2424210 (Refugee) - [2025] ARTA 1318

2424210 (REFUGEE) [2025] ARTA 1318 (15 MAY 2025)
DECISION AND
REASONS FOR DECISION
Respondent: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Tribunal Number: 2424210
Tribunal Member: General Member A Verduci
Date:15 May 2025

Place:Melbourne
Decision:The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant meets s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 15 May 2025 at 3:07pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Yemen – particular social group – university-educated man who has lived and studied abroad – fear of harm from Houthi and other groups – moderate Sunni – participation in protests – abused and discriminated against while at university, approached for recruitment and house seized – detained, questioned and tortured by another group – university study in third country – detained and questioned on return to search for parents – travel ban and arrest warrant – mental health – reasonable explanation for late claims – consistent and reliable claims and evidence – country information – front-line conditions in applicant’s home area – coercion and forced recruitment of university-educated men – attacks, arrests, kidnappings and killings – relocation not practicable – decision under review remitted
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H(1)(a), 5J(1), 5L, 36(2)(a), 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
CASES
Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379
MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF REASONS
BACKGROUND

The applicant is a [Age]-year-old male citizen of the Republic of Yemen (Yemen). He arrived in Australia in November 2023 holding a Visitor (Subclass 600) visas.
He lodged an application for a Class XA Protection (Subclass 866) visa (the Protection visa) in December 2023. In July 2024, his application for the visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
This is a review in relation to that decision.
Vulnerable persons
Based on the medical evidence before me, I have determined that the applicant is a ‘vulnerable person’ within the meaning of the former Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT) Guidelines on Vulnerable Persons.[1]
Summary of Protection visa application and the delegate’s decision
[1] AAT Guidelines on Vulnerable Persons (Migration and Refugee Division). No equivalent guideline has been published by the ART.
The applicant’s application for a Protection visa includes the following information:
a.He was born in Taiz City in the Ta’izz Governorate of Yemen.[2] He is a Yemen citizen, an ethnic Arab and a Sunni Muslim.
b.He is married and has one child. His wife and child are citizens of Yemen but are residing in [Country 1].
c.His mother and father reside in Yemen. He has [brothers and sisters]. One brother and one sister reside in [Country 2] and another brother resides in [Country 3] and his remaining siblings reside in Yemen.
d.He completed High School in Yemen. He withdrew from a [Subject] course but completed a [Related subject] course at a university in Yemen. He studied in [Country 2] and completed a [Qualification] in [Related subject].
e.He lived in Yemen until 2016 and then mainly resided in [Country 1] until 2023.
f.He has travelled internationally to various countries and has held a visa or entry permit to enter [Country 4] and [Country 1].
g.The applicant’s family home in Taiz was seized by the Al Houthi group after war broke out in 2015. His family were forced to relocate to a village about 60km away.
h.Whilst working as [an occupation] at a [workplace] in Yemen, a [senior colleague] tried introducing him to the Al Houthi group.
i.He fled Yemen in 2016 and went to [Country 1]. He returned to Yemen in 2019 because he lost contact with his parents and feared for their safety. He was detained at Aden airport and questioned for three hours about his links with [Country 1]. He fled Yemen again after three weeks with the assistance of an intermediary.
j.He fears harm from various groups including Al Houthi, Abu Al Abbas, Al Qaida, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Yemini government. He fears being targeted because of his age, his proficiency in the English and [Country 1] languages, his education and because he follows the moderate Sunni branch of Islam.
[2] I understand that ‘Taiz’, ‘Taizz’ and ‘Ta’izz’ are all Romanised versions of the same Arabic word. They are used interchangeably throughout this statement of reasons, generally to reflect and preserve the words particular appearance or use in source material.
The delegate found that the applicant did not face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm in Yemen and was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria in s 36(2) of the Migration Act. It was a conclusion reached without inviting the applicant to an interview and without making any findings of fact about the evidence and claims that had been presented. The decision record also includes that somewhat curious analysis that ‘country information does not demonstrate that there is any significant persecution of Sunni Muslims in STC controlled areas.’ A test of ‘significant persecution’ has no foundation in Australian law and is simply wrong.
