A and R Insurance Management Pty Ltd v AMA Group Limited
[2022] WASC 240
•2 AUGUST 2022
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: A AND R INSURANCE MANAGEMENT PTY LTD -v- AMA GROUP LIMITED [2022] WASC 240
CORAM: ARCHER J
HEARD: 2 JUNE 2022
DELIVERED : 2 AUGUST 2022
FILE NO/S: CIV 2107 of 2021
BETWEEN: A AND R INSURANCE MANAGEMENT PTY LTD
Plaintiff
AND
AMA GROUP LIMITED
Defendant
Catchwords:
Application to transfer proceedings to Queensland Supreme Court - Turns on its own facts
Legislation:
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (WA), s 5(2)
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | J Hutton |
| Defendant | : | S Taylor |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Kennedys (Australasia) Partnership |
| Defendant | : | Hopgoodganim Lawyers |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Access Group Australia Pty Ltd v Topper Hydraulic Platforms Pty Ltd [2019] WASC 265
Australian Zircon NL v Austpac Resources NL [2010] WASC 166
Bankinvest AG v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711
BHP Billiton v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400
Deuble v Janet Penna by her Limited Administrator Alyce Catherine Lesberg [2021] WASC 27
Equinox Engineering and Installation Pty Ltd v Puffin Installation Services Pte Ltd [2008] WASC 183
Finstro Securities Pty Ltd v Gosatti [2021] NSWSC 635
Joshan v Pizza Pan Group Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 219; (2021) 106 NSWLR 104
Manjimup Wine Enterprises v The Independent Liquor Group Distribution Cooperative Ltd [2015] WASC 202
Resource Equities Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Carr [2007] WASC 246
Valceski v Valceski [2007] NSWSC 440
ARCHER J:
Introduction
On 21 October 2021, the plaintiff issued proceedings alleging that the defendant had breached a contract with the plaintiff (Supreme Court Action). The defendant seeks orders that the proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court of Queensland. It relies on s 5(2)(b)(iii) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross‑vesting) Act 1987 (WA) (Cross-vesting Act). Under that section, I am required to transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court of Queensland if it appears to me that it is in the interests of justice that the proceedings be determined by that Court.
The defendant contends that it is in the interests of justice that the proceedings be determined by the Supreme Court of Queensland. The plaintiff contends that it is not.
For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the application.
Legal principles
Relevantly to this application, the legal principles to be applied can be summarised as follows:[1]
[1] See BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz [2004] HCA 61; (2004) 221 CLR 400 (Schultz); Manjimup Wine Enterprises v The Independent Liquor Group Distribution Cooperative Ltd [2015] WASC 202; Access Group Australia Pty Ltd v Topper Hydraulic Platforms Pty Ltd [2019] WASC 265.
1.If (but only if) it appears to the court that it is in the interests of justice that the proceedings be determined by the Supreme Court of another jurisdiction, the court must transfer the proceeding. There is no discretion.[2]
[2] Schultz [14] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ) and [62] - [63] (Gummow J, with whom Hayne J agreed); Valceski v Valceski [2007] NSWSC 440 [70]; Manjimup Wine Enterprises [9] and [25].
2.The 'justice' referred to 'is not disembodied, or divorced from practical reality'.[3]
[3] Schultz [15] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ).
3.The decision is a 'nuts and bolts' management decision,[4] to be made as a matter of impression, rather than to be 'overly encumbered by an encrustation of judge-made pronouncements of principle'.[5]
4.Relevant factors include:
(a)any substantial differences between the jurisdictions in the convenience and expense to the parties or their witnesses;[6]
(b)which party is better able to bear the practical costs and burdens of litigating in another state;[7]
(c)any significant practical disadvantage of one forum (such as a much greater delay to hearing in one forum when a party or a witness is near death);[8]
(d)whether only one forum can resolve all of the matters in issue or whether one forum can do so more effectively than the other;[9]
(e)the law governing the relevant transaction,[10] including any exclusive jurisdiction clause;[11]
(f)whether either Court has relevant specialist jurisdiction;[12] and
(g)whether the subject matter of the dispute is more closely connected to one jurisdiction compared to the other (such as where the alleged loss was suffered).[13]
[4] Schultz [13] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ), quoting Bankinvest AG v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711, 714 (Street CJ). See also Access Group [23] and Resource Equities Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Carr [2007] WASC 246 [8] (Martin CJ).
