AA Shi Pty Ltd v Avbar Pty Ltd (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 41 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AA Shi Pty Ltd v Avbar Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 427

Citation: AA Shi Pty Ltd v Avbar Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 427
Parties: AA SHI PTY LTD (ACN 100 459 667) v AVBAR PTY LTD (ACN 100 433 752) and NIR INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 100 276 015)
File number: QUD 121 of 2010
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 6 May 2010
Catchwords: INJUNCTIONS – oral fuel-selling agreements between respondent lessees of fuel service stations and applicant licensee – application of Trade Practices (Industry Codes – Oilcode) Regulations 2006 (Cth) – alleged breach of agreements by applicant – purported termination of agreements by respondents – application for interlocutory injunction by applicant restraining respondents from acting upon notices of termination – whether existing interim injunction should be dissolved – obligations pursuant to fuel re-selling agreements – principles relevant to grant of interlocutory relief – Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 – whether serious question to be tried – whether respondents were entitled to terminate the agreements without notice – consideration of s 35 and s 36 Trade Practices (Industry Codes – Oilcode) Regulations 2006 (Cth) – relevance of principles in Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 115 – whether applicant failed to bank fuel moneys – whether the applicant failed to report competitors’ prices – balance of convenience – value of undertakings as to damages
Legislation: Trade Practices (Industry Codes – Oilcode) Regulations 2006 (Cth) ss 2, 4, 5, 35, 36, 44
Trade Practices (Industry Codes – Franchising) Sections 1998 (Cth) ss 21, 23
Cases cited: Aura Enterprises Pty Ltd v Frontline Retail Ltd (2006) 202 FLR 435 cited
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 applied
Custom Credit Corporation Ltd v Whitehall Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Ipp J, No 1727/91, 7 April 1992) cited
Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 115 cited
Smith & Nephew Pty Ltd v Wake Forest University Health Sciences [2009] FCAFC 14 cited
Date of hearing: 28 and 29 April 2010
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 67
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr B O'Donnell QC with Ms P Ahern
Solicitor for the Applicant: Elliott & Harvey
Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: Mr P Dunning SC with Mr D Quayle
Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Clayton Utz

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 121 of 2010

BETWEEN:

AA SHI PTY LTD (ACN 100 459 667)
Applicant

AND:

AVBAR PTY LTD (ACN 100 433 752)
First Respondent

NIR INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 100 276 015)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 MAY 2010

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant be entitled to interlocutory relief on terms to be finalised following submissions from the parties.

2.The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read AA Shi Pty Ltd v Avbar Pty Ltd (No 2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2010] FCA 427
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of AA Shi Pty Ltd v Avbar Pty Ltd (No 2) involves the applicant, AA Shi Pty Ltd, seeking interlocutory relief against the respondents, Avbar Pty Ltd and Nir Investments Pty Ltd, concerning the termination of oral fuel-selling agreements. The applicant, a commission agent for the respondents, who are the lessees of fuel service stations, claims the respondents improperly terminated these agreements. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the applicant was entitled to an interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondents from acting on the termination notices and entering the service stations.

The central legal issues involved interpreting the Trade Practices (Industry Codes – Oilcode) Regulations 2006 (Cth) to determine if the respondents had the contractual right to terminate the agreements without notice. The applicant argued that the termination was improper, while the respondents claimed the applicant breached the agreements by failing to bank fuel moneys and report competitors' prices. The court also had to consider the balance of convenience in granting interlocutory relief.

The court found that there was a serious question to be tried regarding whether the applicant was required to report competitors' prices and whether the respondents attempted to unilaterally vary the agreements after 26 March 2010 to impose such an obligation. The court was not persuaded that the applicant failed to bank fuel moneys or had an obligation to report fuel prices to the respondents, thus entitling the applicant to interlocutory relief. The balance of convenience, while tight, favoured maintaining the status quo pending a full trial. The court concluded that the applicant was entitled to interlocutory relief on terms to be finalised following further submissions from the parties. The respondents were ordered to pay the applicant's costs of and incidental to the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant be entitled to interlocutory relief on terms to be finalised following submissions from the parties.

2. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Specifically, the interlocutory relief sought by the applicant is as follows:1.That until the trial of this proceeding or further order of this Honourable Court, each of the First and Second Respondents be restrained whether by itself, its agents or howsoever otherwise from:a.entering upon; orb.causing or procuring any other person to enter upon:i.235 Flemington Road, North Melbourne, Victoria; orii.2282 Cunningham Highway, Yamanto, Queensland; oriii.414 Warrego Highway, Hatton Vale, Queensland; oriv.655 Deception Bay Road, Deception Bay, Queensland.2.That until the trial of this proceeding or further order of this Honourable Court, each of the First and Second Respondents be restrained whether by itself, its agents or howsoever otherwise from acting upon or implementing the following purported notices of termination of agreements between the applicant and the first and second respondents:a.Notice dated 12 April 2010 from the first respondent to the applicant, in respect of the “Oz Fuel” service station located at 2282 Cunningham Highway, Yamanto in the State of Queensland;b.Notice dated 12 April 2010 from the first respondent to the applicant, in respect of the “Oz Fuel” service station located at 235 Flemington Road, North Melbourne in the State of Victoria;c.Notice dated 12 April 2010 from the first respondent to the applicant, in respect of the “Oz Fuel” service station located at 4114 Warrego Highway, Hatton Vale in the State of Queensland;d.Notice dated 12 April 2010 from the second respondent to the applicant, in respect of the “Liberty” service station located at 655 Deception Bay Road, Deception Bay in the State of Queensland.3.The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application.4.Such further or other order or direction as this Honourable Court sees fit.BACKGROUND FACTS The following facts are common ground:·For some years Mr David Yahalom, a director of the applicant, has had a business relationship with the respondents, in particular Mr Nir Avrahami, who is a director of the first respondent Avbar Pty Ltd and the sole director of the second respondent Nir Investments Pty Ltd.·The applicant is a commission agent of the respondents within the meaning of s 4 of the Trade Practices (Industry Codes – Oilcode) Regulations 2006 (Cth) (“the Oilcode”) in relation to service stations of which the respondents appear to be the lessees. There are four relevant service stations – one in Victoria (at North Melbourne) and three in Queensland (at Yamanto, Hatton Vale and Deception Bay).·The applicant operates general stores at each service station, hiring a total of 35 staff to operate the sites.·There are one or more fuel re-selling agreements (as defined by s 5 of the Oilcode) between the applicant and the respondents. These agreements are oral. On the basis of such material as is before me, I infer that the parties were in a friendly relationship for many years, which may be a reason why they did not commit their business relationship to writing.·There is very little in writing before the Court as to the terms of relevant agreements. Proper inferences to be drawn from written material as to the terms of the agreements between the parties are disputed.·On 12 April 2010 the respondents purported to terminate the fuel re-selling agreements with the applicant in respect of the four service stations, effective immediately. On that day persons unknown to the staff at each site, claiming to have authority from the respondents, entered the sites and directed the staff to follow their orders.·The grounds for termination were described in correspondence dated 12 April 2010 from Mr Avrahami to Mr Yahalom as follows:Despite repeated requests made by or on behalf of (the respondents), both in writing and orally, Aashi has failed or refused to comply with its Fuel Sales Obligations, Competitor’s Pricing Obligations, Takings and Banking Obligations or the Licence Fee Obligation.·The four alleged obligations of the applicant under the fuel re-selling agreements, which the applicant had allegedly breached, were described by Mr Avrahami in his letters of 12 April 2010 as follows:othe applicant’s obligation to sell the fuel at the service station at prices and on terms and conditions specified by the relevant respondent, including making adjustments to the price of fuel as directed by the respondent in a timely manner (“Fuel Sales Obligations”);othe applicant’s obligation at the times directed by the respondent to check the prices of fuel offered by the relevant respondent’s competitors and report those prices to the relevant respondent to enable the relevant respondent to compete in the market (“Competitor’s Pricing Obligations”);oThe applicant’s obligation to perform the banking tasks and remit the takings from all fuel sales in a diligent manner and as reasonably directed by the relevant respondent. In this regard the applicant was not allowed to withhold monies derived from the sale of fuel at the service station without the consent of the relevant respondent. Insofar as the banking of fuel takings was concerned:▪by 1.00 pm daily, the daily fuel banking was to be completed, and as soon as practicable thereafter the confirmation slip was to be sent by facsimile transmission to the relevant respondent; and▪by 1.00 pm daily, the daily paperwork was to be faxed by the applicant to the relevant respondent.(“Takings and Banking Obligation”)oThe applicant’s obligation to pay a licence fee calculated at 10% of monthly convenience store sales, exclusive of GST (“Licence Fee Obligation”).·Both the applicant and the respondents claim that the service stations and their respective businesses associated with the service stations are their only source of income.INTERLOCUTORY RELIEF

