2403439 (Refugee)

Case

[2025] ARTA 1317

7 May 2025


2403439 (REFUGEE) [2025] ARTA 1317 (7 MAY 2025)

DECISION AND  

REASONS FOR DECISION

Representative:  Ms Anna Joyce Ryburn

Respondent:Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Tribunal Number:  2403439

Tribunal:Deputy President S Roushan

Date:7 May 2025

Place:Sydney

Decision:The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant meets the following criteria:

·s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 07 May 2025 at 10:57am

CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Afghanistan – ethnicity, religion and imputed political opinion – Hazara Shia Muslim and returned failed asylum seeker – fear of harm from Taliban and other extremist groups – multiple periods and deportations as illegal migrant worker in other countries – asylum application in another country not declared in application – temporary protection visa there now expired – arrival by boat – separation from Australian citizen partner and role in Australian citizen child’s life – credibility – incomplete, inconsistent, false and misleading information provided at multiple stages – authenticity and reliability of supporting documentation from home and other country – supporting evidence from relatives and statements from representatives of community organisations – nationality and outline of timeline accepted – country information – renewed and escalating persecution and attacks – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H(1)(a), 5J(1), 36(2)(a), 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.

STATEMENT OF REASONS

BACKGROUND

  1. The applicant is [Age] years old. He travelled to Australia by boat and arrived at [Location 1] [in] April 2013.

  2. Following his arrival, the applicant was interviewed by the Department on 27 May 2013 and 5 June 2013.

  3. The applicant made four separate valid applications for a Class XE Safe Haven Enterprise visa (subclass 790) (SHEV) on 27 March 2017, 8 March 2020, 16 June 2020, and 17 June 2020.

  4. On 9 February 2024, a delegate for the Minister of Home Affairs refused all four applications in a single decision record under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

  5. On 26 February 2024, the applicant applied for a review of the delegate’s decision to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).

  6. On 14 October 2024, the AAT became the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). Under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024(the Transitional Act)applications for review to the AAT that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are taken to be an application for review to the Tribunal. The Transitional Act gives the Tribunal the authority to continue and finalise any aspect of the review not already completed by the AAT.

  7. This is a review of the delegate’s decision by the Tribunal.

    PROTECTION VISA APPLICATION

    Evidence before the Department

    Protection visa application

  8. Based on the information provided in his Protection visa application dated 16 June 2020, the applicant was born in [Village, Town], Ghazni province, Afghanistan. He is of Hazara ethnicity and is a Shi’a Muslim. He stated that his name, as recorded on his national identity card, is [Given name, Patronym] and noted that the ‘patronymic name used on Afghan National Identity Document…is customary.’

  9. His father, [Mr A], and mother, [Ms B], are citizens of Afghanistan, but reside in Pakistan. He has one brother, [Mr C], born in [Year], and two sisters, [Ms D] and [Ms E] (aka [Ms E – Alias]), born in [Years], respectively. His siblings reside in Pakistan. The applicant denied having any personal contacts in Australia, including relatives, friends, and acquaintances.

  10. The applicant resided in [City 1], Iran from 31 December 1999 to 31 December 2002, and in [City 2], Iran from 31 December 2002 to 31 December 2008. He resided in [Location], Quetta, Pakistan from 31 December 2008 to 28 February 2013. He stated his last date of departure from Afghanistan was on [date] January 2013. He was deported from Iran to Afghanistan and departed Afghanistan to return to Pakistan.

  11. According to the travel history recorded in the form, the applicant escaped Afghanistan ‘for safety’ on [date] January 1996 and resided in Quetta, Pakistan until January 2001 when he travelled to Tehran, Iran ‘for work and safety’. In Iran, he worked as a ‘[Occupation 1]’ until December 2003. He then worked as [an Occupation 2] in [City 1] from 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2006. He was deported to Herat, Afghanistan on [date] January 2007, and a few days later he travelled to Quetta to visit his family. In March 2007, he travelled back to Tehran to work as [an Occupation 1] and remained there until [date] December 2009 when he was again deported to Herat. Once again, he travelled to Quetta before returning to Tehran in December 2012. He remained in Iran until his third deportation to Afghanistan in January 2013.

  12. [In] March 2013, the applicant travelled to [City, Country 1] as a transit point ‘on the way to seek asylum’. He then travelled to [City, Country 2], where he remained until [March] 2015. He then travelled to [City, Country 3] and from [Country 3] he came to Australia by boat.

  13. The above account appears to be inconsistent with the applicant’s residential history recorded in the same form.

    Statutory declaration of 18 October 2016

  14. In a statutory declaration, declared on 18 October 2016, the applicant claimed to fear being killed or seriously harmed by the Taliban, Daesh or ‘other Anti-Shia, Anti-Hazara extremist group for the reasons of his Hazara ethnicity, his Shi’a faith, being a failed returned asylum seeker from a Western country, and his ‘imputed political opinion for being someone with foreign connections living in Western nations’.

  15. He stated that he has two younger sisters and one younger brother. When he was about [Age] years of age or in about 1996, he fled with his parents to Pakistan. He lived with his family in Pakistan until late 2001 when, at the age of [Age], his father sent him to work in Iran. He stayed in Iran for ‘almost 12 to 13 years’ and was deported to Herat, Afghanistan on three separate occasions. He visited his family in Pakistan each time he was deported and remained there until he was able to return to Iran. His periods of stay in Pakistan ranged from one to three months. As a suspected illegal migrant, he was ‘bullied’ and ‘mistreated’ in Iran and faced ‘random police arrests.’ He also detailed attacks and incidents of violence against Hazaras in Afghanistan, particularly in Ghazni province, by the Taliban and other extremist groups.

  16. The applicant claimed that he did not have an Afghan National Identity Document (Taskera) when he was a child. His cousin assisted him to obtain his Taskera in Ghazni City, and it was issued [in] February 2015. When he obtained his Taskera, the document indicated that he was [Age] years old in the Afghan year of 1393 and that he was from [Village], Jaghori District, Ghazni.

    Statutory declaration of 20 November 2023

  17. In a statutory declaration, dated 20 November 2023, the applicant provided the following information.

  18. He is an Afghan national, a Hazara and a Shi'a Muslim. In 1996, when he was [Age] years old, he fled to Pakistan with his brother and parents. When they fled, only his father had a Taskera.

  19. He lived in Quetta Pakistan with his family until late 2001 and was [Age] years of age when his father sent him to [City 3], Iran to work and financially support the family.

  20. He illegally resided in Iran and was deported three times to Herat, Afghanistan. After each deportation he would visit his family in Pakistan and rearrange his way back to Iran. In about 2011, he was engaged to [Ms F] in Quetta and subsequently returned to work in Iran. His third deportation from Iran was in early 2013. He arrived at Christmas Island in April 2013 after traveling through [Countries 2, 3 and 1]. The uncertainty of his visa status in Australia and being ‘stuck’ was the reason he could not return to Pakistan to visit his fiancée, and they mutually ended the engagement.

  21. In 2013, his brother, [Mr C], fled Afghanistan to seek asylum in [Country 3]. His brother’s ‘[Country 3] name’ is [Mr C – Alias].

  22. In 2015, his father travelled to Kabul to obtain a Taskera for him. The document consisted of a serial number and was issued [in] March 2015 ‘in the final days of the Afghan year 1393 just before the Afghan new year’. It was verified ‘against the logbook system in Afghanistan as indicated by the shiny silver hologram sticker.’ The Taskera recorded him to be [Age] years of age, ‘which equates to an annual period of birth in the western calendar of ’.

  23. His father died in Quetta [in] April 2019. His father’s Taskera was not located at their house in Quetta after he died. A friend of his father in Kabul, [Mr G], may hold a copy of his father’s Taskera. [Mr G] was the ‘caretaker’ of a property in Kabul owned by his father but has refused to assist in the property being ‘passed down’ as an inheritance to the applicant and his mother.

  24. His father did not leave the title deed with them nor discuss his financial arrangements.

  25. On 25 December 2020 he met [Ms H] when camping in a group in [Location 2]. Himself and [Ms H] became close friends and started dating after about three months. [Ms H] is an Australian citizen. In late 2021 the couple rented an apartment, moved in, and started living together. Within a year their daughter [Miss I] was born on [Date]. [Miss I] is an Australian citizen. In February 2023 due to cultural differences the couple separated, and the applicant moved out to a rented granny flat in [Suburb 1]. He visits [Ms H] and [Miss I] daily and assists with dropping and picking [Miss I] up from daycare three days a week. He also spends time with [Miss I] on Saturdays.

  26. He sends money to Quetta to support his mother and sisters. For safety reasons he sends the money to them with his father as the recipient as sending ‘money in the name of a woman may flag that she is ‘alone and vulnerable.’ In 2021 he sent all his savings to his mother to facilitate the purchase of a residence valued at ‘AUD$350,000’. There were property renovations including fixing solar panels to a sum of about ‘AUD$50,000’.

  27. The statutory declaration included photographs depicting the applicant as a young teen in [City 3], Iran, behind a [machine] and posing with friends and colleagues who he worked with in the same [factory]. It also included a photograph of his father’s gravestone in Quetta.

    The first interview

  28. The applicant was interviewed by a delegate of the Minister on 23 November 2023 (the first interview). According to the delegate’s decision record, the electronic recording of that interview was ‘corrupted.’ The applicant’s oral evidence at that interview was summarised and referred to in the delegate’s decision record. I have relied on this evidence as reflected in the delegate’s decision. The applicant did not dispute the accuracy of this evidence as recorded by the delegate and I have no reason to doubt its faithful representation.  

  29. Following the first interview, the applicant’s representative provided additional submissions and information to the Department.

    Statutory declaration 11 December 2023

  30. In a further statutory declaration, declared on 11 December 2023, the applicant made references to his previous statutory declarations and stated that he wished to ‘make correction and to provide some additional information.’ The following new information was provided by the applicant in this statutory declaration.

  31. He lived with his family in Quetta, Pakistan until late 2001. He was ‘about [Age] years of age’ when his father sent him to [City 3], Iran for work to financially support his family. He worked in Iran for ‘about 7 or more years.’

  32. In 2008, he travelled to [Country 4] from Iran illegally, via [Countries 5 and 6], in search of ‘asylum’. He made his way to [City 4, Country 4] and reported to a police station.

