2302567 (Migration) [2023] AATA 1946 (7 March 2023)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
REPRESENTATIVE: Mr Eric Zhang
CASE NUMBER: 2302567
DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Antoinette Younes
DATE:7 March 2023
PLACE OF DECISION: Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision to cancel the applicant’s Subclass 050 (Bridging (General)) visa.
Statement made on 07 March 2023 at 12:34pm
CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – cancellation – Bridging E (Class WE) visa – Subclass 050 (Bridging (General)) – applicant convicted of an offence and imprisoned – relationship with an Australian citizen – financial hardship – mental health issues – indefinite detention – non-refoulement obligations – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 36, 116, 140, 189, 198, 359, 499; Ministerial Direction 63
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 8, Condition 8564; rr 1.12, 2.43CASES
ACH15 v MIBP [2015] FCCA 1250
Acting Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v CWY20 [2021] FCAFC 195
CGG15 v MIBP [2016] FCCA 219
COT15 v MIBP (No 1) (2015) 236 FCR 148
Ibrahim v MHA [2019] FCAFC 89
R v Budiman (1998) 102 A Crim R 411
WKMZ v MICMSMA [2021] FCAFC 55Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 378 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision dated 14 February 2018 made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs to cancel the applicant’s Subclass 050 (Bridging (General)) visa under s 116 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The delegate cancelled the visa under s 116(1)(g) on the basis that the applicant was charged with drug-related offences. The issue in the present case is whether that ground for cancellation is made out, and if so, whether the visa should be cancelled.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 2 March 2023 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal also received oral evidence from his partner, [Partner A]. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter.
The applicant was represented in relation to the review.
For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa should be affirmed.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Under s 116 of the Act, the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that certain grounds specified in that provision are made out. Relevantly, to this case, these include the ground set out in s 116(1)(g). If satisfied that the ground for cancellation is made out, the decision maker must proceed to consider whether the visa should be cancelled, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, which may include matters of government policy.
Does the ground for cancellation exist?
Section 116(1)(g) - prescribed ground
A visa may be cancelled under s 116(1)(g) if the Minister is satisfied a prescribed ground for cancelling the visa applies to the applicant. The prescribed grounds for cancellation are…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether the delegate's decision to cancel the applicant's visa under section 116(1)(g) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), read with regulation 2.43(1)(p)(ii) of the Migration Regulations 1994, should be affirmed. This involved determining if the prescribed ground for cancellation, namely being charged with a serious offence, was made out, and if so, whether the visa cancellation was appropriate in all the circumstances. The Tribunal also had to consider the weight to be given to various primary and secondary considerations, including the applicant's personal circumstances, the seriousness of the offence, and government policy regarding visa cancellations for such offences.
The Tribunal reasoned that the ground for cancellation was clearly established, as the applicant had been convicted of importing a commercial quantity of opium, a serious offence. While acknowledging the applicant's claims of not knowing the exact nature or quantity of the drugs, the Tribunal noted that the Crown submissions on sentence indicated the applicant was reckless as to the presence of a border-controlled drug and played a significant role as a trusted intermediary. The Tribunal applied the principles outlined in the Direction, giving greater weight to primary considerations, including the government's view that prescribed grounds for cancellation should be applied rigorously. Despite considering the applicant's personal circumstances, such as his relationship with an Australian citizen, financial hardship, mental health issues, and claims of potential harm if returned to Iran, the Tribunal found that these did not outweigh the seriousness of the offence and the need for visa cancellation.
Ultimately, the Tribunal affirmed the decision to cancel the applicant's Subclass 050 (Bridging (General)) visa.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Direction states that primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than secondary considerations. One primary consideration may outweigh the other primary consideration and information from independent and authoritative sources should generally be given greater weight than information from other sources.The primary considerations are:The Government’s view that the prescribed grounds for cancellation at reg 2.43(1)(p) and (q) should be applied rigorously in that every instance of non-compliance should be considered for cancellation. The applicant was charged and is now convicted of importation of a commercial quantity of an unlawfully imported border controlled drug, namely opium. The applicant accepts that this is a serious offence. He accepts that there is an adverse impact of illicit drugs on the Australian community. He expressed remorse and apologised for his unlawful conduct. He reiterated that he was not aware of the nature of the imported item. The Tribunal observes that in the Crown Submissions on Sentence provided to the Tribunal, it is noted that the applicant “…imported [amount] grams of opium. Under the Criminal Code Regulations 2002, the marketable quantity threshold for opium is 20 grams and the commercial quantity threshold is 20,000 grams. The amount of drug imported by the offender was approximately [amount] times the commercial quantity…The offender knew the importation involved a large piece of machinery and knew the size and approximate weight of the machinery. Whilst there is no evidence he knew the exact amount of drug to be imported it must be inferred that he knew it was a substantial importation given the size of the machinery it was being smuggled in…The Crown concedes that the offender was reckless as to the presence of a border controlled drug in the consignment and he did not have specific knowledge of which border controlled drug was being imported or the amount…”.[4][4] Crown Submissions on Sentence dated [in] May 2019, paras 18, 20, and 21. Citing R v Budiman,[5] the Crown submitted that the superior Courts have “…repeatedly stated that illicit drug organisations are only able to prosper because people are ready, willing and able to undertake these types of roles. It is a well-established sentencing principle that persons who participate in the illicit drug trade, at any level, should expect and receive, heavy penalties…the Offender was a trusted intermediary who performed a critical role. The role the offender performed was a significant and essential one in the importation of the drugs into Australia...”.[6][5] R v Budiman (1998) 102 A Crim R 411.[6] Crown Submissions on Sentence dated [in] May 2019, paras 11-12. In submissions to the Tribunal, the representative argued that…the process of construing the Direction is no different to that to be applied in respect of any other written document”: ACH15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2015] FCCA 1250 (ACH15) at [18]. Thus, paragraph 6.1 is to be construed “by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole”: Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381 [69] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) applying Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v FederalCommissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 320 (Mason and Wilson JJ).It follows that the proper construction and application of paragraph 6.1 requires reconciliation with principle 4.3(6) of the Direction which involves taking into account the particular circumstances of the individual. The spirit of this principle has long been recognised by administrative-decision makers who appreciate “the very important role of the Tribunal in ensuring that individual justice is done”: Robey v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2021] AATA 854 at [28]; Rent to Own (Aust) Pty Ltd and Australian Securities and Investment Commission [2011] AATA 689 at [41]-[44].It should also be noted that the word “rigorously” as used in paragraph 6.1 “is addressed solely to the question of whether to enter into consideration of cancelling the visa”: ACH15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1250 at [28]. It would be a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction if this Tribunal were to proceed on the view that the power “to cancel should be exercised rigorously, that is strictly”: ACH15 at [31]. The Tribunal’s exercise of the discretion must take into account the Australian Government’s view that the grounds for cancellation should be applied, rigorously, as part of the matters to be considered, rather than simply to follow that view: 2212473 (Migration) [2022] AATA 3343 applying ACH15 at [33].[7][7] Submissions of 1 March 2023, paras 5-6.