Summary of application for merits review
The applicant applied to the AAT for merits review of the delegate’s decision on 22 July 2024. As the application for review was not determined by 14 October 2024, when the AAT was replaced by the Administrative Review Tribunal (the ART or the Tribunal), the application falls to be determined by the ART in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (the ART Act). Reflecting on the circumstances of this application and the relevant provisions of the Migration Act and the ART Act, I am satisfied that this proceeding has continued in a manner that is efficient and fair.
A request for priority processing was received on 21 January 2025. The document itself is dated 17 January 2024. I assume that is an inconsequential typographical error. The applicant requested that his application for review be granted priority on the basis that his wife and child were living abroad without adequate care and support, he was experiencing severe anxiety and trauma related symptoms and that the effects on his mental health and well-being were exacerbated by the extended uncertainty about his situation.
In a letter dated 30 January 2025, the Tribunal advised the applicant that his request for expedited processing had been approved.
His application for review was constituted to me on 6 March 2025. In a letter dated 7 March 2025, the applicant was given notice of a hearing scheduled for 28 April 2025.
The applicant attended the hearing on 28 April 2025 with his representative.
I received written statements, legal submissions, photographs and other evidence prior to, and after, the hearing. I have been assisted by this material.
The applicant’s evidence during this review is broadly consistent with the claims and evidence provided with his visa application. Additional evidence includes:
a.In 2008, he experienced abuse and discrimination at [Workplace] because he was from Taiz and because of his moderate Sunni views.
b.He was involved in protests and student activities when studying at [University]. He was at a protest in [Location] in Taiz when it was attacked by security forces in May 2011.
c.He was discriminated against at [University] because of his activism, but he continued to be involved in numerous activities and campaigns.
d.He was approached to be recruited to the Houthi cause on two separate occasions in 2016; once by a local sheik and again by a [staff] member of [Workplace] when he was [working] there.
e.He was arrested by Southern Belt Forces when passing through a checkpoint in June 2016. He was questioned about living in Taiz and Houthi activities. He was transferred to a detention centre where he was kept for about eight days. He was tortured and abused during this time. Another detainee helped secure his release after the applicant’s brother transferred a sum of money to him.
f.He was offered admission to a university in [Country 1] and an agent helped secure his departure from Yemen.
g.He returned to Yemen in August 2019 because his parents were missing. He was detained by officials at Aden airport and questioned about his time in [Country 1].
h.He left Yemen again via Aden airport with the help of an agent.
i.His wife and child returned to Yemen in February 2025 because they did not have a visa or entry permit permitting residence in any other country. In February 2025, his family were visited at home by the Houthi. They had a document for the applicant’s arrest.
j.His wife and child were questioned at a Yemini checkpoint in May 2025. Their travel documents were confiscated and his son was injured.
New claims and evidence
The applicant has raised claims and presented evidence before me that was not raised or presented before the primary decision was made. Reflecting on the claims that were raised and the evidence that was presented with the Protection visa application, the lack of an invitation to an interview with the delegate, the applicant’s mental health, and the timing of some specific events that have post-dated the primary decision, I am satisfied that the applicant has a reasonable explanation for why the claims and evidence were not given earlier.
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
The criteria in s 36(2) requires the applicant to face a real chance of serious harm or real risk of significant harm. A ‘real chance’ or a ‘real risk’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent: Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379; MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs , and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
REASONS AND FINDINGS
The applicant’s identity and receiving country
I accept that the applicant’s identity is as he claims it to be. I accept that the applicant is a citizen of Yemen and that Yemen is his receiving country for the purposes of the Act. I have reached this conclusion based on viewing a copy of the applicant’s Yemen passport issued in his own name and other identity documents that he holds, and I have no reason to doubt the genuineness of them.
The applicant was born in Taiz, Yemen. He has lived outside of Taiz at different times but this has primarily been for education purposes. His family currently live in Taiz. Considering the length of time he has resided there and his ongoing familial connections, I find that Taiz City in the Ta’izz Governorate is his home region in Yemen. It is the area that I find he would return to.
