2216368 (Refugee) - [2025] ARTA 2172

2216368 (Refugee) [2025] ARTA 2172 (30 July 2025)
DECISION AND
REASONS FOR DECISION
Representative: Dr Mohamed Al Jabiri (MARN: 9803754)
Respondent:Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Tribunal Number: 2216368
Tribunal:Deputy President S Roushan
Date:30 July 2025

Place:Sydney
Decision: The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant meets the following criteria:
·s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 30 July 2025 at 3:49pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Saudi Arabia – religion – Shi’a Muslim in Sunni-majority country – attendance at mosque, study and leadership roles – participation in peaceful demonstrations – leader and others executed, friend arrested and killed and brother arrested and beaten – house raided and mother relocated – employment terminated and travel ban imposed after departure – consistent, credible and corroborated claims and evidence – country information – widespread official and societal discrimination – use of terrorism laws to suppress dissent – treaty right to enter and reside in neighbouring countries – coordination of security, surveillance and information policies, and extradition obligations – decision under review remitted
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H(1)(a), 5J(1), (4)(b), (c), 36(2)(a), (3), 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF REASONS
BACKGROUND

The applicant is a [Age]-year-old national of Saudi Arabia. He arrived in Australia [in] April 2022 on a Visitor visa (FA-600) granted on 2 March 2022.
On 23 June 2022, the applicant applied for a Protection visa. The application was refused on 3 November 2022 by a delegate for the Minister under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
On 8 November 2022, the applicant applied for a review of the delegate’s decision to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).
On 14 October 2024, the AAT became the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). Under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (the Transitional Act), applications for review to the AAT that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are taken to be an application for review to the Tribunal. The Transitional Act gives the Tribunal the authority to continue and finalise any aspect of the review not already completed by the AAT.
This decision and statement of reasons is a review of the delegate’s decision by the Tribunal.
CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Evidence before the Department
Protection visa application
According to the information provided in his Protection visa application, the applicant was born in Dammam, Saudi Arabia. He is a Shi'a Muslim. His father is deceased, while his mother, sister, [and half-siblings] continue to reside in Saudi Arabia. He is divorced without children.
The applicant lived in the Qatif Governate of Saudi Arabia until January 2022, when he travelled to [Country 1]. He remained there until his arrival in Australia. He described his stay in [Country 1] as an effort to ‘escape.’ Between 2009 and 2018, the applicant travelled to [Countries 2-4] for holidays. He also transited through [Country 5] and [Country 6] on several occasions.
The applicant completed high school in Saudi Arabia and was employed as [an occupation 1] for various Saudi Arabian [companies] from November 2011 to December 2020. From that point until February 2022, he worked as ‘[an occupation 2].’
In response to questions in relation to his reasons for claiming protection in Australia, the applicant stated he experienced harm in Saudi Arabia but did not seek assistance or attempt internal relocation. He stated that he fears further harm if he returned to Saudi Arabia and that he would not be able to relocate internally to avoid the harm he fears.
Statement
In a statement attached to his Protection visa application, the applicant made the following claims for protection.
He was born and raised in the governorates of Al Qatif and is a member of the Shi’a community. During his youth, he participated in religious practises, including regular prayer at the mosque, particularly on Fridays. He engaged in discussions with peers regarding the social and political conditions affecting the Shi'a community, including the marginalisation of the Shi'a population. These discussions often included calls for justice, equality, and freedom. He ‘also participated in a number of peaceful movements.’
Members of the Shi’a community were ‘subject to acts of terrorism and suppression’. A number of individuals from his town were arrested by security forces and executed. He was ‘very lucky to escape arrest.’ Among those executed was Shiekh Nimr Baqir Al-Nimr, a spiritual leader and organiser of demonstrations in al Qatif. In 2016, 46 people including four minors, were executed. His brother, [Mr A], was shot and wounded during an incident while praying at [a] Mosque in al Qatif. A sectarian Sunni armed group attacked the Mosque and [some] people were killed. His brother was hospitalised for an extended period following the incident.
