2213648 (Refugee)

[2025] ARTA 1583

2213648 (Refugee) [2025] ARTA 1583 (22 May 2025)

DECISION AND  

REASONS FOR DECISION

Respondent:Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Tribunal Number:  2213648

Tribunal:General Member C Graydon

Date: 22 May 2025

Place:Melbourne

Decision:The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant meets the following criteria:

·s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 22 May 2025 at 12:52pm

CATCHWORDS

REFUGEE – protection visa – Lebanon – religion – Alawite sect – imputed political identity – constant abuse and threats – victim of violent abduction and assault by Sunni extremist gang – escalating sectarian conflict – extremely volatile – economic crisis – poverty-stricken – unable to meet subsistence needs – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION

Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 5H, 5J–5LA, 36, 65, 369, 499
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.

STATEMENT OF REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 25 August 2022 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

2. The applicant who claims to be a national of Lebanon applied for the visa on 3 April 2018. The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that the applicant is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as outlined in s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

3. On 14 September 2022 the applicant applied for review of the delegate’s decision. On 14 October 2024 the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) became the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). Under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (the Transitional Act), applications for review to the AAT that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are taken to be an application for review to the Tribunal. The Transitional Act gives the Tribunal the authority to continue and finalise any aspect of the review not already completed by the AAT. This decision and statement of reasons is made by the Tribunal.

4. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 1 May 2025 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic (Lebanese) and English languages.

5. The applicant was represented in relation to the review. The applicant’s representatives attended the Tribunal hearing.

   BACKGROUND

6. The applicant is a [Age]-year-old man from Lebanon. He applied for a protection visa on the basis that he feared persecution in Lebanon due to his Alawite sect religious identity and due to his imputed political opinion, also related to his religious identity. The evidence he provided in support of his case is set out below, both at the primary Departmental stage and in this Tribunal review of the Department’s decision. 

   Evidence before the Department

   Information provided in the applicant’s protection visa application

7. In his protection visa application and accompanying Statutory Declaration dated 28 March 2018, the applicant claimed to be born in [year] in [Neighbourhood 1], Tripoli, Lebanon, in an Alawite family. [Neighbourhood 1] is a predominantly Alawite neighbourhood. He is one of [a number of] children, comprised of [boys] and [girls]. His father, a Lebanese citizen, has already passed away. His mother is a Syrian citizen from Homs,.

8. When he was a baby, his family moved from Lebanon to Homs in Syria. He completed his primary and secondary school education in Homs and then started working as a [Occupation 1] in his brother’s [workplace].

9. From [Date range] he returned to Lebanon to perform compulsory military training with the Lebanese Army.

10. Due to the lack of opportunities for non-citizens in Syria, in 2008 he decided to move back to Lebanon and resumed residence in [Neighbourhood 1]. He lived in an apartment adjacent to the neighbouring suburb of [Neighbourhood 2], a predominantly Sunni neighbourhood, and the ‘borderline’ between the Alawite and Sunni neighbourhoods.  The applicant stated in his Statutory Declaration of  28 March 2018 ‘Our building directly faces [Neighbourhood 2’s] suburb and has always come in the fire line in the conflicts between [Neighbourhood 1] and [Neighbourhood 2].’

11. Between 2008 to 2011 the security situation between the two neighbourhoods was constantly flaring up and the applicant was ‘subjected to constant abuse and felt threatened at all times. After June 2015 ‘major armed clashes’ occurred between the neighbourhoods further eroding ‘the social and psychological relationships of the area.’

12. Between 2014 to 2017 he worked in [Workplace 1] owned by [Mr A], a member of [a Christian group]. In his role at [Workplace 1], he moved between different neighbourhoods and became known, including to [Neighbourhood 3] residents, a close by predominantly Sunni neighbourhood, as a genuine and reliable person.

13. Following June 2015 when major armed clashes occurred between the two sects in the [Neighbourhood 1] and [Neighbourhood 2] neighbourhoods (Alawite and Sunni), relationships between these communities unravelled across the country.  The applicant was the subject of an attack in Beirut that occurred on 10 January 2017. The applicant was accompanying his Alawite friend and work colleague, [Friend A], back to his friend’s parents’ village in Akkar and on their way back to Jdeidah, they stopped for coffee in the mixed neighbourhood of [Neighbourhood 3]. A group of men, some armed with guns, iron bars and wooden batons, attacked them in their car, smashing the windows and dragging them out of the car.  They were taken to a nearby garage where they were beaten with the wooden batons. The assailants yelled at them that they were ‘kafirs’ or non-believers, a typical Wahhabi- influenced group chant.  The group’s leader arrived. He happened to run another [shop] that the applicant had previously frequented and he recognised the applicant. The leader ordered the group to free the applicant and his friend. The applicant felt sure that had the leader not recognised him, they would have been tortured or killed due to their Alawite identities.   

14. The applicant claimed that the situation for Alawite in North Lebanon remains very dangerous. The Syrian war has intensified the conflict between the neighbourhoods. Alawites from [Neighbourhood 1] are entrapped there and cannot leave the area for jobs outside, due to the constant threat of violence against them due to their religious identity.

15. The applicant arrived in Australia in November 2017 intending to only stay for a visit.  However on 1 March 2018 he received a message from his friend [Friend A] to say that his former employer [Mr A] has asked him to pass the message to the applicant that the applicant is no longer welcome in Jdeidah and that his life was under threat due to his Alawite identity. This threat immediately triggered the applicant’s decision to apply for a protection visa.

16. In addition to his protection visa application form and Statutory Declaration, the applicant submitted the following documents in support of his application:

    ·     Copy of his current Lebanese passport validity period, and copy of his expired Lebanese passport, validity period [2017] to [2022].

    ·     Translated copy of the applicant’s Lebanese national identity card confirming his name, date of birth, place of birth and single status.

    ·     Translated copy of his Lebanese ‘Family Book’ including the biographical details of his parents, and siblings, noting that his father and [siblings’] faith, including the applicant’s, is recorded as ‘Alawi’, whereas his mother’s faith is recorded as ‘Sunni’ and his eldest [sibling’s] faith is recorded as ‘Sunni’.

    ·     ‘Experience Certificate’ in English, undated, signed by [Mr A], ‘Manager of [Workplace 1]’ confirming that since 1 July 2015 the applicant has worked in [Workplace 1] and providing a list of his duties.  

    Further information provided at or around time of the interview

17. On 20 June 2022 the applicant submitted to the Department a form notifying the Department of some incorrect details in his initial protection visa application form, claimed to be due to incorrect inputs provided by the previous legal representative. These corrections included:

    ·     Corrected address from [May] 2015 to [November] 2017, which was in the [named] Building, [Address 1], Jdeideh.

    ·     Corrected employment period for July 2015 (not July 2014) until July 2017.

    ·     Corrected employment period for work at ‘[Workplace 2]’ from January 2003 to November 2007.

18. On 28 June 2022 the applicant’s representative submitted to the Department a submission providing further detail and context to the applicant’s claims. Accompanying the submission was a Statutory Declaration by the applicant dated 28 June 2022 requesting that the delegate disregard item 11 of the applicant’s earlier Statutory Declaration of 28 March 2018 and confirming that the description of the incident occurring [in] January 2017 in the legal representative’s submission, paragraphs 20 to 53, was the applicant’s true and correct recollection of the incident occurring on that date.

19. The applicant was interviewed by a delegate of the Department on 1 July 2022 with the assistance of an Arabic (Lebanese) interpreter and in the presence of his representative. The Tribunal has reviewed a recording of that interview.

    Further information provided following interview with the delegate

20. No further information was provided by the applicant to the delegate following the Departmental interview.

    Department’s reasons for refusing the applicant’s case

21. The Department refused the applicant’s protection visa application on 25 August 2022.  In the decision, the delegate accepted the following claims made by the applicant:

    ·     He is an Alawite  

    ·     He lived and worked in [Neighbourhood 1] from 2008 to 2015 and as a [Occupation 1] in Jdeidah, Beirut from 2015 until his latest departure in 2017.

    ·     He fears harm as he is an Alawite

    ·     He is concerned about the general security and economic situation in Lebanon

    ·     He is concerned about the authorities’ inability and unwillingness to provide him with protection due to his Alawite background.

22. However the Department did not accept that the applicant had been assaulted and abducted by a Sunni gang in January 2017 as claimed, on the basis that his description of this incident lacked ‘credible details’ was ‘inconsistent and vague.’ The delegate also rejected the applicant’s claim that he had received a warning not to return to Lebanon for his safety since arriving in Australia, on the basis that he did not spontaneously put this claim forward at the interview when the delegate asked him ‘if anything else had happened to him after the 2017 incident?’ and he replied in the negative.  The delegate concluded that ‘he was not targeted as claimed during his stay in Lebanon or since. He did not provide any credible evidence that he had experienced persecution in Lebanon as an Alawite,’ and consequently found that he did not meet the refugee criteria.

23. The delegate also assessed the applicant’s fear of economic hardship and the situation concerning a lack of general security in Lebanon against the complementary protection criteria but concluded that he also did not meet this criteria as the ‘economic conditions, the political unrest, and the severe economic and financial crisis’ is a ‘situation faced by the population of Lebanon generally, and it not specifically aimed at the applicant for reasons personal to himself.’ The delegate found that the applicant was therefore not owed protection obligations in Australia under either the refugee or complementary protection criteria.

    Evidence before the Tribunal

24. The applicant lodged his application for review of the delegate’s decision on 14 September 2022.  On 19 March 2025 he was invited to attend a hearing before the Tribunal on 1 May 2025. On 27 March 2025 the applicant responded to the Tribunal’s invitation, indicating that he would attend the hearing, as well as his legal representative and a barrister briefed in the matter.

25. On 24 April 2025 the applicant’s representative submitted a legal submission, a bundle of country information, referred to where relevant throughout this decision and confirmation that the submissions had been read to the applicant and accurately conveyed his claims.

    The applicant’s oral evidence at the Tribunal hearing

26. The applicant confirmed that he was born in [Neighbourhood 1] and is one of [a number of] children in his family. He shared that his mother, [siblings], and other extended family members, numbering around [number] people in total, had all recently fled from Syria into Lebanon in January 2025. His family had fled as part of a larger mass movement of Alawite people into Lebanon, due to increased risk faced by Alawite people in Syria following the fall of the al-Assad regime in December 2024.