  33. He completed a one-year introductory course for refugee arrivals and worked as [an Occupation 3] in [City 4] and [Town]. He applied for asylum and was granted a visa in ‘2010 or 2011’. He returned to Quetta, Pakistan in 2011 ‘for a short visit’ to his family. It was during this visit that he got engaged to [Ms F]. He had not mentioned the year of his engagement in previous declarations.

  34. When he returned to [Country 4], he lived at a refugee camp called ‘[Camp name]’ in [City 4]. He found it difficult finding ‘decent work’ and heard about people travelling to Australia. His father sent him money to purchase a ticket, and he flew to [Country 2]. His father organised a smuggler in [Country 2] to take him to [Country 3] and then to Darwin through [Location 1]. He did not travel through Afghanistan or [Country 1] or Pakistan on his journey to Australia. He posted his travel document and [Country 4] visa paper from [Country 3] to an acquaintance, [Mr J], in [Country 4] before taking a boat to Australia. He knew [Mr J] from the [City 4] refugee camp. [Mr J], however, had not collected these documents. He did not include his travel to [Country 4] in his Protection visa application forms as his father thought he would not be ‘accepted’ in Australia due to not having travelled directly from Afghanistan or Pakistan.

  35. In 2008, after arriving in [Country 4], his father sent him a ‘blank’ Taskera. He completed the details himself before providing it to the [Country 4] authorities. The name and the age he recorded on the blank Taskera were his ‘personal choice.’ 

  36. In 2015, his father obtained a Taskera with a serial number and this was provided to the Department in support of his Protection visa application. In 2015, he had frequent contact with a maternal cousin in Afghanistan, [Mr K], and he believed that it was his cousin who obtained the Taskera for him. In 2018, however, his father cleared the ‘misunderstanding’ and informed him that he had sent the applicant his Taskera.

  37. His paternal cousin, [Mr L], lives and works in Iran and holds an eTaskera and a paper copy with a serial number. This document shows that he and his paternal cousin share the same place of origin and paternal grandfather. [Mr L]’s father is [Mr J]. [Mr J] is the elder brother of the applicant’s father [Mr A]. [Mr J] holds a Taskera with a serial number that matched what he had provided in support of his protection visa application. Although unsuccessful in obtaining a copy of his father's Taskera, he has been able to obtain a copy of the purchase agreement for his father’s Kabul property, which refers to his father’s Taskera’s serial number and logbook. The logbook reference number matches [Mr J]’s Taskera logbook entry.

  38. At his interview on 23 November 2023, he confirmed his father obtained non-genuine Pakistani IDs for the family. The process included having to provide fingerprints and be given a ‘notation of a scar on his [body part].’ This occurred approximately two years after he travelled to Iran in 2001. He has not seen the document since it was issued. On 12 June 2024, his family were issued a ‘non-genuine’ Pakistani Family Registration Certificate, and his name does not appear on this document. 

  39. In support of his statutory declaration, the applicant submitted the following documents.

    ·     Copy and translation of a Family Pakistani National Database Schedule (Certificate for Children Under the Age of Eighteen), issued on 12 June 2004 by the National Database and Registration Authority (Ministry of Interior), Government of Pakistan. The document records the ‘Applicant’s Name’ as [Mr A] and names [Mr C – Alias], [Ms D] and [Ms E – Alias] as his children.

    ·     Copies of Pakistani National Identity Cards (NIC) issued in the name of [Ms E – Alias] and [Ms D].

    ·     Copy and translation of a property sale agreement dated 15 April 2005. The document names the ‘seller’ as [Mr M] and the ‘buyer’ as [Mr A]. The names of the buyer’s father and grandfather are recorded as [Mr N] and [Mr O], respectively. The buyer’s ‘residence’ is recorded as Jaghori District, Ghazni Province with the Taskera number of [Number].

    ·     Copy and translation of a Taskera issued in the name of [Mr L], born on [Date] in Jaghori, Ghazni. The names of the holder’s father and grandfather are recorded as [Mr J] and [Mr N].

    ·     Copy and translation of a Taskera Booklet issued in the name of [Mr J] born in ‘[Town].’ The names of the holder’s father and grandfather are recorded as [Mr N] and [Mr O].

    The second interview

  40. On 12 December 2023, the applicant attended a further interview with the Department (the second interview). Where relevant, the applicant’s oral evidence to the delegate at that interview is referred to in the Tribunal’s analysis below.

  41. Following the interview, the applicant’s representative provided further information and documentary evidence to the Department, including the following, in support of the applicant’s Protection visa applications.

    ·     Copy and translation of a Taskera (ID no. [Number]) issued in the name of [Mr A] [in] September 2017. The names of the holder’s father and grandfather are recorded as [Mr N] and [Mr O].

    ·     Copy of the applicant’s [Country 4]’s licence issued in the name of ‘[the applicant – Alias].’

    ·     Copy and translation of a Taskera (Serial no. [Number]) issued in the name of [the applicant, given name, different spelling] [in] March 2015. The names of the holder’s father and grandfather are recorded as [Mr A] and [Mr N]. The document records the applicant’s marital status as ‘married.’

    ·     Copies of a birth certificate and passport issued in the name of the applicant’s Australian citizen daughter, [Miss I].

    The delegate’s decision

  42. The delegate attached significant weight to the fact that the applicant ‘provided false, misleading and inconsistent biographical information throughout his dealings with the Department,’ including the inconsistent information regarding the identity documents he possessed in Pakistan, and the unreliability of the Afghan identity documents submitted. The delegate also attached weight to the applicant’s admissions that he had ‘previously provided a false Afghan identity document in an assumed identity to the [Country 4] authorities.’ The delegate did not give any weight to the documentary evidence provided by the applicant in support of his claim to be an Afghan national, including the Afghan Identity Cards relating to him and his family members. As there was ‘no credible evidence’ before the delegate to support the applicant’s claim that he is an Afghan citizen who originates from Jaghori district in Ghazni province, the delegate found the applicant to be a Pakistani citizen who left Pakistan using his own genuine Pakistani passport. The delegate did not accept that the applicant’s father had fraudulently obtained Pakistani citizenship and Pakistani identity documents for his family in Pakistan and found the Pakistani documents submitted by the applicant to be genuine documents, indicating the applicant’s father and his siblings are Pakistani citizens.

  43. The delegate, however, accepted that the applicant is a member of the ‘indigenous Hazara community from Quetta in Pakistan’ and assessed his claims against Pakistan. The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant would face a real chance of serious harm of any kind in Pakistan for the reasons he had provided. The delegate was also not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed to Pakistan, there was a real risk the applicant would suffer significant harm. The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations.

    REVIEW APPLICATION

  1. On 6 September 2024, the applicant applied for a review of the delegate’s decision.

    Prehearing submissions

  2. On 20 September 2024, Ms Ryburn submitted a statutory declaration by [Mr P], dated 20 September 2024, in which it was revealed for the first time that [Mr P] is the applicant’s brother. Ms Ryburn also submitted statutory declarations from [Mr Q], the applicant’s maternal uncle, and [Mr R].

    Statutory declaration of [Mr P]

  3. In his statutory declaration, [Mr P] provided the following information.

  4. He migrated to Australia in 2021 on a Subclass 300 Prospective Partner visa and subsequently married his maternal cousin, [Ms S]. He was granted a permanent partner visa on 9 August 2024. His wife’s father, [Mr Q], is his maternal uncle.

  5. The applicant is his older brother. He also has one younger brother, [Mr C], and two younger sisters, [Ms E] and [Ms D]. He does not know his own exact date of birth, but he is about three to four years younger than the applicant. He did not go to school and received limited religious education and ‘some basic instruction in reading of Dari/Arabic script.’ He recalls playing with friends in [Village].

  6. He was about 12 or 13 years of age, when he travelled with his paternal cousin, [Mr T], to Pakistan for work due to financial difficulties faced by his family in Afghanistan. This was ‘probably during the period when the Taliban were first in power in Afghanistan.’ His parents and ‘younger siblings’ remained in Jaghori. However, his older brother (the applicant) was not in Afghanistan, having already ‘left in search of work.’

  7. He and [Mr T] did not stay in Pakistan for long before travelling to Iran. When he arrived in Iran ‘he met his brother…after having not seen him for a few years.’ In Iran he worked in a [factory] owned by his mother's maternal cousin, [Mr R]. The applicant was working at the same factory. [Mr R] is now living in Sydney. He and his brother lived and worked at the factory with many other Afghan teenagers. He remained in Iran and did not return to Afghanistan nor to Pakistan.

  8. About one or two years after he travelled to Iran, he was informed that his family including his mother, [Ms B], his father, [Mr A], his two sisters, [Ms E] and [Ms D], and his younger brother, [Mr C], had fled Afghanistan to Pakistan.

  9. In 2006 or 2007, he departed from Iran for [Country 4] and did not inform the applicant of his travel plans as he would not have allowed him to travel given the risks involved. When he arrived in [Country 4], he called his father ‘to find out where and when he was born.’ His father told him that he was born in [District] of Uruzgan Province. However, he has no recollection of having lived in Uruzgan and does not know when his family ‘moved from’ [Village], Jaghori to Uruzgan and when ‘they returned to live’ in [Village] Jaghori.

  10. In [Country 4], he lived in a camp in [City 4] for about three years. During his ‘protection interview’ in [Country 4], he told the [Country 4] authorities that he was from Uruzgan Province based on what his father had told him. After five or six years in [Country 4], he was granted a ‘permanent Protection visa’ which entitled him to live and work throughout Europe.

  11. Approximately one or two years after his arrival in [Country 4], the applicant also arrived in [Country 4]. The applicant lived in [Country 4] for around three or four years, obtained ‘a valid 3 or 5 year [Country 4] visa’ and lived in a camp in a rural area outside [City 4].

  12. In 2015, ‘either his father or his paternal uncle [Mr J] organised’ a Taskera for him. He did not request this document as his status in [Country 4] was ‘secure’ and he has ‘no recollection of seeing this document or be aware of it.’

  13. In 2017, he ‘asked [Mr J] to obtain’ a Taskera for him on which his place of birth ‘should be recorded [District], Uruzgan and [his] date of birth should be recorded as 31 January 1991 to match the date allocated to [him] by [Country 4] authorities.’ He requested this document because at that time there was some discussion about him potentially marrying his cousin. The ‘replacement Taskera issued in 2017 was a document [his] uncle sorted for him.’ While he has a copy of this Taskera, he does not have a copy of the one issued in 2015.

