Abbott v Abbott - [2025] WASC 30

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

CITATION:   ABBOTT -v- ABBOTT [2025] WASC 30
CORAM:   HOWARD J
HEARD:   11, 12, 16 and 18 DECEMBER 2024
DELIVERED          :   6 FEBRUARY 2025
FILE NO/S:   CIV 1567 of 2023
BETWEEN:   NORELLE ANITA ABBOTT
Plaintiff
AND
SHARI LEE ABBOTT as executor of the will of KENNETH CHARLES ABBOTT
First Defendant
SHARI LEE ABBOTT
Second Defendant
LUANA ELISE ABBOTT
Third Defendant
BRYCE DESMOND ABBOTT
Fourth Defendant
MATTHEW DANIEL ABBOTT
Fifth Defendant

Catchwords:

Succession - Wills and Estates - Applications under s 6 of the Family Provision Act 1972 (WA) for further and better provision from the testator's estate by two daughters of the deceased - Mutual Will Agreement between deceased and surviving spouse - Whether the will made adequate provision for the proper maintenance, support, education or advancement in life for the applicants - Application granted in respect of one applicant - Deficiencies in case presented for the other applicant

Legislation:

Family Provision Act 1972 (WA), s 6

Result:

Application granted

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff	:	Mr P G McGowan
First Defendant	:	Mr C Breheny
Second Defendant	:	Mr C Breheny
Third Defendant	:	Mr P G McGowan
Fourth Defendant	:	No appearance
Fifth Defendant	:	No appearance

Solicitors:

Plaintiff	:	Macdonald Rudder
First Defendant	:	Hopgoodganim Lawyers (Perth)
Second Defendant	:	Hopgoodganim Lawyers (Perth)
Third Defendant	:	Haynes Leeuwin
Fourth Defendant	:	In Person
Fifth Defendant	:	In Person

Cases referred to in decision:

AB v FGH [2022] WASC 244
Barns v Barns [2003] HCA 9; (2003) 214 CLR 169
Blendell v Byrne [2019] NSWSC 583
Bondelmonte v Blanckensee [1989] WAR 305
Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 176
Boscolo v Australian Unity Trustees Ltd [2023] WASC 391
Butcher v Craig [2009] WASC 164
Christie v Manera [2006] WASC 287
Crossman v Riedel [2004] ACTSC 127
FGH v NOP [2023] WASCA 177
FGH v NOP [2024] HCASL 95
Grant v Roberts [2019] NSWSC 843
Hawkins v Prestage (1989) 1 WAR 37
Hughes v National Trustees, Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1979] HCA 2; (1979) 143 CLR 134
Kleinig v Neal (No 2) [1981] 2 NSWLR 532
Kohari v Snow [2013] NSWSC 452
Lemon v Mead [2017] WASCA 215; (2017) 53 WAR 76
Lloyd-Williams v Mayfield (2005) 63 NSWLR 1
MacGregor v MacGregor [2003] WASC 169
Marks v Marks [2003] WASCA 297
McCosker v McCosker [1957] HCA 82; (1957) 97 CLR 566
McGeough v Blatchford [2019] WASC 454
McGrath v Eves [2005] NSWSC 1006
Pontifical Society for the Propagation of the Faith v Scales [1962] HCA 19; (1962) 107 CLR 9
Salmon v Osmond [2015] NSWCA 42; (2015) 14 ASTLR 442
Smith v Smith [1986] HCA 36; (1986) 161 CLR 217
Stone v Braun [2015] WASCA 103
Taylor v Farrugia [2009] NSWSC 801
Vigolo v Bostin [2005] HCA 11; (2005) 221 CLR 191
Wheat v Wisbey [2013] NSWSC 537
Zitman v Zitman [2023] WASC 135

HOWARD J:

Introduction

Kenneth Charles Abbott (deceased) died on 4 December 2021.
This is an application made under s 6 of the Family Provision Act 1972 (WA) (Act) by his two adult daughters.
The following facts set out in paragraphs [4] to [16] were not controversial and I find accordingly.
The deceased was born on 25 December 1948.[1]
[1] Shari Abbott's affidavit made and filed on 10 May 2024, with amendments (second Shari Abbott affidavit): Ex Y [136.1]. The evidence-in-chief was given by affidavits which included attachments. There was a trial bundle prepared, in three volumes, which was paginated and which included the affidavits. Additional exhibits were tendered at trial but which did not form part of the trial bundle and so were not paginated. Each affidavit was given an exhibit letter and each of its annexures were given the exhibit letter followed by annexure number. Where it is helpful to identify a particular page of the tendered document that was in the trial bundle then I have used the convention by which'TB' is preceded by the volume number and followed by the page number.
The deceased was married to Deanne Margaret Abbott (in about 1972)[2] and they had three children together; namely:
1.Norelle Anita Abbott, the plaintiff, born 14 February 1973;[3]
2.Luana Elise Abbott, the third defendant who is also a claimant in the proceedings, born 7 August 1976;[4] and
3.Bryce Desmond Abbott, the fourth defendant, born 5 March 1981,[5] and who did not take an active part in the proceedings.
[2] Luana Abbott's affidavit made and filed on 4 September 2023, with amendments (first Luana Abbott affidavit): Ex. E [6].
[3] Norelle Abbott's affidavit made and filed on 29 May 2023, with amendments (first Norelle Abbott affidavit): Ex. A [19].
[4] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [20].
[5] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [7.3].
I have referred to Norelle and Luana Abbott, together, as the claimants.
The deceased and Deanne Abbott separated in 1991.[6]
[6] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [24].
Shari Abbott met the deceased in about September 1991[7] and commenced an intimate relationship soon after.[8]
[7] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [4], [9].
[8] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [9], [10].
Shari Abbott had one child, Matthew Daniel Abbott, born 6 February 1987, prior to starting her relationship with the deceased.[9] He was the fifth defendant in the proceedings but did not take an active part.
[9] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [4].
The deceased and Shari Abbott started living together in about 1993.[10]
[10] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [11].
The deceased and Deanne Abbott were divorced in about 1994.[11]
[11] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [8.5].
The deceased and Shari Abbott were married in 1998.[12]
[12] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [12].
On 21 March 2016,[13] the deceased and Shari Abbott executed 'mirror Wills',[14] as well as a Mutual Will Agreement.[15]
[13] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [24].
[14] Shari Abbott's Will is Ex. Y.3 2TB 560; ts 174; the deceased's mirror Will is Ex. Y.2 2TB 532.
[15] Mutual Will Agreement: Ex. Y.4 2TB 588.
The deceased's last Will was the Will he had executed on 21 March 2016 (Will).[16]
[16] Will of Kenneth Charles Abbott (Will of the deceased): Ex. Y.2 2TB 532.
The Mutual Will Agreement provided, in part, the following:
1.In consideration of my husband Kenneth executing a Will in the form set out in Schedule One of this Agreement and agreeing to act in such a way that property affected by this contract does devolve to:
1)Kenneth's daughter NORELLE ANITA ABBOTT;
2)Kenneth's daughter LUANA ELISE ABBOTT;
3)Kenneth's son BRYCE DESMOND ABBOTT; and
4)my son MATTHEW DANIEL ABBOTT;
(together called "our children") in the manner and proportions set out in the terms of that Will, unless I consent, or our children (to the extent to which their interests are affected) or their legal personal representative consents in writing to his acting otherwise, I, Shari agree:
a)to execute a Will in the form set out in Schedule Two; and
b)to act in such a way that property affected by this contract does devolve to our children in the manner and proportions set out in the terms of that Will, unless Kenneth during his lifetime, or thereafter all of our children (to the extent to which each of their interests are affected) or their respective legal personal representative consents in writing to my acting otherwise.[17] (original emphasis)
[17] Mutual Will Agreement: Ex. Y.4 2TB 589.
It was common ground that the Will, and the will executed by Shari Abbott on 21 March 2016,[18] were as provided for in the Mutual Will Agreement.
[18] Will of Shari Lee Abbott: Ex. Y.3 2TB 560.
As will be set out, Shari Abbott was appointed the Executor of the Will and is the first defendant in these proceedings in that capacity. She is joined as the second defendant in her personal capacity. Where I refer to the 'defendants' in these reasons, unless otherwise indicated I am referring to Shari Abbott in her two capacities without differentiation, and I am not referring to the third to fifth defendants.
Unless I indicate otherwise, where I use 'Shari Abbott' I am referring to her in her personal capacity.
Shari Abbott, as Executor, was granted probate of the Will by this court on 30 November 2022.[19]
[19] PRO 7720 of 2022 - In the Estate of Kenneth Charles Abbott. See John Edwards' affidavit made and filed 17 June 2024, with amendments (first Edwards affidavit): Ex. U [8].
As will already be apparent, I have used the first names of the parties for the purpose of clarity. I do so without intending any disrespect to them.

Relevant provisions of the Will

Shari Abbott's evidence was that the wills she and the deceased signed were: 'complex documents and [she didn't] profess to understand how they are meant to operate'.[20] She held to that position in cross‑examination,[21] notwithstanding that she is administrating the Estate pursuant to the Will.
[20] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [25].
[21] ts 200.
Shari Abbott accepted that the Will, as it operated on the current facts, made no effective provision for Norelle or Luana Abbott;[22] nor for Bryce or Matthew Abbott for that matter.
[22] ts 149.
An analysis of the Will, in my view, makes good that concession.
The deceased's Will was set out in four parts, described as follows:
1. Parts of Will
This Will is in four main parts - in general terms:
Part A sets out the Executors and Trustees of my Will and how my Estate is to be distributed;
Part Bsets out the instructions and discretionary and other powers I give to my Executors;
Part Cincludes the terms of a Beneficiary Controlled Testamentary Trust and general administrative provisions; and
Part Dsets out interpretation provisions and a number of the definitions used in this Will.[23] (original emphasis)
[23] Will of the deceased: Ex. Y.2 2TB 533.
By Part A, cl 4.1 Shari Abbott was appointed as the Executor.[24]
[24] Will of the deceased: Ex. Y.2 2TB 533.
By cl 4.5 and the definition in cl 9.1 of Shari Abbott as the 'Primary Beneficiary', she was appointed as the Trustee of a trust described in paragraph [32] below.[25]
[25] Will of the deceased: Ex. Y.2 2TB 534.
By cl 5.4, the deceased stated that he had made a binding death benefit nomination in respect of his member account balance in the KC & SL Abbott Superannuation Fund (SMSF).[26]
[26] Will of the deceased: Ex. Y.2 2TB 543.
That statement is to be read with cl 7.1 by which the deceased, relevantly, directed his Executor to do all in her power to effect any valid binding death benefit nomination operative at the time of his death.[27]
[27] Will of the deceased: Ex. Y.2 2TB 535.
By cll 8.1 and 9.1, the deceased effectively gave the entirety of his Estate to Shari Abbott as the Primary Beneficiary of a trust described in paragraph [32] below..[28]
[28] Will of the deceased: Ex. Y.2 2TB 535.
The deceased's Will at cl 9.3 and following made an alternative provision if Shari Abbott did not survive him by 30 days.[29] That alternative, clearly, was not enlivened here.
[29] Will of the deceased: Ex. Y.2 2TB 536.
By cll 14.1 and 15.1, both in Part B of the Will, the deceased stated his intentions that the division of his Estate between beneficiaries as outlined in Part A be maintained and given effect.[30] Of course, Part A, on the facts here, effectively left everything to Shari Abbott.
[30] Will of the deceased: Ex. Y.2 2TB 538.
By Part C, cl 20 of the Will, in the circumstances of this case, the deceased made provision for the creation of a 'Beneficiary Controlled Testamentary Trust' which nominated Shari Abbott as thePrimary Beneficiary.[31] As noted in paragraph [26] Shari Abbott was the trustee of that trust.
[31] Will of the deceased: Ex. Y.2 2TB 545.
Part C also made provision as to who the (other) 'beneficiaries' would be of that Beneficiary Controlled Testamentary Trust, in cl 20.2. It then provided for the Trustee of the Beneficiary Controlled Testamentary Trust to have certain discretions, including:
…
g) elect to temporarily or permanently exclude a beneficiary from all or any part of the trust fund; and
h) elect to temporarily or permanently refrain from distributing or providing income, Capital or other benefits in respect to all or any part of the trust fund, to or for the benefit of a beneficiary.
…
20.6 The Trustee shall allocate or accumulate the income or the Unreserved Capital of the Beneficiary Controlled Testamentary Trust as follows:
a) the income or Unreserved Capital (or any category of the income or Unreserved Capital) of the trust in each year may be:
i) paid, allocated to or applied for the benefit of such of the beneficiaries that the Trustee in its absolute discretion selects from time to time; or
ii) (in the case of the income) may be accumulated as an addition to the Unreserved Capital of the trust.[32]
[32] Will of the deceased: Ex. Y.2 2TB 545 - 546.
The Will provided as to the 'Ending of Trust' by cl 20.19 that:
20.19 The Beneficiary Controlled Testamentary Trust shall end on the earlier of:
a) a date nominated in writing by the Trustee; or
b) at the expiration of the later of eighty (80) years from the date of my death or the maximum period permitted by law; and
shall vest in such beneficiaries and in such proportions as the Trustee with the consent of the Primary Beneficiary or all of the Specified Beneficiaries may by instrument in writing nominate, provided that if no such nomination is made then:
c) to the Primary Beneficiary (if living); or
d) equally between the Specified Beneficiaries.[33]
[33] Will of the deceased: Ex. Y.2 2TB 550.