The applicant began working for [a] company in 2011. In 2020, he took up a position as [an occupation 2] in Al Khobar. His ‘work gave [him] the opportunity to familiarize [himself] with the dangers that face [his] community.’
[In] January 2022, the applicant's neighbours and a close friend, [Mr B], were arrested by security police. On the following day, he missed a call from ‘[Company] headquarters’. Fearing arrest, he ‘discussed the matter with [his] family and decided to leave home straight away.’ He rented a vehicle, and travelled to [City in Country 5], crossing the border using his national identification card.
[In] January 2022, he underwent Covid-19 testing in [Country 5] and attempted to board a flight to [Country 7]. Due to medical testing restrictions, he was unable to do so and instead boarded a flight to [Country 1] on the same day. He arrived in [City in Country 1] [in] January 2022 and remained in [Country 1] for 100 days before obtaining a visitor visa to Australia. He arrived in Australia [in] April 2022.
[In] January 2022, the General Security Police issued a ‘brochure’ requesting him to report to the police station. [In] May 2022, he received a message via Saudi Arabia’s Absher website (the official digital platform of the Saudi Ministry of Interior), notifying him of a travel ban and ‘putting [him] on the wanted list.’ [In] June 2022, a further message was received through the same platform indicating that his employment had been terminated.
The applicant’s brother, [Mr A], was arrested [in] January 2022 and detained for one week. During this period, his brother was ‘asked about [his] roundabout and he faced very cruel treatment.’ was interrogated regarding the applicant's whereabouts and warned of serious consequences if he failed to cooperate. He was instructed not to communicate with the applicant.
He fears imprisonment, persecution, and execution if he returns to Saudi Arabia. The Shi’a community continues to experience abuse, arrest, torture, and imprisonment. The applicant has not renewed his passport due to fear of approaching Saudi authorities abroad.
Supporting documents
On 27 October 2022, the applicant’s representative, Dr Mohamed Al Jabiri, submitted the following supporting documents:
a.A screenshot and translation of a message in Arabic from an unknown author. The message requests the applicant’s attendance at [Police Station] and threatens legal action for non-attendance.
b.A copy and translation of a notice published in [News source], dated [March] 2022, regarding the death of [Mr C] in a ‘mysterious circumstances attack.’
c.A copy and translation of a certificate from [Organisation] in Saudi Arabia, stating that ‘[the applicant] is a member and activist in teaching the Shiite sect’s rituals’ and that he is now ‘wanted by the Saudis authorities because of his activities in spreading the Shiite ideology.’ The certificate Is signed by an officer of [Organisation].
d.Two screenshots of notifications from [deleted] displayed on a phone’s home screen. One notification, received [in] June, states: ‘we have stopped the services of the holder of ID [Number]’. The other, received [in] May, states the same ID card holder is banned from traveling.
e.Five photographs depicting the applicant with [Mr C].
The interview
The applicant attended a telephone interview with the Department on 31 October 2022. He was assisted by an interpreter in Arabic and English languages. The applicant’s representative, Dr Al Jabiri, was present with the applicant during the telephone interview. The relevant aspects of the applicant’s oral evidence to the delegate are discussed further below.
The delegate’s decision
The delegate had concerns about the applicant’s credibility. She accepted that the applicant is a Shi’a Muslim from the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and that he has experienced insulting and humiliating treatment from Saudi authorities at security checkpoints entering and leaving Qatif. The delegate did not accept that the applicant’s best friend or the applicants brother, [Mr A], was arrested. She did not accept that the applicant was targeted for arrest or that he is of any particular interest to the Saudi authorities on the basis of his friendships, Shi’a beliefs, or participation in two isolated protests. She characterised the applicants claims as relating to his religion rather than a political opinion.
In relation to the harm the applicant experienced at security checkpoints, the delegate found that the harm does not amount to serious harm under s 5J(4)(b) or significant harm.
The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant is a refugee as defined by s 5H(1) of the Act. The delegate was also not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed to Saudi Arabia, there is a real risk he will suffer significant harm under s 36(2A) of the Act. The delegate found that the applicant is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations.