  14. [In] April 2019, he travelled to Pakistan from [Country 4] to attend his funeral.

  15. He remained in [Country 4] until 2021 and was unaware of the applicant’s plans to travel to Australia.

  16. In his Partner visa application form, he omitted to mention the applicant as one of his siblings because the applicant had not included him as a brother in his own application forms.

  17. With his statutory declaration, [Mr P] submitted a copy of his [Country 4] Passport and a copy of his Taskera issued in the name of [Mr P], born [in] January 1991 in [District]. The document was issued [in] November 2017, and the names of the holder’s father and grandfather are recorded as [Mr A] and [Mr N]. In addition, he included a photograph purportedly taken in Tehran in the [factory] where he and the applicant worked, depicting him standing next to his brother; and a photograph taken outside the factory with other Afghan teenagers who also worked at the factory.

    Statutory declaration of [Mr Q]

  18. In a statutory declaration, declared on 12 September 2024, [Mr Q] provided the following information.

  19. He is an Afghan Hazara and a Shi'a Muslim. He was born in [Village] in Jaghori District of Ghazni in [Year]. He is the father of [Ms S] who is married to the applicant’s brother, [Mr P]. He is also the younger brother of the applicant’s mother, [Ms B]. His sister is three or four years older. He and his sister grew up together in [Village]. They have a younger brother, who is currently in [Country 3], and a younger sister residing in Kabul.

  20. He was 11 or 12 years old when his sister married a relative, [Mr A], who was also from [Village], and they used to attend mosque together. He visited his sister and [Mr A] on a weekly basis.

  21. He was about 16 years of age when the applicant was born and soon after he ([Mr Q]) travelled to Iran to work and for ‘safety reasons.’ He returned to Afghanistan approximately 5 years later and married his wife in about 1990 or 1991. He fled to Australia in 2009 with his family. He, his wife, and children are all Australian citizens.

  22. His sister and [Mr A] left Afghanistan for Pakistan in the late 1990s. The applicant’s brothers, [Mr P] and [Mr C], were born in Afghanistan, and his sisters, [Ms D] and [Ms E], were born in Pakistan.

  23. The applicant and his family are from [Village] and are ‘part of the Hazara ethnic community with deep roots in this region.’ Many Afghan families were forced to migrate to neighbouring countries, including Pakistan for ‘safety reasons’ without proper documents and subsequently secured false identity documents in Pakistan to avoid harassment and threats from Pakistani authorities. The applicant and his family have ‘always retained their Afghan identity’ and the documents they obtained while they searched for safety were ‘solely for survival and stability.’

    Statutory declaration of [Mr R]

  24. In his statutory declaration dated 12 September 2024, [Mr R] provided the information set out below.

  25. He is an Afghan Hazara and a Shi'a Muslim. He was born in [Year] in Uruzgan Province. He is originally from Ghazni, and the applicant’s mother is his maternal cousin.

  26. He went to Iran for work in about 1984 and eventually opened his own [Occupation 1] business, employing teenage Afghan boys whose families needed the income. He has known the applicant since he was approximately between [Ages] years old. The applicant’s father, [Ms A], brought him to Iran from Quetta to work in his [factory] ‘approximately 4 or 5 years after [he] started [his] [business].’ [Mr A] subsequently returned to Pakistan, where the rest of the family was residing. The applicant worked for him for approximately six or seven years. He was informed by the applicant’s maternal uncle [Mr U] that the applicant and his brother had travelled to Europe.

    Other supporting statements

  27. Ms Ryburn also submitted a character reference from [Mr V], Director of ‘[Organisation 1],’ stating that the applicant has been an ‘active and integral member’ of the organisation, and a letter of support from [Mr W], a member of Hazara community in Sydney. [Mr W] stated in his letter that he has known the applicant since 2014. He knows many people in the Hazara community who would be able to confirm that he was born in [Town] of Jaghori district. He also knows that many Afghan Hazaras moved from Afghanistan to Pakistan and paid a lot of money to obtain fake Pakistani ID cards to avoid deportation to Afghanistan.

  28. On 21 September 2024, Ms Ryburn submitted a statutory declaration by the applicant, a statutory declaration by [Mr X] and a number of photographs, including photographs of the applicant’s father’s gravestone inscription and the applicant with other members of his family.

    Statutory declaration of 21 September 2024

  29. In a statutory declaration declared on 21 September 2024, the applicant provided the following additional information and ‘corrections.’

  30. He has a brother, [Mr P], who is an Australian permanent resident. He previously did not mention his brother in the information he provided to the Department in connection with his Protection visa application. As he had also omitted mentioning his previous residence in [Country 4] until the first interview, his ‘protection case timeline’ was ‘distorted.’

  31. He and his brother resided in [City, Country 4] and had ‘a troubled relationship as brothers.’  He believed that if he were to disclose that he had a brother living in [Country 4], the Australia authorities would have discovered that he had sought asylum and resided in [Country 4].

  32. His mother's name is [Ms B] but she ‘has an alias in Pakistan of [Ms B – Alias].’ He and his two brothers, [Mr P] and [Mr C], were all born in Afghanistan, but his sisters, [Ms E] and [Ms D], were born in Quetta, Pakistan.

  33. The details in the ‘bogus Shenakhti identities’ for his mother, [Mr C], [Ms E] and [Ms D], including dates and places of birth are not reliable. For example, his brother [Mr C], who is approximately six years younger, is listed on the ‘bogus’ Pakistani 2004 Certificate for Children Under the Age of 18 as having been born in Quetta on [Date], but he was in fact born in Afghanistan. Another example is the name of his father’s father being recorded as [Mr N – Alias 1] in his Pakistani issued documents.

  34. Contrary to the information provided in his 2016 statutory declaration that he fled with his parents to Pakistan in or about 1996 and lived there until late 2001, he was sent to Iran directly from Afghanistan when he was about [Age] years old. The information in the earlier statutory declaration is incorrect and he does not ‘recall ever saying this.’ His parents fled to Quetta Pakistan with his younger brother [Mr C], but he ‘cannot pinpoint’ the time of their travel because he was in Iran at that time.

  35. In Iran, he initially lived with his maternal uncle, [Mr U], in [City 2] while working for [Mr R] at his [factory] in the same city. Later, he left his uncle’s place to live in the factory with other ‘Hazara boys’ from [Location], including [Mr X], who now resides in Sydney.

  36. The applicant attached a photograph of himself purportedly taken against a ‘photoshopped background’ on his first day of arrival in [City 3], Iran, a photograph taken about two years after he commenced work in Iran, and a photograph taken in Iran standing next to [Mr X] and his brother [Mr P].

  37. He was deported from Iran to Afghanistan on two separate occasions. The estimated dates he provided in his Protection visa applications for these deportations ‘are not the right dates.’ The ‘address history and work history on that from are distorted by [his] effort to not disclose [his] travel and living in [Country 4].’ He now believes that he was first deported to Afghanistan from Iran ‘around two years after arrival in [Country 4].’ From Afghanistan he travelled to Quetta where he remained for approximately one year before returning to Iran.

  38. His brother [Mr P] joined him at the factory in [City 2] ‘at some point.’ They ‘had a falling out’ and [Mr P] left the factory to work on [workplaces] in [City 1].

  39. Later, he was informed by his mother on a telephone call that [Mr P] had travelled to Europe to seek asylum in Europe. He also decided to travel to Europe and went to [Country 4]. In [Country 4] he was fingerprinted which restricted his ability to consider seeking asylum in any other European country. He also found [Mr P] in [Country 4] but did not mention him in his Protection visa application.

  40. He has found ‘a copy of the non-genuine Afghan National Identity Document (Taskera) which he provided to the [Country 4] government. He did not have a ‘real’ Taskera to provide at that time, so his father ‘organised a template Taskera for [him] to complete and hand up.’  

  41. As noted in his protection visa interview, the handwriting on this Taskera is his own. His ‘actions as a teenager in [Country 4] were a common practice for Afghan boys seeking asylum because most of us did not have genuinely issued documents.’ At that time, his father was not able to travel back to Afghanistan to obtain a genuine Taskera for him. He wrote in the Taskera that he was from Uruzgan because he was told by other asylum seekers that the [Country 4] authorities were ‘more sympathetic to asylum seekers from Uruzgan rather than from Jaghori, Ghazni.’ He wrote his parents’ real name on the document, but he lied about his age in order for the [Country 4] authorities ‘to deem [him] to be a minor’ and thus process his application quicker.  

  42. His other Taskera (No. [Number]) was issued in 2015 and ‘links’ to his father's ‘log book registration of [Book, Page, Registration].’ The Taskera has been officially verified as indicated by the ‘hologramed silver sticker thereon’ (sic). His father's ‘initial Afghan National Identity Document was a booklet Taskera issued in 1976. He was entered into the log book system with [Volume No, Page Number and registration].  His age was assessed in 1976 as [Age] years of age.’ His father obtained a replacement Taskera in 2017 which references his log book details and his 1976 age assessment of [Age] years of age.

  43. In 2017, ‘a bureaucratic rule was created’ requiring Afghans to be present in person in Afghanistan ‘for the issuance of Taskera’. That rule was not in effect in 2015 and a relative could obtain a Taskera on someone else’s behalf.

  44. [Mr J] is his father’s older brother and his Taskera ‘records a log book reference’ similar to that of his father’s.

  45. He is not ‘naturally good at dates and numbers due to [his] lack of opportunity for schooling as a child and this together with lack of documented records make [the] task of setting out [his] life within a precision timeframe difficult.’ He was also told by his former partner that he might have ‘a memory type issue.’ His GP, however, has not raised any concerns.

    Statutory declaration of [Mr X]

  46. In a statutory declaration dated 21 September 2024, [Mr X] provided the information set out below.

  47. He was born in [Village], and he is a Shi’a, Hazara from Afghanistan. He is now an Australian citizen.

  48. He was a classmate of the applicant at a religious school they both attended in [Village]. He travelled to Iran when he was about 13 or 14 years old and worked with the applicant at the same [factory] owned by [Mr R]. He worked in the factory for about three or four years. During this period, he lived at the factory and shared a room with the applicant and his brother, [Mr P].

  49. He fled Iran to seek asylum in Australia in 2007. He is one of the [founders] of [Organisation 2] in Sydney. He can confirm that the applicant is an Afghan Hazara from [Village].

  50. In an unsigned letter from [Organisation 2], dated 15 September 2024, it was stated that the applicant ‘has been part of the Afghan community in Sydney for a long time’ and they ‘know him from back in Afghanistan.’

