A and A
[2003] FMCAfam 216
•1 July 2003
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| A & A | [2003] FMCA fam216 |
| FAMILY LAW – Property settlement – spouse maintenance – contributions – inheritance received after separation – wife’s ability to find employment – wife’s immediate needs – decision not to split superannuation – lump sum spouse maintenance. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss. 75, 79, 81, 90MC Lee Steere and Lee Steere (1985) FLC 91-626, |
| Applicant: | B D A |
| Respondent: | K J A |
| File No: | LNM 2750 of 2002 |
| Delivered on: | 1 July 2003 |
| Delivered at: | Devonport |
| Hearing date: | 11 & 12 June 2003 |
| Judgment of: | Roberts FM |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr I Guest |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Ian Guest & Associates |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr D Crampton |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Levis Stace & Cooper |
ORDERS
That within thirty days B D A (“the Husband”) transfer to K J A (“the Wife”) all his right, title and interest in the following:
(a)the net proceeds of sale of their former matrimonial home at 31 H S, Latrobe in Tasmania comprising the approximate sum of $129,831 together with any interest earned thereon;
(b)the net proceeds of sale of the parties’ plants, furniture and domestic chattels in the total sum of $6,902 together with any interest earned thereon;
(c)the domestic chattels in her possession or control save for those referred to in Order No. 3 hereof;
(d)the jewellery in her possession or control; and
(e)the Mazda motor vehicle in her possession or control.
That the Wife transfer to the Husband all her right, title and interest in the following:
(a)the jewellery in his possession or control; and
(b)the furniture and chattels in his possession or control.
That within thirty days the Wife transfer and deliver up to the Husband the chattels comprising father’s clock radio, father’s telephone, hand and power tools, Royal Doulton “blue roses” items, Captain Cook plate, McHugh’s brown lamp, McHugh’s dog and Boag’s original basketball as referred to in Exhibit W10 in these proceedings.
That within thirty days the Husband pay to the Wife the sum of twelve thousand four hundred and eighty dollars ($12,480) by way of adjustment of property interests.
That within thirty days the Husband pay to the Wife the further sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) by way of lump sum spouse maintenance.
That the Husband’s Application filed 4th October 2002 and the Wife’s Response filed 11th February 2003 be removed from the pending cases list.
THE COURT NOTES:
That for the purposes of Section 81 of the Family Law Act 1975 these Orders are intended to finally determine the financial relationship between the Husband and the Wife and avoid any further proceedings between them.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT LAUNCESTON |
LNM2750 of 2002
| B D A |
Applicant
And
| K J A |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Applications
This matter concerns competing Applications for property settlement between B D A (“the Husband”) and K J A (“the Wife”).
The Husband commenced the proceedings by filing an Application on 4th October 2002. The Wife filed a Response on 11th February 2003.
Because the parties’ former matrimonial home was sold after the filing of the Application and the Response, both parties informed the Court of what they are now seeking through their counsel at the hearing. In this regard, the Husband seeks a splitting order in relation to his superannuation that would result in the Wife receiving 50 percent of the total value of both parties’ superannuation and further orders to provide for a distribution of the other assets of the parties on the basis of 60 percent to the Wife and 40 percent to himself.
The Wife is seeking orders that would result in her receiving 75 percent of the value of the parties’ assets, inclusive of superannuation and she is also seeking an order for spouse maintenance at the rate of $200 per week.
Background
The Husband is aged forty seven years and the Wife is aged fifty three years. They commenced cohabitation in 1975 and were married on 29th January 1977.
The parties separated on 28th August 2002, however they continued to reside in the same house until early October 2002.
At the time that the parties commenced cohabitation, the Wife was a student for a short period in Hobart and the Husband was a salesman.
The Wife had been previously married and had a daughter to that relationship. That child was placed in the custody of her maternal grandparents following a court hearing. However, the Wife successfully appealed that decision and the child then came to live with the parties in this matter. She was approximately three years old at that time and she continued to live with the Wife and the Husband until she went to Queensland to attend University. The Wife is currently residing with her daughter and son-in-law in Brisbane.
