2406870 (Refugee)

[2024] AATA 3880

2406870 (Refugee) [2024] AATA 3880 (21 August 2024)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

REPRESENTATIVE:  Mr Sam Issa

CASE NUMBER:  2406870

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Lebanon

MEMBER:Denny Hughes

DATE:21 August 2024

PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne

DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

Statement made on 21 August 2024 at 10:09am

CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Lebanon – political opinion – member of Alawi party – opposition to Hezbollah and other militant groups – pressured to join military or reserve because of previous military service – imputed and threatened as supporter of Israel and brother attacked – credibility – temporary skills visa cancelled on arrival, and immigration detention – false, misleading or incorrect information in application – military service, employment, household and English language ability, and no claim of fear of harm – sectarian violence, deaths of father and another brother, and mental health – country information – decision under review affirmed

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H(1)(a), 5H(1), 36(2)(a), (aa), (2A), 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 2 April 2024 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

2. The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of Lebanon, applied for the visa on 10 November 2023. The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy the criteria for grant of a protection visa.

3. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 4 June 2024 and 26 July 2024 to give evidence and present arguments. Both Tribunal hearings were conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic and English languages.

4. The applicant was represented in relation to the review by his representative Mr Sam Issa.

   CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL

   Visa application

5. The applicant lodged his visa application on 10 November 2023.

   In addition to a copy of his identity documentation, the applicant’s claims in the visa application were as follows:

   ·He left Lebanon and travelled to Australia on a Subclass 482 working visa.

   ·He experienced harm in Lebanon. He was subjected to threats of physical harm by Hezbollah operatives and militant Palestinian groups that operate in Lebanon.

   ·He travelled to Australia for his own safety as he was being threatened by Hezbollah operatives and militant Palestinian groups that operate in Lebanon because of his political views and opposition to Hezbollah and militant Palestinians who are dragging Lebanon into a state of war with Israel.

   ·Hezbollah and militant Palestinian groups are more powerful than the Lebanese Government.

   ·Hezbollah and militant Palestinian groups can locate and cause him serious harm anywhere in Lebanon.

6. He also indicates that he will provide a comprehensive statement within 5 working days in which he intends to fully ventilate his claims.

7. Under the character declarations, the applicant answered that he had not served in a military force. However, he did refer to a period of military service with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) between [Year] and [Year] in his employment history.

8. On 17 November 2023, the applicant expanded on his claims in a statutory declaration. He indicates that he is claiming persecution on the grounds of his actual and implied political beliefs. He provides the following additional information about his claims:

   ·He was born on [Date]. He is a Lebanese national, and an Alawite Muslim.

   ·His Subclass 482 visa was cancelled on the basis that he provided false and misleading information. He reiterates that all documentation provided in support of his Subclass 482 visa is genuine.

   ·He was a member of the Hizb El Arabi party since March 2017, which is an Alawi party. He was an active member of the party, attending regular meetings in [Neighbourhood] once or twice a week. The local head of the party is known as [Mr A]. [Mr A] is the local representative of Ali Eid, who escaped to Syria and is unable to return to Lebanon.

   ·While he is a political member, he does not condone any form of violence or unjustified military campaigns.

   ·He joined the LAF in [Year], receiving military training and serving for a period of 12 months.

   ·After the start of the Gaza conflict on 7 October 2023, he attended several meetings to discuss the latest events. During the early phase of the Gaza conflict, and soon after the military engagement of Hezbollah and Palestinian forces in Southern Lebanon, his party started calling for recruits to join the war effort in the south.

   ·[Mr A] asked him personally to join the Hezbollah and Palestinian forces military campaign in the south primarily due to his past military training with the LAF. While many members of the party were eager to join, he resisted because he is opposed to all forms of violence and regards the war with Israel as illegitimate and not in Lebanon’s interest.

   ·Being a long-time member of the party and an Alawi, he was expected to support Hezbollah and the Palestinian forces war effort against Israel. His reluctance to join the war effort was regarded as a betrayal. Furthermore, his anti-war stance was imputed to being a supporter or collaborator of Israel. He was accused of being an Israel collaborator and threatened with serious physical violence on at least four separate occasions by [Mr A] and other high profile party members.

   ·He feared that as the war in Gaza and southern Lebanon intensifies, the threats and attempts on his life by members of the party will increase.

   ·Should he return to Lebanon, he will be targeted by members of the party and likely killed on the basis that he is an Israeli supporter or collaborator.

   ·He does not want to join the war effort because he believes that Lebanon should not be engaged in a war against Israel and that Lebanon should stay out of the Palestinian conflict. Such views are firmly opposed by the Party who are staunch supporters of Hezbollah and Palestinian forces who are trying to drag Lebanon into a war with Israel.

   ·He would also be targeted by Hezbollah and Palestinian factions who operate in Lebanon. His brother [Mr B] who was also a former member of the party as well as a former LAF member was shot in the back by members of the party two days prior to the applicant’s departure from Lebanon. His brother managed to survive the attack, however the applicant is concerned that on the next occasion they will succeed in killing him. His brother continues to fear for his life and is currently in hiding.

   ·He does not want to return to Lebanon where he is vulnerable to being killed by either the party, Hezbollah, or Palestinian factions.

   ·He also fears that should the war against Israel intensify it will inevitably involve the LAF. The implications for him as a former member of the LAF, mean that he is likely to be called up for reservist duties.

   ·He cannot rely on the Lebanese authorities for protection as they are beholden to Hezbollah.

   ·Relocation would not be a viable or practical means of protection as Hezbollah or party agents can track him down anywhere in the country.

   ·As his Subclass 482 visa has been cancelled, and given the grave danger that he faces in Lebanon, he had no option but to apply for a protection visa, this being the only means of avoiding serious harm in his home country.

   ·He does not wish to return to a country which is destined to engage in an unjustified war with Israel.

9. On 26 November 2023, the applicant provided a statutory declaration intended to supplement as well as correct some of the claims made in his protection visa application and first statutory declaration of 17 November 2023, stating:

   ·He joined the ADP (Arabic Democratic Party) in February 2017 in [Neighbourhood]. Being an Alawi, he was expected to join the ADP. He also supported the political platform of the ADP, which he believed sought to give a voice for the minority Alawi population in Lebanon.

   ·He was an active member including attending regular party meetings, encouraging recruitment of new members, participating in political discussions and being active during elections, although his position within the ADP remained as an ordinary member. He did not hold any prominent or high-ranking position within the ADP.

   ·His statutory declaration of 17 November 2023 contained an error with respect to the current ADP leader, who is Rafaat Eid, the son of the former head of the ADP, the late Ali Eid. Rafaat Eid has escaped to Syria and is unable to return to Lebanon. He is currently wanted by the Lebanese Government on charges relating to stirring sectarian conflict in Tripoli.

   ·The error with respect to Rafaat Eid may have arisen due to a misunderstanding when providing oral instructions to his legal representative who had assisted him in drafting his first statutory declaration. Being in immigration detention and the process of providing oral instructions to his legal representative over the telephone was at the time difficult for him.

   ·Furthermore, the events leading to the cancellation of his 482 visa and subsequent detention has caused him significant distress and anxiety. This had adversely impacted his ability to accurately recall dates.

   ·While he was a political member of the ADP, he currently does not condone any form of violence or unjustified military campaigns, including any potential war against Israel. He believes in settling disputes by political means and does not support any military action against Israel because it is against the interest of the Lebanese state and such a war will destroy the country.

   ·Since the outbreak of the Israeli Hamas conflict in Gaza and the subsequent involvement of Hezbollah and Palestinian factions in joining the fighting against Israel on the Lebanese southern border, the ADP has been actively enlisting its members to join Hezbollah and the local Palestinian factions (namely the Lebanese wing of Hamas) to fight against Israel in the south of Lebanon.

   ·Hezbollah provides the ADP with significant funding if they send them ADP recruits. A higher price is paid for recruits who have past military experience. For this reason, the ADP party leadership are seeking to recruit as many ADP members with past military experience as possible. Such requests and offers of glory, and martyrdom were made during various ADP meetings that were conducted in [Neighbourhood] during the early phase of the Israeli Hamas war.

   ·As previously stated in his first statutory declaration, he was approached by the local head of the ADP ([Mr A]) who personally asked him to join the war effort. Members of the ADP who had past military experience were the primary candidates to join the war effort. The applicant and his brother were requested for this reason.

   ·[Mr A]’s requests were made directly to him following a party meeting that had been held at the ADP party headquarters in [Neighbourhood]. During that conversation, he conveyed to [Mr A] his personal objections to the war with Israel because it was not in Lebanon’s interest. [Mr A]’s reaction to his views was very hostile, proceeding to make immediate threats to expel him from the ADP and accusing him of being an Israeli collaborator.

   ·Shortly after stating his views to [Mr A], he was threatened with serious physical violence on at least four separate occasions by [Mr A] himself and other high profile members of the ADP. Their threats were made over the telephone. Fearing for his personal safety, he refrained from attending any further ADP meetings as well as avoiding any known ADP members.

   ·Shortly after his brother’s own refusal to join the war effort, members of the ADP carried out their threats to physically harm him as he too was accused of being an Israel collaborator. He was shot in the back outside of his home in [Neighbourhood] and was lucky to be alive. Fortunately, the injury sustained during the attack was a bullet grazing his lower back and he did not require medical attention.

   ·His brother did not report the incident to the Lebanese authorities as he feared an even more intense backlash against him by the ADP. He chose to go into hiding and hoped to find a way to travel abroad. He was not aware of the precise location of his hiding.

   ·The applicant was fortunate to have been granted a 482 visa. He fears that had he remained in Lebanon, he would have suffered the same fate as his brother. 

