2426237 (Refugee) - [2025] ARTA 1714

2426237 (REFUGEE) [2025] ARTA 1714 (8 JULY 2025)
DECISION AND
REASONS FOR DECISION
Respondent: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Tribunal Number: 2426237
Tribunal:General Member A Verduci
Date:8 July 2025

Place:Melbourne
Decision:The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

Statement made on 08 July 2025 at 12:23pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Pakistan – Federal Circuit and Family Court remittal – imputed political opinion – group of interest – worker for non-government agencies – educated, moderate, Western-influenced Muslim – harassment, intimidation, threats and attacks by extremist organisation – car shot at and improvised explosive device found in yard of compound while applicant in Australia – low-level work, no approach to authorities, passage of time and no recent incidents – return visits and wife and child living in local area – embellished and/or fabricated claims – no current mental health treatment – consistent and cogent evidence – anonymous adverse information unable to be tested and given no weight – country information – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H(1)(a), 5J(1), 36(2)(a), (aa), (2A), 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
CASES
Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379
DCM18 v MICMA [2024] FedCFamC2G 586
MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF REASONS
BACKGROUND

The applicant is a [Age]-year-old male citizen of Pakistan. He first arrived in Australia in January 2013 holding a [Specified] visa. He returned to Pakistan in 2013 and in 2014, each time returning to Australia afterwards. He then lodged an application for a Protection visa in January 2015 which a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs refused to grant under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The applicant applied for merits review of that decision in December 2015.
This is a review in relation to that decision.
Summary of Protection visa application and the delegate’s decision
The applicant applied for a Protection visa in January 2015. His application included the following information and evidence:
·He is an ethnic Pashtun and Sunni Muslim. He was born in the town or city of Peshawar in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan and resided at various address within Peshawar.
·His wife, [child], mother, father and [siblings] reside in Pakistan. They reside in the Khyber Agency and he calls them daily.
·He completed a Bachelor of [Subject 1] in [Specialisation 1] and a Master of [Subject 1] in [Specialisation 2] at a university in Pakistan and Master of [Subject 2] at a university in Australia.
·He has an employment history with local government and aid/not-for-profit agencies operating in Pakistan.
·He left Pakistan because he was given a scholarship by the Australian Government to study in Australia.
·He travelled from Australia to Pakistan on two occasions to visit his family.
In an undated written statement that accompanied his visa application, he also said:
·He is a Pakistani citizen with a wife and [children] living in Pakistan. He belongs to an educated family of moderate Muslims.
·He has worked in the development or aid sector for local government and non-government organisations (NGOs).
·He has experienced harassment, intimidation, threats and attacks from Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) because of his employment and aid work. He and his family have received threatening letters and telephone calls, a motor vehicle owned by the applicant was shot at and an explosive device was buried at the front of his family’s residential compound.
He attended an interview with an officer of the Department and also provided written and documentary evidence in support of his application. Without referring to all the material given by the applicant, it included:
·Copies of passports, marriage and birth certificates for the applicant and members of his family.
·Copies of education qualifications and letters of reference from previous employers.
·A written statement by the applicant’s brother.
·Copies of complaint letters and investigation reports.
·Photographs of a damaged motor vehicle.
The delegate accepted the applicant’s education and employment history but concluded that the rest of his evidence was fabricated or based upon speculation. Little weight was given to the applicant’s documentary material because of the availability of document fraud in Pakistan.
The delegate found that the applicant did not face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm in Pakistan as an NGO worker and/or because of an imputed political opinion. The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria in s 36(2) of the Migration Act.
Summary of application for merits review before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
The applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT) on 4 December 2015.
The applicant and his then representative provided extensive oral and written submissions. The AAT (differently constituted) held two hearings with the applicant and his then representative also attended.
During the course of the review, the AAT received information from the Department that was covered by a non-disclosure certificate. The certificate related to a dob-in/allegation about the applicant. The applicant was given a copy of certificate and the substance of the dob-in/allegation was discussed with him. The AAT ultimately placed no weight upon the dob-in/allegation.
In a decision dated 24 May 2024, the AAT (differently constituted) accepted that the applicant received mental health treatment in Australia, had worked for local government and aid organisations in Pakistan, had come to the attention of LeI because of his employment, had received threatening telephone calls and a threatening letter, that his car had been shot at and that an explosive device was discovered near his family’s compound in Pakistan.
However, the AAT concluded that the applicant would not face a real chance of serious harm, or a real risk of significant harm, in all areas of Pakistan. It was, according to the AAT, safe and reasonable for the applicant to internally relocate within Pakistan to either Lahore or Islamabad.
The AAT’s decision was set aside by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) on 28 June 2024[1] and the application for review was remitted back to the AAT for re-determination according to law. In doing so, the court accepted that information in the 2017 DFAT Report on Pakistan under the heading of ‘GROUPS OF INTEREST – Human Rights Organisations’ that was of central importance to the applicant’s claim had been overlooked.
Summary of application for merits review before the Administrative Review Tribunal
[1] DCM18 v MICMA [2024] FedCFamC2G 586.
As the application for review was not determined by 14 October 2024, when the AAT was replaced by the Administrative Review Tribunal (the ART or the Tribunal), the application falls to be determined by the ART in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (the ART Act). Reflecting on the circumstances of the application and the relevant provisions of the Migration Act and the ART Act, I am satisfied that this proceeding has continued in a manner that is efficient and fair.
The applicant provided written submissions and material prior to his hearing. That material included a recent statutory declaration made by the applicant, an undated legal submission by his representative and country information from a variety of sources. Also provided were copies of written material already given throughout his visa application and merits review process, such as prior statutory declarations, complaint/investigation documents, letters in support, education qualifications and employment references. Various medical documents from 2017 were also re-submitted.
The applicant appeared before me in person on 28 May 2025. His representative also attended the hearing. We discussed the procedural history of his protection visa application including the decisions made by the delegate, the AAT and then later by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. I took great care to explain that I was considering his application afresh and that I would reach my own conclusions based upon my own assessment of the claims and evidence before me. That may lead me to accept a fact that was not accepted by the delegate or by the AAT; but it may equally lead me to not accept a fact that was previously accepted.
The oral and written evidence given to me is broadly consistent with what has proceeded it. The applicant continues to fear harm from LeI because of his work with NGOs in Pakistan and his stated intention to work for an NGO if he returns.
He maintains that he had an encounter with two LeI militants when he was on a field excursion, was the subject of a threatening letter and threatening telephone calls, had his car shot at and an explosive device planted in front of his family’s compound. Since the explosive device was discovered in January 2015, the applicant and his family have not experienced any further threats, harassment, intimidation or harm.