The applicant has held visas or entry permits allowing him to enter and reside in countries other than Australia. Those visas or entry permits have now expired, ceased or been cancelled. I therefore accept that, at the time of this decision, the applicant does not have a right to enter and reside, whether temporarily or permanently, any country apart from Australia. Accordingly, s 36(3) of the Act does not apply.
Country conditions in Yemen
Yemen has a population of approximately 32,140,443 and land area of approximately 527,968sq km. It shares land borders with Oman and Saudi Arabia and a coastline with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea to the south and the Red Sea to the west. The majority of the population live in the Asir Mountains (part of the larger Sarawat Mountain system), located in the far western region of the country. 99.1% all Yemeni citizens are Muslim; approximately 65% are Sunni and 35% are Shia. The remaining 0.9% includes Jewish, Baha’I, Hindu and Christians. The country is divided into 22 governorates and the main urban areas by population include Sanaa (the capital) with 3.292 million people; Aden with 1.080 million people; and Tiaz with 772,000 people.
The Yemeni Armed Forces is comprised of the Yemini National Army, Air Force and Air Defence, Navy and Coastal Defences Forces, Border Guard, Strategic Reserve Forces (including Special Forces and Presidential Protection Brigades which are the under the Ministry of Defence but responsible to the President), Popular Committee Forces (aka Popular Resistance Forces; government backed tribal militia). Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have raised and backed irregular forces in Yemen; Saudi-backed forces have included paramilitary/militia security brigades based largely on tribal or regional affiliation; UAE-backed forces include tribal and regional based militia and paramilitary units concentrated in the southern governates and include forces such as the Southern Transitional Council (STC), the Joint Forces, the Giants Brigade, and Security Belt Forces. Houthi forces include land, aerospace (air, missile), naval/coastal defence, presidential protection, special operations, internal security, and militia/tribal auxiliary components. It is estimated that up to 70% of Yemen’s military and security forces defected in whole or in part to former president Salah and the Houthi opposition between 2011 – 2015.[3]
[3] The World Factbook – Yemen (>
Yemen’s religious divide largely falls along geographic lines, with followers of Shia Zaidism predominant in the northern highlands, along with a small Isma’illi minority, and Sunnis forming the majority elsewhere.[4]
[4] European Council on Foreign Relations, Mapping the Yemen Conflict, p3 (>
According to Yemen Corner, an independent initiative that seeks to offer reliable information focused on Yemen’s conflict, political dynamics, culture and society:
The modern day Republic of Yemen was formed in 1990, when the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), based in Sana’a and known as ‘North Yemen,’ united with the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), based in Aden and known as ‘South Yemen.’ In 1994, a brief but violent civil war broke out between the two capitals after the southern leader of the unity government, and former General Secretary of the Socialist Party of Yemen, Ali Salem al-Beidh, attempted to pull out of the unity pact. Pro-unity forces won the civil war and enforced unification.
…
In February 2012, [then President Ali Abdullah] Saleh transferred power to his longtime deputy Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi as part of a political deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and endorsed by the UN. The post-Arab Spring political transition envisioned two years of institutional reforms, a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) to address national grievances and the drafting of a new constitution, culminating in national elections. The outcomes of the NDC, issued in 2014, mapped out a revamped state including a federal system of governance, which was rejected by some of the factions of the Southern Movement. The Houthis signed off on the NDC document and accepted a draft constitution that was written afterward. However, throughout the political transition, the Houthis expanded militarily from their stronghold in Sa’ada governorate, taking advantage of the sharp polarization of the political elite during the transitional process and the fragility of the army's institutions during its restructuring as part of the GCC initiative. In September 2014, Houthi forces allied with tribal and military forces loyal to former President Saleh and stormed the capital Sana’a. By January 2015 they had placed President Hadi under house arrest. He escaped in February and fled to the southern port city of Aden.