Dispute as to the composition of the Estate

Shari Abbott, as Executor, filed a Rule 9B Statement of the deceased's assets and liabilities.[34]
[34] Shari Abbott affidavit made and filed on 23 October 2023 (first Shari Abbott affidavit): Ex. AA 2TB 486 [2] and Statement of assets and liabilities: Ex. AA.1 2TB 487.
Mr Edwards, an accountant, gave evidence, (to which I will return below) and stated that this first Rule 9B statement had been prepared using information he had provided.[35]
[35] First Edwards affidavit: Ex. U [10].
A second statement of the deceased's assets and liabilities was prepared (it appears by Mr Edwards) and put before the Court.[36]
[36] Revised statement of assets and liabilities as at the date of the deceased's death: Ex. U.2 3TB 674 - 675.
It provided:
[EDWARDS] REVISED STATEMENT OF ESTATE'S ASSETS & LIABILITIES AT DATE OF DEATH

MOVEABLE PROPERTY

NAB account $803,064.06

Bentley motor vehicle E         $70,000.00

Tax refund 2021 $45,466.97

Tax refund 2022 $34,888.82

KCA Sales Pty Ltd $1.00

Ken Abbott Super Pty Ltd $1.00

Loan payable by B&A Abbott Family Trust $990,476.00

Loan payable by Camabb Pty Ltd $137,139.00

Personal effects $1,000.00

Wages owing $1,909.00

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

65 Bushland Retreat, Carramar E        $925,000.00

LIABILITIES

NAB credit card $14,819.81

Funeral expenses $19,333.63

KCA Sales Guarantee $189,128.20

Funds owing to Ken Abbott Superannuation Fund $150,484.00

Funds owing to Family Trust $634,101.52

Synergy $351.44

Telstra $130.43

Carramar expenses $1,334.05

NET TOTAL E     $1,999,262.77

Where "E" is estimated
(original emphasis)

The above table (Edwards Revised Statement) provides a convenient starting point for the determination of the Estate.
Mr Edwards also adduced, and had presumably created, a further statement of the Estate's assets and liabilities as at 29 May 2024.[37] That can be put to one side for the time being.
[37] First Edwards affidavit: Ex. U [15] and Statement of assets and liabilities as at 29 May 2024: Ex. U.3 3TB 676.
It was agreed between the parties at trial (as a result of a subsequent valuation) that the value of the Carramar property at the deceased's death was $1 million.[38]
[38] ts 145 - 146
Mr Edwards explained the adjustments he made in the Edwards Revised Statement by reference to discrete items set out in his first affidavit at [16].[39]
[39] First Edwards affidavit: Ex. U.
At the start of trial, there were four items in dispute between the parties: Items 16.2, 16.3, 16.5 and 16.9. By the conclusion of the trial, only Items 16.3 and 16.9 remained in dispute.

Mr Edwards' evidence

Before turning to the items in dispute, I make the following observations as to Mr Edwards' evidence.
Mr Edwards made two affidavits: the first made and filed on 17 June 2024, with amendments, (first Edwards affidavit), [40] and the second made and filed on 4 December 2024 (second Edwards affidavit). [41] These were tendered as his evidence-in-chief.
[40] First Edwards affidavit: Ex. U.
[41] John Edwards' affidavit made and filed 4 December 2024 (second Edwards affidavit): Ex. V 3TB 694.
I find that Mr Edwards is an accountant who has practised for about 40 years and has run his own practice for at least 25 years.[42]
[42] First Edwards affidavit: Ex. U [1].
I find that Mr Edwards:
1.had never met the deceased;[43] and
2.had not been the deceased's accountant, nor the accountant for any of the entities connected with the deceased, including the KC & SL Abbott Family Trust (Family Trust)or the SMSF (both of which will be returned to below).[44]
[43] First Edwards affidavit: Ex. U [3].
[44] First Edwards affidavit: Ex. U [3]
From the evidence, I find those roles had been performed for a number of years by the firm Brennan Sloan and, in particular, by Greg Brennan.[45]
[45] Financial Statements for the Family Trust for the year ending 30 June 2021 (Financial Statements): Ex A.11 1TB 59.
I find that Mr Edwards met Shari Abbott in about March 2022 and assisted her:
1.in her capacity as the executor of the Estate; and
2.in relation to the Family Trust.[46]
[46] First Edwards affidavit: Ex. U [2].
Mr Edwards did not characterise the capacity in which he made his first affidavit - i.e. as accountant for the Estate or otherwise, but said in his second affidavit that he was making it at Shari Abbott's request in her capacity as Executor.[47]
[47] Second Edwards affidavit: Ex. V [2].
In his second affidavit, Mr Edwards described himself as Shari Abbott's accountant and did not draw any distinction between acting for her in her personal capacity and for her in her capacity as Executor.[48] In his oral evidence, he confirmed that he had prepared Shari Abbott's personal tax returns since 2022.[49]
[48] Second Edwards affidavit: Ex. V [1].
[49] ts 175.
Mr Edwards deposed to having 'assisted Shari with investigating various historical transactions and reconstructing the accounts' of the Estate.[50] The Edwards Revised Statement was the result of those efforts.
[50] First Edwards affidavit: Ex. U [12].
I find that at least since the time of preparing her personal tax returns for the 2022 financial year, Mr Edwards has also acted as Shari Abbott's personal accountant.
The context of Mr Edwards' evidence is that:
1.there was an order of this court on 15 October 2024 for the Executor to have leave to adduce as expert evidence the first Edwards affidavit 'to the extent necessary';
2.the defendants did not seek to qualify Mr Edwards as an expert;
3.Mr Edwards did not appear to have prepared his affidavits with an understanding of the requirements of independence as required by the various court expert protocols (I say that without criticism as it does not appear that the lawyers acting for Shari Abbott in her two capacities asked him to do so);
4.in any event, Mr Edwards could not be presented as being independent of Shari Abbott;
5.Mr Edwards did not set out in his affidavits the instructions he had received, if any, from the defendants or their solicitors;
6.Mr Edwards did not seek to set out the documents which were made available to him; and
7.it was not immediately obvious what methodology Mr Edwards had adopted on some of the contentious items. (Again, I say that without criticism of Mr Edwards himself).

The things that Mr Edwards relied upon were (without specification) said in his first affidavit to have included:
…
11.2Information provided to me by Shari, including Financial Statements for the Family Trust for the financial year ended 30 June 2021. Those Financial Statements had been prepared by Ken's accountants, Brennan Sloan.
11.3Information gained from my own enquiries.[51]
[51] First Edwards affidavit: Ex. U [11].
In all of the circumstances, I have taken Mr Edwards' evidence as not being expert accounting evidence on the remaining two contested items. Rather, I have taken it as being a statement of the Executor's position on the items by way of a submission, informed by her accountant.
In approaching Mr Edwards' evidence in that way, I have not needed to assess, in any way, his credibility. In saying that, I am not suggesting that Mr Edwards presented other than as a careful and candid professional. The claimants did not suggest otherwise.

Item 16.2

Item 16.2 concerns the SMSF[52] - of which the deceased and Shari Abbott were members.
[52] That is, the self-managed superannuation fund named the KC and SL Abbott Superannuation Fund.
The trustee of the SMSF is Ken Abbott Super Pty Ltd (SMSF Trustee).[53] The SMSF Trustee was incorporated on 27 September 2007, and from that date Shari Abbott and the deceased were its directors.[54]
[53] Second Edwards affidavit: Ex. V [6].
[54] ASIC Current & Historical Organisation Extract for Ken Abbott Super Pty Ltd: Ex. V.1 3TB 706, 708.
Shari Abbott has continued, it appears, as the sole director of the SMSF Trustee.
The defendants, in closing,[55] did not press their contention that the $150,484 amount, which had been included as a liability of the Estate owing to the SMSF on the Edwards Revised Statement, should be repaid by the Estate. Resultingly, they accepted that the liabilities of the Estate should be reduced by that sum of $150,484.
[55] ts 213

Item 16.3

Item 16.3 concerns both the Family Trust and Chivas Enterprises Pty Ltd (Chivas).
In the Edwards Revised Statement, Mr Edwards had calculated that the Estate owed $634,101.52 to the Family Trust and had included that sum as a liability of the Estate.
The claimants dispute that, and assert that the Family Trust, in fact, owes monies to the Estate.
Item 16.3 is, by far and away, the most significant matter to resolve in determining the composition of the Estate. Before considering the parties' contentions, it will be of assistance to set out some factual matters, which mostly were not in dispute, before turning to the question of the disputed liabilities.
There are two principal aspects to Item 16.3. They are:
1.the distribution through the Family Trust of the proceeds of the sale of shares in the 2021 financial year; and
2.payments, either accepted or asserted, to do with a property 'owned' by the Family Trust at Quindalup.[56]

The Family Trust

[56] Of course, a trust does not own property; rather a trustee does subject to the terms of the trust. However, the parties adopted this shorthand expression and I have followed suit. As will be seen, that shorthand has been followed into describing monies owed to or from the Family Trust by the Estate; and for monies paid to the Family Trust for shares.

The history of the Family Trust was set out by Shari Abbott in undisputed evidence as follows, and I find:
1.it was originally called the KC & DM Abbott Family Trust;[57]
2.initially the deceased and Deanne Abbott were the directors and shareholders of Mekong Pty Ltd which was the trustee of the Abbott Family Trust;[58]
3.in 1994, Mekong was deregistered, and the deceased became the trustee;[59] and
4.in 2000, Shari Abbott was added as a named beneficiary and the name of the trust was changed to the Family Trust.[60]
[57] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [28].
[58] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [29.1].
[59] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [29.2].
[60] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [29.3].
I find that Shari Abbott is now the sole trustee of the Family Trust.[61]
[61] Second Edwards affidavit: Ex. V [5] - [9].
The trust instrument for the Family Trust was not before the Court. Further, as will be seen, only limited financial statements for the Family Trust were before the Court.
The matters in paragraphs [71] to [94] below were not in dispute, and I find accordingly.
Among the Family Trust's assets prior to August 2020 were shares in four companies. The most significant of those was Chivas which is considered separately immediately below.