27. He said his family had moved back to [Neighbourhood 1] and described their current situation. No members of his family have any paid work.  They are entirely dependent on remittances sent by the applicant and his cousins in Australia. He said that his family had lost all of their property and belongings as they had to abandon these in Syria and flee for their lives. Their house in Syria was likely now occupied by someone else, as many foreigners had recently entered Homs. His brother-in-law’s house in Latakia, in northwest Syria, was set on fire.

28. He added that his family now living back in [Neighbourhood 1] were trapped in the area and unable to freely move around to try to find work. This was because of the increased hostility towards Alawite people in Lebanon, especially Sunnis, since the fall of the Assad regime. He emphasised the direct ‘knock-on’ effects of the regime change in Syria to the power dynamics between Alawites and Sunnis in Lebanon. He added that his family and other Alawite people faced a constant threat of violence and lack of security due to the now emboldened Sunni Salafists in northern Lebanon and the lack of any effective intervention by Lebanese authorities. As evidence of this, he said that Salafists were openly flying the ‘Dash’ (Islamic State, ‘ISIS’) black flag in Tripoli celebrating the fall of the al-Assad regime and the ascendence of an extremist Sunni leadership in its place in Syria. No authorities in Tripoli intervened to prevent these groups from doing so. He claimed that this had sent a strong message to all non-Sunni groups in Tripoli and surrounding areas, especially Alawites, that their rights in Lebanon, not only in Syria, are now under threat from radical Sunnis who feel emboldened and empowered. He added that the al-Assad regime had previously had an enormous influence in Lebanon and its fall, combined with the rise of extremist Sunni leaders in Syria, has caused a major shift in sectarian power dynamics within Lebanon.

29. I asked the applicant if he had a right to enter and reside in Syria and explained that even though he is not a Syrian citizen, if he did have the right to enter and reside in Syria, then I would need to assess his claims against Syria, as well as against Lebanon. He explained that prior to the fall of the Assad regime, Lebanese nationals with a Syrian mother, such as him, were allowed to live in Syria but did not have all the rights of a Syrian citizen. Since the fall of the Assad regime the rights of Lebanese people with Syrian mothers, remain very unclear, as are many things at this time since Ahmed al-Sharrah, (nom de guerre Mohammed al-Jolani), became the transitional Syrian President in January 2025. The applicant highlighted that the new Syrian President had suspended the Constitution and disbanded the courts, replacing judges with Sheiks and other religious figures without any legal qualifications. He also added that the new President used to be the leader of the al-Nusra Front, which he described as a Salafist-Jihadi terrorist organisation that operated in Syria during the civil war.[1]  He added that since the regime change, Syria has become very unsafe now for Alawite people with many Alawite people being threatened, attacked and killed due to their sect identity. This is why his family fled in January 2025, fortunately prior to the mass killings of Alawite people in March 2025, killed in revenge due to their assumed association with the al-Assad regime.

    [1] The transitional Syrian President was formerly the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group established after the al-Nusra Front was disbanded.  

30. I informed the applicant that I was satisfied that it was unsafe for Alawite people in Syria at present and took the view that even if he had a right to enter and reside in Syria, my assessment is that he would face a real chance of serious harm due to his religious identity, and therefore would meet the refugee test with regards to Syria, as further discussed in my findings below.

31. I asked the applicant for his views on how the influx of Alawite people fleeing from Syria into Lebanon had impacted on the security of Alawite communities living in [Neighbourhood 1], including his family members. He explained that even though there are more Alawite people there now, they are weak as since the fall of al-Assad they do not have powerful patrons, their own militia or power base, and are now in a much weaker position in Lebanon than previously. Now extremist Sunnis in northern Lebanon feel empowered to openly vent their hatred towards Alawites. He added that he expects there will more targeting and more religious tension between the two areas and that the Alawites will not have security and will continue to be limited in where they can live and will be unable to work or live a normal life.  He said that this was the current situation of his family, who cannot move outside of [Neighbourhood 1], despite the extreme poverty and lack of jobs within [Neighbourhood 1]. He said it would not be safe for them to move out of [Neighbourhood 1] as they would lack protection for their security. He added that they lacked any Alawite support outside of [Neighbourhood 1] and other sects would not be willing to rent an apartment or house to them, even if they had money, which they do not.   

32. I asked the applicant for his views on whether in the current context the Lebanese army (LAF) would be willing or able to intervene and to protect the Alawite community from inter-religious tensions and violence, as they had in the past.  He responded that the role of the army in northern Lebanon is very limited at present, as many army resources have now been deployed to southern Lebanon as part of the ceasefire with Israel. He said that this leaves people in the north of Lebanon unprotected from internal conflicts, such as those faced by the Alawites. I asked the applicant if there were many Alawite people who served in the Lebanese army. He said there were not. I asked if the Lebanese army had barracks or resources positioned close to [Neighbourhood 1] enabling them to respond at short notice if security situations flared ups suddenly. He responded that the there is only one small army barracks in [Neighbourhood 4], a suburb of Tripoli, and a military checkpoint on the road to [Neighbourhood 1].

33. I asked the applicant if many Alawites serve in the Lebanese police forces. He said not many. I asked how he would assess police capacity and willingness to provide protection and support to people in [Neighbourhood 1] if they faced problems with their security. He said that the police do their best but the problem in Lebanon is that the police are marginalised and not given power, as most of the power is given to the army. I asked the applicant whether religious leaders, who had often defused and de-escalated inter-sect violence in [Neighbourhood 1] in the past, could effectively maintain peace and security for Alawite communities in the current circumstances. He said that many Alawite leaders are busy sending their children overseas and hoping to follow them, as they lack any confidence in there being peace and security for Alawites in Lebanon. He said that he was aware, for example, that the son of the Alawite sect leader in Lebanon had applied for a visa to Australia. The religious leaders all feel the coming danger and they are almost certain there will be major reprisals against Alawites in Lebanon, as there have been in Syria.       

1. I asked the applicant about his movements in 2014. He explained that he came to Australia to visit his paternal aunt, as he had previously too. He came to take a break from the pressure of living in Lebanon. He said that for the seven years prior to this visit he had lived in [Neighbourhood 1], and during this time there were almost daily and weekly skirmishes and shelling between the Alawite and Sunni neighbourhoods. He said that during that period he had worked as a [Occupation 2, providing a service] to elderly people, as he could not get any [Occupation 1] related job and had to do [Occupation 2] to cover his basic expenses.  He said that [he provided the service] within [Neighbourhood 1], as it was unsafe for him to move outside to [provide the service] elsewhere.

2. I asked the applicant why he did not stay in Australia and apply for protection at the time that he visited in 2014. He said that at that time he did not yet have a specific threat facing him personally at that time and that he wanted to follow Australian visa laws. He said that he did think about applying and may have applied, except then he received news that his brother had helped him secure a job working outside of [Neighbourhood 1], under the protection of [Mr A].

3. I asked him how he got the job working for [Mr A]. He explained that his brother (a [Occupation 3]) had a well-connected friend who contacted [Mr A] on his brother’s behalf. [Mr A] agreed to offer him a job and accommodation living in the [Workplace 1] building in Jdeidah, Beirut. After he returned from Australia in May 2015, in July 2015 he commenced the position as a [Occupation 1]. It was the first time he had lived outside of [Neighbourhood 1] in Lebanon. He said he had felt safe living there as it was an area dominated by Christian Maronite people and everyone knew that he was living under the protection of [Mr A], so he was safe. It was a small [workplace], with just [a number of] employees, including himself, [Mr A] and [a number of] other people. He was the only Alawite working there. He felt happy and safe working there from July 2015, until the incident that occurred in January 2017.  

4. In January 2017, he travelled to Akkar with his friend [Friend A] (also an Alawite) to escort [Friend A’s] parents back to their village in Akkar. On their return journey to Jdeidah, they were attacked. They stopped in [Neighbourhood 3], close to Jdeideh, to have coffee.  They were in a  narrow street sitting in the [Workplace 1] car, which was marked as such. A group of men likely wanted to rob them, which was the initial reason they were attacked. They locked and closed the car windows and doors but the men smashed the windows, opened the doors and dragged them out of the car. They then marched them to a garage where they were beaten for around 15 or 20 minutes while waiting for the gang leader to arrive to provide the gang with further instructions. The gang quickly found out that the applicant and [Friend A] were Alawite, calling them ‘Alawi kafirs’ (Alawite infidels) and beating them savagely. I asked how they knew that he and [Friend A] were Alawite. He said they would be immediately suspicious due to his Syrian accent and also from [Friend A’s] name, a name used mainly by either Shia or Alawite people. But then as soon as they asked them basic questions, such as where they were from, and they answered from [Neighbourhood 1], the gang members immediately knew with certainty that they were Alawite. He added that Lebanese people can tell from accents which part of Lebanon they are from, as people in Tripoli, Beirut and other parts of Lebanon all have slightly different accents. There was no point lying to them, as they would still know and that would make the situation even worse.

5. The leader of the gang ([Mr B]) arrived and recognised the applicant, as he had chatted with him several times when the applicant had stopped by at the gang leader’s [shop]. [Mr B] ordered that they be released. The applicant was very surprised to find out that [Mr B], who had seemed a normal person and had treated him normally in the [shop], was in fact the leader of an extremist Sunni gang, which attacked people from other sects.

6. The applicant’s evidence was that he was badly impacted by this attack, both physically and psychologically. For around two or three months he did not leave his apartment. Both him and [Friend A] were badly injured from the beating. [Mr A] arranged for a doctor to see them at home, who treated their wounds and gave them medication. The applicant was not able to work for around two months and [Mr A] arranged for people to bring them food until they recovered. He did not report the incident to the police because he has no faith in the police, the judiciary or the state in general. To highlight this, he described a situation where the Lebanese foreign minister was visiting an area and someone shot at his car but the police did not do anything about it. He stated that given they could not protect a minister, they definitely could not help an Alawite person like him. He was also afraid that if he reported [Mr B] and his gang to the police that this would result in them taking reprisals against him. He does not know if [Mr B’s] gang was associated with any particular organisation but it was clear to him that it was a Sunni extremist gang. 

7. I asked him if anything else had happened to him between January 2017 and November 2017 when he came to Australia. He said that no further incidents had occurred during this period but that he kept a very low profile during this time as the attack had made him very fearful, as it had occurred close to his home area and was led by someone he had thought was an ordinary person but turned out not to be. During this period prior to his departure from Lebanon he only went to and from work and to local shops that he knew and he always remained within Christian areas.