   ·He fears that given his opposition to the war with Israel and being imputed by the ADP leadership with being an Israeli collaborator, this will also bring him to the adverse attention of Hezbollah and Palestinian groups, namely Hamas elements who operate in Lebanon.

   ·When he referred to Hezbollah operatives in his initial protection visa claims, he was referring to the ADP who is closely allied to both Hezbollah and it is for this reason he fears they will also target him.

   ·He initially joined the LAF in February [Year] as opposed to [Year] as stated in his first statutory declaration. This was an error caused by a lapse in memory.

   ·After joining the LAF, he completed a period of 2 months training at [a] military base. Following the period of initial training he was assigned to [Battalion], [Brigade] and his LAF number was [Number]. His rank in the LAF was that of an ordinary soldier. After completion of his military training, he was stationed at [a compound].

   ·His motivation in joining the LAF was for legitimate reasons, and to defend his country against legitimate external threats and to maintain peace. However, he offered his resignation only 12 months after joining the LAF because he was subjected to severe (mistreatment) at the hands of high-ranking Sunni military officers. He soon discovered that sectarianism is also rife in the LAF and largely remains driven by personal, political and sectarian interests as opposed to legitimate national interests.

   ·Should the war against Israel intensify, it will inevitably involve the LAF and former members of the LAF, and he is likely to be called up for reservist duties.

   ·In his 482 visa application, he failed to state that he has undertaken military service. This omission was not intentional, but was caused by possible inadvertence or miscommunication between the applicant and his representative.

   ·He stated in his first statutory declaration that he is now opposed to the war against Israel and to all forms of violence. He continues to hold these views. His objection to wars and all forms of violence have been formed by many years of exposure to needless sectarian violence and bloodshed in Tripoli between rival Sunni and Alawi militias.

   ·He still suffers from recurring nightmares and trauma from the impact of exposure to sectarian violence in Tripoli which saw a significant escalation in violence during the Syrian civil war.

   ·Their family home in [Neighbourhood] sustained significant damage on multiple occasions during this period. The applicant and his family were lucky to have not been seriously harmed during this period of heightened sectarian violence. He witnessed much death and destruction, and these events have had an enduring impact on his life and have largely shaped his current objection to all forms of violence.

   ·His mental health and memory have also been adversely (and cumulatively) impacted by the death of his [brother] in May 2022, and the death of his father in January 2022.

   ·While he did attend [High School], between the years [Year] and [Year] (in which the curriculum was predominantly in the English language) the passage of time since completing his high school education and these traumatic events have been the root cause of decline of his English language skills.

10. The applicant provided documentation in support of his claims, including his ADP membership card, and copies and translations of his LAF discharge documentation.

11. He claims that when he referred to Hezbollah operatives in his initial protection visa claims, he was referring to the ADP who is closely allied to both Hezbollah and it is for this reason he fears they too will target him.

12. Following the visa interview, the applicant provided a written submission through his representative. That submission reiterates his claims and his feared risk profile. The representative also provides further submissions in support of these claims:

    ·Central to the applicant’s contention is the claims that the ADP is continuing to recruit ADP party members, particularly those having past LAF military experience.

    ·Such assertions are supported by a cogent evidentiary foundation which are principally featured, albeit to a limited degree in the local media and is widely disseminating in the ADF party recruitment propaganda and its official stance on the Israeli Hezbollah border conflict.

    ·Al Jazeera news recently featured an article in which it was asserted that the Hamas Lebanon wing is actively engaging in recruiting activities in Lebanon.[1]

    ·The ADP leader Rifaat Ali Eid, official Facebook (and) Instagram accounts are replete with political commentary calling for recruitment of ADP party membership and the need to defeat what the party regards as the enemy, Israel.

    ·It is respectfully submitted that the above sources, chiefly, the ADP leader Rifaat Ali Eid’s official Facebook and Instagram accounts, present as cogent evidence of the ongoing recruitment of ADP party members to join the war effort against Israel. Hence, in light of such evidence the applicant’s central claims cannot be discounted as fanciful or farfetched.

    ·The applicant’s written and oral evidence relating to his political views, and fear of being subjected to severe or serious harm on account of such held views are not hyperbolic and are verified by evidence. Furthermore, his oral evidence has been largely consistent, rational and despite his anxiety and indubitable interpretational errors has also been coherent and intelligible.

    [1] Justin Salhani, ‘Hamas is now recruiting in Lebanon. What will that mean for Hezbollah?’ Al Jazeera, 18 December 2023

13. A screenshot and translation purportedly from the Facebook account of Rifaat Ali Eid, the head of the Arabic Democratic Party is provided in support of these contentions. The screenshot is of a post dated 22 December 2023, the translation states:

    We are where we have to be. #The ArabDemocraticParty

    Our party was not created to be only on the margins of History. But we are made to be an active part of it, to defend the issue of the Nation, and to serve our people. The Resistance is an honor for the Nation and the Title of Liberation and Freedom.

    RIFAAT ALI EID
    The Secretary-General of the Arabic Democratic Party

    Tribunal review

14. The applicant lodged his application for review on 2 April 2024. He provided the Tribunal with a copy of the delegate’s decision. 

15. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal at hearings on 4 June 2024 and 26 July 2024.

16. On 30 May 2024, the applicant’s representative provided what appears to be a photo of the applicant in a military uniform.

1. On 26 June 2024, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant and invited him to comment on or respond to adverse information, and to provide information. On 28 June 2024, the applicant’s representative provided the Tribunal with its response to the invitation. The Tribunal has considered the invitation and response as discussed below.

2. On 3 July 2024, the applicant’s representative provided a document entitled ‘determine the period of retention for reservists’ originators of military training’ and translation.

3. On 26 July 2024, the applicant’s representative provided a copy and translation of the title deed to the applicant’s family’s property in Tripoli. That document relevantly indicates that the property is held in equal shares by the applicant and his brother from 28 December 1993.  

4. Following the second hearing, the representative provided a copy of a 10 April 2024 article from Memri TV relating to the arrest of a Lebanese journalist that had been critical of Hezbollah and investigated for collaboration with Israel, which he had mentioned at the hearing.[2] The representative subsequently provided an article from The Times of Israel, which discusses the suppression of any form of opposition to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The representative contends that the article supports the applicant’s claims that his expressed objection to fighting Israel (which was made directly to the ADP leadership), imputes him to being an Israeli supporter or collaborator, which would have serious repercussions for him.[3]

   [2] Memri TV, Lebanese Journalist Critical of Hizbullah Investigated for Collaboration with Israel, 10 April 2024

   [3] Gianluca Pacchiani, Intimidations, threats, assassinations: How Hezbollah suppresses dissent inside Lebanon, Times of Israel, 3 August 2024

5. In undertaking this assessment, the Tribunal has considered all the material before it, including evidence and submissions provided at the hearings.

   CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA

6. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b) or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

7. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.

8. A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).

9. Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a  person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)–(6) and ss 5K–LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

10. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

    Mandatory considerations

11. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

    CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

12. The issue in this case is whether the applicant meets the criteria for grant of a protection visa.

13. The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s past circumstances and the potential impact of trauma on his evidence. He made no claims to fear harm on return to Lebanon related to his mental health, however he contends it has impacted his memory and recall. While no evidence of any mental health concerns was provided, the Tribunal acknowledges the difficult position the applicant faces being in immigration detention. As discussed below, the Tribunal also accepts and has considered the impact of the family trauma he has experienced, as well as the trauma of the security situation in his home area. The Tribunal has weighed those matters in the assessment of his evidence. Equally, it was the Tribunal’s impression that the applicant was able to meaningfully participate in the hearings. 

14. While there are aspects of the applicant’s claims that the Tribunal accepts uncritically, the Tribunal has a number of concerns with the applicant’s substantive claims, as well as concerns arising from information he has provided in the course of this visa application and related applications. The Tribunal considers those matters accumulate to raise serious concerns about the applicant’s credibility and the credibility of his substantive claims.

15. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed. 

    Assessment of substantive claims and credibility

16. The Tribunal has a number of concerns arising in relation to the applicant’s credibility across time, including information provided in the course of his previous Subclass 482 visa.

    Identity and citizenship

17. The applicant provided the Department with a copy of his Lebanese passport. There are no apparent issues with his identity and citizenship. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a citizen of Lebanon.

18. There is nothing before the Tribunal to suggest the applicant has citizenship of any other country, or that he has any right to enter and/or reside in any third country. Based on the information before it, the Tribunal is satisfied s 36(3) of the Act does not apply. The Tribunal finds that Lebanon is his receiving country and has assessed his claims against that country.

19. The applicant’s ethnic and religious profile has been consistently advanced across his oral and written evidence. There is nothing that contradicts these claims. The Tribunal accepts he is an Alawite (sometimes referred to as Alawi) from the [Neighbourhood] district in Tripoli in the North of Lebanon. The applicant’s remaining family members still live in this area in the family home. The Tribunal accepts this profile and this is the area he would live if he returned to Lebanon.

    Migration history

20. According to the decision record, a copy of which was provided with the application for review, the applicant initially applied to come to Australia on 15 June 2015 on a Subclass FA-600 Visitor visa. That visa was refused on 4 July 2015, and the applicant sought review of that decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 17 August 2015. The Tribunal, then differently constituted, made a decision to affirm the visa refusal on 7 January 2016.

21. On 23 June 2021, the applicant applied for a Subclass GG-408 Temporary Activity visa, but that was refused by the Department on 20 May 2022.

22. On 20 October 2023, the applicant applied for a Subclass GK-482 Temporary Skills visa. That visa was granted on 1 November 2023 and the applicant arrived in Australia [in] November 2023.

