2520959 (Refugee) - [2025] ARTA 1779

2520959 (REFUGEE) [2025] ARTA 1779 (23 JULY 2025)
DECISION AND
REASONS FOR DECISION
Respondent: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Tribunal Number: 2520959
Tribunal:General Member B Butler
Date:23 July 2025

Place:Melbourne
Decision:The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant meets the following criteria:
·s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 23 July 2025 at 11:46am
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Pakistan – Federal Circuit and Family Court remittal – ethnicity, religion and political opinion – Pashtun Turi and Shia Muslim in Sunni majority area – anti-Taliban and anti-government opinions – work as recognisable occupation in community – travel restrictions and witness to violent attacks and deaths – fear of harm from extremist groups – unauthorised maritime arrival – low-profile participation in protests in Australia – mental health and treatment – returned failed asylum seeker – country information – recent sectarian violence and travel restrictions – real chance of serious harm does not extend to large cities – complementary protection – real risk of significant harm – relocation possible and reasonable despite some difficulties – limited mental health services or support, and protection from authority – risk of harm faced by applicant personally – decision under review remitted
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5(1), 5H(1)(a), 5J(1), (5), 36(2)(a), (aa), (2A)(d), (2B), 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
CASES
ABAR15 v MIBP (No 2) (2016) 242 FCR 11
BBK15 v MIBP (2016) 241 FCR 150
Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379
FCS17 v MHA (2020) 276 FCR 644
MIAC v MZYYL (2012) 207 FCR 211
MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505
MZAAJ v MIBP [2015] FCA 478
SZSPT v MIBP [2014] FCA 1245
SZTAL v MIBP; SZTGM v MIBP (2017) 262 CLR 362
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

