
4.That for the past 10 years, the rent from [the Melbourne property] has been received by the Respondent wife in which she has used for her sole use and benefit.
5.That the Applicant sold the 13th floor apartment to his current wife for the value of TRY104,000.00. The valuation report is based on a market value in 2010. This value should not be accepted and the consideration value given should be applied.
I observe that the husband’s written summary of argument in support of the appeal was completely inadequate, and although he tried his best during the hearing he was not able to make any relevant or sensible submissions in support of the grounds of appeal.
The husband’s application in an appeal
On 28 March 2011 the husband filed an application seeking that he be granted leave to adduce further evidence. That further evidence is annexed to an affidavit also filed by the husband on 28 March 2011.
Section 93A(2) of the Act provides that in an appeal the Full Court can, in its discretion, receive further evidence upon questions of fact. In CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172, the High Court discussed the circumstances in which an appellate court may exercise its discretion to admit further evidence. McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ said:
109.One consideration in construing s 93A(2) is its remedial nature. Its principal purpose is to give to the Full Court a discretionary power to admit further evidence where that evidence, if accepted, would demonstrate that the order under appeal is erroneous. The power exists to facilitate the avoidance of errors which cannot be otherwise remedied by the application of the conventional appellate procedures. A further, but in practice subsidiary, purpose is to give the Full Court a discretion to admit further evidence to buttress the findings already made.
Their Honours then said:
111.…Nor can the availability of further evidence relevant to the issues in the appeal be treated as equivalent to a ground of appeal, proof of which prima facie entitles the appellant to a new trial. The power to admit the further evidence exists to serve the demands of justice. Ordinarily, where it is alleged that the admission of new evidence requires a new trial, justice will not be served unless the Full Court is satisfied that the further evidence would have produced a different result if it had been available at the trial. Without that condition being satisfied, it could seldom, if ever, be in the interests of justice to deprive the respondent of the benefit of the orders made by the trial judge and put that person to the expense, inconvenience and worry of a new trial.
And finally their Honours said:
116.The failure to have adduced the evidence before the primary judge will be a variable factor, the weight of which will depend upon all the other factors pertinent to the case. Where the evidence has been deliberately withheld, the failure to call it will ordinarily weigh heavily in the exercise of the discretion. In other cases, the failure to call the evidence even if it could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence may be of little significance. No invariable rule concerning the failure to call the evidence can or should be laid down in view of the wide discretion conferred on the court by the section.
The wife opposes the application.
As to the further evidence the annexures to the affidavit comprise the following:
Document 1 – A translation from Turkish to English of a commentary by the husband on the paragraphs of the Federal Magistrate’s reasons for judgment with which he disagrees.
Document 2 – A translation from Turkish to English of a copy of a share transfer form dated 21 December 2001 between one Mr T and the wife, apparently evidencing the transfer of 50 shares in a company in Turkey to the wife.
Document 3 – A translation from Turkish to English of a birth certificate for Mr T, born in 1968.
Document 4 – Five pages in the Turkish language including photographs of the wife and Mr T.
Document 5 – Nine pages described as being “Owner Income & Expenditure” for the Melbourne property from July 2001 to June 2006 apparently produced by a real estate firm.
Document 6 – Copy letter from a real estate agent to the husband dated
July 2009 providing an estimated rental potential for the Melbourne property of $270 per week gross.
Document 7 – Copy handwritten undated document of three pages addressed to whom it may concern from the husband apparently providing information about the parties.
Document 8 – Copy one page handwritten undated document addressed to whom it may concern apparently written by the parties’ eldest daughter in relation to the husband’s pension.
Document 9 – Copies of Notices of Assessment issued by the Australian Taxation Office to the husband for the years ending 30 June 1991 to 30 June 1996.
Document 10 – A copy document in the Turkish language apparently containing a photograph of the husband’s current wife.
Document 11 – A translation from Turkish to English of a copy of an order apparently made in Turkey in 2004 whereby the husband and the wife were divorced, custody of the two youngest children was granted to the husband, access to them was granted to the wife, the wife was to pay child maintenance to the husband, and the wife was to pay legal costs, charges and fees and out of pocket expenses. I observe that this document was before the Federal Magistrate, annexed to the husband’s affidavit filed on 22 October 2009.
Document 12 – A translation from Turkish to English of an undated copy of a valuation report apparently provided by an estate agent in Turkey in relation to a property there.
Document 13 – A one page document in the Turkish language.
It was not apparent on the face of all of the documents annexed to the husband’s affidavit what relevance they had to the appeal or to the issues in dispute before the Federal Magistrate. The husband did attempt to explain the basis on which he was presenting these documents but save and except in respect of one or two of the documents that attempt was unsuccessful.
In any event, there are two significant hurdles that the husband has failed to overcome in having this further evidence received. Firstly, it is readily apparent that very few if any of the documents annexed to the husband’s affidavit would be admissible in evidence. This then highlights the High Court’s use of the expression “if accepted” in paragraph 109 of the decision in CDJ & VAJ. Secondly, even if, notwithstanding their inadmissibility the documents were accepted, I am not persuaded that so doing would render erroneous the decision of the Federal Magistrate. This also must be viewed in the context of his Honour’s finding that the husband failed to provide full and frank disclosure of his financial circumstances, and I make that comment in light of the fact that some of the documents sought to be presented were clearly available to the husband at the time of the hearing.