During 1976 the Wife received some funds from a property settlement with her former husband. Their former matrimonial home had been sold and she purchased a motor vehicle from her share of the proceeds. There is a dispute between the parties as to how much she received from that property settlement. I shall deal with that below.
In 1976 the Husband started working part-time at a hotel in Devonport, while also working as a salesman full-time. The Wife and her sister started a hairdressing business.
Late in 1976 the parties purchased their first home in Devonport and commenced renovations.
In early 1985 the Husband changed his full-time employment when he started working for a Tasmanian brewery. Not long after that the Husband also started working part-time at a different hotel in Devonport.
Shortly after that, the parties purchased a residential investment property in Hobart, which they subsequently sold.
In 1985 the Wife sold the hairdressing salon and the parties started a coffee shop business in Devonport. Initially, that was conducted primarily by the Wife, but the Husband assisted when he was able to do so. He was still working for the brewery full-time and at a Devonport hotel part-time.
By 1986 the coffee shop business was sufficiently successful to enable the Husband to give up his second job at the Devonport hotel to work in the coffee shop in addition to his full-time job with the brewery.
The parties purchased a holiday cottage in 1987. However, they sold it shortly afterwards for a very small profit. During that year, they lost approximately $20,000 on the stock exchange. It would appear that that experience was sufficient to dissuade them from further investment in the stock market.
In 1988 the parties sold the coffee shop and the Wife did not work for approximately one year following that sale. She then obtained part-time employment as a hairdresser and continued that employment until after separation
In 1995 the parties purchased a home in Latrobe with the assistance of a bank loan. Initially that property was tenanted. However, the parties moved into that home after they sold their Devonport home. That property was extensively renovated by the parties and was sold in April 2003, at which time the Wife moved to Brisbane to live with her daughter. She has not been employed since that time.
The Husband continues to be employed by the brewery.
Agreed Position at Hearing
The parties reached some agreements in relation to their assets and the values of assets and those were set out in an exhibit handed to the Court at the start of the hearing. There was a change to that in relation to chattels during the hearing. However, that was also agreed and the exhibit was appropriately amended.
The agreed position in relation to the parties’ property is as follows (in whole dollars):
Contents of home
$59,333
Wife’s jewellery
$2,500
Husband’s jewellery
$130
Mazda motor vehicle
$3,800
Sale proceeds from antiques
$3,732
Sale proceeds from plants etc
$3,170
Sale proceeds from home
$129,831
Husband’s inheritance
$35,896
The parties are not agreed upon how I should deal with the Husband’s inheritance. However, I shall deal with that below.
The parties also agreed that they are each to retain the home contents in their respective possession or control, except that the Wife is to provide certain chattels to the Husband worth $4,916. When that has been done, the share of the contents of the home then retained by the Husband will have a value of $28,618 and those retained by the Wife will have a value of $30,715.
The Husband is also to retain his jewellery and be responsible for the payment of his credit card debt at $1,692. The Wife will retain her jewellery and the Mazda and be responsible for her credit card debt of $13,391.
The parties also agreed upon their positions in relation to superannuation and tendered to the Court documentation that had been received from their superannuation funds.
The Husband has superannuation through his employment in a fund that is administered by AMP. The Wife has superannuation policies with Tasplan and MLC. All three funds are accumulation funds in the growth phase and the documents provided to the Court show their values to be as follows:
AMP Superannuation at 28/5/03
$83,752
Tasplan Superannuation at 29/5/03
$3,349
MLC Superannuation at 28/5/03
$8,513
The parties also agree that the Husband has entitlements to accrued holiday pay at $14,123 and long service leave at $9,983.
The Law
Section 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”) defines the Court’s powers in determining applications for property settlement. Subsection 2 of that Section provides that the Court shall not make an Order unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to do so.
The Court’s approach to the determination of an application for the adjustment of property interests has been well established by authority. See Lee Steere and Lee Steere (1985) FLC 91-626, Ferraro (1993) FLC 92-335 and Clauson (1995) FLC 92-595. It is essentially a multi-step process: firstly, identifying the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties at the time of the hearing; secondly, evaluating the contributions made by the parties as defined in Section 79(4)(a) to (c) and thirdly, evaluating the matters contained in Section 75(2) if they are relevant.
