Abbas and Pesut

[2009] FamCA 548

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ABBAS & PESUT [2009] FamCA 548

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Settlement in relation to marriage

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75(2), 79

Lee Steere and Lee Steere (1985) FLC 91-626
Ferraro and Ferraro (1993) FLC 92-335
Hickey and Hickey (2003) FLC 93-143; 30 Fam LR 355
Coghlan and Coghlan (2005) FLC 93-220; 32 Fam LR 414
Clauson and Clauson (1995) FLC 92-595; 18 Fam LR 693

APPLICANT: Ms Abbas

RESPONDENT: Mr Pesut

FILE NUMBER: SYC 2528 of 2008

DATE DELIVERED: 25 June 2009

PLACE DELIVERED: Sydney

PLACE HEARD: Sydney

JUDGMENT OF: Johnston JR

HEARING DATE: 30 April & 1 May 2009

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Wong

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Clinch Long Letherbarrow

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Thomas

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Lapaine Pomare & Forster

Orders

1. That the wife pay to the husband within 42 days the sum of $34 345.

2. That within 42 days the husband and wife do all things and sign all documents necessary to discharge the mortgage registered against the titles to the properties known as G property, and P property in New South Wales and that the wife do all things and sign all documents necessary to refinance the loans into her sole name.

3. That the wife indemnify the husband in relation to all debts and outgoings in relation to the above properties and in relation to the company S Services Pty Limited.

4. The husband shall forthwith deliver to the wife the Honda Prelude motor vehicle owned by S Services Pty Limited.

5. That in the event that the wife fails to comply with orders 1 and 2 above she shall forthwith do all things and sign all documents necessary to sell the said property at G for the best price reasonably able to be obtained and pay the husband $34 345 from the proceeds of sale together with interest at the rate under the Family Law Rules for the period commencing within 42 days and concluding on the date paid.

6. That otherwise each party shall be the sole owner of all items of property and superannuation in their respective possession and / or control.

7. That in the event that either party refuses or neglects to sign any document required for the purposes of these orders the Registrars of this Court are appointed pursuant to s 106A of the Act to sign any such document in the name of such party and to do all things necessary to give validity to the operation of the said document.

8. That both parties have leave to re-list these proceedings on 7 days notice in relation to the implementation of these orders.

9. That the above orders not commence operation until 10 July 2009 and that both parties have leave to re-list these proceedings at any time prior to 10 July 2009 for the purpose of further submissions about the form of these orders only.

10. That all exhibits be released.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Abbas & Pesut is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

FILE NUMBER: SYC 2528 of 2008

MS ABBAS

Applicant

And

MR PESUT

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and Applications

1. The parties in these proceedings are Ms Abbas and Mr Pesut.  For convenience I shall refer to them as “the wife” and “the husband” respectively.  They have approached this Court in circumstances where they have been unable to achieve a resolution of their dispute about their property. 

2. The wife seeks orders to the following effect:

   1.That within 42 days the parties do all acts and sign all documents necessary to discharge the mortgage on the properties at [G] being Folio […] and [P] being Folio […] and that the wife do all acts and sign all documents necessary to refinance the loans into her sole name. 

   2.That simultaneously with compliance with the above order the wife shall indemnify the husband and keep him indemnified in relation to all debts and outgoings in relation to the above properties and also in relation to the company [S] Services Pty Limited.

   3.That otherwise each party be declared the sole owner of:

   ·Any property, chattels, goods, furnishings, motor vehicles and any other property in their possession and / or control respectively;

   ·Any monies, shares, debentures, superannuation, business, entity or property which stands in their sole name respectively.

   4.That otherwise each party be declared solely liable in law and in equity for any debt in that party’s sole name or in the name of any entity in which that party has an interest.

   5.That in the event that either party refuses or neglects to sign any deed or instrument necessary for the purposes of these orders the Registrar of this Court is appointed pursuant to s 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 to sign such deed or instrument in the name of such party and to do all acts necessary to give validity to the operation of the deed or instrument.

3. On the other hand, the husband is seeking orders to the effect that the two properties referred to in the first order sought by the wife be sold for the best price reasonably able to be obtained and that the net proceeds of sale after payment of the mortgages and costs of the sale be paid in an appropriate amount to the husband which would achieve an equal division of the property available for division between the parties.