For the reasons given below, I have reached a number of different conclusions compared to the delegate and the AAT. My concerns about the evidence were raised with him at each point during the hearing and again in my summation before the hearing was concluded. He was provided with multiple opportunities throughout the hearing to address my concerns and his representative provided oral submissions as well. There was no request to adjourn the review to allow for post-hearing submissions and no additional material has been given to me after the hearing.
The applicant’s mental health
I am cognisant of the evidence provided in relation to the applicant’s mental health throughout his protection visa application and the merits review process. It includes a psychologist report dated 5 July 2017, a health care plan, medical notes, written submissions and the applicant’s own oral evidence. They describe a history of counselling and treatment for anxiety, depression, fear, fatigue, sleep disturbances and similar conditions.
I also recognise that the applicant’s evidence relates to events that are said to have taken place many years ago. He has also been required to give, and re-give, his evidence over a long period of time. I have reflected on this throughout the review and in reaching the conclusions that I have made.
During his hearing with me, the applicant described feeling anxious and having sleep disturbances. He described difficulties with being separated from his family and feeling integrated and being constantly concerned about things, such as whether he has locked his car or where his car keys are. He also confirmed that he took no medication on the day of the hearing and did not take regular medication for any health issues. He does not see a psychologist or mental health professional and he has not attended counselling with a health professional for some time. His health plan ended in either 2017 or 2018 and was not replaced with anything new. He has maintained full-time employment in Australia for the last ten years and presented his evidence to me in a manner that was consistent, articulate and cogent.
I accept that the applicant has been living alone in Australia and geographically separated from his family for a long period of time. Although he is in regular contact with them, I accept that the separation will have had an effect on the applicant’s health and well-being. Overall, I am satisfied with his capacity to recall events and give evidence.
Dob-in information
The AAT discussed the dob-in allegation and invited the applicant to comment on it. I have read the dob-in allegation and I have considered the applicant’s responses given at that time. I raised it with him again during hearing and invited him to make any further comments about it. The applicant believes the allegation was made by a disgruntled former housemate and I am content with this explanation. The dob-in is anonymous and I have no further means to test the veracity of what is alleged. I have placed no weight upon this material.
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
The criteria in s 36(2) requires the applicant to face a real chance of serious harm or real risk of significant harm. A ‘real chance’ or a ‘real risk’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent: Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379; MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, I have taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
REASONS AND FINDINGS
The applicant’s identity and receiving country
I have reviewed the applicant’s identity documents, including his Pakistani passport. The delegate found that the applicant was a citizen of Pakistan and I have reached the same conclusion. I find that the applicant is a citizen of Pakistan and that Pakistan is his receiving country for the purses of the Migration Act.
I find that the applicant’s home region is in area of [Location 1] in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of the Peshawar Division, Khyber District, Pakistan. It is an area where he previously resided and where his wife, his [children], his father and most of his siblings reside now.
Return travel to Pakistan by the applicant and his family
The applicant’s wife entered Australia in March 2013. She gave birth to their [child] in September 2013. The applicant, his wife and child departed Australia in November 2013 and returned to Pakistan together.
The applicant re-entered Australia in February 2014. He then departed Australia in June 2014 and returned to Pakistan for a second time. He re-entered Australia again in late July 2014.
I have considered the circumstances and the applicant’s evidence surrounding this travel. I accept that the applicant’s wife may have found living in a shared house in Australia difficult, particularly with a newborn child. I also accept that there were financial pressures in supporting his family in Australia, that the applicant’s family in Pakistan were eager to meet the applicant’s [child], and that the applicant’s wife would be more comfortable with their care and support.
The applicant has also said to me that he had no safety concerns about returning to Pakistan at these times. I find this evidence concerning. By his account, he had a long history working for local government and aid/charity NGOs. He has tied his work history to Western influences and to an actual or imputed political opinion. He claims to have been approached by the LeI when out at a site visit in 2009 and to have been of interest to the LeI ever since then. He claims to have been under surveillance and to have received a threatening letter and telephone calls. All of these events are said to have happened prior to the above travel. I am not prepared to accept that these would be insignificant events for the applicant and members of his family. I do not accept that these events were not taken seriously by the applicant or his family. It is very difficult to reconcile these events with the applicant’s voluntary return to Pakistan on two occasions, and his wife’s decision to also return with their [child]. I have considered the applicant’s evidence that it was safe for his wife and child to return to Pakistan because the LeI do not target women and children, but I am not persuaded about the accuracy of such a claim.
This travel suggests very strongly to me that the applicant’s evidence about particular events discussed further below has been embellished and/or fabricated to support this application.
Work activities in Pakistan
The applicant’s evidence about his education and employment experiences is detailed and nuanced. It is supported by written material and is consistent with him travelling to Australia in January 2013 holding a [Specified] visa.
It leads me to accept that the applicant has an employment history with local government, aid organisations and NGO’s operating in Pakistan. This includes [Employers/Organisations 1-5]. I accept his involvement with local government consultancy projects and with [Organisation 6]. I accept that at least some of these agencies have international financiers, including USAID.
Whilst this employment history is accepted, I do not view the applicant’s education and employment history as involving human rights activism. His curriculum vitae with job descriptions lists his roles in [general tasks] and his involvement in [specific tasks]. Without seeking to diminish the value of the applicant’s past employment, I draw a distinction between work of this kind and, for example, a lawyer involved in political or sensitive cases, promoting women’s rights and gender equality, press freedom and/or freedom of expression.
Did LeI members speak to the applicant during a site visit in [Town 1] in 2009?
I accept that the applicant conducted a site visit in the [Town 1] region of the Khyber Agency in early-2009 as a part of his employment with [Organisation 3]. During a routine visit, the applicant and [Mr A], a prominent person from the [Organisation 7], were approached by two armed youngsters and told off for using a camera to take pictures. [Mr A] spoke to the armed youths and explained who they were and that they had permission to be there. The applicant and [Mr A] were allowed to leave after some discussion. I accept that the LeI were present in [Town 1] and in the Khyber Agency at this time and it is reasonable to conclude that two members would have taken an interest in applicant’s field visit. He reported his encounter to a supervisor who suggested that he avoid further contact with [Mr A] and focus his attention on other regions within the Khyber Agency.
I am also prepared to accept that members of LeI visited [Mr A] at the [Organisation 7] because he had invited them to do. They talked about the applicant and [Mr A] said that he was a member of the FATA [Government department] and personally vouched for him. This provided a cover for the applicant’s employment with [Organisation 3] and seems to have satisfied the LeI.
The applicant was not threatened or harmed at the site visit, during the militants contact with [Mr A] or in an immediate period afterwards. The evidence leads me to conclude that, whilst members of the LeI questioned the applicant and [Mr A] about their presence in [Town 1], and were angry with a camera being used, the situation was diffused by the [Mr A] without any further repercussions for anyone present. I conclude that this was an isolated incident based on the applicant’s presence in [Town 1] with [Mr A]. He took the advice of his then supervisor and focused on the areas of [Town 2] and [Town 3] in the Khyber Agency and avoided [Town 1].
Was the applicant being watched in mid-2009?

