2306400 (Refugee)
[2024] AATA 2327
•26 February 2024
2306400 (Refugee) [2024] AATA 2327 (26 February 2024)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER: 2306400
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Thailand
MEMBER:Peter Vlahos
DATE:26 February 2024
PLACE OF DECISION: Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
This Statement was made on 26th February 2024 at 9.30AM
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Thailand – Federal Circuit Court remittal – no new evidence and consent to decision without hearing – political opinion – opposition to military coup and support for democratic rights – no activities, harm or profile – economic conditions – unlawful work in Australia – country information – socio-economic circumstances do not reach significant harm – decision under review affirmedLEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5(1), 5AAA, 5H(1)(a), 5J(1)(a), 36(2)(a), (aa), (2A), 65, 360(2)(b)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
CASES
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1997) 1997 CLR 510
NABE v MIMIA (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263
SZQRB v MIAC [2013] FCAFC 33
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.
______________________________________________________________________
In accordance with s 431 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the Tribunal will not publish any statement which may identify the applicant or any relative or dependant of the applicant.STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 19 December 2019 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicant who claims to be a citizen of Thailand, applied for the visa on 3 November 2018. The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that requirements of subsection 36(2) were not met.
Application’s Procedural history
The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision, and that decision was set aside by the Federal Circuit Court [in] May 2023. The matter was placed before the Tribunal for re-hearing pursuant to an order of the Court.
On 7 December 2023 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant indicating that it had considered the material before it, but was unable to make a favourable decision. The Tribunal invited the applicant to appear before it (in-person) to provide evidence and to make submissions concerning the applicant’s claims. The hearing was scheduled for 22 February 2024 at 9.30AM.
On 20 February 2024 the applicant wrote to the Tribunal expressing his intention to have his claims dealt with by the Tribunal on the available evidence on file/on the papers without him attending the scheduled hearing.
Therefore, the Tribunal has determined this matter on the papers having received the applicant’s consent to do so as is provided for by section 360(2)(b) of the Act.
The applicant provided no new evidence to the Tribunal.
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The issue in this case is whether Australia has protection obligations in respect of the applicant. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.
Country of origins and identity
Bogus documents
There is no evidence before the Tribunal to indicate that any of the documents provided to the Tribunal in order to prove the applicant’s identity is a bogus document as is defined in section 5(1) of the Act.
Also, based on a copy of the applicant’s Passport, which was provided to the Department of Home Affairs (‘the Department’) and to the Tribunal (on file)[1] and the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant is a national of Thailand and has had his claims assessed against that country in relation to section 36(2)(a) and section 36(2)(aa) of the Act and on this evidence (currently, before the Tribunal), the Tribunal further accepts and finds the applicant’s identity is as is claimed for the purposes of this decision.
Protection in another country whether available considered
[1] see, AAT File and Department of Home Affairs File no. [Reference]
The Tribunal finds on the evidence before it, that the applicant does not have a right to enter or to reside in a country other than Thailand. Therefore, the Tribunal concludes and finds that section 36(3) of the Act does not apply to the applicant or to his circumstances.
Department File accessed by the Tribunal
The Tribunal has before it the Department’s file relating to the applicant’s claims. The Tribunal also has had regard to the material referred to in the delegate’s decision record.
Background – the applicant’s migration and visa history
Date Event details [June] 2013 Arrived in Australia on a TU-573 Student Visa
3 November 2018 Applied for a XA-866 Protection visa; associated Bridging visa granted EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL
Background – Personal details
The applicant recorded in his application that he was born on [Date] in [District], Udon Thani Province, Thailand. He speaks and writes Thai but did not indicate in his application whether or not he speaks, or writes English. He is not married. The applicant’s ‘on-line application’ provided no details of his family in Thailand and no details concerning the applicant’s education levels or his employment while in Thailand except to indicate that his ‘unemployed. His application is also silent on providing a description of the applicant’s circumstances while here, in Australia, except to state the following:[2]
[2] see, Department of Home Affairs File no. [Reference]_Application for Protection visa_ on-line_ and AAT File no 2000161.
Give details of how the applicant occupied their time and financially supported themselves during unemployment.
Activities undertaken:
I have to work as illegal labour in farm sometime with contractor
because I have to pay for eat and for my life cost daily.Financial support:
I have to support myself so please allow me to work and study
because I have to work for buy the food and to study for get the
job. And English language is very important for use my life in Australia so the study is very important for me.The applicant provided no further details about himself.
The applicant’s claims for Protection
The Tribunal noted that the applicant made the following written claims in his application for Protection visa which submitted to the Department and noted in summary form here, as follows:[3]
[3] Department of Home Affairs File no. [Reference]_ Applicant’s Application for Protection Form_ also, see Delegate’s _decision record_ dated 3 November 2018.
- Since the coup in Thailand on 20 April 2014 led by Prayut Chanocha, the Thai people,
including him, have lacked the freedom of political election.
right to democracy and to participate in the administration of the country.
economic downturn.
of the whole country.- He opposes the coup as it is unlawful, and because the population of Thailand has lost the
- The coup damaged the economy in Thailand, resulting in unemployment and debt.
- He did not experience harm in Thailand.
- If he returns to Thailand, he will lose the right to liberty, political involvement, and democracy.
- His political opinion will be controlled. He will face unemployment due to the country’s
- The authorities in Thailand will not protect him as they hold the sole power and are in control
- He cannot relocate to another part of Thailand to avoid harm as the problems extend across the whole country.
The applicant provided no further claims.
The Tribunal noted the comments made in the delegate’s decision record that the applicant had been provided with the opportunity to provide all of the details of his protection claims. It was noted by the delegate, that the application form the applicant completed and submitted advised that he should provide all of his protection claims and all documents or other information to support his claims. The delegate[4] also made it known to the applicant that a decision would be made on the information provided with his application.
[4] see, AAT File no. 2000161_ Delegate’s decision record_ (copy) at pp. 2-3.
In addition to the above, on 30 November 2018 the applicant was sent an acknowledgement of valid application letter which advised him that he could provide additional information relating to his claims. The letter also informed the applicant that the decision on his application could be made by the Department without another opportunity for him to present any further information. At the time of decision (by the delegate), no additional information had been received by the Department.
Supporting evidence on Department File
The Tribunal noted (referring to the Department’s File) that the applicant provided no supporting evidence with his Protection Application Form, nor did he provide any supporting evidence with his Application for Review Form submitted to the Tribunal.
COUNTRY INFORMATION[5]- THAILAND POLITICAL CRISIS POPULAR SENTIMENT TOWARS MILITARY AND THE RULE OF LAW
[5] see, Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade Country Information Report – Thailand 18 December 2023.
DFAT (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) has provided the following country information relevant to the applicant’s claims in their report dated 18 December 2023 which provides the following information concerning the political situation in Thailand.
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
2.1 Thailand is the only Southeast Asian country to never have been colonised by a Western power. An absolute monarchy until an elite-led revolution in 1932, Thailand has since alternated between democracy and military rule. While the monarch’s powers are theoretically limited by the constitution, the King exercises significant influence over politics, the military and society. The monarchy’s power and legitimacy are tightly intertwined with that of the military, which has carried out over a dozen coups in the last century and maintains a central role in Thai politics.
2.2 Beginning in 1992, Thailand experienced a period of democracy that culminated in the rise of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra during the early 2000s. Although Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party enjoyed widespread support in Thailand’s rural north and northeast, his populist policies, alleged corruption, and perceived disloyalty to the crown alienated the urban elite. Conflict between Thaksin’s ‘Red Shirt’ supporters and his royalist ‘Yellow Shirt’ opponents subsequently characterised Thai politics for the following decade.
2.3 A coup removed Thaksin in 2006 and he fled to the UK. Thaksin’s sister Yingluck was elected Prime Minister in 2011 before she was also removed by a coup in 2014, which installed Army chief Prayuth Chan-o-cha as head of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). The NCPO held a referendum to approve a new constitution in 2016, and national elections took place in 2019. While opposition parties won more seats than the military-backed party, they were unable to form government. Prayuth then became Prime Minister.
2.4 King Bhumibol Adulyadej died in October 2016 and was succeeded by his son, King Maha Vajiralongkorn (Rama X). As King, Rama X has strengthened his influence over Thai politics and the military and assumed control of the Crown Property Bureau, reportedly making him the richest monarch in the world. In early 2020, a series of protests began against the Prayuth government, which expanded to include demands for reform of the monarchy. Authorities responded by deploying riot police and arresting hundreds of protesters, many of whom faced ongoing legal action at the time of publication.