It is also clear from Russell v Russell (1999) FLC 92-877 that the Court must also look at the overall result to see whether it is “just and equitable” in accordance with section 79(2) of the Family Law Act 1975.
Since 28th December 2002, there has been a dramatic change in the law in relation to property settlement of spouses. Prior to that time, superannuation was generally treated as a financial resource and not as property. In the main, Courts did not have the power to adjust superannuation interests. Often the only option available to the Court was to take the superannuation into account and make an appropriate adjustment in relation to the property of the parties – see Crapp & Crapp (1979) FLC 90-615. Clearly, that had the potential to result in some injustice, but the Court is now able to “split” superannuation interests pursuant to Part VIIIB of the Act where it is considered appropriate to do so.
Evidence & Findings
In relation to credit, I find that both parties were essentially honest. However, both appeared to run their cases on the basis of stressing the importance of their own contributions while attempting to diminish the contributions of the other party.
It is clear to me from the evidence, and indeed both parties appeared to reluctantly concede such in cross-examination, that both parties worked extremely hard during the marriage. They put in long hours in relation to their employment and both parties also put in significant efforts in relation to the renovation and improvement of property. One only has to look at the “before” and “after” photographs of their former matrimonial homes that were tendered to the Court to see what they were able to achieve. It is quite clear that the Husband put in many hours of physical labour into those renovations. It is equally clear that the Wife put in many hours doing things of a less physical nature and her flair and design skills were relied upon.
In her affidavit, the Wife claims that the proceeds of her property settlement with her former husband were in the vicinity of $5,000 to $8,000. However, she also claimed to have had a Morris 1100 worth approximately $800. In cross-examination she conceded that she had in fact purchased the Morris 1100 from the funds she received by way of property settlement.
The Husband claimed that the Wife’s property settlement from her former husband was in the vicinity of $3,500 to $4,000. Unfortunately, no documentation is available to support either party’s claim in relation to that early direct contribution by the Wife.
I find that I am in a similar position in relation to the Husband’s contributions at the start of the relationship. He claims that he had a motor vehicle worth $2,500 and savings of approximately $1,000. In relation to the latter, he was unable to produce any documentation but stated in cross-examination that he always had savings so it would have been about that amount.
It is clear, that neither party made a very substantial contribution at the start of their relationship and I find that their initial contributions were approximately equal.
As I have stated above, both parties worked very hard and it is my view that up until the time that the Husband received his inheritance from his father, the parties’ contributions were equal. I make this finding notwithstanding the fact that the Wife did not work for approximately one year in or about 1989 and thereafter worked part-time until separation. It is quite clear that contributions as a homemaker are contributions to be taken into account. In this regard, both parties have made contributions according to their abilities. The Wife’s health may have precluded her from doing some of the heavier jobs, but it is clear that she did her fair share. It is also clear that, because she was only working part-time, she had more time available to do more of the homemaker role.
Although the Wife’s daughter is not a child of this relationship, it is quite clear from the Husband’s own evidence that she was accepted by him as being part of the family and, at least up until these proceedings were instituted, he made no complaint about either party’s contributions to the upbringing and support of that child. That would appear to include the contributions towards the costs of appealing the initial custody decision in relation to that child.
The parties’ contributions in relation to the inheritance from the Husband’s father are in a somewhat different category, because that inheritance is of such recent origin. The Husband’s father died approximately three months before the parties separated and the Husband received the inheritance of $35,896 after separation.
There was some evidence given in relation to a falling out between the Wife and the Husband’s father some years before he died. However, that did not appear to have any bearing upon the way in which the Husband’s father left his estate, so I find that evidence to be irrelevant to my consideration of this issue. It is clear that the Wife cannot claim any contribution in relation to the funds inherited by the Husband. It is for that reason that I find that the parties’ overall contributions prior to the receipt of that inheritance were equal, but the Husband contributed that inheritance in its entirety.
In Bonnici and Bonnici (1992) FLC 92-272 the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia said:
“A property does not fall into a protected category merely because it is an inheritance. On the other hand, if there are ample funds from which an appropriate property settlement can be made and a just result arrived at, then the fact of a recently acquired inheritance would normally be treated as an entitlement of the party in question.”