Evidence before the Tribunal
On 8 November 2022, the applicant applied for a review of the delegate’s decision. The applicant continued to be represented by Dr Al Jabiri in connection with the review.
Pre-hearing submissions
On 24 July 2025, the applicant’s representative provided a submission to the Tribunal, a letter from the applicant and documents previously provided to the Department on 27 October 2022, including photographs of the applicant, two screenshots of notifications received from [deleted], messages from [Location] police, and the certificate issued by the [Organisation].
In his letter, the applicant stated that he was distressed and emotionally overwhelmed during his interview with the Department, and he was now writing to clarify and expand upon his claims.
[In] January 2022, he received a missed call at 3:02 AM from [Police Station]. His close friend, [Mr B], had been arrested the day before. Fearing his own arrest, the applicant left for [Country 5]. After his departure, he received ‘official Absher notifications,’ including a police summons [in] January 2022, a travel ban [in] May 2022, and service suspension [in] June 2022. He stated that these messages confirm that he ‘was placed on a watchlist after [he] left the country.’ He also noted that ‘Saudi Arabia’s exit system does not always flag individuals in real-time.’
Following his departure from Saudi Arabia, the applicant’s friend, [Mr C], was killed under suspicious circumstances. His brother was also detained and beaten by the authorities, who questioned him about the applicant. His brother continues to suffer from a knee injury and nerve damage and his mother lives in fear of harm.
The applicant reiterated that, while living in Saudi Arabia, he was harassed and sometimes physically humiliated at security checkpoints due to his Shi'a faith. He stated Shi'as face arbitrary arrest and even ‘peaceful observance is sometimes treated as political dissent.’ He claimed he was ‘under surveillance’ when he began teaching Shi'a history at [Organisation] and that ‘several religious figures in [his] community have since been arrested for similar activity.’
The applicant has not renewed his expired passport, as doing so would require direct contact with Saudi authorities. He fears immediate detention and fears for his life if he were to return to Saudi Arabia.
In his covering submission, Dr Al Jabiri stated that the applicant left Saudi Arabia because he ‘feared arrest, persecution, and potentially death, consistent with the treatment of many Shia individuals in Saudi Arabia.’ He noted that the applicant has provided evidence from as early as the morning of [Day] January 2022 indicating he was being sought by the Saudi authorities. The notifications of service suspension and the travel ban ‘demonstrate a sustained and systematic effort by the authorities to restrict his freedom and compel his compliance.’
Dr Al Jabiri further submitted that ‘the police actively attempted to prevent his departure and subjected him to measures that constitute persecution’ under the Act. Since the applicant’s departure, ‘his brother was reportedly assaulted by police during an interrogation regarding [the applicants] whereabouts, resulting in a serious nerve injury and permanent disability. His mother, previously residing in the same district, has relocated after her home was raided by police searching for [the applicant] and his belongings.’
Without reproducing country information in full, Dr Al Jabiri stated that reports from international human rights organisations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the United Nations Human Rights Council, document widespread mistreatment of Shia individuals in Saudi Arabia, including arbitrary detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings.
The hearing
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 29 July 2025 to give evidence and present arguments. He was assisted by an interpreter in Arabic and English languages. The representative, Dr Al Jabiri also attended the hearing. Where relevant, the oral evidence at the hearing is discussed in the Tribunal’s analysis below.
At the hearing, the applicant submitted reports and news articles from multiple sources, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Guardian, Nabaatv and Mehr News.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Criteria for protection visa
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
REASONS AND FINDINGS
The applicant claims to fear persecution in Saudi Arabia on the basis of his Shi’a faith and imputed political opinion. For the following reasons, I have concluded that the decision under review should be remitted for reconsideration.
I found the applicants evidence at the hearing to be entirely consistent with the written claims and submissions previously made to the Department. The evidence was presented in a clear and straightforward manner, without exaggeration or embellishment. Overall, I found his evidence to be reliable and credible, corroborated by supporting documents.