Chivas

Chivas was incorporated in August 1992.[62] The business of Chivas was to provide earthmoving equipment for hire,[63] and the business was run through a business name of 'Mayday'.
[62] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [89].
[63] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [93].
An investor initially provided start-up funding and held shares in Chivas.[64]
[64] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [88.3].
After that investor was bought out in July 2010, the Family Trust owned 100 shares and the deceased owned 102 shares personally.[65]
[65] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [100].
The deceased was the sole director of Chivas.[66]
[66] First Edwards affidavit: Ex. U [29.2]; Second Edwards affidavit: Ex. V [21]; ASIC Current & Historical Organisation Extract for Chivas: Ex. V.6 3 TB 737.
By August 2020, the shares in Chivas were held as follows:
1.the Family Trust as to 22 shares;
2.the deceased as to 104 shares; and
3.Bryce Abbott as to 84 shares.[67]
[67] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [101]; Second Edwards affidavit: Ex. V [24].
In 2020, Bryce Abbott[68] acquired all of the shares in Chivas.[69] That is, the 104 shares held by the deceased, and the 22 shares held by the Family Trust.
[68] I have referred to this shareholder, the subsequent purchaser (and, as will be seen, the borrower) as 'Bryce Abbott', the fourth defendant. This is shorthand. The documents are to the effect that it was Bryce Desmond Abbott and Amy Lee Abbott as trustee for the B & A Abbott Family Trust who were the counterparties to the Family Trust and the deceased in these loan and share transactions.
[69] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [102]; Second Edwards affidavit: Ex. V [26].
Further, as part of the same transaction, Bryce Abbott acquired the following shares in the following companies which had been owned by the Family Trust:
1.60 shares in Oldridge Investments Pty Ltd; [70]
2.6 shares in Newside Holdings Pty Ltd; [71] and
3.60 shares in King Diamond Pty Ltd[72].[73]
[70] Security Transfer Forms: Ex. V.7 3TB 760.
[71] Security Transfer Forms: Ex. V.7 3TB 761.
[72] Security Transfer Forms: Ex. V.7 3TB 762.
[73] First Edwards affidavit: Ex. U [30].
The shares purchased were the subject of Security Transfer Forms as for those set out immediately above and as follows:
1.for the 22 Chivas shares;[74] and
2.for the 104 Chivas shares from the deceased.[75]
[74] Security Transfer Forms: Ex. V.7 3TB 763.
[75] Security Transfer Forms: Ex. V.7 3TB 764.
The consideration paid by Bryce Abbott for the shares in Chivas, Oldridge Investments, Newside Holdings and King Diamond was a total of $2.4 million which was made up of the following:
1.$571,428.57 paid to the Family Trust for the 60 shares in Oldridge Investments;[76]
2.$57,142.86 paid to the Family Trust for the 6 shares in Newside Holdings;[77]
3.$571,428.57 paid to the Family Trust for the 60 shares in King Diamond;[78]
4.$209,523.81 paid to the Family Trust for the 22 shares in Chivas;[79] and
5.$990,476.19 paid to the deceased for the 104 shares in Chivas.[80]
[76] Security Transfer Forms: Ex. V.7 3TB 760.
[77] Security Transfer Forms: Ex. V.7 3TB 761.
[78] Security Transfer Forms: Ex. V.7 3TB 762.
[79] Security Transfer Forms: Ex. V.7 3TB 763.
[80] Security Transfer Forms: Ex. V.7 3TB 764.
That is, a total of $1,409,523.81 was to be paid to the Family Trust; and $990,476.19 to the deceased.
On 16 July 2020, the deceased and Bryce Abbott entered into agreements by which:
1.the deceased personally agreed to lend Bryce Abbott $990,476 from 19 August 2020, to purchase the shares owned by the deceased personally;[81] and
2.the deceased, as trustee for the Family Trust, agreed to lend Bryce Abbott $209,524 from 19 August 2020 to purchase the shares in Chivas owned by the Family Trust.[82]
[81] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [103]; Unsecured Loan Agreement dated 16 July 2020: Ex. Y.6 2TB 596; Unsecured Loan Agreements: Ex. V.8 3TB 774.
[82] Unsecured Loan Agreements: Ex. V.8 3TB 765.
Both loan agreements were for a maximum of 10 years and were interest free.[83]
[83] Unsecured Loan Agreements: Ex. V.8 3TB 766, 782.
Gregory Brennan, then the deceased's and the Family Trust's accountant, was a witness to the deceased's execution of the two loan agreements.[84]
[84] Unsecured Loan Agreements: Ex. V.8 3TB 772 - 773, 780 - 781.
On 2 September 2020, Mr Abbott's personal NAB account received 'from Mayday a credit of $1.63 million.[85]
[85] Statements for NAB Flexi Account: Ex. V.9 3TB 783.
The defendants' position is that the $1.63 million received into the deceased's personal NAB account should have gone to the Family Trust as it represented the sale proceeds of shares that had been owned by the Family Trust.
The claimants contended differently to the effect that the Family Trust did receive those funds. They did so by reference to the financial statements for the 2021 financial year for the Family Trust[86] and from the General Ledger prepared for the Family Trust for the 2021 financial year (General Ledger).[87]
[86] KC & SL Abbott Family Trust financial statements for the 2021 financial year (Family Trust financial statements): Ex. X. These financial statements also appeared in the Norelle Abbott affidavit made and filed on 2 August 2024 (third Norelle Abbott affidavit): Ex. C 1TB 340 tendered as Ex. C.1 1TB 344 - the only difference between the two documents is that Ex. X was signed by Shari Abbott as the director of the trustee of the Family Trust. I have worked from Ex. C.1 because of the convenience of having TB page numbers.
[87] General ledger for the Family Trust for the year ended 30 June 2021 (General Ledger): Ex. C.2 1TB 354.
From entries in the General Ledger[88], prepared by Mr Brennan, Mr Edwards calculated that the Family Trust was paid (or ought to have been paid), as a result of the sale of the above shares, $1,630,975[89] made up as follows:
1.sales proceeds from the Family Trust's sale of shares in the four companies in the amount of $1,409,523.81;
2.repayment by Bryce Abbott of a 2016 loan in the amount of $130,976;
3.repayment by Bryce Abbott of a 2018 loan in the amount of $150,000;
4.repayment by Bryce Abbott of a 2019 loan in the amount of $150,000; and
5.less the Family Trust's loan of $209,524 as made by the 16 July 2020 loan agreement referred to in paragraph [82].[90]
[88] The General Ledger was part of the financial statements for the Family Trust for the 2021 financial year: Ex. C.2 1TB 354.
[89] Reconstructed journal entry: Ex. V.11 3TB 793 - see the box at the end of that page.
[90] Unsecured Loan Agreements: Ex. V.8 3TB 765.
The General Ledger, in the account 501/03 Drawings (which it was common ground was the deceased's account in the Ledger), records on 19 August 2020 that: [91]
1.there was a debit of $1,630,975.81 with the notation 'Received by Ken for KC & SL Trust';
2.there was a credit of the same amount on the same date with the same notation; and
3.after those 'netting out' entries, there was a debit recorded in that account with the notation 'Received by Ken for KC & SL Trust' in the amount of $326,195.81.
[91] General ledger: Ex. C.2 1TB 359.
On the same date, in the General Ledger account 502/03 Drawings (which it was common ground was Shari Abbott's account in the Ledger) a debit of $1,304,780 was recorded with the notation 'Record proceeds on disposal of shares'.[92]
[92] General ledger: Ex. C.2 1TB 361.
The General Ledger recorded:
1.a balance of $675,808.78 in the deceased's Drawings account (501/03);[93] and
2.a balance of $1,304,780 in Shari Abbott's Drawings account (502/03).[94]
[93] General ledger: Ex. C.2 1TB 360.
[94] General ledger: Ex. C.2 1TB 361.
Those two balances were carried into the deceased's and Shari Abbott's respective 'unpaid present entitlements' set out at Note 9 to the 2021 financial statements for the Family Trust.[95]
[95] Family Trust financial statements: Ex. C.1 1TB 352.
At the end of the 2021 financial year, the financial statements of the Family Trust showed:
1.the deceased owed the Family Trust $227,720 being, in effect, the 'negative' balance of his unpaid present entitlements;[96] and
2.Shari Abbott having an unpaid present entitlement owing to her of $329,020.[97]
[96] Family Trust financial statements: Ex. C.1 1TB 352.
[97] Family Trust financial statements: Ex. C.1 1TB 352.
The claimants accept that the Estate, at the end of the 2021 financial year, owed the sum of $227,720 to the Family Trust, and that was an extant liability at the time of the deceased's death.[98]
[98] Claimants' outline of submissions dated 27 November 2024 (Claimants' submissions) [41].
The defendants say that, in effect, the 2021 financial statements, as tracked through above, do not reveal the true position of the Estate, which they contend is that:
1.the deceased received the whole of the $1.63 million which should had gone to the Family Trust;[99] and
2.there should be a reconstructed or corrected set of financial statements for the Family Trust for the 2021 financial year as prepared by Mr Edwards.[100]
[99] See, for example, Second Edwards affidavit: Ex. V [34].
[100] Second Edwards affidavit: Ex. V [36]; Amended financial statements for the KC & SL Abbott Family Trust for the year ended 30 June 2021: Ex. V.10 3TB 784.
Shari Abbott's evidence, to which the defendants pointed in closing,[101] was that she 'never received such a distribution'.[102] I have taken that evidence, in the absence of elaboration or explanation, to mean that she did not receive a payment in that amount into a bank account, or otherwise.
[101] ts 233.
[102] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [136.9].
Mr Edwards did not disclose the full process of reasoning he undertook in producing his reconstructed or corrected set of financial statements for the Family Trust for the 2021 financial year. It appears that Mr Edwards took the view that the Family Trust's financial statements needed to be 'brought into line' with the fact of the receipt of the $1.63 million into the deceased's personal account. That is the best inference I can draw as Mr Edwards did not express his process of reasoning otherwise.
As noted above, the 2021 financial statements for the Family Trust were prepared by its then accountant (who then was also the deceased's and Shari Abbott's accountant) and were signed off by Shari Abbott, the Trustee, as being, in effect, true and correct.[103]
[103] Letter from NAB Business to the deceased dated 22 April 2013: Ex. S at page 2.
Further, the defendants effectively accepted the inference that, in the ordinary course, various tax returns (including Shari Abbott's) would have been prepared and submitted in a way that was based on, or consistent with, the Family Trust's financial statements[104] which were signed off by the Trustee for the 2021 financial year.
[104] ts 226, 228 - 229. This was in circumstances where such tax returns were not put before the Court.
In closing, the defendants submitted that, even following through the distributions recorded in the General Ledger as outlined above, the deceased received, they said on the face of things, a distribution which ought to have gone to Shari Abbott.
With respect to that submission, I think that the material question is whether the Family Trust received the $1.63 million. From the General Ledger and verified financial statements for the 2021 financial year set out above, it appears that the Family Trust did. So much must be the result of the Family Trust making the distributions it is recorded as doing so to the deceased and to Shari Abbott. I find the Family Trust did receive the $1.63 million.
That is, it appears from the financial records that the Family Trust treated the money as being received by it (notwithstanding that the cash was deposited into the deceased's personal account) and then that sum being distributed by it. Whether or not Shari Abbott may have had a claim against the Estate in respect of any of 'her' distribution received by the deceased, is a matter which does not arise in these proceedings. And, in circumstances where it was made plain that Shari Abbott makes no further claim on the Estate then, it would appear that the time has well passed for that matter to now be agitated.
The consequence of the above reasoning is that I conclude that the starting point of calculating what is owed between the Estate and the Family Trust is that the Estate owed $227,720 as a result of the 'overdrawn' unpaid present entitlements of the Estate as at the end of the 2021 financial year and by extension to the date of death.