In the decision in Burke & Burke (1993) FLC 92-356, Fogarty J was faced with a situation similar to this one in relation to an inheritance. In that case, the wife had a post-separation inheritance of $66,000 and Fogarty J was of the view that there were two ways of dealing with that inheritance. One was to take it out of the pool of property to which equal contribution otherwise applied and the other was to increase the Wife’s percentage contribution to the total pool of property in the proportion that the inherited sum bore to the total figure. In that case he decided that it was more convenient to adopt the former approach. In my view, either approach is valid. In this case, I will also adopt the approach of excluding the inherited funds from the pool to which equal contribution applies.
The parties were also in dispute as to how I should treat a sum of $4,000 that was withdrawn from their bank account at the time of separation. That sum was intended to enable the Wife to vacate the former matrimonial home and move to Queensland. As it happens, she did not do that although she did spend some money with that in mind (and had to forfeit some funds paid on an airline ticket that was not used).
The facts in relation to this particular issue are that the Husband actually withdrew $4,500 from the bank, retained $500 for himself and gave the Wife $4,000. She spent some of that money in relation to valuations of property, payment of the home loan, storage costs, optometrist expenses and the airline ticket referred to above. The total of those expenses came to $2,626 and it is her position that she used the balance on normal living expenses.
It is the Husband’s position that I should treat that as a distribution of property to the Wife in the sum of $4,000 to be added back in on her side of the ledger. However, I do not accept that as reasonable. That is because he used $500 at the same time for his own expenses and, given that the Wife has not been employed since October last year, I have no difficulty in finding that she used that money for normal living expenses.
The parties were also in dispute about how I should treat the Husband’s failure to meet all the mortgage payments up to the time that the house sale settled. In this regard, it is clear that a previous order of this Court required him to meet those mortgage payments and it is also clear that he did not meet them all. Consequently, the arrears of $1,182 should be added back in to the pool of assets. This is because the net proceeds of the sale of the former matrimonial home would have been more if the Husband had met his obligations. Consequently, it seems appropriate to treat the total sale proceeds of the former matrimonial home as being $131,013 in total, with $1,182 having already been applied for the benefit of the Husband.
As mentioned above, there was agreement between the parties that the Husband entitlements to holiday pay in the sum of $14,123 and long service pay in the sum of $9,983. However, it was his evidence that he intends to take his holidays and he intends to keep working until he is required to retire. In those circumstances, his accrued holiday pay and long service leave entitlements would only provide him with his normal income while on leave from work. In view of that, it does not seem appropriate to me to include those entitlements in the property pool. Those entitlements are factors in the Husband’s terms of employment and I will be taking those terms of employment into account when considering the Section 75(2) factors below. In relation to long service leave and holiday pay entitlements, see Burke and Burke (supra) and Gould & Gould (1996) FLC 92-657.
Section 90MC of the Act provides that a superannuation interest is to be treated as property for the purposes of paragraph (ca) of the definition of “matrimonial cause” in Section 4. It therefore seems to me that in arriving at the total “pool”, I should look at both property and superannuation. On that basis, excluding the inheritance, the asset pool in this matter is as follows:
House contents
$59,333
Wife’s jewellery
$2,500
Husband’s jewellery
$130
Mazda motor vehicle
$3,800
Sale proceeds from antiques
$3,732
Sale proceeds from plants, etc.
$3,170
Sale proceeds from home
$131,013
Husband’s superannuation
$83,752
Wife’s superannuation
$11,962
Total:
$299,392
It is necessary to deduct the parties’ credit card liabilities from that total. They total $15,083 so the asset pool has a total net value of $284,309 (excluding the inheritance).
If I was deciding this matter on contributions alone and dividing the pre-inheritance assets equally, the Wife would receive $142,155 (inclusive of those assets to be retained by her). However, it is quite clear that there are other factors apart from contributions that need to be taken into account.
I need to look at the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party to the marriage but in this matter, it is unlikely that the orders that I make will effect the earning capacity of either party.
The Relevant Factors Under Subsection 75(2)
I need also to look at the means and needs of the parties and the other factors under subsection 75(2) so far as they are relevant.