The further evidence sought to be adduced by the husband does not meet the conditions for admission, and the application filed by the husband must be dismissed.
I note that the husband filed a further brief affidavit on 11 April 2011 which appears to be another attempt by the husband to put further evidence before the Court. There he refers to documents which he says that he has and which the “solicitor did not put in”, but he does not annex those documents to the affidavit. There is no question that this affidavit also fails to satisfy the conditions for acceptance of the further evidence, and I refuse to receive it.
Discussion
Ground 1
Given his Honour’s finding as to the lack of credit of the husband and his failure to provide full and frank disclosure, it was open to the Federal Magistrate to make the finding that the husband purchased an entitlement to the 10th floor apartment and to attribute a value of $50,000 to that interest. As was said by the Full Court in Weir and Weir (1993) FLC 92-338, at 79-593:
It seems to us that once it has been established that there has been a deliberate non-disclosure … then the Court should not be unduly cautious about making findings in favour of the innocent party. To do otherwise might be thought to provide a charter for fraud in proceedings of this nature.
His Honour’s finding was based on the evidence of the wife and the eldest daughter of the parties coupled with the lack of any credible evidence by the husband. His Honour found that he had absolutely no hesitation in preferring the evidence of the wife and the eldest child over the evidence of the husband and his current wife.
There is of course a presumption that a decision of a trial judge is correct, and the onus is on the appellant to demonstrate that the trial judge made an error. This is always a difficult task where the challenge is to a trial judge’s findings on credit, because a trial judge enjoys advantages that I lack. In Mims & Green and Green (2008) FLC 93-359 the Full Court there referred to the
High Court decision in Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167 at 178 where McHugh J (with whom Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ concurred) referred to “the power of the Court of Appeal” and to the judgment of Lord Sumner in SS Hontestroom v SS Sagaporack [1927] AC 37 at 47:
…not to have seen the witnesses puts appellate judges in a permanent position of disadvantage as against the trial judge, and, unless it can be shown that he has failed to use or has palpably misused his advantage, the higher Court ought not to take the responsibility of reversing conclusions so arrived at, merely on the result of their own comparisons and criticisms of the witnesses and of their own view of the probabilities of the case. The course of the trial and the whole substance of the judgment must be looked at, and the matter does not depend on the question whether a witness has been cross-examined to credit or has been pronounced by the judge in terms to be unworthy of it. If his estimate of the man forms any substantial part of his reasons for his judgment the trial judge’s conclusions of fact should, as I understand the decisions, be let alone.
In State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) and Others (1999) 160 ALR 588, having extensively reviewed the history of “Appellate review of facts”, and the “Emphasis on the duty of appellate review and its constraints”, Kirby J explained “the trial judge’s real advantages”. In the course of his judgment his Honour said at 619:
90.The true advantages in fact-finding which the trial judge enjoys include the fact that the judge hears the evidence in its entirety whereas the appellate court is typically taken to selected passages, chosen by the parties so as to advance their respective arguments. The trial judge hears and sees all of the evidence. The evidence is generally presented in a reasonably logical context. It unfolds, usually with a measure of chronological order, as it is given in testimony or tendered in documentary or electronic form. During the trial and adjournments, the judge has the opportunity to reflect on the evidence and to weigh particular elements against the rest of the evidence while the latter is still fresh in mind. A busy appellate court may not have the time or opportunity to read the entire transcript and all of the exhibits. As it seems to me, these are real reasons for caution on the part of an appellate court where it inclines to conclusions on factual matters different from those reached by the trial judge. These considerations acquire added force where, as in the present case, the trial was a very long one, the exhibits are most numerous, the issues are multiple and the oral and written submissions were detailed and protracted. In such cases, the reasons given by the trial judge, however conscientious he or she may be, may omit attention to peripheral issues. They are designed to explain conclusions to which the judge was driven by the overall impressions and considerations, some of which may, quite properly, not be expressly specified. (Footnotes omitted)
Here, the husband has not taken the Court to anything which persuades me that his Honour erred in these findings. Thus there is no merit in this complaint.
Grounds 2 and 3
For the same reasons as I have expressed in relation to Ground 1, this complaint also lacks merit, and nothing further need be said.
Ground 4
The husband has failed to identify what error it is that he says the Federal Magistrate has made here. He has also not pointed to where in the evidence or the submissions before his Honour this issue was raised. In short, the husband has not persuaded the Court that even if the allegation that he makes in this ground is correct, the trial judge has erred in any way in relation to it in making the orders that he did. Accordingly this ground must also fail.
Ground 5
While his Honour accepted that the 13th floor apartment was transferred by the husband to his current wife, he found that there was no proper consideration, and in any event they arranged this “solely in order to remove it from the asset pool for the purpose of these proceedings”.
In these circumstances it was open to the trial judge to notionally add this property back to the asset pool and fix a realistic value for it. In that regard
his Honour accepted the evidence of the registered valuer who valued the property from the outside, given he was unable to gain entry.
Thus, and also for the same reasons as I expressed when considering Ground 1, there is no merit in this complaint.
Conclusion
Given that there is no merit in any of the grounds of appeal the appeal must be dismissed.
I also observe that this was a wholly unmeritorious appeal, and a waste of this Court’s valuable time. It is therefore fortunate for the husband that the wife was without legal representation and thus sought no order for costs.
I certify that the preceding sixty-eight (68) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Strickland delivered on 14 December 2011.
Associate:
Date: 14 December 2011
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