The applicant is a [Age]-year-old man who is a national of Pakistan. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs to refuse to grant him a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicant arrived in Australia by boat [in] July 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. The applicant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa, which is a protection visa, on 16 June 2017. The delegate refused to grant the visa on 5 May 2020. His matter was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The IAA affirmed the decision of the delegate on 26 June 2020.
The applicant sought judicial review of the IAA’s decision. On 14 March 2025, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) ordered, by consent of the applicant and the Minister, that the IAA decision is quashed and that, in accordance with rules 11 and 12 of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Rules 2024 (Cth), the matter is remitted to the Tribunal to review the delegate’s decision according to law.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 16 July 2025 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Pashto and English languages.
The applicant was represented in relation to the review. The representative attended the Tribunal hearing.
BACKGROUND
Evidence before the Department
The applicant provided a statutory declaration, dated 24 May 2017, outlining his claims for protection. These are summarised as follows:
·He is a Pashtun and a Shia Muslim who was born in [Village 1], Parachinar, Kurram Agency, Pakistan. He has [brothers] and [sisters]. His mother and one sister have passed away. His father remarried and he has [stepsisters].
·His father owns agricultural land. The family uses the land for their own consumption sells the left-over harvest. They did not have many problems living in the region until 2007. In 2007, the fighting and conflict between the Sunni and Shia populations started. During this time, the applicant had to stop going to [his workplace] and it was difficult to travel. The road between Parachinar and Peshawar was closed and people were killed if they attempted to travel on the roads. They were surrounded by Sunni villages where people supported the Taliban.
·He was [an occupation 1] for a number of years at a [workplace] for the Shia community and would be recognised as [an occupation 1] from the [workplace]. He was not able to continue his job as a full-time [occupation 1] as he had to travel through a neighbouring Sunni village and was fearful that he would be killed.
·He also assisted with his family’s business which [did a work task] at [events]. He considers that he would be recognised because of his involvement in the business. He was fearful that he would be killed when he worked for the business.
·He was traumatised by witnessing the death of many people, as explosions and bomb blasts happened often. He recalled witnessing an explosion at the [Location] in Parachinar and recalled seeing injured people. The situation deteriorated to the point that he was fearful to leave his house, and he was unable to work or support his family. These incidents have affected his mental health, and he has problems with anxiety and difficulty sleeping. He seeks counselling at [Health provider] in Melbourne.
·He was issued a Pakistani passport in Parachinar in [2013]. He departed Pakistan [in] May 2013 and travelled to Australia via [Countries 1-4].
·At the time of his statutory declaration, he feared harm from the Taliban, Daesh and other Sunni extremist groups if he returned to Pakistan, as they want to take revenge on Shia Muslims and follow the Taliban’s ideology. They do not consider Shias as Muslims. He fears that they would kill or kidnap him because of his religion.
·He also feared being persecuted by the Pakistani government and the Pakistani Army, who may question him because of his absence from the country and because they may view his application for protection in Australia as bringing shame on the country.
·He did not think that he could relocate within Pakistan to avoid harm because throughout Pakistan, the Taliban would identify him as a Shia as he is a Pashtun from Parachinar. He noted that he has an accent and physical appearance which would lead to people identifying him as a Pashtun Shia. He does not consider that there are any safe places for Shias in Pakistan. The authorities could not protect him as they are afraid of the Taliban. He also has no family or support networks elsewhere in Pakistan to assist him relocate.
In terms of his education, he declared that he completed a [Subject 1] degree in Parachinar from 2006 to 2008, and [an occupation 1] course by distance education from 2005 to 2006. He also completed a pre-[subject 2] degree at a government degree college from 2003 to 2006. He provided evidence of these courses to the Department.
The applicant was interviewed upon entry to Australia, and also by a delegate on 13 February 2020. The applicant’s statements at the interviews are largely consistent with his written statement, summarised above.
The delegate accepted that the applicant is a Pashtun Turi Shia from Parachinar in Pakistan. They accepted that the applicant had worked as [an occupation 1] and in his family’s [work task] business and had witnessed violence in Pakistan. They also accepted that the applicant would return to Pakistan as a failed asylum seeker from the west, and that he has political views against the Pakistani state. However, having regard to country information at the time of the decision, the delegate concluded that the applicant did not face a real chance or real risk of harm on the basis of his particular profile.
Immigration Assessment Authority
The Reviewer accepted the applicant’s particular profile. Having regard to country information, the Reviewer found that the security situation in the Kurram District had improved, and that the applicant did not face a real chance or real risk of harm on the basis of his particular profile. The Reviewer also found that the applicant would not be denied medical treatment for his mental health conditions because of a reason in s 5J(1)(a) and, in relation to the availability of medical treatment for his mental health conditions, found that there was no intention to cause significant harm to the applicant.
In quashing the IAA decision, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) noted that the IAA did not consider an integer of a claim: that he faced a moderate risk of harm as a Shia Turi by not having regard to the DFAT report (dated 20 February 2019) which assessed that Turis in Kurram Agency faced a moderate risk of sectarian violence from militant groups because of their Shia faith.
Evidence before the Tribunal
Written material
The applicant submitted documents in relation to his health, including a letter from his treating psychiatrist, [Dr A], of [Health provider], dated 31 March 2025. Her current positions include medical lead at [Health provider] and Consultant Psychiatrist at [Hospital and Mental Health service]. [Ms B] has been involved in the applicant’s care since being appointed to her position at [Health provider] in July 2024. In writing her report, she had regard to progress notes and psychiatric reports from 2017 onwards. She states that the applicant’s depressive symptoms date back to the applicant’s release into the community and were formally documented in 2017 when his GP diagnosed him with depression and referred him for assessment. His symptoms include low mood, poor sleep, fluctuating appetite, low energy, reduced motivation, and anxiety. PTSD symptoms reported include nightmares/flashbacks and intrusive memories of traumatic experiences; emotional numbing and avoidance of triggers which date back to at least to May 2017 when they were documented by another doctor. She states that the applicant has been in the care of psychiatrists at the service since 2017 and that he has an improved mood in response to a combination of medications. His recovery is described as partial and that gaining meaningful employment and building social connections are particularly difficult due to the severity of his symptoms. She reports that he displays ongoing low energy; sleep disturbance and every other day he experiences nightmares and flashbacks; as well as ongoing mood fluctuations.