    Statutory declaration of 23 September 2024

  51. On 23 September 2024, the Tribunal received a further statutory declaration by the applicant, in which he included photographs taken during his 'engagement' to [Ms F] 13 years ago in 2011 in Quetta, Pakistan, depicting, his father, mother and two sisters. He stated that his sisters were about [Ages] years of age at that time. Another photograph features [Mr Q] at the same ceremony.

  52. He claimed that the bogus Pakistani Certificate for Children Under the Age of Eighteen, dated [June] 2024, records the ages of his two younger sisters ‘as older than their real ages’. If this document was accurate then [Ms E] (referred to as [Ms E – Alias] in the document) should have been 10 years of age at the time of his engagement. However, his sisters appear to be younger than 10 years of age in the photographs.

  53. He further stated that his father passed away [in] April 2019. A photograph of his gravestone inscription in Quetta shows that the inscription refers to [Mr A] son of [Mr N – Alias 1], which accords with his father’s details as ‘recorded to match his bogus Pakistani Shenakhti ID in order to protect the safety of [his] mother and younger sisters’ who remain in Quetta ‘on bogus documentation’.

  54. He also referred to his father's ‘bogus Pakistani ID which was issued on 13 May 2017, and which was valid at the time of his death’ and stated that the document records his paternal grandfather’s name as [Mr N – Alias 1], which is ‘incorrect’. He claimed ‘[Mr N – Alias 1] may have been the name of the Pakistani man from whom [his] father bought this bogus document’ and he is certain that his paternal grandfather's name was [Mr N]. His father’s photograph on this document is ‘very similar’ to that which he has used on his 2017 replacement Taskera document, which correctly records his paternal grandfather’s name as [Mr N].

    The hearing

  55. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 24 September 2024 date to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Hazaragi and English languages. Ms Ryburn also attended the hearing. The Tribunal also took evidence from [Mr P], [Mr Q], [Mr R] and [Mr X].

    Post-hearing submissions

  56. On 14 October 2024, Ms Ryburn submitted the following supporting documents.

    ·     Copy and translation of the Pakistan National Identity Card for [Mr A]. The card records his year of birth as [Year] and his father’s name as [Mr N – Alias 1]. The card was issued [in] November 2001.

    ·     Copy and translation of the Pakistan National Identity Card for [Ms D]. The card records her date of birth as [Date] and identifies [Mr A] as her father. The card was issued [in] March 2020.

    ·     Copy and translation of the Pakistan National Identity Card for [Ms D]. The card records her date of birth as [Date] and identifies [Mr A] as her father. The card was issued [in] March 2020.

    ·     Copy and translation of [Ms D]’s school report for the academic year 2012/2013. The report is issued by the [Ministry of Education] and indicates that [Ms D] attended [a] school in Quetta, Pakistan.

    ·     Copy and translation of a title deed from [Property Dealer]. The document is dated 15 April 2005 and states that [Mr M], son of [Mr Y], grandson of [Mr Z], a native of Jaghori district and current resident of [Village], sells a 493 square meter property (deed number blank) to [Mr A], son of [Mr N], grandson of [Mr O] of Jaghori district, Ghazni province.

    ·     Copy and translation of a Local Certificate, issued [in] August 2002 by the Office of Executive District Officer (revenue) Quetta, certifying that [Mr A], son of [Mr N – Alias 1] is of the Hazara ‘caste’ and permanent resident of Quetta. The document lists his wife and daughters, [Ms D] and [Ms E – Alias], as members of his family.

100.   On 15 October 2024, Ms Ryburn submitted the following additional documents.

·     Copy and translation of the Pakistan National Identity Card for [Ms B – Alias]. The card records her year of birth as [Year], and states that she is the wife of [Mr A]. The card was issued [in] November 2001.

·     Copy and translation of [Ms B]’s Revised Government of Pakistan Identity Card. The card records her year of birth as [Year] and states that she is the wife of [Mr A]. The card was issued [in] August 1998.

·     Copy and translation of Government of Pakistan Identity Card of [Mr A]. The card indicates [Mr A] was born in [Year] and is the son of [Mr N – Alias 1]. The card was issued [in] September 1993. Identity number [Number].

·     Copy and Translation of [Mr Q]’s Taskera. The document, issued [in] June 2003, indicates that [Mr Q] was [Age] years old in 1975/1976 and was born in [Village]. His father was [Mr AA].

·     Copy and Translation of [Mr A]’s Taskera, issued in 2017. The document indicates [Mr A] was [Age] years old in 1976/1977. The place of birth is blank. The names of the holder’s father and grandfather are recorded as [Mr N – Alias 2] and [Mr O], respectively. The document number is [vol, page, registration number] and was issued [in] September 2017.

·     Copy and translation of a Form B or a Child Registration Certificate, issued by the Directorate General of Registration, Pakistan Ministry of Interior to register minors under the age of 18. The Form (serial number [Number]) indicates that [Ms D] lives with her parents, [Mr A] and [Ms B – Alias]. The document is not dated and [Ms D]’s date of birth is recorded as ‘illegible.’

·     Copy and translation of a Form B in relation to [Ms E – Alias] (serial number [Number]). The form indicates [Ms E – Alias], born on [Date], lives with her parents [Mr A] and [Ms B – Alias]. The document is not dated.

101.   On 16 October 2024, Ms Ryburn submitted a statutory declaration, declared by [Ms B] (the applicant’s mother) on 15 October 2024. [Ms B] provided the following information in her statutory declaration.

102.   She is an Afghan Hazara Shi’a Muslim woman. She was born in [Town] area, Jaghori District, Ghazni. She does not know her exact birthdate and was not issued with an Afghan National Identity Document, which was common for girls born in her area. She estimated her year of birth to be [Year] based on the age of her younger brother.

103.   She has a bogus Pakistani CNIC, issued in the name of [Ms B – Alias] with [Year] as her year of birth, which she uses to stay in Pakistan. Her husband helped her procure these documents. She is not a Pakistani national and does not have a legal right to become a Pakistani national.

104.   Her younger brother, [Mr Q], and two of her sons live in Sydney. Another son, [Mr C], lives in [Country 3]. Her younger sister, [Ms BB] lives in Afghanistan. She has a half-sister, [Ms CC], who lives in Kabul, and a half-brother, [Mr U], who lives in Iran.

105.   She married [Mr A] ‘over 40 years ago in [Town]’. [Mr A] worked as a ‘[Occupation 4] from Jaghori to Ghazni and from Ghazni to Mazar Sharif,’ he was away from [Town] for work for extended periods and travelled to Pakistan and Iran to seek work opportunities.

106.   The applicant was her first child and [Mr P] was her second surviving child.

107.   When the applicant was [Age] years old, [Mr A] was in Iran, and he arranged for the applicant ‘to be collected and taken to Iran to live with [her] brother [Mr U] [who] was living in Iran and working there.’ She disagreed with this plan because the applicant was too young to live on his own and apart from his family in a foreign country. [Mr A] did not listen to her as he ‘was very stubborn and did what he thought was right and he was also not very good with [her] either.’ He beat her ‘so many times’ and he was a ‘short-tempered person.’  After two months, [Mr A] arranged for [Mr P] to travel to Iran to live with [Mr U] as well.

108.   After the applicant and [Mr P] travelled to Iran, she, [Mr A] and [Mr C] travelled to Pakistan as the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan and [Mr A] could not continue to work in his job for safety reasons.

109.   Her two daughters, [Ms D] and [Ms E – Alias] (previously known as [Ms E]), were born in Pakistan.

110.   In 2001, the situation for Afghans in Pakistan worsened and ‘it was hard for Afghans to go outside without an ID because the Pakistani Police would arrest’ them. At that time, a person called [Mr DD] made fake CNIC cards for her and her husband.

111.   [Ms D] and [Ms E – Alias] attended a Farsi school, but later they attended Pakistani schools. [Ms D] completed primary school at [School] in [Year].

112.   About a year after she moved to Pakistan, the applicant and [Mr P] visited her in Pakistan and stayed for three to four months before going back to Iran. About a year later, the applicant returned to Pakistan a second time and stayed for about two months.

113.   ‘Some years later’ her brother, [Mr U], informed her that [Mr P] had migrated to Europe. Later the applicant also travelled to Europe.

114.   When the applicant visited Pakistan from [Country 4], she arranged his engagement to her paternal aunt's granddaughter, [Ms F]. They later divorced when the applicant migrated to Australia.

115.   Before [Mr A]’s death in 2019, he collected and removed Afghan documents from their home. He feared if Pakistani authorities found the Afghan documents, they would be in trouble for creating bogus documents. She does not know if [Mr A] made Pakistani CNIC’s for the applicant, [Mr P], or [Mr C].

116.   She arranged for her son [Mr P] to marry [Ms S] (her niece) and subsequently, she and [Mr P] travelled to Kabul for an engagement party.

117.   On 16 October 2024, Ms Ryburn also submitted the following additional evidence.

·     Copy and translation of [Mr U]’s (the applicant’s maternal uncle) Taskera. The document states [Mr U] was born in [Village], and his date of birth is not legible. The names of the holder’s father and grandfather are recorded as [Mr AA] and [Mr EE], respectively. The registered residence section of the document identifies the place of residence as Jaghori district, Ghazni. The document number is [Volume (new), page, registration number]. The document is not dated.

·     Copy and translation of [Ms CC]’s (the applicant’s maternal aunt) Taskera. The document indicates [Ms CC] was born in [Town] and was [Age] years old in 2009/2010. The names of the holder’s father and grandfather are recorded as [Mr AA] and [Mr EE], respectively. The document number is [Number volume (females), page, registration]. The document was issued [in] June 2016.

·     Untranslated copy of [Ms CC]’s Afghan National Identity Card. The reverse side of the card is in English and indicates that she was born on [Date] in Ghazni. The card was issued in February 2022.

·     Copy and Translation of [Mr FF]’s (the applicant’s paternal uncle) Taskera. The document indicates [Mr FF] was born in [Village] (his date of birth is recorded in the translation as ‘illegible’). His father is [Mr N], and his grandfather is [Mr O]. The document was issued in 2005/2006, document number is [volume, page, registration number].

·     Untranslated Copy of [Mr FF]’s Taskera.

·     Copy of [Mr A]’s Pakistani Death Registration Certificate. The document is in English and Urdu and states that [Mr A] is a Pakistani national, his father was [Mr N – Alias 1], he was born on [Date] and died [in] April 2019 in Quetta.