The Quindalup property

The next item to be reckoned with are payments to do with the Quindalup property.
That the Quindalup property was an asset of the Family Trust is supported by the contract for sale which described the buyer as the deceased as trustee for the Family Trust.[105]
[105] Contract for Sale of Land: Ex. U.5 3TB 679.
It was common ground between the parties, at trial, that the Quindalup property was, and remains, an asset of the Family Trust. It is also common ground that the Quindalup property was not shown in the books or financial statements of the Family Trust. That omission, while common ground, is not explained in the evidence and, from the Court's perspective, nothing is to be gained by speculating as to why that is so. However, a consequence of the omission is that no expenses or other payments in relation to the Quindalup property are recorded in the Family Trust's books and financial statements.
In relation to the Quindalup property, the claimants assert that the following items were paid 'personally' by the deceased to the benefit of the Family Trust, and should be brought into account when calculating the liability of the Family Trust to the Estate or vice versa; namely:
1.payout of the loan amount in the sum of $540,000;
2.payment of the balance of the purchase price in the sum of $154,000;
3.payment of the deposit in the sum of $10,000;
4.stamp duty in the sum of $26,000;
5.interest on the NAB loan in the sum of $210,000;
6.renovation of the property in the sum of $60,000;
7.water rates in the sum of $11,000; and
8.local government rates in the sum of $12,000.[106]
[106] Claimants' submissions [41].
It is now agreed that the deceased paid out the NAB loan in respect of the Quindalup property in the amount of $525,585.90. That agreement followed from the tender of the NAB statement for a personal account of the deceased, which showed the paying out of that sum on 16 September 2020.[107]
[107] NAB Statement for the account of Mr Ken Abbott ending 0330 between the period 12 and 18 September 2020: Ex. T.
By letter from the vendors' agent to the Family Trust and the deceased,[108] it appears that a deposit of $10,000 was payable on or before 20 March 2013.
[108] Letters from Stocker Preston: Ex. U.4 3TB 677.
The claimants assert that the deposit of $10,000 was paid by the deceased and should be repaid or brought into account as a repayment from the Family Trust.[109]
[109] Claimants' submissions [41].
The claimants assert that the deceased paid $154,000 as 'payment of balance of purchase price' for the Quindalup property.[110]
[110] Claimants' submissions [41]: Fourth item of the Table.

From the evidence before the Court, I can infer that both the $154,000 and the deposit of $10,000 were paid, but it is unclear how they were paid.[111]
[111] see first Edwards affidavit: Ex. U [26].
However, there is simply no evidence before the Court as to how, and by which entity or person, either the $154,000 or the deposit of $10,000 were paid.
In those circumstances, I have not been able to conclude that the Family Trust owes that money to the Estate.
In closing, the claimants accepted that the amounts they contended for in relation to the renovation of the Quindalup property, water rates and local government rates were 'inferred sums'.[112]
[112] ts 273.
The claimants claim in respect of these items rested on Norelle Abbott's evidence in her third affidavit.[113]
[113] Third Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. C [6] and following.
The position of stamp duty in the sum of $26,000 is analogously the same as that of the deposit. The Court may infer that the stamp duty was paid in about that amount, but because of the complete lack of evidence, I am unable to conclude that the stamp duty was paid by the deceased and should therefore be repaid by the Family Trust.
In relation to the interest on the NAB loan, the evidence, so far as it goes, is provided by Mr Edwards in his first affidavit:[114]
[27]In relation to the NAB loan of $540,000.00, I have been able to determine that:
27.1Until about August 2018, the NAB loan repayments were paid from the Family Trust's bank account.
27.2Between about August 2018 and March 2020, the NAB loan repayments were paid from Ken's personal bank account. I have not had the opportunity to analyse how Ken funded the repayments made by him during this period.[115]
[114] First Edwards affidavit: Ex. U.
[115] First Edwards affidavit: Ex. U [27].
As far as I understand it, the defendants did not adduce into evidence the deceased's bank statements which supported Mr Edwards' statements as quoted above.
Norelle Abbott appears to have accepted in her evidence that the deceased personally paid loan repayments only from August 2018 to March 2020 and she calculated those as being $3,000 per month for 19 months for a total of approximately $57,000 of interest.[116]
[116] Third Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. C TB [6].
The interest on the Family Trust's Quindalup property that was paid by the deceased personally should be included in the calculation of the net balance between the Family Trust and the Estate, for the period of about August 2018 to March 2020.
Unless the parties were to agree a different figure, then I would apply the figure of $57,000 as being owed by the Family Trust to the Estate in respect of interest paid by the deceased on the Quindalup property.
From Mr Edwards' statement that the Family Trust made loan repayments initially to NAB in respect of the Quindalup property (which appears to be accepted by Norelle Abbott's evidence) it appears to be that the Family Trust did make, at least, some payments in relation to Quindalup. In my view, that makes it more difficult to draw an inference that the deceased personally paid all of the initial expenses in relation to the Quindalup property including the deposit, balance of the purchase price and stamp duty.
In those circumstances, I am unable to conclude that the Family Trust owes the deceased in relation to those sums.
My calculation as to the position between the Estate and the Family Trust is as follows:
1.the Estate is indebted to the Family Trust in the sum of $227,720: see [103] above;
2.the Family Trust is indebted to the Estate in the sum of $525,595.90: see [108] above; and
3.the Family Trust is indebted to the Estate in the sum of $57,000: see [122] above;
for a total of $240,865.90 being owed by the Family Trust to the Estate.

Item 16.5

Item 16.5 concerns KCA Sales Pty Ltd (KCA Sales).
KCA Sales was incorporated on 26 November 2020.[117] In early 2021, the deceased began using KCA Sales to buy and sell earthmoving equipment.[118]
[117] ASIC Current & Historical Organisation Extract for KCA Sales: Ex. V.13 3TB 810: second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [110].
[118] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [111].
KCA Sales had a business facility/overdraft account with NAB (KCA NAB account).[119] This account appears to have been opened at the beginning of February 2021.
[119] Letter from NAB to 'The Secretary' of KCA Sales: Ex. V.14 3TB 826.
On 10 February 2021, the deceased executed a guarantee and indemnity in favour of NAB.[120]
[120] NAB Guarantee and Indemnity dated 10 February 2021: Ex. V.12 3TB 794.
A statement for the KCA NAB account for the period 31 December 2022 to 3 March 2023 was in evidence.[121] That statement showed that the overdraft account was credited with a sum of $213,645.20 on 3 March 2023 which, effectively, brought the account to a nil balance; and the account was closed soon after.[122]
[121] Statements for NAB account ending 3274 for the period 31 December 2022 to 3 March 2023: Ex. V.15 3TB 835.
[122] Statements for NAB account ending 3274 for the period 31 December 2022 to 3 March 2023: Ex. V.15 3TB 835.
Bank statements for the Estate's NAB account were tendered[123] which showed a corresponding debit from the Estate's account of the $213,645.20. The credit to the KCA NAB account was shown as coming from the Estate's NAB account.
[123] Bundle of NAB bank statements of the Estate of the deceased starting 18 January 2023 and ending 17 July 2024: Ex. R.
The claimants conceded in closing that the Estate had properly paid the amount in respect of the KCA Sales overdraft.[124]
[124] ts 279.
On that basis, no adjustment is required to the liabilities in the Edwards Revised Statement which showed, at the time of the deceased's death, an amount owing by the Estate in respect of the 'KCA Sales Guarantee' in the sum of $189,128.

Item 16.9

Item 16.9 concerns CamAbb Pty Ltd (CamAbb).
The matters in paragraphs [136] - [140] below were not in dispute and I so find.
CamAbb was incorporated on 3 September 2004.[125] From its incorporation, its directors were Brett McNicol Cameron, Fiona May Cameron, Shari Abbott and the deceased.[126]
[125] ASIC Current & Historical Organisation Extract for CamAbb Pty Ltd (ASIC Extract (CamAbb): Ex. V.16 3TB 836.
[126] ASIC Extract - CamAbb: Ex. V.16 3TB 837 - 838.
Although it was not completely clear from the extract from the ASIC register,[127] it appears that the shares in CamAbb were owned equally by Abbott family and Cameron family entities.
[127] ASIC Extract - CamAbb: Ex. V.16 3TB 839 - 840.
Shari Abbott's evidence was that CamAbb:
1.was set up to develop rural property near Albany on behalf of the owners;[128]
2.was intended to obtain approval for subdivision, then sell the property, but that did not eventuate; [129] and
3.had never traded.[130]
[128] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [107].
[129] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [107].
[130] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [107].
Shari Abbott's evidence was that she and the deceased put about $137,139 into CamAbb which was recorded as a loan.[131] There was no evidence as to how, or where, such a record had been made.
[131] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [108].
CamAbb was deregistered on 6 October 2024.[132]
[132] Letter from ASIC dated 6 October 2024: Ex. V.17 3TB 843.
Mr Edwards proposed or asserted that the Edwards Revised Statement should be further adjusted by deleting 'or writing off' the loan payable by CamAbb to the Estate.[133]
[133] Second Edwards affidavit: Ex. V [51] - [56]; first Edwards affidavit: Ex. U [16.9], [18], [19].
The evidence concerning the loan to CamAbb and its recoverability as at the deceased's death is unsatisfactory. There is, for example, no evidence as to:
1.what the money was lent for;
2.what CamAbb used the money for;
3.whether there was a written loan agreement;
4.where, or if, the loan was recorded, as noted above;
5.whether the directors of CamAbb had guaranteed its borrowing;
6.what CamAbb's assets were at the time of the deceased's death;
7.why, if CamAbb had never traded, it had borrowed any money at all; and
8.whether any demand had been made for repayment of the loan and, if not, why.
Clearly, from the time of its deregistration on 6 October 2024, it may be confidently asserted, and I find, that the loan will not be repaid.
However, the Executor had included it in the Rule 9B Statement and, presumably, considered at that time that it was appropriate to list that loan as an asset of the Estate. The Executor had at that time the assistance of lawyers and Mr Edwards.
As noted, Shari Abbott was at all times a director of CamAbb. In these proceedings, she was the only party who could have given evidence as to the matters I noted above. For whatever (unexplained) reason she did not do so.
In all of the circumstances, I consider that there is no evidence before the Court to, effectively, displace the Rule 9B Statement made by the Executor.
I conclude that the Edwards Revised Statement should not be further adjusted by deleting from the Estate's assets the loan to CamAbb.

Determination as to the composition of the Estate

I consider that the Edwards Revised Schedule should be amended by:
1.adjusting the value of the Carramar Property from $925,000 to $1 million;
2.the liability of the Estate to the SMSF should be deleted so that the liabilities of the Estate should be reduced by $150,484;
3.the 'funds owing to the Family Trust' in the amount of $634,101.52 should be deleted and so deleting that sum from the Estate's liabilities. This includes deleting, from within the assets of the Estate, the sum of $240,865.90 which is owing to it from the Family Trust.
With those amendments, at the date of death, by my calculation the Estate's:
1.assets were $3,324,811.75;
2.liabilities were $375,581.56; and
3.the net assets were $2,949,230.19.