2.5 Thailand held national elections in May 2023. The progressive Move Forward Party won the most seats, ahead of the Thaksin-backed Pheu Thai party, although could not secure sufficient support from the military-appointed senate to form government. Pheu Thai eventually took government at the head of an 11- party coalition. Former businessman Srettha Thavisin became Prime Minister on 22 August 2023. On the same day, Thaksin returned from exile.
POLITICAL SYSTEM
2.22 Thailand is a constitutional monarchy, with King Maha Vajiralongkorn as its Head of State. While the King has limited formal power, he is highly influential over Thai politics and the military (see Military). The National Assembly consists of an elected 500-member House of Representatives and an appointed 250- member Senate. All current senators were appointed by the last military junta; many are closely aligned with the military (see Recent History). The House of Representatives has a four-year term; the senate has a five[1]year term.
2.23 At a sub-national level, Thailand is divided into 76 provinces and two special administrative areas (Bangkok and Pattaya). Provincial governors are appointed, while the governors of Bangkok and Pattaya are elected. Provinces are further subdivided into districts, led by centrally-appointed district chiefs. Local government sub-units include subdistricts, municipalities, and villages, in which citizens directly elect their leaders. The village headman or headwoman plays an important role in village life, including through organising collective action and mediating disputes. 2023 National Elections
2.24 Thailand held national elections on 14 May 2023, for the second time since the restoration of democracy in 2019. The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) described the elections as being ‘well-run’ and ‘mostly free and fair’. Critics pointed to flaws including a constitutional framework that favoured military[1]backed parties, restrictions on freedom of speech, and state-sponsored disinformation campaigns. While there were some reports of vote buying, there were no reports of violence and ANFREL did not observe voter intimidation or undue influence at polling stations. Voter turnout was a record 75 per cent.
2.25 The campaign was largely a three-way contest between conservative, military-backed parties, the Thaksin-backed Pheu Thai party and the progressive Move Forward Party. The latter ran on a strongly reformist platform, including proposals to expand welfare, raise the minimum wage and abolish military conscription. Controversially, they also proposed to amend Thailand’s strict lèse-majesté law (see Critics of the Monarchy).
2.26 Move Forward won the most seats, ahead of Pheu Thai, while military-backed parties performed poorly. Move Forward leader Pita Limjaroenrat immediately began negotiations to form a coalition government, including Pheu Thai and six other parties. Move Forward’s bid was strongly opposed by the military-appointed senate, particularly due to their proposed reform of the lèse-majesté law. Under the 2017 constitution, Pita needed the support of a majority of the senate to become Prime Minister and fell well short of this target. Pheu Thai formed a new coalition, including military-backed parties it had previously sworn to exclude, and in August 2022, Pheu Thai candidate Srettha Thavisin was sworn in as Prime Minister.
POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED)
3.14 Article 34 of the Constitution guarantees the right to express opinions, make speeches, write, print, publicise and express by other means, although allows for this right to be restricted by law for the purpose of maintaining state security, public safety, public order or good morals, or for protecting the health of the people. While Article 44 guarantees the right to assemble peacefully, it allows for this right to be restricted by law for the purpose of maintaining state security, public safety, public order or good morals, or for protecting the rights or liberties of other persons.
3.15 Despite these Constitutional guarantees, human rights activists have criticised the government for its frequent use of judicial harassment or ‘lawfare’ to silence critics, including under the following laws:
• Section 112 of the Criminal Code (Lèse-Majesté)
• Article 116 of the Criminal Code (‘the Sedition Law’)
• Sections 326 to 333 of the Criminal Code (criminal defamation)
• the Computer- Related Crime Act (2007; amended 2017)
• the Public Assembly Act (2015)
• the Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation (2005)
• National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) decrees (2014-2019)
3.16 Businesses, individuals, and authorities often use so-called SLAPP suits (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) for the same purpose, particularly under criminal defamation laws. While physical violence, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings on the basis of political opinion are infrequent, they do occur – for examples, see Critics of the Monarchy and Civil Society, Human Rights Defenders and Whistleblowers.
3.17 The space for political expression is generally wider under civilian governments than military ones. Since Thailand’s return to democracy in 2019, Thai politics has featured robust exchanges of political views, and criticism of the government has been common and accepted. Ahead of the 2023 elections, some in-country sources said that in the current environment ‘you can talk about anything except the monarchy’. In practice, exceptions apply
3.18 DFAT assesses that ordinary citizens are generally not at risk of official or societal discrimination or violence on the basis of political opinion, with the important exception of critics of the monarchy. DFAT assesses that groups such as opposition politicians, protesters and whistleblowers also face risks on the basis of political opinion – see relevant sections for specific assessments.
Critics of the Monarchy
3.19 Thailand’s strict lèse-majesté law forbids all criticism of the monarchy. Under Section 112 of the Criminal Code, anyone who ‘defames, insults, or threatens the King, the Queen, the Heir-apparent, or the Regent’ faces 3-15 years in prison. An individual can be charged with multiple cases simultaneously, and sentences are cumulative, sometimes resulting in extremely long sentences. In 2021, a 65-year-old public servant was sentenced to 43 years in jail for sharing audio clips deemed to insult the monarchy, while in 2017, a man was sentenced to 35 years in jail for social media posts that were deemed to insult the monarchy.
3.20 The law does not define what constitutes an insult to the monarchy, leaving courts to interpret a wide range of actions and statements as illegal. These have included: hanging banners, printing stickers, making statements online (including in private chatrooms), and liking or sharing social media posts, as well as appearing onstage with another person who criticised the monarchy, criticising royal pets, and writing about historical or fictional monarchs. In February 2022, two women were charged with lèse-majesté for conducting public polls on whether people felt bothered by royal motorcades. In March 2023, a man was sentenced to two years in prison for publishing a calendar featuring yellow ducks (a symbol of the 2020-21 protest movement) which authorities said mocked the King.
3.21 A total of 141 people were charged with lèse-majesté from 2006 to 2017, including Red Shirts and critics of the 2006 and 2014 coups. The youngest was aged 13 (see Children). Although prosecutions slowed after the death of King Bhumibol in 2016, they increased dramatically following the 2020-21 protests. Since then, more than 360 people have been charged with lèse-majesté, over twice the number charged during the entire period 2006-2020. In-country sources reported in 2023 that the use of the lèse-majesté law was ‘the worst it has ever been’, and that new charges were being filed weekly or even daily.
3.22 Thai law permits citizens to file lèse-majesté complaints against each other. Ultra- royalist vigilante groups collect evidence and file charges against people under Section 112 and encourage others to do so. According to local and international media reports, following the 2014 coup the “Rubbish Collection Organisation” led by retired Major-General Rienthong Nanna led a campaign to harass, vilify and file charges against hundreds of people it accused of insulting the monarchy. More recently, vigilante groups such as Thai Phakdee (“Loyal Thais”) and the Center of Legal Assistance for Victims of Cyberbullying (also known as the “Minion Army”) have targeted people they accused of insulting the monarchy. Their tactics include online threats, doxxing, and publishing guidelines for people to file lèse-majesté complaints. In June 2021, representatives from the Minion Army handed over about 90 lèse-majesté complaints to authorities.
3.23 People accused of lèse-majesté are usually denied bail, access to legal aid, and banned from leaving the country. While some lawyers take on Section 112 cases pro bono, there are insufficient qualified lawyers for the number of cases. When defendants are granted bail, they are often required to sign an undertaking to desist from political activities and wear an electronic monitoring device. People have complained these monitoring bracelets are bulky and require constant charging, interfering with daily activities like shopping and school. People accused of lèse- majesté are rarely acquitted, unless they can show they did not commit the actions they are accused of, for instance if they were obviously framed.
3.24 A small number of Thai anti-monarchy activists in neighbouring countries have been forcibly returned to Thailand, disappeared, or killed. In December 2018, the bodies of three Thai anti-monarchy activists who lived in Laos were found bound and mutilated in the Mekong River. The men had broadcast anti-monarchy radio programs and encouraged protests in Thailand. In June 2020, 37-year-old Thai dissident Wanchalearm Satsaksit was abducted outside his home in Phnom Penh, Cambodia; he was never seen again. Some activists said his disappearance was related to his anti-monarchy activity. DFAT is aware of reports that Thai political dissidents, including anti-monarchy activists, have been forcibly returned to Thailand by authorities in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Malaysia.
3.25 Under King Vajiralongkorn’s reign, royal guards, palace officials and others with links to the palace have been punished for perceived transgressions. From 2016-2020, at least 86 people were named in the Royal Gazette for misconduct including ‘abusing power’, ‘arrogance’, ‘disloyalty’ and ‘extremely evil behaviour’. Punishment included demotion, stripping of ranks and honours, imprisonment, and, in some cases, alleged mistreatment and violence.