I accept that the applicant was employed with the [Organisation 3] and was promoted to the role of [specialist] in mid-2009. I do not accept that he was under any kind of surveillance during that time.
The applicant suspects that FATA locals of Pashtun ethnicity were watching him work or travel around his village of [Location 1], [Town 2] and [Location 2]. He claims to have noticed other men because of their style of clothes and their beards. He says that he was conscious of his security because a colleague and a colleague’s father had previously been kidnapped by the LeI. His then supervisor told him to constantly change his travel route and gave him flexibility with travel and the timing of his tasks to be performed.
I accept that the applicant was travelling between various regions including [Location 1], [Town 2] and [Location 2]. Whilst out, it is possible that the applicant noticed other men of Pashtun or Afridi Pashtun appearance. I accept that members of the LeI would likely have been active in these areas and that the applicant knew of colleagues or other people who had been taken or who had disappeared. This probably contributed to a heightened state of awareness and suspicion in the applicant.
However, the applicant’s concerns about being watched do not rise above mere speculation. As he said previously ‘I cannot say for certain whether they were Laskar-e-Islam, but the fact that they kept appearing near me, and looked out of place, particularly outside my work, made me think that they were surveying me’.[2] In the circumstances presented to me, including where I have accepted the field incident above and that LeI may have been operating in the area, I do not accept that his speculation about being watched by members of the LeI has a factual basis. The applicant was working on the project from around April 2009 until approximately the start of 2010. He claims to have noticed being watched from at least mid-2009. For all that time, he was never approached, spoken to, threatened or harmed by either the people said to be watching him or by anyone else.
[2] Applicant’s statutory declaration dated 29 June 2017.
If he was genuinely a person of interest to the LeI, I find it improbable that he would be observed from a distance for an extended period of time without anyone approaching him, or saying or doing anything. If the men he noticed were already present outside of his place of work, making changes to his travel routes or having flexibility with his working times also seems a measure of limited benefit as it was a workplace that he continued to attend.
The applicant’s voluntary return to Pakistan on two occasions after this, and the lack of any attention directed at this wife and children, is a further reason for doubting the reliability of this claim.
Did the applicant receive a threatening letter in either 2010 or 2011?
I accept that the applicant commenced work for the [Organisation 2] around mid to late 2010. I accept that country information cited by the applicant in previous submissions identifies an escalation in fighting in [Town 1] region around the same time.[3] I do not accept that the applicant was given a letter from the LeI summonsing him to appear and be tried under Islamic law.
[3] Legal submission to the AAT dated 30 June 2017.
It concerns me that a letter would be given to the applicant’s uncle at his workplace in a market. If the applicant had been under previous surveillance by the LeI, it is not clear why the LeI would give a warning letter to someone else instead of the applicant, either directly or by delivering it to his workplace or home. If the LeI knew about his familial connection with his uncle, it seems that they could also have obtained information about the applicant directly from him. They could have used threats, violence or other forms of persuasion if they were strongly motivated to do so.
I am also concerned about the applicant’s claimed response to the letter. He has said in one statement that he did not think he was top of the list for LeI or other groups, that NGO workers were routinely targeted but only a few resulted in kidnappings, killings or assaults.[4] It also seems that he took the letter seriously and saw it as a precursor to a ransom or further threats. In evidence to me, he speculated that he was targeted because of his work history and perceived association with the West. Elsewhere, he has suggested that ‘anyone considered well off is expected to pay money’.[5] Whatever the reason, he took it seriously enough to seek help from the [Organisation 2] which they were unable to provide. He also discussed it with this family.
[4] Applicant’s statutory declaration dated 21 May 2025.
[5] Applicant’s statutory declaration dated 29 June 2017.
The applicant did not report the letter to police or security forces who might have been able to assist. He did not seek any form of personal protection beyond talking to his family and a supervisor at the [Organisation 2]. He did not stop work, change employers or leave the region. He says that he tried to lay low and avoid being out at night, but otherwise he did nothing different and life continued on. He ‘did not drastically change his behaviour’.[6] If the applicant and his uncle were already known to the LeI, and the applicant expected further letters and the issue to escalate, I am not persuaded that he would have done little more than try to be home before dark and hope that he would not be followed.[7] I am also not persuaded that the [Organisation 2] requested him not share information about the threat outside of the [Organisation 2] because it could not the risk to the organisation and that the applicant may lose his job.
[6] Applicant’s statutory declaration dated 21 May 2025.
[7] Applicant’s statutory declaration dated 29 June 2017.
It is unnecessary to speculate on what did or did not happen to the applicant’s neighbour whom the applicant says was abducted and ransomed. There is insufficient information before me about the applicant’s neighbour, but the applicant has highlighted his neighbour as being an [Country] national without family or tribal support in [Location 1]. Even if I were to accept that the applicant’s neighbour was kidnapped and ransomed, it would not overcome the concerns I have about the applicant’s evidence and his personal circumstances.
The applicant’s voluntary return to Pakistan on two occasions after this, and the lack of any attention directed at this wife and children, is a further reason for doubting the reliability of this claim.
Did the applicant receive a threatening telephone call in 2011?
