FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ABC15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1314
Citation: ABC15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1314 Appeal from: ABC15 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2015] FCCA 1340 Parties: ABC15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 563 of 2015 Judge: ROBERTSON J Date of judgment: 24 November 2015 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from judgment of Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review, for jurisdictional error, of decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 198, 336E, 424A, 425
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)Cases cited: SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 125 Date of hearing: 24 November 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 32 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms J Davidson Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 563 of 2015
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: ABC15
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 NOVEMBER 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the second respondent be amended to: “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.
2.The appeal be dismissed, with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 563 of 2015
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: ABC15
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE:
24 NOVEMBER 2015
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This appeal is brought from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 6 May 2015 that the application to that Court be dismissed, with costs. The Federal Circuit Court had before it an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) on 9 February 2015 affirming the decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection on 8 January 2015 not to grant to the then applicants, including the present appellant, protection visas under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Before the Tribunal, the then second and third applicants, the first applicant’s son and his son’s wife, did not make any claims in their own right.
The then second and third applicants were not parties to the judicial review application to the Federal Circuit Court and neither are they parties to the present appeal. I shall refer to the first applicant before the Tribunal as the appellant.
The Tribunal set…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1314
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Refugee Review Tribunal had made a jurisdictional error in the assessment of the appellant's visa application. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider certain factors, including the impact of the data breach and his difficulties in calculating a debt. The Minister, on the other hand, contended that the Tribunal had properly considered these issues and that the appeal was a disguised attack on the merits of the Tribunal's decision.
The court held that the appellant's arguments were challenges to the merits of the Tribunal's decision, rather than jurisdictional errors. The court found that the Tribunal had considered the impact of the data breach and the appellant's difficulties in calculating the debt, and there was no basis for the contention that the Tribunal's decision was illogical, arbitrary, or irrational. The court further found that the appellant's claim that he should have been given extra time to provide written submissions and evidence was not supported by the evidence and was also a challenge to the merits of the Tribunal's decision. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the name of the second respondent be amended to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, with costs.
The court's decision confirms that challenges to the merits of an administrative decision are not grounds for a successful appeal on the basis of jurisdictional error. The court found that the Tribunal had properly considered the issues raised by the appellant and that the appeal was essentially an attack on the merits of the Tribunal's decision, which is not a valid ground for appeal. The court's decision also highlights the importance of providing medical evidence to support claims of incapacity or difficulty in providing evidence or submissions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the second respondent be amended to: “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.
2. The appeal be dismissed, with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted that the decision in SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 125 at [121] was distinguishable as here the Tribunal, rather than the Department, was the relevant decision-maker. To the extent that the appellant claimed to have been entitled to some other process, apart from consideration by the Minister’s delegate in the context of the original decision and review of that decision by the Tribunal, to assess the implications of the data breach, the foundation for that entitlement was nowhere articulated, nor was such a claim raised in the Federal Circuit Court. The consequences of the data breach in the appellant’s case were considered both by the delegate in assessing his protection visa application and on review by the Tribunal, including by reference to consequences of the breach that he claimed gave rise to non-refoulement obligations. Consideration Assuming in the appellant’s favour that he may raise these grounds of appeal, my conclusions are as follows. I see no basis for the contention that the Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claims illogically, arbitrarily or irrationally. As to Falun Gong being banned when the appellant started to practice, the Tribunal noted what the appellant had said about that at [25] and [53], the evidence being that Falun Gong was banned in China in 1999, the appellant claimed to have been a follower since 2001 and to have attended Falun Gong lectures three nights a week whilst in China. I find that this ground is no more than a purported challenge to the merits of the Tribunal’s decision. This ground fails. As to the submission that the Tribunal failed to take into account as a relevant consideration the appellant’s difficulties in calculating the amount that he owed as a debt in China, and assuming this to be a relevant consideration in the legal sense, there is nothing to suggest that the Tribunal’s findings were based on any difficulties the appellant may have had with calculating the amount of interest. As the Minister submitted, the Tribunal’s consideration of this claim focused on why the amount of any debt would be the same in 2015 as it was in 2005. The Tribunal also asked the appellant if he had ever repaid any of the alleged debt during his time in Australia and the appellant said no. The appellant did not give then as a reason that he had no contact with the alleged lender while he had been in Australia. This ground seems to me to be a purported challenge to the merits of the Tribunal’s decision. This ground fails. As to the contention that the Tribunal should have given the appellant extra time to provide written submissions and evidence, and again assuming this to be a relevant consideration in the legal sense, this was not a matter raised before the Tribunal, there was no medical evidence that the appellant had had a stroke, and even if there had been such evidence there was nothing to suggest that the appellant’s ability to give evidence had been sufficiently affected by it. I adopt, with respect, the reasons of the primary judge on this point at [26]-[27]. This ground fails.