[5] Resource Equities [9] (Martin CJ), quoting Bankinvest.
[6] Schultz [15] and [18] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ); Access Group [26].
[7] Manjimup Wine Enterprises [22].
[8] Schultz [15] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ).
[9] See Access Group [26].
[10] Schultz [18] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ).
[11] Finstro Securities Pty Ltd v Gosatti [2021] NSWSC 635 [28] - [30]. Further, it is arguable that a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause may be a relevant factor - see Joshan v Pizza Pan Group Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 219; (2021) 106 NSWLR 104 [88].
[12] Schultz [28] and [31] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ).
[13] Manjimup Wine Enterprises [19] and [24]. See also Access Group [26].
The only issue that continues to generate different views is whether an applicant for transfer bears a burden of persuasion analogous to an onus of proof. In this case, the plaintiff contends that the defendant did bear such a burden.[14]
[14] Submissions of Plaintiff on Defendant's Chambers Summons Seeking Transfer filed 27 May 2022 (Plaintiff's Submissions) [18].
On the current state of authority, I would proceed on the basis that an applicant for transfer does not bear such a burden.[15]
[15] See Schultz [14] and [25] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ), [71] - [72] and [76] - [77] (Gummow J, with whom Hayne J agreed) and [167] - [168] (Kirby J); Manjimup Wine Enterprises [10]. See also Equinox Engineering and Installation Pty Ltd v Puffin Installation Services Pte Ltd [2008] WASC 183 [6]; Australian Zircon NL v Austpac Resources NL [2010] WASC 166 [33], [78] - [79]; Deuble v Janet Penna by her Limited Administrator Alyce Catherine Lesberg [2021] WASC 27 [24]. Compare Joshan [62] (Bell P, with whom Gleeson and McCallum JJA agreed). Joshan was a case involving an application for a stay of proceedings under s 20(4) of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), but Bell P queried why an applicant in the analogous context of the cross-vesting legislation would not bear at least a persuasive onus.
In any event, the plaintiff in this case does not contend that its choice of forum is of any weight in the analysis. Given that, even if I accepted the plaintiff's contention that the applicant bore a burden of persuasion, it would be of no practical impact. This is because it is plain from the language of the statute that, if both courts are equally appropriate, the application for transfer must be dismissed. Unless it appears that it is in the interests of justice that the proceedings be determined in another jurisdiction, the application for transfer must be dismissed. If it appears that the interests of justice will be equally served by each jurisdiction, the application for transfer must be dismissed.
Factual background
The plaintiff provides motor vehicle insurance claims handling and allocation services for motor vehicle insurers and fleets. In these proceedings, it alleges that the defendant failed to pay invoices in respect of services the plaintiff says it provided between about November 2020 and August 2021. Its key allegations are as follows:
1.The defendant's failure to pay the invoices was a breach of an agreement (Agreement) or a varied agreement (Varied Agreement).
2.The Agreement arose following an offer made by the plaintiff's chief executive officer Mr Beuermann to the defendant's then chief commercial officer Mr Bubeck on or around January 2018 (2018 Conversation). Mr Beuermann offered that the Plaintiff would allocate 'Direct Insured Services' to be performed by repairers owned by the Defendant (Allocations). The two men agreed that the Allocations would be provided on a cost-neutral basis and the plaintiff would charge the defendant $100 excluding GST for each successful claim.
3.Since about February 2018, the plaintiff has performed the Allocations for the defendant.
4.Since about July 2018, the plaintiff has also provided additional services of providing hire cars and towing services.
5.The plaintiff invoiced the defendant for the Allocations and additional services (collectively, the Services) and the invoices were generally paid within or around 45 days after they were issued.
6.By the defendant's acceptance of the Services and payment of the invoices, the defendant accepted the offer made in the 2018 Conversation, and an agreement was thereby formed between the plaintiff and the defendant.