The Husband is aged forty-seven years and he is in good health. On the other hand, the Wife is aged fifty-three years and her health is not as good. Her doctor gave evidence by way of affidavit and she was cross-examined. Her evidence was that the Wife’s medical conditions include asthma, obesity, osteoarthritis, reactive depression and she has been borderline in the past for hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis.
In a report to the Wife’s solicitors dated 4th June 2003, the Wife’s doctor stated that the Wife’s mood was depressed following separation and she appeared to be under stress prior to that separation. She said that an examination of her knee joints was consistent with osteoarthritis.
The Wife’s doctor went on to say that the Wife is obese. Clearly, different people have different views of what is meant by the term “obese”. In my opinion, the Wife is probably not as trim as she might like to be, but she is not obese. However, that may be consistent with the Husband’s own evidence that the Wife’s weight has fluctuated and she has been able to go on crash diets from time to time to lose weight.
The Husband’s counsel would like to see the Wife in the gymnasium, swimming and generally undertaking a rigorous exercise regime in order to reduce her weight and to keep her arthritic joints working. That may be highly desirable, but it is my view that I must deal with reality rather than perfection. Realistically, the Wife is unlikely to undertake a very strenuous exercise campaign, but her evidence is that she has commenced a walking programme and that should be of benefit to her, given her age.
I am required also to look at the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties and their mental and physical capacity for appropriate gainful employment. In this regard, the evidence that I have in relation to the Husband’s employment is that it is likely to continue. He has a salary from his employment that is in the vicinity of $48,000 per annum and he is provided with a motor vehicle that he can use for almost any private purpose. In short, his motor vehicle costs him nothing for running expenses or capital replacement. His evidence was that his motor vehicle is replaced every three years.
In addition to being provided with a motor vehicle, the Husband’s employer pays half his home telephone account and provides him with a mobile telephone used primarily for work purposes. He also has some alcoholic drinks provided at no cost to him.
The Wife is not currently employed and prior to the sale of the former matrimonial home she was only employed part-time. It is her evidence that she would not be able to work full-time as a hairdresser and that evidence is consistent with the evidence of her general practitioner. She said that the Wife is able to work part-time as a hairdresser for approximately twenty-five hours per week. However, in the report attached to her affidavit, the Wife’s general practitioner emphasised that she is not an occupational physician and said that she felt that:
“that it would be prudent to refer her for further assessment should a legal decision be pending”.
Unfortunately, such an assessment from an occupational physician was not available to the Court.
It was the doctor’s evidence that the Wife’s main condition that affects her work as a hairdresser is her joint pains in her hands and knees. The doctor went on to say that the Wife is unable to endure the longer days on her feet and the constant work with her hands that she was once capable of doing. This evidence was consistent with the Wife’s own evidence and I accept that it is highly unlikely that she would be able to work full-time as a hairdresser.
It was also the doctor’s evidence that the Wife’s medical condition is not such that she is unable to work in another occupation. However, it is clear that she would require more training for a more sedentary job than hairdressing.
The Husband’s counsel submitted that, in running her own hairdressing and coffee shop businesses, the Wife had acquired entrepreneurial and management skills that should enable her to find reasonable employment. He also laid great stress upon the Wife’s own admissions that she is determined and resourceful.
In my view, the Wife is both determined and resourceful and she has acquired business skills that she was keen to play down. Although her evidence was that she is unable to use computers, I have absolutely no doubt that she has the intelligence and the capability to learn how to use computers if she was to attend an appropriate course conducted by TAFE or some similar organisation.
I am therefore of the view that it will not be long before the Wife is able to prove to potential employers that she is capable of working full-time even if it is not as a hairdresser. In my view, the Wife should be able to find some reasonable employment within a period of twelve months. In this regard, I am of the view that I can also take judicial notice of the fact that the unemployment rate in Queensland is lower than that in Tasmania. Consequently, her employment prospects in Queensland must be better than they would have been if she had chosen to remain in Tasmania.
Having said this, it is also clear to me that the Wife is unlikely to be able to find employment that is as well remunerated as that of the Husband.
Neither party is claiming to have any commitment to support any other person.