23. On arrival at the airport in Melbourne, the applicant was not immigration cleared and his Subclass 482 visa was subsequently cancelled at the border. According to the delegate’s decision in the current review, the applicant’s Subclass 482 visa was cancelled on the basis that he had provided false or misleading information in connection with that visa.   

24. The applicant was detained in immigration detention at Melbourne Immigration Transit Accommodation (MITA) [in] November 2023. He applied for a protection visa on the same date, and the delegate made a decision to refuse that visa on 2 April 2024. 

    Past employment

25. A concern for the Tribunal relates to the applicant’s evidence about his employment and his related financial position in Lebanon.

26. In his protection visa application, the applicant indicated he had worked as [an occupation 1] in [job task 1] between July 2019 and November 2023 when the application was made. He also indicated that he had worked as [an occupation 2] in [job task 2] between November 2010 and July 2019. Prior to a period of military service (listed as [Year] to [Year]), he claimed he had worked as [an occupation 2] between [Year] and [Year].

27. At the first hearing, the Tribunal asked the applicant about his employment experience. He indicated that he had only ever worked in [occupation 1] and undertook training (similar to an apprenticeship) in [occupation 1] after school. He confirmed he had not done any other work and had been employed since finishing school. When asked about his assets, his evidence was that he had no vehicle and no property.

28. Later in the first hearing, the Tribunal put to the applicant that it had information before it from a previous Tribunal review in 2015 in which the applicant and his brother had given different evidence about his past employment and situation in Lebanon.

29. In that 2015 hearing, the applicant and his brother provided evidence about his employment history. His brother gave evidence that the applicant worked as [an occupation 3]. He explained that his brother had worked as [an occupation 4] from the age of 15, but he was ‘good and smart’ and he had become [an occupation 3]. Related to this, the evidence was that the applicant made good money, owned a car and the family home. Each of these considerations was advanced to indicate the applicant would return to Lebanon at the end of his visitor visa.

30. In response to this issue at the first hearing (in this review), the applicant said he had been working with a friend in [occupation 3], but it was not his business. He said it had been a long time ago. He claimed he was using his friend’s car, and the house was under his and his brother’s name. He said he had forgotten.

31. The applicant was also invited to comment on this information in writing after the first hearing.

32. The written response states that the applicant concedes that he had provided inconsistent evidence to the Tribunal with respect to his past employment. He acknowledges that he has provided evidence to both the Department and the Tribunal in support of his protection visa application that he only ever worked in [occupations 1 and 2]. This information was not consistent with the claims previously made to the Tribunal (differently constituted) on 16 December 2015, in which he had stated that he worked as [an occupation 3] in Lebanon and as [an occupation 4] from the age of 15.

33. In the written response, the applicant confirms that he did work as [an occupation 4] in the family business from the age of 15 as well as [an occupation 3] for a relatively short period. He further states that he failed to mention both prior occupations due to the traumatic events from exposure to past sectarian violence in [Neighbourhood], the recent deaths of his brother and father as well as the threats received from the ADP officials, [which] have all combined to adversely impact his memory. Additionally, the response states that the distress associated with being detained in immigration detention facilities has also exacerbated his condition, resulting in depression for which he has not received professional treatment.

34. In terms of his evidence regarding his assets (i.e. his earlier claimed ownership of the family home), the applicant also provided a copy of the deed to his family’s home and translation. Consistent with his evidence in 2015, that document appears to indicate he owns the family home in Tripoli jointly with his brother.

35. The applicant’s employment and other history is in some respects tangential to this review, but the evidence is before the Tribunal and it considers it pertinent to the credibility of his background and experiences in Lebanon, and his credibility overall, as it is a means of confirming his claimed history.  

36. As discussed above, no evidence has been provided to the Tribunal that he has sought or been denied mental health support while in detention, or that he has been assessed as having any condition that impacts his memory. However, as the Tribunal accepts the applicant lived in [Neighbourhood] in Tripoli, the Tribunal accepts that he has likely had some exposure or proximity to violence and trauma (discussed further below). The Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s family has been impacted by tragedy, including the death of his father (illness) and the accidental death of his brother. The Tribunal accepts the lasting impact of these events, including nightmares. While the Tribunal ultimately does not accept his claims related to the ADP, the Tribunal accepts other aspects of his past and has weighed that in the assessment of his evidence.

37. In terms of the ownership of his home or other assets, or his financial position, the Tribunal considers some allowance for omissions in his evidence is reasonable. He partly owned the family home, which he lived in with other family members, and that may explain his inconsistent answers. The Tribunal considers there was no intention to conceal his household situation.

38. In terms of his employment, the Tribunal notes the applicant was born in [Year]. At the time of his 2015 review, he was around [Age] years of age. If he had worked as [an occupation 3] and then a salesperson from the age of [Age], that would account for around 10 years of work experience. The Tribunal also notes the evidence given was that he had done well in these roles. However, there was no reference in his more recent oral or written evidence to this employment. Instead, his oral and written evidence was clearly that he had only worked in [occupations 1 and 2]] work since a young age.   

39. While the Tribunal has factored in his submissions and accepts his memory or recall may be impacted to some degree by his past experiences, the Tribunal considers the applicant has not been credible about his employment history. The evidence provided to the Tribunal in 2015 suggests he was a successful [occupations 3 and 4], and had worked for over 10 years. Given the significance of his claimed employment, the Tribunal does not accept these are omissions explained by memory or trauma. Particularly where his written and oral evidence provided in the course of the current application only refers to [occupations 1 and 2]  work, including the 10-year period prior to the 2015 visa application.

40. The Tribunal does not consider these concerns are determinative of themselves, but it considers the applicant has not been credible about his evidence and past experiences in Lebanon, particularly in terms of his evidence of his past employment, and the Tribunal considers this is material to the overall assessment of his claims and the reliability of his evidence in general.

    English ability

41. A further issue arising in this review relates to the applicant’s evidence about his English competency.  As summarised above, the applicant’s Subclass 482 visa was cancelled at the border because Australian Border Force (ABF) believed the applicant had provided false information in connection with his application for a Subclass 482 visa.

42. In his first statutory declaration provided to the Department in connection with the current review, the applicant responds to this issue as follows:

    13.  As stated above my 482 visa was cancelled upon entry into Australia. I am informed that my visa was cancelled on the basis of purported provision of false or misleading information that I provided or caused to be provided to the Department of Home Affairs in support of my application for a 482 visa.

    14.  I state that all the documentation that I provided in support of my 482 visa are genuine, including documentation relating to my education at [High School], which is located in Tripoli, North Lebanon.

    15.  I state that I had completed 5 years of school education (Grades 8,9,10,11, and 12) at [High School], between [Year] till [Year].

    16.  I provided my academic transcript from [High School] to my lawyer for the purpose of the 482 visa English language requirement.

    17.  Since completing my high school education in 2007, I have not completed any further English language courses and I concede that my English language ability has declined over time.

43. In a further submission to the delegate on 2 January 2024, his representative stated that the applicant continues to deny that he had provided or caused to have been provided false  and/or misleading information to the Department in his 482 visa application.

44. The information about the cancellation of his visa and the submissions in response to that issue were before the Tribunal. The Tribunal considered this information potentially undermined aspects of his claims and his overall credibility.

45. At the second hearing, the Tribunal put to the applicant information that was before it relating to his Subclass 482 visa and its cancellation, noting the concerns about his English competency.

46. At the second hearing, the Tribunal asked the applicant what happened at the border when he arrived in Australia. He indicated he was stopped and taken to the security office after a long flight. He claimed he was very tired when he got to the airport. It was difficult to talk. He also talked about the fact that he had lost his brother and father, he had been at risk when he left, and he had forgotten many things. 

47. The Tribunal asked the applicant to converse in English briefly at the hearing. The applicant was asked about his room at the detention facility. He indicated the number of the room, but it appeared to the Tribunal that it was a struggle for the applicant to speak in English.   

48. The Tribunal is in some respects sympathetic to the applicant’s evidence. The Tribunal also acknowledges the submissions about past trauma and memory and considers this could very much explain his difficulty speaking at the border. Even putting aside the impact of his past experience, his high school studies were over 15 years ago and it is reasonable to expect his English skills have declined over this period – if those studies were in English. The pressure of proving his English competency after a long flight, or even before the Tribunal, is also something the Tribunal has considered.

49. However, it is not the case that the applicant only claimed to have studied English in high school many years ago. Another document on file provided in support of his Subclass 482 visa application, was a letter from [Institution], dated 2 October 2023. This document was before ABF and formed part of its assessment. It is also before the Tribunal in the current review. It relevantly states:

    ·We hereby confirm that (the applicant), born in Tripoli in the year [Year], has successfully fulfilled the requirements for the 3-month English Language Studies program at [Institution]. The course was held from July to October 2023.

    ·(The applicant) has consistently demonstrated strong abilities in English language skills, including listening, speaking, reading, and writing. His performance throughout the course has been commendable, and he has successfully passed all assessments and evaluations.

    ·We are pleased to attest that (the applicant) is proficient in the English language and is well-equipped for academic and professional challenges that necessitate such skills.

1. That evidence suggests a recent assessment of the applicant having strong English proficiency. The Tribunal is unable to reconcile the [Institution] letter with his oral and written evidence about his past experiences, including his statement provided in this application that since completing high school in 2007, he had not completed any further English language courses and that his English language ability has declined over time.

2. The applicant did not seek to explain the clear contradictions arising in the letter from [Institution].   

3. The applicant has expressly maintained in submissions to this Tribunal that he did not provide false information. The Tribunal considers this is a strong indication that the applicant has provided false or misleading information about his English proficiency to the Department in the course of his Subclass 482 visa application. His evidence about his English proficiency provided in the course of his current application raises serious concerns about his credibility and the credibility of his evidence in terms of his past experiences in Lebanon.  

