AB - [2005] WASAT 303

JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

STREAM: HUMAN RIGHTS

ACT: GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA)

CITATION: AB [2005] WASAT 303

MEMBER: MS F CHILD (MEMBER)

HEARD: 14 SEPTEMBER 2005

DELIVERED : 22 NOVEMBER 2005

FILE NO/S: GAA 1307 of 2005

BETWEEN: AB
Represented person

Catchwords:

Guardianship and administration - Need for a guardian - Represented person diagnosed with cognitive impairments and mental illness - Discharged from involuntary status under the Mental Health Act 1996 - Need for a guardian to decide accommodation and medical treatment including psychiatric treatment of the represented person

Legislation:

Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 4, s 4(1)(2), s 43, s 43(1)(a)(b)(c), s 43(2), s 44(5), s 45(2)(d), s 64, s 64(1)(a), s 119, s 119(1)(1a)(2)(3)(3a)(4)

Mental Health Act 1996 (WA), s 107, s 109, s 110(1)(2)

State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 78

Result:

1. Public Advocate appointed limited guardian to decide where the represented person is to live and to consent to medical treatment
2. Public Trustee appointed plenary administrator

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Represented person : Self-represented

Solicitors:

Represented person : Self-represented

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

MM v Mental Health Review Board, unreported decision of the Sup Court; No 990093; 4 March 1999
Re BCB; Application for Guardianship Order, (2002) SR (WA) 338
Re BTO, unreported decision of the Full Board (Hon Justice ML Barker, President; Dr A McCutcheon, Member; Ms F Child, Member) delivered 14 October 2004
Re JB, unreported decision of the Full Board of the Guardianship and Administration Board (Ms P Eldred, Deputy President; Ms F Child, Member; Ms H Leslie, Member); 17 September 2002
Re MC, unreported decision of the Guardianship and Administration Board (Mrs P Eldred, Deputy President; Ms F Child, Member; Dr A McCutcheon, Member); 7 May 2004
Re MM [2001] 28 SR WA 320

Case(s) also cited:

Nil

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Summary of Tribunal's decision

The State Administrative Tribunal appointed the Public Advocate as limited guardian for a 67 year‑old man with a diagnosis of a severe cognitive impairment and psychiatric illness. The functions of the guardian were to consent to treatment and to determine where the man should live on his discharge from hospital.
The man was a patient at Selby Lodge, a psychiatric treatment facility, where he had been treated as an involuntary patient under the Mental Health Act 1996 (WA) (MH Act). However, at the time of the hearing before the Tribunal he had been discharged from involuntary status and it appeared that there was no formal authority for his continued treatment or detention. The Tribunal considered that there was a need for lawful authority to consent to medical treatment, as the patient was incapable of giving consent due to his cognitive impairments. A guardian was also required to determine where he should live on his discharge from hospital. The Tribunal considered that this decision should be made independent of service providers.
As there was no‑one in his family able to act on his behalf in relation to his health care, personal and financial decision-making, the Public Advocate was appointed limited guardian to consent to medical treatment and to decide where he should live and the Public Trustee was appointed plenary administrator to manage his financial affairs.

Background

These reasons relate to decisions of the Tribunal to appoint the Public Trustee as plenary administrator and the Public Advocate as limited guardian for AB (the represented person). The represented person is a man of 67 years who is diagnosed as suffering from a cognitive impairment, dementia, and a paranoid disorder. He is a patient at Selby Lodge. Prior his admission to Selby Lodge he was a patient at the Forensic Unit at Graylands Hospital.
These written reasons have been prepared at the request of the Public Advocate pursuant to s 78 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA).