7.In April 2020, the defendant started requesting hazards detection and remediation services (Further Services). This work involved the plaintiff arranging, at the request of one of the defendant's repair centres, for third party contractors to inspect and remove hazards (such as drug residues and syringes) where vehicles had been stolen. The plaintiff provided the Further Services, they were invoiced according to a standard schedule of fees, and the invoices were paid by the defendant. By requesting the Further Services and paying the invoices, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant accepted an offer to vary the Agreement to include the provision of the Further Services (Varied Agreement).
8.The defendant paid the invoices that were issued up to 12 November 2020. The plaintiff continued to provide the Services and Further Services until 13 August 2021. However, invoices issued after 12 November 2020 were not paid by the defendant.
Factors said to be in favour of transfer
The defendant submits that the following three factors weigh in favour of these proceedings being transferred to the Supreme Court of Queensland:
1.the alleged contract was made in Queensland;
2.the likely witnesses primarily reside in Queensland; and
3.any performance of the alleged contract was primarily in Queensland.
Where the alleged contract was made
The defendant says that the 2018 Conversation between Mr Beuermann and Mr Bubeck occurred in Queensland. The defendant submits that, therefore, the alleged contract was made in Queensland. It submits that, therefore, the action has the most real and substantial connection with Queensland. The defendant points out that the evidence suggests that the plaintiff operated out of Queensland until March 2019. It submits, therefore, that in the period following the 2018 Conversation, when the plaintiff pleads that the 'offer' was being accepted by conduct, the plaintiff itself was in Queensland.
Even if I was to accept that the alleged contract was made in Queensland,[16] I do not accept that this would mean that the action has the most real and substantial connection with Queensland.
[16] Although the 2018 Conversation occurred in Queensland, it is pleaded to be the offer. It is the subsequent conduct of the defendant which is pleaded to comprise the acceptance.
As the defendant implicitly acknowledged,[17] the assessment of the degree of connection does not turn on identifying technical connections divorced from any practical impact.[18] The defendant conceded that the relevant law to be applied to the plaintiff's claim of breach of contract was the common law of Australia.[19] Accordingly, if, for example, the defendant did not dispute that the alleged contract was made, the fact it was made in Queensland would not be relevant to whether it was in the interests of justice to transfer the proceedings. Similarly, if the defendant did dispute this, but all of the witnesses who were to give evidence on this issue lived in Perth, this would again not be a relevant factor.
[17] The defendant accepted that its submissions in relation to where the contract was made was relevant only in its impact on the witnesses to be called at trial - see ts 33.
[18] And see Manjimup Wine Enterprises [17] as an example of a case in which there would be no practical benefit from trying the case in the place in which the contract was made, and it was held that the location was therefore not of significant assistance in determining the justice of the case.
[19] ts 14 and 32.
I was told from the bar table that every element of the plaintiff's claim is in dispute.[20] While I do not doubt that this was honestly believed by counsel, the defendant has not filed a defence.
[20] ts 26.
The defendant acknowledged it had not filed a defence. It said it needed more clarity on the plaintiff's pleading before doing so. The defendant noted that there was a tension between bringing an application for transfer promptly and taking time to first identify the issues in dispute.[21]
[21] ts 25.
I accept this. However, filing a defence is not the only way to identify the issues. The defendant could not (and did not) contend that it did not understand the substance of the case against it. It says it does not understand the way in which it is said to be liable for the conduct of other entities when the plaintiff does not plead, for example, that these other entities are subsidiaries.[22] The substance of the case, however, could not be clearer. It is a very simple case of an alleged failure to pay money due under a contract. The defendant could have identified the issues, or at least some of them, by adducing evidence. It could have filed an affidavit from Mr Bubeck, denying the alleged 2018 Conversation. It could have filed an affidavit to support a contention that, for example, it did not request the alleged services, or did not receive the alleged services, or had paid for the alleged services. It did not adduce any such evidence. This was despite reading five affidavits in support of its application.
[22] See ts 22 - 23, 25, 28.