I accept that the applicant was still working for the [Organisation 2] in 2011. I do not accept that he received a threatening telephone call from LeI during this time. I am not persuaded that the applicant’s involvement with [Organisation 2], ongoing military action in FATA or the applicant completing qualifications including a Diploma in [Subject 3] caused the LeI to accuse him of being an infidel or spy for America or a Jewish lobby.
Descriptions of the call have ranged from it being a possible prank by one of the applicant’s friends, an attempt to exploit money by a low-level criminal or an ideologically motivated threat made by LeI.[8] If considered as an isolated incident, I might accept that it would be difficult for the applicant to know the motivation of the claimed caller. This call is said to have followed a number of other events directly targeting the applicant because of his employment and association with NGOs, however. That makes it harder to accept that the call was taken ‘lightly’ by the applicant and his family[9] and/or that it might have been considered a prank call.
[8] Applicant’s undated statutory declaration and also his statutory declaration dated 29 June 2017.
[9] Applicant’s undated statutory declaration.
Reflecting on this call and the other claimed events that proceeded it, I am not prepared to accept that the applicant continued working with the [Organisation 2], and later with the [Organisation 1], until leaving Pakistan in 2013 without any further attempts being made to contact him personally or to target him for harm.
The applicant’s voluntary return to Pakistan on two occasions after this, and the lack of any attention directed at this wife and children, is a further reason for doubting the reliability of this claim.
Did the applicant’s brother receive telephone calls threatening the applicant?
I accept that the applicant returned to Pakistan in June 2014 to visit his family. I accept that the applicant and his family stayed at a hotel in [City], a mountain resort city in the northern region of the Punjab province of Pakistan. I do not accept that the applicant’s brother received telephone calls threatening the applicant. It follows that I do not accept that the applicant’s brother told the applicant about threatening telephone calls that he had been receiving.
If the applicant’s brother received numerous telephone calls about the applicant, accusing him of being a Western spy and supporter of Jewish lobby groups, it is logical and reasonable to conclude that his brother would share that information with the applicant and/or the applicant’s wife. It is reasonable to assume that this brother would share this information regardless of where the applicant was residing at the time. The information would indicate an ongoing interest in the applicant and action may have been required to protect members of his immediate family still living in Pakistan. If the applicant’s wife was told about the threats in order to help protect herself, it is also logical and reasonable to conclude that she would have told the applicant before his return visit to Pakistan.
It is even more problematic and difficult to accept that the information would not be shared with the applicant once his return visit to Pakistan was arranged. I have considered whether the information would be withheld from the applicant because his brother did not take the threats seriously, and the applicant’s own claim that he would not have taken the threats seriously either, but this is contradicted by the applicant’s claim to have reported the threats to the local political agent in Pakistan as soon as he learnt about them. The applicant’s claim that the political agent told him to go somewhere else in Pakistan for a time whilst they investigated the complaint suggests that a complaint would be taken seriously and investigated. This willingness to investigate adds further weight to my concerns above about the applicant and his family not reporting all of their other claimed experiences because they didn’t take the threats seriously and didn’t think that authorities could or would do anything about it.
I have considered the available evidence that supports the applicant’s account, including his brother’s statement and the political agent’s special reports/FIRs. I have given that material some weight. I have also placed some weight upon the reported ease at which fraudulent documents can be produced in Pakistan, including fraudulent FIRs. Not all documents are fraudulent, however , and police in Pakistan do also produce credible FIRs.[10] On balance, the material given in support of the applicant’s claim is insufficient to overcome the strength of my concerns.
Was the applicant’s car shot at on 30 December 2014?
[10] DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan (30 April 2025), 5.63 – 5.64.
I accept that the applicant is the owner of a motor vehicle in Pakistan. The applicant claims it is a very distinct motor vehicle but I have no real means of objectively assessing his claim about that. I also accept that the evidence shows a motor vehicle belonging to the applicant has bullet holes, objectively demonstrating that the vehicle has been shot at some point in time. I am not persuaded that this evidence represents an actual or a purported attack on the applicant.
I have weighed up the available evidence in support the applicant’s claim. I have considered and place some weight upon the photographs, statements and copies of text messages about this claimed event.
I place more weight upon the applicant not being in Pakistan at the time of the claimed shooting. This gives me very strong cause to doubt that the applicant’s vehicle was shot at by people intending to target the applicant.
The evidence is also ambiguous about who the target of the attack was. The applicant’s brother was driving the car and he is unsure if the attackers’ called out his own name or the applicant’s. His brother’s report to the political agent makes no reference of the applicant’s name being called out.
The applicant’s account of the claimed attack also fails to persuade me that it occurred as claimed. I find it improbable that a car being driven by the applicant’s brother, and carrying his brother’s wife and [children] along with the applicant’s wife and [child], was shot at by men riding past on a motorcycle. It relies upon the applicant being of interest to the LeI, the LeI keeping a watch out for the applicant despite him being out of Pakistan (although I am aware he has returned in the past), members of the LeI familiar with the applicant being a wanted person observing his car being driven at a time when he is out of the country, and then men on a motorcycle riding behind and beside the car to shoot at it with the intend of harming the applicant but despite him not actually being inside the vehicle (or even in Pakistan) at the time. The motorbike only stopped and turned around because authorities at a checkpoint started shooting back.