·     Copy and translation of a sales document in relation to [Mr A]’s property in Kabul. This document appears to relate to the same property referred to in the title deed from [Property Dealer] (see above). The document, however, appears to be a different translation or version of the deed.

·     Copies of a number of photographs, purportedly depicting members of the applicant’s family together in Afghanistan and Iran, and the applicant together with other ‘[Village] boys.’

118.   On 17 October, the applicant submitted a copy and translation of [Mr GG]’s (the applicant’s maternal uncle) Taskera. The document indicates [Mr GG] was born in [Village] and that he was [Age] old in 1975/1976. His father’s name is recorded as [Mr AA] and his grandfather’s name as [Mr EE]. The document was issued [in] September 2014. The document number is [volume, page, registration number].

119.   On 9 November 2024, Ms Ryburn submitted a written submission (‘amended’), dated 8 November 2024. This submission was first submitted on 15 October 2025, an amended copy was submitted on 16 October 2024, a final amended copy was submitted on 9 November 2024. In the final amended copy, Ms Ryburn stated that the applicant ‘admits’ to the following.

1.     He omitted to reference his travel and living in [Country 4] until his protection visa interview;

2.     He created and provided a non-genuine Afghan National Identity Document to [Country 4] authorities in the name ‘[the applicant – Alias]’ which stated he was from Uruzgan, Afghanistan;

3.     He omitted to include a brother ‘[Mr P]’ in his sibling list whom was living in [Country 4] but whom has subsequently migrated to Australia on a partner visa;

4.     He failed to provide to Australian authorities bogus Pakistani Identity Documents for family members whom have been living in Pakistan;

5.     He inadvertently provided a non-NAATI professional translation for his father’s 2017 replacement Afghan National Identity Document translation with a translation error as to [Mr A]’s father’s name.

120.   Ms Ryburn then made the following submissions in relation to the evidence provided throughout the process.

121.   The applicant’s 2015 Taskera has the hologram seal to indicate the ‘Afghan government verified the logbook connection to his father [Mr A].’ That document states the applicant was born in [Town] in Afghanistan and the other details in the document appear to correspond to the details recorded in the Taskeras of both parental uncles, [Mr J] and [Mr FF].

122.   Although it could not be located, the applicant attests his father had an Afghan National Identity Booklet (Taskera) and corresponding Afghan logbook entry for when the family fled to Pakistan. This Taskera was referred to in the applicant’s 2015 Taskera.

123.   [Mr J]’s (the applicant’s paternal uncle) old form (booklet) Taskera was issued in 1988/1989. The document shows [Mr J] was born in [Town], his logbook reference is [Volume, Page, and Registration Number]. [Mr A]’s logbook reference that was listed in the applicants 2015 Taskera was [Book, Page, and Registration number]. [Mr FF]’s (the applicant’s paternal uncle) old form (booklet) Taskera’s reference is [Volume, Page, and Registration Number number]. As [Mr J], [Mr FF], and [Mr A] have sequential references found on the same page on the same logbook, this suggests the existence of a fraternal relationship between these three men.

124.   There is a discrepancy in the name of [Mr A]’s father as recorded in his 2017 Taskera. [Mr A]’s father’s name is recorded as [Mr N – Alias 2] while [Mr J] lists his father as [Mr N] in his Taskera. [Mr A]’s 2017 Taskera is non-genuine and should not be considered as legitimate nor should it be considered as evidence that [Mr A] was not an Afghan national ‘given that illegal Afghans in Pakistan are often pressured for Afghan National Identity Documents which they are unable to produce promptly without travel back to Afghanistan and as a result non-genuine documents are indeed most likely to be held by actual Afghan [nationals].’

125.   Four of the applicant’s mothers’ siblings/half-siblings ([Ms CC], [Mr U], [Mr Q], and [Mr GG]) have provided copies of their Taskeras. As with his paternal uncles, the applicant’s maternal uncles have logbook entries in sequential order ([Mr U] (registration [number]), [Mr Q] (registration [number]), and [Mr GG] (registration [number])). This is evidence of their fraternal relationship and their Afghan origins.

126.   [Mr A]’s computerised Pakistani CNIC with the expiry date of 2014 was issued [in] November 2001. This card also references [Mr A]’s old Pakistani identity number of [Number]. The ‘old numbering system included numbers referring to place followed by year that the identity number came into being and then a unique identifier number series.’ In [Mr A]’s case, 601 refers to Quetta Pakistan and 93 refers to the year 1993. This CNIC is ‘prima facie evidence that [Mr A] first obtained a Pakistani identity number in 1993 when he was about [Age] years of age and/or he arranged for the back-dated forgery of a document to create this effect.’ This shows that [Mr A] was not a Pakistani national by birth and that he obtained Pakistani papers in 1993 or thereafter.

127.   In [Ms D]’s Form B (serial number [Number]), [Ms B – Alias]’s Pakistani identity number is recorded as [Number]. This indicates the identity number was issued in 1993 despite her birth year being [Year] suggesting she migrated from Afghanistan. This document is not dated but it is estimated to have been completed after 1999 and before 2001 on the basis that [Ms D] was born in [Year] and [Ms E – Alias], who was born in [Year], was not included in this form.

128.   In contrast to [Ms D]’s Form B, in [Ms E – Alias]’s Form B (serial number [Number]), the name of [Mr A]’s wife is recorded as [Ms B] instead of [Ms B – Alias]. [Ms B]’s identity number is recorded as [Number 1] instead of [Number 2]. [Ms B – Alias] and [Ms B] are the same person, and this was a deliberate attempt to present [Ms B/Ms B – Alias] as a person who was originally of Pakistani nationality by forging an identity number that suggests she was issued her identity documents in her birth year. This suggests that the applicant’s family procured bogus documents to stay in Pakistan illegally.

129.   In addition, there are no CNIC numbers recorded next to the listed names of [Mr A]’s parents, [Mr N – Alias 1] and [Ms HH], on his Death Registration. This is ‘prima facie evidence that [Mr A]’s parents were not Pakistani.’ On the balance, inconsistencies in the Pakistani documents ‘support the contention that the family’s Pakistani identities are non-genuine.’

130.   The applicant was not included in the Pakistani paperwork which was completed or obtained by his father for his mother and younger siblings. The applicant and [Mr P] were never added to the family’s Pakistani children list. The likely explanation for this is because [Mr P] and the applicant were not born in Pakistan and did not immigrate with their father to Pakistan as they had travelled to Iran before the rest of the family fled to Pakistan. Had they have been born in Pakistan, or resided there, they would likely have been registered as [Mr A]’s children in Pakistan.

131.   Ms Ryburn submitted that the photographs of the applicant and his brother [Mr P] in Iran, combined with other corroborating evidence that they worked in Iran at [Mr R]’s [factory] ‘show their movement from Afghanistan to Iran at a young age.’ The non-genuine Pakistani documents in relation to the applicant’s father, mother and sisters show their presence in Pakistan starting from 1993-2001, around the time when the Taliban had come to power in Afghanistan for the first time. The earlier estimate (1993) is based on the issue dates of the Pakistani documents, and the ‘window of travel time of 1993 to 2001 is sufficient for the purposes of finding the Pakistani CNIC of [the applicant’s] family members to be bogus and therefore to find them to be Afghani rather than Pakistani.’

132.   Country information sources support the view that Afghan Hazara refugees living in Pakistan, create or obtain bogus documents, and that ‘safety considerations as well as considerations of not drawing attention to inconsistencies before the Department are both factors influencing [the applicant] in not revealing the existence of this set of bogus family Pakistani documentation prior to protection visa interview.’

133.   Ms Ryburn submitted that there is an inconsistency between the contents of the Statutory Declarations of the applicant and his brother, [Mr P]. [Mr P] holds a Taskera issued in Uruzgan due to [Mr P] previously informing the [Country 4] authorities that he was from Uruzgan and his wish to present a consistent history from the time of his entry to [Country 4]. [Mr P] stated in his evidence that his father told him he was born in Uruzgan as the family were there when he was born and that he believes this to be true. Nevertheless, [Mr P] has a ‘genuine Afghan National Identity Document’ which identifies his father as [Mr A] and his grandfather as [Mr N]. This document has not been ‘contested by [Country 4] or Australian authorities or any of the witnesses that he is indeed Afghani and was born into a family originating from [Village] Ghazni.’ In addition, the ‘old photograph taken in Afghanistan, [the applicant’s] family’s Taskeras, the community references, statutory declarations, and the evidence of scattering of the family across Iran, Pakistan, [Country 3] and Australia all contribute to cement [the applicant’s] origins as [Village], Ghazni, Afghanistan.’

134.   Ms Ryburn submitted that it can be surmised that the applicant was born between 1984 and 1987 in [Town], Afghanistan. His mother moved from [Town] to Quetta between 1993 to 2001 and his sisters were born in Quetta in [Years]. The applicant travelled to Iran between 1996 to 2000 and subsequently to [Country 4] in 2008.

CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

Criteria for a protection visa

135.   The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b) or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

136. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.

  1. A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).

  2. Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

  3. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

    Mandatory considerations

140.   In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

Analysis, reasons, and findings

141.   The applicant, in essence, claims to be a national of Afghanistan, of Hazara ethnicity and Shi’a faith. He claims that, if removed to Afghanistan, he would face persecution by the Taliban for the reasons of his race and religion. The delegate found the applicant to be a national of Pakistan. Therefore, the applicant’s claimed nationality is a central issue that must be determined before assessing his protection claims.

Credibility

142.   Throughout the process, the applicant has demonstrated a pattern of withholding information and providing evidence that is unreliable and, at times, misleading in relation to his background and circumstances. His oral and written evidence, including successive sworn statutory declarations contain material inconsistencies and omissions that give rise to significant credibility concerns. These inconsistencies include discrepancies between his evidence and testimony of witnesses, such as the late evidence of his brother, [Mr P]. In addition, he has acknowledged that he had obtained and submitted fraudulent documents to the [Country 4] authorities in the past.