I accept that the applicant is a Shi'a Muslim from a devout Shi'a family. I accept that he consistently practised his faith in Saudi Arabia, including regular attendance at mosque and Husseinyas (Shi’a prayer halls). I accept that he engaged in ongoing religious study, obtaining certificates in Shi’a history, as a Muaddin (caller to prayer), Qari (Quran reciter) and in Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). I accept that, in 2020, he became qualified to teach Shi'a history at the [Organisation] in Qatif.
I further accept the applicant’s evidence that he participated in peaceful demonstration advocating for Shi'a rights in 2011 and 2016, and that he subsequently ceased participating in such activities due to fear of harm. I accept that he was regularly stopped, harassed and humiliated at security checkpoints on account of his Shi'a faith. I also accept that, following the seemingly arbitrary arrest of his friend [in] January 2022, the applicant drove to [Country 5] on the following day and departed for [Country 1] two days later, fearing he might suffer a similar fate.
Subsequently, the applicant received messages on his mobile phone from the police, requesting that he report to the [Location] police station. These were followed by notifications via the Absher platform, informing him of termination of his employment and that he was subject to a travel ban. I accept the applicant’s evidence that he could only speculate as to the reasons for these actions, but he believed they were due to his Shi'a faith, his imputed political opinion and his failure to respond to the initial police summons. These claims are consistent with the country information sources I have consulted.

Shi’a Muslims constitute an estimated 10 to 15 percent of Saudi Arabia’s citizen population, while Sunni Muslims make up an estimated 85 to 90 percent. Shi’a Muslims are concentrated in the Eastern Province, although there are communities elsewhere in Saudi Arabia.[1] Shi’a Muslims constitute approximately 25 to 30 per cent of the population in Eastern Province.[2]
[1] US Department of State (US DoS), International Religious Freedom Report for 2023 - Saudi Arabia, 9 August 2024, and Still invisible – the stigmatization of Shi’a and other religious minorities in Saudi Arabia', Minority Rights Group International (MRG), November 2015,
[2] US DoS, International Religious Freedom Report for 2023 - Saudi Arabia, 9 August 2024,
Various reports have documented the pervasive societal and official discrimination against Shi’a Muslims in Saudi Arabia, including discrimination in the criminal justice system, obstructions to freedom of religion, stigmatism of beliefs and practices, and exclusion from high political office and certain public sector jobs.[3]
[3] See Saudi Arabia’s “Reforms” Don’t Include Tolerance of Shia Community, HRW, 21 September 2018, Briefing on Religious Freedom and Human Rights for Shia Communities in Sunni Countries, HRW, 26 June 2018, See also Still invisible – the stigmatization of Shi’a and other religious minorities in Saudi Arabia, Minority Rights Group International (MRG), November 2015,
A joint report by the Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) and the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD) published in 2017 noted that the abuse and discrimination of Shi’a Muslims is enshrined in Saudi Arabia’s ideology as reflected in the state-sponsored destruction of Shi'a places of worship and vandalism of Shi’a graves and mausoleums. The state’s ideology also encourages targeted, physical attacks on Shi’a worshippers, particularly during Ashura celebrations. The report stated:
The Government of Saudi Arabia sanctions religious and cultural discrimination against its Shia minority. Anti-Shia discrimination in the religious and cultural spheres manifests in the destruction of significant Shia religious and cultural sites, the closure of Shia mosques, the arrest and detention of Shia religious leaders and worshippers, and the government-sponsored and government-sanctioned disruption of Shia religious practices and festivals. This discrimination also takes a less tangible form in the use of sectarian and anti-Shia language in sermons and school textbooks that demean and degrade Shia and their practices and heritage. Anti-Shia sermon and textbook language underpins other aspects of Shia discrimination by propagating anti-Shia sentiment. In these ways, religious and cultural discrimination against Shia minimizes their cultural and religious heritage, violates their internationally-sanctioned right to exercise their freedoms of religion, expression, association, and assembly, and ultimately endorses violence against Shia.