I have already expressed strong doubts about the applicant being a person of ongoing interest to the LeI. Taken together with the above, the weight of my concerns causes me to find that the applicant is the owner of a vehicle that has bullet holes. I do not accept that the bullet holes were causes by the car being shot at on 30 December 2014 in the circumstances claimed by the applicant. It is also unnecessary to identify a counterfactual for how they occurred, it is sufficient that I am being that it was not part of a targeted attack directed towards the applicant.
Was an improvised explosive device (IED) planted in front of the applicant’s family home?
I do not accept that an IED was found buried out front of the applicant’s family home in January 2015.
The applicant’s evidence does not persuade me that his family employ a retired [officer] as their housekeeper, that this person observed that the ground in front of the family compound had been disturbed and that he called the political administration who investigated and found a buried explosive device.
I am concerned about why an IED would be placed outside of the applicant’s family home at a time when he was not in Pakistan. I am also not persuaded that it was put there based on his earlier travel plans as this suggests a level of intelligence about his travel arrangement that is currently unexplained. If his travel arrangements were known to the LeI, it would also concern me why the device was present after his plans were changed sometime earlier.
It is also unexplained how the IED was intended to detonate and harm the applicant, assuming that he was entering or leaving the family compound at some time. If it were triggered by a vehicle driving over it, for example, there would be no way of controlling the device to ensure that the applicant was in the car being driven at the time and not somebody else. If it were detonated in some other way, it suggests that a person would need to be watching and waiting for the applicant to enter or leave. When asked at the hearing, the applicant did not wish to speculate on how the IED might been detonated to ensure that the correct target was harmed. When added with my concerns about the applicant not being a person of ongoing interest to the LeI, I find both of the situations to be improbable.
Nor do I accept that it was discovered by a retired [officer] working for the applicant’s family. I am not making a value-based judgment on how easy or difficult it might be to notice that a hard gravel or cement-like surface in front of the family home had recently been disturbed, but I am not prepared to accept that disturbed ground out the front of their home led to further investigation and ultimately the discovery of an IED.
I have considered the applicant’s evidence in support, including his brother’s statements and the political agent’s reports. I have given this material some weight, but it is insufficient to overcome the concerns that I have.
What events have occurred after January 2015?
There has been a notable lack of threats and violence directed toward the applicant and/or his family since at least 2015. I find this very difficult to reconcile with the applicant’s claim to be a person of ongoing interest to the LeI. If the applicant was being watched and targeted for harm since 2009, including during periods when he was not residing in Pakistan, it seems improbable that calls, letters, threats, or actions intended to harm the applicant and members of his family simply stopped after an IED was discovered in January 2015. The applicant’s family, including his wife and children, continue living in the same family compound. His own children continue attending school, as do his brother’s children. Their location is not a secret, and it is supposedly the same location where they have been targeted with an IED.
I am not persuaded by the applicant’s speculation that his family may be paying bribes to secure their safety. There is no other evidence of this occurring, and it is implausible that the applicant would not have more direct knowledge of steps being taken to ensure his family’s safety if such steps were genuinely required.
Does the applicant face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm now or in the reasonably foreseeable future?
The AAT concluded that the applicant had come to the attention of the LeI in Khyber Agency in the past and that there was more than a remote chance that he would come to their attention again in the reasonably foreseeable future. As I foreshadowed to the applicant during the hearing, I have reached a different conclusion.
I have accepted that the applicant worked for local government and NGO’s. I have found that the applicant had a single encounter with members of the LeI whilst attending a site visit in 2009. He was vouched for by a prominent local figure and did not experience any further adverse attention. I have not accepted that he was followed, called, sent threatening letters, had his vehicle shot at by LeI or was harmed in any way. I have not accepted that members of his family have been targeted for harm because of their relationship to the applicant.
I have found that the applicant will return to [Location 1] in Khyber Agency.
If returned to Pakistan, the applicant says that he will return to working in the charity, aid and/or NGO sector. Whilst I have very strong doubts about this based upon his education and employment history in Australia, I cannot rule out that he has tried working in these areas but has been denied because of the temporary visa status. I therefore accept that the applicant would seek to use his education qualifications and past employment experience if seeking employment in Pakistan.
I do not accept that the applicant faces a real chance or a risk of harm because of past or future work with an aid, charity or NGO in Pakistan. I do not accept that he has been, or will be, imputed with a political opinion whether described as being anti-Pakistan, a pro-Western spy, a member of a Jewish lobby or anything similar. Conclusions to the contrary are not supported by the weight of country information.
The Australian Government, via DFAT, has produced country information reports in relation to Pakistan. The most recent report is dated 30 April 2025 (the 2025 DFAT Report) and is therefore extremely current. The second most recent report is dated 25 January 2022 (the 2022 DFAT Report). I have reflected on the contents of both reports and note that the 2025 DFAT Report expressly replaces the 2022 DFAT Report.[11]
[11] DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan (30 April 2025), p 5.

