SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
A PERSON v INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONER AGAINST CORRUPTION (No 3)
[2021] SASC 31
Ruling of the Honourable Justice Parker
STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION
STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - SCHEDULES
STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - PARTICULAR WORDS AND PHRASES - SPECIFIC INTERPRETATIONS - IN RELATION TO
The claimant was partially successful in its application under clause 3 of Schedule 3 to the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 (SA) (ICAC Act). This ruling concerns the power of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption to retain an item seized by an investigator in the exercise of the statutory powers conferred by s 31 of the ICAC Act after this Court has ruled on questions of legal professional privilege.
Held, per Parker J:
1.The phrase “in relation to” in s 31(14) of the ICAC Act has a broad effect and to serves to link the exercise of powers conferred under a warrant issued pursuant to s 31 with the thing or document that is seized. Thus, the words “in relation to” in s 31(14) apply Schedule 3 to a thing seized pursuant to a warrant issued under s 31.
2.As s 31(14) displaces the operation of s 32(3a), that section will not operate in cases where clause 4(3) or clause 4(5) of Schedule 3 of the ICAC Act requires the Court to order that a seized thing to be returned to the claimant.
3.The claimant’s mobile phone, as distinct from its memory, cannot be separated into a privileged part and non-privileged part, it therefore falls within the residual provision in para (c) of Schedule 3. The phone must be returned to the claimant after copying of that part of its contents found not to be privileged.
Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 (SA) s 5, s 31, s 32, s 56, sch 3; Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 19(1)(a), referred to.
Inland Revenue Commissioners v Gittus [1920] 1 KB 563; O’Grady v Northern Queensland Co Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 356; Re Foley; Channell v Foley (1952) 53 SR (NSW) 31; Technical Products Pty Ltd v State Government Insurance Office (1989) 167 CLR 45; Travelex Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 241 CLR 510, applied.
South Australian Banking Co v Horner (1868) 2 SALR 263, considered.
A PERSON v INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONER AGAINST CORRUPTION (No 3)
[2021] SASC 31Civil
PARKER J: This ruling concerns the power of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (the Commissioner) to retain an item (i.e. a mobile telephone) seized by an investigator in the exercise of the statutory powers conferred by s 31 of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 (SA) (the ICAC Act) after this Court has ruled on questions of legal professional privilege.
The determination of the legal professional privilege issue was made by the Court under Schedule 3 of the ICAC Act. Section 56 of that Act prohibits the publication, without the permission of the Commissioner or…
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- Case
- [2021] SASC 31
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court examined the language of the ICAC Act and relevant statutory interpretation principles, concluding that schedules to Acts form part of the Act and should not be presumed to be subordinate to the body of the Act. The Court found that the phrase "in relation to" in section 31(14) of the ICAC Act broadly applied Schedule 3 to items seized under a warrant issued pursuant to section 31. This meant that Schedule 3's provisions for the return of seized items, including the phone, took precedence over the general powers of seizure and retention under sections 31 and 32. Given that the phone could not be divided into privileged and non-privileged parts, it fell under the residual provision in Schedule 3, mandating its return to the claimant after redacting privileged content.
The Court ordered that the claimant’s mobile phone must be returned after the redaction of privileged content. The Court determined that the provisions of Schedule 3 to the ICAC Act, which provide for the return of seized items under certain conditions, take precedence over the general powers of seizure and retention under sections 31 and 32. The phone, being an indivisible physical object, must be returned to the claimant after redaction of the privileged content, in accordance with the statutory scheme.
Orders
Orders of the court
Held, per Parker J:
1. The phrase “in relation to” in s 31(14) of the ICAC Act has a broad effect and to serves to link the exercise of powers conferred under a warrant issued pursuant to s 31 with the thing or document that is seized. Thus, the words “in relation to” in s 31(14) apply Schedule 3 to a thing seized pursuant to a warrant issued under s 31.
2. As s 31(14) displaces the operation of s 32(3a), that section will not operate in cases where clause 4(3) or clause 4(5) of Schedule 3 of the ICAC Act requires the Court to order that a seized thing to be returned to the claimant.
3. The claimant’s mobile phone, as distinct from its memory, cannot be separated into a privileged part and non-privileged part, it therefore falls within the residual provision in para (c) of Schedule 3. The phone must be returned to the claimant after copying of that part of its contents found not to be privileged.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The present circumstances fall within clause 4(5)(c) of Schedule 3 as the phone cannot be divided into privileged and non-privileged parts and nor can the phone be copied (as distinct from the content of its memory) and divided into privileged and non-privileged components. As clause 4(5)(c) applies, the phone must be returned to the claimant. Consideration The orders made by another judge of this Court encompassed the downloading from the mobile phone seized from the claimant under a warrant of communications between the claimant and their two lawyers, the copying of that material onto electronic storage devices and the production of hard copies of the downloaded material. All of that material, including the phone, was provided to the Registrar of this Court. I subsequently made orders concerning material that was claimed by the claimant to be privileged. While I found that there was certainly privileged material, I rejected the majority of claims. There were also many communications between the claimant and their lawyers that were not the subject of a claim for privilege. The phone may also contain communications with a great many other people in addition to the claimant’s lawyers. Such messages, or other information held in or accessible through the phone, might potentially provide relevant evidence to support a prosecution. The resolution of the question concerning return of the phone hinges upon a question of statutory interpretation, i.e. whether the provisions of Schedule 3 prevail over ss 31 and 32. Depending on the answer to that question, there may also be an issue as to how the statutory scheme applies to the electronic storage devices upon which the communications extracted from the phone are stored. There was a suggestion by counsel for the Commissioner that the provisions of ss 31 and 32 should prevail over Schedule 3. At least until the 19th century, the orthodox view was that provisions contained in the body of an Act prevailed over the contents of a schedule.[1] However, more recent authority has recognised that a schedule is not an inferior portion of an Act but constitutes part of the Act.[2] Section 19(1)(a) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) has put the approach taken in the more recent authorities into statutory form. It provides that a schedule forms part of an Act. Thus, the interaction between provisions found in the body of an Act and in a schedule, must be approached without any presumption that the former will prevail in the event of an apparent inconsistency. Any question of inconsistency must be resolved by reference to the text, context and purpose of the ICAC Act and by applying the general principles of statutory interpretation. [1] South Australian Banking Co v Horner (1868) 2 SALR 263 at 264 (Gwynne J); see also Dennis C Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 9th Ed, 2019) at [4.68] and cases cited therein.[2] Re Foley; Channell v Foley (1952) 53 SR (NSW) 31 at 36 (Roper CJ in Eq); Inland Revenue Commissioners v Gittus [1920] 1 KB 563 at 576 (Lord Sterndale MR).