The Saudi government’s negative stance towards religion and worship that differs from its official interpretation of Islam sanctions discrimination against Shia. There is no freedom of religion or freedom of conscience in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi state privileges its own particular interpretation of Islam over all other religions. The practice or worship of any religion other than the state’s official interpretation of Islam is a criminal offense. The country adheres to Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab’s interpretation of Sunni Islam, which is necessarily discriminatory towards Shia Muslims and Shia Islam. This interpretation underpins authorities’ discriminatory practices against the state’s Shia populace.[4]
[4] Voice for the Voiceless: Religious and Cultural Discrimination in Saudi Arabia, ADHRB & BIRD, February 2017, >
In a report published in 2017, Human Rights Watch (HRW) detailed how official hate speech and incitement by Saudi clerics and institutions have a direct and damaging impact on ordinary Shi’a citizens and that Shi’as face entrenched discrimination in many areas of daily life. The report noted that government-appointed clerics and the justice system criminalise normal Shi’a religious practices and restrict their ability to build houses of worship outside Shi’a-majority areas.[5]
[5] “They Are Not Our Brothers”: Hate Speech by Saudi Officials, Human Rights Watch, 26 September 2017,
This institutional bias is reinforced through the education system, where curricula stigmatise Shi’a beliefs and practices, labelling them as heretical or polytheistic, which isolates Shi’a students and perpetuates negative stereotypes among their peers. The consequences of this environment are severe. The report linked official hate speech to real-world violence, citing attacks on Shi’a mosques by armed groups who use the same derogatory language found in official Saudi discourse. Shi’as are thus exposed to both social exclusion and physical danger. Additionally, when Shi’as speak out against hate speech or call for reform, they risk imprisonment, as the government targets critics rather than protecting minority voices. These factors combine to create a climate of fear, marginalisation, and insecurity for ordinary Shi’as, who are denied equal rights in worship, education, employment, and access to justice.[6]
[6] Ibid.
The most recent US Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report in relation to Saudi Arabia[7] referred to the systemic discrimination and significant challenges faced by Shi’as and provided the following information.
[7] US DoS, International Religious Freedom Report for 2023 - Saudi Arabia, 9 August 2024, >
There have been minor signs of increased tolerance for Shi’a practices, with the authorities permitting limited public celebrations of Ashura and other holidays, as well as visits to sacred sites such as the Baqi al-Gharqad Cemetery during specific periods. However, these improvements remain overshadowed by systemic discrimination. Authorities continue to ban unified mourning processions and impose restrictions on gatherings. Husseinyas face closures during key celebrations like Eid al-Ghadir. Additionally, Shi’a mosques outside the Eastern Province are prohibited from being built, forcing worshippers to hold prayers in private homes or community centres where they risk harassment.
Shi’a clerics and activists frequently face arrests and detentions for peaceful demonstrations or dissenting opinions. Many detainees endure torture, solitary confinement, or worse prison conditions than their Sunni counterparts. Some families report that authorities fail to return the bodies of executed individuals for burial. Within the judicial system, Shi'as often encounter discrimination. Sunni judges reportedly dismiss or refuse to hear testimony from Shi’as, perpetuating inequality in legal proceedings. Shi’as face disproportionately harsh sentences, including death penalties for crimes that are often non-violent or allegedly committed as minors. The convictions have raised concerns due to vague charges, confessions obtained under torture, and violations of international human rights standards.
Shi’as are underrepresented in government positions, particularly in national security-related roles such as the Ministries of Defence and Interior. They also face barriers in education and certificates from Shi’a religious training centres are not recognised for employment credit. Public-school principals are predominantly Sunni, although some Shi’a teachers are employed. Saudi textbooks have also undergone revisions to remove derogatory references to other religions; however, negative portrayals of Shi’a practices remain. Shi’as report systemic discrimination in societal attitudes and media representations, with the use of derogatory terms, such as ‘rejectionists.’[8]
[8] Ibid.