Evidence of Norelle Abbott

Norelle Abbott gave her evidence-in-chief by affidavits, made and filed on:
1.29 May 2023 (first Norelle Abbott affidavit);[134]
2.22 March 2024 (second Norelle Abbott affidavit);[135] and
3.2 August 2024 (third Norelle Abbott affidavit).[136]
[134] Ex. A.
[135] Ex. B 1TB 78.
[136] Ex. C 1TB 340.
There were some parts of the first Norelle Abbott affidavit which were objected to and which were not read: those were struck through by the witness before she adopted the balance of the affidavits as her evidence-in-chief.
The following evidence of Norelle Abbott was not challenged and I accept and find in accordance with paragraphs [153] to [170] below.
Norelle Abbott was the first born child of the deceased and Deanne Abbott and was born on 14 February 1973.[137]
[137] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [17] - [19].
In 1991, when she was 18, her parents separated and Deanne Abbott left with Luana and Bryce Abbott. Norelle Abbott moved to Japan and was overseas for about six years.[138]
[138] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [24].
Norelle Abbott worked in Japan with a dance company until she was 24. When she returned to Perth she worked in hospitality managing restaurants before she moved to Yallingup where she worked for the Abbey Vale Winery.[139]
[139] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [35], [36].
She then had a dance and drama franchise for about a year before working with Centrelink for the Department of Human Services (DHS) for over 16 years.[140]
[140] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [37].
Since March 2021, she has been married to Clinton Syers; having met and commenced their relationship in April 2010.[141]
[141] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [30].
Mr Syers works for the Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development as a senior policy officer and has worked there for 30 years. Mr Syers was born on 5 September 1972.[142]
[142] ATO income tax return and notice of assessment for Mr Syers: Ex. B.12 1TB 324.
In 2014, Norelle Abbott and Mr Syers purchased a house in Kallaroo for $880,000.[143]
[143] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [32].
Norelle Abbott and Mr Syers have one child, their daughter, born on 30 March 2013. Norelle Abbott was 40 at that time. Their daughter was born prematurely at 29 weeks, and spent her first 10 weeks in hospital.[144]
[144] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [33].
After her daughter was born, Norelle Abbott had a year of maternity leave and then returned to part-time work for two days per week.[145] Due to the premature birth and her daughter being prone to illness, her ability to work was impacted.[146] She resigned from DHS when her daughter was two years old.[147]
[145] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [38].
[146] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [37].
[147] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [38].
In September 2020, as part of the COVID-19 relief program, she withdrew $10,000 from her superannuation fund, which reduced some financial pressure and paid, in part, for her wedding to Mr Syers.[148]
[148] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [41].
She commenced study in speech pathology at Edith Cowan University about five years ago[149] and expected to complete that degree at the end of 2024 and be qualified to work as a speech pathologist in February of 2025.[150]
[149] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [39].
[150] ts 63.
Her evidence is that she intends to seek work as a speech pathologist once she is qualified.[151] Understandably, Norelle Abbott's evidence is that she is 'apprehensive' about her prospects of employment given her age, and the fact that she will not have worked full-time for around 12 years.[152]
[151] ts 63.
[152] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [53].
When Norelle Abbott started studying she worked casually as a bookkeeper for a piano company around once a fortnight but last worked there in October 2022.[153]
[153] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [41].
She currently works as a support worker for a girl who has down syndrome one day per fortnight for which she is paid $50, and has been doing this for about three years 'sporadically'.[154]
[154] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [43].
From time to time, Norelle Abbott works at events as a VIP assistant. This is not regular work and tends to be limited to larger events over summer.[155] When she does work, she is paid $30 per hour.[156]
[155] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [40].
[156] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [40].
Norelle Abbott gave the following unchallenged evidence about her daughter's schooling:[157]
1.she started at a local public primary school in February 2019;
2.Norelle Abbott and Mr Syers considered that there were difficulties with the teaching environment at the school, which they were unable to resolve, despite their efforts;
3.they decided to send her to another primary school in the area;
4.after application, she was accepted into her present school and started there in year 2;
5.Norelle Abbott had discussed her daughter's schooling, and its cost, with the deceased;
6.the deceased had said words to the effect of 'if you have an issue paying the fees, let me know, but I really want her out of [the first primary school]';
7.Norelle Abbott and Mr Syers had previously assumed that their daughter would be at the first primary school from years 1 - 6; and
8.Norelle Abbott and Mr Syers intend for their daughter to remain at her current school until she completes year 12.
[157] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [23] - [24], [50].
That there was a discussion about the schooling of Norelle Abbott's daughter with the deceased was corroborated by Shari Abbott.[158]
[158] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [137.1].
Norelle Abbott's daughter is currently in year six, and so has a further six years of schooling.[159]
[159] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [50].
Given my assessment of Norelle Abbott as a witness below, and there being no challenge to this evidence nor any cross‑examination on it, I accept all of the evidence about the education of Norelle Abbott's daughter set out above.
It appears, and I find, that Norelle Abbott had an unremarkable relationship with the deceased. By that I mean it appears to have been well within the bounds of what would generally be regarded as 'normal' by measures such as interest, warmth and frequency of contact. For example, he walked her down the aisle at her wedding and made a contribution towards the costs of the wedding.[160] They discussed her daughter's schooling, and he gave her and her family access to the holiday house at Quindalup[161]. They appear to have been in regular communication, even though Norelle Abbott gave evidence as to having some difficulties in her relationship with Shari Abbott.[162]
[160] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [30].
[161] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [28].
[162] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [29]. That evidence was disputed to some degree by Shari Abbott: see, for example, second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [136.7] - [136.8]. Neither Norelle Abbott nor Shari Abbott were cross‑examined on any difference in this evidence and I do not need to resolve the differences, if any.
In her first affidavit, Norelle Abbott provided a summary of her income and expenses as at the date of the deceased's death[163] and a summary of her assets and liabilities.[164]
[163] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [44].
[164] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [45].
In her second affidavit, Norelle Abbott provided a further table of her income and expenses as at the date of the deceased's death[165] and an updated or revised table of assets and liabilities as at that date.[166] The tables were all prepared on the basis of being joint between her and Mr Syers. No objection was taken to that.
[165] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [9].
[166] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [9].
In her second affidavit, she gave evidence as to the basis for the revisions that she had made in her second affidavit.[167]
[167] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [4] - [9].
In closing,[168] the defendants accepted that Norelle Abbott's income and expenses as at the date of the deceased's death were as per the revised table[169] she had provided in her second affidavit with one exception: namely that her and Mr Syers' income should be increased by about $347 per month. I find that the table with that adjustment sets out her income and expenses as at the date of the deceased's death.
[168] ts 253.
[169] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [9].
Making that adjustment, Norelle Abbott's monthly income (including Mr Syers') was, by my calculation, $7,313, with joint monthly expenses of $8,084. That left a monthly deficit of expenses over income of $771 per month at the time of the deceased's death.
It does not seem to me necessary that the revised table need be part of the generally available reasons. I have included the table, however, as Confidential Annexure A to these reasons.
In closing,[170] the defendants accepted the revised table of Norelle Abbott's (and Mr Syers) joint assets and liabilities at the time of the deceased's death with an adjustment that the house should be valued at $1 million rather than $900,000, to reflect an expert valuation.[171] I find that the table with that adjustment sets out her assets and liabilities as at the date of the deceased's death.
[170] ts 253.
[171] ts 253
Making that adjustment it appeared that their total assets at the time of the deceased's death was $1,748,112.01 with their joint liabilities being $376,152.
Those assets included approximately $628,776 in superannuation entitlements.[172] So, more than $1.6 million in assets were held in their residence and in entitlements which, in the ordinary course, could only be accessed more than 15 years after the deceased's death.
[172] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [9].

The liabilities included $350,800 of the home loan and Norelle's HECS debt of $18,000.[173]
[173] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [9].
For similar reasons to those expressed above, I consider it appropriate to annex that revised table of joint assets and liabilities as at the deceased's death (prior to the adjustment made above) to be Confidential Annexure B to these reasons.
By her second affidavit, Norelle Abbott stated that her and Mr Syers' present financial position[174] of income and expenses was as per the table which I have annexed to these reasons as Confidential Annexure C (which is before the adjustment I make below).[175]
[174] Although the second Norelle Abbott affidavit was made and filed 22 March 2024, the parties conducted the trial on the basis that it remained accurate to the present, and I have found accordingly.
[175] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [46].
In closing,[176] the defendants accepted that table reflected Norelle Abbott's (with Mr Syers') current income and expenses, save that it should be increased by about $680 a month: so that their combined monthly income was, by my calculation, $8,356 and their monthly expenses were $9,359, leaving a current monthly deficit of expenses over income of about $1,000 per month. I find Norelle and Mr Syers' current joint income and expenses to be as per the table (subject to that adjustment), including the monthly deficit.
[176] ts 256.
Extracting the direct costs of schooling - including fees and uniforms - from the table which is Confidential Annexure C results in an annual figure of just over $13,000 to which must be added an additional $2,000 per year (as a further adjustment, I would make) in additional fees for technology, school excursions, levies et cetera.[177]
[177] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [50].
It appears from Norelle Abbott's evidence that the combination of sending their daughter to a private school (albeit it one with relatively modest fees)[178] and her studying and not working full time has had the result that she and Mr Syers rely on their savings to meet their liabilities; and has led to the near exhaustion of their savings. Her evidence was that to continue sending their daughter to their school of choice they will have to look to increase their income, by Mr Syers getting a pay increase; her receiving income as a speech pathologist; the refinancing of their house; or downsizing their residence.[179]
[178] I have used 'modest' principally to draw a distinction from higher charging school fees in Perth which are regularly reported to be a good multiple of that figure. I accept that each of 'modest' and 'higher charging' are not value free assessments on my part.
[179] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [50] - [53].
In her second affidavit, Norelle Abbott stated her and Mr Syers' joint current assets and liabilities to be as per the table which I have annexed to these reasons as Confidential Annexure D (which is before the adjustment I make below).[180]
[180] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [46].
The defendants in closing[181] accepted the accuracy of that table (save that the house - as a result of an expert valuation - should be at $1.3 million so that the total joint assets were $2,032,508 with the joint liabilities of $377,441). I find accordingly.
[181] ts 265.
Those assets included approximately $669,352 in superannuation entitlements. So, more than $1.86 million in assets were held in their residence and in entitlements which, in the ordinary course, could only be accessed by them more than 12 years after the trial.
The current liabilities included $332,627 by way of the home loan and Norelle's HECS debt of $32,287.[182]
[182] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [46].
For the avoidance of doubt, I note that it was not submitted on the part of Shari Abbott that Norelle Abbott's financial position - whether at the time of the deceased's death or presently, indicated any disentitling conduct within s 6(3) of the Act. That is, it was not suggested, and nor could it have been, that there was any profligacy on the part of Norelle.
Leaving aside their current financial liabilities (and increases thereto, such as with interest rates et cetera) Norelle Abbott's evidence was to the effect that presently:
1.their house requires substantial maintenance;[183]
2.her car has not been serviced in over three years and is 16 years old and she would like to purchase a new or newer car that has more safety features and reliability;[184]
3.she would like to fund holidays other than in a permanent caravan at the caravan park in Busselton, more like staying at the Quindalup property which they did while the deceased was alive;[185]
4.she would like to repay her credit card debt;[186] and
5.she requires surgery on a compacted wisdom tooth.[187]

Assessment of Norelle Abbott as a witness

[183] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [17].

[184] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [27].

[185] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [28].

[186] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [29].

[187] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [30].

Norelle Abbott presented as a careful witness. To my observation and impression, she gave her evidence in a candid way and, I thought, without embellishment or attempting to 'improve' her case.
Throughout her cross-examination, she appeared to me to accept readily the limitations of her knowledge and evidence (for example as to how payments had been made in respect of the Quindalup property) and readily accepted sensible propositions put to her in cross‑examination as to, for example, her prospects of employment as a speech pathologist.
I accept fully her explanations as to the revisions that she made to her and Mr Syers' financial position at the time of the deceased's death as she set out in her second affidavit.
While it may go without saying that it would have been preferable for Norelle Abbott to have conducted the sort of in‑depth review of her financial position (by reference to the full suite of documents) initially (i.e. in her first affidavit) that she did make in her second affidavit, I do not think that reflected on her honesty or reliability.
The defendants made no contrary submissions in their closing and, as may be seen above, broadly accepted Norelle Abbott's truthfulness and reliability.
In all of the circumstances, I have accepted Norelle Abbott's evidence as set out above.