Applications and Material before the Tribunal

The applicant, a social worker from Selby Lodge, sought the appointment of a guardian to make accommodation and medical treatment decisions on behalf of the represented person pursuant to s 43 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (the GA Act) and for the appointment of an administrator to manage his financial affairs pursuant to s 64 of the GA Act.
The hearing proceeded at Selby Lodge at the request of the applicant. The represented person, the applicant social worker, Dr DJ (the medical officer) and a representative of the Public Advocate (the Public Advocate) attended the hearing.
The Tribunal received the following reports in support of the applications:
•the Aged Care Assessment Team assessment (ACAT report) dated 23 August 2005;
•a list of medications prescribed for the represented person from Selby Lodge received by the Tribunal on 17 August 2005;
•a report from the applicant social worker;
•a report from the psychiatrist from Graylands Hospital, Dr JL, and
•a summary of the clinical psychological assessment of the represented person dated 19 July 2005 prepared by clinical psychologist, GF.
In addition, a written submission from the Public Advocate addressing the question of the need for a guardianship order is before the Tribunal. Along with information and submissions regarding the best interests of the represented person, the report refers to information provided to the Public Advocate that the represented person suffers rheumatoid arthritis and will require ongoing medical treatment for this condition.

Legislation

Before a guardian can be appointed under s 43 of the GA Act, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the person for whom the application is made has attained the age of 18 years; is incapable of looking after his own health and safety; is unable to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his person; or is in need of oversight, care or control in the interests of his own health and safety or for the protection of others; and is in need of a guardian.
Before an administrator may be appointed under s 64, the Tribunal must be satisfied the person is unable, by reason of mental disability, to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to all or any part of his estate; and is in need of an administrator of his estate.
Section 43 and s 64 of the GA Act, for the appointment of a guardian and administrator respectively, are expressly subject to s 4 of the GA Act, which provides:
"4(1)       In the performance of its functions the Tribunal shall observe the principles set out in subsection (2).
(2)(a)     The primary concern of the Tribunal shall be the best interests of any represented person, or of a person in respect of whom an application is made.
(b)Every person shall be presumed to be capable of —
(i)looking after his own health and safety;
(ii)making reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his person;
(iii)managing his own affairs; and
(iv)making reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his estate,
until the contrary is proved to the satisfaction of the   Tribunal.
(c)A guardianship or administration order shall not be made if the needs of the person in respect of whom an application for such an order is made could, in the opinion of the Tribunal, be met by other means less restrictive of the person's freedom of decision and action.
(d)A plenary guardian shall not be appointed under section 43(1) if the appointment of a limited guardian under that section would be sufficient, in the opinion of the Tribunal, to meet the needs of the person in respect of whom the application is made.
(e)An order appointing a limited guardian or an administrator for a person shall be in terms that, in the opinion of the Board, impose the least restrictions possible in the circumstances on the person's freedom of decision and action.
(f)In considering any matter relating to a represented person or a person in respect of whom an application is made the Tribunal shall, as far as possible, seek to ascertain the views and wishes of the person concerned as expressed, in whatever manner, at the time, or as gathered from the person's previous actions."
In determining the appropriate appointment of a guardian, s 44(5) of the GA Act is relevant to this matter in that unless she is appointed to act jointly with another person or persons, the Public Advocate shall not be appointed as a guardian unless there is no other person suitable and willing to act.
The GA Act provides at s 119, a regime for consent to be obtained for medical treatment of patients who are incapable themselves of consenting to treatment. This may mean that there is no need for the appointment of a guardian as this arrangement can operate as a less restrictive alternative to the making of a guardianship order for this purpose.
The section provides:
"119(1) If in the opinion of a practitioner a person presented to him for treatment ¾
(a) is in need of urgent treatment;
(b)is incapable of consenting to the proposed treatment; and
(c)is at the time of presentation a person for whom a guardian could be appointed under this Act,
the practitioner may provide the treatment if the person referred to in subsection (3) consents to it.
(1a)A practitioner may provide treatment under subsection (1) without the consent of the person referred to in subsection (3) if in the opinion of the practitioner it is not practicable to obtain that consent.
(2)If in the opinion of a practitioner a person presented to him for treatment ¾
(a)is in need of treatment that is not urgent treatment;
(b)is incapable of consenting to the proposed treatment; and
(c)is at the time of presentation a person for whom a guardian could be appointed under this Act,
the practitioner may provide the treatment if the person referred to in subsection (3) consents to it.
(3)For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), the person who may consent to treatment is the first in order of priority of the following persons ¾
(a)a guardian of the person needing the treatment;
(b)the spouse or de facto partner of the person needing the treatment;
(c)a person who, on a regular basis, provides or arranges for domestic services and support to the person needing the treatment but does not receive remuneration for doing so;
(d)a person who is the nearest relative (other than the spouse or de facto partner) of the person needing the treatment and who maintains a close personal relationship with the person needing the treatment;
(e)any other person who maintains a close personal relationship with the person needing treatment; or
(f)a person prescribed in the regulations.
(3a)For the purposes of subsection (3) a person is to be regarded as maintaining a close personal relationship with the person needing the treatment if the relationship is maintained through frequent personal contact and a personal interest in the welfare of the person needing the treatment.
(4)In this section ¾
"practitioner" in relation to medical treatment means a medical practitioner within the meaning of the Medical Act 1894, and in relation to dental treatment means a dentist registered under the Dental Act 1939; and
"urgent treatment" means treatment that in the opinion of the practitioner concerned is urgently needed ¾
(a)to save the life of the person needing the treatment;
(b)to prevent serious damage to the health of the person needing the treatment; or
(c)to prevent the person needing the treatment from suffering or continuing to suffer significant pain or distress."