In this particular case there can be no doubt that the Wife has suffered a significant deterioration in her standard of living since she was required to vacate the former matrimonial home upon its sale. She is now living with her daughter and son-in-law but she wishes to either purchase a two-bedroom home in the area where her daughter resides or rent such a property. Her enquiries of real estate agents in the area reveal that it would cost her between $180,000 and $200,000 to purchase and between $180 and $200 per week to rent such a property.
While I raised the issue of whether it is fair to the Husband for her to move to Queensland where housing is more expensive, it seems to me that any such unfairness is clearly offset by the Wife’s better prospects of obtaining employment.
On the other hand, there does not appear to have been any significant deterioration in the Husband’s standard of living. He is still employed under the generous terms and conditions provided by his employer and he is currently paying rent that is significantly less than the mortgage payment that he was paying prior to the sale of the former matrimonial home.
Conclusions
When I weigh up all these factors in relation to adjustment of the parties’ property interests, I am of the opinion that there should be an adjustment in favour of the Wife of fifteen per cent of the asset pool. This means that she should receive sixty-five per cent and the Husband should receive thirty-five per cent.
As referred to above, the net asset pool (which does not include the inheritance) is $284,309. Sixty-five per cent of that is $184,800.
The Wife has jewellery, a motor vehicle, domestic chattels and superannuation worth $48,977, but she is liable to pay her credit card bill of $13,391. That means that she will retain assets with a net value of $35,586. Consequently, if she is to receive sixty-five per cent, she needs an adjustment of $149,214.
The superannuation that the Husband has accumulated is almost exactly seven times that accumulated by the Wife. Further, the Wife is six years older than the Husband, so statistically she is likely to need security at an earlier stage. Because the Husband’s superannuation is an accumulation interest in the growth phase, any splitting of his superannuation would mean that the Wife could have a new interest created in her own right or have that interest rolled out of the Husband’s superannuation fund into another fund. In those circumstances, the Wife would be able to rely upon satisfying a condition of release herself rather than relying upon the Husband to satisfy a condition of release.
I have considered that factor carefully, and I find that the Wife’s more immediate deeds are the factors that I should give attention to. Consequently, I am of the opinion that the wife should receive an adjustment of $149,214 from the available property only and not from a division of both property and superannuation. In this regard, it should not be forgotten that the Husband’s inheritance is available to him to meet any orders that I make, notwithstanding that I excluded those inherited funds from the pool to which equal contribution applied.
If the Wife receives all the proceeds of the sale of the former matrimonial home ($129,831) and the sales of antiques, and plants etc. ($6,902), she would receive $136,733. That would mean that she would still require an adjustment of approximately $12,480 in her favour.
I was told during submissions that some interest has accrued on the invested funds but I do not have any evidence in relation to that. However, in the overall picture that is not likely to be very much, given current low interest rates, and it is my view that the Wife should receive all that interest. That would mean that the Wife would be in possession of a capital sum of approximately $150,000.
The Wife would also have domestic chattels including antiques of value that she could sell if she wished to do so.
The result is that the Wife will have available to her nearly all the capital that she needs to purchase a home and I am sure that she would be able to borrow a small sum if that is necessary. Consequently, her expenditure will be reduced. However, it is clear that for a short time, until she finds employment, she will have a need for maintenance. On her unchallenged anticipated expenses, that exceeds the sum of $200 per week that she is seeking. I therefore consider it appropriate to order that she receive the sum of $200 per week for a short period.
As stated above, I am of the view that the Wife will be able to find suitable employment within a period of a year. I also note that, pursuant to Section 81 of the Act, if it is practicable, the Court should finally determine the financial relationships between the parties in order to avoid further proceedings. It is therefore my view that there should be a lump sum payment to the Wife of a further $10,000 by way of spouse maintenance. That is not quite $200 per week for one year, but there needs to be some discounting because of the lump sum payment.
The result of all of this is that the Wife will receive all the proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home, antiques, plants etc., and in addition, the Husband will pay to the Wife a total of $22,480.
Although that will leave the Husband with a capital sum of slightly less than $13,500 from his inherited funds, it will also leave his superannuation untouched. Given the Husband’s demonstrated skills in the improvement of real estate, together with his relatively generous employment package, I am of the view that he should be able to re-establish himself within a relatively short period.
I certify that the preceding eighty-two (82) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Roberts FM
Associate:
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