Evidence of Luana Abbott

Luana Abbott gave her evidence-in-chief by affidavits:
1.made and filed 4 September 2023 (first Luana Abbott affidavit);[188]
2.made and filed 22 March 2024 (second Luana Abbott affidavit);[189]
3.made and filed 12 July 2024 (third Luana Abbott affidavit);[190] and
4.made 4 November 2024 and filed 7 November 2024 (fourth Luana Abbott affidavit).[191]
[188] Ex. E.
[189] Ex. F.
[190] Ex. G 2TB 435.
[191] Ex. H 2TB 443.
There were passages objected to, and which were not read in the first and second Luana Abbott affidavits. Those passages were struck through by Luana prior to her adoption of the balance and their tendering.
The following evidence of Luana Abbott was not challenged, and I accept and find in accordance with paragraphs [203] to [223] below.
Luana is the second born child of the deceased and Deanne Abbott and was born on 7 August 1976.[192]
[192] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [6(b)].
Luana Abbott had a very close relationship with the deceased throughout his lifetime.[193]
[193] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [18].
She was 15 years old when her parents separated. She then lived with Deanne Abbott most of the time but saw the deceased regularly and enjoyed spending time with him.[194]
[194] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [20].
Luana Abbott graduated from high school in 1993 and started work at a radiology company, initially in a junior role, and then worked up to become a senior medical secretary.[195]
[195] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [26] - [27].
In 1999, she completed a Certificate IV in Travel and Tourism and then initially worked in tourism and then as an events officer and event manager.[196] In these roles she worked full-time up until the time of her daughter's birth in December 2011. She then worked part-time of approximately 20 hours per week.[197]
[196] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [28] - [29].
[197] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [29].
She has two children from a previous relationship; namely Jake who was 20 years of age at the time of trial, and Mahli who was nearly 13 years old at the time of trial.[198]
[198] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [11].
Her de facto relationship with her children's father ended in June 2013;[199] after about 14 years.[200]
[199] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [12].
[200] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [65].
As an adult, her relationship with the deceased 'became stronger' and they were in regular contact.[201] Prior to the end of her de facto relationship with her children's father, she had a close relationship with both the deceased and Shari Abbott, and she and her de facto would socialise with them regularly. There was also a close relationship between the deceased and Shari Abbott and her two children.[202]
[201] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [21].
[202] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [22] - [24].
From no later than mid-2018, Luana Abbott purchased a house at Woodvale from the deceased and Shari Abbott.[203] The consideration for that purchase was about $500,000 for which Luana obtained a loan on mortgage for $400,000[204] and the other $100,000 was, effectively, gifted to her by the deceased and Shari Abbott.[205] Although Luana Abbott did not refer to the effective gift of the $100,000 in her evidence‑in‑chief[206] she readily accepted in cross-examination that had occurred.[207]
[203] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [68]; first Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [42].
[204] ts 73.
[205] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [68].
[206] See for example first Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [42].
[207] ts 73.
There was a subsequent refinancing of that home loan which increased it by at least $85,000. Those additional funds were to completely renovate the backyard, including putting in a pool, and the consolidating of debt.[208]
[208] ts 73 - 74.
Luana Abbott married Kenneth Christopher Doyle on 23 October 2021, and they are still married. The deceased walked her down the aisle.[209]
[209] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [10]
Mr Doyle has two adult children from a previous relationship.[210]
[210] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [13].
Mr Doyle was added, as an owner, to the title of the Woodvale property in about 2017 or 2018.[211]
[211] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [43].
Luana Abbott and Mr Doyle were living at the Woodvale property at the time of the deceased's death.[212]
[212] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [42].
In 2020, Luana Abbott completed a Certificate IV in Training and Assessment.[213]
[213] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [30].
So, at the time of the deceased's death, Luana Abbott was married to Mr Doyle, working as an event manager (at LG Professionals) and was living at the Woodvale property.
In May 2022, Luana Abbott started work at Sacred Heart College as an event manager, working 30 hours a week.[214]
[214] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [31].
At the time of trial, Luana Abbott and Mr Doyle lived in a property in Iluka which they purchased in July 2022[215] for the sum of $960,000.[216]
[215] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [44].
[216] ts 117.
At the time of purchasing the Iluka property, they sold the Woodvale property for $652,000.[217]
[217] Second Shari Abbott affidavit: Ex. Y [70]; ts 74.
In January 2023, she commenced lecturing at TAFE on a fulltime contract but resigned in July 2023 before subsequently commencing, later in July 2023, as a support officer in a jobs program where she works 30 hours a week.[218] Her evidence as to why she resigned from the TAFE position is set out below.
[218] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [31] - [34].
In September 2023, Luana Abbott and Mr Doyle lived with her two children and one of his children. Those three resident children were dependent on Mr Doyle and her.[219]
[219] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [46].
Luana Abbott gave evidence, in the second Luana Abbott affidavit, that in March 2024 she and her children moved out of the house they shared with Mr Doyle for a short period, because of relationship difficulties between her and Mr Doyle. They returned to live in the house within the month.[220] Norelle Abbott's second affidavit corroborated that Luana and her children had spent five days at Norelle's house 'as she had left her family home': that evidence was not challenged.[221]
[220] Second Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. F [5].
[221] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [46].
Her evidence was that she considered her marriage was effectively at an end and she and Mr Doyle have been separated under one roof since she and her children returned to the Iluka house in March 2024.[222]
[222] Second Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. F [6] - [7].
I will return to the status of Luana Abbott's relationship with Mr Doyle below, noting that she was challenged to some degree in cross‑examination about her evidence of the marriage being at an end.
By the time of the second Luana Abbott affidavit, it appears that Mr Doyle's adult child had moved out and Luana Abbott's son was no longer employed as he was studying full‑time.[223]
[223] Second Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. F [18] - [19].
Luana Abbott's daughter commenced at a local public high school at the beginning of 2024.[224] There appears to have been a change of plan as to her schooling from the time of Luana Abbott's first affidavit in September 2023.[225]

Luana Abbott's physical and medical conditions

[224] Second Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. F [20].

[225] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [50].

Luana Abbott's evidence as to her physical and medical conditions was not challenged in cross-examination and I find the matters set out in paragraphs [230] - [238] below accordingly.
Luana Abbott suffers from high blood pressure and has taken medication to manage it for about the last 20 years. The condition affects her kidney function.[226]
[226] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [51].
She suffers from tinnitus for which there is no treatment.[227]
[227] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [52].
She has hearing loss and requires hearing aids which she has not purchased because they are too costly.[228] She has received a quotation of about $11,000 for the recommended hearing aids.[229]
[228] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [53].
[229] Quote for hearing aid dated 9 July 2024: Ex. G.2 2TB 439.
Luana Abbott has been advised that she has, additionally, an issue with her ear drums in both ears which may require surgery.[230]
[230] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [54].
Luana Abbott suffers from anxiety which requires daily medication which she has taken since 2021.[231]
[231] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [55].
Her anxiety was a major contributing factor to her ceasing work as a lecturer at TAFE and limits the employment roles she considers she could be employed in.[232]
[232] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [55].
She has been advised to start counselling for that anxiety but by September 2023 had delayed doing so because of the costs.[233] That remained her position in March of 2024.[234]
[233] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [56].
[234] Second Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. F [24].
Her GP referred her to a psychologist to treat her anxiety in May 2024.[235] As at July 2024, she had a mental health care plan from the GP entitling her to 10 subsidised appointments which she was attending approximately every two weeks.[236]
[235] Third Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. G [9].
[236] Third Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. G [10] - [12].
The subsidised appointments cost her $122 per visit, but when the subsidy finishes then the consultation fees will be approximately $215 per visit, some of which she may be able to recover from her health fund although it was not clear how much.[237]

Trip to America

[237] Third Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. G [11] - [12].

Luana Abbott's evidence-in-chief about a dance tour trip to the USA was as follows:[238]
[238] Second Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. F [21] - [22].
1.the trip was taken from 26 March to 15 April 2024;
2.Luana Abbott went with her two children;
3.the purpose of the trip was for her daughter to perform with her dance academy in a parade at Disneyland in the USA;
4.the trip was committed to in July 2022;
5.the total cost of the trip, which I infer were Luana and her daughter's costs, was $20,779;
6.Luana borrowed $5,000 from her son for the trip;
7.Luana's son had paid for his own costs towards the trip of about $5,000;
8.Luana's ex-de facto partner had agreed to pay about half of their daughter's costs, at about $3,000 but had contributed about $2,200; and
9.leaving aside the amounts borrowed from her and paid by her ex‑partner, Luana had paid the remaining amount of about $8,600 from a particular Bank of Queensland account.
The careful cross-examination of Luana Abbott on the relevant bank accounts when they were all produced showed, in my judgement, that Luana Abbott had paid for the Disneyland trip as a matter of substance in the way she described in her evidence-in-chief, if not exactly from the accounts she had firstly nominated. That is, the substance of her evidence in chief was correct but she had not recalled accurately which account she had used. There was no suggestion, in cross-examination or closing, that there had been any material mis‑statement of her financial circumstances. As a result. I accept the substance of her evidence set out in paragraph [239] above.
The principal criticism that Shari Abbott made of the evidence about the Disneyland trip was that it, in effect, was profligate spending on the part of Luana Abbott in the sense that it was not necessary or, assumedly, responsible expenditure. The logical end point of that criticism is, presumably, that if Luana Abbott has a need or a deficiency in financial resources then they are self-inflicted and should not lead to an exercise of the Court's discretion. I will return to that below in my consideration of Luana Abbott's claim at the second stage of the enquiry.

Luana Abbott's marriage

I have noted Luana Abbott's evidence above as to the breakdown of her marriage to Mr Doyle.
That breakdown was not accepted by Shari Abbott, and Luana Abbott was cross‑examined on that evidence.
It is fair to say that cross-examining counsel did not put much by way of challenge to Luana Abbott on this topic. That is unsurprising given that one might readily imagine that Shari Abbott has no direct knowledge as to the status of that marriage and certainly gave no evidence in her affidavits about it.
The principal challenges made were that:
1.Luana Abbott had only included the relevant evidence in her second affidavit, and not subsequent affidavits;[239] and
2.Luana Abbott went on holiday with Mr Doyle and his daughter to Bali in August 2024 for his 50th birthday.[240]
[239] Second Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. F.
[240] ts 84.
Luana Abbott's evidence was that, in effect, she had deposed to the marriage breakdown in that second affidavit and as nothing had changed, she did not return to that evidence in her later affidavits. I accept that explanation.
Luana Abbott's explanation was that in August of 2024 she was still trying to save the marriage.[241] She said:
I - rightly or wrongly, still trying to save my marriage - it was his birthday. I celebrate birthdays. We all put on a mask when we're trying to not deal with what's right in front of us. And that's exactly what Bali was.[242]
[241] ts 84, ts 88.
[242] ts 88.
From my general findings below as to Luana Abbott as a witness and having regard to the manner in which she gave her evidence in cross‑examination about her marriage, I find that:
1.since March 2024, Luana Abbott and Mr Doyle have been living separately under the one roof;
2.despite efforts at reconciliation, such as the trip to Bali, Luana considers that the marriage is at an end;
3.she does not consider that the combined financial position which she has presented and which I accept in paragraphs [252] ‑ [279] below accurately represents her and Mr Doyle's separate positions if they were to stop living separately under the one roof.

However, with respect, it is plain that as Mitchell and Beech JJA stated Lemon v Mead:
[273]It is impossible to describe, in terms of universal application, what adequate provision for proper maintenance etc will entail for a parent in respect of an adult child. In many cases adequate provision for proper maintenance will not require the parent to support a capable adult child for the rest of his or her life. However, each case will depend on its own circumstances. As … decisions of the High Court … illustrate, in certain circumstances an award in favour of a capable adult child will be justified.[349] (citations omitted)
[349] Lemon v Mead [273].
To similar effect, Hallen J said in Blendell v Byrne:
… I do not intend what I have described as 'principles' or 'general principles' to be elevated into rules of law, propositions of universal application, or rigid formulae. Nor do I wish to suggest that the jurisdiction should be unduly confined, or the discretion should be constrained, by statements of principle found in dicta in other decisions, or by preconceptions and predispositions. Decisions of the past do not, and cannot, put any fetters on the discretionary power, which is left largely unfettered. I do not intend what is provided as a guide to be turned into a tyrant.
It is necessary for the Court, in each, case, after having had regard to the matters that the Act requires it to consider, to determine what is adequate and proper in all the circumstances of the particular case. In addition, in each case, a close consideration of the facts is necessary in order to determine whether the basis for a family provision order has been established. Every case is different and must be decided on its own facts.[350]

The second stage

[350] Blendell v Byrne [636], [637].