3.26 A royal prison is reportedly maintained inside Dhaveevatthana Palace in Bangkok for ‘insiders’ who displease the monarch. There are multiple credible reports of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in this prison, such as beatings, being forced to roll in excrement, and being forced to do excessive heavy labour. In 2015, three former palace insiders died in custody after being arrested for embezzling funds from ‘Bike for Dad’, a royal charity project. The exact circumstances of their deaths remain unclear.
3.27 According to international media reports, some royal wives and consorts have been punished for perceived misconduct. In 2020, photos emerged of Vajiralongkorn’s ex-wife, Srirasmi Suwadee, apparently living under house arrest in Ratchaburi. In October 2019, an announcement in the Royal Gazette removed royal consort Sineenat Wongvajirapakdi from her position and stripped her titles for being “disloyal” and trying to “elevate herself to the same status as the queen”. Sineenat’s position and titles were reinstated in September 2020, but there are some reports that she has fallen out of favour again and has not been seen in public since late 2021.
3.28 DFAT assesses that people accused of criticising the monarchy are at high risk of official discrimination, in the form of unfair trials, refusal of bail, and lengthy prison sentences. They are at moderate risk of societal harassment in the form of threats and intimidation by ultra-royalist vigilante groups. High-profile critics of the monarchy who flee to neighbouring countries are at moderate risk of official discrimination in the form of forced repatriation and/or violence by royalist actors, including enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killing. Palace ‘insiders’ (including royal guards and consorts) who fall out of favour face a moderate risk of abuse and violence, including arbitrary detention and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, and a low risk of enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.
Opposition Politicians
3.29 Military-backed governments have often used legal measures to target opposition parties and politicians. Following the 2006 coup, corruption charges were brought against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who fled to the UK, where he lived in exile until 2023. His sister, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, fled to Dubai after another coup in 2014 to avoid an indictment for criminal negligence carrying a potential 10-year prison sentence. The Shinawatra’s supporters said the charges against them were politically motivated. Thaksin returned to Thailand in August 2023 and was immediately arrested; his prison sentence was subsequently reduced by royal pardon from eight years to one. Yingluck remains in exile.
3.30 Before and after the 2019 election, the NCPO repeatedly filed charges including sedition and breaches of the Computer Crimes Act against opposition politicians. While most were eventually dropped, rights groups criticised their handling and lengthy delays in their finalisation.
3.31 Since direct military rule ended in 2019, the military-backed government has frequently used criminal defamation suits and accusations of lèse-majesté to silence opposition politicians. In 2021, Future Forward Party leader Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit was charged with lèse-majesté after accusing the government of mishandling the COVID-19 vaccine rollout, and unfairly favouring a vaccine supplier owned by King Vajiralongkorn. The Criminal Court later ordered his posts removed. In February 2023, Move Forward MP Rangsiman Rome was sued for criminal defamation after he said an arrest warrant had been improperly revoked for a senator wanted on drug charges. As at the time of publication the case had yet to be finalised.
3.32 On several occasions, the Election Commission and the Constitutional Court have dissolved political parties that opposed the interests of military-backed governments. Less than a month before the 2019 election, the Constitutional Court dissolved the Thaksin-aligned Thai Raksa Chart party and banned its executives from politics for 10 years. The Election Commission had earlier found Thai Raksa Chart had violated election laws by nominating Princess Ubolratana, the elder sister of King Vajiralongkorn, as its prime ministerial candidate. Almost 300 Thai Raksa Chart candidates were disqualified from contesting the election as a result.
3.33 In February 2020, the Constitutional Court dissolved the Future Forward Party and banned its executives from politics for 10 years, after finding Thanathorn and his party had breached campaign funding rules. In March 2023, a former advisor to the military-backed government filed a petition with the Election Commission to have the Pheu Thai party dissolved, saying they had violated election law by allowing banned former politicians to canvass for them ahead of the May 2023 election. The Election Commission declined to act, and Pheu Thai was able to contest the election
3.34 In June 2023, the Election Commission announced there were grounds to investigate Pita Limjaroenrat, whose Move Forward Party won the most seats in the 2023 national election, for electoral misconduct over his alleged ownership of shares in a media company. If convicted, he faces up to 10 years’ jail and a 20-year ban from political office. Pita and his party have dismissed the allegations as baseless.
3.35 DFAT assesses that prominent politicians and political figures who oppose military-backed interests face a moderate risk of official discrimination in the form of fines, lawsuits and bans from political activities. DFAT assesses they are generally not at risk of violence. People Associated with the Red Shirt Movement
3.36 Initially formed as the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), the Red Shirt movement rose to prominence in 2009. It opposed the military-backed governments of Surayud Chulanont and Abhisit Vejjajiva and sought the return from exile of ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. It also took up issues of economic and political inequality. At its height, the Red Shirt movement had millions of supporters. The majority were from Thailand’s rural north and northeast, although it also included some progressive urbanites, academics, and left-wing activists. Most Red Shirts were non-violent, but a small number engaged in or supported violence against political opponents, civilians, and authorities.
3.37 In early 2010, mass demonstrations by Red Shirt protesters against the Abhisit government shut down central Bangkok for several weeks. Authorities dispersed the protests in a violent crackdown that killed dozens and wounded hundreds more. Security forces were widely criticised for their excessive and indiscriminate use of force against the protesters. No members of the security forces were ever held accountable for the violence. Following the crackdown, authorities questioned, arrested, and detained Red Shirt leaders and members who took part in the protests, as well as accused sympathisers.
3.38 After the 2014 coup, many Red Shirts were detained and subjected to “attitude adjustment” sessions, where security forces pressured them to end their political activities (see Arbitrary Arrest and Detention). Amnesty International recorded many human rights abuses during this period, including arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and torture. Red Shirt leaders were jailed on charges including defamation, incitement, and lèse-majesté. Grassroots supporters were harassed, intimidated and in some cases detained. Afterwards, some Red Shirt leaders withdrew from politics, while others switched allegiance to military-backed parties.
3.39 While significant numbers of Thais still identify as Red Shirts, the movement is now much less prominent than in the past. Red Shirts played a limited role in the 2019 election, 2020-21 protests, and the 2023 election. Most in-country sources said that authorities no longer harassed or monitored Red Shirt supporters, especially if they were no longer politically active. Although DFAT is aware of isolated reports of active Red Shirt supporters being harassed or monitored by local authorities, DFAT is not aware of specific cases, and has no evidence to suggest such treatment is centrally directed or widespread.
3.40 DFAT assesses that people associated with the Red Shirt movement who are no longer politically active are not at risk of official discrimination or violence. DFAT assesses that prominent Red Shirts who remain politically active are at low risk of official discrimination, in the form of possible monitoring or harassment by local authorities.
Protesters
3.41 Large-scale street protests have been a feature of political unrest in Thailand since at least the 1970s. Most are peaceful, however some have involved deadly violence and destruction of property, as well as wide scale disruption of businesses and public services. Official responses have often involved excessive force. Crackdowns by security forces killed dozens or hundreds of protesters in 1973, 1976, 1992 and 2010. No one has ever been held accountable for this violence.
3.42 Beginning with the Thai political crisis of 2005-2006, Thailand experienced a decade of intense political conflict between the royalist-conservative Yellow Shirts and the pro-democracy, pro-Thaksin Red Shirts (see People involved with the Red Shirt movement). Following the 2014 coup, the NCPO severely restricted freedom of expression and assembly, including through Order 7/2557, which banned political gatherings of more than five people, and Order 3/2558, which gave authorities wide- ranging powers to detain individuals accused of ‘actions intended to undermine or destroy peace and national security’. Hundreds of protesters were arrested under these laws, including for peaceful acts such as reading George Orwell’s ‘1984’ in public and giving a three-finger salute made popular by the film ‘The Hunger Games’.
3.43 Starting in early 2020, student groups led a series of protests in response to the disqualification of progressive politician Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit and the dissolution of the Future Forward Party. The protester’s demands included reform of the constitution and education system, an end to conscription, and, most controversially, reform of the monarchy. At their height, these protests attracted tens of thousands of participants. While most were in Bangkok, protests also occurred throughout the country. The majority were non-violent, although some protesters threw Molotov cocktails, metal bars and other objects at police, and some burned vehicles and tires. Dozens of people were injured during the protests, including protesters, police, and journalists. In October 2020, a 14-year-old protester was shot dead near Din Daeng Police Station. A 28-year-old man was arrested for his killing; he reportedly had no connection to authorities.