4. The husband also consents to an order being made the effect of which would be that he would return the Honda Prelude motor vehicle to the wife within 7 days after she paid him the amount under the above order.

Background

1. The husband was born in August 1962 and he is therefore 46 years of age.  The wife was born in January 1975 and she is therefore 34 years of age.  There is a keenly contested issue about when they commenced cohabiting and I shall refer to this further below.  It is clear that the parties married in February 2005 and that they separated on 6 April 2008.  There are no children of the marriage.  The husband has three children from a previous relationship.

2. At the time of the marriage the wife’s property consisted of the villa registered in her name at G, New South Wales.  The wife had purchased this property in October 2004 for $$305 000.  She had paid a deposit of $36 260, legal fees of $1222 and she had received approximately $7000 by way of the first home owner’s grant which of course went towards the purchase costs.  She borrowed money from the National Australia Bank on mortgage, the outstanding balance at the time of the parties’ marriage being approximately $275 500.  At this time the wife also owned her interest in her company S Services Pty Limited.

3. The wife had also paid $10 000 towards the parties’ wedding reception and photographs which was the major part of the costs of the wedding and $4470 towards the parties’ honeymoon in Croatia.  The wife also contributed $3000 towards spending money on the honeymoon. 

4. On the other hand, at the time of marriage the husband had no assets of significant value apart from an interest which he had in the First State Superannuation Fund, the value of which at the time is unclear but at the date of the hearing was agreed as being $45 689.  The husband had a liability of $27 000 to G E Finance secured over the Honda Prelude motor vehicle.  The husband contributed approximately $5000 towards the costs of the wedding and honeymoon.

5. In October 2006 the parties purchased in the wife’s name the property at P, New South Wales for $245 000.  The wife paid amounts totalling $42 925 by way of deposit and costs. 

6. The wife paid all of the mortgage repayments in respect of each of the properties from the account of her company S Services Pty Limited.  Both the husband and wife were jointly responsible to the bank in respect of the loans secured by mortgages over the properties.

Credit

1. I have serious reservations about the reliability of the sworn evidence of each of these parties.

2. On the one hand the wife appeared to me to be an unimpressive witness.  From the outset of her cross-examination she demonstrated great difficulty in being able to provide a responsive answer to each question.  After I had observed this difficulty following several questions to her I endeavoured to explain what a responsive answer was and the importance of her trying to concentrate on the question and provide a responsive answer.  Subsequently I had further cause to endeavour to do this but it made no difference to the manner in which the wife gave her answers.  The answers usually included a narrative which sometime bore some relevance to the matter the subject of the question.  Some of the answers contained speeches.  Most of the answers appeared to me to be an endeavour by the wife to say things which were perceived by her to be likely to promote her own case. 

3. Some matters caused me particular disquiet. 

4. The wife’s absolute denial that the parties had anything other than a platonic relationship before they were engaged which was shortly before marriage caused me some concern.  I shall refer to this again below.  It also troubled me that the wife refused to concede that the husband had made any household contributions during the parties’ marriage apart from her concession that he cut the small amount of grass adjacent to the villa at G sometimes.  I shall also refer to her evidence about this again below. 

5. Having said that, on the other hand, I was very concerned about many aspects of the husband’s evidence.  I regard him as being an even less reliable witness than the wife.  His assertions about the parties’ relationship, and especially details thereof prior to their marriage, was completely irreconcilable with the account of the wife about such matters.  In summary, he asserted that they had cohabited from approximately 1998 at various homes rented by him and he denied that their relationship over that period was merely platonic, asserting that it was a full relationship.  I shall refer to this again below.