4. The Tribunal again does not consider these concerns are determinative of themselves, but it indicates that the applicant has not been credible in his evidence about his past experiences in Lebanon, and the Tribunal considers this is material to the overall assessment of his claims and the credibility and reliability of his evidence in general.

5. The Tribunal has considered whether the applicant may have believed he had no choice but to provide false information in support of his Subclass 482 visa application in order to travel to Australia, however that has not been his evidence.

6. The Tribunal considers the applicant’s evidence in this regard raises real concerns about his past experiences in Lebanon and the reliability of his evidence overall.

   Evidence provided in response to the cancellation of his visa

7. As discussed with the applicant in the first and second hearings, a concern for the Tribunal was that in the applicant’s response to the Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation, he was asked if there were any reasons the visa should not be cancelled.

8. According to the documents, the applicant referred to the situation back home being very bad. He said that he went through hard circumstances and his [brother] died. He claims his mother is back home and she is very sick. He said there are a lot of problems happening down there. It was a very hard time to get the visa. He waited a long time and paid (and wasted) lots of money. He paid money so that he could come (to Australia) and improve his situation. He states there is no future back home, and he is hopeful his visa will not be cancelled.  He said it was like a dream for him.

9. The applicant made no mention of his fears in relation to the ADP, Hezbollah or Hamas. He also made no reference to the conflict with Israel, or his brother being shot. Given the recency and centrality of these matters to his later protection claims, the Tribunal considered the omission of these matters entirely from his cancellation response was a concern.     

10. In response to this concern, the representative provided what the Tribunal considers to be persuasive submissions about the context of that interview and the fact that the applicant had at that point received no legal advice. The Tribunal also notes the applicant’s own evidence about the long flight from Lebanon and the duration of the cancellation interview, the stress of that context and his past experiences, and is prepared to accept the submission that he may not have felt safe to raise such matters in this interview. The Tribunal also notes that he did refer, at least in general terms, to the situation in Lebanon being bad.

11. The Tribunal accepts the submissions and draws no adverse conclusions from any omissions in his cancellation interview at the border. 

    Omission of claims from initial protection visa application

12. While the Tribunal has not given weight to the omissions in the cancellation interview, the Tribunal does have concerns about the omission of key aspects of his claims from his initial protection visa application.

13. In his initial protection visa application, the applicant claimed he was subjected to threats of physical harm by Hezbollah operatives and militant Palestinian groups that operate in Lebanon. He claimed Lebanon is currently in a state of war with Israel and as an Alawite he was being threatened by armed militants because of his opposition to Hezbollah and militant Palestinian groups who operate in Lebanon.

14. Those claims shifted significantly in his two later statutory declarations in which he revised his claims to state that he was a member of an Alawite political group – the ADP, or Hizb EI Arabi which has been actively enlisting its members to join Hezbollah and the local (Lebanese) Palestinian factions of Hamas to fight against Israel. He claimed he was approached by a head of the ADP ([Mr A]) who asked him and his brother to join the war effort. He advised [Mr A] that he objected to war against Israel as he felt it was not in Lebanon’s interest. He claimed he was then targeted and threatened by [Mr A] and other high profile ADP members and accused of being an Israel collaborator. His brother was later shot.

15. The Tribunal considers there is a clear divergence between his claims in the initial protection visa application that he was being targeted and threatened with physical harm by Hezbollah and Hamas because of his opposition to these, and his later claims that he was targeted and threatened by members of his own political group (ADP) because he resisted supporting and joining Hezbollah or Hamas in the current conflict with Israel.

16. In his statutory declaration, the applicant appears to acknowledge this concern. He states that when he referred to Hezbollah operatives in his initial protection claims, he was ‘referring to the ADP who is closely allied to both Hezbollah (and Hamas)’ and he fears they will also target him.

17. The Tribunal is unpersuaded by the explanations for the divergence in his claims. The Tribunal accepts the applicant was in a difficult position being in detention and that the application was completed over the phone as he has contended. However at this stage he had access to legal advice. While the Tribunal also accepts it would have been completed hastily as was claimed, the visa application form contained credible details about his background and summarised his claims in some detail. The answers in the form appropriately caution that further information would be provided, but the Tribunal does not accept that explains the complete omission of the ADP, the attempts to recruit the applicant or his brother, or the threats from his own political group because of his claimed objection to the conflict.

18. The Tribunal does not accept that his reference to Hezbollah was a reference to the ADP. The ADP is clearly a discrete entity from Hezbollah, representing the interests of Alawites in Lebanon. In contrast, Hezbollah represents the interests of Shias more broadly. The ADP and its leadership played a central role in sectarian issues in his home area, and the applicant claims to have joined the group in 2017 and actively participated in the group on a political level. In that context, the Tribunal does not accept the applicant would consider them equivalent or confuse them. The Tribunal also does not consider the applicant would consider other Palestinian militant groups to be equivalent to the ADP or confuse them.

19. If the applicant was a member of the ADP since 2017, and the group had targeted and threatened him, and shot his brother, the Tribunal considers that the ADP and its local leader [Mr A] would have been at the forefront of his evidence in the protection visa application. Other details, names and dates could come later, but for the claims to be characterised in a way that suggests the threat is directly from Hezbollah or Hamas rather than the ADP, is a concern for the Tribunal and raises further doubts about the credibility of his claims.

    Past experiences in [Neighbourhood]

20. The applicant claims to be from the Tripoli suburb of [Neighbourhood] and that he was exposed to death, violence and trauma from sectarian violence between Sunni and Alawi militias that were in conflict in his area.

21. In his written evidence, he claims that his family home sustained significant damage on multiple occasions during this period of violence, and he and his family were lucky to have not been seriously harmed. He claims these events have had an enduring impact on his life and have largely shaped his current objection to all forms of violence.

22. As part of the written invitation to comment, the Tribunal put to him evidence from the 2015 review where he stated that he had never faced issues for being an Alawite, and the situation in his home area was good and nothing was going on. This was in contrast to his later oral and written evidence that he had been impacted and traumatised by sectarian violence in [Neighbourhood].

23. In the post-hearing submission, the representative contends that by 2015 the sectarian conflict between Alawites and Sunnis in Tripoli had largely dissipated due to the increased security measures that had been taken by the Lebanese authorities including heavy deployment of LAFs between the warring enclave of [Neighbourhood] and surrounding predominantly Sunni suburbs.

24. Ultimately, while the Tribunal has a number of concerns about his evidence, it is satisfied that the applicant is an Alawite from [Neighbourhood]. The country advice indicates a history of significant sectarian violence in this area between Alawites and Sunnis.[4] The Tribunal accepts he has experienced and had some proximity to the sectarian conflict in his area. The Tribunal also accepts that violence had eased in this area by 2015. The Tribunal accepts that submission and gives no adverse weight to his earlier evidence in the 2015 review.   

    [4]  DFAT, Thematic Information Report - Sectarian Violence in Lebanon, 8 December 2013

25. Following the easing of the conflict, the applicant continued to live and work in his home area. Other than his later claims related to the ADP, he made no claim to have suffered harm in this period. However, the applicant has consistently advanced that his father and [brother] died in recent years. These matters have been consistently raised in his evidence. The Tribunal notes that the death of his brother was a factor raised in his cancellation interview.

26. There is no claim those matters are material to this assessment apart from the impact of that trauma on the applicant. The Tribunal accepts these incidents occurred and has weighed the trauma and impact of these matters on his memory and evidence.

    Military service 

27. A key aspect of the applicant’s claims relates to his military service with the LAF. He claims that he experienced sectarian violence during his first year with the LAF and this was the reason he elected not to continue his service. He also claims his past military service and training was the reason the ADP sought to recruit him, and that he also fears being called back into service for the LAF if the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel deteriorates into a wider war.

28. The applicant has submitted that his military service was unintentionally omitted from his Subclass 482 visa application. The Tribunal notes that his military service is referred to in his employment experience in his protection visa application, albeit it appears he has failed to select yes in the discrete questions about military involvement or training. There has also been variance in his claimed dates, but given the years that have passed and context in which the application was raised, the Tribunal is prepared to accept this was unintentional and gives these factors no adverse weight. The Tribunal considers the applicant has been broadly consistent about his military service.  

29. The Tribunal considers the documentary evidence provided in support of his visa application is somewhat limited. It includes a blurred ID-type photo of the applicant in military uniform, and a poor photocopy relating to his service and discharge with translations. The documents also appear to refer to a non-existent brigade within the LAF ([Brigade 1]).

30. While the documentation is limited, the Tribunal considered the applicant’s oral evidence about his involvement with the LAF to be plausible and freely given. He was able to credibly discuss his training, identification number, area of service, training and his rank. His evidence about his brigade ([Brigade 2]) and its emblem were consistent with other information before the Tribunal.[5]

    [5] Lebanese Army (website), [Brigade], undated (accessed June 2024)

31. In his initial statutory declaration, the applicant said that he joined the LAF and served for 12 months. In his second statutory declaration, he said that he resigned from the LAF because he was subjected to severe mistreatment at the hands of high ranking Sunni military officers. He claims he came to realise sectarianism is rife within the LAF, and it remains driven by personal, political and sectarian interests as opposed to legitimate national interests.

32. When asked at the hearing why he left LAF after a year, the applicant said he was exposed to violence. He said the officers were violent towards him for sectarian reasons, because he was Alawite. He estimated he experienced violence 10 times and it made him hate being in the Army. When asked how they were violent, the applicant said they would pick on him by giving him extra hours of patrolling. When asked if there was physical violence, he said they would scream and swear at him and humiliate him. When asked what happened at the end of the 12 months of his service, he said he did not make any complaint because he would face repercussions.