Further, it seems inherently unlikely that the proceedings will turn upon the resolution of a dispute as to the content of the (January) 2018 Conversation. I say this because the plaintiff alleges that, after that alleged conversation, and on an ongoing basis over nearly three years, the defendant made requests for Services, the plaintiff sent invoices, and the defendant paid them. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant only stopped paying after 12 November 2020. If true, these allegations will be relatively easy to prove by documents. Given this, it seems unlikely that the terms of the 2018 Conversation will matter much.
Even if I was to assume that there would be a dispute about this (and that the resolution of that dispute could affect the outcome), it would only be a relevant factor if it had some practical impact on the conduct of the case. The defendant submitted that it would have a practical impact in this case because the two men involved in the 2018 Conversation, Mr Beuermann and Mr Bubeck, live (or appear to live) in Brisbane.
I will later say more about witnesses generally. However, for the reasons I have given, I would not characterise Mr Beuermann and Mr Bubeck as likely witnesses.
For these reasons, I do not accept that where the contract was made is a factor that weighs in favour of transferring the proceedings.
The performance of the alleged contract
The defendant submits (references omitted):[23]
The location where the plaintiff sustained the alleged loss may be a relevant factor. By extension, the location where the contract was primarily performed may be a relevant factor.
The alleged 'Services' provided by the plaintiff comprised of repair allocations and the provision of hire car and towing services, while the alleged 'Further Services' comprised of hazard detection and remediation services. While the allocation component of those services was allegedly coordinated from the plaintiff's registered office in Perth, the physical services themselves (ie the actual repair work, hire car or towing services) were primarily provided in Queensland. Furthermore, the plaintiff's claim against the defendant is for unpaid invoices, and those invoices were primarily issued to recipients in Queensland. Accordingly, the plaintiff's alleged losses primarily arose in Queensland by reason of the failure to pay those invoices by the recipients in Queensland.
[23] Defendant's Written Outline of Submissions in Support of Cross-vesting Application filed 27 May 2022 (Defendant's Submissions) [17] - [18].
I do not accept these submissions.
First, the plaintiff pleads, in short, that it did the work pursuant to the Agreement and Varied Agreement, that it is entitled to be paid for that work pursuant to those agreements, and that the defendant has breached those agreements by failing to pay for that work. Therefore, the relevant performance of the Agreement and Varied Agreement is the work done, or arranged to be done, by the plaintiff, for which the defendant has not paid.
The plaintiff's Allocations work (being work done after the plaintiff had moved to Perth[24]) was all done in Perth. The repairs carried out by the defendant are not relevant to the outcome of the proceeding. The plaintiff's claim in relation to the Allocations is for fees it alleges it earned for the antecedent administrative work of allocating repairs sought by an insurer to the defendant. Its claim in this respect is unaffected by whether any repairs were actually carried out by the defendant.
[24] As noted earlier, the plaintiff claims it was not paid for services provided between about November 2020 and August 2021. Long before November 2020, the plaintiff had moved to Perth.
The position is more complex in relation to the other work allegedly done by the plaintiff. The evidence indicates that the plaintiff (in Perth) engaged third parties to provide hire cars, towing services and hazard services to the defendant in locations outside of Western Australia. While the work of the plaintiff was technically entirely within Western Australia, the services it arranged to be carried out for the benefit of the defendant were outside of the State. Accordingly, to prove its entitlement to be paid for this other work, the plaintiff would need to prove both that it organised the third party to do the work, and also that the work was done. In this sense, the performance of this other work was not limited to Western Australia. Nevertheless, one of the two elements the plaintiff must prove in relation to this other work occurred in Western Australia.
Third, while the largest volume of repairs was carried out in Queensland (and the largest volume of invoices sent to Queensland), Queensland was just one of several jurisdictions to which invoices were sent and in which repairs were carried out. More importantly, the plaintiff's claimed loss is that it was not paid for the work that it did. The plaintiff is based in Perth. Its invoices required payment to be made to its Perth bank account. It therefore suffered any loss in Perth.[25]
[25] The defendant accepted this - see ts 34. And see Manjimup Wine Enterprises [19] and [24], as an example where the location of the loss was considered to be significant.