6. It is clear that the husband exaggerated the level of his taxable income for each of the financial years ending 30 June 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 as set out in his affidavit.  He did this by a considerable margin.  I am satisfied further that he exaggerated any contribution which he might have made to the wife’s business.  In my view he made little, if any, contribution to her business.  I was particularly concerned about the document which became Exhibit 8 in the evidence.  This was a document which purported to be a reference by the wife on her business letterhead about the history of the husband’s employment by her business and a description of the type of work which he had undertaken in the business as well as some observations about his personal character and work ethics.  The wife denied that she had ever signed any such document.  The husband said that he had prepared the document and that he had given it to the wife to sign.  I must say I prefer the wife’s evidence about this matter.  I am no hand-writing expert but to my observation the signature which appears on this document is not the same signature as that which appears consistently in the wife’s affidavit and other court documents in these proceedings.  In my view, it is more probable than not that this has been a document prepared by the husband in a somewhat clumsy endeavour to fabricate evidence to promote his case.

7. In February 2009 the husband was working with continuity as a relief teacher at R School.  Yet in his affidavit sworn at that time he indicated that he remained registered with Centrelink and was accepting casual and relief teaching positions offered.  It surprised me that he did not go on to indicate that in fact he was working at R School.  His explanation for not doing so was that he was only doing this in a relief teaching capacity and was uncertain whether further work would be offered.  In my view he was less than forthcoming concerning the real position of his employment. 

8. The husband was also asked a question about whether he had ever sold anything on the internet to which he answered in the negative.  But it emerged during cross-examination that he had in fact advertised artwork of his for sale on the internet.  In my view this casts him in a poor light.  It seems to me that having been asked whether he had ever sold anything on the internet the appropriate answer would have been no but that he had placed an advertisement on the internet in an endeavour to sell artwork. 

9. My conclusion about the credit of the parties is that each of them is an unreliable witness and the Court needs to exercise caution about what each of them says without corroboration from some objective source.

Cohabitation

1. There is an issue about when the parties commenced cohabiting.  I have made a passing reference to this above.  The wife asserts that the parties commenced their cohabitation upon their marriage in February 2005.  On the other hand the husband says that they commenced cohabiting in or about August 1998 at premises owned by him and his former wife at M.  He said that from about that time until their marriage in February 2005 they lived together as a couple and essentially as husband and wife.  He said that the wife lived at his various homes from between four to five nights per week there, that they shared the same bedroom and had a sexual relationship, that the wife had personal belongings of hers at his home, that they did the shopping together and that each of them referred publicly to the other as their partner.  The husband also said that he had three children from his previous marriage and continued to see them mainly on weekends on which occasion the wife would not be staying with him but would stay with her parents.  The husband also said that the wife had explained to him that she could not live with him in a de facto relationship on a full time basis as her family did not approve of the relationship.

2. During the course of her cross-examination the wife denied each and every one of these assertions.

3. The wife said that the parties only became engaged a few weeks before their marriage in February 2005.  So this would have put the time of their engagement at January or February 2005.  The wife agreed with that.  The wife said that she purchased her G villa completing the purchase on 21 October 2004.  She said that she obtained the mortgage from the National Australia Bank and that she was the only signatory to the loan in the first instance.  She said that the husband became a co-borrower in respect of the loan with her in late 2004.  She said that they went together to the National Australia Bank in late 2004 and changed the mortgage from only her signature to both signatures.  The wife said that during 2004 the parties had only a platonic relationship and she denied that their relationship was more serious than platonic at the time that the husband became a co-borrower in respect of the loan.  In respect of this part of the wife’s evidence learned counsel for the husband suggested that it is simply unbelievable and I must say that I accept that submission.  In my view what the wife has done is to have understated the extent of the relationship between the parties and the duration thereof with a view to promoting her own case. Having said that I am unable to make a finding that the parties commenced cohabiting certainly at any time prior to the time in January 2005 when the wife said that they were in a state of engagement before marriage.

4. But in any event, this matters little in these property proceedings.  I say this because what is relevant is the contributions which each of the parties have made to their property and to their welfare. 

5. Some support for the view that it is more likely than not that these parties only lived together from a time very shortly before their marriage is given by the Financial Agreement which they entered into on 10 February 2005.  Recital C to this Agreement is as follows:

   C.[Ms Abbas] and [Mr Pesut] have never lived together.