33. The applicant initially claimed he had experienced 10 episodes of violence, however the Tribunal considers his evidence suggested the treatment he faced was more akin to discrimination and harassment. At the time he served in the LAF sectarian tensions were particularly high in the country. In that context, the Tribunal is prepared to accept that the applicant experienced some discrimination and mistreatment while in the LAF, such as extended patrols and verbal abuse.

34. The Tribunal finds it relevant that he completed his 12 months and opted not to extend, rather than initiate any formal complaint because of that mistreatment. However, given his age and concerns about repercussions, it is plausible he did not consider that as an option.

100.   While the Tribunal accepts he experienced discrimination and harassment as part of his military service, the Tribunal also considers it clear from his evidence that he fears no specific harm related to those past experiences. His only residual fear connected to his past military service relates to the recruitment initiated by the ADP, and his concerns of being drawn into a future conflict as part of the LAF reserve.

101.   While the Tribunal accepts the applicant served with the LAF, a concern for it is whether the applicant remains a member of the LAF reserve and/or whether he would be required to serve in any future conflict in Lebanon.

102.   When asked if he was a reservist at the hearing, the applicant said he was. When asked how long the reserve period lasted, he responded ‘until now’ and he does not know how long. He confirmed he had not put an LAF uniform on since his service ended in [Year]. When asked what being in the reserve involved, he said his name was on the list.

103.   A post-hearing submission included a document and translation entitled “Determine the period of retention for reservists’ originators of military training”. The submission draws attention to articles three and four of the document which refer to potential periods of service, and the methods of calling reservists for service. The Tribunal considers this document consistent with other advice from DFAT which confirms the LAF has a reserve force of 20,000 (in addition to active personnel of 96,000).[6]

[6] DFAT, Country Information Report – Lebanon, 26 June 2023

104.   At the second hearing, the Tribunal asked the applicant further about his claimed status as an LAF reserve. The Tribunal observed that the document he submitted supports the existence of a reserve force, but that it also suggested reservists ‘may’ be called on to undertake periods of up to two weeks training annually. At the second hearing, the Tribunal noted the applicant had given evidence in the first hearing that he had not been in an LAF uniform since his initial period of service and that he had ended his service and never again engaged. He also had not undertaken any further training as a reserve, as suggested in the document provided.

105.   The applicant indicated that if a person received training, they would not be asked to train again. He reiterated that he had a military number, so it was compulsory for him to join the LAF if war erupts again. The Tribunal again asked if he had any evidence he was in the LAF reserve force. The applicant asked the Tribunal how he could get this information. He also said in 2006 (in the war between Hezbollah and Israel) the LAF had called on its reserve forces.

106.   The applicant has provided no persuasive evidence he is in the LAF reserve. He contended that it is difficult to obtain such information and that the government would not tell people whether they are in the reserve, but it is also apparent that he has not tried to obtain any documentation, nor has he provided any existing documentation that confirms he is in the reserve and has reservist obligations. The Tribunal notes he was invited in writing to provide such information.

107.   The applicant has no claims against the government – his position against the war is shared by the Lebanese Government – and the Tribunal considers there would be no barrier to the applicant requesting such information from the LAF, whether directly or through his representative or family in Lebanon. In that context, his failure to provide any information or evidence that confirms he is a part of the LAF’s 20,000 reserve force is a further concern for the Tribunal.  

108.   Given the size of the reserve forces (around a 1/5 of the active force), the time that has passed since his own service, the lack of any further training or engagement with the LAF, and the lack of any supporting documentation that indicates he is part of the reserve, the Tribunal is not satisfied and does not accept the applicant is a member of the 20,000 personnel in the LAF reserve.

109.   The Tribunal has considered whether there is potential for anyone with military experience to be called back into service for the LAF, for example if a conflict was so expansive that it was necessary to re-enlist any former military personnel. There is no information before the Tribunal that this is the case, however it is not implausible. If it were the case, the Tribunal considers the applicant would be a part of a very large cohort of former LAF personnel, and this would be a very different thing from being part of a smaller formal active reserve that can be called into service at short notice if a conflict was to arise, as suggested in the reservist document provided by the applicant. While the Tribunal has significant doubts the applicant has any ongoing links to the LAF, it has factored that possibility in its assessment below.

Membership of ADP

110.   The applicant’s main protection claims relate to his claimed membership of the ADP.

111.   The applicant claims he joined the group in 2017. He provided a photocopy and translation of his ADP card issued in that year. He claimed that as an Alawite, he was expected to join the ADP. He also supported the political platform of the ADP, which he believed sought to give a voice for the minority Alawite population in Lebanon. He claimed he was an active member of the ADP, including attending regular party meetings once or twice weekly, encouraging recruitment of new members, participating in political discussions and being active during elections, but his position within the ADP remained that of an ordinary member. He states that he did not hold any prominent or high-ranking position within the ADP.

112.   In his written evidence, he further claims that while he was a political member of the ADP, he does not condone any form of violence or unjustified military campaigns, including any potential war against Israel. He believes in settling disputes by political means and does not support any military action against Israel because it is against the interest of the Lebanese state and such a war will destroy the country.

113.   In his second statutory declaration, the applicant stated that there was an error in his first statutory declaration and he referred to the leader of the ADP as the late Ali Eid, rather than his son the current leader Rifaat Eid.

114.   Although a curious error given the passing of Ali Eid in 2015,[7] the Tribunal is prepared to accept the error was unintentional. However, the Tribunal does have concerns with the applicant’s evidence as it relates to his claimed involvement with the ADP. A key concern for the Tribunal is his involvement with this group whose leaders have been actively involved in violence and sectarianism.

[7] Naharnet, Fugitive ex-MP Ali Eid Passes Away in Syria, 26 December 2015

115.   At the first hearing, the applicant said he was obligated to join the ADP and that it was compulsory. When the Tribunal put to him he was [Age] or [Age] in 2017 when he claimed to have joined the ADP and that seemed quite late to join if he was obligated, he said he did not want to join the ADP, however he had no choice and had to join because of his family and other people. He initially said he just joined, but did not have any involvement in anything. When the Tribunal asked him to clarify his evidence, he said he was against violence in any way. When asked if he undertook activities, his evidence was that he did things like exercising.

116.   When asked if he was involved politically, he then said he did some activities in elections, like distributing vouchers. He said he was involved in elections in 2020 and mentioned a candidate in this election. The Tribunal put to him that his written evidence was that he was an active member, attending regular meetings, encouraging recruitment of new members, participating in political discussions, and being active in elections. When the Tribunal put to him that he had earlier said in the hearing that he did not want to join, that he felt obligated, and he did not have any involvement, the applicant responded that he was working, and he was not spending all his time with the party.

117.   The Tribunal asked if the ADP had been involved in violence and sectarianism. The applicant said it was and that the leader Rifaat Eid had escaped to Lebanon and was now in Syria. He said Eid is wanted by the Lebanese Government because of sectarian events that happened in Tripoli. When asked why he would join such a party if he personally was against violence and sectarianism, the applicant said he joined for political activities and he is against violence. When the Tribunal put to him those matters would be linked, the applicant said he was involved in social activities. 

118.   The Tribunal asked him about his opinion of Eid. He said after the events, they (the ADP) turned against him. They did not want the violence. The Tribunal asked why the ADP would want him to join Hezbollah or Hamas if they wanted peace, he said it was because of the conflict with Israel.

119.   The Tribunal found the applicant’s evidence about his involvement with the ADP to lack credibility. His evidence was shifting, variously claiming that he did not have any involvement, and later that he was actively involved politically. When the Tribunal put to him its concerns about his political involvement with the ADP given he was against sectarianism and violence, he then varied his evidence to claim he was involved socially.

120.   The Tribunal also finds it difficult to accept he would have any involvement with the ADP given his claim to be so ardently against sectarianism and violence. While the Tribunal accepts this is a group that advocates for and supports Alawites, it is also a group whose past two leaders escaped to Syria because of sectarian activities in Lebanon. The former ADP leader (Ali Eid) has been accused of involvement in the al-Taqwa and al-Salam mosque bombings in Tripoli, that killed more than 40 people in 2013.[8] His son, Rifaat Eid (the current ADP leader), was accused of involvement with a terrorist group and inciting sectarianism in Tripoli.[9]

[8] L’Orient Today, Ten years on: Remembering the Tripoli mosque attacks, 24 August 2023

[9] Al Jazeera (Reuters), Lebanon Alawite leader charged for incitement, 5 April 2014

121.   In the post-hearing submission, the representative submits that joining a political party such as the ADP does not negate his anti-violence stance, but rather participation in political discourse was perceived as a viable means of obviating the need to resort to violence. It further states that since October 2023, ADP party propaganda and its official stance on the Israeli Hezbollah border conflict that has been widely disseminated, has caused a political rift between the review applicant and the ADP.

122.   The Tribunal acknowledges that a person could join a party such as the ADP seeking to advocate for an anti-violence stance, however the Tribunal does not accept that the current conflict caused a rift between the applicant and the ADP.  

123.   It was the applicant’s evidence that the ADP was a staunch supporter of Hezbollah, that they are close allies, and that Hezbollah provides the ADP with significant funding for recruits. That suggests an ongoing history between the groups rather than any recent development. Moreover, despite his violent sectarian history, the evidence provided by the applicant indicates that Rifaat Eid remains the leader of the ADP, and represents the ADP in social media posts such as those provided to the Tribunal. That suggests the ADP has both an ongoing history of support for Hezbollah and involvement and tolerance of sectarian violence.