As noted, the considerations between the first and second stage overlap. In setting out the following, I am not excluding from my consideration the other relevant considerations which I set out in the first stage above.
At the second stage, the Court exercises its discretion by reference to the circumstances as they exist at the date of the order.[351]
[351] Lemon v Mead [56] (Buss P).
The Court is empowered to order such provision from the deceased's estate as the Court thinks fit, but the Court is not empowered to award more than what is 'adequate' provision for the claimant's 'proper maintenance' et cetera.[352] The power is confined by the text and purpose of the legislation to the making of orders which will ensure that 'adequate' provision is made from the deceased's estate for the claimant's 'proper' maintenance et cetera.[353]
[352] Lemon v Mead [58] (Buss P).
[353] Lemon v Mead [58] (Buss P).
As understood within the parameters of the High Court's explanation of the statutory criterion, the Court's discretionary power at the second stage is not limited to making provision for the bare needs, subsistence or necessities of life of the claimant.[354]
[354] Lemon v Mead [78] (Buss P).
The exercise of the discretionary power in the second stage has been described as 'one of great difficulty and delicacy' and 'must always be one largely of guess-work …'.[355]
[355] Lemon v Mead [57] (Buss P) approving of the statement by Lord Roma for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 176.
The task at the second stage has been described as 'instinctive synthesis' or 'intuitive assessment'.[356]
[356] Stone v Braun [2015] WASCA 103 [92] (Beech J for the Court).
Although the discretionary power at the second stage is, no doubt, very broad, the discretion must be exercised by reference to the evidence before the Court, or in appropriate circumstances, facts of which the Court can take judicial notice.[357]
[357] Lemon v Mead [83] (Buss P).

Consideration of Norelle Abbott's claim

In her first affidavit, Norelle Abbott sought an order which would allow:
1.the house loan secured by a mortgage to be paid off;
2.her HECS debt to be paid off;
3.her daughter's education to be paid for; and
4.the provision of a lump sum to insulate against the uncertainties of life and to provide a financial buffer.[358]
[358] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [60].
Initially, she sought half of the deceased's Estate.[359] At trial, however, she sought one quarter of the deceased's Estate.[360]
[359] First Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. A [61].
[360] ts 40.
At the time of the deceased's death, it may be accepted that Norelle Abbott and Mr Syers were in a reasonably healthy position if one considers their assets over their liabilities: see paragraph [180] above.
However, as noted in paragraph [181] above, more than $1.6 million of their assets, which totalled $1,748,112, were in their house and superannuation entitlements.
The significance, in my view, of that is that, as a matter of superannuation law, while their entitlements are significant in the longer term, they may be considered to be of less significance in assessing a claimant's claim to more immediate provision (both at the time of the deceased's death and now).
That may be seen from the following: based on the findings made in paragraph [177], at the time of the deceased's death Norelle Abbott and her Mr Syers were drawing on their savings to meet a monthly deficit of about $1,000. As noted, there was no suggestion made by Shari Abbott that Norelle Abbott and Mr Syers spent money or incurred expenses in a profligate way.
Principally, that deficit was the result of their daughter's school fees and their decision for Norelle Abbott not to work full-time in paid employment (on the assumption that she would have been able to find full-time work) and for her to engage in further education and re‑training.
Some submissions were made to the effect that there was a decision made by Norelle Abbott not to work full-time in paid employment and, at least in the early part of their daughter's life, to prioritise parental responsibilities.[361]
[361] ts 62 - 63.
I think the intention of that submission was to suggest that because of that choice, Norelle Abbott and Mr Syers had 'chosen' to curtail their means from which they could meet their needs.
The extension of the submission, appears to me, was that the making of no provision by the deceased by the Will was not inadequate provision (within the statutory meaning) because of the choices which Norelle and Mr Syers had made.
There appears to me to be an assumption in the submission that the decision to prioritise parental responsibilities should only be made if a couple can 'afford' to do so. The thrust of the submissions seems to be that:
1.if the income of the party to the couple working full-time is not sufficient to meet the couple's expenses, then the other party 'should' work in paid employment; and
2.a party should not undertake further education to gain a qualification for specialist employment, but rather should take paid employment which does not require additional education or qualifications.
I think by contemporary accepted community standards, there are a number of contestable propositions inherent in that submission.
I am not saying that there would be a single answer given by reference to those standards to the contestable propositions. However, the fact that different answers are available from within those standards suggests strongly to me that I should not find that the choice or choices made had the effect that the no provision made was adequate provision at the time of death.
It might also be considered that there are some practical assumptions or propositions within the submission. For example, that Norelle Abbott would have obtained paid full-time, or part‑time, work. And, that the income derived from that would have exceeded any additional costs, such as childcare, which her working in paid employment might have necessitated.
I do not accept the submission that, in all of the circumstances, no provision here was adequate provision because of choices made by Norelle Abbott.
In my assessment, Norelle Abbott had 'needs' for her proper maintenance, support, education or advancement which were not being met at the time of the deceased's death from her own resources.
In making that finding, I consider it of significance that the deceased had stated a willingness to assist with Norelle Abbott's daughter's school fees.[362] While the test is objective, I do not consider it to be irrelevant that the deceased made the statement I have found in paragraph [168.6] above. That is, the deceased's attitude or intention evidences to some degree an accepted community standard that a grandparent should or might contribute to, or make provision for, the education of a grandchild.
[362] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [24].
Further, the deceased's intention at the time of his death remained that, ultimately, his estate would, on Shari Abbott's subsequent death, be shared between the four children.
The fact that Norelle Abbott and Mr Syers were unable to cover their cost of living month to month (and not as a result of profligate spending) is, consistently with the principles identified above, to be considered, along with the considerable size of the Estate.
And, there was no suggestion made by Shari Abbott that had the Will made adequate provision for Norelle Abbott at the time of the deceased's death, that would have prejudiced any other person who had a claim to the deceased's bounty or Estate in any meaningful way.
I find at the time of the deceased's death that the Will did not make adequate provision for Norelle Abbott for her proper maintenance, support, education or advancement in life.
I find that Norelle Abbott satisfies the first stage or the 'jurisdictional question'.
I now turn to what would be adequate provision.
Again, assessing Norelle Abbott's financial position, it may be accepted that currently, as per paragraph [190] above, she is in a reasonably sound position if one simply were to take her net asset position.
However, to do that simply, in my view, ignores two relevant matters.
The first is that she and her family need to live somewhere. Their house has been the family home for a good number of years and is close to their daughter's school.[363] While the value of their house is relevant to a consideration of their financial position, it is too simplistic, in my view, to look at the value of the house without considering the cost of a possible or convenient alternative.
[363] Second Norelle Abbott affidavit: Ex. B [33]
Again, I repeat the observations I made in paragraph [378] above as to the relevance of their superannuation entitlements as at today's date.
At the second stage, I consider Norelle Abbott and Mr Syers' joint superannuation entitlements assist me to conclude that an order ought not be made now which seeks to provide for the rest of Norelle Abbott's life. That conclusion is reinforced by the effect of the Mutual Will Agreement.
As found in paragraph [185] above, notwithstanding no profligacy (and notwithstanding the value of their house and superannuation entitlements) there is a current monthly deficit of about $1,000 per month.
That deficit may be covered entirely if Norelle Abbott were to obtain paid employment as a speech pathologist.[364] However, as accepted by Shari Abbott, that is not certain.[365] The Court is required to undertake the difficult and delicate assessment which must be largely one of guess-work, (or instinctive assessment) consistently with the authorities.
[364] Norelle Abbott estimated that full-time graduate work in speech pathology would pay between $78,000 and $89,000 per year. She testified that she is hoping to work 3 days a week, and that the extra income will assist her and Mr Syers to 'break even'. ts 64 - 65.
[365] ts 255.
However, taking into account their relatively comfortable position of assets over liabilities (when one considers the house and superannuation entitlements and the effect of the Mutual Will Agreement), in my judgement Norelle Abbott's 'needs' for which provision should be made are for the next number of years only. That is even accepting that there is the real possibility of her obtaining paid employment as a speech pathologist.
In my judgement there should be an award to Norelle in the sum of $245,000 which would:
1.make provision for the expenses of her daughter's education for the next six years; which I would assess at 6 x $15,000, or $90,000;
2.provide a sum which would allow her to pay her HECS debt of around $32,000 in full; and
3.provide a sum which will allow her to have the required surgery and give her a relatively modest buffer against life's contingencies; which I would assess at about $120,000 (remembering they have little, if anything, by way of savings to draw on).
That is, I would be minded to award a sum of $245,000, which I note is about 8.3% of the net Estate. I have used the above items only as a way of guiding the instinctive assessment required. I am not stipulating that any sum awarded is to be allocated to or spent on any one of the above items.
The claimants indicated that they wished to consider, and then be heard on the form of the final orders which might be made if the Court found in their favour.
It seems to me that is an appropriate course to adopt. There are considerations such as raised by s 14 of the Act which have not been the subject of any submissions.
However, in particular, I am conscious that an order under the legislation is not an opportunity for the Court to re‑write a testator's will in anything other than the most limited manner to make adequate provision.
In that context, the Mutual Will Agreement and the contractual obligations it imposes on Shari Abbott are of significance.
Clearly, the intention of the award I would be minded to make in favour of Norelle Abbott is not intended to bring forward her whole entitlement in the event that Shari Abbott performed the Mutual Will Agreement. I should note there was no suggestion at trial that Shari Abbott intended to do otherwise. Nor do I presently consider that an award would be an occasion to depart from the Mutual Will Agreement.
An option which may commend itself to the parties is that any orders made reflect a lump sum being paid to Norelle Abbott, but that the parties reach an agreement as to some form of words, whether in an order or otherwise, which otherwise preserves Norelle Abbott's position under the Mutual Will Agreement.
That is, I consider that any order made by the Court should disturb to the smallest extent possible both the deceased's Will and the Mutual Will Agreement (which lay behind the Will).

Consideration of Luana Abbott's claim

Luana Abbott also seeks one quarter of the deceased's Estate.
What is apparent (from Confidential Annexure E), is that Luana Abbott and Mr Doyle's assets, which were not the subject of borrowings at the time of the deceased's death, included only a modest amount of savings. At the time of the deceased's death, it may be accepted that Luana Abbott (and Mr Doyle) were in a reasonably healthy position if one considers their assets over their liabilities: see paragraph [253] above.
However, as noted in paragraph [254] above, more than $850,000 of their assets of $915,000 were in their house and superannuation entitlements.
I do not repeat here my observations above as to the significance of the superannuation entitlements (both at the time of the deceased's death and now).
It is to be remembered that by the time of the deceased's death, Mr Doyle, who was contributing most of the income to the couple, had already had significant back surgery and was facing, at the very least, some uncertainty as to whether he could continue in his employment as it then was: see paragraph [294] above.
Shari Abbott, correctly in submissions, drew the Court's attention to the surplus of about $4,000 per month of income over expenses at the time of the deceased's death.[366] Accepting that, as I have already, it is plain that while the surplus was not then translating into savings, it might have provided a more significant buffer for the couple.
[366] ts 85.
The submissions made against Luana Abbott's claim at this stage were to the effect that there had been an element of, if not profligacy, at least, somewhat imprudent spending up to the time of the deceased's death.[367]
[367] ts 104.
That was coupled with the submission as to the deceased's and Shari Abbott's previous assistance to Luana Abbott (with the purchase of the Woodvale property) and the discretionary expense (as I infer the submission to be) and increase in their home loan to improve the Woodvale property by the total renovation of the backyard.
The effect of Shari Abbott's submissions, as I understood them, was that because of the previous gift of a $100,000 'deposit' towards the purchase of the Woodvale property, and the choice made to increase the home loan over the property, the excess of income over expenses means that the no provision made was not inadequate in all of the circumstances.
There is obvious force in that submission.
However, in my judgement, at the time of the deceased's death, there were questions about the continuation of Mr Doyle's employment in the way and at the remuneration that they had enjoyed because of his medical conditions. There was no particular reason to question Luana Abbott's income at that time, but it was much the smaller part of the couple's income.
Further, given that uncertainty, there was, in my judgement, a question at the time of the deceased's death about the adequacy of the buffer which the couple had in the event of unforeseen adverse life events or a significant deterioration (or non-recovery) in Mr Doyle's physical condition.
I accept that Luana Abbott and Mr Doyle's financial position at the time of the deceased's death could have been better from what it was.
The assessment of the adequacy of the provision includes consideration of the size of the Estate. As noted above, there is no suggestion that making provision for Luana Abbott would have prejudiced, or does so now, any other claimant on the deceased's bounty or Estate.
I have found that the deceased and Shari Abbott had gifted the 'deposit' of $100,000 towards the purchase of the Woodvale property. That occurred some years before the deceased's death. While that is relevant to the question of whether adequate provision was made at the time of the deceased's death, I do not consider it to be determinative or to have great weight.
That Luana Abbott and Mr Doyle had carried out the improvements to the Woodvale property might be thought by some to have been unnecessary and indicative of a strong financial position. However, there would be a very significant proportion of the community that has carried out such improvements by increasing the loan secured against the property to be improved. That is, at least for a significant part of the community, and their contemporary accepted standards, the extra borrowing and improvement would not be considered out of the ordinary.
Taking all of the above matters into consideration at the time of the deceased's death, I find that the lack of provision made by the deceased in the Will was not adequate provision for Luana Abbott.
That is, I hold that she meets the requirements of stage one, or the jurisdictional question.
I turn to what would constitute adequate provision now.
The item which attracted the bulk of the submissions against current provision was the Disneyland trip.
The submissions made were to the effect that this was profligate or extravagant spending.
Again, as I understood it, the thrust of the submission made against Luana Abbott here is that the choice she made to take the Disneyland trip with her daughter meant that if she was living outside of her means, that was by reason of her choice.
I accept Luana Abbott's evidence that she considered the trip to be a 'once in a lifetime' opportunity for her daughter. As was her evidence, I accept this was not her daughter simply visiting Disneyland, but was part of her dancing activities through a dedicated school, and was some two years in the planning and preparation.