In March 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces accelerated their expansion to the east, west and south out of Sana’a, with the aim of taking over key cities, such as Taiz and Aden, and strategic oil and gas facilities in Marib and Shabwa governorates. Later that month, on March 26, six months after the Houthis stormed Sana’a, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states launched a military campaign, “Operation Decisive Storm,” to roll back the advances of Houthi-Saleh forces and restore Hadi to power.[5]
[5] Yemen Corner, Basic Facts ( actors
Today, the main warring parties in Yemen’s civil war are the Houthis, the internationally recognized government, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and UAE-backed Red Sea coastal forces aligned with Tariq Saleh, a former commander of Yemen’s special forces and a nephew of ex-President.
Houthis: The Houthis, or Ansar Allah (Supporters of God) as they prefer to be called, have rebranded several times since emerging in the early 1990s as the “Believing Youth,” a movement aimed at reviving Zaidi Shia identity in the face of alleged marginalization and discrimination by the state. Ironically, President Saleh and many of the ruling elite in his regime were also Zaidi. Granted, Saleh and other republican leaders since the September 26 revolution of 1962 channeled limited resources to the Houthi heartland in Sa’ada governorate, but their argument that Zaidi identity was under threat seemed to be a cover to restore the political Zaidi ideology that was forced upon Yemenis before the republican revolution. This ideology, which installs Hashemite families as political elite in all state institutions, stands in opposition to the modern republic of Yemen which seeks to be an equal democratic system.
Eventually, the group adopted the name of its founder, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, who was killed by government forces in 2004, sparking the first of the six “Sa’ada Wars” between 2004 and 2010. The leaders of the Houthi group are Hashemites, meaning they claim descent from the Muslim Prophet Mohammed. This “superior” bloodline is the basis of a perceived supremacy over other social groups in Yemen that Hashemite imams promoted while ruling parts of Yemen intermittently for a millennium until 1962. Houthi politics draw from the Zaidi imamate blueprint in many ways, including through the appointment of a Hashemite leader (currently represented by Abdulmalik al-Houthi) as the highest authority in the land and bestowing privileges to the broader Hashemite class.
Internationally recognized government: Led by President Hadi and his cabinet which is mostly based in Riyadh, the government is often referred to as the “legitimacy” among Yemenis. The Hadi government’s legitimacy derives from UN recognition as the successor to the Saleh regime, in line with the GCC-brokered political transition that started in 2012.
Southern Transitional Council (STC): The UAE-backed STC was founded in May 2017 by several southern officials in the internationally recognized government whom President Hadi had fired earlier that year. The founders include former Aden governor, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, and Sheikh Hani bin Breik, former Minister of State and Security Belt forces commander, who are currently president and vice president of the council, respectively.
The core leadership of the STC hail from Al-Dhale and Lahj governorates. The inhabitants of this region are known as the Tughma. Their rivals are known as the Zumra from neighboring Abyan and Shabwa governorates. The Tughma and Zumra were the main political elite during the socialist era in the south. Prominent Zumra figures include President Hadi and several of his close political allies. More broadly, the STC can be seen as an outgrowth of the secessionist wing of the Southern Movement known as Hirak, which was organized in 2007 by former southern military and security officials who lost their jobs after the 1994 civil war.
The STC commands a variety of UAE-trained militias formed in the early years of the war. They include the Security Belt forces in Aden, Lahj, Al-Dhale and Abyan governorates, as well as the Shabwani Elite forces in Shabwa governorate and Hadhrami Elite forces in Hadramawt governorate.
Regional actors
Yemen’s civil war is taking place within a broader regional struggle for power in which Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have sought to limit Iran’s growing influence.
Saudi Arabia intervened in the war on March 26, 2015 at the request of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, who was driven from power by the Iran-backed Houthis in early 2015. Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab states to defeat the Houthi-Saleh alliance and return Hadi and his internationally recognized government to power. Saudi forces mainly supported the remnants of Hadi’s national army fighting Houthi forces in northern governorates until mid-2019, when the UAE announced a military drawdown.