8. I asked the applicant if there were any other parts of Lebanon where large numbers of Alawite people live together. He stated that Alawites were only in large numbers in [Neighbourhood 1] and that others may be scattered around in smaller numbers in Akkar and Beirut, but there are no other significant populations living in Lebanon.  He added that in some rural areas of Akkar there are three or four small villages where Alawites live, but they are surrounded by Sunni villages.  I asked how Alawite people living outside of [Neighbourhood 1] ensure their security. The applicant said they can only live safely if they have a patron from another sect who will take responsibility for their security, such as through an employer or a family connection, like he had when he worked for [Mr A]. 

9. I asked the applicant if he any contact with [Mr A] since he had come to Australia. He said that soon after his arrival he was in contact with him via [Social media 1]. He asked the applicant how it was in Australia and advised him not to return to Lebanon due to the incident that had occurred in January, as well as due to the general situation in Lebanon. He has not had any other contact with Mr [A] since that time. The applicant remains in close contact with his friend [Friend A] on an almost daily basis. The Tribunal asked if there was any reason why he had not asked [Friend A] to be a witness in his case. He said that nobody asked him to and it did not occur to him. 

10. I asked the applicant what he thought would happen to him if he returned to Lebanon.  He said that he is fearful of a major increase in violence against Alawite people in Lebanon, as there has been in Syria.  He emphasised that the two countries and their politics are very intertwined and it is a dangerous situation for Alawites in Lebanon that is likely to erupt. He told the Tribunal that Sunnis in [Neighbourhood 2] and other Sunnis from northern Lebanon have been trained by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, (HTS) in Idlib, the group founded by the new Syrian President, and that some have fought for him in the Syrian civil war. He added there is a local Sunni militia leader from [Neighbourhood 2], whose family name is al-Masri, who was involved in many of the previous attacks on Alawites in Lebanon. He was sent to prison in Lebanon but later released and more recently trained in Idlib in Syria alongside other Lebanese Sunnis. The applicant is fearful their training will equip them to lead a new effort to recreate the historical Sunni Muslim emirate from Tripoli to Homs, just as ISIS had planned to do. He fears they have been trained to lead attacks against Alawite and other sects that resist them in Lebanon.  He fears that the recent influx of Alawite refugees from Syria gives the extremist Sunnis in north Lebanon more confidence and that the larger numbers of Alawites now in Lebanon make extremist Sunnis think there is more need for them (Alawites) to be suppressed. The Alawites do not present a risk to the Sunnis as they lack arms and no longer have a militia or wider political support. He has seen videos on [Social media 2] of Sunni extremists from northern Lebanon saying it is good that Alawites from Syria are gathering in [Neighbourhood 1] as this makes it easier for them to slaughter them in one go. 

11. He added that if he returned to Lebanon, he would be confined to [Neighbourhood 1], like all his other family members and also like them, would be without any opportunity to work. His family’s income would collapse without his remittances from Australia and they would all struggle to survive.  They would either be forced to live on the street or they would have to rely on Red Cross handouts like many Syrians in Lebanon who are forced to be beggars. I asked if he would be able to continue working for [Mr A]. He said he did not think so as his communication with him ceased a long time ago and he does not even know if he is still in Lebanon.  His brother who had helped him initially get the job with [Mr A] is also not in touch with him any longer. If there were any opportunities for help from [Mr A], his brother would be working for him, however his brother has no work at all and is stuck in [Neighbourhood 1], as the applicant fears he would be too. The applicant emphasised that [Neighbourhood 1] is a particularly poor area and lacks any job opportunities as there are only a few grocery and shisha stores there and no other employers or companies there. 

12. I asked the applicant if he had completed military service with the LAF and if so, what his experience of that had been. He responded that he completed compulsory military service in [year range] and that at that time, Hariri was still the Prime Minister of Lebanon and so the situation was generally safe and secure for Alawites until around 2004, when things started to go downhill. He said that people over the age of [Age] are not called upon as reservists anymore and there is no longer military conscription in Lebanon. He does not foresee a situation where he could be called up for military service in Lebanon.

13. I asked the applicant how the period of intense bombardment of Lebanon by Israel in 2024 had impacted the security situation in [Neighbourhood 1].  He said that while [Neighbourhood 1] had not been directly attacked, thousands of Shia people from southern Lebanon had moved to [Neighbourhood 1].  He said that ninety to ninety-five percent of displaced people had now returned to their homes in the south but that there is a small group planning to stay, as they feel safer there than in the south.  He added that Israel had bombed Beirut only two days prior to the hearing, which had resulted in some more people fleeing from Beirut to [Neighbourhood 1]. He said that the other reason why extremist Sunnis in north Lebanon are feeling empowered now following the fall of al-Assad and the rise of the new Syrian President is also because Israel has weakened Shia Hezbollah. Sunni extremists in northern Lebanon consider Shia to be ‘infidels’ and so they are happy that Israel is doing this. He added that when Hezbollah leader Nasrallah was killed, people in local Sunni areas in north Lebanon were celebrating this as good news and delivering sweets in the neighbourhood. All of these are signs that there will likely be more violence by Sunni extremists against Alawites in Lebanon.

14. I asked if there was anything further the applicant would like to add or any other reasons why he feared returning to Lebanon, which had not been already covered. He responded that the main issue is the security situation because radical Sunni groups or gangs feel they have achieved an historic victory with the fall of the al-Assad regime and so even moderate Sunnis are happy with the chance and willing to go along with the re-arming of Sunni groups and reinstatement of the Sunni Emirate from Homs to Tripoli, ‘just like the situation after the Second World War. If those people stay in power, we will die.’ He added that this was in addition to the dire economic and humanitarian situation in Lebanon for all Lebanese people, but especially for Alawite and other minority groups who had less support to protect them from the impacts of these wider circumstances.

    CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

    Criteria for protection visa

15. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

16. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.

17. A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).

18. Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

19. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

    Mandatory considerations

20. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, I have taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

    REASONS AND FINDINGS

21. The issue in this case is whether there is a real chance that the applicant will suffer serious harm if returned to Lebanon for reasons of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Alternatively, whether there are substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Lebanon, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm.

22. For the following reasons, I have concluded that the decision under review should be set aside and remitted for reconsideration.

    Applicant’s identity and country of reference

23. The applicant has provided a copy of his Lebanese passport, his Lebanese civil registration ‘Family Book’, his Lebanese National Identity Card and his Lebanese Army Identity Card. He has consistently claimed to be from Lebanon. There are no apparent concerns with the applicant’s identity. I am satisfied that the applicant is a citizen of Lebanon.

24. I note that the applicant’s father is a Lebanese citizen and his mother is a Syrian citizen. While the applicant’s mother is a Syrian citizen, I am satisfied that under Syrian nationality law,[2] she is unable to confer her citizenship upon her children, including the applicant, and therefore the applicant is not a Syrian citizen.

    The law is predominantly based on paternal jus sanguinis: This means a person will become Syrian, wherever they are born, if they have a Syrian father. Birth to a Syrian mother does not automatically confer nationality, however the law does allow transmission of nationality from the mother if the child is born in Syria and the father is unknown. However, this provision is not always implemented in practice. When born abroad an individual will only be Syrian if their father is Syrian.[3]  [Emphasis added]

    [2] Legislative Decree 276, 1969.

    [3] Norwegian Refugee Council ‘Toolkit: Understanding stateliness in the Syria refugee context’

25. An applicant’s ‘receiving country’ under s 5(1) of the Act is defined as:

    (a)    a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or

    (b)   if the non-citizen has no country of nationality – a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.

    Based on this definition, I find that the applicant’s ‘receiving country’ is Lebanon and I have assessed his claims against that country.

26. However s 36(3) of the Act provides that Australia is taken not to have protection obligations to non-citizens who have not taken all possible steps to avail themselves of a right to enter and reside in any country.  There are exceptions to this qualification, broadly, where a person has a well-founded fear of being persecuted or faces a real risk of significant harm in that country or has a well-founded fear of refoulement from that country to a place where they face such treatment.[4] In short, under these provisions I therefore need to determine whether the applicant has a ‘right to enter and reside’ in Syria, and if so, I then need to also assess his protection claims against Syria and not only against Lebanon.

    [4] Sections 36(4)–(5A).

27. The applicant has previously resided in Syria for a period of [number] years. His evidence is that under Syrian law implemented by the al-Assad regime, as the child of a Syrian national, he was entitled to reside in Syria for as long as he wished but that he would not acquire all the rights of a Syrian citizen, such as regarding real estate ownership, public service jobs and access to financial capital from lenders. Country information indicates that during the al-Assad regime, Lebanese citizens were able to enter Syria without a visa, using just their passport or national identity card.[5] However since the fall of the al-Assad regime, new restrictions have been imposed on the entry of Lebanese citizens to Syria limiting entry to Lebanese with residency permits or official permission.[6] The clearest available information about the new rules in place for non-citizens entering Syria is that issued by Turkish Airlines on 17 January 2025, which states that:

    [5] ‘Syria puts entry restrictions on Lebanese after border clash: Lebanese security sources’, 3 January 2025, The New Arab. ‘Syria, Lebanon pledge 'long-term strategic relations' after Assad ouster’, 11 January 2025, France 24.

    [6] Ibid.

    Important information for our passengers travelling to Syrian Arab Republic

    In accordance with recent decisions taken by the Syrian Arab Republic authorities, certain rules have been established for passengers entering Syria.

    ·     Syrian citizens can enter the country by presenting a document proving that they are Syrian citizens.

    ·     Lebanese citizens must meet at least one of the following conditions in order to enter Syria

    o    One of the family member (mother or father) have to be Syrian citizen,

    o    Have a valid residence permit in another country,

    o    Have a visa from any Syrian consulate,

    o    Have a valid residence permit in Syria,

    ·     Iranian citizens can only enter the country with prior authorization.

    ·     Citizens of all countries except Israel can enter the country.

    ·     Special permission is required from Ministry of Information of Syria for members of press.

    ·     Special permission is required from Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Syria for religious groups.

    ·     The Syrian government has implemented an entry visa requirement for non-Syrian passengers, in accordance with the “principle of reciprocity.” The visa fees must be paid in cash upon arrival at the airport, as credit cards are currently not accepted. Therefore, passengers traveling to Damascus who do not hold Syrian citizenship are kindly requested to ensure they carry sufficient cash (USD new series) to cover the entry visa fees.