[Dr A] assesses that the applicant meets the diagnostic criteria for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder; with secondary Major Depressive Disorder (moderately severe) and partially treated. [Dr A] states that, in her opinion, the lack of certainty (about the refugee determination process) is an ongoing stressor that perpetuates his PTSD and removes his ability to plan ahead positively towards recovery. [Dr A] states that the nature of his diagnosis, PTSD, makes it likely that he will continue to experience episodic relapse related to social stressors; and require ongoing support and treatment. In her opinion, a return to Pakistan would almost certainly trigger a worsening in symptoms of nightmares and flashbacks; along with worsening the symptoms of the severe Major Depressive Disorder.
During the hearing, the applicant was asked about the type of treatment he receives at [Health provider], and he was given the opportunity to provide further material in respect of his treatment. Following the hearing the applicant’s representative submitted a letter from [Dr A] dated 21 July 2025 which states that the applicant receives trauma informed supportive psychotherapy, which she reports is one of the best evidence-based modalities for PTSD. She states that the applicant has developed an excellent therapeutic alliance in his treatment and attends regularly, which is favourable for a good outcome. She concludes that, it is hoped with continued treatment, he will be able to meet his goals of further training to enable him to work in the future in Australia as [an occupation 1].
The applicant provided a statutory declaration dated 25 June 2025, in which he confirms that he relies on his earlier evidence and also provides new reasons for fearing harm in Pakistan. These reasons are summarised as follows:
·Extremists in Pakistan are actively killing Shias throughout Kurram. The roads have been closed for nine months because the Pakistan government cannot guarantee their safety. There was a large attack last year on Shias travelling from Parachinar to Peshawar. The closed roads have led to shortages of food, medicine and essential supplies in Parachinar, which has affected his family. The family’s farmland is insufficient to provide for them and they are affected by petrol and energy shortages.
·His family remain in their home in [Village 1] and only feel safe within the home. When his brother leaves to purchase supplies, they do not expect that he will return safely. His family members feel like prisoners.
·Even if the applicant wanted to return home, he could not do so as the road to Parachinar is closed. The army guards the roads from Peshawar and on the Afghan border and have kept them closed since November 2024.
·He does not believe that the blockade of the road will end, but if it does, he continues to fear that he will be targeted and killed as a Shia Turi by radical anti-Shia militants including the Taliban, ISIS and others in Kurram who are on the roads. He considers that he is at heightened danger as [an occupation 1], and [occupation 1] have been targeted in the past, including in May 2023 in [Village 2] in Kurram.
·He also fears harm throughout Pakistan as a practising Shia, because there are killings of Shias, and they are targeted by extremists. He also fears harm from the state authorities who are opposed to Shias.
·He is also opposed to the authorities in Pakistan, and he views the authorities as corrupt. He has participated in political protests in Australia, including on at least four occasions, with the most recent occasion being [in] February 2025 in [City] in front of [Venue]. The protests have been organised by the Pashtun Shia community associations in Melbourne. At one protest, he held the banner “[Wording of banner]”. He considers that the banner reflects his belief that the Pakistani government is corrupt, and the army and intelligence are secretly supporting the Taliban and other extremists to harm Shias. He considers that it is impossible to accept a nuclear superpower like Pakistan which engaged the Indian army this year cannot control a 20 km road into Parachinar for nine months. He fears that the authorities will discover and harm him for his protest activity in Australia because they target critics. He fears that his risk is particularly high because he is a Shia Turi, Pashtun, practising Shia, and is actively opposed to them and has lived abroad for an extended period.
·He fears harm on the basis that he has resided in Australia for 13 years and would be returning as a failed asylum seeker, and the Pakistani government is against such people. He fears being interrogated at the airport and being vanished for claiming asylum abroad. As he suffers from mood issues and cannot control himself if he does not have his medication, he may act in a way which would raise his profile such as by speaking against them, and they may then torture or vanish him.
·He does not consider that he could relocate within Pakistan because of his PTSD and mental health, and also because of a lack of a support network outside of Kurram. He thinks that Pashtuns do not accept those with mental health issues which means that he would have to avoid other Pashtuns. He may also find it difficult to obtain employment to survive because of his mental health and lack of support networks. He struggles to wake up at a set time in the morning and wakes at odd hours because of his mental health which affects his ability to find employment.
He also submitted to the Tribunal a copy of a June 2025 newspaper article “Daily Ehsaas Islamabad’ (with Google translation) to confirm that the blockade of the road from Parachinar to Peshawar continues.
He also provided letters from [Organisations 1 and 2]. He is a member of both groups and is reported to participate in community functions.
He has provided screenshots taken from [Social media] videos which show him participating in the protests (referred to above) and holding banners.
His representative provided a comprehensive submission, dated 30 June 2025, outlining current country information directly relevant to the applicant’s profile as a Turi Shia and as a Pashtun.
The hearing
The applicant gave evidence at the hearing which was consistent with his written statements and interviews with the Department.
He was asked about his beliefs as a Shia. He outlined his beliefs, the mosque he attends and the importance of his religion to his life.
He provided an update on his family who live in [Village 1] and said that they buy supplies in Parachinar when necessary. He said that they usually walk to town. He speaks to his family once a month. He prefers to limit contact with his family as they ask about his visa status and work, which bothers him and affects his mental health. He said that they have been affected by the shortages caused by the road blockage and that he sends them money regularly.
In relation to the blockage of the road to Peshawar, he said that the government of Pakistan is not helping the people in the area. It has led to shortages of essential items in Parachinar. He referred to the local member of Parliament raising the issue, but the government has not assisted. He cited the reason for the blockage is that the government does not wish to provide a security convoy (for Shias) in the area.
The applicant was asked to explain his political views. He confirmed that prior to leaving Pakistan, he was not a participant in political activities in Pakistan. When Imran Khan came to power, as Prime Minister (in August 2018), the applicant became interested in politics. He said that Imran Khan worked for minorities within Pakistan, including Shias. He said that the current government is biased against Shias and gave the example of the recent dispute with India which ended after a few days. He reasoned that if the Pakistani government can engage with India and resolve conflicts promptly (such as the recent conflict in May 2025)[1], it is troubling that they cannot control the road area near Parachinar and reopen it after nine months and indicates that they are not interested in peace in the region. He said that during Imran Khan’s time in power, there was some relief for Shias. He said that when Imran Khan lost power in April 2022, the situation in Pakistan deteriorated. While he has participated in protests in Australia, he said that he would not be able to do so in Pakistan because if someone protests against the government in Pakistan they will be arrested or disappear for months.
[1] Christopher Clary, Four Days in May: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025, Stimson Center, 28 May 2025 <>
He spoke about his treatment at [Health provider]. He said that he has attended for a number of years and currently attends once every four to six weeks. He said that they discuss his current mental health with him and adjust his medication. He said that by attending his sessions, he is able to find some peace and that without his treatment, he would have anger problems. He added that the only people he trusts are at [Health provider].