3.44 On-and-off demonstrations persisted into 2021, with police using water cannons, tear gas, batons, and rubber bullets to disperse protesters, hundreds of whom were arrested on charges including sedition, lèse-majesté, and breaching COVID-19 restrictions. Many of these cases were ongoing at the time of publication. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch accused police of using excessive force during the protests and in some cases of torturing protesters in custody; authorities denied these accusations. DFAT is aware of prosecutions against street vendors, businesses and others who were perceived as supporting the protests, even when they were not directly involved. In November 2021, the Constitutional Court found three protest leaders had intended to ‘overthrow the monarchy’ and ordered protest groups ‘to cease further action in these matters’. By 2022, large-scale protests had mostly ceased.
3.45 Notwithstanding the issues described above, many people who attend protests do not suffer long-term consequences for their participation. In-country sources told DFAT that young people who had participated in the 2020-2021 protests but subsequently abandoned their activism had been able to graduate university and secure jobs, including in the civil service. Two protest leaders won seats in the May 2023 national elections, despite facing ongoing legal issues related to their protest activity.
3.46 DFAT assesses that active anti-government protesters in Thailand face a moderate risk of official discrimination in the form of arbitrary detention, judicial harassment, intimidation, and surveillance. DFAT assesses they face a low risk of violence in the form of excessive security responses and possible torture or mistreatment in custody. DFAT assesses that former protesters who are no longer politically active, and are not the subject of ongoing legal action, are unlikely to face discrimination or violence for past involvement in protests.
ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
2.7 Thailand has experienced rapid economic and social development since the 1960s. The World Bank has classified Thailand as an upper-middle income economy since 2011. The economy contracted sharply during the COVID-19 pandemic, largely due to a halt in foreign tourism, which normally accounts for 11 per cent of GDP (the whole tourism sector accounts for approximately 20 per cent of GDP). Although tourism rebounded in 2022, 2023 GDP growth figures have been weaker than expected, mostly due to a slowdown in demand for Thailand’s manufactured exports, a drop in Government spending due to election period, and longer than expected time taken to form government.
2.8 Second quarter 2023 GDP growth figures for Thailand showed a slowdown from the first three months of 2023 (2.6 per cent year-on-year to 1.8 per cent), with the Bank of Thailand predicting growth of 2.8 per cent over all (before rebounding to 4.4 per cent in 2024). Other major economic sectors include services, manufacturing, and agriculture. While agriculture contributes less than 10 per cent of GDP, it employs approximately one-third of the labour force. Poverty has reduced significantly in the past 30 years, from 58 per cent in 1990 to 6.8 per cent in 2020. Nevertheless, inequality remains very high, and rural households are generally much poorer than urban households.
2.9 Thailand’s official unemployment rate is amongst the lowest in the world, at just 1.05 per cent. Analysts attribute this to a low birth rate, lack of unemployment benefits, and the practice of considering those working in Thailand’s large informal sector to be employed, regardless of how few hours per week they work. In practice, there is considerable unemployment and underemployment in Thailand, including among recent university graduates. Other economic challenges include low productivity, high levels of household debt, falling real wages, and a large shadow economy (see Security Situation).
2.10 Thailand has expanded its welfare system over the past decade. Around 14.5 million Thais who are over 18 and earn less than THB 100,000 (AUD 4,200) per year are eligible for benefits under the state welfare card scheme. Benefits include a THB 300 (AUD 12) per month cash handout, THB 500 (AUD 20) credit for public transport, discounts for gas and utility bills, and additional cash handouts for the disabled and elderly.
2.11 Thailand experiences extreme weather events, including floods and occasional drought. In 2011, floods killed more than 500 people and caused almost AUD50 billion in loss and damages. Thailand is increasingly exposed to the impacts of climate change - including the ‘worst April heatwave in Asian history’ in 2023, with temperatures reaching a record 45.4 degrees Celsius in parts of the country.
Health
2.12 Thailand has an advanced healthcare system. Thai citizens have access to good quality, affordable public healthcare under the government-funded Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS). More than 75 per cent of the population is covered by the UCS, with the remainder covered under separate schemes for civil servants and private sector employees. The UCS offers a benefit package that includes general medical care and rehabilitation services, many (but not all) high-cost medical treatments, and emergency care. Certain types of treatment, such as in-home kidney dialysis, still incur significant out-of-pocket costs. UCS enrolees receive a gold card which entitles them to free care at health centres in their home district and contracted hospitals, as well as referrals to provincial or tertiary care hospitals.
2.13 All provinces, districts and sub-districts have provincial hospitals, district hospitals and health centres respectively. There are also many high-quality private hospitals, which are the first choice of many wealthier Thais and foreign medical tourists. Thai medical staff are generally well-trained, and the number of doctors per head of population meets global benchmarks. Nevertheless, public hospitals suffer from overcrowding, long wait times and outdated equipment.
2.14 A significant rural-urban healthcare divide persists, despite long-running government programs to improve healthcare in rural areas. Structural barriers, including distance and poverty, render people living in rural areas less likely to access healthcare and more likely to experience adverse health outcomes than people in cities. The COVID- 19 pandemic strained the Thai medical system and exposed the need to train and recruit more healthcare workers, especially in light of Thailand’s ageing population
INTERNAL RELOCATION
5.22 Although Section 38 of the Constitution provides for freedom of internal movement, it also allows for the restriction of this right by law in cases of national security, public order, public welfare, town, or country planning, maintaining family status or for welfare of a minor. Thai citizens from all backgrounds frequently relocate internally for a variety of reasons.
5.23 The government restricts the free internal movement of stateless people who are not citizens but who hold government-issued identity cards. Authorities prohibit holders of these cards from travelling outside their home districts without prior permission from the district office, or outside their home provinces without permission from the governor. Offenders are subject to fines or a jail term of 45 to 60 days. People without identity cards may not travel at all.
5.24 According to human rights organisations, police at inland checkpoints often ask for bribes in exchange for allowing stateless people to move from one district to another. In addition, two groups – former Chinese civil war belligerents and their descendants living in the country for several decades, and children of Vietnamese immigrants residing in 13 north eastern provinces – live under laws and regulations restricting their movement, residence, education, and access to employment. The Chinese group is restricted to residence in the northern provinces of Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and Mae Hong Son.
5.25 As noted in Women, DFAT assesses that internal relocation may be more difficult for single women seeking to relocate with children, especially where they lack financial independence and the support of family and friends. DFAT assesses that people wanted by the authorities, particularly in politically sensitive cases, are unlikely to be able to escape through internal relocation
FINDINGS AND REASONS FOR DECISION
The applicant claims that if he returns to Thailand, he will lose the right to liberty, political involvement, and democracy, and that his political opinion would be restricted and controlled by the military-backed government. The applicant also claimed that because of the political situation that has caused an economic downturn in Thailand, he will suffer unemployment.
Consideration of the applicant’s claims - Preliminary remarks
From the outset, the Tribunal noted that the evidence in support contained in the Department’s File was not substantial. Also, no new information was forthcoming to the Tribunal with the applicant’s application for review.
The Tribunal, having been confronted with the lack of evidence (other than what was recorded in the Applicant’s Protection Application Form) is reminded of the applicant’s (who is a non-citizen) responsibility in his protection claim as is provided for in section 5AAA of the Act.
That section states the following:
(1) This section applies in relation to a non-citizen who claims to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations (however arising).
(2) For the purposes of this Act, it is the responsibility of the non-citizen to specify all particulars of his or her claim to be such a person and to provide sufficient evidence to establish the claim…
(3) …
(4) To remove doubt, the Minister does not have any responsibility or obligation to:
(a) specify, or assist in specifying, any particulars of the non-citizen’s claim; or
(b) establish, or assist in establishing, the claim …
The purpose of this provision, is to make clear, that it is the applicant’s responsibility to specify the particulars of their claim to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and to provide sufficient evidence to establish their claim.[6] Indeed, for the avoidance of doubt, it is also made clear that the Minister (or in this instance, the Tribunal) does not have any responsibility to make a case for protection on behalf of the asylum seeker ( in this instance, the applicant).[7] Further, though this provision has not yet been the centre of attention by the courts, the section’s wording, subject to any subsequent consideration to the contrary, it is likely that section 5AAA will be found to be consistent with existing law which establishes the following which are relevant to the applicant’s circumstances in this review:
§that it is the applicant to make out his or her own case: see, Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1997) 1997 CLR 510, at [187] per Gummow and Hayne JJ; and
§that the decision-maker is only required to consider claims that are expressly made by an applicant or that clearly arise on the materials before the decision-maker: see, NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(No.2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004]FCAFC 263 (NABE) at [58], [60-61] per Black CJ, French and Selway JJ.