1. The Tribunal has been unable to locate any more authoritative country information clarifying the specific content of the new restrictions upon the entry of Lebanese citizens to Syria and the right of Lebanese citizens to maintain residence in Syria. This is hardly surprising given the seismic ongoing changes in the uppermost echelons of Syria’s legal framework. On 13 March 2025, interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa signed a constitutional declaration that serves as a temporary constitution and legal framework for a five-year transitional period.[7] This declaration replaced the 2012 Ba'athist constitution, upon which previous Syrian laws were based. This current legal vacuum leaves a vast manner of legal questions, including that regarding the applicant’s ‘right’ to ‘enter and reside’ in Syria, somewhat uncertain at present. Based on the incomplete and imperfect information available to me, I find that on the balance of probabilities, the applicant would be eligible to enter Syria on the basis that his mother is a Syrian citizen. I also find it to be more likely than not, that he also retains a right to reside in Syria, on a similar basis, due to him having a Syrian parent. Having said that, I do still harbour significant reservations regarding this finding, especially as the applicant is Alawite and it cannot be excluded that Lebanese Alawites may be subject to different restrictions to enter and reside in Syria in practice. This is especially since al-Assad loyalists, who may be assumed to more likely be from al-Assad’s own Alawite sect, have engaged in attacks against members of the new Syrian government’s security forces.[8] Therefore the risk of ‘special rules’ being applied in practice to Alawites seeking to enter Syria, including from Lebanon, cannot in my view, be excluded.

   [7] BBC, ‘Syria leader signs temporary constitution for five-year transition’ 14 March 2025.

   [8] Carter, B., ‘Alawite insurgents seek to use sectarian violence to destabilise the interim government in Syria’, 3 April 2025, Institute for the Study of War.

2. In any event, the need for a clear finding of fact regarding the applicant’s ‘right’ to ‘enter and reside’ in Syria, is not crucial in this case, because I am able to make a further very clear finding that in any event, s 36(3) does not apply to the applicant, as he falls within one of the relevant exceptions to that provision, being s 36(4)(a), which states that:

   However, subsection   (3) does not apply in relation to a country in respect of which:
   (a)  the non - citizen has a well - founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

3. I make this further finding that this exception to s36(3) applies to the applicant on the basis of the applicant’s oral testimony and on the basis of country information indicating that Alawites in Syria are at high risk of targeted attacks amounting to persecution in the current context of Syria. I note the applicant’s credible evidence that his own family were forced to flee from Syria in January 2025 due to the heightened insecurity they faced in Homs due to their identity as Alawites. I also base my finding on the extensive country information confirming that civilian Alawites have been, and continue to be, targeted and subjected to indiscriminate killing, including by supporters of the new Government. While these attacks were triggered by insurgent al-Assad loyalists clashing with government forces, ordinary Alawites who had no role in the al-Assad regime were amongst those attacked due to their identity as Alawites and their imputed association with the al-Assad regime.

4. In March 2025, just a week before the new Syrian transitional constitution was adopted, up to 1500 people were reportedly killed: 

   Last week, gunmen supporting Sharaa's Sunni Islamist-led government were accused of carrying out revenge killings against members of Assad's minority Alawite sect in the western coastal region following a deadly ambush on a security patrol by gunmen loyal to the former regime. One monitoring group has said almost 1,500 civilians were killed. Sharaa has pledged to hold the perpetrators to account and ordered the formation of a committee aimed at preserving civil peace. However, many Alawites and members of other religious and ethnic minorities are wary of his intentions because of his past as the leader of al-Qaeda's former Syrian affiliate.[9]

   [9] BBC, ‘Syria leader signs temporary constitution for five-year transition’, 14 March 2025.

5. While the majority of killings occurred in the northwestern coastal region of Syria, there were also reports of killings in Homs, where the applicant previously lived and from where his family recently fled:

   The Alawite Islamic Forum in Syria, on Jan. 3, released a statement that expressed support for the interim Syrian government but accused the MOC [Military Operations Command[10]] of sectarian-motivated attacks against Alawite communities in Homs, Hama, Latakia, Tartus, Damascus, and Daraa. HTS-led clearing operations in Alawite majority neighborhoods led to a flurry of allegations of civilian intimidation, illegal searches, and inhumane treatment.  
   The SOHR [Syrian Observatory for Human Rights] obtained footage of the MOC targeting civilians in the Alawite neighborhoods of al-Zahraa, al-Arman, al-Sabil and al-Muhajereen in the city of Homs. Civilians were made to bray like animals and were intimidated with gunfire. The actions of the MOC were described as “Shabiha-like” – a reference to the notorious criminal gangs used by the Assad regime to intimidate and murder civilian opposition.   Around the same time, the MOC was accused of cultural vandalism against Alawite sites. SOHR activists in Homs reported several attacks on cemeteries in the predominantly-Alawite neighborhoods of al-Zahraa and Wadi al-Zahab. The MOC also has been accused of damaging Alawite houses, tombs, and other cultural sites. These allegations fly in the face of al-Shaibania’s promise to honor diversity.[11] [Emphasis added]

   And:

   Entire families, including women and children, were killed during the recent violence in Syria's coastal region, the UN human rights office says. A spokesman told reporters that the UN had so far verified the killing of 111 civilians since last Thursday, but that the actual figure was believed to be significantly higher. Many of the cases were summary executions and appeared to have been carried out on a sectarian basis, with predominantly Alawite areas targeted in particular, he added. Gunmen supporting the Sunni Islamist-led government have been accused of carrying out revenge killings following a deadly ambush on a security patrol by loyalists of President Bashar al-Assad, who is an Alawite. A monitoring group has reported that more than 1,200 civilians, most of them Alawites, have been killed in Latakia, Tatous, Hama and Homs provinces.[12]

   [10] Described as ‘a loose coalition of Syrian militias headed by HTS.’

   [11] Outhwaite, R., ‘Persecution of Syrian Minorities Risks the Future of Sanctions Relief’, 15 April 2025, New Lines Institute.

   [12] BBC, ‘Whole families dead in recent Syria violence, says UN’, 12 March 2025.

6. Further explaining the sectarian motive behind these attacks and the imputed association of all Alawites with the al-Assad regime:

   The dismantling of the security apparatus behind the oppressive machine of the Assads, including the country's army and the ruling Baath party, meant the sacking of hundreds of thousands of people. Among them were large numbers of the minority Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shia Islam to which the Assad family belong. Under the Assads, they held prominent positions. Now, under Sunni Muslim-led authorities, they have lost their power and privilege, and say they have been under attack and discrimination, despite Sharaa's pledges to respect different religious sects.[13]

   [13] BBC, Syrian bloodshed heaps pressure on Sharaa and exposes deep fractures, 10 March 2025.

7. There are also reports that insurgent Alawites seek to draw the new Government into sectarian conflict to undermine and destabilise the interim Syrian Government.[14] Thus the risk of continuing attacks is ongoing and not a one-off event.

   Sectarian violence has flared since early March, when Alawite insurgents and government forces clashed and committed sectarian murders. The insurgents conducted a coordinated assault across coastal Syria and killed Sunni civilians and government militiamen. The predominantly Sunni government responded by massacring Alawites, exacerbating preexisting sectarian tensions in the area. One insurgent leader indicated that the coordinated attacks were meant to trigger sectarian reprisals from the government in order to damage Damascus’ international image. Insurgent activity has continued to spread throughout western Syria since this episode, highlighting the worsening problem that the government faces.[15] [Emphasis added]

   And:

   With the collapse of the Assad regime, the future social and economic status of Syria’s Alawites became uncertain. In rebel-held areas, Alawites had previously been removed from top positions in government and the security services. This was the case in HTS-controlled Idlib, where critics have argued that the so-called de-Baathification of the army and civil service was, in reality, a process of de-Alawisation. There is anxiety within Alawite communities that the same will now happen in the newly captured governorates.[16] [Emphasis added]

   [14] Carter, B., Alawite insurgents seek to use sectarian violence to destabilise the interim government in Syria, 3 April 2025, Institute for the Study of War.

   [15] Ibid.

   [16] Outhwaite, R., ‘Persecution of Syrian Minorities Risks the Future of Sanctions Relief’, 15 April 2025, New Lines Institute.

8. It has only been in the weeks since the March attacks that the full scale of the retributive targeting of Alawite people in Syria has become known.

   One video from Sanobar shows a pro-government fighter marching through the village chanting, "ethnic cleansing, ethnic cleansing".

   Lists of victims from the village, compiled by local activists, include the names of more than a dozen women and children, including an 11-year-old, a pregnant woman and a disabled man.

   The survivor who watched gunmen kill her father and brother said the family showed their killers the men's civilian ID cards to prove they hadn't been part of Assad's army. But it made no difference; their only accusation, she said, was that the family were "Alawite pigs".[17]

   [17] Williamson, W., ‘Syrian security forces monitored armed civilians who killed Alawites, accused man says’, BBC, 5 May 2025.

9. There are also reports that while attacks on Alawites in Syria have not since reached the scale of those from the killings in March 2025, a further smaller scale massacre of Alawite Syrians occurred in Homs in April 2025, triggered by an unrelated incident.

   Gunmen have killed and abducted 14 members of Syria's Alawite minority in the space of 72 hours, it was revealed on Sunday, as security forces cordoned off neighbourhoods to prevent further attacks.

   The killings are the latest outbreak of sectarian violence in Sunni-majority Syria targeting mainly Alawites, who lost out when forces led by Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS) removed Bashar Al Assad late last year. The HTS ascendancy has ended Alawite control of the security forces and changed the region's dynamics, depriving Shiite Iran of a forward position and cutting off a supply line for Hezbollah.

   Members of the Al Fawara tribe entered Alawite areas of Homs on motorcycles on Thursday and Friday, carrying AK-47 rifles and abducting men from streets and businesses, according to residents and members of the Alawite sect. Their bodies were found on the outskirts of the city over the past 48 hours.

   Ahmad Al Zuaiter, a former Alawite political prisoner who was detained several times for opposing the Assad regime, said the bloodshed started after security forces entered Al Bayada, a Sunni neighbourhood, looking for a wanted man from Al Fawara. The tribe clashed with security forces, then mounted the incursions into Alawite neighbourhoods.

   "The Alawites had nothing to do with it," Mr Al Zuaiter told The National. The gunmen are believed to have entered the Zahra and Nuzha districts and other neighbourhoods in Homs. [Emphasis added]

10. There is also growing concern regarding the lack of accountability measures taken by the new Syrian government against those involved in the March and April 2025 killings, and the implications of this for protection of Syria’s Alawite from ongoing reprisal attacks.