124.   The Tribunal found the applicant’s written and oral evidence to be inconsistent and unpersuasive. There is nothing obviously implausible about an Alawite joining a political group that supports the rights of the Alawi minority, but the Tribunal does not accept he would support a group whose leaders have been involved in and supportive of violence and sectarianism over an extended period. Had the applicant simply joined the ADP out of pressure from his family, and engaged with the group on a limited social level (for example in sport or exercise), the Tribunal may have accepted that involvement notwithstanding its other concerns, but that was not his claim. The Tribunal is left with serious concerns about the credibility of his claimed involvement with the ADP.

Assessment of claims related to ADP and recruitment to Hezbollah or Hamas

125.   The applicant’s fears on return to Lebanon relate to his active involvement with the ADP and his attendance at meetings where the Palestine-Israel conflict was being discussed. He claims the ADP party leadership were seeking to recruit as many ADP members with past military experience as possible. He claimed these requests and offers of glory, and martyrdom were made during various ADP meetings that were conducted in [Neighbourhood] during the early phase of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

126.   The applicant contends he was approached by the local ADP head ([Mr A]) who asked him to join the war effort. He claims he conveyed his personal objections to the war because it was not in Lebanon’s interest. He claims [Mr A]’s reaction was hostile, threatening to expel him from the ADP and accusing him of being a collaborator. He claims he was threatened with violence on four occasions by [Mr A] and other high profile ADP members.  He claims his brother also refused to join the war, and he was shot in the back outside of his home. The bullet grazed his brother’s lower back, but he did not require medical attention. His brother went into hiding, and the applicant claims he was fortunate to have been granted a Subclass 482 visa and he left the country.

127.   There are aspects of his claims the Tribunal finds credible. It is clear from his evidence across time that he is an Alawi/Alawite from the [Neighbourhood] area in Tripoli. Given the history of conflict in that area,[10] the Tribunal accepts he has experienced and had some proximity to conflict and the impact and trauma of such events, as has it weighed the impacts of those events on his memory, but also his claims to have been involved with a group such as the ADP.

[10]  DFAT, Thematic Information Report - Sectarian Violence in Lebanon, 8 December 2013

128.   He has provided some limited support in terms of his membership of the ADP, notably a photocopy and translation of an ADP membership card issued in 2017. The Tribunal has given this evidence some weight.

129.   The applicant’s evidence about the recruitment by the ADP was broadly consistent across his oral and written evidence. At the hearing, the applicant initially indicated his concerns occurred over a three to four month period, but when reminded these events occurred between October and November 2023, he revised his evidence and said it was three to four weeks.

130.   The Tribunal has considered the claims that his brother was shot. In the first hearing, he initially indicated that he was already in Australia when his brother was shot in Lebanon. The Tribunal put to him that his written statement indicated he was shot two days before he left Lebanon, and the hospital document was dated 5 November 2023, a few days before he left Lebanon. The applicant said he did not know anything about the shooting until after he left. He then said his brother was already on the run, he only heard about him being shot after he came to Australia.

131.   The applicant has provided photos of his brother’s injuries and a medical note (and translation) from [a] Hospital which states that the applicant’s brother was treated for being shot on 5 November 2023. When asked how he got this, he said he got this evidence through his other brother in Australia.  

132.   The Tribunal notes that the applicant both claimed his brother did not require medical treatment, and provided a medical document relating to his brother’s treatment at a hospital. The Tribunal considers the photos provide some limited corroboration, however the Tribunal cannot confirm the photos are of his brother, where they were taken, or what caused the injuries. The Tribunal has given these documents limited weight.

133.   While there are aspects of his evidence that are not implausible, aspects that have been consistently raised, and there is some limited documentary and photographic evidence in support of his claims, the Tribunal has a number of concerns with the applicant’s other evidence and his overall credibility.    

134.   The Tribunal has again considered his mental health and past trauma, as well as the impact of his detention. The Tribunal considers reasonable allowance should be made for discrepancies in his evidence. For example, the applicant’s initial confusion of the timeframe for these events at the first hearing appeared to be an unintended error in his evidence. Moreover, his confusion regarding the timing of his brother’s shooting between his oral and written evidence could be explained by the stress and timing of his departure from Australia, the fact that he did not witness these events, and receiving information about his brother from his siblings in Australia.

135.   However, the Tribunal’s concerns with these claims are several in number, and while there are matters the Tribunal has accepted, there are concerns with his evidence that the Tribunal considers are not explained by trauma, mental health or memory. 

136.   For the following reasons, the Tribunal is not satisfied and does not accept that he was ever recruited by the ADP (or anyone else) to join Hezbollah or Hamas, that he ever objected to the conflict or refused to join Hezbollah or Hamas, or that he (or his brother) were ever targeted or threatened by members of the ADP, Hezbollah or Hamas, whether for reasons of his refusal to support these groups, his refusal to support or be involved in any conflict, any actual or imputed opinion or profile that he was against the ADP, Hezbollah, Hamas or Lebanon, any actual or imputed opinion or profile that he supported Israel or was a collaborator, or on any related basis.

137.   Firstly, as detailed above, the Tribunal has given weight to the applicant’s omissions and inconsistent characterisation of his claims between his visa application and his later written statements (statutory declarations). The claims as articulated in the visa application omit entirely the ADP, the issue of recruitment to Hezbollah/Hamas, or the conflict in Israel. The Tribunal has not accepted the explanations for those omissions and considers those omissions are a serious concern. 

138.   Secondly, as detailed above, the Tribunal has serious concerns about his claimed involvement and membership of the ADP, including his evidence that he is against violence and sectarianism. The Tribunal is also concerned about his shifting and inconsistent oral and written evidence about the extent of his involvement with the ADP, particularly at the first hearing.

139.   Thirdly, the Tribunal finds it significant that the applicant has not provided any objective country advice to support the contention that Alawites (or other minority groups) are being recruited to join Hezbollah or Hamas, whether directly, or through political entities such as the ADP.

140.   One report provided to the Department in support of the applicant’s claims does indicate Hamas is recruiting within the Palestinian refugee camps and mosques in Lebanon, and that Hezbollah is trying to enlist the support of Sunni groups (such as Hamas in Lebanon) in its fight against Israel, but it does not suggest that either group is seeking to recruit within other minority communities in Lebanon, such as Alawites.[11]

[11] Justin Salhani, ‘Hamas is now recruiting in Lebanon. What will that mean for Hezbollah?’ Al Jazeera, 18 December 2023

141.   An earlier report before the Tribunal discusses the recruitment processes of Hezbollah, indicating the military group undertakes vetting, screening recruits for religious devotion and loyalty, and suggests there sometimes can be social pressure for Shias to join the group. The Tribunal notes there is no indication that the group engages in forced recruitment.[12]

[12] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, ‘LBN201146.E - Lebanon: Hezbollah [Hizbollah, Hizbullah, Hizballah, the Party of God], including political participation and representation, military activities and areas under control; recruitment practices, including forced recruitment and consequences’, 8 September 2022

142.   The Tribunal acknowledges the representative’s concerns about reliance on this advice given it predates the current conflict, however the Tribunal considers this is at least indicative of the recruitment strategy of Hezbollah.

143.   The Tribunal also acknowledges the representative’s concerns that this review is not misconstrued in terms of universal or forced recruitment. He contended that the applicant was targeted for his refusal to participate in the conflict in support of Hezbollah and Hamas and he is being targeted because of his (actual or imputed) opinion that he is against the conflict and supported or collaborated with Israel. The Tribunal accepts the distinction being made, however it is also the case that there is no advice before the Tribunal that Hezbollah or Hamas are engaging in the type of recruitment being claimed.

144.   The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s submission, suggesting Rifaat Eid’s social media accounts (including Instagram) are ‘replete with political commentary calling for recruitment of ADP party membership and the need to defeat what the party regards as the enemy, Israel’. A link to the Facebook account contains untranslated materials, however the applicant has provided one translation of a screenshot of a 22 December 2023 post on Facebook (quoted above).  

145.   The Tribunal accepts that post could be in general terms supportive of Hamas or Hezbollah, however it does not accept that it is indicative of recruitment to these groups by the ADP. Had Rifaat Eid’s social media been replete with examples of such recruitment as is contended, the Tribunal considers clearer examples of such recruitment could have been provided. The Tribunal considers the social media evidence is unconvincing.

146.   On 26 June 2024, the Tribunal requested the following further information:

·Information or country information that indicates that the ADP has supported or engaged in recruitment or forced recruitment in Lebanon in connection with the current conflict, whether for Hezbollah or Hamas, or targeted those that have resisted such recruitment.

·Information or country information that indicates that Hezbollah or Hamas have engaged in recruitment or forced recruitment in Lebanon in connection with the current conflict, or targeted those that have resisted such recruitment.

·Information or country information that indicates that Hezbollah or Hamas have engaged in recruitment or forced recruitment of Alawites in Lebanon.

147.   In the applicant’s 28 June 2024 response, he provides no such evidence. The Tribunal is conscious of the recency of these developments, and the potential difficulty in obtaining such information. However, it is also the case that there is no clear advice that supports his contention that such recruitment strategies are occurring.

148.   The Tribunal has considered the contentions at both hearings that this recruitment is being done in secrecy. However, the Tribunal considers this is contradicted in the applicant’s other evidence. In his written statement, the applicant said that Hezbollah provided the ADP with significant funding for ADP recruits, that these requests and offers of ‘glory and martyrdom’ were made during various ADP meetings. They have also contended that these recruitment messages are being put forward on social media.

149.   While the Tribunal notes the applicant claims he and his brother were approached by [Mr A] directly, it was also the case that he said many members of the ADP were recruited. If this recruitment was discussed at meetings and involved many members of the ADP, the Tribunal rejects the contention this was done in secrecy. In that context, the Tribunal considers there should be far more potential for supporting advice that confirms the ADP is engaged in such recruitment for Hezbollah or Hamas, and the absence of any such advice is a further concern that goes against his claims and credibility.