[6] Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Act 2015 (Cth), commencement date 13 April 2015 see, the Explanatory Memorandum.
[7] see, ibid, the Explanatory Memorandum
The Tribunal is guided by these judicial considerations in arriving at its conclusions and findings concerning the applicant’s claims below.
Does the applicant meet the ‘refugee’ criterion in this instance?
First, the applicant’s election not to participate at a scheduled hearing causes the Tribunal to have some significant concerns with the applicant’s reasons for submitting this application in the first place.
There are concerns on the Tribunal’s part considering the applicant’s claims because the applicant was not present ‘in-person’ for the Tribunal to listen to his concerns and for the Tribunal to probe the applicant’s claims with questions for him to answer in order (for the Tribunal) to determine for itself, the actual reasons for the applicant’s concerns which caused him to leave Thailand. The applicant claims to fear persecution by the military and the military-backed government because of his political opinions which are opposed to the current government. The applicant claims that he ‘opposes the coup’ and that the ‘coup was bad for Thailand’ because it ‘damaged the economy’ and severely restricted the democratic rights of all Thai citizens including the applicant’s democratic rights.[8]
[8] see, _Decision Record of the Delegate at p.2
However, with his application, the applicant provided no information whatsoever as explanation as to why the political situation in Thailand necessitated him to leave Thailand and to claim protection in Australia. Indeed, the Tribunal would have asked the applicant to explain his concerns if he had attended the scheduled hearing, in light of his admission in his application, that he ‘did not experience harm in Thailand’.
A ‘refugee’ is a person who has, as defined in s.5J(1)(a) a well-founded fear of persecution ‘for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group’. As noted above, the applicant admitted to in his application that he had not faced harm in whatever form or for any reason while in Thailand – even for his political opinion being a person – a Thai citizen who, together with many other Thai citizens opposed the military and the military-backed government.
However, the evidence before the Tribunal and that provided to the Department earlier does not show any reason or reasons the applicant would be targeted even though he states he disagrees with the military and their curtailment of Thai democracy and democratic rights. The applicant does not suggest or described himself as a political activists or as a member of particular opposition group involved in civil protests. He has provided no evidence whatsoever of having been singled out for his opposing political opinion. On the contrary, he was allowed to leave Thailand when he chose to do so and was not prevented from being issued with his travel documents by the same government, he claimed had persecuted him for his political opinions. The Tribunal, having considered the evidence on the Department’s file and on its own file, finds that the applicant’s fear of harm in Thailand for his political opinion or for any other reason as provided in s.5J(1)(a) not satisfied. There is no information before the Tribunal to suggest the applicant on his return to Thailand would be targeted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in s.5J(1)(a) of the Act.
The country information provided in this decision above, (which is updated) and that provided in the delegate’s decision,[9] indicates that the NCPO relaxed restrictions on political opposition in the lead up to the March 2019 elections in Thailand. It is indicated that the elections were held without incidents of serious violence, or the authorities targeting opposition groups. However, it is indicated that the conduct of the election was manipulated to ensure that the military-aligned Palang Pracharat party was able to form a government and to ensure that Prayut Chanocha was elected as Prime Minister. The country information also indicates that the Thai police will not protect anti-military activists from being attacked, and that people who engage in criticism of the monarchy, the military, or military aligned government face official reprisals, including monitoring, detention, arrest, prosecution and ‘attitude adjustment’. Additionally, high profile political activists and dissidents face systematic, politically motivated violence. Though, the applicant has expressed a personal opposition to the former military government in Thailand, he has not raised any claim or claims of having engaged in political activities or public criticism while in Thailand or provided any evidence suggesting this which could have otherwise exposed him to some form of harm.
[9] see, AAT File & Department File_ Delegate’s decision_ at pp.3-13_ Country Information
Further, the applicant has declared (as Tribunal indicated earlier) that he has not previously experienced harm in Thailand, and has not made clear (with any evidence) why or how he would lose his right to liberty, political involvement and democracy, or how his political opinion will be controlled, and how these matters will cause him harm.
Given that the applicant has not presented claims or evidence of having been involved in any past political activity, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a high-profile activist or dissident, and as such, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant would face a real chance of being a victim of systematic, politically motivated persecution and a victim of violence if he was to return in the foreseeable future to any part of Thailand. The country information referenced above indicates that the applicant would be able to support and vote for an opposition political party if he returned to Thailand. Having said this, the Tribunal accepts (from the independent information referred to) while the current political situation in Thailand may restrict the applicant’s ability to vote in entirely free and fair democratic elections, the Tribunal is not satisfied that this restriction amount to ‘serious harm’.
On the basis of the claims put forward by the applicant, and in the absence of any new evidence, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the persecution the applicant fears involves ‘serious harm’. As such, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of persecution in Thailand on the basis of his political opinion.
Unemployment
The applicant claimed that because of the military coup and the military’s involvement in government this has caused a general economic downturn in Thailand and because of this he faced the prospect of ‘unemployment’. As the Tribunal mentioned earlier in this decision [at paragraph (27)] above, a ‘refugee’ is a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution ‘for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ as provided for in s.5J(1)(a) of the Act. The Tribunal having considered all the evidence before it, finds that this harm feared by the applicant relates to the broader economic situation that is faced by the general population of Thailand. That being the case, the Tribunal finds that in relation to this claim, the applicant’s fear of persecution in Thailand is not one of the s.5J(1)(a) reasons.
Having considered the applicant’s claims regarding his political opinion and facing unemployment in Thailand, the Tribunal is not satisfied that any of the feared harm expressed by the applicant in his application (and evidence) amounts to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’.
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).
Consideration of Complementary Protection
Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa) – complementary protection. As the Tribunal has indicated in its reasons as set out in paragraphs [34]-[45]above, the Tribunal was not satisfied that there was a real chance that the applicant would be persecuted for reasons of his political opinion if he returned to Thailand. The Tribunal considers from the evidence it reviewed in determining whether there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant’s removal from Australia to Thailand, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm as a result of his political opinion. In light of the finding of Federal Court in SZQRB v MIAC [2013] FCAFC 33 (20 March 2013), the threshold for a ‘real risk’ of harm is the same to that of a ‘real chance’ test. As such, considering the country information discussed above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm in Thailand on the basis of his political opinion.
Also, the applicant claimed that he will face unemployment if he returns to Thailand due to the country’s current economic state. Section 36(2A) of the Act provides an exhaustive list of the types of ‘significant harm’, which are relevant to an assessment under s36(2)(aa) of the Act. Significant harm is defined to include a non-citizen being arbitrarily deprived of their life, the death penalty being carried out on the non-citizen, the non-citizen being subjected to torture, the non-citizen being subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment, and the non-citizen being subjected to degrading treatment or punishment. In assessing the risk that the applicant would face ‘significant harm’ for this reason if he was removed to Thailand, the Tribunal considered the available and relevant country information.[10]
[10] see paragraph [27]in this decision above and the Appendix to this decision (incorporating the country information referred to by the delegate)
In the applicant’s Protection visa application, the applicant has recorded that he is of Thai ethnicity and that he originates from Udon Thani province in North-Eastern Thailand. The applicant also recorded that he was never employed. The Tribunal also note that the applicant is currently aged [Age]. The country information provided in this decision above, indicates that the Thai economy has experienced moderate growth in recent years and that employment opportunities exist in both the formal and informal employment sectors. The unemployment rate in the formal employment sector in Thailand is relatively low, however, the majority of Thais work in the informal sector. The information also indicated that the previously Thai military junta took steps to improve economic conditions in Thailand. The country information indicates that members of ethnic minority groups may be more likely to experience poverty in Thailand, however, as the applicant has recorded that he is of Thai ethnicity, the Tribunal is satisfied that this is not applicable to him.
The country information above, also indicates that employment opportunities exist within Thailand through internal migration and that a large number of people under the age of 45, such as the applicant, internally migrate for work. The Tribunal noted as did the delegate in his decision, that the applicant claimed that problems such as unemployment affect the entirety of Thailand, however, the Tribunal (as did the delegate) after considering the independent country information places more weight on the independent country information that indicates that internal migration has a significantly positive impact on the per capita income of such workers. Although the applicant has not indicated that that he has friends or family living elsewhere in Thailand, he has demonstrated his ability to adapt to a change of circumstances through his relocation to Australia.
Having considered the applicant’s circumstances in light of the country information, the Tribunal is satisfied that employment opportunities exist for him in Thailand and the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant would face any greater risk of unemployment than the rest of the population of Thailand generally upon his return to Thailand. The country information referenced above also indicates that the applicant would be able to access universal health care in Thailand, however, it is possible that the Thai government may alter this system in future.
