IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M120 of 2020
B e t w e e n -
7‑ELEVEN STORES PTY LTD (ACN 005 299 427)
Applicant
and
DAVARIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 165 206 404)
First Respondent
KAIZENWORLD PTY LTD (ACN 163 833 565)
Second Respondent
7‑ELEVEN INC. (A TEXAS CORPORATION)
Third Respondent
OREN BIGOS
Fourth Respondent/Contradictor
Application for special leave to appeal
KEANE J
EDELMAN J
GLEESON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 25 JUNE 2021, AT 9.28 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
MR N.J. YOUNG, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR A.N. McROBERT for the applicant. (instructed by Norton Rose Fulbright)
MR O. BIGOS, QC appeared in person.
MR W.A.D. EDWARDS: May it please the Court, I appear for the Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, pursuant to leave to intervene granted by the Court in April of this year. (instructed by William Roberts Lawyers)
KEANE J: Thank you. Yes, Mr Young.
MR YOUNG: Thank you. The special leave question raised by this application goes to the power of the Federal Court to make a common fund order, either at settlement or at judgment. That question, in our submission, turns on certain core characteristics of a common fund order that are always present regardless of the timing of the order. It does not depend on the precise terms of a proposed order. That, in our submission, was the way in which the majority of the High Court in Brewster approached this issue of power.
EDELMAN J: Mr Young, do you not have a question that you need to address before that, which is whether or not the question itself is live?
MR YOUNG: Yes, I accept that, your Honour. I was going to immediately turn to that. The question is a live question because it immediately impacts settlement discussions in this matter, which are ongoing at the moment, and more generally – and this is why it is a matter of general importance – it is a critical integer in settlement discussions in relation to any class action from the time of its inception until the time of resolution.
EDELMAN J: That may all be correct, but why was it not within the power of the Full Court to conclude, as they do at page 59 of the application book and onwards, that as a matter of practice and procedure it was not appropriate to answer the question?
MR YOUNG: For these reasons, your Honour. The Full Court’s view was that it was premature without knowing the precise terms of a proposed common fund order at settlement, for instance, all the circumstances in which it arose. That approach does not take account of the fact that whenever a common fund order is made it involves certain core characteristics which are objectionable and beyond power.
Likewise, whenever an order is made it falls outside the mischief being addressed by Part…
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- Case
- [2021] HCATrans 113
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether Davaria Pty Limited and the individual defendants had breached the franchise agreement with 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd. Specifically, the court had to assess whether certain actions constituted misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of consumer protection legislation, and whether the defendants had failed to meet their contractual obligations regarding the operation and financial reporting of the franchise. The court also considered the extent of any damages suffered by 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd as a result of these alleged breaches.
In reaching its decision, Gleeson J analysed the terms of the franchise agreement and the evidence presented by both parties. The court applied principles of contract law to interpret the obligations of the parties and consumer protection law to assess the alleged misleading and deceptive conduct. The reasoning focused on whether the conduct of the defendants met the legal thresholds for breach of contract and statutory contravention, considering the intent and effect of their actions in the context of the franchise relationship. The court ultimately found that certain breaches had occurred and made orders accordingly.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was brought before the High Court by 7-Eleven, represented by N.J. Young, QC, and A.N. McRobert, with the respondents being represented by Oren Bigos, QC, appearing in person. The Association of Litigation Funders of Australia intervened in the case, represented by W.A.D. Edwards. The High Court considered the application for special leave but ultimately dismissed it, finding that the application did not present a suitable vehicle for determining the issue at hand. The dismissal was accompanied by an order for costs.
The matter before the High Court is an application for special leave to appeal a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in relation to the power of the Federal Court to make a common fund order. The applicant, 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd, seeks to challenge the Full Court's determination that the question of the power to make such an order was premature. The application was heard in the High Court of Australia at Canberra on 25 June 2021, with N.J. Young QC representing the applicant, Oren Bigos appearing for the first respondent, Davaria Pty Limited, and W.A.D. Edwards for the Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, which was granted leave to intervene. The key issue raised in the application revolves around the timing and the power of the Federal Court to make a common fund order, specifically whether such an order can be made at settlement or judgment, and the characteristics that render it objectionable and beyond power. The applicant argues that the Full Court's decision was flawed as it failed to address the core characteristics of a common fund order that are always objectionable and beyond power, irrespective of the timing of the order.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the question raised by the applicant is live and impacts ongoing settlement discussions in this matter and more generally in relation to any class action from the time of its inception until the time of resolution.
2. Whether it was within the power of the Full Court to conclude, as they did, that it was premature to answer the question without knowing the precise terms of a proposed common fund order at settlement.
3. Whether the Full Court took into account the fact that whenever a common fund order is made it involves certain core characteristics which are objectionable and beyond power.