143.   A notable early omission in the applicant's evidence was his failure to disclose his travel to [Country 4] in 2008, during which he was granted a refugee visa valid for five years. This information became known only after the Department identified his prior stay in [Country 4] through open-source social media investigations. Upon this discovery, the applicant acknowledged the omission and attributed other inconsistencies and falsehoods in his evidence to advice from his father, who purportedly cautioned against disclosing his residence in [Country 4] due to concerns that it might adversely affect his Protection visa application. Despite this explanation, the applicant did not inform the Department at that time of the existence of the younger brother, [Mr P], who was already residing in Australia, a fact he revealed to the Tribunal only shortly before the hearing. Throughout the proceedings the applicant maintained that his nondisclosures stemmed from a fear of jeopardising the success of his Protection visa application. I find this explanation completely unconvincing and find that the applicant has exhibited a persistent disregard for the truth, as evidenced by his repeated presentation of misleading information.

144.   Several inconsistencies in the evidence remain inexplicable. For example, despite the submission of extensive supporting materials, including numerous statutory declarations by witnesses in support of the applicant’s claim that his family originates from [Village] in Ghazni and that he, as the eldest son, was born there, [Mr P] consistently asserted that he was born in Uruzgan, a claim also reflected in his Taskera. [Mr P]’s explanations for this discrepancy, which contradicted the broader body of evidence regarding his family’s origins, were vague and unconvincing. While he claimed to have minimal reflection of his time in Afghanistan or his family’s movements, he simultaneously maintained that his father had informed him of his birth in Uruzgan, and that he believed this to be true. This dual assertion, professing both lack of personal memory and a firm belief based solely on his father's account, fails to satisfactorily reconcile the inconsistency.

145.   Furthermore, there were significant discrepancies in the evidence concerning both the timing of the applicant’s initial travel to Iran and the location from which he departed. In his statutory declaration of 18 October 2016, the applicant claimed to have fled Afghanistan with his family in 1996 and subsequently travelled to Iran from Pakistan in 2001. In his statutory declarations of 20 November 2023 and 11 December 2023, he reiterated that he had escaped Afghanistan with his family in 1996 and then travelled to Iran from Pakistan when he was [Age] years old (in approximately [Year]). This evidence directly contradicts [Mr P]’s assertions in his statutory declaration that he ([Mr P]) was 12 or 13 years old when he travelled from Afghanistan to Iran via Pakistan with his paternal cousin; that at the time of his departure the applicant had already left Afghanistan in search of work; and that his parents and remaining siblings escaped Afghanistan about one or two years later. In his statutory declaration, [Mr R] stated that [Mr A] brought the applicant to Iran at a time when the applicant’s family was residing in Pakistan. However, during the hearing, the applicant, for the first time, stated that his family was in Afghanistan when he initially travelled to Iran. He further testified that upon his arrival in Iran, his father was already present and personally took him to [Mr R]. He added that his father frequently travelled to Iran and Pakistan for work purposes, a claim that was not previously disclosed. When questioned about his failure to disclose this information in any of his previous statutory declarations, he explained that it had not occurred to him that he would be required to provide oral testimony before a Tribunal and that he was scared and naïve. I find these explanations wholly unpersuasive. The inconsistencies in the evidence are difficult to reconcile, and it remains unclear why false and misleading evidence was submitted at various stages of the proceedings.  

Nationality

146.   Notwithstanding these significant credibility concerns, having considered the totality of the applicant’s evidence, for the following reasons I have concluded that the applicant is a national of Afghanistan as claimed.

147.   As noted earlier, in reaching his conclusions regarding the applicant’s nationality, the delegate relied on the credibility of the applicant’s evidence, the unreliability of the Afghan identity documents submitted, and the applicant’s provision of false Afghan identity documents to the [Country 4] authorities. The delegate also found that the Pakistani documents submitted by the applicant were genuine and demonstrated his family’s Pakistani citizenship. However, the delegate provided no explanation in his reasons, despite the country information, as to how the applicant’s father could have obtained legitimate Pakistani identity documents.

148.   The applicant, despite many other inconsistencies in his evidence, has consistently claimed that he was born in [Village] and spent his early childhood in that area. There is substantial corroborating evidence to support this claim, including written and oral evidence of [Mr Q], [Mr X], [Mr R], statutory declaration of the applicant’s mother, and letters of support from [Mr V] and [Mr W]. The credibility concerns I have identified in the applicant’s evidence are not sufficient to warrant the wholesale rejection of this body of corroborating evidence.

149.   I found [Mr Q] to be a generally credible witness. I accept his evidence that he is the applicant’s maternal uncle, that he and his sister (the applicant’s mother) were born in [Village] and that his sister married [Mr A], a relative, who was also from [Village]. I also found the statutory declaration provided by the applicant’s mother to be a generally persuasive account of her background and life events. Her account appears to address some of the gaps in information and inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence. I accept that she was born in [Village] and married [Mr A] ‘over 40 years ago’ in the same area. I find that the applicant’s parents both originated from [Village], and they were married in the same area.

150.   I am prepared to accept the applicant’s explanations regarding the bogus documents he had provided to the [Country 4] authorities, identifying his place of birth as Uruzgan. There is no other evidence to support the claim that the applicant was born in Uruzgan. I am satisfied, on balance, that the applicant was born in [Village] and that he spent his early childhood in that area. I accept the claims in [Ms B]’s statement that [Mr P] and [Mr C] were also born in [Village] and that [Mr A] arranged for the applicant and [Mr P] to travel to Iran via Pakistan to work when they were still young. I prefer this evidence to the applicant’s initial assertions before the Department that he had travelled with his family to Pakistan before travelling to Iran in 2001. In reaching this view, I have taken into account the applicant’s young age at the time of his migration and the numerous migratory movements that characterised his early life. In view of these factors, I do not consider it reasonable to expect him to recall with exactitude the specific dates or every detail relating to his movements.

151.   I further accept [Ms B]’s claim in her statement that [Mr A] frequently travelled to Iran and Pakistan in search of work opportunities. However, the family ([Mr A], [Ms B] and their youngest son, [Mr C]) did not move to Pakistan until after the applicant and [Mr P] had travelled to Iran. There is no persuasive evidence before me to suggest that [Ms B] had travelled or had any links to Pakistan prior to this move. It is unclear precisely when the family relocated to Pakistan. However, based on the estimated timeline of events set out in [Ms B]’s statutory declaration, it appears that the move occurred sometime between 1993 and 1996. This timeframe, which I accept, is broadly consistent with the applicant’s own claims and the evidence provided by other witnesses.

152.   Despite the inconsistencies in the evidence regarding [Mr A]’s travel history and employment, there is no information before me to link [Mr A] to Pakistan prior to 1993. The earliest Pakistani document, namely [Mr A]’s Identity Card (no. [Number]), was issued [in] September 1993. While the card provides his year of birth ([Year]) and his father’s name ([Mr N – Alias 1]), it does not provide information in relation to his place of birth. As noted by Ms Ryburn in her submissions, [Mr A]’s computerised Pakistani CNIC, which was issued on 19 November 2001, references his Pakistani Identity Card (no. [Number]). This suggests that documents subsequently obtained by [Mr A] were primarily based on the Identity Card issued in 1993. I find that [Mr A] first obtained a Pakistani Identity Card in 1993 prior to the family’s relocation.

153.   The evidence before me, as outlined below, suggests that [Mr A] had obtained the Pakistani Identity Card through fraudulent means.

154.   In the Identity Card, [Mr A]’s father’s name is recorded as [Mr N – Alias 1]. The documentary evidence, including Taskeras purportedly issued in the names of the applicant, his brother, his paternal uncles and his paternal cousin, as well as the Kabul property sale agreement, consistently records [Mr A]’s father’s name as [Mr N] and his grandfather’s name as [Mr O]. By contrast, [Mr N – Alias 1] is recorded as [Mr A]’s father on his Pakistani Identity Card, which, as I have previously noted, appears to be the document upon which he had relied to obtain his CNIC and other official Pakistani documents. I also accept the explanation that the inscription on [Mr A]’s gravestone recording his father’s name as [Mr N – Alias 1] was designed ‘to match [Mr A’s] bogus Pakistani Shenakhti ID in order to protect the safety of [his] mother and younger sisters’ who remain in Quetta ‘on bogus documentation’.

155.   The documentary evidence before me also supports the claim that the applicant’s mother’s name at birth was [Ms B] and that the name [Ms B – Alias] only appeared in the Pakistani documents issued in the 1990s. This supports the view that the Pakistani documents issued in her name were fraudulently obtained.

156.   While I accept that the applicant’s two sisters were born in Pakistan, there is a discrepancy in the evidence concerning their dates of birth. The applicant and [Ms B] claimed in their evidence that [Ms D] and [Ms E – Alias] were born in [Year] and [Year], respectively. However, the Pakistani issued documents (Form Bs) record their birth years as [Years]. Although the Form Bs are undated, both reference [Mr A]’s Identity Card number. However, each Form B cites different number for [Ms B – Alias]’s Identity Card, thereby further undermining the authenticity of the Pakistani issued documents.

157.   In his evidence to the delegate, the applicant stated that he recalled seeing Pakistani documents issued in his name during one of his return trips to Pakistan from Iran. However, he had no other recollections regarding these documents. If Pakistani documents were in fact issued in the applicant’s name, I am of the view that they were issued fraudulently at his father’s behest. This view is supported by the fact that the applicant does not appear on any of the Pakistani Form Bs purportedly issued in relation to his sisters as their sibling or a child of his parents. His brother, [Mr C], however, is listed on the Family Pakistani National Database Schedule (Certificate for Children Under the Age of Eighteen), issued on 12 June 2004 along with his sisters as a child of [Mr A] born in Quetta on 30 August 1991.

158.   The weight of the documentary evidence, therefore, strongly suggests that the Pakistani documents obtained by the applicant’s father and other members of his family in Pakistan are not legitimately issued, authentic documents. This is further supported by the country information before me regarding the acquisition of Pakistani citizenship by Afghan Hazaras.

159.   Despite Pakistan’s Citizenship Act 1951 technically providing citizenship for all children born in Pakistan without discrimination by race or ethnicity, in practise, the Pakistani government has systematically denied citizenship to Afghans and their descendants born in Pakistan.[1] The US Department of State explicitly noted in March 2020 that Pakistan does not accord Pakistani citizenship to the children of Afghan refugees.[2] DFAT also reported in 2001 that while Article 9 of Pakistan’s Citizenship Act allows a foreign national to be naturalised if they fulfil specific criteria, in practice, this provision had not been applicable to Afghan refugees.[3]

[1] Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 - Pakistan, US Department of State, 11 March 2020,

[2] Ibid.

[3] Afghans holding Pakistani passports, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 4 May 2001, CX52333.