When asked about what he fears in Pakistan, he said that as a Shia from Kurram Agency, and as a Turi, he thinks he will be harmed by the Taliban or other Sunni extremist groups, and that he faces harm from the government because of his protest activities in Australia. He was asked to explain why he held up the banner stating ‘[Wording of banner]’ at the protest. He said that he chose the banner because it represents his views: the Pakistani government is corrupt and does not wish to reopen the road to Parachinar, and it was in the Army’s presence that the convey was attacked last year, which indicates that they do not wish to protect Shias.
He was also asked to explain why he could not relocate to another area in Pakistan, such as Islamabad which has a functioning police force and security apparatus. Consistent with his written statement, his response focused on his mental health and lack of community networks outside of Kurram. It was suggested that he may be safe in a city like Islamabad as the Taliban and other extremist groups may not operate within the region or wish to target a person like him in such an area. He responded that he would not be able to find work there because of a lack of family support, and that this would cause his mental health to suffer. He noted that he would not have access to psychological support, which would lead to a deterioration in his mental health and affect his ability to work. He also said that he would be reluctant to disclose his mental health difficulties with other Pashtuns because they would look down on him, but because of his difficulties he considers that people would look down on him and this would affect his ability to find accommodation and employment.
The applicant confirmed that he has one uncle and a distant cousin who both live in Australia. He currently lives with his distant cousin. The applicant does not work full-time because of his mental health, and works as [an occupation 2] when he feels well enough to work.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Criteria for protection visa
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, I have taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
REASONS AND FINDINGS
The issue in this case is whether the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or under the complementary protection criterion.
For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be set aside and remitted for reconsideration.
I accept that the applicant was a credible witness. He did not, at any time, seek to embellish his evidence or avoid any questions. He responded to all questions calmly and asked for clarification when appropriate. While the applicant suffers from mental health concerns and said that he had not slept well the night before the hearing, he spoke in a coherent manner and asked the Tribunal to ensure the hearing proceeded as a pace which would allow him to process the Tribunal’s questions and information.
I accept that the applicant is a Shia. He has consistently claimed to be a Shia and answered my questions about his faith. I also accept that he is a Pashtun and is a Turi. I accept that he departed Pakistan in 2013 and that he was motivated to do so because of the situation in Parachinar, which had deteriorated from 2007 when the Taliban took control of parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The Taliban in Pakistan, known as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was established in 2007 as an umbrella organisation with the appropriation of Taliban leaders from the former FATA, and mainly consists of Sunnis and Pashtuns.[2] The TTP’s short-term goal is to undermine the influence of the Pakistani state, especially in Pashtun areas, and its long-term goal is to overthrow the state and establish Sharia law and an Islamic caliphate.[3] Though it is reported to have been driven out of Pakistan in 2014, it has regained some control in pockets of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.[4] Kurram Agency or District is located in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
[2] Country of Origin Information: Pakistan - Country Focus ( 3.2.1.
[3] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Country Information Report – Pakistan (30 April 2025) (DFAT Report), para 2.114.
[4] Country of Origin Information: Pakistan - Country Focus ( 3.2.1.
The Turis are a Pashtun tribe residing primarily in and around the Kurram District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and there are reportedly 500,000 Turis residing in Pakistan with most adhering to the Shia sect of Islam.[5] DFAT reports that Turis have historically faced significant violence due to territorial disputes with other Pashtun tribes, their Shia faith and their active opposition to the Afghan Taliban, TTP and other Sunni militant groups.[6] This is consistent with the applicant’s claim that as a Turi Shia, he would be targeted by the Taliban and other Sunni extremist groups.
[5] DFAT Report, para 3.56.
[6] DFAT Report, para 3.57.
It is reported that the security situation for Turis in Kurram District had improved significantly since 2019, but that the underlying triggers for conflict remained present,[7] and that sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims reportedly flared up in Kurram District in November 2024, resulting in at least 32 deaths according to international media.[8] A convoy of 200 passenger vehicles was travelling through Kurram District in November 2024 when it was attacked by gunmen, resulting in the deaths of at least 41 people and a further 16 were critically injured, and according to BBC reporting most of the passengers travelling in the convoy were Shia.[9] There was further violence in the region following the attack on the convoy, which resulted in the deaths of more people with the a local administration official reporting that the clashes and convoy attacks had resulted in the deaths of 82 people and a further 156 were injured.[10] There was further sectarian violence in January 2025, a gun attack on Shias, and road side bombs killing Shia were reported in June 2025.[11] Opinion pieces in South Asian media indicate that the Pakistani state favours the majority while leaving minorities to fend for themselves, having regard to the history of Parachinar and sectarian violence originating in the state’s support of sectarian Sunni militias in Afghanistan, which has left the Shia population of Parachinar vulnerable to extremist violence, and that the state has been slow to address the cause as the region’s religious diversity has become a source of conflict rather than unity.[12]
[7] DFAT Report, para 3.57.
[8] DFAT Report, paras 3.58, 2.89.
[9] Pakistan: Dozens dead in attack on passenger vehicles in Kurram, BBC News, 22 November 2024 < Pakistan violence: Dozens killed in sectarian attacks, BBC News, 25 November 2024 <
[11] The Wailing Of Parachinar, Kashmir Observer, 5 March 2025 < Four killed in roadside IED in Parachinar,The Express Tribune, 25 June 2025 <Four killed in roadside IED in Parachinar>.
[12] The Wailing Of Parachinar, Kashmir Observer, 5 March 2025 < Praveen Swami, Pakistan’s Shia killings: Islamic State is destroying its nationhood, The Print, 24 November 2024 <>
An official ceasefire was agreed to after the attack on the convoy of Shia travellers, however, the road between Parachinar and Peshawar remains closed, and reporting in mid-April 2025 indicates that no aid convoy had entered Parachinar since 27 March 2025.[13] The applicant confirmed that the road remains closed, and as noted above has provided a google translation of a local media article in June 2025 to confirm the status of the road. There is little recent reporting on the road in English language or international media; based on the material before me, I accept that Parachinar remains affected by the road closure. This has resulted in shortages of food and medicines in the area and, it has been reported that the lack of supplies has led to the deaths of 31 children.[14]
[13] Pakistan violence: Dozens killed in sectarian attacks, BBC News, 25 November 2024 < Siege of Parachinar: A source of income for security forces and ongoing suffering for Shias, ABNA English, 13 April 2025 < Shutter-down strike in Parachinar as residents want sole road to city reopened, DAWN, 15 April 2025 < At least 31 children dead amid medicine shortages in Pakistan's north-west, ABC News, 24 December 2024 <>
The Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) in its Pakistan Security Report 2024 reported that there were 11 sectarian-related terrorist attacks in 2024 in Pakistan, which claimed 64 lives, mostly in Kurram, and inflicted injuries on another 27 people.[15]
[15] Pakistan Security Report 2024, Pak Institute of Peace Studies, January 2025, 1.1 <>
In relation to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa more broadly, the security situation is reported to have continued to deteriorate in 2024 as compared to 2023 (this is in contrast to the rest of Pakistan, with the exclusion of Balochistan).[16] The Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) in its Pakistan Security Report 2024[17] reported that there were 295 terrorist attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2024, with 509 people killed and 517 injured. This represents a 69% increase in the number of attacks between 2024 and 2023, a 21% increase in the number of people killed and a 34% decrease in the number of people injured. The number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan increased for the fourth consecutive year.
[16] DFAT Report, para 2.71.
[17] Pakistan Security Report 2024, Pak Institute of Peace Studies, January 2025 <>
PIPS summarised that the frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks has increased in 2024, and that after a decline in terrorist violence since 2014, the trend began reversing following the Taliban's 2021 capture of Kabul.[18] PIPS has assessed that by 2024, the number of attacks has reached levels comparable to the security situation prior to 2014. There is a difference between the present situation and the pre-2014 situation as unlike the period before 2014, terrorists do not control specific territories inside Pakistan, however PIPS concludes that the prevailing insecurity in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (and Balochistan) is ‘alarming’.[19]
[18] Pakistan Security Report 2024, Pak Institute of Peace Studies, January 2025, 1.2.2 < Pakistan Security Report 2024, Pak Institute of Peace Studies, January 2025, 1.2.2 < the applicant satisfy the refugee criterion for protection?
Having regard to the available country information, the situation in Parachinar and the surrounding area appears to be dire because of the shortages of essential goods. The main road to Peshawar (the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) has been closed since November 2024, which has led to shortages of food and medicines in Parachinar. There have been attacks on Shias, including the attacks in November 2024 which resulted in the deaths of 82 people. There have been further instances of violence since November 2024, referred to above.
The applicant claims to fear harm from Sunni extremist groups, such as the TTP, who appear to have recently conducted attacks on Shias in the region. DFAT has reported that, according to in-country sources, the TTP wanted to distance itself from its past attack on the Army School in Peshawar in 2014 and the attempted assassination of prominent female education advocate Malala Yousafzai in 2012, and that in 2024 it stated that it would not attack election rallies, such that its targets were limited to the military and security forces.[20] However, this information must be read in light of the recent attacks on Shias in the region which continue, and the cycles of violence which has affected the region (at varying intensities) since 2007. I accept that there have been periods of stability in the Kurram region including most recently until November 2024 according to DFAT,[21] however, having regard to current media reporting, the situation appears to have deteriorated. This is also against an apparent increase in terrorist attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
[20] DFAT Report, para 2.114.
[21] DFAT Report, para 2.89.
The criterion in s 5J(1)(a) contains a subjective requirement, that an applicant must in fact hold a fear of being persecuted, while s 5J(1)(b) imposes an objective standard, that there be a real chance the person would be persecuted. A ‘real chance’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent: Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379.
I accept that the applicant, as a Shia and as a Turi from Parachinar, would be a target of sectarian violence in Peshawar instigated by Sunni extremist groups, such as the TTP. I also accept that as he holds anti-Taliban and anti-government views, which he may express in Pakistan. His expression of his views would further elevate his profile in the region and may mean that, within a group of Shias, he may be targeted by extremists for his particular profile. I accept that the applicant faces a real chance of harm in the Kurram District.
Having regard to the non-exhaustive list of instances of serious harm in s 5J(5), I find that the applicant faces a threat to his life or significant physical harassment and significant physical ill-treatment from the Sunni extremist groups, including the TTP. I find that the harm the applicant faces is serious harm.
I also accept that this is because of his religion (Shia Islam) and his ethnicity (Turi Pashtun) and his membership of a particular social group of people who do not support the Taliban and hold anti-government views.
Under s 5J(1)(c), the real chance of persecution must relate to all areas of the receiving country. The Full Federal Court has held that the reference to ‘all areas of a receiving country’ means all areas ‘where there is safe human habitation and to which safe access is lawfully possible’, and that ‘areas which are unsafe or physically uninhabitable or so inhospitable that a person would be exposed to a likely inability to find food, shelter or work are not included within the areas of a receiving country’: FCS17 v MHA (2020) 276 FCR 644 at [80]–[81].
While I accept that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm in Kurram, I do not accept that the real chance relates to all areas of Pakistan. There is no indication that the Taliban, or other Sunni extremist groups, would target the applicant outside of his region in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or that it would have the means to do so. The targeted violence towards Turi Shias is concentrated in the area around Parachinar.
Pakistan is a country of 241 million people,[22] which has four provinces: Sindh (capital: Karachi), Punjab (capital: Lahore), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North-West Frontier Province and now including the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas; capital: Peshawar) and Balochistan (capital: Quetta), and Islamabad has its own status as a 'Federal Capital Territory'.[23] As noted above, the security situation is reported to have continued to deteriorate in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and also in Balochistan, with the other parts of the country remaining stable.[24]
[22] DFAT Report, para 2.9.
[23] DFAT Report, para 2.49.
[24] DFAT Report, para 2.71.
I discussed with the applicant whether the chance of harm extended throughout Pakistan, such as to Islamabad, which is a large city outside of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which has a mixed population (including a large Pashtun population). I acknowledge that the security situation in Pakistan has reportedly deteriorated in parts of Pakistan, however, the threat to the applicant originates from the TTP or Sunni extremist groups operating in Kurram in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The capital, Islamabad, for instance is reported to have a lower crime rate than other areas because of its large security presence.[25] According to DFAT, the Islamabad Capital Territory, with a population of 2.36 million, had 26 fatalities in terror attacks and associated counter-terror operations in 2024.[26]
[25] DFAT Report, para 2.127; Pak Institute of Peace Studies, Pakistan Secureity Report 2024 ( 1.1: Overview of security situation 2024, where one terrorist attack was recorded in Islamabad in 2024 which claimed the life of a religious scholar.
[26] DFAT Report, para 2.86.