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

There is no evidence before me of industry practice as to whether it can be seriously contended that a commission agent would not be obliged to communicate prices charged by competitors to the supplier. In any event, Mr Yahalom has claimed that the arrangement between the parties was that he alone would set the prices for fuel at the relevant service stations. I consider that there is a serious question to be tried as to whether the applicant was required, prior to 26 March 2010, to check the prices of fuel offered by competitors of the respondents and report those prices to the respondents to enable them to compete in the market, and as to whether there was an attempt by the respondents to unilaterally vary their agreements with the applicant after 26 March 2010 to impose such an obligation.Conclusion I am not persuaded by the respondent’s submissions that, on the evidence before me, the applicant failed to bank fuel moneys belonging to the respondents, or that the applicant had an obligation to, in summary, report fuel prices to the respondents. It follows that there are serious questions to be tried for the purposes of considering whether the applicant is entitled to interlocutory relief.BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE Mr Dunning SC on behalf of the respondents conceded that the position as to the balance of convenience with respect to the parties in this case was very tight. However the respondents contend that the balance of convenience favours them because, in summary:·The applicant’s loss, if its position were vindicated, would not be irreparable if interlocutory relief is denied. The applicant could be protected by suitably framed costs and damages orders, and it could return to operating the stores and service stations and be paid the net profit it would have achieved in the interim should it be successful.·There is no likelihood that the goodwill of the relevant businesses would be injured if interlocutory relief is denied because the same employees would be offered ongoing employment by the respondents.·On the other hand if interlocutory relief is granted the respondents will continue to be the subject of subversive and persistent defaults on the part of the applicant of its reporting and responding obligations, and can never know what loss they have suffered.·The respondents are excluded from their sites, and prevented from dealing with a new retailer on those sites whose performance would be more satisfactory than that of the applicant. In contrast, the applicant submits that the balance of convenience favours the grant of the interlocutory injunction because, in summary:·The status quo between the parties has existed for many years.·The applicant is the sole source of income of Mr Yahalom and his family.·As sworn by Mr Yahalom in his affidavit sworn 16 April 2010 the applicant already reports in detail to the respondents about the service stations’ financial and other performance on a daily and weekly basis. Further, the applicant has offered further undertakings with respect to, inter alia, access by the respondents to the sites of the service stations and spot checks, and performance of tasks in the nature of fuel price reporting, adjustment of prices and banking of fuel monies as sought by the respondents, pending trial of this matter.·It is appropriate to maintain the status quo until the parties participate in a dispute resolution procedure pursuant to Pt 4 of the Oilcode, and which is mandatory in light of s 44 of the Oilcode.·Mr Yahalom has given evidence that when he left previous sites at Mr Avrahami’s request, the employees’ employment was terminated.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In response, the applicant submits in summary:·An event falling within the scope of s 36(1) does not give a supplier an entitlement to terminate an agreement.·Section 36(1) merely makes inapplicable fetters on the power to terminate an agreement, as found in s 35. Accordingly, the respondents must establish they have a contractual right to terminate for such acts as failure to bank fuel moneys or failure to properly report competitors’ prices. The right to terminate is not derived from s 36(1).·The respondents have not yet established that they have a contractual right to terminate the relevant agreements for reasons listed in s 36(1).·Section 36(1) does not operate for the benefit of either party. It merely states that the inhibitions on the right to terminate imposed by s 35 do not apply in the circumstances contemplated by s 36(1).·The language of s 36(2), which states that “a supplier may terminate a fuel re-selling agreement relating to particular retail premises” on the occurrence of either or the events listed in that section, suggests that s 36(2) gives the supplier the right to terminate, in contrast with s 36(1), which does not so empower the supplier.·Neither party gave evidence as to whether the agreements give the respondents the right to terminate in the event that there is a failure by the applicant to bank fuel moneys. The best case for the respondents is that a contractual provision as to banking fuel moneys is an intermediate term as discussed by the High Court in Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 115, and the rights of the respondents in respect of breach of such a term are dependent upon the consequences of the breach. In this case the amounts retained by the applicant were relatively small in quantum compared to the overall fuel takings, namely less than $10,000 from a monthly turnover of fuel sales of approximately $2.5 million. Retention of such small amounts would not constitute a breach of the relevant contract entitling the respondents to terminate.·The letter of 26 March 2010 from Mr Avrahami to Mr Yahalom identifies the amounts alleged to be wrongfully withheld as “float money” which had been retained by the applicant out of fuel takings, and evidences the previous practice of the applicant retaining float money out of proceeds from the sale of fuel. The evidence is that under the agreements the applicant was entitled to retain float money. Consequently there has been no breach of the agreements.Consideration of section 35 and section 36 Section 2 of the Oilcode provides that the purpose of the code is to regulate the conduct of suppliers, distributors and retailers in the petroleum marketing industry. It is not in dispute in these proceedings that the agreements between the applicant and the respondents are subject to the operation of the Oilcode. The only source of contention for the purposes of the present proceedings is the application of s 36(1) in respect of the agreements.