160.   The operation of Pakistan’s Foreigners Act, 1946, has enabled the direct displacement of rights to naturalisation and citizenship by birthright, for Afghan refugees and, indirectly, it has enabled the implied exclusion of these rights to their Pakistani-born descendants.[4] According to the European University Institute, Pakistan law regards Afghan refugees, who may also be parents, to be foreigners and aliens under the Foreigners Act 1946 and that the ‘long stay of a foreigner in a foreign country would not automatically convert him to be the citizen of that country unless he acquires the nationality by process of law.’[5]

[4] Birthright Citizenship Around the World, Law Library of Congress, 01 November 2018,

[5] Report on Citizenship Law: Pakistan, European University Institute , Faryal Nazir, 01 December 2016,

161.   An April 2015 news report included information from an official of Pakistan’s Special Branch Police, who stated that ‘all those Afghan nationals who immigrated to Pakistan before civil unrest erupted in 1979 in their country would be treated as illegal residents and deported.’[6] According to the same report, information sourced from an Intelligence Bureau official indicated that, as a result of the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951 (and Pakistan Citizenship Act Rules 1952), anyone who moved to Pakistan after this date ‘would have to apply for nationality as per the procedures set by the government.’ The same official noted that ‘(a)fter the introduction of this act, no person could automatically become a Pakistani national by purchasing land or obtaining a CNIC’ due to verification of Afghan refugees.[7]

[6] No country for old Afghans ‘Post-1951 immigrants to be considered illegal’, The Express Tribune, 3 April 2015, Ibid.

162.   Other reports indicate that Hazaras who migrated to British India prior to 1962 were recognised as a ‘local tribe’ in Baluchistan and granted Pakistani citizenship.[8] However, this recognition did not extend to later arriving Afghan Hazara refugees.[9] Anthropologist Alessandro Monsutti, an expert on Hazara migration, has observed that in ‘a place like Quetta, notions such as citizenship are not so clearly defined’ and that ‘[t]he fact that the Hazaras are recognized as a local tribe in Baluchistan does not mean that any Hazara is considered as a Pakistani citizen, by far.’[10] In information provided to the Australian authorities in 2014, he stated that while Pakistani law does not formally provide naturalisation to Afghan refugees, this does not mean Afghans have never obtained Pakistani documents. However, such access depends not on legal entitlement but on personal connections, informal networks, and often fraudulent means. He highlighted that ‘many Hazaras in Quetta who came from Afghanistan in the 1970s and never got Pakistani papers’, and that ‘[t]hey may own a house in Quetta, have not been to Afghanistan for more than 30 years, without being formally Pakistani citizens’.[11] In a 2005 book, Monsutti also stated in relation to Hazaras who had settled in Quetta that the Pakistani government had ‘readily granted them Pakistani papers’ between 1971 and 1977 to offset Pashtun influence in the region, although he did specifically state what these ‘Pakistani papers’ were.[12] In any event, there is no evidence before me to suggest that [Mr A] or any other remember of the applicant’s family was present in Pakistan during that period.

[8] See Planned Extermination: Balochistan’s Shia Hazara Community, Hassan, N, Newsline (Pakistan), May 2012, and Conditions for Asylum Caseloads Hazaras in Quetta, DFAT, 30 July 2010, CX246851.

[9] Conditions for Asylum Caseloads Hazaras in Quetta, DFAT, 30 July 2010, CX246851.

[10] Email from Alessandro Monsutti: Re: DIBP Request for Information on ‘Status of Hazaras in 1963', Monsutti, A, 15 December 2014, CIS2F827D91802.

[11] Ibid.

[12] War and Migration: Social Networks and Economic Strategies of the Hazaras of Afghanistan’, Monsutti, A, Routledge, 2005.

163.   DFAT has reported that an officer at Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior had advised that no Afghan had ever been given a certificate of naturalisation, national identity card or any other Pakistani identity document before or after 1977.[13] The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) also reported in May 2022 that Afghan refugees in Pakistan are not able to obtain Pakistani citizenship, even if a child of an Afghan refugee is born in Pakistan. Some Afghan refugees have sought to become naturalised citizens in Pakistan, but their requests have been rejected at administrative and judicial levels.[14]

[13] Pakistan residence/citizenship requirements', Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 10 May 2001, CX52501.

[14] Pakistan - Situation of Afghan refugees, European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 20 May 2022,

164.   A 2013 DFAT report further confirmed that while some Afghan nationals have been ‘apparently illegally granted Pakistani nationality,’ this occurred ‘in violation of the country’s laws.’[15] The DFAT report stated that:

[15] PAK14924 and PAK14948 Citizenship of Pakistan-born Afghan children; mailing of passports within Pakistan, DFAT, 15 July 2013, CX311292.

Open-source reports suggest that Afghan nationals had, in the past, been apparently illegally granted Pakistani nationality. A May 2011 Daily Times report stated Pakistan's Interior Ministry granted Pakistani citizenship to 126 Afghan nationals among 203 other foreigners in 2008-10 in violation of the country's laws. It cited a Pakistani Senator who said Afghan nationals had acquired Computerised National Identity Cards (CNICs) - although not fake, but through unfair means (this fact was reported from time to time in Pakistan media) …

However, there is a significant body of evidence to suggest literally hundreds of Afghans have obtained Pakistan CNICs, and then Pakistan passports to exit Pakistan and move onto the irregular migration route to Australia. This involves the complicity of officials in obtaining CNICs through the Form B (birth certificate) process, CNIC and then passport.[16]

[16] Ibid.

165.   I am mindful that recent Pakistani court decisions have expressed the view that persons of Afghan descent born in Pakistan are entitled to Pakistani citizenship under the Pakistan’s Citizenship Act 1951.[17] However, it is clear that the government is reluctant to adopt or implement this interpretation of the law. In any event, I have found that the applicant was not born in Pakistan and this interpretation is not applicable to him.

[17] See Every child has birthright to citizenship: IHC, Express Tribune, 23 October 2022,

166.   On the basis of the evidence before me, I find that the Pakistani documents obtained by [Mr A] and other members of his family in Pakistan were/are fraudulent. I find that [Mr A], [Ms B] and their children, including the applicant never had any entitlement to Pakistani identity documents or Pakistani citizenship. I find that the applicant was never in possession of legitimate Pakistani documents, including a National Identity Card and passport. I find that the applicant is not a national of Pakistan.

167.   There is no doubt that the Afghan documents submitted by the applicant are generally of poor quality and appear to lack reliability. I appreciate, however, that historically Afghan nationals have faced longstanding and systemic challenges in obtaining and verifying official identity and civil status documentation, arising from decades of armed conflict, regime changes, and the collapse of civil infrastructure. The serious conflicts that have taken place in the country from the 1970s, successive periods of Taliban and non-Taliban rule, foreign interventions, and institutional instability, have led to the near total breakdown of reliable bureaucratic functions in many parts of the country. The absence of a stable, centralised authority over extended periods has resulted in inconsistent or inaccessible registration systems, particularly in rural and conflict affected areas. Widespread illiteracy, poverty, lack of secure document storage, and the destruction of government records have further compounded these difficulties. Against this backdrop, the prevalence of document fraud, whether through necessity or exploitation, has become a known feature of Afghanistan’s official documentation landscape. These factors significantly undermine the reliability of Afghan documents and pose acute challenges for Afghan nationals in securing, authenticating, or producing official records of identity, family relationships, and legal status.[18] This information provides a reasonable explanation for the irregularities in the Afghan identity documents produced by the applicant.

[18] See Samuel Hall, Documentation and Legal Identification in Afghanistan, IOM, August 2023, Afghanistan: Tazkera, passports and other ID documents, Landinfo, 22 May 2019, Legal Identity and Civil Documentation in Afghanistan, UNHCR, May 2024, and DFAT Country Information Report – Afghanistan, 27 June 2019.

168.   In relation to Taskeras in particular, the IOM has noted that ‘six versions of the paper Taskera were in circulation at the time of the government change in August 2021, with variances in appearance and application procedures by district.’[19] In 2019, the Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre, Landinfo, noted:

[19] Samuel Hall, Documentation and Legal Identification in Afghanistan, IOM, August 2023.

The starting point for the assessment of Afghan documents, is Afghanistan’s administrative culture; an administrative culture which is strongly characterised by bribery, corruption, incompetence and nepotism. Nepotism is extensive at all levels of administration and the majority of people in senior positions are there on account of kinship or acquaintances… Bribery, corruption and illegal production of different types of documentation is widespread in Afghanistan…

Documents issued by the proper authority can contain both correct and incorrect information. It is easy to provide ID documents with incorrect information issued by the proper authority. There is also a large market for fake documents in Afghanistan…

It is evident that the continual conflict situation has contributed to there not being an established, uniform, regulated and predictable control of identifying information in connection with the issuing of tazkeras and passports, either in Afghanistan or by Afghan representatives abroad…

Based on Landinfo’s experience on problems with identity and nationality in countries suffering from armed conflicts, problems of poverty, weak administration and extensive corruption, it will normally be easier to decide the nationality rather than identity when no documents are available. It is natural to assume that it is also the case concerning Afghanistan.[20]

[20] Afghanistan: Tazkera, passports and other ID documents, Landinfo, 22 May 2019.

169.   I have found above that the applicant and his parents were born in Afghanistan. I have found that [Mr A] and [Ms B] migrated to Pakistan from Afghanistan sometime between 1993 and 2001. I have also found that the applicant is not a national of Pakistan. On the basis of these findings, the corroborative evidence of the witnesses, the overall weight of the documentary and other evidence before me, I find that the applicant is a national of Afghanistan and that Afghanistan is the receiving country.

Being a Hazara Shi'a in Afghanistan

170.   The applicant’s Hazara ethnicity and his Shi’a faith have never been in dispute. I accept that he is a Shi’a Muslim of Hazara ethnicity.

171.   The sources I have consulted suggest that, following the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Afghanistan’s Hazara and Shi'a communities have faced escalating persecution characterised by targeted violence, systemic discrimination, and the erosion of religious freedoms.