Evidence and Findings

Capacity

The ACAT report notes the represented person suffers "paranoid ideation, regular short term memory problems, delusions, disorientation and displays occasional aggression". The report notes that supervision and prompting are required for all health care tasks. The report also refers to arthritis and weakness suffered by the represented person and recommends low-level residential care for him. During the course of the hearing, the applicant and the medical officer reported that this assessment had been reviewed, and the recommendation now is that the represented person requires high-level residential care.
The list of medications provided to the Tribunal and referred to in the hearing identifies anti‑psychotic medication and medication for arthritis.
The report of Dr JL, psychiatrist, refers to a diagnosis of dementia of "unclear nature" and psychosis, and indicates that the condition is probably progressive. The report states that the represented person is incapable of making reasoned decisions about his personal health care, his living situation and his financial affairs.
The clinical psychological assessment referred to earlier reports of the State Forensic Mental Health Service which indicated that the represented person had a diagnosis of "organic mental disorder, dementia and paranoid disorder". The report refers to "problems with planning, sequencing, problem‑solving, working memory, dealing with more than one stimulus or thought at a time and shifting from one task to another". The report concludes that the represented person has "significantly impaired intellectual ability" and "significant problems with executive functioning".
The represented person takes issue with this evidence as he states he is able to look after himself and make his own decisions.
Based on the evidence of the report of Dr JL and the clinical psychologist, GF, the Tribunal finds that the represented person is a person for whom an administration order can be made.
In respect of s 43(2) of the GA Act the Tribunal is satisfied that because of his significant cognitive impairment and impairments of executive functioning that the represented person meets all of the criteria set out in s 43(1)(b). He is therefore a person for whom a guardianship order may be made.

Need for orders

Even where the Tribunal finds that a person meets the tests in s 43(1)(b) and s 64(1)(a), it must find that there is a need for a guardian and an administrator to be appointed and there are no less restrictive means of meeting the needs of the represented person.
There was no contest to the need for an administrator from the Public Advocate or from the professionals who attended the hearing. The details of the represented person's estate are disclosed in the application: he has a pension income and some possessions in storage. No other details of his estate are known. The need for an administrator arises from the need of the represented person for an independent authority to manage his pension on his admission to a nursing home. His accommodation costs, necessities and other personal needs must be met. The Public Advocate supports the need for an administrator.
The Public Advocate however questions whether there is a need for a guardian to be appointed for the represented person.
In the application, the applicant identifies accommodation and medical treatment decisions as the two areas in the life of the represented person that require the appointment of a guardian.
The status of the represented person under the MH Act is relevant to the question of the need for a guardian. The written application dated 21 July 2005 and filed with the Tribunal on 1 August 2005 states: "[The represented person] is a patient at Selby Lodge (Red Wing) and is now considered to be near ready for discharge to a more appropriate setting. Currently he is an involuntary patient. An early hearing will expedite his opportunity to live in a less restricted environment".
At the time of the hearing on 14 September 2005, the represented person had been discharged from involuntary status on or around 8 September 2005. The Public Advocate expressed concern about the appropriateness of the discharge of the represented person from involuntary status, as it was agreed by the professionals at the hearing that he remains non‑compliant with his psychiatric treatment.
The Public Advocate submitted that this leaves the represented person in a "grey area", meaning that his status and the authority for his treatment are unclear. The applicant responded that the represented person is considered unlikely to abscond from the facility and that if the represented person had not been discharged from involuntary status, special leave application forms would have been required when he visited nursing homes in the company of the applicant.
The reason for and the timing of the discharge of the represented person from involuntary status remains somewhat puzzling. However, the Tribunal accepts that at the time of the hearing of the applications, the represented person is not an involuntary patient under the MH Act. Had this not been the case and the represented person had been maintained on involuntary status, the treating psychiatrist might have considered that he could authorise the transfer of the represented person to a nursing home and his continued treatment with the anti‑psychotic medication under a community treatment order under the MH Act.
The comments of Scott J in the decision MM v Mental Health Review Board, unreported decision of the Sup Court; No 990093; 4 March 1999 considered whether "treatment" under the MH Act included "a safe environment in which to live". His Honour stated at page 16 and 17:
"…the question that really falls for consideration under this ground of appeal is the proper construction of the word "treatment" and whether it includes the provision of "supervision and a safe environment in which to live". In my opinion, the word "treatment" should be interpreted widely in the context of this statute in order not to subvert the intent and purpose of the provision."
As it is, since the represented person has been discharged from involuntary status there is no one with legal authority to make the decisions which need to be made regarding his accommodation and medical treatment.