Although the applicant may be faced with socio-economic challenges upon being returned to Thailand, the Tribunal on the evidence before it is not satisfied that any resulting impact on his socio-economic circumstances would be so severe as to reach the threshold where it could be considered to constitute one or more of the types of ‘significant harm’ under s36(2A).
The Tribunal is not satisfied there are substantial grounds that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed to Thailand, there is a real risk the applicant will suffer significant harm. Therefore, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa).
The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa).
There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s 36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s 36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2).
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Peter Vlahos
MemberATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a) severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b) pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d) arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b) that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a) for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b) for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c) for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d) for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e) for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a) a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b) if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
5H Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a) in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b) in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note: For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…
5J Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a) the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b) there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c) the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note: For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note: For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a) conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b) conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c) without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a) that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b) the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c) the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a) a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b) significant physical harassment of the person;
(c) significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d) significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e) denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f) denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a) disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b) disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note: Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a) a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b) the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c) any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d) the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a) protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b) the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a) the person can access the protection; and
(b) the protection is durable; and
(c) in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…
36 Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a) a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a) the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b) the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c) the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d) the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e) the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a) it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b) the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c) the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…
APPENDIX
Country information – provided in the delegate’s decision.
On 24 March 2019, Thailand held its first national elections since the coup of 2014.3 The results of elections took nearly 10 weeks to be finalised, with the delay leading to speculation of vote rigging and manipulation.4 With no single party winning a majority of seats (251 of 500 available seats) in the lower house, both major parties (Pheu Thai and Palang Pracharat party or PPRP) moved to cobble together a coalition of willing partners.5 In a highly contentious move, the Election Commission decided to post facto change the formula for calculating party list seats, ripping at least seven seats from anti-military parties and re-allocating them to minor parties who promptly chose to join a pro- military coalition.6 In the end, this reallocation proved decisive, with PPRP joining with the Democrats, Bhumjai Thai and a cabal of (nineteen) minor parties to reach a slim majority of 254 seats.7 On Wednesday 5 June 2019, a majority of Parliament, both the Senate and Lower House as required under the Constitution, endorsed Prayut as Prime Minister.8
Even after the elections, according to the constitution, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO - the post-coup military government) would only be formally dissolved once a new cabinet had been sworn into office.9 Until this time, the 2017 constitution stipulated that all NCPO orders are ‘constitutional and lawful’ and are to remain in effect until revoked by the NCPO, an order from the military-appointed legislative body, the prime minister, or cabinet resolution.10 On 9 July 2019, Prayut issued an order to repeal 70 of the 557 NCPO announcements/orders that the NCPO issued after assuming power in May 2014.11 Most NCPO orders and announcements therefore remained in effect under the new parliamentary government.12 This includes the military’s authority to detain civilian critics without judicial oversight for up to seven days on national security grounds, or for so-called ‘attitude adjustment’ sessions, typically held in military barracks.13 While it is not clear if it is the same law, new Internal Security Operations Commands (ISOC) legislation grants ISOC the power to summon and detain people for questioning without a warrant for several days if there are grounds for suspicion.14 In mid-July, opposition party Future Forward prioritised amending constitutional articles undergirding the ongoing authority of existing NCPO orders, promising to propose bills by the years’ end, at latest.15 On 10 July 2019, a new cabinet was finally appointed and then royally endorsed, some 108 days after the election, before being formally sworn in on 16 July.16 Most appointees were connected with the former junta.17
3 For broad coverage of Thailand’s March 2019 elections see Situation Update - Thailand Elections 2019, Country of Origin Information Services Section (COISS), 26 June 2019, 20190626153346
4 'Thailand Junta Leader Named Prime Minister After Contentious Vote', The New York Times, 5 June 2019, 20190606123311; 'Thai opposition says 'not too late' for parties to change minds as pro-junta talks stall after election', The Straits Times, 29 May 2019, 20190530112125
5 'Thailand’s Stolen Election', The Diplomat, 1 June 2019, 20190604102808
6 'Small parties back Thai military government chief after rule change gave them seats', Channel News Asia, 13 May 2019, 20190514115206; 'Small Parties Put Thai Coup Leader on Track to Remain in PM Post', Voice of America, 14 May 2019, 20190515162401; 'Thailand’s Stolen Election', The Diplomat, 1 June 2019, 20190604102808
7 'Thailand's military-backed PM voted in after junta creates loose coalition', The Guardian, 6 June 2019, 20190606141320
8 'Thailand Junta Leader Named Prime Minister After Contentious Vote', The New York Times, 5 June 2019, 20190606123311
9 ‘Media bans lifted, military court cases transferred’, Bangkok Post, 9 July 2019, 20190715110234; 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Thailand', US Department of State, 13 March 2019, p.1, 20190314092700; 'Pheu Thai gears up to grill ministers', Bangkok Post, 24 June 2019, 20190624112242
10 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Thailand', US Department of State, 13 March 2019, p.1, 20190314092700
11 ‘Military authorities can still arbitrarily detain civilians’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, 13 July 2019, 20190715103854
12 ‘Military authorities can still arbitrarily detain civilians’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, 13 July 2019, 20190715103854
13 ‘Military authorities can still arbitrarily detain civilians’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, 13 July 2019, 20190715103854; Thailand keeps power of arbitrary detention’, The Star Online, 11 July 2019, 20190715113738
14 ‘Media bans lifted, military court cases transferred’, Bangkok Post, 9 July 2019, 20190715110234
15 ‘Thailand's Opposition Parties Aim to Amend Pro-Military Constitution’, Voice of America, 16 July 2019, 2019071814170016 ‘New Thai cabinet eases uncertainty, but doubts persist over economy’, Reuters, 11 July 2019, 20190715115636; ‘Cabinet ministers sworn in’, Bangkok Post, 16 July 2019, 20190717143846
17 ‘New Thai cabinet eases uncertainty, but doubts persist over economy’, Reuters, 11 July 2019, 20190715115636; ‘Thailand’s Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha rewards loyalists in new cabinet’, South China Morning Post, 10 July 2019, display’, Bangkok Post, 12 July 2019, 20190715115004
Following the May 2014 coup, the military government prohibited all existing political parties from holding meetings or engaging in political activities, forbade any new parties from forming and suspended state funding for political parties.18 In December 2017, the NCPO issued an Order permitting the formation of new political parties.19 On 14 September 2018, the NCPO decreed in the Royal Gazette that political parties could now organise, albeit on a limited basis.20 In December 2018, the Prime Minister lifted the ban on political activities, including the ban on gatherings of five or more persons.21 There are no reports of authorities targeting opposition groups with violence in the lead up to March elections, which appeared to be free of serious incidents of violence.22