I do not accept that, in a city such as Islamabad, where there is a high security presence, that the TTP or other Sunni extremist groups would enter and target the applicant. The European Union Agency for Asylum, when considering recent security trends and the impact on the civilian population, reports that in 2024, there were several violent incidents, including the shooting of a religious scholar and counter terrorism operations.[27] Despite the targeting of specific individuals, I consider that the risks to the TTP or Sunni groups of undertaking action against the applicant in Islamabad would appear to outweigh the potential gain to them of attacking the applicant. Operating within Islamabad would likely prompt a swift response from the local authorities. This would also be the case for the applicant in other major cities, such as Lahore or Karachi. DFAT has noted that in-country sources have reported that it was highly unlikely any anti-state militants had the organisational capacity to track down, target or undertake violence against Pashtuns residing outside of traditionally Pashtun areas of KP, unless they had an unusually high-profile public profile at the national level.[28]
[27] Country of Origin Information: Pakistan - Country Focus ( DFAT Report, para 3.52.

Accordingly, I do not accept that the real chance of serious harm from the TTP or other Sunni extremist groups to the applicant extends throughout Pakistan, and I find it is confined to Kurram where he faces a real chance of serious harm has a Turi Shia who holds political views against the Taliban and the Pakistani government. In Kurram, the TTP and other Sunni extremist groups would have relocation more scope to operate and the repercussions to them of targeted action on an individual such as the applicant would not be significant, and unlikely to lead to a response from the Pakistani authorities. However, the same cannot be said for a city such as Islamabad, where I find that the security apparatus would be motivated to prevent any such violence. I do not accept that the real chance extends to a city such as Islamabad.

Accordingly, I do not accept that there is a real chance that the TTP or other Sunni extremist groups would target the applicant outside of Kurram, given they do not largely operate outside that region, and I find that chance that they would target an individual with the applicant’s profile to be remote. The real chance of harm from the TTP or Sunni extremist groups does not relate to all areas of the receiving country, Pakistan, for the purposes of s 5J(1)(c).

The applicant has claimed to fear harm from the government of Pakistan and the Pakistani establishment because of his political views. I accept that the applicant holds anti-government views and that he may express them in Pakistan (for example, if he is challenged and not taking his medication, or if he is asked by acquaintances).

DFAT reports that a variety of groups representing a broad range of interests, including minorities, frequently exercise their right to assemble across Pakistan and that large-scale protests are common.[29] However, the authorities do not always respect the right to protest, demonstrations of more than four people require police permission, and the authorities have had less tolerance for protests since the 9 May 2023 protests against the arrest of Imran Khan and in support of the PTI.[30] Large protests in Islamabad in November 2024 in relation to Imran Khan’s continued detention resulted in the arrests of up to 4,000 people and the deaths of six people.[31]

[29] DFAT Report, paras 3.158, 3.168.

[30] DFAT Report, paras 3.157, 3.159, 3.160.

[31] DFAT Report, para 3.166.

DFAT assesses people who organise or lead protests on matters sensitive to or critical of Pakistan’s government or military face a moderate risk of official discrimination in the form of harassment, arrest and imprisonment (except for PTI protesters who lead protests, who face a high risk of official discrimination).[32] DFAT assesses people who participate in protests face a low risk of official discrimination, in the form of harassment and arrest; however, the level of societal or state sponsored violence at any given protest depends on the nature of the protest.[33] The overall risk of violence towards protestors at peaceful protests is generally low.[34] DFAT assesses protesters do not generally face societal discrimination on the basis of being a protester alone, but they may face elevated risks depending on the group they belong to or issues they are protesting about.

[32] DFAT Report, para 3.168.