The 2023 US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Saudi Arabia stated that:
Sources, especially among NGOs dedicated to human rights, documented dozens of cases of Shia defendants facing the death sentences during the year. Not all the facts in the cases were known, but human rights organizations believed that Shia persons in the country faced a disproportionate level of scrutiny and may have faced inflated charges. ESOHR, for example, documented nine individuals on death row who had allegedly committed the crimes for which they were sentenced when they were under the age of 18. Among these nine, eight were members of the Shia community, a clearly disproportionate number given that the Shia represent just 10-15 percent of the Saudi population. In a July report, Human Rights Watch (HRW) said that “Saudi Arabia and … other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries continue to use overbroad provisions contained within terrorism laws to suppress dissent and target religious minorities” and noted prior instances when the country had reportedly targeted Shia Muslims…
As many as 66 individuals, including a disproportionately high number (56) Shia individuals, faced the possibility of execution, according to a December report by ESOHR. As was the case for detainees of any religious group, international human rights NGOs said that many of the convictions were “based on confessions extracted through prolonged solitary confinement and torture” during pretrial detention and interrogation...
On January 30, authorities raided houses in the Eastern Province and arrested 10 Shia men from Qatif, al-Awamiya, Um al-Hamam, and Hafr al-Batin, according to Shia Waves and CDHRAP. On April 24, the Shia news website Mirat al-Jazeera reported that security forces raided houses in Qatif villages and arrested 10 men. It was not publicly known what charges the men faced.[9] (emphasis added)
[9] US DoS, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Saudi Arabia, 22 April 2024,
Minority Rights Group International has reported that:
[The] passing in 2014 of a new anti-terrorism law…now allows the government to legally prosecute a wide range of forms of peaceful dissent and criticism as acts of terrorism. At the same time, it has done little to address the grievances behind the protests in the Eastern Province, while its brutal stance towards the activists involved has convinced many of the futility of trying to advocate for more rights with the government.[10]
[10] Still invisible – the stigmatization of Shi’a and other religious minorities in Saudi Arabia, Minority Rights Group International, November 2015,
With regard to travel bans, the US Department of State noted that:
There were reports the government attempted to control mobility as reprisal against citizens abroad, by denying them consular services or otherwise engaging in actions aimed at jeopardizing their legal status, restricting their movement, or provoking their detention in the country where they were located…
Activists, media, and rights groups alleged the government used travel bans as part of a broader effort to suppress free expression and dissent. Activists estimated tens of thousands of citizens were under travel restrictions, including released activists, relatives of citizens detained in the government’s anti-corruption campaign, and relatives of detained clerics and human rights activists…[11]
[11] US DoS, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Saudi Arabia, 22 April 2024.
On the basis of the evidence before me, I find it highly likely that the applicant had come to the adverse attention of the authorities in Saudi Arabia on account of his Shi'a faith immediately before his departure. I am satisfied that, even if the applicant was not of interest at that time, he has since become so, due to the circumstances of his departure, his failure to comply with the request to report to the authorities and the imposition of a travel ban his absence. I'm further satisfied that the applicant’s Shi'a faith, which, in the context of Saudi Arabia, appears to attract imputations of adverse political opinion, would serve to expose the applicant to risk of harm at the hands of the Saudi authorities if he were to return to his country of nationality.
I find that there is a real chance that the applicant would be subjected to arrest, imprisonment, significant physical ill treatment and threats to his life in Saudi Arabia. I consider that such treatment amounts to serious harm under s 5J(4)(b) of the Act. I am satisfied that the harm the applicant fears involves systematic and discriminatory conduct as required by s 5J(4)(c).
I find that the essential and significant reason for the persecution feared by him is his religion and imputed political opinion. I am satisfied that the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of Saudi Arabia. I am satisfied that he could not take reasonable steps to modify his behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution. I also find that effective state protection against the harm he fears is not available to him in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Saudi Arabia.
Third country protection
Section 36(3) of the Act provides that Australia is taken not to have protection obligations in respect of a non-citizen who has not taken all possible steps to avail themselves of the right to enter and reside in a country other than Australia. This right may be either temporary or permanent and may arise or be expressed in a range of ways. However, this qualification does not apply where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution or faces a real risk of significant harm in that third country, or where they have a well-founded fear of being returned from that country to another where they would face such harm.
I have considered whether the applicant, as a Saudi national, has a right to enter and reside in any of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE.