Again, in my judgement, views in the community may well differ as to this expenditure.
As I assess it, the question is not whether everybody in the community would have made that expenditure, but rather whether such expenditure is within contemporary accepted standards such that it would not prevent Luana Abbott requiring further provision now.
I find that a significant part of the community would accept that if not necessary as such, the trip and the expenditure were proper and worthwhile both for Luana Abbott and her daughter.
It may be noted that on her evidence, Luana Abbott prioritised that trip and expenditure over spending money on herself and her medical conditions.[368]
[368] First Luana Abbott affidavit: Ex. E [22] - [24].
In all of the circumstances, including considering the size of the Estate and that provision for Luana Abbott (depending on the size of this provision) would not prejudice any other claimant on the deceased's bounty, I consider that the Estate should make provision now for Luana Abbott.
I have accepted Luana Abbott's evidence as to her physical and medical conditions and the expenditure that would be required to address those issues. I would assess the 'required' provision to include a sum that would allow Luana Abbott to address those conditions.
However, the single biggest matter by any measure is Luana Abbott's claim for provision now to allow her financial independence and to live apart from Mr Doyle.
I have accepted Luana Abbott's evidence that she considers her marriage to be at an end and that she wishes to (understandably) live apart from Mr Doyle. In my judgement, it is plain that, on the assumption that Luana Abbott is to provide for her two children on her income and child support from her former partner for the foreseeable future, serious difficulties arise.
Even dividing her and Mr Doyle's equity in the Iluka property (the sum being $385,840) equally would lead to Luana Abbott facing significant obstacles to provide for herself and for her two children in any way starting to approach their current standard of living.
On that basis also, it may be seen that the expenditure on the Disneyland trip is comparatively immaterial to Luana Abbott's current financial position.
That raises for me considerations as to how I should assess that provision in light of the family law considerations which follow.

Luana Abbott: family law considerations

In her opening submissions, it was submitted for Luana Abbott that:
Luana and [Mr Doyle's] marriage is experiencing difficulties, and they are separated but living under one roof. If Luana and [Mr Doyle's] marriage was to permanently breakdown or if [Mr Doyle] was to suffer greater ill health, Luana would not have means to meet her expenses. Her half share of the equity in her home is insufficient to purchase a suitable property for her and her children if needed and Luana would be unlikely to obtain a loan to purchase a property. Her marriage and financial support from [Mr Doyle] is uncertain.[369] (original citations omitted)
[369] Claimants' submissions [64].
Shari Abbott, in closing, submitted that Luana Abbott's present needs were very difficult to determine on the evidence of her marriage being at an end.[370]
[370] ts 267.
In closing, in answer to a question, counsel for Luana Abbott submitted:
… if your Honour makes an order and a certain sum is paid to Luana Abbott, then that forms part of her financials for whatever Family Court proceedings may ensue. So it's not as if it's quarantined, marginalised, kept separate. It would have to be brought to account, because it has now been received, and so her circumstances for the purpose of Family Court proceedings would then be as they present, with the benefit of your Honour's determination forming part of that.[371]
[371] ts 292.
Counsel for Luana Abbott then further submitted:
… I think the answer I've given your Honour is the best I can do in the circumstances, and I don't think - whilst it's a consideration that your Honour might bring to bear, there are no Family Court proceedings on foot. There is therefore no reason or no impediment to your Honour proceeding, as we're encouraging you, to make a determination, and if in the exercise of discretion that leads to a payment to Luana Abbott, then that's the discharge of your Honour's jurisdiction within the context of these proceedings. How that falls to be determined in the Family Court is a matter which doesn't form part of these considerations ...[372]
[372] ts 293.
The submission was then made to the effect that this Court should treat the current assets and liabilities of Luana Abbott and Mr Doyle as being effectively divided between them half and half; or that was how the Family Court would treat them.[373]
[373] ts 293.
Here, Luana Abbott seeks an order for her provision to give her 'financial security'[374] and an award which would allow her to provide separately for herself and her two children.[375]
[374] ts 292.
[375] ts 38: Luana Abbott's opening submissions.
So the Court is asked to assess Luana Abbott's current need for provision on the basis that she 'needs' to separate from Mr Doyle and provide separately for herself (and her two children).
Understandably she does not assert that there would not be Family Court proceedings if there was such a separation and divorce, including as to the adjustment of property interests.
However, it is entirely unclear to me:
1.what division the Family Court may make of the property which I have found to be Luana Abbott and Mr Doyle's current assets and liabilities; and
2.how the Family Court would treat any award made by this Court now to Luana Abbott in that Court's future adjustment, if any, of the parties' (to the marriage) property rights.
Unfortunately, there is simply no material before the Court which might give me any confidence that the assumption that there will be a half and half division between Luana Abbott and Mr Doyle on a family law adjustment of their property is correct.
Further, 'adequate' provision for Luana Abbott depends very much on what, if any, assumptions I make as to whether any award to her will be 'received' by, or shared with, to any degree, Mr Doyle.
The submissions to the Court were to the effect that adequate provision for her now would allow her to live apart from Mr Doyle with her two children. However, there was no evidence before the Court as to what would be required to provide the rent of a suitable house if either the Iluka property was to be sold, or Mr Doyle remained in that house. Or, if the Iluka property was sold, what additional provision Luana Abbott might require in all of the circumstances, to purchase or rent such a residence.
While I have cited the statement of principle that at the second stage there is always 'guess-work' I do not imagine that such statements are intending to suggest that this should not be an educated or informed basis for the assessment..
All of this, of course, occurs in the context where it was open to Luana Abbott to put material before the Court as to:
1.how the Family Court would likely approach the matter of their existing property 'pool';
2.how the Family Court would likely consider an order of this Court under the Act and, more particularly, whether it would be considered part of the asset 'pool' of the marriage; and
3.what sum would allow her to buy or rent a suitable house.
Further, it was unclear whether an agreement had been attempted, or could be reached, with Mr Doyle as to the future division of any award this Court makes.
The purpose of the previous two paragraphs is to identify gaps in the evidence or material before the Court that Luana Abbott could have addressed.
In all of the circumstances an acceptable disposition of the matter may have been that the Court holds that Luana Abbott had not (outside of the medical and physical conditions) established a claim to proper provision at the present time.
That disposition does not presently commend itself to me, without hearing further from the parties. Such a disposition would not be consistent with the findings I have made as to Luana Abbott's current position, and such a result would visit (unfairly, in my view) on Luana Abbott the consequences of her case not having been prepared properly.
I have been unable to find any authority which directly assists me as to the proper approach that should be adopted. The question was not before the Court in Boscolo v Australian Unity Trustees Ltd,[376] (to which I was referred) and, in those circumstances, the observations that Solomon J made[377] are not to the present point.
[376] Boscolo v Australian Unity Trustees Ltd [2023] WASC 391 (Boscolo v Australian Unity Trustees Ltd).
[377] Boscolo v Australian Unity Trustees Ltd [183] ‑ [184].
Nor does the High Court's decision in Smith v Smith[378] assist. In that case, the High Court was considering two broad questions, namely:
1.whether there was an inconsistency between s 87 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and s 31 of the Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) within the meaning of s 109 of the Constitution; and
2.whether the Family Court of Australia had jurisdiction to exercise the power of approval conferred on the Supreme Court of New South Wales by s 31 of the Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW).
[378] Smith v Smith [1986] HCA 36; (1986) 161 CLR 217.
It was in that context that, for example, the observations were made by Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ that:
… maintenance and the determination and adjustment of property interests on the breakdown of a marriage is, generally speaking, a legal topic which is separate and distinct from testator's family maintenance.[379]
[379] Smith v Smith 243.
However, I have been greatly assisted in my thinking by the broad and detailed analysis undertaken by Solomon J as to the formulation of orders in the second stage in AB v FGH.[380] Unfortunately, this was not cited to me.
[380] [2022] WASC 244. Appeal dismissed in FGH v NOP [2023] WASCA 177. Special leave was refused in FGH v NOP [2024] HCASL 95.
At this point I do not need to repeat or even summarise the vast work reflected in those reasons. However, what is plain and material here by reference to the authorities cited in AB v FGH (and FGH v NOP),[381] is that:
1the Act is directed to provide for the applicant, rather than to give her a slice of the Estate;[382]
2an order of the Court under the Act is the grant of a new right from the time of the Court's order;[383]
3whether an award under the Act would in fact benefit the claimant is a most important consideration; and
4the Act, as remedial legislation, is to be construed to give the most complete remedy which the wording of the statute permits.[384]
[381] [2023] WASCA 177.
[382] AB v FGH [2022] WASC 244 [139].
[383] AB v FGH [190 (g)].
[384] Barns v Barns [44] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); AB v FGH [118], [190(a)]; FGH v NOP [34] (Beech JA and Seward J) and [149] (Mullins AJA).
The careful working through and application of such principles to the fashioning of an award as done by Solomon J in AB v FGH, is simply not possible here on the current materials.
Because of the matters identified in Norelle Abbott's claim above, final orders cannot be made immediately on the delivery of these reasons in any event.
In those circumstances, my view is that I should hear from Luana Abbott further as to whether she wishes to re-open her case in any respect, and then hear from the parties further as to how they submit the Court should proceed in relation to Luana Abbott's claim.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
IF
Associate to the Hon Justice Howard
6 FEBRUARY 2025

MOVEABLE PROPERTY
NAB account	$803,064.06
Bentley motor vehicle	E $70,000.00
Tax refund 2021	$45,466.97
Tax refund 2022	$34,888.82
KCA Sales Pty Ltd	$1.00
Ken Abbott Super Pty Ltd	$1.00
Loan payable by B&A Abbott Family Trust	$990,476.00
Loan payable by Camabb Pty Ltd	$137,139.00
Personal effects	$1,000.00
Wages owing	$1,909.00
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
65 Bushland Retreat, Carramar	E $925,000.00
LIABILITIES
NAB credit card	$14,819.81
Funeral expenses	$19,333.63
KCA Sales Guarantee	$189,128.20
Funds owing to Ken Abbott Superannuation Fund	$150,484.00
Funds owing to Family Trust	$634,101.52
Synergy	$351.44
Telstra	$130.43
Carramar expenses	$1,334.05
NET TOTAL	E $1,999,262.77
Where "E" is estimated