The 2014 military coup attempted to destroy elements supportive of Thaksin Shinawatra, jailing dissenters, breaking up opposition rallies or meetings and causing many opponents to go into exile.23 Sedition laws were used to charge former Pheu Thai politicians critical of the NCPO.24 Military courts targeted political parties, politicians and demonstrators aligned with Thaksin Shinawatra.25 Corruption charges were used as a political weapon, principally targeting allies of Thaksin.26 The regime, for example, prosecuted leading members of the previous Yingluck Shinawatra government,27 including for official government schemes such as the rice subsidy program.28 As discussed further below, military personnel monitored and harassed Red Shirt leaders for years following the coup.29 Other opposition groups (such as the New Democracy Movement and Dao Din) have also been crushed, with members imprisoned or intimidated.30 Lèse-majesté laws have frequently been used to target political opponents.31 In the days following the swearing in of the new cabinet, and potentially in a sign of political rapprochement, a prominent red-shirt activist was released from jail after a royal pardon halved his original ten year sentence.32
In order to counter perceived ‘internal threats’, the NCPO established the Peace and Order Maintenance Command (POMC), which operated under regional army units.33 The POMC’s mission was to monitor public events, observe and summon individuals for talks, press charges against those expressing political opinions and to compile files on individual critics.34 According to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR), military personnel attached to POMC classified any suspected ‘threats’ into ‘target groups’, who then became the subject of military-style ‘missions’.35 Targets were monitored both online and offline, had extensive dossiers prepared on them and were often subjected to home visits.36 Frequently, targets were followed by military personnel or police or summoned to meet with such officers for ‘talks’.37
18 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.13, CIS7B83941602
19 ‘Assessment of Thailand's follow-up actions for the implementation for the UN Human Rights Committee's recommendations’, International Federation for Human Rights et al, 14 September 2018, CIS7B839419458
20 ‘Thailand’s new party Future Forward offers hope – if junta will let it’, South China Morning Post, 29 September 2018, CXBB8A1DA37930
21 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Thailand', US Department of State, 13 March 2019, p.1, 20190314092700
22 ‘International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) to the Kingdom of Thailand’s 2019 General Election – Interim Report’, Asian Network for Free Elections’, 26 March 2019, p.6, 20190613160753
23 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, pp.5, 31, CIS7B83941602
24 ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Thailand’, US Department of State, 20 April 2018, pp.5, 31, OGD95BE927697
25 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.10, CIS7B83941602
26 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.11, CIS7B83941602
27 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.28, CIS7B83941602
28 Freedom in the World 2019 - Thailand, Freedom House, 11 April 2019, Sect. B1, 20190418142231
29 ‘Collapsed rule of law: The consequences of four years under National Council for Peace and Order for human rights and Thai society’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, June 2018, p.17, 20, 20190709100649
30 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, pp.3,9, CIS7B83941602
31 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.6, CIS7B83941602
32 ‘Jailed red-shirt singer released under royal pardon’, Bangkok Post, 17 July 2019, 20190717143451
33 ‘Collapsed rule of law: The consequences of four years under National Council for Peace and Order for human rights and Thai society’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, June 2018, p.3, 20190709100649
34 ‘Collapsed rule of law: The consequences of four years under National Council for Peace and Order for human rights and Thai society’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, June 2018, p.3, 20190709100649
35 ‘Collapsed rule of law: The consequences of four years under National Council for Peace and Order for human rights and Thai society’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, June 2018, p.3, 20190709100649
36 ‘Collapsed rule of law: The consequences of four years under National Council for Peace and Order for human rights and Thai society’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, June 2018, p.4, 20190709100649
37 ‘Collapsed rule of law: The consequences of four years under National Council for Peace and Order for human rights and Rights, June 2018, p.4, 20190709100649
During 2018, the NCPO routinely detained those who expressed political views38 and harassed citizens who publicly criticized the government.39 Throughout 2018, the NCPO continued to summon members of the opposition Pheu Thai Party and the United Democratic Front for Democracy (UDD), as well as anyone accused of opposing military rule, for ‘attitude adjustment’, aiming to compel them to stop expressing anti-junta political views.40 Although the circumstances are murky, in January 2019, the bodies of several anti-junta activists who had fled to Laos in 2014 were found floating in the Mekong River, ‘stuffed with concrete’. Human rights groups expressed concerns this may be indicative of sanctioned death squads taking out junta critics.41
According to TLHR documentation, at least 929 individuals were summoned to participate in attitude adjustment sessions in the five years following the coup.42 Human Rights Watch states that thousands of people were summonsed and pressured to stop making political comments, although it is not clear whether all were subjected to periods of detention.43 Numbers of people summonsed reportedly declined from 2016 to 2017.44 Authorities detained individuals for up to seven days without informing them of charges or bringing them before a court, with the detention period sometimes extending beyond this period.45 Detainees were warned to cease political activities and forced to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in which they promised to cease participating in political activities.46 Failing to report to ‘attitude adjustment’ was considered a criminal offence, for which at least 14 people were prosecuted, while not complying with the MOU was also a criminal offence, which at least some individuals have also been charged.47 Military authority to detain critics for attitude adjustment will continue under the civilian government.48
Individuals who repeated their criticisms of the NCPO or continued their political activism were repeatedly summonsed to military camps, while some were ordered to report to authorities on a weekly basis.49 Others who were released post-summons were subsequently required to seek permission from authorities should they wish to travel outside of Thailand or even outside of their local area.50 TLHR report that at least 18 individuals made complaints about torture in custody as a consequence of being detained under martial law, NCPO orders or the Head of the NCPO Orders.51
38 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Thailand', US Department of State, 13 March 2019, sect.1e, p.10, 20190314092700
39 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Thailand', US Department of State, 13 March 2019, sect.2a, p.15, 20190314092700
40 'Human Rights Watch World Report 2019', Human Rights Watch (HRW), 17 January 2019, p.575, 20190118091502; ‘Statement at the end of visit to Thailand by the United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights’, OHCHR, 4 April 2018, CIS7B83941735
41 ‘Mutilated Thai bodies on Mekong shore are activist's aides’, BBC News, 22 January 2019, 20190712115650; ‘Bodies of exiled Thai activists “stuffed with concrete”', Reuters, 23 January, 20190408145418; 'HRW Urges Laos to Investigate Missing Exiled Thai Activists', 23 January 2019, 20190124170627; ‘Thai junta death squads eliminate exiled opponents’, Ugly Truth Thailand, 27 January 2019, 2019071710135242 ‘Military authorities can still arbitrarily detain civilians’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, 13 July 2019, 20190715103854
43 'Human Rights Watch World Report 2019', Human Rights Watch (HRW), 17 January 2019, p.575, 2019011809150244 ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Thailand’, US Department of State, 20 April 2018, p.8, OGD95BE927697
45 ‘Collapsed rule of law: The consequences of four years under National Council for Peace and Order for human rights and Thai society’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, June 2018, p.18, 20190709100649
46 ‘Collapsed rule of law: The consequences of four years under National Council for Peace and Order for human rights and Thai society’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, June 2018, p.18, 20190709100649
47 'Human Rights Watch World Report 2019', Human Rights Watch (HRW), 17 January 2019, p.575, 20190118091502; ‘Collapsed rule of law: The consequences of four years under National Council for Peace and Order for human rights and Thai society’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, June 2018, p.18, 20190709100649
48 ‘Military authorities can still arbitrarily detain civilians’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, 13 July 2019, 20190715103854
49 ‘Collapsed rule of law: The consequences of four years under National Council for Peace and Order for human rights and Thai society’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, June 2018, p.19, 20190709100649
50 ‘Collapsed rule of law: The consequences of four years under National Council for Peace and Order for human rights and Thai society’, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, June 2018, p.19, 2019070910064951 ‘Five years under NCPO, isn’t that enough? Recommendations to eliminate the effects of the coup’, Thai Lawyers for Human
Rights, 18 July 2019, 20190726112812
Economic conditions
The country’s 2015 per-capita GDP (purchasing power parity) was USD16,306, alongside a moderately growing economy.79 The 2016 unemployment rate sat at 0.6 per cent, on par with previous years.80 The majority of Thais (around 64 per cent as of 2014) work in the informal labour sector.81 Informal labour is dominated by the production, services and agriculture sectors,82 and lacks social safety nets and labour protections.83 A growing number of Thais otherwise excluded from the formal economy work in the so-called ‘platform economy’, that is for services such as Airbnb, Uber and BeNeat.84 Despite the availability of work in the formal and informal sectors, economic inequality has increased in recent years, with certain sections of society unable to access adequate levels of education and health care.85 Around 11 per cent of the population continue to live below the national poverty line, though poverty rates tend to be geographically concentrated in the Muslim-Malay far south, among ethnic minority groups in the northern highlands and the Isan people of the populous north-east.86 The minimum wage was raised in January 2018 to between 308-330 baht per day,87 while the NCPO has implemented a populist economic program called State Populism.88 Plans to develop border areas through linking up with neighbouring countries’ Special Economic Zones were being developed by the NCPO,89 though implementation under an incoming government will have to be monitored.