The United Arab Emirates co-led military operations with Saudi Arabia for the first four years of the war, forming militias throughout Yemen’s southern governorates ostensibly to fight Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), ISIS and Houthi forces. Many of those UAE-backed militias have gone on to pursue broader political objectives under the STC, including driving the national army out of southern governorates. The UAE and STC have focused in particular on weakening government forces affiliated with the Islah party.
The Yemeni forces backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE formed what became known as the “anti-Houthi alliance.” These allies, working together and separately, achieved many successes in the early years of the war. However, since then, factions within the alliance, in particular, STC-affiliated forces and Islah-affiliated forces in the internationally recognized government’s national army, have increasingly fought each other. STC-aligned forces in Aden attempted to seize control of Aden in January 2018 and succeeded in doing so in August 2019 with the UAE air support.
Iran has provided a steady supply of advanced weapons, fuel and illicit drugs to the Houthis throughout the war. Advisors from the paramilitary Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), as well as from Iran’s Lebanese proxy force Hezbollah, have trained Houthi forces to manufacture weapons including missiles and drones and taught Houthi leaders how to rule in line with Iran’s “Islamic revolution.” Although overt support for the Houthis didn’t emerge until shortly after the Houthis seized control of Sana’a in a military coup in September 2014, Iran has sent covert weapons shipments to the group since at least 2009. Yemeni officials have accused Iran of supporting and arming the Houthis dating back to the beginning of the Sa’ada wars between the Houthis and the regime of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh from 2004 to 2010. The ideological influences of Iran’s revolutionary regime on Houthi leaders are evident dating to the 1990s. The Houthi-Iran relationship has grown stronger and more public during the war, particularly in recent years.
International actors
At the international level, the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as the UN Security Council and other international NGOs have been influential actors in the war. In mid-April 2015, three weeks after the start of the Saudi-led coalition’s military intervention, the 15-member UN Security Council passed Resolution 2216 authorizing a targeted arms embargo to prevent Iran from shipping weapons to the Houthis. The resolution demanded that the Houthi-Saleh alliance lay down arms and abide by the Gulf Cooperation Council political transition initiative that sought to bring about democratic reforms in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings.
The United Kingdom, as the “pen holder” of the Yemen file on the UN Security Council, has played a leading role in shaping subsequent resolutions and determining the stance of the council in general regarding the war.
In the initial years of the war, the United States provided significant support for the Saudi-led coalition including intelligence sharing for airstrikes, mid-air refueling of Saudi fighter jets and general maintenance of the Saudi Royal Air Force. In November 2018, Congress limited American involvement by ceasing fueling operations. In February 2021, incoming President Joe Biden lifted the Trump administration’s designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization and pledged to stop supporting all offensive Saudi coalition operations in the war.
International NGOs have also played a major role during the war by providing record amounts of humanitarian aid to Yemen’s population and influencing the direction of the conflict at times. The Yemeni parties to the conflict, particularly the Houthis, have weaponized food, cash and other aid provided by UN agencies and organizations like Oxfam and USAID in several ways. The Houthis, which control the most densely populated parts of the country where humanitarian work is concentrated, have diverted aid to loyalists or to the frontlines, sold the aid on the black market to fund military operations, and in doing so prevented the intended recipients from receiving the aid.[6]
[6] Yemen Corner, Main Actors ( type="1">
The United Kingdom Home Office, citing a 2024 publication in the CIA World Factbook, reported that the Internationally Recognised Government controlled up to 300,000 military, paramilitary, militia and other security forces; the Saudi-led coalition controlled between 150,000-2000 trained forces, and that the Houthi controlled approximately 200,000 fighters. According to other reports cited by the United Kingdom Home Office, the Southern Transitional Council controlled approximately 15,000 fighters, the Joint Forces on the West Coast controlled approximately 40,000 fighters, the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) controlled between 3,000 – 4,000 fighters and the Islamic State in Yemen remained active but was considerably smaller in size compared to the AQAP.[7]