6. The husband was cross-examined in detail about this matter.  He said that despite the fact that he had signed the agreement and initialled various recitals and clauses in the agreement that he did not read that recital at the time that he signed the agreement.  He said that he simply signed the agreement out of his love for the wife.  In my view there are a number of matters which cause some concern about the husband’s assertions in this regard.  Firstly he said that he had some concerns about the solicitor who prepared the agreement Rita Hanna.  He was concerned about Ms Hanna because he knew that she was a friend of the wife.  The second matter of concern is simply the nature of the agreement.  This is because it was clearly an agreement purporting to have been made in contemplation of the parties’ impending marriage.  Amongst other things the husband was acknowledging in the agreement that he had made no financial contribution towards assets and resources of the wife as set out in the schedule to the agreement.  Given the level of education of the husband, given the fact that he is a professional person and given his life experience I must say I find myself unable to accept his assertions in this regard.  In my view, it is more probable than not that he knew that he was signing an important document which recorded, amongst other things, that the parties had never lived together. 

The Applicable Law

1. Sub-section 79(1) of the Act provides that in property settlement proceedings, the Court may make such order as it considers appropriate.

2. Sub-section 79(2) provides that the Court shall not make an order under the above sub-section unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order.

3. There is a long-standing preferred approach to the determination of an application brought pursuant to the provisions of s 79.  This involves four inter-related steps.  Firstly, the Court should make findings about the identity and value of the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties at the date of the hearing.  Secondly, the Court should identify and assess the contributions of the parties within the meaning of ss 79(4)(a), (b) and (c) and determine the contribution based entitlements of the parties expressed as a percentage of the net value of the property of the parties.  Thirdly, the Court should identify and assess the relevant matters referred to in ss 79(4)(d), (e), (f) and (g), including, because of s 79(4)(e), the matters referred to in s 75(2) so far as they are relevant and determine the adjustment (if any) that should be made to the contribution based entitlements of the parties established at step two.  Fourthly, the Court should consider the effect of those findings and determination and resolve what order is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case. 

4. This approach has been confirmed in numerous cases in this Court including for example Lee Steere and Lee Steere (1985) FLC 91-626; Ferraro and Ferraro (1993) FLC 92-335; Hickey and Hickey (2003) FLC 93-143; 30 Fam LR 355; Coghlan and Coghlan (2005) FLC 93-220; 32 Fam LR 414 and Clauson and Clauson (1995) FLC 92-595; 18 Fam LR 693.

Property available for division

1. There were a number of issues about the assets and liabilities.  The first issue is that it is submitted on behalf of the wife that an amount of $11 000 should be added back to the pool of available property as against the husband.  On 7 April 2008, which was the day after the parties separated, the husband withdrew from the parties’ joint account with the National Australia Bank amounts totalling $51 000.  He spent $11 000 of that amount and after some time returned $40 000 to the account.  This matter became the subject of Court orders made on 4 June 2009.  It is submitted on behalf of the wife that the $11 000 spent by the husband should be added back as I have indicated.  On the other hand it is submitted on behalf of the husband that he has given a full account of this expenditure.  It is the case that he took the money in circumstances where he did not have any money and apart from the purchase of a laptop computer, printer and scanner he spent this money on his living costs and costs of relocating to new accommodation.  I accept the submission on behalf of the husband that in circumstances where he did not have any money it was not an unreasonable manner in which to dispose of $11 000.  In my view there is no case for these monies to be added back to the pool of available property. 

1. There was also an issue about whether $19 000 which the wife deposed in her affidavit to having paid to her brother apparently by way of repayment of a partial loan should be added back to the pool of available property as against the wife.  There might have been a basis for this by way of an admission against interest.  But as learned counsel for the wife pointed out paragraph 25 of the wife’s affidavit in which this matter was deposed to was objected to on behalf of the husband and I ruled the paragraph to be inadmissible.  For this reason there is no evidence to support the submission and that ends this matter. 

2. The area of greatest issue certainly at the outset of the proceedings was in relation to how the Court should deal with substantial monies owed by the wife to her company S Services Pty Limited by way of Director’s loans.  Annexed to the wife’s affidavit was a letter from accountant Mr F to the effect that the wife’s director’s loan balance as at 30 June 2008 was a debit of $140 848.88.  Mr F also indicated that there was interest accrued on that amount as at the same date of $16 991.53.  There was a very strong submission on behalf of the wife to the effect that this was a proper liability and that at law the wife has an obligation to repay these monies to her company. 