    Several weeks after the killings, residents of the coast and the wider Alawite community remain uncertain about who to trust. There is also widespread scepticism about the prospect of genuine accountability for what happened, despite the new government’s pledges….Syrian writer and journalist Nawwar Jabbour, who is from Syria’s Christian minority, blamed the massacres on the new government’s failure to take quicker action to punish the crimes of the previous regime – despite widespread demands for justice from the public after the extent of its abuses at torture centres like Sednaya prison emerged in December.  “The current government’s failure to take clear steps toward transitional justice has allowed a substitute retributive process to emerge, laying the groundwork for widespread violence against Alawites along the coast,” Jabbour said. “The breach can only be remedied by permitting international investigative committees to work freely to identify and prosecute those directly responsible for the massacres.”[18] [Emphasis added]

    [18] Al-Meri, A.,  ‘The Alawites caught between revenge and a new Syria: “They were our own countrymen.”’, The New Humanitarian, 26 March 2025.

11. Based on the information before me, I am satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Syria for reasons of his religious identity and his imputed political opinion as an Alawite. He therefore meets the criteria for s36(4)(a), being one of the exceptions to the application of s36(3) of the Act. He is therefore not excluded from being owed protection obligations due to any right he may have to enter and reside in Syria.

12. I will now proceed to assess the applicant’s case against Lebanon, as his receiving country.

    Findings of fact

13. The applicant presented to the Tribunal as a credible witness who answered my questions spontaneously and convincingly. He demonstrated himself to be knowledgeable and reflective in his responses and did not appear to exaggerate or embellish his claims. For example, when the Tribunal asked him if anything further happened between January and November 2017 prior to him departing from Lebanon, he was upfront in his response and said that no further incidents occurred. Contrary to the finding of the delegate, I found the applicant’s description of the ‘incident’ in January 2017 to be detailed and consistent with his previous accounts of this event. Considering the overall consistency and detail of the information that he provided in his protection visa application, including correcting earlier small errors in details on his protection visa application form, during his interview before the Department, the further documentation he has provided substantiating his claims regarding the risks facing Alawite people, as well as his oral evidence provided to the Tribunal, I accept the applicant to be a witness of truth and I accept his version of the events he claims occurred.

14. Based on the applicant’s evidence, as well as the country information discussed and referred to below, I make the following findings of fact:

    ·The applicant is from a predominantly Alawite family and is himself an Alawite.

    ·Between 2008 and 2015 he lived in [Neighbourhood 1]. Due to continuous tensions and flare-ups with the Sunni people in the adjoining area of [Neighbourhood 2], the applicant was regularly exposed to sectarian violence and confrontations, which were often not promptly responded to by state authorities, placing the applicant and his family at risk of violence due to their Alawite identity. Due to this insecurity, he was unable to exercise his right to freedom of movement and this curtailed his work opportunities.

    ·After his return from a visit to Australia in 2015, through family contacts the applicant was able to secure a job in [Workplace 1] in Jdeideh, Beirut, a predominantly Christian Maronite area. He lived and worked under the protection of the [workplace] owner, [Mr A], a Christian Maronite affiliated with [a Christian group.]

    ·In January 2017 the applicant and his friend [Friend A] (also an Alawite) were sitting in their car in [Neighbourhood 3], close to Jdeideh, when they were subjected to a violent abduction and assault by members of a Sunni extremist gang. When their Alawite identity was quickly discovered, they were subjected to sectarian insults and taunts, then blindfolded, bound and marched to a garage where they were then severely assaulted by numerous gang members, including with wooden batons. They were released by the gang leaders when he recognised the applicant as a patron from his [shop].

    ·The applicant’s injuries prevented him from working for around two months. He returned to work but this incident shattered his fragile sense of security he had built up in Jdeideh and his movements remained limited to transits to and from work and to local trusted shops.

    ·He departed from Lebanon in November 2017 and arrived in Australia on a visitor visa.  In March 2018 the applicant was in contact with his former employer, [Mr A], who warned him not to return as the local situation in Jdeideh had changed and it would no longer be safe for him to return there.   

    Does the applicant satisfy the refugee criterion for protection?

15. My task is to undertake a forward-looking assessment of what risks the applicant may face in the current and foreseeable context in Lebanon. In undertaking this assessment, I must also consider the applicant’s prior experiences, which may provide indications of what risks the applicant may continue to face in the future. However the current situation in Lebanon is extremely volatile and the risks faced by the applicant in the future may well exceed or differ from those he has faced in the past. Due to this ongoing volatility, making a future assessment of the risks facing the applicant in the foreseeable future, is particularly challenging. 

16. Country information indicates that numerous interdependent factors underpin the current volatility in Lebanon, on top of the longstanding sectarian issues faced by Alawites in Lebanon, particularly relevant in the applicant’s case.  These additional factors include: the fragile and dynamic external security situation with regards to the ceasefire with Israel, with 50 airstrikes on Lebanon, including several in Beirut, reportedly occurring in the month of April 2025 alone;[19] the political effects of the fall of the al-Assad regime in Syria, especially upon Alawites in Lebanon;[20] and the wider security threats and shifts occurring across the Middle East.[21]

    [19] Al Jazeera, ‘Hezbollah leader says Lebanese gov’t must do more to end Israeli attacks’, 27 April 2025;

    [20] Macaron, J. ‘Lebanon Braces for Monumental Changes in Next-Door Syria’ Wilson Center, 17 January 2025.

    [21] Masters, J., ‘Lebanon: How Israel, Hezbollah, and Regional Powers Are Shaping Its Future’, Council on Foreign Relations, 27 January 2025.

17. The internal security situation within Lebanon remains extremely challenging. In addition to external security threats, internal sectarian armed groups are also manoeuvring to re-position themselves in response to these external events as the Lebanese state tries to strengthen its position and work towards achieving a monopoly of force over entrenched sectarian military groups.[22] There is also the continuing impacts of ongoing displacement and humanitarian needs following the intense period of conflict with Israel in 2024 and the continuing airstrikes in 2025,[23] plus additional demands placed on the Lebanese state dealing with a new influx of refugees (and Lebanese nationals) from Syria in 2025, including as of 18 April 2025, around 21,000 Alawites fleeing from Syria.[24]

    [22] ‘Lebanon's Aoun to TNA: 2025 will be the year of state monopoly on all weapons’, 15 April 2025, The New Arab.

    [23] OCHA, ‘Lebanon: Flash Update #65 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 28 March 2025’ reported that: At least 20 killed and 58 injured in airstrikes in Lebanon since 22 March (source: MoPH); 93,306 people remain displaced outside their cadaster of origin, while 965,360 people have returned (source: IOM); Over 23,000 people have arrived from Syria in North Lebanon since early March (source: UNHCR);  Attalah,J., Feghali, N. ‘Lebanon’s Struggle for Survival: The Lasting Impact of Israel’s War on a Nation in Crisis’, Wilson Center,24 October 2024.

    [24] ‘21,000 Syrian Alawites 'flee to Lebanon' from coastal regions after sectarian violence’, 18 April 2025, The New Arab.

1. The backdrop to these events is also a new and fragile Lebanese government and a protracted economic crisis since 2019, where it is estimated that 60% of the Lebanese population currently lives below the poverty line[25] and 3.7 million people out of Lebanon's 5.7 million population, require humanitarian aid.[26] These cumulative factors pose enormous challenges for the overstretched and under-resourced national security forces, both the Lebanese army and the police, who are expected to cover security needs in southern Lebanon as required under the ceasefire agreement, as well as meet all of the other security needs of the population facing multiple crisis.

   [25] Ghoson, S. ‘Lebanon’s Economic Crisis Pushes 60 Percent of the Population Into Poverty, Lebanese American University’, 25 January 2025.

   [26] Lebanese Response Plan, 2024, Lebanon Response Plan 2024 - Chapeau Document - Lebanon | ReliefWeb.

2. The risks faced by the applicant in the future may well be impacted by these macro-level variables as the fluid political, economic and social situation currently faced by people in Lebanon continues to evolve.  In this current complex context, political and humanitarian actors all agree that Lebanese people are now even more reliant and dependent on their membership of sectarian groups to shore up their security and their economic survival.[27] It is well documented that those who are members of larger, more powerful religious, political, security groups in Lebanon, have always fared much better than those who are members of small minority groups,[28] including Alawites, as further discussed below. 

   Applicant’s home area

   [27] Khatib, L., Wallace, J. ‘Lebanon’s politics and politicians’, Chatham House, December 2022.

   [28]  Hachem, F., The Rights of Religious Minorities in Lebanon: An In-depth Analysis and Recommendations, National Working Group on Freedom of Religious Beliefs (FORB), 2025, p.2,15-16.

3. In assessing the risks facing the applicant in Lebanon due to his Alawite identity, first I need to consider where in Lebanon he would likely return to, and then if he is unable to safely return to that place, whether he may have any option to safely relocate to another part of Lebanon where he would not face a ‘real chance’ of ‘serious harm.’

4. I note that the applicant was born in [Neighbourhood 1] and lived there from 2008 until 2015. He then moved to Jdeideh in Beirut and lived there between May 2015 until January 2017. I note that the applicant’s evidence is that his move from [Neighbourhood 1] to Jdeideh was only possible because he secured a job which also included assistance for his accommodation and security. I accept the applicant’s evidence that he has no continuing link to [Mr A] and does not know if he remains in Lebanon. I accept that there is no foreseeable prospect of the applicant securing employment, accommodation and protection from him again, if he were to return to Lebanon.

5. I further note that all of the applicant’s family, including his brother who helped him secure the job with Mr [A], all currently live in [Neighbourhood 1]. In these circumstances I therefore find the applicant would most likely return to [Neighbourhood 1] if he returned to Lebanon. Thus my assessment of the risks he would face as an Alawite in Lebanon commences with a brief demographic overview of Alawites in Lebanon, followed by a more detailed assessment of risks he may face in his home area of [Neighbourhood 1]. I will then consider any relocation prospects the applicant may have.

   Alawites in Lebanon

6. According to the US Department of State, Alawites are one of the five officially recognised Muslim groups in Lebanon, making up an estimated 0.6 per cent of the citizen population in Lebanon (combined with Ismailis).[29] DFAT information indicates that the Alawite population is concentrated in the Akkar and Northern Governorates, with the majority of Alawites living in the Tripoli suburb of [Neighbourhood 1].[30] I note that this is consistent with the applicant’s evidence regarding the concentration of the Lebanese Alawite population in [Neighbourhood 1], in particular.

   [29] 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom - Lebanon', US Department of State, 26 June 2024, pp.3 & 6, 20240627180848. 

   [30] DFAT ‘Country Information Report: Lebanon', Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 26 June 2023, (‘DFAT Report’) p.17; 'An uncertain future for Syrian refugees in Lebanon: The challenges of life in exile and the barriers to return', Minority Rights Group International (MRG), 27 February 2019, p.5.