[7] United Kingdom Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note: security situation, Yemen (March 2025) (>
According to the European Council of Foreign Relations, the Houthis and their allies have largely been forced out of Yemen’s independent south but continue to hold ground elsewhere despite continuing airstrikes, a naval blockade by the coalition and the efforts of anti-Houthi militias on the ground. Despite gains by local anti-Houthi resistance fighters in Taiz, the battle continues, fuelling a deepening humanitarian crisis. The province of Ibb, neighbouring Taiz to the north, has witnessed a continuing back-and-forth as Houthis class with the opponents, as has the strategic province of Al Bayda, where the Houthis and their allies have reversed earlier losses.[8]
[8] European Council on Foreign Relations, Mapping Yemen, p5 (>
According to Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Yemen is now divided between the Houthis in the north and the Presidential Leadership Council, consisting of eight members selected by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which controls much of the south and east of the country, operating from the city of Aden.[9]
[9] DFAT, Yemen: Political Overview (>
In a 2024 global peace index, Yemen was rated as the least peaceful country in the world followed by Sudan, South Sudan Afghanistan and Ukraine.[10]
[10] Global Peace Index 2024: Identifying and measuring the factors that drive peace, 16-17 (>
In relation to Taiz specifically, the region is in a stalemate between the Houthis and a diverse, tenuously aligned, though increasingly divided, coalition of groups affiliated with IRG. Western and central areas leading into Taiz are mainly under the control of IRG forces, as is most of the governorate capital. Recent years have seen fluctuating tensions between pro-Islah factions and forces affiliated with Tariz Sale, particularly to the south of the city. Houthi forces are still positioned in the city’s western, northern, and eastern outskirts, leaving it in a state of semi-besiegement as the main access roads remain sites of frequent skirmishes and exchanges of shelling. Houthi forces also maintain control of the north and east of the governorate.[11]
[11] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, Yemen Conflict Observatory, Taizz Frontlines (>
According to one source cited by the United Kingdom Home Office, there were a total of 1,726 ‘security events’ recorded in Taiz across 2023 and 2024, involving a recorded 572 fatalities amongst combatants and civilians alike. The same United Kingdom Home Office Report also states:
‘Ta’izz: 189 civilian casualties were reported in Ta’izz. A large proportion were the result of continued hostilities on the Ta’izz frontlines; shellfire and drone activity were responsible for 70 civilian casualties in Ta’izz in 2024, over a third of the governorate’s total … In 2024, four in five civilian sniper casualties were reported in Ta’izz … Children are frequently reported among the frontline casualties in Ta’izz, and in 2024, more child casualties were reported in Ta’izz (61) than in any other governorate.’[12]
[12] United Kingdom Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note: security situation, Yemen (March 2025) (>
Country information indicates that the Houthis use various strategies to recruit for its armed forces, including coercion and forced recruitment. These practices include the targeting of university educated males. Universities and institutes are said to have been turned into military and ideological mobilization centres and there are credible reports of university staff being kidnapped and/or killed.[13] Scholars, public intellectuals and university students are said to have suffered from violent attacks, arrests, kidnappings and the effect of armed conflict.[14] Educational institutions have been used for indoctrination purposes and staff have been directed to mobilise to the front lines for fighting.[15]
[13] Yemen Monitor/Newsroom, “Rights Report Accuses Houthis of Turning Universities and Institutes into Military Mobilization Centers” Yemen Monitor (Online, 4 February 2025) (
[14] University of Aden, December 05, 2020 Scholars At Risk ( ‘Houthi militia imposes thousands of teachers to join battlefronts’ Yemen National Military Web (Online, 23 June 2020) ( ‘Houthi abusing education for sectarian indoctrination’ Yemen National Military Web (Online, 13 July 2019) (>
Reports also exist of adults being arrested for suspected links to Houthi armed groups in areas that not controlled by the Houthis. Houthi suspects, other terrorist group suspects, and government loyalists are reported to have been arrested by the STC operating in Aden.[16] All parties to conflict are said to have engaged in arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances.