150.   Lastly, the Tribunal has concerns about the applicant’s evidence about his English ability (and supporting documentation) and his claims about his past employment experience. The Tribunal considers the applicant has not been credible about his past study and employment experiences in Lebanon, and the Tribunal considers this is relevant to his overall credibility and raises questions about the reliability of his oral and written evidence about his ADP involvement and related protection claims.

151.   In view of all the evidence before it, the Tribunal finds the applicant has not been credible about these claims. It does not accept that he joined or was an active and politically active member of the ADP. It does not accept that members of the ADP (including a local leader named [Mr A]) ever asked him and other members of the ADP to join Hezbollah or Hamas (or other Palestinian militant groups) in the conflict with Israel on the southern border, whether because of his past military service or otherwise. The Tribunal does not accept he refused to be involved and that he was threatened by [Mr A] or other ADP members (or Hezbollah or Hamas or anyone else). It does not accept that his brother was shot for the same reasons, or that his brother was forced into hiding. The Tribunal does not accept the applicant left Lebanon for any of these reasons.

152.   The Tribunal finds the applicant has never been at threat of harm from ADP, Hezbollah or Hamas (or other Palestinian militant group), or any other person or group, whether in relation to recruitment to Hezbollah or Hamas, any future conflict with Israel, or otherwise, nor would he be at threat of harm for these reasons if he returned to Lebanon in the reasonably foreseeable future.

153.   For clarity, the Tribunal is also not satisfied these groups are targeting people for recruitment in the way claimed, or that people are at threat in connection with any such recruitment. The Tribunal finds that there is no threat of the applicant being recruited by the ADP, Hezbollah or Hamas, on return to Lebanon in the foreseeable future.  

154.   It follows that the Tribunal finds there is no real chance of the applicant facing harm for any of these reasons from the ADP, Hezbollah or Hamas, or any other person or group, if he returned to Lebanon, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Tribunal also finds that there is not a real risk of the applicant facing harm or significant harm from members of the ADP, Hezbollah or Hamas, or any other person or group, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Lebanon. 

Political opinion

155.   Having rejected the applicant’s claims as they relate to the ADP, the Tribunal has considered whether the applicant is against the war and whether he would be targeted for harm because of that opinion, whether as a general anti-war stance, or that he holds or would be imputed with an opinion that is supportive of (or a collaborator with) Israel or anti-Hezbollah or anti-Lebanon, or on some other basis.  

156.   As discussed with the applicant at the hearing, the advice before the Tribunal indicates that many Lebanese officials are against a conflict with Israel, not least because the country cannot afford to be involved in such a conflict.[13] An article provided by the applicant appears to indicate that a majority of Lebanese people have lost confidence in Hezbollah, and even among Shias, many have a negative view of Hezbollah’s loyalty to Tehran over the Lebanese state.[14]

[13] Patricia Karam, Lebanon’s Political Forces Oppose a War with Israel, Arab Center Washington DC, 20 December 2023

[14] Gianluca Pacchiani, Intimidations, threats, assassinations: How Hezbollah suppresses dissent inside Lebanon, Times of Israel, 3 August 2024

157.   The article provided by the applicant also points to Hezbollah’s targeting of critics, particularly journalists and political opponents who have spoken out against the group, the imputation of collaboration with Israel, and what appears to be a chilling effect in terms of criticism of the group or its conflict with Israel, referring to the recent intimidation of a journalist in Beirut this year, and the killing of an activist in southern Lebanon in 2021.[15]

[15] Gianluca Pacchiani, Intimidations, threats, assassinations: How Hezbollah suppresses dissent inside Lebanon, Times of Israel, 3 August 2024; Memri TV, Lebanese Journalist Critical of Hizbullah Investigated for Collaboration with Israel, 10 April 2024

158.   DFAT advice is also clear about the reach and influence of Hezbollah, and the threat of violence to those who are critical of the group:

Hezbollah exercises effective control over parts of Lebanese territory, particularly in South Lebanon, southern Beirut, and parts of the Beka’a Valley: interlocutors have reported that, in these areas, Hezbollah’s influence and control exceeds that of the Lebanese state. According to in-country sources, Hezbollah works to prevent the emergence of sources of power within the Shi’a community outside of the Hezbollah-Amal duopoly, which might represent a threat to its control. In addition to political activists, perceived adversaries include journalists seeking to report on ‘red line’ topics, including: Hezbollah’s weapons; Hezbollah’s relationship with security authorities; its role in politically-motivated assassinations; and its role in the Syrian civil war. In-country sources report that Hezbollah is particularly attuned to and oppressive of critics within the Shi’a community, its support base.

DFAT understands that the ability of an individual within the Shi’a community to criticise Hezbollah depends to a large degree on the extent of the individual’s connections (wasta) with powerful or influential people. DFAT assesses that those within the Shi’a community without wasta who criticise Hezbollah face a high risk of societal discrimination, harassment and violence by state or non-state forces.[16]

[16] DFAT, Country Information Report – Lebanon, 26 June 2023

159.   The applicant’s evidence at the hearing was that he has never been politically critical of any group in Lebanon. He said they (the ADP) were with the government and they were against violence. They were never critical, they were only seeking peace.

160.   Having rejected that he was ever active with the ADP, the Tribunal finds he was never politically active or critical of any group in Lebanon, including Hezbollah, nor would he be imputed with such a profile.

161.   The Tribunal accepts the applicant believes the conflict is not in Lebanon’s interest, as do many Lebanese people. However, the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant has or would express those views. It does not consider his claimed political involvement or activity was credible. The Tribunal is not satisfied he holds or has expressed any views that would be considered supportive/collaborative of Israel, anti-Hezbollah, anti-Lebanon or any other basis, or that there is any basis to impute him with such a profile. The Tribunal finds that there is not a real chance or risk of the applicant being harmed for reasons of any actual or imputed political opinion, if he were to return to Lebanon, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Conflict between Israel and Hezbollah/Lebanon

162.   The Tribunal has considered country advice about the current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah (or related militant groups[17]) on Lebanon’s southern border.

[17] L'Orient Today, Besides Hezbollah, who’s firing at Israel from southern Lebanon?, 12 January 2024

163.   In the weeks that followed the first hearing, the situation on the southern border continued to deteriorate. At the second hearing, the Tribunal discussed the general security situation with the applicant, both in terms of the Hezbollah-Israel conflict and the potential for a broader war in Lebanon.

164.   The Tribunal considers the country advice indicates the prospect of the situation continuing to deteriorate on the southern border is more than just remote, although the extent and form of a continuing conflict remains unclear.[18] There are also indications of an expanded conflict involving Iran.[19] The Tribunal considers those concerns are credible and supported in the analysis before it.

[18] Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Coming Conflict with Hezbollah, March 2024

[19] Financial Times, Iran would use ‘all means’ to back Hizbollah if Israel launches full-blown war, official says, 2 July 2024; Reuters, Iran's president-elect reaffirms policy towards Israel, 9 July 2024

165.   While the Tribunal considers there is a credible chance of an intensifying conflict between Israel and Hezbollah on Lebanon’s southern border, it also considers there is no real chance or risk of the applicant being harmed in any such conflict. The applicant lives in Tripoli in the north of Lebanon, an area not under Hezbollah control[20] and far from the conflict zone. Having rejected his claims to fear harm or recruitment to Hezbollah or Hamas, and given the Tribunal is satisfied there is no prospect of him supporting either group in any sense, the Tribunal finds there is no real chance or risk of the applicant facing harm in the current conflict on the southern border, whether now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

[20] DFAT, Country Information Report – Lebanon, 26 June 2023

166.   The applicant has contended that he would also be harmed if Lebanon and the LAF is drawn into a broader conflict. He contends this is what occurred in 2006 (during the 2006 Lebanon-Israel War).  

167.   While the Tribunal has not accepted the applicant is an active reservist within the LAF, the Tribunal has considered the issue of a broader war between Israel and Lebanon, enveloping the whole country, including his home area of Tripoli in the north, and the chance or risk of the applicant being harmed in such a conflict.

168.   The focus of much of the current analysis is on the southern border and the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Outside of Hezbollah and the areas it controls, the Tribunal considers there is little indication of any appetite or likelihood of the Lebanese Government or Armed Forces being drawn into a wider conflict.

169.   As discussed with the applicant, advice before the Tribunal indicates that political forces across all fronts in Lebanon oppose a war, including the caretaker Prime Minister declaring any war against Israel as being ‘in no one’s interest’ and recently reiterating his preference for peace, while urging Israel to cease its attacks.[21] The Lebanese Government condemned the most recent attacks on Israel and called for an immediate cessation of all hostilities.[22] The Commander of the LAF met with US counterparts in June to discuss efforts to de-escalate tensions along the southern border.[23] There is also considerable international resistance to an expanded conflict.[24] Underpinning the limited potential for any wider conflict is analysis that indicates Lebanon cannot afford a war with Israel.[25]

[21] Patricia Karam, Lebanon’s Political Forces Oppose a War with Israel, Arab Center Washington DC, 20 December 2023; Middle East Monitor, Lebanese premier calls on Israel to stop ‘repeated attacks’ on Lebanon, 29 June 2024

[22] Barrons (AFP), Lebanon Condemns ‘Violence Against Civilians’ After Deadly Golan Strike, 27 July 2024

[23] Al-Monitor, Pentagon hosts Lebanon’s army chief in bid to avert Israel-Hezbollah war, 12 June 2024

[24] Voice of America, Blinken: No main actors want war between Israel, Hezbollah, 1 July 2024; NDTV (AFP), In 1st Call With Netanyahu, UK PM Keir Starmer Urges “Caution” On Israel-Lebanon Border, 7 July 2024

[25] Reuters, Broken Lebanon cannot afford war between Hezbollah and Israel, 27 October 2023; Patricia Karam, Lebanon’s Political Forces Oppose a War with Israel, Arab Center Washington DC, 20 December 2023.