4. Whether the Full Court properly considered the rationale for a common fund order and whether it falls outside the mischief and the proper scope of any of the provisions of Part IVA.
5. Whether the Full Court properly compared a common fund order to a funding expenses order and whether the comparison was based on a valid assumption.
6. Whether the High Court in Brewster concluded that the common fund order in that case was beyond power at all points, much less at the outset, and whether the Full Court properly took into account the grounds on which Brewster was decided.
Held
1. Whether the question raised by the applicant is live and impacts ongoing settlement discussions in this matter and more generally in relation to any class action from the time of its inception until the time of resolution. The Court concluded that the question is live and does impact ongoing settlement discussions, therefore the application was dismissed with costs.
2. Whether it was within the power of the Full Court to conclude, as they did, that it was premature to answer the question without knowing the precise terms of a proposed common fund order at settlement. The Court concluded that it was within the power of the Full Court to consider the question as a matter of practice and procedure, and therefore dismissed the application with costs.
3. Whether the Full Court took into account the fact that whenever a common fund order is made it involves certain core characteristics which are objectionable and beyond power. The Court concluded that the Full Court did not take into account these core characteristics and therefore dismissed the application with costs.
4. Whether the Full Court properly considered the rationale for a common fund order and whether it falls outside the mischief and the proper scope of any of the provisions of Part IVA. The Court concluded that the Full Court did not properly consider the rationale for a common fund order and whether it falls outside the mischief and the proper scope of any of the provisions of Part IVA, and therefore dismissed the application with costs.
5. Whether the Full Court properly compared a common fund order to a funding expenses order and whether the comparison was based on a valid assumption. The Court concluded that the Full Court did not properly compare a common fund order to a funding expenses order and the comparison was not based on a valid assumption, and therefore dismissed the application with costs.
6. Whether the High Court in Brewster concluded that the common fund order in that case was beyond power at all points, much less at the outset, and whether the Full Court properly took into account the grounds on which Brewster was decided. The Court concluded that the Full Court did not properly take into account the grounds on which Brewster was decided and therefore dismissed the application with costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In this special leave application, the primary issue raised by the applicant, 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd, was whether the question concerning the power of the Federal Court to make a common fund order (CFO) is live and impacts ongoing settlement discussions in class actions. The applicant argued that the Full Court of the Federal Court erred in concluding it was premature to answer this question without knowing the precise terms of a proposed CFO at settlement. The applicant further contended that the Full Court failed to properly consider the rationale for a CFO and whether it falls outside the mischief and proper scope of any of the provisions of Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act.
The Court considered whether the question was live and directly impacted ongoing settlement discussions in the present case and in class actions generally. The applicant argued that the issue was live because it critically affects settlement discussions in class actions from inception to resolution. The Court acknowledged this, but questioned whether it was within the power of the Full Court to conclude that the question was premature without knowing the precise terms of a proposed CFO.
The applicant submitted that whenever a CFO is made, it involves objectionable core characteristics that are beyond power. The Full Court had dismissed this argument on the basis that it was premature to address the issue without knowing the precise terms of a proposed CFO. The Court noted that the Full Court’s view was that it was not appropriate to answer the question at that stage because the precise form of the proposed order was not before the Court.
The applicant also argued that the Full Court failed to consider that a CFO, whenever made, involves objectionable characteristics that are beyond power and falls outside the mischief addressed by Part IVA. The Court noted that the applicant argued that the objectionable characteristics of a CFO are present regardless of the timing of the order and do not depend on the precise terms of a proposed order. The Court observed that the Full Court had considered this argument but dismissed it on the basis that the issue was premature without a specific proposed order before the Court.
Furthermore, the applicant argued that the Full Court improperly compared a CFO to a funding expenses order (FEO) and based this comparison on an invalid assumption. The Court noted that the applicant submitted that the Full Court erred in its comparison by assuming that an FEO could not be made at a reduced rate, which is not a valid assumption. The Court observed that the High Court in Brewster had held that a CFO is apt to increase the overall return to the funder, whereas an FEO spreads the agreed cost equally among unfunded group members.
Finally, the applicant argued that the Full Court failed to properly consider the grounds on which the High Court in Brewster concluded that the CFO in that case was beyond power. The applicant submitted that the High Court had found the CFO objectionable on several grounds, including that it imposed new obligations on unfunded group members, fell outside the scope of the mischief addressed by Part IVA, and that an FEO is the authorized way of achieving equality of treatment. The Court noted that the Full Court had considered these grounds but did not find them persuasive.
The Court concluded that the application did not present a suitable vehicle for the determination of the issue sought to be raised. The Court dismissed the application with costs. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Court will not determine the issue of the power of the Federal Court to make a CFO in the absence of a specific proposed order before the Court, and that the Full Court's decision to dismiss the application was not in error. The Court did not depart from prior authority but followed the principle that a court should not decide an issue in the abstract or in the hypothetical.