3. I must say I have a rather different view about this matter.  What was clear was that the wife has used the company not only as a vehicle through which she has operated her business but also as a vehicle for the payment of her general living expenditure and mortgage repayments in particular.  The various items of such expenditure over the years have been listed in her director’s loan account and may be the explanation for the amounts set out in Mr F’s letter.  It appears to be far from clear whether this money would ever have to be repaid to the company.  After all the company is really the wife in the sense that she is the sole owner of the company. 

4. The parties engaged Mr B as joint single expert to value the wife’s company.  In his report Mr B said, amongst other matters, that the area of director’s loans had grown dramatically since 1 July 2005.  He said that the total amount remains as an asset of the company which in all probability is unlikely to be repaid. 

5. There was no evidence before me about what the income tax implications of this situation might be.  But in my view, to accept the wife’s submission and bring this loan amount in as a liability of the wife would be to visit on the husband a gross injustice.  The view that I have is that these will come in as contributions by the wife.  In my view, to take account of the liabilities in the strict sense that the wife is asking the Court to do would be in practical terms to permit the wife to double-dip.  I have no reason to go behind the view expressed by Mr B that in all probability the outstanding liability is unlikely to be repaid.  I do not propose to bring the director’s loan into the list of liabilities for the purpose of determining the net property available for division between the parties.

6. On this basis the property available for division is as follows:

Assets	$
1.         Property at 2B	245,000
2.         Property at P	200,000
3.         Wife’s company S Services Pty Limited	73,759
4.         Wife’s household contents	3,000
5.         Wife’s superannuation	11,000
6.         Husband’s household contents	500
7.         Husband’s superannuation	45,689
_____________
$578,948
Liabilities	$
1.         Mortgage on G property	116,400
2.         Mortgage on P property	188,500
3.         Wife’s HECS debt	5,600
_____________
$310,500
Net	$268,448

Contributions

1. I have referred above to the initial contributions by each of the parties.  It is clear that the wife had property of a significant value at the commencement of the parties’ marriage.  Accordingly, she is well ahead of the husband initially in terms of her financial contributions. That position has not changed notwithstanding the fact that the husband came into the marriage with a superannuation benefit which as at the current time is several times greater than that of the wife. 

2. The wife has worked full time throughout the marriage until recently.  The husband has undertaken such work as has been available to him.  Mostly this work has been by way of casual relief teaching. 

3. The comparative positions of the parties in terms of their taxable income as set out in the following table are noteworthy. 

   Wife               Husband

   2006              $21 150         $10 633

   2007              $21 160         $15 545

   2008              $23 201         $15 637

4. But the above table does not indicate the real position in a practical sense.  In fact the value of the wife’s labours has been significantly greater than the amounts of her taxable income indicate.  This is because much of the parties’ living costs and all of the mortgage repayments have been paid for by her company.  And as indicated above, those expenses paid by the company have been recorded in the director’s loan account.  Accordingly, the financial contributions by the wife in this regard have been considerably greater than those of the husband.

5. So the situation which was apparent at the commencement of marriage namely, that the wife’s initial contributions were much greater than those of the husband in fact continued throughout the entirety of the marriage.  This was conceded on behalf of the husband.

6. In relation to the parties’ contributions to their welfare and as homemakers, there was a significant issue between them about this.  Each asserted that they undertook more of the household work and the general maintenance on the home than the other.  As indicated above, I had considerable difficulty with the credit of each of the parties.  I am unable to separate one from the other in respect of this aspect of the contributions.  In these circumstances, I find that each of them made significant contributions in this area. 

7. In my view there is no doubt that the wife has made greater contributions than the husband overall, in my view her greater efforts have been by a very considerable margin and more than double the contributions of the husband.  I assess the wife’s contributions overall as having been 75 percent and the husband’s contributions overall as having been 25 percent.

s 75(2) matters

1. The husband is 46 years of age and in reasonable health.  As indicated above he has been working over many years as a casual school teacher.  His greatest period of continuity of employment in the more recent years was the period when he worked with M School in Queensland shortly before the parties were married.  But this was a contract as distinct from him enjoying a permanent teaching position.  Since that time he has worked for various schools but it has been on a casual part time basis.  His income this year has been $309.25 per day. 