170.   In the post-interview response, the representative contends that the LAF has recently announced that if an Israeli incursion is to eventuate that it would be forced to join the fighting to defend Lebanese sovereign territory. While no source was provided for this submission, the Tribunal accepts the Lebanese Government and Armed Forces would seek to maintain its territorial sovereignty, however that has consistently been the Lebanese Government’s position along with its desire to de-escalate the conflict.[26]

[26] Qatar News Agency, Al-Monitor, Pentagon hosts Lebanon’s army chief in bid to avert Israel-Hezbollah war, 12 June 2024;

171.   It is not clear to the Tribunal the LAF has any intention of being drawn into the conflict. The limited advice that is before the Tribunal suggests the role of the LAF in any such conflict could be to secure the south if Hezbollah withdrew as part of a de-escalation.[27] Whether the latter is probable or not, the Tribunal does not consider there is advice to suggest the Lebanese Government or LAF wants to be drawn into an expanded conflict against Israel, or that a broader and ongoing conflict is likely. The Tribunal also notes, in contrast to the applicant’s contentions about the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, the LAF’s involvement was limited, it did not actively engage in the conflict with Israel and was deployed to the southern border after Israel withdrew.[28]

[27] Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Coming Conflict with Hezbollah, March 2024

[28] Human Rights Council, Report of Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-2/1, A/HRC/3/2, 23 November 2006; UN News, Lebanese army moves into South Lebanon positions after Israeli withdrawal, UN reports, 2 October 2006

172.   While the Tribunal considers insecurity on the southern border is likely to continue to deteriorate, and there are credible risks for people living in these areas, the Tribunal considers the advice before it suggests the prospect of a broader war in Lebanon, enveloping the whole country and the north where the applicant lives, remains remote.

173.   The Tribunal notes that it found the applicant was not a member of the LAF reserve, but it has also considered whether there is a real chance or risk of the applicant being harmed as a former member of the LAF. Given the assessment of the likelihood of any conflict being remote, the Tribunal considers the prospect of the applicant being called back into service outside of the active and reserve LAF forces, and also being engaged in any active conflict within Lebanon, to be even more remote. 

174.   In view of all the information before the Tribunal, the Tribunal considers that there is not a real chance or risk of the applicant being harmed in any future conflict in Lebanon or for any related reason, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Profile as an Alawite/Alawi

175.   Outside of the current security situation, the Tribunal has considered the applicant’s profile as an Alawite/Alawi more generally.

176.   As above, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant is an Alawite from [Neighbourhood] in Tripoli, and that he has experienced and had some proximity to historical sectarian conflict in that area, and the trauma of such events has had an impact on him and his family.[29] The Tribunal has accepted the applicant experienced some sectarian discrimination and mistreatment while he served in the LAF.

[29] DFAT, Thematic Information Report – Sectarian Violence in Lebanon, 8 December 2013

177.   The Tribunal notes and has had regard to more recent DFAT advice that indicates violence between Sunnis and Alawites in Tripoli is localised and relatively low level, with political rather than religious motivations, and that the Lebanese authorities are generally committed to preventing violence between religious communities.[30]

[30] DFAT, Country Information Report – Lebanon, 26 June 2023

178.   The Tribunal considers that consistent with the applicant’s own evidence about the dissipation of the conflict in his local area.

179.   DFAT also states:

[M]embers of recognised religious groups do not face official discrimination on religious grounds. Members of recognised religious groups who reside in areas where they are a minority may face low-level societal discrimination, however this is unlikely to include violence.[31]

[31] DFAT, Country Information Report – Lebanon, 26 June 2023

180.   The Tribunal accepts that the applicant is an Alawite. DFAT advice indicates this is a recognised religious group.[32] The Tribunal considers the applicant would return to live and work in [Neighbourhood] in Tripoli in an Alawite majority area. Given the advice before it, the Tribunal considers there is no real chance or real risk of the applicant facing discrimination on the basis of his profile as an Alawite or Alawi in this area, and outside of these areas, the Tribunal considers any discrimination he would face would be low level and not amount to serious or significant harm.  

[32] DFAT, Country Information Report – Lebanon, 26 June 2023

181.   The Tribunal accepts that there has been a history of sectarian tensions and violence between Alawites and Sunnis in his home area and neighbouring areas in Tripoli, however it is satisfied those threats and tensions have eased. The Tribunal has rejected that the applicant is at all politically involved in Lebanon, whether with the ADP or otherwise, and considers this further reduces the chance or risk of him being involved in any violence.

182.   Based on the information before it, the Tribunal finds that there is no real chance and no real risk of the applicant facing harm in relation to violence between Sunnis and Alawites in Tripoli, or in sectarian violence more generally, or on the basis of his profile as an Alawite or Alawite from [Neighbourhood], if he were to return to live in Lebanon, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Departure from Lebanon

183.   DFAT states the following about conditions for returnees to Lebanon:

·DFAT understands it is not a crime for Lebanese citizens to seek asylum abroad. Information on conditions for failed asylum seekers who have returned to Lebanon is limited. DFAT understands, however that no significant stigma attaches to this group and has no evidence to suggest they are subject to any particular type of official or societal discrimination. However, in-country sources report that Lebanese authorities may administratively delay the return of deportees and failed asylum seekers from other countries where their cooperation is required. On return, a failed asylum seeker would only come to the attention of authorities if they had an existing stop order against them, or if they had committed a crime abroad of sufficient gravity for authorities to request an accompanied transfer. However, in 2022, with the sharp increase in irregular migration from Lebanon to Cyprus and elsewhere, international media sources suggested that Lebanese authorities’ previous apparent tolerance of such migration was decreasing and they were forcibly returning Lebanese who attempted such departure. International media sources also report that authorities have deported Syrians who attempted irregular migration from Lebanon back to Syria.

·A returnee would generally return to their home community or resettle in Beirut or another major city. Although Lebanese authorities do not provide support for resettlement, several NGOs do.[33]

[33] DFAT, Country Information Report – Lebanon, 26 June 2023

184.   The Tribunal notes that the applicant left Lebanon lawfully.

185.   The Tribunal has not accepted the applicant has any adverse profile, whether with the ADP, Hezbollah, or Hamas, nor is there any suggestion he has an adverse profile with the LAF or the Lebanese Government. There is no claim or suggestion he has committed any crime or would be subject to a stop order.

186.   Even if the Lebanese authorities were to determine he had sought asylum, having regard to the country advice, the Tribunal finds that there is no real chance or risk of the applicant facing harm for any of these reasons if he returned to Lebanon, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Current situation in Lebanon

187.   Separate from the Tribunal’s consideration of his claims, it is clear the situation in Lebanon is uncertain. The Tribunal has found that the prospect of a conflict enveloping all of Lebanon is remote, as is the chance or risk of the applicant being harmed. However, the Tribunal is also conscious that the current situation is volatile, particularly in the south of Lebanon, and many countries are advising their nationals not to travel to Lebanon or to leave the country.[34]

188.   The Tribunal notes that the applicant made no submission seeking the Tribunal’s referral for ministerial intervention.

189.   It appears from the decision record that the applicant made a ministerial intervention request in relation to his application for a bridging visa. The outcome of that application is not before the Tribunal. It is not clear whether it was decided, or what factors were considered, but it is evident the applicant remains in detention. The Tribunal also notes the cancellation of his visa related to the provision of incorrect information.

190.   The Ministerial Guidelines refer to the matters that should and should not be brought to the Minister’s attention. Given the applicant has made no request to the Tribunal, given an application for intervention has previously been made, and having regard to the basis of his visa cancellation for provision of incorrect information, the Tribunal has not made a referral to the Minister at this time.

191.   While the Tribunal has not referred the matter to the Minister for intervention, it considers the current volatile situation in Lebanon is a unique and exceptional circumstance and, notwithstanding its assessment of his protection claims, the Tribunal considers there is some force in considering whether the applicant should be permitted to remain in Australia in the short term, or until the security situation in Lebanon stabilises. The Tribunal also notes the applicant has siblings that are Australian citizens.

192.   Ultimately, this is a matter for the Minister, and the Tribunal considers it open to the applicant to pursue that option should it remain open and available to him.

[34] DFAT, 2024

Conclusion

193.   For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a). The Tribunal is also not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa).

1. While the applicant has family in Australia, there is no claim or suggestion that the applicant satisfies s 36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s 36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the applicant does not satisfy the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(b) or (c).

   DECISION

195.   The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

Denny Hughes
Member

ATTACHMENT  -  Extract from Migration Act 1958

5 (1) Interpretation

…

cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:

(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or

(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;

but does not include an act or omission:

(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

…

degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:

(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

…

torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:

(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or

(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or

(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or

(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or

(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;

but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

…

receiving country,  in relation to a non-citizen, means:

(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or

(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.

…

5H    Meaning of refugee

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:

(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or

(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.

Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.

…

5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:

(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and

(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and

(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.

Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.

(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.

Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.

(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:

(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or

(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or

(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:

(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;

(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;

(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;

(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;

(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;

(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):

(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and

(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and

(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:

(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;

(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;

(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;

(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.

(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family

For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:

(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and

(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:

(i)the first person has ever experienced; or

(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.

Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family

For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:

(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and

(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and

(c)     any of the following apply:

(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;

(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;

(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

5LA Effective protection measures

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:

(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:

(i)the relevant State; or

(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.

(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:

(a)     the person can access the protection; and

(b)     the protection is durable; and

(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.

…

36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act

…

(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

(aa)  a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and

(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and

(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:

(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or

(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or

(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:

(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.

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