79 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.15, CIS7B83941602
80 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.16, CIS7B83941602
81 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.17, CIS7B83941602
82 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.17, CIS7B83941602
83 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.17, CIS7B83941602
84 ‘Flexibility but not security in Thailand’s platform economies’, New Mandala, 10 July 2018, CXBB8A1DA3531285 ‘Wealth gap remains under Thai junta rule’, Asia Times, 6 September 2018, CXBB8A1DA35349; ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.15, CIS7B83941602
86 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.15, CIS7B83941602
87 ‘New minimum wage ranges between B308 and B330’, Bangkok Post, 18 January 2018, CXBB8A1DA25529; ‘Thailand to boost minimum wage nationwide for first time since 2013’, The Straits Times,18 January 2018, CXBB8A1DA25530
88 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.15, CIS7B83941602
89 ‘Thailand scraps new economic zones and plans regional linkups’, Nikkei Asian Review, 15 August 2018, CXBB8A1DA35341
Internal labour mobility
Domestic labour migration is a common occurrence in Thailand.90 Official data indicates that from 2005-2010, 30.6 per cent of migrants moved within a province, while 61.7 per cent crossed provincial lines.91 Government statistics under-report the extent of domestic migration however, omitting the high level of seasonal migration that occurs within Thailand.92 Slightly older academic work indicates that the numbers of those domestically migrating for employment opportunities is even higher among those under 45 years of age.93
Historically, Bangkok has been viewed as the centre of the country, with millions of North easterners migrating there for work.94 The main suppliers of labour migration are the North and Northeast regions of Thailand, while the main migration destinations are Bangkok, the central plains95 and the proliferation of new industrial zones in the north and east of the country.96 Domestic migrants have typically found work in the construction, manufacturing, and services sectors.97
Overall, internal migration has a significantly positive impact on the per capita income of migrant- sending households, reducing rural poverty and rural-urban inequality.98 A large proportion of migrant workers see their incomes increase and consider their working and living conditions to have improved.99 Internal migration eases unemployment or underemployment in rural areas,100 with remittances used to sustain livelihoods of family members in the home village.101 In the poorer northeast of Thailand, between 12–38 percent of household incomes are dependent on remittances from out-migration.102
Though there are no restrictions on labour mobility, consecutive National Economic and Social Development Plans have concentrated economic growth in Bangkok and other major urban centres.103 More than one quarter of domestic labour migrants move to locations where they do not know anyone, with some 72 per cent moving to a location where they already know someone.104 Of this number, 59 per cent know parents/spouses/children living in the new place of residence, 28 per cent other relations, and 13 per cent friends.105 Generally, migrant workers with higher levels of education have an increased chance of finding better quality employment.106
Social infrastructure
All Thai citizens are eligible for the government’s Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS).107 The benefit package is comprehensive and includes general medical care and rehabilitation services, high cost
medical treatment and emergency care.108 As of 2011, 98 per cent of citizens were covered by the scheme.109 Holders of UCS cards are entitled to free care at health centres in their home district and contracted hospitals, plus referrals to provincial or tertiary care hospitals in urban areas.110 A range of medical services is provided by the UCS, including outpatient, inpatient and emergency care.111 The UCS is entirely funded by the government, mostly through general tax revenue.112 Non-citizen members of hill tribes are barred from accessing government services such as the UCS.113
90 ‘Overview of Internal Migration in Thailand’ UNDP, 2017, p.2, CISEDB50AD8508
91 ‘Overview of Internal Migration in Thailand’ UNDP, 2017, p.3, CISEDB50AD8508
92 ‘Thailand Migration Report 2014’, IOM, 2014, p.9, CISA447F084851
93 ‘Joining the Dots of Agrarian Change in Asia: A 25 year view from Thailand’, Jonathan Rigg and Albert Salamanca, World Development, Vol.20, No.190, 2012, p.6, CIS961F9402872; ‘Red-Shirt Heartland - Village-level socioeconomic change in Northeast Thailand between 1999 and 2008’, Edwin de Jong et al, Asian Politics and Policy, Vol. 4, No.2, 2012, CIS961F9402873
94 Thailand's inequality: Myths & Reality of Isan, Asia Foundation, 18 June 2019, p.49, 20190620120804
95 ‘Overview of Internal Migration in Thailand’ UNDP, 2017, p.3, CISEDB50AD8508
96 ‘Thai mobilities and cultural citizenship’, Mary Beth Mills, Critical Asian Studies, Vol.44, No.1, 2012, p.90, CIS961F9402875
97 ‘Overview of Internal Migration in Thailand’ UNDP, 2017, p.3, CISEDB50AD8508
98 ‘Overview of Internal Migration in Thailand’ UNDP, 2017, p.7, CISEDB50AD8508
99 ‘Overview of Internal Migration in Thailand’ UNDP, 2017, p.5, CISEDB50AD8508
100 ‘Well-being of returning migrants in the rural Northeast of Thailand: Process Oriented Methodology’, Buapun Promphakping, Historical Social Research, Vol.42, 2017, p.290, CISEDB50AD8506
101 ‘Well-being of returning migrants in the rural Northeast of Thailand: Process Oriented Methodology’, Buapun Promphakping, Historical Social Research, Vol.42, 2017, p.296, CISEDB50AD8506
102 ‘Well-being of returning migrants in the rural Northeast of Thailand: Process Oriented Methodology’, Buapun Promphakping, Historical Social Research, Vol.42, 2017, p.296, CISEDB50AD8506
103 ‘Well-being of returning migrants in the rural Northeast of Thailand: Process Oriented Methodology’, Buapun Promphakping, Historical Social Research, Vol.42, 2017, p.290, CISEDB50AD8506104 ‘Overview of Internal Migration in Thailand’ UNDP, 2017, p.6, CISEDB50AD8508
105 ‘Overview of Internal Migration in Thailand’ UNDP, 2017, p.6, CISEDB50AD8508
106 ‘Overview of Internal Migration in Thailand’ UNDP, 2017, p.5, CISEDB50AD8508
107 ‘Thailand’s universal coverage scheme’, Center for Global Development’, 2015, CISEDB50AD99
A priority of Thailand’s 11th National Development Plan (2012-2016), the UCS did not appear in the successor 12th National Development Plan (2016-2022), which instead focused on discovering the “social determinants of health.”114 After the 2014 military coup, the new military regime looked for ways to reduce public health expenditure and in late 2016 junta leader Prayuth stated that the Thaksin-implemented 30-baht health care program, while not being revoked, would be modified to save money.115 The concern over the high costs of maintaining the universal coverage scheme is real, partly due to its free and widespread use, and also reflective of growing concerns over the aging population, already placing significant strain on the system.116 In early 2017 the government set up a committee to reform the legislation governing the UCS; critics are concerned that any amendments to the National Health Security Act may include the introduction of a co-payment system putting the health of Thais who rely on public coverage at risk.117 By late February 2018, the UCS was still in place, though researchers continued to warn that public expenditure on the system may prove unsustainable.118
Basic education in Thailand consists of six years of primary education, three years of lower secondary, and three years of upper secondary education.119 Free and compulsory education spans for nine years from primary to lower secondary school.120 Boys and girls have equal access to every level of schooling.121 According to UNESCO, school enrolment levels have continued at approximately 92.8% at the primary level and 87% at the secondary level – schooling is compulsory in Thailand up to ninth grade.122 The quality of education varies significantly by geographic location and is influenced by a shortage of teachers and inadequate funding, particularly in rural areas.123 The highest quality schools are concentrated in Bangkok.124 The biggest obstacles to education are in the far south where schools have often closed and teachers have been shot because of the regional insurgency.125 NCPO leaders support the privatization of universities, with the result that tuition fees have continued to rise, with institutions unable to adapt to this transition sometimes forced to close.126
Basic unemployment, sickness, injury, death, child allowance, old-age, maternity, and workplace compensation benefits are available, though in practice for workers in the formal sector.127 Workers in the informal sector enjoy only limited access to the social security system,128 being required to make voluntary contributions for benefits, and without any substantive social assistance available to them.
108 ‘Universal health-care coverage scheme’, International Labor Organization, 27 November 2016, p.1, CIS38A80124936
109 ‘What Thailand can teach the world about universal healthcare’, The Guardian, May 2016, CX6A26A6E15807
110 ‘Thailand’s universal coverage scheme’, Center for Global Development’, 2015,CISEDB50AD99
111 ‘What Thailand can teach the world about universal healthcare’, The Guardian, May 2016, CX6A26A6E15807
112 ‘What Thailand can teach the world about universal healthcare’, The Guardian, May 2016, CX6A26A6E15807; ‘Thailand’s universal coverage scheme’, Center for Global Development’, 2015,CISEDB50AD99
113 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Thailand', US Department of State, 13 March 2019, sect.6, p.36, 20190314092700
114 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.22, CIS7B83941602
115 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.22, CIS7B83941602
116 ‘‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.22, CIS7B83941602117 ‘Millions at risk as junta jeopardises national healthcare scheme’, Prachatai, 7 June 2017, CXC9040668922
118 ‘Is the future of Thailand’s health care in danger?’, Bangkok Post, 28 February 2018, CIS7B83941785
119 ‘Basic education overview: Thailand’, UNESCO Bangkok, 2015, CISEDB50AD102
120 ‘Basic education overview: Thailand’, UNESCO Bangkok, 2015, CISEDB50AD102
121 ‘Basic education overview: Thailand’, UNESCO Bangkok, 2015, CISEDB50AD102
122 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.25, CIS7B83941602123 ‘Basic education overview: Thailand’, UNESCO Bangkok, 2015, CISEDB50AD102
124 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.25, CIS7B83941602
125 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.25, CIS7B83941602
126 ‘BTI 2018 Country Report Thailand’, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 March 2018, p.21, CIS7B83941602
127 'Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Asia and the Pacific, 2018', United States of America (USA): Social Security Administration, 21 March 2019, pp.264-270, 20190403103626; ‘Thailand can afford equitable social welfare’, New Social Security Office, CISEDB50AD103
128 ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Thailand’, US Department of State, 20 April 2018, pp.41-42,
OGD95BE927697
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