Accommodation

The Public Advocate submitted that there was no need for a guardian to make the decision as to where the represented person should live as he had "agreed" with the applicant to go to the nursing home that he had visited following his discharge from hospital.
The applicant confirmed that he had taken the represented person to visit a nursing home and that the represented person had agreed to go there for a time. In the hearing, the represented person said that he would live at the nursing home for three months and then he would "go private". He stated that he would live "in town" and that he did not need anyone to look after him or assist him.
Both the applicant and the psychiatrist expressed concern about the move of the represented person from the highly structured environment of the facility to a nursing home environment with less staff resources and suggested this may result in deterioration in his condition. They agreed with the Public Advocate that should his condition deteriorate significantly he could be readmitted under the MH Act as an involuntary patient. In their view the placement of the represented person in appropriate accommodation poses greater risks than the "average placement". The medical officer considers that the represented person's statement that he will accept a move to a nursing home should be considered against the background of his long-term refusal of treatment. From his statements during the hearing, it was apparent that the represented person lacks insight into his need for care and is completely dismissive of the comments of the applicant and medical officer in this regard.

The clinical psychologist's report which refers to his memory and other impairments together with the applicant's comments about the past inconsistency in the represented person's views regarding nursing home placement raises doubt about the capacity of the represented person to understand and follow through with his agreement to go to a nursing home. The lack of certainty about the durability of that choice, if in fact it represents a real choice by him, given his significant impairments, places the represented person in a vulnerable position with regard to his future accommodation. The decision about accommodation for the represented person should be made independent of the service providers by someone acting for him and considering his best interests. The represented person has no available family or other persons involved in his life other than the service providers. In light of the opinions of the applicant and the medical officer that any placement may break down due to the aggressive behaviours of the represented person, there is a need for oversight of the decision‑making in relation to the accommodation. There is a need for proper authority to make the decisions which the represented person clearly cannot make on his own behalf. This view is consistent with the position taken by the Full Board of the Guardianship and Administration Board (the Board) in Re MM [2001] 28 SR WA 320.