For these reasons, I do not accept that the location in which the alleged contract was performed weighs in favour of these proceedings being transferred to the Supreme Court of Queensland. It is not obvious to me, on the material currently available, that there would be a significant practical benefit in hearing the case in the location in which the alleged contract was performed or where the loss was suffered. However, to the extent that there would be a benefit, I consider that this factor weighs against the transfer of the proceedings.
The location of likely witnesses
The defendant submits that there are nine 'potential key witnesses' who live in Queensland (the nine), but only two in Perth. The defendant submits that this 'is a factor which weighs heavily in favour of transferring the proceedings to Queensland'.
The nine are said to include Mr Bubeck and Mr Beuermann (although the defendant says only that 'it appears' that Mr Beuermann is in Queensland, based solely on a LinkedIn entry[26]).
[26] Defendant's Submissions [10], citing the affidavit of Carl Stanley Bizon affirmed 20 May 2022 [23]. The plaintiff notes that the same LinkedIn entry incorrectly records Mr Beuermann as still working for the plaintiff - see ts 55.
The other seven (the seven) are said to be likely witnesses 'based on the current pleadings and affidavit evidence'. They are Mr Stephen Harding-Smith, Ms Stephanie Voulcaris, Mr Stephen Becker, Mr Brad Burns, Mr Paul Allen, Mr Dave Calder and Mr David Fantom.[27]
[27] Defendant's Submissions [10].
I do not accept that the location of these people 'weighs heavily in favour of transferring the proceedings'.
First, to be of any weight, it would be necessary that there was a likelihood that one or more of the nine would be required to give oral evidence, beyond simply identifying documents (to the extent that such documents were not admissible of themselves).
It is not apparent to me that any of the nine are likely to be witnesses in that sense.
Of the seven, four are included in the defendant's list solely because they are referred to in the statement of claim. They are Mr Harding-Smith, Ms Voulcaris, Mr Burns and Mr Allen.[28]
[28] Defendant's Submissions [10], relevantly citing the affidavit of Carl Stanley Bizon affirmed 3 December 2021 (Bizon December 2021 Affidavit) [15(d)].
Mr Harding-Smith and Ms Voulcaris are referred to in the statement of claim simply as people who were involved with the draft contract. The plaintiff does not sue on the draft contract. Mr Burns and Mr Allen are referred to in the statement of claim simply as people who sent or received emails after the parties had fallen into dispute.
There is no basis upon which I could infer that any of these four would likely be a witness.
In relation to Mr Becker, the plaintiff appears to acknowledge the possibility that he may be a witness.[29] However, without knowing the basis upon which the claim will be defended, this can only be a possibility.
[29] Affidavit of Rachel Anderson affirmed 7 May 2022 [29(f)].
The basis upon which the defendant asserts that Mr Calder and Mr Fantom are likely witnesses is that they were two of the three of the defendant's representatives who were communicating with the plaintiff 'for general operations'.[30] There is no explanation as to how, why, or to what extent, if any, these communications will be relevant to the proceedings. Nor is it currently possible to know whether there will be any dispute as to any relevant content.
[30] Defendant's Submissions [10], relevantly citing the Bizon December 2021 Affidavit [19(b)].
Given the pleaded case and the fact that the defendant has not yet filed a defence, I consider it is currently not possible to determine which, if any, of the seven are likely to be required to give oral evidence.
In relation to the two men involved in the 2018 Conversation, I have already explained why I would not characterise them as likely witnesses.
Second, to the extent that oral evidence is required, current video technology enables witnesses to give evidence remotely. I accept that there remain some advantages of evidence being given in person. Technological issues are avoided. Counsel may feel better able to control the witness. Formality in the courtroom may be easier to achieve. Where the oral evidence is extensive or credibility is in issue, these advantages may be a significant factor in the assessment of where the interests of justice lie. In my view, however, where the oral evidence is not extensive and credibility is not in issue, the advantages will be of little weight.
There is no material before me from which I could infer that there was a realistic possibility that oral evidence will be extensive or that credibility will be in issue.
Having regard to these considerations combined, I do not accept that the location of likely witnesses weighs in favour of these proceedings being transferred to the Supreme Court of Queensland.