[33] DFAT Report, para 3.168.

[34] DFAT Report, para 3.168.

While I accept that the applicant has expressed political views in Australia by attending protests on four occasions and that he has been captured in footage posted on social media attending such protests, he is not an active member of any political groups and has not held a high-profile position. I do not accept that he would be a high-profile protester or organiser of such protests upon return, given his lack of profile in Australia. I accept that he may attend political protests in Pakistan, such as those in support of the PTI (Imran Khan’s political party) and in support of Pashtuns. However, having regard to the available country information, while I acknowledge that protests can turn violent, given he would not be a leader of such protests and would be an attendee of those protests, I do not accept that he faces a real chance or real risk of harm in respect of attending protests (either at the protest itself or following the protest).

The applicant has claimed that he may face interrogation at the airport upon return because he is a failed asylum seeker. I have had regard to the information provided by the applicant in support of this claim, in particular that the Pakistani authorities are unlikely to issue him with a passport because he has sought asylum abroad.[35] It appears that this policy of not issuing passports to Pakistani asylum seekers abroad was later reversed.[36] DFAT reports that repatriates who departed Pakistan on valid travel documents and are generally processed like any other citizen when returning to the country.[37] Pakistan’s diplomatic missions issue emergency travel documents and passports to Pakistanis overseas, including those who have previously sought asylum in foreign countries and as a rule, the government issues returnees with temporary documents when they arrive.[38] Immigration officials have been known to interview failed asylum seekers upon return but generally only detain them if they committed a crime in Pakistan prior to their departure or if their identity documents pre-date enrolment in Pakistan’s national biometric database.[39] I find that the applicant would likely to be issued with a temporary travel document (or a passport) allowing him to return to Pakistan. I find that he may be questioned upon his return, considering he has been outside the country since 2013. However, I do not accept that he would be detained as there is no indication that he has been involved in any crimes in Pakistan prior to his departure. I do not consider that his profile as a Shia or Turi Shia, or his protest activity in Australia where he was a participant but not a high-profile organiser, would mean that he would be selected for further interrogation upon his re-entry. I do not accept that being questioned upon his return and identified as a failed asylum seeker amounts to serious or significant harm. I find that he would be released into the community without coming to any harm from the Pakistani authorities.

[35] See e.g., Pakistanis seeking asylum abroad to lose passport, The Express Tribune, 12 June 2024 < Policy shift allows Pakistani asylum seekers to get passports, DAWN, 23 July 2024 < DFAT Report, para 5.36.

[38] DFAT Report, para 5.36.

[39] DFAT Report, para 5.37.

I have considered the applicant’s profile as a Shia. While Pakistan has the world’s second-largest Shia population after Iran, they face rising religious intolerance and official discrimination in the form of blasphemy accusations.[40] They face a low risk of societal discrimination in form of anti-Shia protests and a low risk of official discrimination on the basis of their religion in the form of unfair trials and prosecution for religious offences.[41] DFAT assesses that Shia are generally able to practise their religion freely in Pakistan, although it appears to have become more difficult to build new mosques since 2018 and to obtain permission to hold religious gatherings.[42] While I acknowledge that there are risks specific to the applicant as a Turi Shia (as I have found above) and that the situation for religious minorities in Pakistan appears to be challenged by the Sunni majority, I do not accept that he faces a real chance or real risk of harm on the basis of his religion alone throughout Pakistan. I acknowledge that blasphemy accusations can be weaponised to harm specific individuals who may not have done or said anything to warrant the charge, but there is no information before me to suggest that there is anyone who would wish to specifically target the applicant for such a charge. I find that there is a remote chance that he would be charged with blasphemy in Pakistan. I accept that he practises his Shia Islam faith in Melbourne and would continue to do so in Pakistan; there is no material before me to indicate that he would take any action or partake in any activities in Pakistan that would give rise to a blasphemy claim because of his Shia faith. I do not accept that he faces a real chance or real risk of harm in Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future on the basis of his Shia faith.

[40] DFAT Report, paras 3.112, 3.115.

[41] DFAT Report, para 3.120.

[42] DFAT Report, para 3.120, 3.114.

Accordingly, while I have accepted that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm in Kurram, the requirements of s 5J(1) are not satisfied.

Does the applicant satisfy the complementary protection criterion for protection?

Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa).

Section 36(2)(aa) refers to a ‘real risk’ of an applicant suffering significant harm. In MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505, the ‘real risk’ test was held to impose the same standard as the ‘real chance’ test applicable to the assessment of ‘well-founded fear’ in the Refugee Convention definition. I have accepted that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm in Kurram from the TTP and other Sunni extremist groups. Accordingly, the applicant also faces a real risk of harm.

The harm the applicant faces amounts to significant harm. ‘Significant harm’ for these purposes is exhaustively defined in s 36(2A): s 5(1). A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. ‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’, ‘degrading treatment or punishment’, and ‘torture’, are further defined in s 5(1) of the Act.

‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’ for the purposes of s 36(2A)(d) is exhaustively defined in s 5(1) of the Act to mean an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is inflicted on a person, or pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is inflicted on a person, so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature. The pain or suffering must be intentionally inflicted, in the sense that there is an actual, subjective intention on the part of a person to bring about the suffering by their conduct: SZTAL v MIBP; SZTGM v MIBP (2017) 262 CLR 362 at [26]–[27] and [114].

I accept that the applicant may be deprived of his life and subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment, in the form of physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted by the TTP and other Sunni extremist groups which is intentionally inflicted for the purpose of bringing about the applicant’s suffering because he is a Shia Turi, and as a Shia Turi who holds views which are anti-Taliban and anti-government.

Could the applicant relocate?

As I have found that the real risk of significant harm is confined to the applicant’s home area of Kurram and the surrounding area, I have to consider whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to another area of Pakistan where there is not a real risk of significant harm.

I have considered whether it would be reasonable for the applicant with his particular profile and circumstances to relocate to a city such as Islamabad.

Freedom of movement in Pakistan is guaranteed by Article 15 of the Constitution, and internal migration is common and widespread.[43] It is reported that people migrating within Pakistan often rely on family, friends, tribal and/or ethnic networks to establish themselves in a new location, and that social and economic barriers to relocation can impact vulnerable groups disproportionally.[44] It is therefore possible for the applicant to relocate within Pakistan as there are no legal barriers to him doing so.