Consent to Treatment

In relation to medical treatment, the represented person is under the care of a rheumatologist for his arthritis and is treated with medication for this condition. He receives anti‑psychotic medication to treat his mental illness. In the discussion in the hearing about the authority by which the represented person is currently treated the medical officer referred to the "duty of care" owed by any nursing home providing accommodation. The Tribunal does not accept that the authority for decisions regarding medical treatment of the represented person can be transferred from the represented person to the staff at a nursing home or to his treating doctors.
The role played by the health professionals is to provide treatment and care to the represented person. The treatment currently provided to the represented person is not of a type that would bring it within the meaning of "urgent treatment" as defined in the GA Act (s 119(4)) and so s 119(1a) does not apply.
The Board considered the position of treatment of a person unable to consent in Re BCB; Application for Guardianship Order, (2002) SR (WA) 338 (BCB).
The approach to the law taken by the Board in BCB in respect of the issue of consent was affirmed in a more recent decision Re BTO, unreported decision of the Full Board (Hon Justice ML Barker, President; Dr A McCutcheon, Member; Ms F Child, Member) delivered 14 October 2004 . In the reasons for decision in that case the Full Board referred to the earlier decision:
"This issue was addressed in Re BCB; Application for a Guardianship Order, unreported decision of the Full Board delivered 24 May 2002 (Mr K Chapman, President, Mrs P Eldred, Deputy President and Dr G Hamilton, Member) and we need not on this occasion revisit it. In short, the Board there noted that the English House of Lords in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilization) [1990] 2 AC 1, recognised that in certain situations a medical practitioner may act in accordance with a "principle of necessity" and treat a patient without obtaining the consent of that patient. However, some doubt about the recognition of such a principle under Australian law was expressed in some of the judgments in the High Court decision in the case colloquially known as Marion's case (1992) 175 CLR 218. As a result, in Re BCB the Board thought it unwise to conclude that the general law applicable in Western Australia presently permitted a medical practitioner or any other health professional to provide treatment without a patient's consent. With this approach to the law we respectfully agree."
If the represented person is to be lawfully treated, both in respect of medications for his arthritis and in relation to his psychiatric treatment, in the absence of his capacity to give consent, there must be some lawful authority for that treatment.
The MH Act is silent in relation to the question of consent to treatment for voluntary patients (except in respect of s 107 which is not relevant to the represented person).
In respect of an involuntary patient, s 110 of the MH Act provides that the Chief Psychiatrist can approve medical treatment of an involuntary patient who is in an authorised hospital:
"s 110 (1)     A person who is in an authorised hospital as
(a)     an involuntary patient; or
(b)     a mentally impaired accused,
may be given medical treatment, other than psychiatric treatment or treatment referred to in section 108, if it has been approved in writing by the Chief Psychiatrist.
(2)Subsection (1) does not limit a power conferred by any other written law by which a person may consent to the medical treatment of another person."
The position in relation to the represented person is that he is a voluntary patient, and it appears that his discharge from the facility (which is understood to be an "authorised hospital") to a nursing home is imminent. As he is not an involuntary patient s 110 of the MH Act does not apply to him even though he is in an authorised hospital. On his discharge from an authorised hospital it cannot apply to him even if he were on a community treatment order.
Even if the represented person remained an involuntary patient as he was at the time the application, s110 of the MH Act is seen as a "default position" and does not preclude the appointment of a guardian. This was stated in the reasons of the Board Re MC, unreported decision of the Guardianship and Administration Board (Mrs P Eldred, Deputy President; Ms F Child, Member; Dr A McCutcheon, Member); 7 May 2004 where the Board concluded:
"We consider it plain that the authority of the Chief Psychiatrist under section 110, whatever its boundaries, is not intended to override the authority of a guardian. We also consider it is more appropriate for the independent guardian to give consent to medical treatment than the authority to be exercised by the Chief Psychiatrist. Thus, it is clear in our view that the existence of the authority of the Chief Psychiatrist does not preclude the Board from finding that a person is in need of a guardian within the meaning of section 43(1)(c). Indeed, we consider that the authority of the Chief Psychiatrist is in fact a default provision to be used where there is no-one else with legal authority to consent for persons who are incapable of giving consent for themselves."
Accordingly, the MH Act does not authorise treatment of the represented person in his current circumstances.
In respect of the psychiatric treatment now given to the represented person, this Tribunal considers that a guardian may consent to it for the following reasons:
The GA Act provides at s 45(2)(d) that the authority of a guardian may include:
"… consent to any treatment or health care of the represented person"
In the interpretation section of the Act, s 3, "treatment" is defined as:
"any medical surgical dental or related treatment or care that may lawfully be provided to a patient with the patient's consent or the consent of any person authorised by law to consent on behalf of the patient, but does not include the procedures referred to in Div 3 of Pt V."