Factors said to favour refusing to transfer
In addition to the plaintiff's submissions in relation to the location of the performance of the Agreement, the plaintiff relied on a number of other factors which it said weighed against transfer.
Inconvenience or expense to a party
The places where the parties respectively carry on their business
At all relevant times, the plaintiff's registered office and its principal place of business has been located in Perth. Its only other office is a small accounts office in Brisbane which was established in July 2021, after most of the work the subject of the invoices had been done. The whole of the claims handling team, which is alleged to have done the relevant work, is and has always been in Perth.
The defendant's business dealings and operations are spread more widely, throughout Australia. However, it says it has a 'large presence' in Queensland and does not have a corporate office in Western Australia (only panel repair sites).
If the parties had been of equal size, I would have considered this is a neutral factor. However, the plaintiff is significantly smaller. Because of this the practical impact on the plaintiff in having to conduct the proceedings in Queensland would be greater than the impact on the defendant if the proceedings are not transferred.[31]
[31] And see Manjimup Wine Enterprises [22], as an example of a case where the difference in financial resources was considered to be a relevant factor.
I consider this factor weighs in favour of refusing to transfer the proceedings.
Location of law firms
The plaintiff submits that the location of the parties' solicitors favours leaving the proceedings in Western Australia, simply because the plaintiff's solicitors do not have an office in Brisbane, whereas both sets of solicitors have offices in Perth and the solicitor on the record for the defendant practices in Perth.
The defendant points out that the plaintiff's solicitors operate from New South Wales and that the managing partner of this litigation for the plaintiff, Mr Le Blond, is already located in New South Wales. The defendant points out that Mr Le Blond will presumably have to travel to the trial whether it is in Perth or Brisbane.
In my view, the fact that the plaintiff's solicitors do not have an office in Brisbane is the only aspect of this factor that supports keeping the proceedings in Perth. However, having regard to the overall circumstances, it is of limited weight.
The law governing the transaction
In the statement of claim, the plaintiff pleads that, in mid-2019, the defendant conducted a review of its relationship with the plaintiff and a draft contract was prepared. The parties did not ultimately execute the contract. In its written submissions, the plaintiff said that the relevance of the draft contract to the pleaded claim 'is really only to show that both before, during and after it was negotiated, the Services and Further Services continued to be provided and that the parties were proceeding on the basis that they should have more formal legal relations'.[32] In oral submissions, counsel for the plaintiff acknowledged that the draft contract was not relevant to anything that the plaintiff had to prove to establish its claim.[33]
[32] Plaintiff's Submissions [10(e)].
[33] ts 44. See also ts 57 and 59.
In its written submissions, the plaintiff contended that a factor weighing against transferring the proceedings was that it might be inferred that the parties intended the law of Western Australia to govern their business dealings. The plaintiff submitted that this might be inferred 'from the fact that the draft contract was negotiated over several months and at all times contained a governing law and non-exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of Western Australia, which was at no stage objected to'.[34] In oral submissions, counsel for the plaintiff acknowledged that the applicable law to be applied was the common law of Australia. Counsel acknowledged that, therefore, even if it should be inferred that the parties intended the law of Western Australia to govern their business dealings, this would not be of any weight in circumstances where there would be no difference in the law that would be applied in the two jurisdictions.[35]
[34] Plaintiff's Submissions [44].
[35] ts 47 - 48. See also ts 57.
This concession was, in my view, rightly made.
In any event, the draft contract was never signed. Given that, I do not consider it would sustain an inference that the parties intended the law of Western Australia to govern their business dealings.
For these reasons, I do not consider that this factor weighs against transferring the proceedings.
Conclusion
I have explained why I consider that two of the factors relied upon by the defendant do not support its application and why one weighs against it. I have explained why I consider that the factor of inconvenience and expense weighs against the application, albeit to a limited degree.
Having considered all of the circumstances, it does not appear to me that it is in the interests of justice that the proceedings be determined by the Supreme Court of Queensland.
Accordingly, I would dismiss the application.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
AG
Associate to the Honourable Justice Archer
27 JULY 2022
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