172.   Hazaras, a predominantly Shi'a ethnic minority comprising 10–20% of Afghanistan’s population, have endured marginalisation for over a century. During the Taliban’s first regime (1996–2001), they suffered brutal oppression, including the massacre of at least 2,000 Hazaras in Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998.[21] After the US led intervention in 2001, Hazaras achieved modest progress in education, political representation, and human rights advocacy. However, these gains unravelled rapidly following the Taliban’s resurgence, reigniting fears of renewed persecution.[22] 

[21] See Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-I Sharif, Human Rights Watch (HRW), November 1998,

[22] Hazaras and Shi’as: Violence, Discrimination, and Exclusion Under the Taliban, JURISTnews, 14 May 2024,

173.   The seizure of power by the Taliban on 15 August 2021 marked a watershed moment for Afghanistan. It led to the collapse of the Islamic Republic, the withdrawal of international forces, and the onset of a profound human rights and humanitarian crisis that reversed nearly two decades of fragile progress.[23] The Hazara community’s scepticism toward the Taliban’s 2021 promises of inclusivity stemmed not only from this history of violence, but also Taliban's subsequent actions, including systematic marginalisation and dismantling previous legal and political frameworks that offered them some measure of recognition and protection.

[23] The Rule of Taliban: A Year of Violence, Impunity and False Promises, Amnesty International, August 2022,

174.   According to Tawab Danish:

After the resurgence of the Taliban, the Hazaras and Shia of Afghanistan have faced violence, systematic discrimination and exclusion. The targeting of Hazaras has intensified, and many attacks go unprosecuted.[24]

[24] Hazaras and Shi’as: Violence, Discrimination, and Exclusion Under the Taliban, JURISTnews, 14 May 2024.

175.   In January 2022, DFAT reported that members of the Hazara community have been subject to Taliban violence.[25] There have been ‘widespread allegations’ of Taliban abuses against Hazaras, including killings, detentions and forced displacements in the Hazarajat region.[26] Within weeks of the Taliban taking power, reports began emerging of non-Pashtun Afghans being forcibly evicted from their homes and farms, so that the victorious Taliban could reward their followers with land taken from other groups, particularly Hazaras, Turkmen and Uzbeks. These evictions were reported across the country.[27] These operations often occurred with minimal notice, preventing families from harvesting crops or retrieving belongings. While Taliban officials justified the evictions as resolving property disputes, NGOs have condemned them as ethnic cleansing aimed at erasing Hazara presence from historically contested regions.[28] 

[25] DFAT Thematic Report on Political and Security Developments in Afghanistan (August 2021 to January 2022), DFAT, January 2022. 

[26] See Afghan Witness, (According to its website, Afghan Witness is ‘a project to independently collect, preserve and verify information on the human rights, security and political situation in Afghanistan’. It is coordinated by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR), ‘a UK-based non-profit organisation with expertise in open-source analysis and investigations’).

[27] The Rule of Taliban: A Year of Violence, Impunity and False Promises, Amnesty International, August 2022.

[28] Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority Shi'a, HRW, 22 October 2021, and Afghanistan's Shi'ite Minority Suffers 'Systematic Discrimination' Under Taliban Rule, Radio Free Europe, 17 July 2023,

176.   In addition, Shi’a religious observances have faced escalating restrictions. In July 2023, Taliban fighters barred Shi’a residents in Kabul from publicly celebrating Eid al-Ghadir, a major festival.[29] During Muharram, authorities prohibited the installation of ceremonial gates, flags, and water stations, citing security concerns, which were dismissed by Shi’a leaders as pretextual discrimination.[30] The Taliban have also systematically targeted Shi’a educational institutions, preventing the teaching of the Shi’a Jafari school of jurisprudence and have placed restrictions on Shi’a literature and religious materials.[31] In June 2023, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the historically strong anti-Hazara sentiment has remained present since the Taliban’s seizure of power, and that the Taliban’s attitude could perpetuate and legitimise long-standing anti-Hazara sentiments.[32] In a recent report, the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) citing other sources reported:

[29] Afghanistan's Shi'ite Minority Suffers 'Systematic Discrimination' Under Taliban Rule, Radio Free Europe, 17 July 2023.

[30] Bennett Calls for Comprehensive, Human Rights-Centered Action Plan for Afghanistan, KabulNow, 2 November 2024, Hazaras and Shi’as: Violence, Discrimination, and Exclusion Under the Taliban, JURISTnews, 14 May 2024; Afghanistan's Shi'ite Minority Suffers 'Systematic Discrimination' Under Taliban Rule, Radio Free Europe, 17 July 2023; 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Afghanistan, US Department of State, 28 June 2024, and Taliban Systematically Restricts Minorities’ Rights & Services, Says Rights Group, Afghanistan International, 20 March 2025,

[32] General Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

[The] Taliban do not usually attack Hazara and Shia communities and had not, as of October 2023, documented any confrontations in provinces where Hazara leaders had been appointed, such as in the provinces of Bamyan and Daykundi. However, armed Taliban fighters have constantly been out controlling these areas, ‘so, some will always think there is a possibility that the status quo may change for the worse.[33]

[33] Country of Origin Information Report - Afghanistan – Country Focus, EUAA, November

177.   More importantly, since the Taliban's return to power, Hazaras and Shi’as in Afghanistan have faced intensified sectarian violence by the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISK). This violence appears systematic and has inflicted devastating casualties on civilians, particularly within Hazara communities. The group has claimed responsibility for 13 attacks and has been linked to 3 others, resulting in over 700 casualties.[34] Among the deadliest assaults was the October 8, 2021, suicide bombing at the Gozar-e-Sayed Abad Mosque in Kunduz, which killed 50 worshippers and injured 100. A week later, on October 15, another attack at the Imam Bargah Mosque in Kandahar claimed 65 lives and wounded 70. ISK explicitly threatened further violence after the Kandahar bombing, vowing to target Shi’as in every way, from slaughtering their necks to scattering their limbs.[35] The September 30, 2022, bombing of the Kaaj Educational Centre in Kabul exemplified this campaign, killing 53 students-including 35 girls-and injuring 110 others.[36]  While  the number of attacks targeting Hazaras and Shi’as decreased in 2023, following Taliban operations against the ISK and a shift of focus of the ISK to Taliban targets, attacks targeting Shi’a Hazaras resurfaced again in October and November 2023. These attacks continued into 2024 with IED and shooting attacks resulting in significant casualties in January, April, and September 2024.[37]

[34] Afghanistan: ISIS Group Targets Religious Minorities, HRW, 6 September 2022,

[35] Afghanistan: ISIS Group Targets Religious Minorities, HRW, 6 September 2022; and Afghanistan: Surge in Islamic State Attacks on Shi'a, HRW, 25 October 2021,

[36] Hazaras and Shi’as: Violence, Discrimination, and Exclusion Under the Taliban, JURISTnews, 14 May 2024; and Attacks Target Afghanistan’s Hazaras Inadequate Protection Provided for Community Long at Risk, HRW, 3 May 2024,

[37] Country of Origin Information Report - Afghanistan – Country Focus, EUAA, November

178.   According to EUAA, there have also been unclaimed attacks targeting Shi’a Hazaras, including the killings of five Shi’a religious leaders in three targeted attacks in the outskirts of Herat City towards the end of 2023, an explosion at a commercial centre in Dasht-e Barchi on 11 January 2024, and shooting of worshippers inside a Shi’a Mosque in Herat Province in April 2024.[38]

[38] Ibid.

179.   Despite pledging to protect religious minorities, the Taliban have consistently failed to prevent ISK attacks or assist victims. Human Rights Watch has documented the Taliban’s refusal to provide adequate security during Shi’a religious observances, such as Muharram processions, and their failure to deliver medical aid to survivors. This inaction has exacerbated vulnerabilities, with Shi’a communities accusing the Taliban of tacitly enabling ISK’s sectarian agenda.[39]  

[39] Afghanistan: ISIS Group Targets Religious Minorities, HRW, 6 September 2022; Hazaras and Shi’as: Violence, Discrimination, and Exclusion Under the Taliban, JURISTnews, 14 May 2024; Country of Origin Information Report - Afghanistan – Country Focus, EUAA, November 2024; Attacks Target Afghanistan’s Hazaras Inadequate Protection Provided for Community Long at Risk, HRW, 3 May 2024.

180.   On the basis of the evidence before me, I find that if the applicant were to be removed to Afghanistan, there is a real chance that he will be subjected to threats to his life or liberty, significant physical harassment and significant physical ill treatment at the hands of the Taliban authorities and/or the ISK. I am satisfied that such treatment amounts to serious harm under s 5J(4)(b) of the Act. I find that the essential and significant reason for the persecution feared by the applicant is his Hazara race and Shi’a religion. I find that effective state protection against the harm the applicant fears is not available to him in Afghanistan. I am satisfied that the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of Afghanistan. I also find that the applicant cannot take reasonable steps to modify his behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in Afghanistan.

181. As I have accepted that the applicant faces a real chance of persecution in Afghanistan for the reasons of his religion and ethnicity, I find that he has a well‑founded fear of persecution in Afghanistan. Therefore, I am satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).

182.   I have found that the applicant is not a national of Pakistan and I am satisfied that he does not have a presently existing right, however expressed, to enter and reside in Pakistan. Similarly, there is no evidence before me to suggest, and I find, that he does not have a right to enter and reside in [Country 4]. Section 36(3) therefore does not apply.

DECISION

183. The Tribunal sets aside and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Date of hearing: 24 September 2024

Representative for the Applicant: Ms Anna Joyce Ryburn

ATTACHMENT  -  Extract from Migration Act 1958

5 (1) Interpretation

cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:

(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or

(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;

but does not include an act or omission:

(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:

(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:

(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or

(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or

(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or

(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or

(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;

but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

receiving country,  in relation to a non-citizen, means:

(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or

(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.

5H    Meaning of refugee

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:

(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or

(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.

Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.

5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:

(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and

(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and

(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.

Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.

(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.

Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.

(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:

(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or

(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or

(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:

(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;

(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;

(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;

(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;

(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;

(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):

(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and

(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and

(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:

(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;

(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;

(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;

(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.

(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family

For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:

(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear of persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and

(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:

(i)the first person has ever experienced; or

(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.

Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family

For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:

(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and

(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and

(c)     any of the following apply:

(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;

(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;

(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

5LA Effective protection measures

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:

(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:

(i)the relevant State; or

(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.

(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:

(a)     the person can access the protection; and

(b)     the protection is durable; and

(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.

36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act

(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

(aa)  a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and

(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and

(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:

(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or

(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or

(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:

(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.


30 June 2023,


2024,


2024.

Actions
Download as PDF Download as Word Document


Cases Citing This Decision

0

Cases Cited

0

Statutory Material Cited

0