[43] DFAT Report, para 5.29.

[44] DFAT Report, para 5.29.

Large urban centres such as Karachi and Islamabad have ethnically and religiously diverse populations and offer some anonymity for people fleeing violence by non-state actors.[45] Pashtuns are reported to occupy enclaves within those cities.[46]

[45] DFAT Report, para 5.30.

[46] DFAT Report, para 5.30.

The applicant is a single Pashtun man. Pashtuns traditionally live among their own tribes and sub-tribes in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as in Balochistan. There are Pashtun communities in urban areas throughout Pakistan, with the largest Pashtun community in the world living in Karachi.[47] The applicant is from the Turi tribe, which follow the Shia sect of Islam. Turis relocating to other parts of Pakistan would not immediately be distinguishable from other Pashtuns.[48] However, the majority of Pashtuns follow Sunni Islam, and the applicant may be somewhat restricted in his ability to form networks with other non-Turi Pashtuns.

[47] DFAT Report, para 3.47.

[48] DFAT Report, para 3.59.

The applicant has not previously lived elsewhere in Pakistan. He speaks Pashto and declared in his visa application and that he can read, write and speak Urdu. He also speaks some English as he communicates with his psychologist in English. It is apparent that he would not have difficulties communicating with other Pashtuns in Islamabad, or people of other ethnicities or the other cities mentioned, given he speaks Urdu, the national language of Pakistan.[49]

[49] DFAT Report, para 2.10.

There are a number of matters which must be considered when determining whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate within Pakistan, to a city such as Islamabad. These include his Pashtun ethnicity, his Shia faith, and his Turi tribe identity and whether he would be subjected to discrimination, whether he would be able to secure employment and housing, the general security situation, whether he would engage in political activity (such that he may face difficulties), and also his mental health.

The applicant is an ethnic Pashtun. I acknowledge that there is stereotyping and profiling which occurs in Pakistan, which affects Pashtuns, and that this is because there is a perception within Pakistan that Pashtuns were sympathetic towards the TTP.[50] Nevertheless, outside of conflict-affected areas such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, DFAT assesses that Pashtuns face a low risk of official and/or societal discrimination and a similar risk of violence to other ethnic groups.[51] I accept that the applicant may face some negative comments upon relocation to a non-majority Pashtun area, however he may elect to choose a city such as Islamabad, which has a large Pashtun community. I do not accept that low-level comments made by non-Pashtuns towards him would amount to harm in his context, particularly where there is a local Pashtun community in which he would be able to live. DFAT reports that security forces were often suspicious of Pashtuns and that they are selected for additional scrutiny or searches at military checkpoints.[52] While I acknowledge that such treatment may be unfair and cause upset, I do not consider that it amounts to serious or significant harm. I have also considered the treatment of Pashtuns within Pakistan when determining whether it would be reasonable for him to relocate and do not consider that such discrimination on its own would mean that it would not be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to a city such as Islamabad.

[50] DFAT Report, paras 3.49, 3.54.

[51] DFAT Report, para 3.55.

[52] DFAT Report, para 3.49.

I have considered whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to a city such as Islamabad, given he is a Shia. Islamabad is reported to have a significant Shia community.[53] While there are reports that it has become more difficult since 2018 for Shia to establish new mosques and more difficult to hold religious gatherings, I find that it would be open to the applicant to practise his faith in Islamabad, as he does in Melbourne, and as such, his practise of Shia Islam would not mean that it would be unreasonable for him to relocate to Islamabad.

[53] DFAT Report, para 3.112.

I have considered whether the general security situation in Pakistan, in particular in Islamabad, would mean that it would be unreasonable for the applicant to relocate there. I accept that the political and security situation in Pakistan is currently volatile. For instance, there have been recent protests in Islamabad in November 2024 in respect of the political situation.[54] This protest activity towards the end of 2024 notwithstanding, I have considered the situation for him in a major city with a multi-ethnic population, functioning police force, and functioning security apparatus such as Islamabad, and find that the political situation in Islamabad would not mean it would not be reasonable to relocate there.

[54] Pakistan ends lockdown of its capital after protests : NPR ( NPR, 27 November 2024; Imran Khan’s party suspends protest in Islamabad; at least four dead in overnight crackdown, ( The Hindu, 27 November 2024.

DFAT notes that Pashtuns reported instances of their Computerised National Identity Cards not being recognised when relocating, which can impede access to property and assets.[55] Despite this, there are reportedly large Pashtun communities within cities of Pakistan and the applicant noted that it is possible for Pashtuns to migrate within Pakistan. There are housing registration requirements.[56] I accept that the applicant may face some difficulties registering in Islamabad, however given the size of the Pashtun community, I find that it is possible for the applicant to make enquiries with the Pashtun community in Islamabad, locate housing through the Pashtun community and register with the authorities as required.

[55] DFAT Report, para 3.54.

[56] See e.g., Islamabad Police (>

I accept, based on the applicant’s evidence at the hearing, that he genuinely holds anti-government views and that he would express these views in Pakistan and may attend protests as an attendee, as he has done in Australia. He has not attended protests in Australia in a leadership capacity, and I do not accept that he would not become a public advocate or leader of protests in Pakistan. I have found that he would face a real chance or real risk of harm in Pakistan arising from his political views. I also do not consider that his political views would mean that it would be unreasonable for him to relocate to Islamabad, given he would be able to participate in protests in Pakistan, including protests in support of Imran Khan. While these protests have turned violent in the past, I do not accept that it would lead to harm for him, given his particular profile as an attendee and not as an organiser.