In considering any DFAT report, it is also important to note the terms used by DFAT and their respective meanings. The term ‘high risk’, for example, means that DFAT is aware of a strong pattern of incidents; ‘moderate risk’ means an awareness of sufficient incidents to suggest a pattern of behaviour; ‘low risk’ means an awareness of incidents but with insufficient evidence to conclude that a pattern is formed.[12] In this context, assessments expressed within a DFAT report are generally about patterns of incidents and behaviours and do not represent absolutes.
[12] DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan (30 April 2025), p 6
Whilst the applicant has expressly referred to being targeted by the LeI, I accept that a number of militant extremists organisations operate both independently and jointly in pursuit of common goals. The LeI, in particular, is said to have recently entered into an alliance with Tehreek-e Taliban (TTP), a distinct terrorist organisation also known to be operating in Pakistan. A report published in 2024 by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) also identified more than 20 armed militant groups active across Pakistan in 2023, and attributed more than three quarters of all of the recorded militant attacks to the TTP, Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army.[13]
[13] PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2023, 3 January 2024, p 11 (>
Because of this, I have not just considered LeI to the exclusion of all other actors in Pakistan. Instead, I have looked holistically at the security situation as it is reported and I have applied a forward-looking test.
The 2022 DFAT Report described the political environment in Pakistan as being generally hostile to internationally and local NGOs and noted a worsening situation where they are often perceived as a security risk. It described a registration process that NGO’s must comply with in order to operate and restrictions on operating in sensitive geographic areas. It identified human rights activist as facing the threat of violence and harassment from the military, government and militant groups. At the time of the report, DFAT assessed that NGO workers, human rights activities and civil society actors faced a high risk of official discrimination and a moderate risk of violence, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the former FATA. NGO workers and activities dealing with religiously sensitive issues were said to face a moderate risk of societal discrimination and violence, as well as violence from militant groups. Harassment and monitoring by security forces could occur in the country.[14]
[14] DFAT 2022 Report; 3.110 – 3.113
After years of improvement, it cited a recent deterioration in the security situation more generally. It set out a trend of terrorist attacks based on credible data from the PIPS and expressed a view that terrorist attacks targeted civilians or security forces, vehicles and outposts, places of worship, schools and other buildings.
The 2025 DFAT Report notes the continuation of this trend and cites a continuing deterioration of security in 2024 compared to 2023 in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa area. [15] It cites recent data from credible reporting sources including PIPS, the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), Pakistan’s Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) and the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP).
[15] DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan (30 April 2025), 2.71.
In relation to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in particular, the 2025 DFAT Report states that the majority of recorded incidents in 2023 specifically targeted security and law enforcement agencies (namely the army and police), with the establishing of military posts at certain locations also contributing to an improved, although not perfect, security situation.[16]
[16] DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan (30 April 2025), 2.87 – 2.91.
Reporting by in-country sources of bombings and kidnappings by militant groups in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region needs to be considered along with other reports of major militant groups, including the TTP, exclusively targeting security forces and not civilians since 2019.[17]
[17] DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan (30 April 2025), 2.90.
According to the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), recent years have seen the TTP and its affiliations focus on security force personnel, particularly the police which only possessed light arms and was insufficiently trained and deployed to provide an effective counter to the militant groups. The ISKP, in competition with the TTP, has targeted civilians from religious minorities such as Sikhs and Shiites.[18] Targets apart from security force personal have included customs officials, a former senator, a physician involved in a polio vaccination campaign, a bus carrying Chinese workers, several barbers and other persons of unspecified profile.[19] An increase in attacks on polio vaccination campaigns mostly resulted in casualties among police officers assigned to protect the campaign workers, but some polio, health workers and civilians were also killed.[20]
[18] European Union Agency for Asylum, Country of Origin Information, Pakistan – Country of Focus December 2024 ( p 63.
[19] European Union Agency for Asylum, Country of Origin Information, Pakistan – Country of Focus December 2024 ( p 66.
[20] European Union Agency for Asylum, Country of Origin Information, Pakistan – Country of Focus December 2024 ( p 66.
The 2025 DFAT report acknowledges, and common-sense dictates, that a fluid security situation will lead to a variation in data and reporting. I have independently reviewed the most up-to-date publicly available data published by PIPS, CRSS and SATP.[21] In my view, the most recently published data is consistent with the data, trends and reports already expressed above.
[21] Pak Institute for Peace Studies ( Pakistan’s Centre for Research and Security Studies ( South Asia Terrorism Portal ( all accessed on 8 July 2025.
I therefore place some weight upon the 2025 DFAT Report containing fewer references and assessments about NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). It does describe, for example, CSOs and human rights defenders as being concerned about the Government’s use of power to target government critics and those that have fallen out of favour with the military and security services.[22] It refers to the political environment often being hostile toward local CSOs and INGOs because authorities sometimes perceive them as threats to national security and cites a 2024 Human Rights Watch report as saying that ‘NGOs reported intimidation, harassment, and surveillance of various groups by government authorities’ along with the Government’s use of regulation to frustrate the work of humanitarian and human rights groups.[23] It cites human rights activists and lawyers being sometimes targeted for enforced disappearance or violence, but I do not accept that the applicant is, or will be imputed to be, a human rights activist within the context of that term being reported on.