The Board has considered in previous decisions that the potential scope of the meaning of "treatment" under the GA Act as wide. In Re BTO, which dealt with end of life decision making, the general statements of the Board on the scope of the meaning of "treatment" was affirmed and the Board considered that:
"the concept of treatment adopted by the G&A Act appears to include not only medical or surgical procedures designed actively to treat a person's illness or condition, but also the provision of care, any form of oversight of a person's condition and medical advice as to by what means it may be best managed, the prescription or courses of medication and the like".
In the submissions to the Tribunal, the Public Advocate raises the question of the authority of the guardian to act in respect of patients who are subject to the MH Act.
It is accepted that in relation to psychiatric treatment of an involuntary patient, the MH Act provides that consent is not required (see s 109 MH Act). As such, the MH Act prevails over the authority of a guardian in respect of psychiatric treatment for such a patient. However, if a patient is not subject to the MH Act and is unable to give consent to psychiatric treatment, the definition of "treatment" under the GA Act does not preclude an appointed guardian giving consent to that treatment if the function provided for in s 45(2)(d) of the GA Act is included in any guardianship order made in respect of that person.
The authority of a guardian to provide a substituted consent is subject to the particular limitations on substituted consent referred in Re JB, unreported decision of the Full Board of the Guardianship and Administration Board (Ms P Eldred, Deputy President; Ms F Child, Member; Ms H Leslie, Member); 17 September 2002 where the particular statutory language of s 107 of the MH Act (which relates to the delivery of electro-convulsive therapy) was considered by the Board to preclude any substitute decision‑maker.
That a guardian may give consent to psychiatric treatment of a represented person may raise policy concerns for the appropriate intersection of the MH Act and the GA Act. It is understood that the provisions of the MH Act for review of involuntary status of patients provides a statutory framework for the oversight of the detention of those patients. The appointment of a guardian for a person who is appropriately treated as an involuntary patient, as he or she meets the necessary statutory criteria for that status under the MH Act, should not be seen as a mechanism by which that oversight can be avoided.
On the facts before the Tribunal at the hearing of this application, the represented person is not an involuntary patient and not subject to that statutory regime. Relevant to this Tribunal, he meets the criteria in s 43(1)(a)(b) and (c) of the GA Act and as the meaning of "treatment" as it is currently understood includes psychiatric treatment nothing precludes a guardian with "health care " authority from giving consent to psychiatric treatment.
Sometimes the application of s 119 of the GA Act may operate as a less restrictive alternative to the making of a guardianship order for the function of consent for a person for whom a guardianship order would otherwise be made. In the circumstances of the represented person; there is evidence that there is no one available in his life from whom consent may be sought. The only known family member, his brother, who lives in Sydney and experiences health problems of his own, has told the applicant and the Public Advocate that he is unable to play a role in his brother's health care decision‑making. The information from the applicant is that the brother has not had contact with the represented person for some years.
Since there are no other known relatives or persons who provide unpaid care to the represented person or persons who maintain a close personal relationship with him, there is no person who falls within any of the categories of persons set out in the hierarchy of s 119(3), who could give consent to treatment unless a guardian were to be appointed.
Because the represented person is in need of treatment and there is no one from whom consent may be sought to authorise that treatment he is need of a guardian who can give consent on his behalf.

Appropriate appointment and functions

Since there is no other person in the life of the represented person who is suitable or willing to be appointed the Public Advocate must be appointed as his guardian. (s 44(5))
The appointed guardian requires the functions originally identified by the applicant ‑ accommodation and authority to consent to treatment. The Tribunal accepts the evidence of the medical officer that the aggressive behaviour of the represented person arises from his psychiatric condition and the medication prescribed is treatment of that condition. There is therefore no need for the inclusion in the functions of the guardian an authority to consent to restraint of the represented person.
A limited order with the functions set out above is sufficient to meet the needs of the represented person.

Orders:

The Public Advocate is appointed limited guardian with the following functions:
(a)to decide where the represented person is to live, whether permanently or temporarily;
(b)to decide with whom the represented person is to live;
(c)subject to Division 3 of the GA Act, to consent to any treatment or health care of the represented person;

The Tribunal approves delegation by the Public Advocate of her functions as guardian of the represented person to an officer or employee employed in the Office of the Public Advocate.
The order is to be reviewed by 14 September 2006

The Public Trustee is appointed plenary administrator of the estate of the represented person with all the powers and duties conferred by the GA Act.
The order is to be reviewed by 14 September 2010.
I certify that this and the preceding [61] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
MS F CHILD, MEMBER