However, of particular concern is the applicant’s mental health and how this would affect his ability to relocate to Islamabad. He has provided psychiatrist reports which state that he has been diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder; with secondary Major Depressive Disorder (moderately severe) which is partially treated. He continues to take medication and attends sessions with his psychiatrist every four to six weeks. Despite his ongoing treatment, he reports sleep disturbances which affect his ability to work. I accept that the applicant has witnessed violent incidents in Parachinar and that these experiences have adversely affected his mental health, and I accept that he has the psychological conditions as stated.
I have considered the applicant’s psychological conditions and whether it is reasonable for him to relocate. The applicant said that he would not be able to obtain treatment in Pakistan and that his health would suffer. In respect of the availability of treatment, this is consistent with country information, with DFAT reporting that there were approximately 270 psychiatrists and no more than 500 psychologists working in Pakistan in 2024.[57] It is reported that 90 per cent of people living with mental health conditions remain untreated.[58] DFAT assesses that public mental health care services can be accessed without discrimination but the quality and availability varies widely and can be inadequate, especially in rural areas, more so than the broader public health services.[59]
[57] DFAT Report, para 2.37.
[58] DFAT Report, para 2.37.
[59] DFAT Report, para 2.39.
While mental health services may be limited in Pakistan, they are available in major cities.[60] For example, the UK Home Office reports that private facilities are available in Islamabad at the Shifa International Hospital for inpatient, outpatients and follow-up by both psychologists and psychiatrists, and that mental health services are now included in the Sehat Sahulat Program (a health insurance scheme for underprivileged citizens) but to a limited extent.[61]
[60] UK Home Office, ‘Country policy and information note: healthcare and medical treatment, Pakistan, July 2024,’ 12 Mental health <
[61] UK Home Office, ‘Country policy and information note: healthcare and medical treatment, Pakistan, July 2024,’ 12 Mental health <>
I have also considered whether being in Pakistan would affect his mental health, because it would enliven memories of previous incidents in Pakistan in Kurram. I find that he would not be in the same location as the previous events, if he was in Islamabad, and would be in an environment with a large security presence which is not connected to the previous events. However, I find that returning to Pakistan after a period of 12 years in Australia, even though he would not be in the same location as the past incidents, would likely lead to a deterioration in his condition given the relative proximity to his home region, being in the same country as where those incidents took place and the presence of Pakistani authorities, whom he blames in part for the current situation affecting the Turi Shias in Kurram. I find that this would adversely affect his mental health, which would have consequences for his ability to secure accommodation, form networks in the city, and to find employment.
I note that he does not have any connections to any region in Pakistan outside Kurram. Accordingly, I find that he would be required to relocate to Islamabad alone. I find that it is likely that he would be able to make contact with other Pashtuns and Turis prior to arrival, however, I accept that it would be difficult for him to live in Islamabad, particularly if he is living alone or with unfamiliar people, given his mental health conditions if he is unable to continue accessing support.
While I find that the applicant would be able to find accommodation (albeit with some difficulty) in Islamabad, he would be required to live alone or with unfamiliar people without ongoing family support. Based on the available information, I am concerned that he would not be able to obtain appropriate support for his mental health conditions. While there is a reported limited number of psychologists and mental health professionals in Pakistan generally, and I accept that mental health support is available in Islamabad, I find that it would be difficult for him to access the services which are available because of the applicant’s particular profile as a Pashtun man who has limited links to Islamabad. Such services are available to private patients and having regard to the applicant’s evidence that he sends money from Australia to Pakistan, it is not apparent that he would be able to continue to afford such services over time (noting the applicant has received consistent treatment in Australia since 2017 according to his psychiatrist report). If he is unable to source such mental health support, I find that this would affect his ability to obtain and maintain his employment, thereby inhibiting his ability to survive in Islamabad. His mental health diagnoses would also affect his ability to form the networks required in Islamabad to live in the city.
I have considered the applicant’s situation cumulatively, including his mental health and his lack of family connections outside Kurram and find that, primarily having regard to the applicant’s mental health diagnosis (as evidenced by his ongoing and regular treatment, discussed above), it would not be reasonable, in the sense of practicable, for him to relocate to another city within Pakistan, such as Islamabad.
Accordingly, I do not consider it reasonable for the applicant to relocate for the purposes of s 36(2B)(a).
Could the applicant obtain protection from an authority?
Under s 36(2B)(b) of the Act there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country if the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. That is, the level of protection must be such to reduce the risk of the applicant being significantly harmed to something less than a ‘real risk’: MIAC v MZYYL (2012) 207 FCR 211. The provision requires consideration of the source and nature of the harm faced, the nature and degree of protection able to be afforded by the authorities from the specific harm faced, whether that protection could be obtained, and whether, upon obtaining that protection there would still be a real risk of significant harm: ABAR15 v MIBP (No 2) (2016) 242 FCR 11 at [60]–[61].
The harm the applicant faces in Kurram is from the TTP and other Sunni extremist groups. In respect of obtaining protection from the police, DFAT reports that police capacity and effectiveness in Pakistan is limited by a lack of resources, poor training, cultural attitudes, and under-resourcing, and competing pressures from superiors, political actors, security forces and the judiciary.[62] The police would not provide ongoing protection to the applicant and it is apparent that they have been unable to protect Shias from sectarian attacks in Kurram or protect Shias travelling in a security convoy. While the applicant may be able to report any future attacks or threats to the police, I do not accept that this would mean he would have protection such that there would not be a real risk. He would only report to the police after he had been harmed or attacked, and this would not prevent the attack or reduce the risk to below a real risk.
Is the risk faced by the population generally?
[62] DFAT Report, para 5.12.
Under s 36(2B)(c) of the Act there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm if the Tribunal is satisfied that the real risk is one faced by the population generally and is not faced by the applicant personally. The term ‘population of the country generally’ refers to the commonly understood concept of the general population, such that there is no requirement that the risk be faced by all members or every citizen of a country’s population for s 36(2B)(c) to apply: BBK15 v MIBP (2016) 241 FCR 150 at [32]. The reasoning in BBK15 and other Federal Court judgments (SZSPT v MIBP [2014] FCA 1245; MZAAJ v MIBP [2015] FCA 478) indicates that s 36(2)(c) will apply where a real risk is faced by an individual applicant but is the same as the risk faced by the general population. However, s 36(2B)(c) requires a decision-maker to determine whether the risk faced by an applicant is a risk faced by the population of the country generally, not to the population in a particular area of the country such as a particular city or province.
The risk of harm is not faced by the population of Pakistan generally. It is a risk faced by the applicant personally because of his particular profile, which means he is at risk of harm from the TTP and other Sunni extremist groups.
I have concluded that the applicant faces a real risk of significant harm in Kurram in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, and that none of the exceptions in s 36(2B) apply.
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).
Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa).
DECISION
The Tribunal sets aside and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act.
Dates of hearing(s):  16 July 2025
Representative for the Applicant:           Mr Walid Babakarkhil
ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…
5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
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36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
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(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
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