[22] DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan (30 April 2025), 2.59.
[23] DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan (30 April 2025), 3.169 - 3.176.
DFAT has assessed that human rights activists and civil society actors who publicly criticise Pakistan’s government and military, or who work on topics deemed sensitive, face a high risk of official discrimination.[24] The applicant has not claimed to be a vocal critic of the government and I am satisfied that this will not change in the reasonably foreseeable future. The evidence does not suggest that he has worked on sensitive topics and there is no reason to believe that he would start doing so in the reasonably foreseeable future.
[24] DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan (30 April 2025), 3.176.
DFAT has also assessed that CSO members, activists, human rights defenders and their lawyers face no risk of societal discrimination, although it comes with a caveat that the hidden nature of low-profile CSO members, especially those working for service delivery organisations, and their reluctance to speak out, makes it difficult to assess the relative risks that they may face.[25]
[25] DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan (30 April 2025), 3.176.
In the context of all the other information set out within these reasons, I am not willing to infer that the relatively limited reporting about the treatment of NGO workers masks or otherwise hides the true depth of their experiences.
I have considered the material referred to me by the applicant, including reports of individual NGO workers fearing the constant threat of harm from militant groups.[26] Whilst I do not dispute that specific incidents of harm can and do occur, a direct comparison between two or more specific people is not always appropriate or helpful. In the article titled Persecution at Home and Abroad: Pakistani Human Rights Defenders on the Run, the two interviewees are described as ‘rights defenders from Pakistan …encourage[ing] public health campaigns and the education of women’ and promoting ‘basic issues of women’s rights and education as well as the combating of domestic violence.’ I do not accept this is comparable to the applicant’s own circumstances or that it is a relevant predictor of his own chance or risk of harm.
[26] For example, the 10 February 2025 article by Open Society Foundations (>
As noted above, the 2025 DFAT Report describes the political environment often being hostile toward local CSOs and INGOs because authorities sometimes perceive them as threats to national security and cites a 2024 Human Rights Watch report as saying that ‘NGOs reported intimidation, harassment, and surveillance of various groups by government authorities’ along with the Government’s use of regulation to frustrate the work of humanitarian and human rights groups.[27] A 2024 report by the EUAA, citing other credible reporting agencies such as Freedom House and Human Rights Watch, described an intrusive, government imposed, registration program that included vetting by military intelligence officers and the use of regulation policies to impede the registration and functioning of international humanitarian and human rights groups.[28] A report by the United States Department of State (USDS) refers to several of Pakistan’s domestic intelligence services monitoring NGOs and of having policies that restrict NGOs and INGOs ability to carry out their work.[29]
[27] DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan (30 April 2025), 3.169 - 3.176.
[28] European Union Agency for Asylum, Country of Origin Information, Pakistan – Country of Focus December 2024 ( p 126.
[29] United States Department of State, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Pakistan (>
There is also evidence to suggest an increasing space for NGOs to be operating in Pakistan, despite the vetting and the bureaucracy involved in doing so. In a report by International Center for Not-for-Profit (ICNL) published in 2024, it states that, not only does Pakistan have numerous organisations that employ thousands of staff, the not-for-profit sector has actually grown in size and scope over recent years. It cites there being approximately 45,000 organisations in Pakistan employing around 300,000 people. The same report identifies a discernible trend in Pakistan in which the State is moving away from being the monopoly provider of social services, and is creating an enabling environment for a variety of non-state actors to deliver a wide range of social services.[30] The 2024 EUAA report cites one source as saying that Pakistan has a broad spectrum of NGOs and a trend of more people actively standing up for their rights and freedoms in Pakistan.[31] The same 2023 USDS report referred to above also highlights the temporary relaxing of registration restrictions following in-country floods in 2022, noting a blanket approval for all local NGOs to conduct relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in flood affected areas for a six month period. That temporary period has now expired and INGOs are said to have again complained about delays and difficulties in operating.[32]
[30] International Center for Not-For-Profit Law ( accessed 13 June 2025.
[31] European Union Agency for Asylum, Country of Origin Information, Pakistan – Country of Focus December 2024 ( p 127.
[32] United States Department of State, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Pakistan (>
Other credible sources, such as Amnesty International,[33] refer to the enforced disappearances of journalists, activists, students, comedians, political opponents and their families, but do not expressly refer to NGO, INGO, CSO or similar type of aid/charity/not-for-profit workers. For reasons already given above, I do not accept that the applicant is properly characterised as an ‘activist’ or would be imputed to be.
[33] Amnesty International, The State of the World’s Human Rights; Pakistan 2024 (>
I have reflected on the other material before me, including detailed written submissions from the applicant’s former representative dated 30 June 2017. It cites multiple sources of country information regarding NGOs, LeI and the TTP, among other things. I have generally placed less weight upon the material cited in these earlier submissions because of the length of time that has passed since those reports were produced and the availability of more up-to-date country information. As a more general observation, the 30 June 2017 in particular says much about the operations of LeI and the TTP prior to 2017, particularly in the Khyber Agency and surrounding areas, but it also fails to establish a clear targeting of NGO or aid-workers during that same time. Cited targeting of aid workers relates to 2013 and 2014 and includes health, education and water sanitation workers, education and welfare workers, polio vaccination workers and Ms Malala Yousafzai, an advocate for women and girls education.[34] For reasons already discussed, the applicant’s own profile as an NGO workers is different from what I have just described.
[34] Written submission by Messrs Clothier Anderson Immigration Lawyers dated 30 June 2017.