2. On the other hand the wife is 34 years of age and she is in reasonable health.  As indicated above she has been working for her company S Services Pty Limited now for many years.  She said that she does not enjoy anything like the amount of business which she had been able to obtain previously from her major client.  She said that the effect of this is that rather than working full time she has only had sufficient work to keep her occupied with the company’s work for approximately one day per week.  She said that this has had a dramatic effect on her income and that at the present time her income is approximately $403 per week. 

3. There was a very strong submission on behalf of the husband to the effect that the Court should be cautious about accepting this from the wife.  It was submitted on behalf of the husband that whereas the wife asserts her weekly income as being $403 per week she also says that her total personal expenditure is $1224 per week.  It is submitted that the wife has given no satisfactory account of how she meets this shortfall.  I am not persuaded entirely about this submission because there was some material before the Court which was in inadmissible form.  Suffice to say that I accept the broad thrust of this submission by learned counsel for the husband and in my view the wife has a clearly greater capacity to earn income than does the husband.  After all this was the whole pattern throughout the entirety of the parties’ marriage.  I would be most surprised if some differential between their income earning capacities does not extend into the future. 

4. It was submitted on behalf of the wife that if the Court determined that there was likely to be a difference between the parties in terms of income earning capacities then the Court should regard this as not being very significant and not award a set off of more than 2.5 percent in favour of the husband for this s 75(2) matter.  On the other hand there was a strong submission on behalf of the husband that the Court would be confident that it is more likely than not that in the future the wife will earn considerably more income than the husband.  It was submitted on behalf of the husband that therefore the Court should adjust 5 percent for this relevant s 75(2) matter. 

5. I accept these submissions by learned counsel for the husband in respect of this matter and propose that there be a set off of 5 percent of the available property in favour of the husband to take account of this matter.

6. In my view this would be an appropriate set off in circumstances where the marriage is a short marriage and each of the parties is still relatively young.  There should be many years of income earning capacity ahead for each of them.

7. It was also submitted on behalf of the husband that the Court should take into account the fact that he spent $8000 on legal costs in apprehended violence proceedings which were brought against him by the wife and ultimately dismissed.  My view of this matter is that if there had been a proper basis for making a costs order in those proceedings the Court should have done so.  I do not propose to take this into account pursuant to s 75(2)(o) of the Act. 

Conclusion and fourth step

1. The wife is to have 70 percent of the available property.  This is property with a value of $187 914.  The wife has the following property:

$
1.         G property	245,000
2.         P property	200,000
3.         S Services Pty Limited	73,759
4.         Household contents	3,000
5.         Superannuation	11,000
_____________
$532,759

1. But the wife has the following liabilities:

$
1.         Mortgage on G property	116,400
2.         Mortgage on P property	188,500
3.         Wife’s HECS debt	5,600
_____________
$310,500

1. Accordingly the wife has property with a net value of $222 259 ($532 759 - $310 500 = $222 259).  For the wife to have property with a value of $187 914 she would have to pay the husband $34 345 ($222 259 - $187 914 = $34 345).

2. On the other hand the husband is to have 30 percent of the available property.  This is property with a value of $80 534.  The husband has the following:

$
1.         Husband’s household contents	500
2.         Husband’s superannuation	45,689
_____________
$46,189

1. To achieve property with a value of $80 534 the husband requires additional property with a value of $34 345 ($80 534 - $46 189 = $34 345).  This can be achieved by a payment in this amount by the wife to him.

2. I propose to make such an order. 

3. The orders I propose will not affect the income earning capacity of either party.  But the wife will have to borrow the funds required to pay the husband or sell one of her properties.

4. The marriage was short and the contributions have been disparate, much greater contributions having been made by the wife.  There are no children.  The wife should be able to retain her villa at least.  She should have many income-earning years ahead of her.

5. On the other hand, the husband has retained his superannuation and he will have the modest payment from the wife.  Like the wife, he should have many years ahead during which he can earn income.

I certify that the preceding fifty-nine (59) paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judicial Registrar W P Johnston.

Associate:     

Date:              25 June 2009