7. I also note that in Lebanon, where the entire social and state organisation is based on membership of a ‘sect’ or a person’s religious identity,[31] that this also automatically results in Lebanese people being imputed with an accompanying political identity, based on their membership of that sect. Thus the applicant’s claims to face persecution due to his religious and imputed political opinion grounds, are fully intertwined.  

   Risks facing Alawites in [Neighbourhood 1]

   [31] DFAT ‘Country Information Report: Lebanon', Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 26 June 2023 [2.2], [2.22-2.26].

8. The longstanding tensions described by some as a ‘seemingly intractable vendetta’[32] between Alawite and Sunni communities concentrated on [Street 1], which divides [Neighbourhood 1] and [Neighbourhood 2], are well documented. In the 1970s and the civil war, the two sects supported different warring sides: the Sunnis overwhelmingly supported the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), whereas the Alawites supported the Syrian army; armed confrontation resulted in the occupation of Tripoli by the Syrian army between 1976-2005, which suppressed all opposing Sunni groups.[33] 

   [32] Astley, A.M., ‘Assad's Fall Threatens to Reignite Decades of Sectarian Strife in Northern Lebanon’ 15 April 2025, DAWN. 

   [33] Center for Operational Analysis and Research,  ‘Conflict Analysis Tripoli, 14 January 2022, Conflict Analysis – Tripoli - COAR Global, p.1.

9. The contemporary tensions between Alawite and Sunni communities in Lebanon build on this history and have been intrinsically linked to sectarian tensions, Syrian influence in Lebanon, the civil war in Syria, poverty and marginalisation, political and ideological factors and the roles of external actors.[34] Violence between the communities flared at the outbreak of the Syrian war, comprising pro- and anti-Syrian government sides, and around 200 people were killed.[35] The security situation reportedly saw some improvement following the establishment of a security plan and increased presence of the Lebanese Armed Forced (LAF) in 2014/15, however further escalations occurred in 2022,[36] requiring further deployment of the LAF. A strategy to broaden LAF’s representation and improve local confidence in the LAF through a recruitment drive from Tripoli and Akkar was undertaken and the interim Government assigned a greater security presence to the north in January 2024.[37]

   [34] Ajil, A., Politico-ideological violence in Lebanon: The narrative embeddedness of grievances Dynamics of Migration and (Im)Mobility Volume 4 - 2022 |  ICRC, ‘Tripoli, Jabal Mohsen. Destruction and poverty are consequences of recurring conflicts.’1 December 2014; International Crisis Group ‘New Crisis, Old Demons in Lebanon: The Forgotten Lessons of Bab-Tebbaneh/Jabal Mohsen’,14 October 2010.

   [35] ‘After violent clashes in Tripoli and Ain al-Hilweh, could tensions escalate?’ L’Orient le Jour (L’Orient Today), 12 September 2022, 20221013112928.

   [36]Center for Operational Analysis and Research,  ‘Conflict Analysis Tripoli, 14 January 2022, Conflict Analysis – Tripoli - COAR Global.

   [37] DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon', Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 26 June 2023, p.13, 20230626100419.

10. However these confidence-building measures have become less relevant in light of the changed situation over the past 18 months. These changes include the impacts on Lebanese security capacities due to the conflict with Israel, resulting in a focused deployment of the LAF to the south of Lebanon, leaving the north of Lebanon more exposed to increased sectarian violence. Such violence has become much more likely now, due to the political changes in Syria which have greatly increased the vulnerability of Alawites in Lebanon to similar reprisal attacks as Syrian Alawites have experienced. This is especially as many Syrian Alawites have now fled to [Neighbourhood 1] and may continue to be the target of Sunni extremists taking revenge against those assumed to be associated with the al-Assad regime.

11. This changed situation is reflected in the most recent Australian Government travel advice which highlights the volatility of the growing tensions between communities in [Neighbourhood 1] and [Neighbourhood 2] and the heightened risks posed by Sunni extremist groups, especially since the fall of the al-Assad regime in Syria. DFAT’s travel advice current as of 21 May 2025 states: 

    Don't go to Tripoli's [Neighbourhood 1] and [Neighbourhood 2] neighbourhoods. The risk of civil unrest remains high and can turn violent.

    Lebanese authorities say extremists have taken refuge in northern Lebanon, including throughout the Akkar district.[38] [Emphasis added]

    [38] DFAT, Lebanon Travel Advice & Safety | Smartraveller.

12. Consistent with the applicant’s testimony, there are several media reports of how the fall of the al-Assad regime and influx of Alawite refugees to Lebanon is intrinsically linked to intensified tensions between Sunni and Alawite populations, and led to a growing sense of trepidation that worse is to come.  

    Amid the euphoria sparked by the overthrow of the Syrian regime, Lebanon's northern capital remains wary of a resurgence of old tensions between the Alawite neighborhood of [Neighbourhood 1] and the Sunni district of[Neighbourhood 2].[39] [Emphasis added]

    As noted earlier, attacks on Alawite people in Syria have continued on a smaller scale since the March 2025 attacks, which create an ongoing tinder box effect between Alawite and Sunni communities in Lebanon. This was highlighted recently by the rapid escalation of violence that occurred when a child from Sunni Idlib in Syria was reportedly attacked by an Alawite from [Neighbourhood 1], necessitating the immediate deployment of the LAF, as reported in March 2025.

    Most of Lebanon’s Alawites live in the [Neighbourhood 1] neighborhood in Tripoli. Last month, the Lebanese military deployed a unit along [Street 1], which separates [Neighbourhood 1] from the mainly Sunni neighborhood of [Neighbourhood 2], after tensions escalated when a minor was stabbed. The attacker, initially misidentified as a Syrian national, was later confirmed to be from [Neighbourhood 1]…. With the memory of violence still fresh, many in Lebanon are holding their breath, waiting to see if these new arrivals will exacerbate intra-Lebanese social tensions.[40] [Emphasis added]

    And:    

    Angry protesters had taken to the streets of Tripoli after news broke out over the stabbing of a minor from Syria’s Idlib. Soon after, news circulated on social media that Ahmed Bitar, a man from the predominantly Alawite neighborhood of [Neighbourhood 1] in Tripoli, was behind the attack. The protesters blocked the [road] leading to [Neighbourhood 1], while tensions were high in the Qobbeh neighborhood, as the people called for the arrest of the perpetrator.  The tensions boiled over into a gunfight, sparking panic among the people. The army soon deployed heavily in the area and restored calm.[41]

    [39][information deleted]

    [40] [information deleted]

    [41] [information deleted]

13. While the LAF was able to contain this incident on this occasion, I note that the LAF is highly stretched, and that the ongoing attacks and risks to Alawites in Syria, fanned by the lack of accountability taken so far against perpetrators involved in these sectarian revenge attacks against Alawites in Syria, also has a direct impact on the risks facing Alawites in Lebanon. For example,

    The army deployed in areas separating Sunni and Alawite neighborhoods in Tripoli overnight on Friday to contain any tensions from the violence in neighboring Syria.[42] [Emphasis added]

    [42] Ibid.

14. The interconnectedness between Sunni-Alawite relations in Syria and Lebanon and the ongoing risks to Alawites in Syria from revenge attacks, have a direct impact on the risks facing Alawites in Lebanon. Referring to the impact of Syrian Alawite refugee arrivals in [Neighbourhood 1] in 2025, other potential flashpoints between the [Neighbourhood 1] and [Neighbourhood 2] communities are continuously arising:

    Although the new arrivals have been settling in as quietly as possible, old scars might be reopening in Tripoli, with a string of shootings and other violence in recent weeks. In one incident, Sunni youths from [Neighbourhood 2] stormed a hospital treating a suspected Syrian former Assad regime officer. Lebanon's new prime minister, Nawaf Salam, hastily visited Tripoli and announced a new security intervention to restore calm.  "When the Assad regime fell, at the same time you had the issue of Sednaya prison, so all of this trauma came back to the surface," Baroudi says. The Alawite community in Jebel Mohsen can feel like it is "surrounded on all sides," she adds. "Whatever happens in Syria is going to have an impact here." She sees poverty as an "amplifier" of the violence, but not the root cause. "The main root cause of all of this is this feeling of victimhood. The feeling of oppression," she says. "A sense that I'm fighting for a cause. No one has ever given them the sense of belonging to a nation at the end of the day. And people need to belong to something."

15. Further support for the interconnectedness between the plights of Syrian and Lebanese Alawites is emphasised by reports that residents of [Neighbourhood 5], another Sunni quarter adjacent to [Neighbourhood 1], have erected a large poster of Syria's new president at the entrance to the suburb. I also note the applicant’s evidence, corroborated by country information, that groups of Sunni extremists from Lebanon have received training in Idlib Syria and fought in the Syrian civil war against the al-Assad regime. The applicant mentioned the example of al-Masri, a well-known Lebanese Sunni militia commander from the [Neighbourhood 2] neighbourhood of Tripoli. Al-Masri and his brother trained in Syria and fought in the Syrian civil war. He was arrested and sentenced in Lebanon to two and a half years jail, along with a large cohort of other Lebanese Sunnis who fought in the Syrian war.[43] Al-Masri’s brother was captured in Syria and sent to the notorious Sednaya prison on the outskirts of Damascus.

    ‘For years, he heard no more of his brother's fate—until Assad's regime abruptly crumbled in December. Like so many prisoners in Sednaya, his brother had died in its dungeon-like cells; he was most likely tortured to death.’[44]

    [43] [information deleted]

    [44] Astley, A.M., ‘Assad's Fall Threatens to Reignite Decades of Sectarian Strife in Northern Lebanon’ 15 April 2025, DAWN. 

16. According to other reports, ‘scores’ of Lebanese Sunnis went to Syria for training in Idlib and fought in the Syrian civil war:

    Scores of Sunnis from Lebanon, and especially Sunni-majority Tripoli, sneaked into Syria to fight alongside overwhelmingly Sunni rebels in Qusair.[45]

    And:

    Abu Rami is a commander in the growing band of volunteer Lebanese fighters who are getting involved in the conflict in neighboring Syria. Most come from Tripoli, the northern Lebanese city that is largely home to a Sunni Muslim population. Their hatred of the Assad regime is rooted in the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, which only ended in 2005…. "The struggle for freedom in Syria is our own struggle for freedom," says Sheik Masen al-Mohammed, one of the most important Sunni religious leaders in Tripoli. "We Lebanese are part of the Syrian revolution, part of the rebellion. If Syria gains its freedom, then we will also win in Lebanon." In addition to the political reasons, the sheik also has a key reason for encouraging Lebanese to fight in Syria. "Assad is an infidel," the sheik says, noting that the Syrian dictator is part of the Alawite sect, which splintered from Shiite Islam hundreds of years ago. Sheik Masen views Assad as an enemy rather than a true Muslim.[46] [Emphasis added]

    [45] Aljazeera, ‘Lebanese Sunnis fighting ‘holy war’ in Syria, 14 February 2014.