100. I have also considered the amount of time spent by the applicant in Australia and the impact (if any) that may have upon how he is viewed or perceived in Pakistan. I note that the applicant lawfully departed Pakistan on three occasions and lawfully returned twice. There is no evidence to suggest that he has engaged in any conduct in Australia that may adversely affect his profile as a returnee to Pakistan. The act of applying for, and being refused, refugee status in Australia does not suggest, in and of itself, that he will be a person of interest upon his return. The evidence does not suggest that he will be imputed as pro-Western or hostile to Pakistan’s interest because of the time he has spent residing in Australia. I am satisfied that he will not be.[35]
[35] DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan (30 April 2025), 5.32 – 5.39.
101. When considered along with the government’s registration, vetting and approval framework for NGOs, INGOs, CSOs and their employees, meaning that he would be working for registered organisations operating in an approved space or on an approved project, I do not accept that the applicant will be viewed as, or imputed to be hostile to Pakistan’s interest, a spy or a person operating under Western influence. All of the applicant’s other accepted characteristics, including being a Pashtun, residing in Australia and his past employment experiences do not change my assessment of this.
Summary and conclusions
102. I have accepted that the applicant is an ethnic Pashtun and Sunni Muslim with employment experience in the NGO, INGO or CSO sectors. His employment experience is of a particular kind focused primarily in [specific tasks] as well as emergency relief work. I accept that he may choose to work in similar fields in the future.
103. I have accepted that he encountered members of the LeI during a field visit in 2009 and that he was questioned about what he was doing and why he was taking photographs. He was accompanied by a prominent local figure who vouched for the applicant and who answered questions about the applicant at a later meeting. I have not accepted that the applicant was any further interest to the LeI following this.
104. I have not accepted that the applicant was under surveillance or was being followed because of his past employment. I have not accepted that the applicant or his brother received threatening telephone calls and/or letters because of the applicant’s past employment. I have not accepted that the applicant’s family were targeted, either intentionally or by mistake, whilst driving a car belonging to the applicant because of the applicant’s past employment. I have not accepted that an IED was placed outside of the applicant’s family home with the intention of targeting the applicant because of the applicant’s past employment.
105. I have found that the applicant entered and departed Pakistan lawfully on multiple occasions and that he has resided in Australia for a significant length of time. I have accepted that the applicant will be a failed asylum seeker.
106. I accept that the applicant may choose to work for local government, NGOs, INGOs, CSOs or similar in the reasonably foreseeable future.
107. I have considered these factors individually and cumulatively.
108. I find that he will not be targeted by LeI or any other state or non-state actor because of his past or future employment.
109. I find that the applicant will not be imputed with an adverse political opinion. He will not be viewed as, or be imputed to be, a spy, agent of the West or a person operating against the interests of Pakistan.
110. I find that the applicant does not face a real chance of serious harm, or a real risk of significant harm, in Pakistan, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
111. I am not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act.

There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s 36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s 36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2).
DECISION

113. The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
Date(s) of hearing: 28 May 2025
Representative: Mr Emad Fuad Khraim

ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…

cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a) severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b) pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;

but does not include an act or omission:
(c) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d) arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…

degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b) that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…

torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…

receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a) a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b) if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…

5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…

5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note: Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

(d) the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a) protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…

36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

(c) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…