[16] US Department of State, 20 April 2024, p.22 ( Yemen Press Agency (YPA), 23 July 2023 (>
In 2021, for example, the Arab American News reported that “Yeminis travelling from other parts of the world to regions controlled by Saudi and UAE-backed militias are targeted for kidnapping, extortion, theft and murders, as they hope to bring much needed aid to their fallen families back home.”[17] Similar reporting also exists elsewhere.[18]
Did the applicant experience past harm in Yemen?
[17] Arab American News, 16 September 2021 ( Middle East Eye, 18 September 2021 ( Middle East Eye, 11 September 2021 (>
The applicant’s evidence has generally been consistent throughout the Protection visa application and merits review process. The oral and written evidence presented to me is more detailed than originally given in his Protection visa application, but I have also had the benefit of the applicant appearing before me at a hearing. His oral evidence appeared spontaneous and reliable and his responses to my follow up questions suggests that he was drawing on personal and lived experiences. There is documentary evidence before me regarding his student activism, his education qualifications, his home in Taiz, his marriage and his status as a wanted person.
The evidence leads me to accept that the applicant is a Sunni Muslim originating from the Taiz region. He has resided, and been educated, in Yemen and in [Country 1]. He is highly educated and has been awarded a [Qualification] for his studies.
I accept that he was involved in various student actions and protests. It is likely that at least some of the issues affecting the student politic were related to general country and economic/financial circumstances, but I am also prepared to accept that at least some of the applicant’s actions involved and displayed an anti-government/anti-political dimension. I further accept that he attracted adverse attention because of this.
I accept that the applicant was approached for recruitment to the Houthis on two occasions. It is a plausible account that is generally consistent with the country information about the Houthis recruitment practices set out above. His refusal to join the Houthis led to a travel ban and warrant being issued for his arrest.
I also accept that he was detained when passing through a security checkpoint in 2016 and held for a period of time. He experienced abuse whilst in detention and was released with the help of an intermediary whom he paid.
I accept that he was detained and questioned at Aden airport in 2019 because he was travelling into Yemen after residing for some time in [Country 1]. Some of his personal belongings were confiscated by authorities.
Does the applicant hold a well-founded fear of persecution?
Reflecting on the applicant’s lived experiences and the country information I have already discussed above, I am satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm in Yemen.
The chance of being questioned and detained at Aden airport, at a military checkpoint and/or anywhere throughout his home region of Taiz is more than remote, farfetched or speculative. It involves a real chance. He was previously a person of interest for Houthi recruiters and is subject to a travel ban and an arrest warrant. These factors point to an ongoing interest in the applicant and increase the chance of him coming to the attention of state and non-state actors in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Upon being stopped, questioned, detained or forcibly recruited, he faces a real chance of threats to his life and liberty and significant physical harassment or ill treatment. It is serious harm within the meaning of the Migration Act. He may experience the serious harm as a part of being unlawfully questioned and detained. He may experience the serious harm as a result of refusing to join the Houthis or by refusing to use his education and skills to support their cause. He may experience the serious harm because he is perceived to have information about the Houthis or [Country 1] which he cannot give to his captors because he does not actually hold
It involves systematic and discriminatory conduct and is for the essential and significant reasons of being a university educated male and/or a person who has lived and studied abroad. Each (or both) of these involve a characteristic shared by all members of the group including the applicant. The characteristic distinguishes the group from society and the characteristic is not a fear of persecution. They are a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning of s 5L of the Migration Act.
They involve characteristics that are fundamental to the applicant’s identity and/or characteristics that are immutable. They are characteristics that he cannot be required to modify.
The nature and scale of the conflict in Yemen means that effective protection measures are not available.
Considering the totality of the internal conflict occurring in Yemen, I am satisfied that the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the country. The applicant’s physical and mental health, taken together with a need for his wife and child to relocate with him, renders relocation within Yemen unreasonable, in the sense of not being practicable.
Conclusion
I am satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
DECISION
The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant meets s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
Date(s) of hearing:  28 April 2025
Representative:  Ms Lydia Ganci
ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
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cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
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degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
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torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
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receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
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5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
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5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note: For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
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36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
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(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
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