    [46] Putz, U ’Jihadists Declare Holy War Against Assad Regime’, 30 March 2012, Spiegel International.

17. The resurgence of Sunni extremists in Lebanon, some of whom are veterans from the Syrian civil war and whose family members were amongst those tortured and killed by al-Assad’s regime, plus the former occupation by al-Assad of Tripoli, both provide strong and direct motivations for these groups to vent their revenge on Alawites living in Lebanon, especially since the influx of Syrian Alawites, likely to be seen as more directly associated with the al-Assad regime.

    In [Neighbourhood 1], Tripoli, dozens of families fleeing the Syrian coast arrive each day. But the fear among Alawite refugees has not subsided, especially with the rise in incitement against them by some voices in the “Capital of the North,” citing various accusations, the most prominent being their alleged affiliation with the remnants of the Assad regime. This was exacerbated by recordings reporting an Assad regime officer being treated in one of Tripoli’s hospitals, as well as ongoing security tensions in the area, which required intervention by the Lebanese army.

18. Many Alawites in Lebanon continue to fear that they will be attacked by Sunnis in Lebanon.

    Rajwa (60 years old) fled from Safita [Syria] to [Neighbourhood 1] with her only son, fearful that the situation would explode in the region. She told Daraj: “I fled seeking safety among our relatives here, with my only son, who never served in the regime’s army. My husband has been missing since the start of the war 12 years ago. My son carried me on his back as we crossed the river—it was a breathless escape. And even though I arrived in a place with no checkpoints or killings, I’m still afraid for my son. I fear he’ll leave [Neighbourhood 1] and never return. I can’t bear to lose him too.”[47]

    [47] [information deleted]

19. I also note in the applicant’s evidence, he claimed to have seen [Social media 2] messages of Sunni extremists from north Lebanon saying, ‘it is good that Alawites from Syria are gathering in [Neighbourhood 1] as this makes it easier for them to slaughter them in one go.’ I note this media report corroborating the applicant’s claim:

    Rajwa says: “Our relatives here in [Neighbourhood 1] tell me I’m exaggerating in my fear, and that the situation in Tripoli today is not like it was years ago. But I worry about my son more than myself, especially after watching several [Social media 2] videos calling for us to be hunted down and killed in Lebanon.[48] [Emphasis added]

    [48] Ibid.

20. As Alawites in Syria have faced persecution, Alawites in Lebanon now feel particularly vulnerable since losing their political cover, with the fall of the al-Assad regime in Syria.

    With the Assad family out of power in Syria, the ADP is no longer as present as it once was in [Neighbourhood 1]. Young said this fact put the neighborhood’s Alawites in a precarious situation: they no longer have political cover, and Sunnis are enjoying a resurgence following the rebel victory in Syria. “Without the Assads, the Alawites have suddenly become very, very vulnerable against a revitalized Sunni community,” Young explained. “The political protection that [Neighbourhood 1] may have enjoyed, I don’t think it is there anymore.”[49] [Emphasis added]

    [49][information deleted]

21. Having carefully reviewed available country information, I find that it is foreseeable that the ongoing situation of extreme vulnerability of Alawites in Syria will continue to cause a spill-over effect regarding Alawite-Sunni dynamics in Lebanon, as they have previously. I find that the risk of ‘flashpoints’ arising between Alawites and extremist Sunnis groups in Lebanon, some of whom trained and fought in Syria, will remain high for the foreseeable future. Given the way in which targeted killings of Alawites has, and continues, to unfold in Syria, I cannot exclude the possibility that such violence may spread to Alawites in Lebanon in the foreseeable future, and that in this scenario, the applicant would face a greater than ‘real chance’ of a serious threat to his personal security, such that he would be at risk of facing ‘serious harm’.

    Willingness and ability of Lebanese authorities (LAF and police) to provide effective protection

1. Having found that there is a real risk of the security situation spilling over in the foreseeable future in the [Neighbourhood 1]-[Neighbourhood 2] area, which may result in the applicant facing serious harm, the question then becomes whether the Lebanese authorities, both the LAF and the police, have the will and capacity to reliably intervene and de-escalate violence flashpoints to the point where the risk of serious harm to the applicant falls below the threshold test of him facing a ‘real chance’ of such harm.

2. While the LAF has proven responsive so far to the arrival of the Alawite refugees from Syria, by deploying forces to the north in an effort to prevent conflict spill-over, this effort is also tempered by the reality that these measures may become inadequate to the challenge of preventing violence from ‘spiralling out of control’, especially given the presence of radical Sunni groups in Lebanon who have fought and trained in Syria, augmented by the influx of unregulated weapons flowing from Syria.

   Lebanese security forces are heavily deployed in Tripoli and surrounding areas, one security source said, where they are "heavily focused on preventing conflict". He added: “There is growing fear that the situation could spiral out of control but security forces have so far managed to maintain calm and prevent any alarming clashes…

   Small radical Sunni groups in Lebanon have also sent fighters across the border to join the rebels.

   The collapse of Syria's army in December has flooded the region with firearms, allowing Lebanese gun dealers to profit by buying cheap weapons and smuggling them into Lebanon. According to security sources, the price of an AK-47, for example, was about $25. Thousands of weapons have been smuggled through illegal border crossings, particularly in the north.[50] [Emphasis added]

   [50] The National, ‘Lebanese security forces 'heavily focused' on preventing conflict as Syrian Alawites flee across border: Fears growing in northern Lebanon that situation could spiral out of control, 13 March 2025.

3. I accept that the available evidence indicates that the LAF is willing to protect the Alawite community in Lebanon. However there remains a further question of whether they have capacity to do so. Under the terms of the current strained ceasefire with Israel, the LAF is expected to deploy a total of 10,000 troops to the south of Lebanon.[51] However from the outset of the ceasefire, the lack of resources and capacities of the LAF to fulfil this core term of the agreement, has been a major concern.[52] These concerns increased in January 2025 when US President Trump  Lebanon suspended all international aid for three months, also impacting on the LAF,[53] but then in March 2025, the US decided to release US$95 million in military assistance to Lebanon.[54] However, even with this support, the LAF still does not have the resources to meet the ceasefire deployment requirement despite the existential implications for Lebanon’s national security, as indicated by statements made in April 2025 by President Aoun, seeking international support for the LAF:

   Aoun revealed that Lebanon was reinforcing its armed forces, with 4,500 new troops deployed to the south and a goal to reach 10,000. He also reiterated Lebanon's request for continued regional support, especially from Gulf states like Qatar …[55] [Emphasis added]

   [51] Le Monde, ‘Post-ceasefire, strengthening Lebanon's army remains a challenge’, 29 November 2024.

   [52] The Washington Post ‘Can Lebanon’s army secure the south? I ceasefire could depend on it’, 20 November 2024; Momtaz, R., ‘Game-Changing Support for Lebanon’s Army is Europe’s Best bet’, 29 October 2024, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

   [53] Jalkh, J.‘Suspension of US military aid: What about the Lebanese Army?’, 29 January 2025, L’Orient Today.

   [54] ‘Trump administration approves $95m in aid to Lebanon’s military, 6 March 2025, Middle East Eye.

   [55] ‘Lebanon's Aoun to TNA: 2025 will be the year of state monopoly on all weapons’, 15 April 2025, The New Arab.

4. I also note that this stretched capacity has been caused by the longer-term depletion of LAF due to lack of  resources especially since the start of the economic crisis in 2019 when the wages of professional soldiers were either unpaid or became worth so little, causing high rates of desertion.[56] In light of the well-documented insufficient capabilities of the LAF to meet existing demands and given the great strain the ceasefire is currently under, I cannot exclude the possibility that in the current context the LAF will be unable to reliably contain the escalation of further tensions between the Alawite and Sunni communities in [Neighbourhood 1] and [Neighbourhood 2], especially given how overstretched the LAF currently is and the increased threat caused by Sunni extremist groups, who according to DFAT, have ‘taken refuge’[57] in northern Lebanon and continue to increase their traction and power in northern Lebanon.

   [56] ‘Lebanon’s Army Suffers with Currency Collapse, as Desertions Mount’, 25 February 2023, Kaetab.org.

   [57] DFAT, Lebanon Travel Advice & Safety | Smartraveller.

5. Furthermore, I note that the charged security situation in [Neighbourhood 1] and [Neighbourhood 2] goes beyond what a civil police force could be expected to manage alone, however based on available country information it seems to me that the police would also be unable to offer the LAF much in the way of ‘back up’ to military operations between conflict affected communities or civil policing within the affected communities. This is because, as with the LAF, national and municipal policing capacities in Lebanon are reported by DFAT and others to have been severely stretched and also facing mass desertions for a significant period since the onset of the economic crisis in 2019.[58]  I find that the police would be unable to provide reliable and effective state protection to the applicant in the charged sectarian context he would likely face in [Neighbourhood 1].   

   [58] DFAT Country Information Report Lebanon, 26 June 2023 at [5.6-5.7].

6. Based on the information before me, I find that effective protection measures, as defined in s 5LA of the Act, would not be available to the applicant given the real risk the authorities in Lebanon would be unable to shield him from the risk of attack or harm by Sunni extremists targeting him due to his Alawite identity and residence in [Neighbourhood 1].

   Relocation options in Lebanon

7. Having found that the applicant faces a real risk of serious harm in [Neighbourhood 1] and that he will not be afforded reliable effective state protection from this harm, I now need to consider whether the applicant could safely relocate to another part of Lebanon.

8. As earlier noted, the applicant has lived in Beirut for nearly two years between 2015 to 2017. However as per earlier findings, his ability to live there was conditional upon him having the support of a benefactor willing to provide the three essential ingredients to make such a move feasible for him, being employment, housing and security. I accept that the applicant does not have the option or possibility of further employment (and thus also housing and security) from Mr [A]. He would therefore need to secure these three essential elements for life outside of [Neighbourhood 1] through other means.

9. Having considered the available country information, I am not satisfied that he would likely be able to secure employment, housing or security in Beirut or indeed in any other location in Lebanon, unless he had a similar benefactor willing to assist him, which according to his evidence, he does not have.  This is because it is difficult for Alawites to move to areas outside of [Neighbourhood 1] as they are a tiny minority group and do not have large established communities elsewhere in Lebanon who can provide such support. The majority of Alawites in Lebanon live in [Neighbourhood 1], with smaller numbers scattered across mixed neighbourhoods in villages in the Akkar and Northern Governorates. Some individual Alawites, who have employment or family links, are able to live in Beirut, as the applicant previously did.