Article 3 of the Economic Agreement Between the Gulf Cooperation Council States stipulated:
GCC natural and legal citizens shall be accorded, in any Member State, the same treatment accorded to its own citizens, without differentiation or discrimination, in all economic activities, especially the following: 1. Movement and residence 2. Work in private and government jobs 3. Pension and social security. 4. Engagement in all professions and crafts 5. Engagement in all economic, investment and service activities 6. Real estate ownership 7. Capital movement 8. Tax treatment 9. Stock ownership and formation of corporations 10. Education, health and social services Member States shall agree to complete implementation rules sufficient to carry this out and bring into being the Gulf Common Market.[12]
[12] The Economic Agreement Between the Gulf Cooperation Council States (The Economic Agreement), United Nations Network on Migration,
GCC nationals have the right to enter and reside in any GCC state. The GCC offers ‘genuine free settlement to the citizens of the six countries.’[13] Beyond the foundational agreements and the establishment of the Common Market, practical measures have been implemented to facilitate the entry and residence of GCC nationals in member states.
[13] The Gulf Cooperation Council: free movement for citizens but not for resident migrants, Future Citizen Institute, 8 October 2018,
With regard to the treatment of Shi'as, Kuwait presents the most favourable environment for Shi'a Muslims among the GCC countries, with conditions markedly better than in Saudi Arabia. Shi'as constitute approximately 30-35% of Kuwaiti citizens, forming a substantial minority with significant influence. According to Minority Rights:
Shi’a enjoy many religious freedoms. They are able to maintain their have their own mosques, choose their own clerics without state interference and maintain a separate court system for domestic cases in Kuwait. However, community members have reported barriers relating to slow registration of new mosques, limited facilities and restrictions on the observance of major ceremonies such as Ashura in open public spaces. Shi’a are also not allowed to organize religious courses in public high schools or establish religious training centres within Kuwait. All Islamic education courses – mandatory for Muslims – use the Sunni interpretation of Islam.[14]
[14] Shi’a in Kuwait, Minority Rights Group,
Kuwaiti Shi’as have historically enjoyed a relatively cordial relationship with the ruling al-Sabah family despite sectarian differences[15]. They have played an integral role in Kuwait's development, contributing significantly during crucial moments in the nation's history, from the 1921 Battle of Jahar to resistance against Iraq's 1990 invasion. While there have been periods of tension, particularly following the 1979 Iranian Revolution when questions arose about Shi’a loyalty, Kuwait has generally avoided implementing systematic discrimination policies against its Shi’a population.[16]
[15] Ibrahim Al-Marashi, Shattering the myths about Kuwaiti Shi'a, Al-Jazeera, 30 June 2015, Shattering the myths about Kuwaiti Shia | Religion | Al Jazeera.
[16] Shi’a in Kuwait, Minority Rights Group, >
Writing for Open Canada, Zehra Imam noted:
Kuwaiti Sunnis have a historical relationship with the Shi’a community, and they take the necessary measures to maintain these ties. Some of the ways in which Kuwait protects its religious minorities are by taking legal measures, such as its national unity law that explicitly prohibits “stirring sectarian strife;” providing security and protection when necessary, such as after a 2015 mosque bombing; and promoting social acceptance through messages put out by the government, the media and businesses during times of religious commemoration and celebration.[17]
[17] Zehra Imam, Kuwait’s own brand of pluralism, Open Canada, 14 September 2018, Kuwait’s own brand of pluralism - Open Canada.
According to Safaa Abdel Qader:
In Kuwait, the Shia minority can practice their religion without government interference, provided they do not disturb neighbours or violate laws on gatherings and proselytizing. However, there are restrictions on repairing existing Shia mosques or building new ones, and Shia Muslims rarely reach leadership positions. In Oman, the situation for Shia Muslims appears more favourable; they enjoy political and economic influence, possibly due to Oman’s better relations with Iran compared to other Gulf states.[18]
[18] Safaa Abdel Qader, Second-Class Citizenship: Discrimination Against Shia Communities in the Gulf, 26 September 2024, Second-Class Citizenship: Discrimination Against Shia Communities in the Gulf. - مواطن.

Oman also presents a unique case among Gulf states due to its predominant Ibadi Muslim population and its approach to religious minorities. Shi’as constitute a small minority in Oman, estimated at approximately 5% of the population.[19] Unlike Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi orthodoxy, Oman's predominant Ibadi Islamic tradition (a distinct branch separate from both Sunni and Shi’a Islam) has facilitated a more tolerant religious environment.[20]
[19] US DoS, International Religious Freedom Report for 2023 - Oman, 9 August 2024, 547499-OMAN-2023-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf
[20] Aaron Zelin and Elizabeth Dent, Responding to the Islamic State Attack in Oman, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 24 July 2024, Responding to the Islamic State Attack in Oman | The Washington Institute
However, I am mindful of other information before me which indicates that wanted Saudi citizens residing in GCC countries face substantial risks of persecution, extradition, and state-sanctioned harassment despite regional provisions for free movement. The GCC's security architecture, combined with Saudi Arabia's extraterritorial application of repressive laws, creates an environment where dissenters remain vulnerable even beyond Saudi borders. This security architecture is reflected in GCC’s 2012 joint security agreement, which called for closer coordination of internal security and surveillance policies, as well as greater information sharing and unified plans for joint actions.[21]
[21] What is the GCC?, Aljazeera, 4 December 2017,
According to Human Rights Watch:
The agreement’s 20 provisions include a vaguely worded article that would suppress “interference in the domestic affairs” of other GCC countries, which could be used to criminalize criticism of gulf countries or rulers. Another provision provides for sharing citizens’ and residents’ personal data at the discretion of Interior Ministry officials. [22]
[22] GCC: Joint Security Agreement Imperils Rights, Human Rights Watch, 26 April 2014,
Article 3 of the agreement stipulates: ‘Each state party should take legal measures on any act considered a crime under its existing legislation when its citizens or residents interfere in the domestic affairs of any other state parties.’[23] Prohibition on ‘interference in domestic affairs’ has been interpreted to include social media criticism of any GCC government.[24]
[23] Ibid.
[24] See Silence is King: The persecution of activists in the Gulf, Amnesty International, 11 October 2022,
The agreement also includes binding extradition obligations among the GCC states. Each country must hand over persons wanted by a fellow member for offenses related to security or politics. In effect, a political dissident or criminal suspect who flees from one Gulf country to another should be returned upon request.[25]
[25] Saudi Arabia: Transnational Repression Origin Country Case Study, Freedom House, 2021,
As noted by Human Rights Watch, ‘each of the GCC countries has prosecuted people solely for exercising their rights to free expression, association, and peaceful assembly’ and that ‘the agreement could extend the reach of those countries into the other member countries.’[26] Freedom House has also noted that ‘such a broad provision, applied within a group of countries that routinely violate human rights through dubious legal proceedings, is ripe for abuse.’[27]
[26] GCC: Joint Security Agreement Imperils Rights, Human Rights Watch, 26 April 2014.
[27] Saudi Arabia: Transnational Repression Origin Country Case Study, Freedom House, 2021.
More importantly, the existence of travel bans imposed on the applicant make it unlikely that he would be able to enter any GCC country, as travel bans or arrest warrants issued in one GCC country are sometimes enforced across others.[28] Even if he were allowed entry, existing security agreements mean the travel ban could significantly increase the likelihood of his removal or extradition to Saudi Arabia. I cannot regard the chance of the travel ban being enforced by other GCC countries as remote. In other words, I am satisfied that there is a real chance that GCC countries will return the applicant to Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, I find that the applicant has a well-founded fear of being returned from GCC countries to Saudi Arabia and that s 36(3) does not apply.
[28] See HZ Legal, ‘Is it possible to travel through Saudi Arabia if a case is registered in the UAE’, 7 October 2024, Webpage,
DECISION
The Tribunal sets aside and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
Date of hearing:                   29 July 2025
Representation:                   Dr Mohamed Al Jabiri
ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…
5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…
36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…