10. I note the applicant’s prior experience of being attacked and harmed by a Sunni extremist gang in a neighbouring suburb of Beirut in January 2017 due to his Alawite identity. This was prior to the increased risk of targeted sectarian attacks against Alawites in Lebanon following the fall of al-Assad’s regime and other factors empowering Sunni extremists in Lebanon. It was only due to the applicant falling under the protection of [Mr A] and having cultivated friendly relations with particular businesses in non-Maronite areas that secured the applicant’s release from the Sunni gang or prevented other attacks due to his identity. Now that the applicant no longer has this protection, I find that should he try to re-establish residence in Beirut he will lack safety and will be at constant risk moving around and through different neighbourhoods, of being identified as Alawite. This aspect of his identity is easily known to others due to his Syrian accent and when he answers even the most cursory of questions. He will be unable to hide his Alawite identity and this would place him at risk of sectarian targeting, as occurred to him in the past. I find that he would not be safe ‘living alone’ without a benefactor to protect him in another part of Lebanon.

11. Given the applicant’s membership of the small minority Alawite sect would mean he would lack effective protection provided by his sect, sect being the main source of security in Lebanon, and given that his identity as an Alawite can be easily established even in casual daily encounters and may cause members of opposing sects to attack him simply because of his Alawite identity, I find that the applicant’s religious identity would place him at risk wherever he goes in Lebanon. I am satisfied that moving to another location in Lebanon is not an option available to the applicant without him continuing to face a real chance of serious harm, which relates to all areas within Lebanon. While this finding is sufficient for me to conclude that the applicant satisfies s 5J(1)(c), as the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of Lebanon, I also take note of a number of other additional factors which would also make it difficult for him to safely relocate elsewhere in Lebanon.

12. I note that the applicant lacks family support anywhere other than in [Neighbourhood 1], meaning that if he were to relocate to another part of Lebanon, he would not be able to live with family members and would be dependent on the private rental market to find somewhere to live. Regarding means of support, the applicant’s evidence is that is currently staying with a friend in Australia as he cannot pay rent, and that he works in [various roles]. Him and his cousin are supporting around 25 family members in Lebanon who are entirely dependent on his remittances with other family in Australia too. Thus I accept that the applicant has been unable to amass sizeable savings to assist him ‘get on his feet’ if he returned to Lebanon and that it is most likely that he would be returning to Lebanon with little or no financial cushion.   

13. I also note the dire housing shortages and rent increases in Lebanon especially since the conflict with Israel, due to increased housing scarcity.

    The recent conflict resulted in wide-scale destruction of civilian housing, with about 100,000 units across the country damaged or destroyed completely. Among these, by 14 November 2024, 18% were classified as completely destroyed and 82% sustained partial damage... Lebanon’s housing sector was already in difficulty following the 2019 economic crisis. Rising inflation, currency devaluation, and the surging costs of building materials led to the abandonment and incompletion of many private housing projects across the country. The Government’s reconstruction capacity is extremely limited, and many families have lost their incomes, challenging their ability to rebuild at their own expense… Amid the 14-month conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, the demand for rental accommodation in safer areas of Lebanon surged, leading to increased prices. While the hostilities have ceased, rental prices continue to increase. This makes affordable accommodation increasingly inaccessible for shelter-vulnerable populations, especially those whose houses have been damaged or destroyed.[59]

    And:

    In this context, some landlords are capitalizing on the situation by claiming exorbitant prices tripling or even quadrupling rates in certain cases, especially for furnished accommodations where displaced individuals can move in immediately.[60]

    [59] ACAPS, "The Assessment Capacities Project", ‘Lebanon: After the ceasefire: current situation, humanitarian needs, and outlook’, 5 March 2025.

    [60] This Is Beirut, ‘Rising Rentals: Effects of the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict’, 11 October 2024.

14. I further note the country information indicating that many neighbourhoods, including in Beirut, are not welcoming of ‘strangers’ coming and living amongst them, having become more aware of the background of their neighbours to avoid increased risk of harm, for example from Israeli airstrikes against alleged Hezbollah members, which remains a continuing risk with the threat of the collapse of the ceasefire or escalation of the current level of aerial attacks including on Beirut.

    Volunteers in uniform are patrolling the predominantly Christian neighbourhood holding walkie-talkies to co-ordinate their operation…. “We have concerns with displaced people who are coming in huge numbers to Beirut, and they have a lot of needs, and it is very complicated,” says Nadim Gemayel, who formed the organisation behind the neighbourhood watch…. Some building management firms have sent out forms to residents asking them for identity details, the number of family members who are staying in flats, and vehicles they are using.  In some areas, leaflets have been distributed asking for members of Hezbollah to leave, while individuals known to be affiliated with the group have been told to go.[61]

    And also:

    … recent Israeli military attacks on these areas, specifically on buildings housing displaced people, have led to more cautious responses among residents. Some landlords have already started declining tenants based on their origins. “We don’t know who they are; one of them could be from Hezbollah, and that puts us all at risk,” said Walid Yazbek, owner of a building in the Christian neighborhood of Achrafieh in Beirut. He told The Media Line that he only accepted people he knew and trusted after rejecting a young man from Dahiyeh, a friend of one of his tenants.[62]

    [61] BBC, ‘Lebanon: Communal tensions grow in Beirut as war forces relocations’, 30 October 2024.

    [62] Taylor, T. ‘Caught Between Conflicts, Lebanon’s Christians Resist Displacement and Division’, 13 November 2024.

15. Not only would it be difficult for the applicant to secure accommodation, but he would also likely have poor prospects of securing employment despite his skills as a [Occupation 1] and his history of previous employment in Lebanon and Australia. 

    Lebanon faces long-standing jobs challenges and the Syrian refugee crisis has had a significant impact on the Lebanese labor market. Job creation has been concentrated in low-productivity, low-skilled activities. A large reservoir of untapped human resources coupled with limited private sector job creation has led to high and long-term unemployment and pushed a growing number of workers to either migrate abroad or engage in subsistence-level activities in the informal economy.[63]

    [63] International Labour Organisation, ILO. Lebanon | International Labour Organization

16. Without employment, he would also face challenges in meeting his basic subsistence needs, also worsened due to reduced food security in Lebanon[64] and the high dependence of the population on limited available humanitarian assistance.[65] 

    Conclusions on risks of harm in Lebanon

    [64] ACAPS, "The Assessment Capacities Project", ‘Lebanon: After the ceasefire: current situation, humanitarian needs, and outlook’, 5 March 2025.

    [65] The 2024 Lebanon Humanitarian Response Plan sought $2.72 billion in funding but received only $977 million (36%) by September 2024, leaving a significant shortfall. See Humanitarian Action, Lebanon: Global Humanitarian Overview, 4  December 2024.

17. In conclusion, I find that the applicant would be at risk of treatment amounting to serious harm due to the ‘essential and significant reason’ of his religious identity, within the meaning of s 5J(4)(a), caused by likely escalating sectarian conflict when living in his home area of [Neighbourhood 1]. In addition to the risks he faces to his personal security due to his religious identity, also linked to his place of residence, I further find that he would be at risk of being unable to meet his subsistence needs in poverty-stricken [Neighbourhood 1], due to the lack of employment opportunities or alternative support that exist there. This risk is highlighted by the applicant’s family’s experience that none of them, including his [Occupation 3] brother, have been able to secure any paid employment since their arrival in [Neighbourhood 1] more than three months ago. Like them, he would also be unable to move freely outside of [Neighbourhood 1] to seek employment. For this combination of reasons, his fear of persecution in [Neighbourhood 1] is well founded.

18. I have also considered whether the applicant would be able to safely relocate to another part of Lebanon and I find that he would be neither safe from the risk of sectarian motivated attack and nor would he be able to overcome risks to his ability to subsist due to the lack of any family or other support available to him outside of [Neighbourhood 1] and his likely inability to secure employment, housing and means of subsistence.     

19. Considering my reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of s 5J of the Act. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) of the Act.

    DECISION

20. The Tribunal sets aside and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

    Date of hearing:     1 May 2025

    Representative:      Mrs Maryanne Issa (MARN: 1577048)

    Dr J.D. Donnelly, Barrister-at-law

    ATTACHMENT  -  Extract from Migration Act 1958

    5 (1) Interpretation

    …

    cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:

    (a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or

    (b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;

    but does not include an act or omission:

    (c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

    (d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

    …

    degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:

    (a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

    (b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

    …

    torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:

    (a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or

    (b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or

    (c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or

    (d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or

    (e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;

    but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

    …

    receiving country,  in relation to a non-citizen, means:

    (a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or

    (b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.

    …

    5H    Meaning of refugee

    (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:

    (a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or

    (b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.

    Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.

    …

    5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution

    (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:

    (a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and

    (b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and

    (c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.

    Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.

    (2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.

    Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.

    (3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:

    (a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or

    (b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or

    (c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:

    (i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;

    (ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;

    (iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;

    (iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;

    (v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;

    (vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

    (4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):

    (a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and

    (b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and

    (c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

    (5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:

    (a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;

    (b)     significant physical harassment of the person;

    (c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;

    (d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

    (e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

    (f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.

    (6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

    5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family

    For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:

    (a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and

    (b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:

    (i)the first person has ever experienced; or

    (ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

    where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.

    Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

    5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family

    For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:

    (a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and

    (b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and

    (c)     any of the following apply:

    (i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;

    (ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;

    (iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

    (d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

    5LA Effective protection measures

    (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:

    (a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:

    (i)the relevant State; or

    (ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

    (b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.

    (2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:

    (a)     the person can access the protection; and

    (b)     the protection is durable; and

    (c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.

    …

    36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act

    …

    (2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

    (a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

    (aa)  a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or

    (b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

    (i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and

    (ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

    (c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

    (i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and

    (ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

    (2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:

    (a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

    (b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or

    (c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or

    (d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

    (e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

    (2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:

    (a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

    (b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

    (c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.

    …

    
    

Associated Press ‘Israeli jets strike Beirut's southern suburbs for third time since ceasefire’, 27 April 2025; OCHA, ‘Lebanon: Flash Update #65 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 28 March 2025’.

Salhani, J. ‘Will US pressure tactics on Lebanon make Hezbollah disarm faster?’ Al Jazeera, 16 April 2025.

Yassine, M. Soldiers are increasingly deserting the Lebanese Army, L’Orient Today, 14 October 2021.