2208643 (Refugee) - [2025] ARTA 1841

2208643 (REFUGEE) [2025] ARTA 1841 (5 AUGUST 2025)
DECISION AND
REASONS FOR DECISION
Respondent: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Tribunal Number: 2208643
Tribunal:General Member J McLeod
Date:5 August 2025

Place:Melbourne
Decision:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa

Statement made on 05 August 2025 at 8:46pm.
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Lebanon – particular social groups – divorced and abused males – fear of harm from ex-wife’s family – arrived on prospective marriage visa – physical health and surgery, and wife’s miscarriage while applicant visiting family in home country – relationship ceased and threats from ex-wife’s family – family’s or one uncle’s criminal history and political connections – no recent contact with ex-wife or threats from family – no mental health diagnosis or treatment – new Australian citizen partner, children and step-children – religion – minority Alawite Muslim – fear of harm from religious/political parties and militias – returnee from western country and economic conditions – large family, most in employment – country information – recent external and internal security factors – conditions faced by population generally – no evidence that Alawites targeted – compassionate circumstances – partner and children – referred for ministerial consideration – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H(1)(a), 5J(1), (4)(a), 36(2)(a), (aa), (2A), (2B)(c), 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
CASES
AWC21 v MHA [2022] FCA 1568
GLD18 v MHA [2020] FCAFC 2
SZRSN v MIAC [2013] FCA 751
WZARI v MIMAC [2013] FCA 788

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is a review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicant claims to be a national of Lebanon. He first arrived on a prospective marriage visa [in] November 2017, and following the breakdown of this relationship and purported threats of harm from his ex-wife’s family in Lebanon, he applied for this protection visa on 13 September 2019.
The applicant participated in a phone interview with the Departmental delegate on 26 April 2022 and on 8 June 2022 the delegate refused to grant the visa. The delegate had numerous concerns with the applicant’s credibility, and she ultimately did not accept his claims regarding his ex-wife’s family. She found he would not face a real chance of persecution or real risk of significant harm in Lebanon on the basis of these claims, and that he would not otherwise face a real chance or real risk of any other harm that would amount to serious or significant harm for any other reasons.
On 14 June 2022 the applicant applied to the. Administrative Appeals Tribunal (now the Administrative Review Tribunal)[1] to have the decision reviewed. He has been assisted by a legal representative.
[1] On 14 October 2024 the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) became the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). Under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (the Transitional Act), applications for review to the AAT that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are taken to be an application for review to the Tribunal. The Transitional Act gives the Tribunal the authority to continue and finalise any aspect of the review not already completed by the AAT. This decision and statement of reasons is made by the Tribunal.
On 6 June 2025 he appeared before the Tribunal on to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic (Lebanese) and English languages.
APPLICANT’S BACKGROUND
The applicant provided the following information and documentation relevant to his nationality, identity and background to the Department and the Tribunal, and the Tribunal accepts it to be true:
He is an Alawite Muslim born in [Year] in Lebanon.[2] Although he was born in Akkar (and this is where his family originates from), he only ever lived in the Jabal Mohsen neighbourhood in Tripoli.[3]
[2] The applicant has provided identity documents to the Department and Tribunal.
[3] While it was initially claimed to the Department that he was a Sunni Muslim and had lived part of his life in Akkar, he clarified in the protection visa interview that: (1) those were errors and he was in fact born (and remains) an Alawite Muslim; and (2) although he was born in Akkar, he never lived there; he lived his whole life in Lebanon in Jabal Mohsen.
He has [brothers] and [sisters]:
·One of his brothers and two sisters live in Australia: His brother [Mr A] has lived here since 2010 and his sister [Ms B] has lived here since 1998. They both moved to Australia for their marriages. His half-sister [Ms C] was born here, to a relationship his father had in Australia when he spent time here in the 1970s.
·His brother [Mr D] lives in Jabal Mohsen, about five minutes from the family home. He used to work in [work task 1], then worked in [work task 2] and does [work task 3]. Sometimes his work takes him outside Jabal Mohsen.
·His mother and his sister [Ms E] live together in the family home in Jabal Mohsen.
·His sisters [Ms F, Ms G, Ms H and Ms I] also live in Jabal Mohsen. Their husbands work at a [workplace 1] in Jabal Mohsen, at a [company 1] near Beirut, as [an occupation 1]/owner of a [company 2], and as [an occupation 2] with [Employer 1].
·His sister [Ms J] resides in Akkar and is married to [an occupation 3] in [Employer 2]. He is away for days at a time. Her husband’s cousin also resides there.
·His sister [Ms K] lives in [District]. Her husband works for [Employer 3] [doing work task 4] trucks and travels to Beirut for work each day.
·His sister [Ms L] was living in Jabal Mohsen but moved to [Country 1] with her husband who is [Religion], about five years ago.
·He also had another sister, [Ms M], who passed away at age one.
He has been married once and is now divorced. He met his ex-wife ‘[Ms N]’ in Jabal Mohsen when she was visiting from Australia, to see her relatives in Tripoli. They fell in love and their families agreed to their engagement, which occurred in January 2017. [Ms N] returned to Sydney while the applicant awaited his Australian visa. He was granted a prospective spouse visa and he joined [Ms N] in Australia in November 2017. They had their Katb Al-Kitab ceremony in December 2017 and their wedding and honeymoon in February 2018. They faced problems in their marriage and were officially divorced in 2020.[4]
[4] The applicant has provided documents evidencing his marriage to [Ms N], and their divorce.
He has since re-partnered with ‘[Ms O]’ and they have their own family in Australia. They have two young children together and also raise [Ms O’s] two children from a previous relationship. They all live together as a family.[5]
[5] The applicant has provided identity documents relating to his new partner in Australia and their young children, and documents regarding their shared residential address.
Since coming to Australia in 2017, the applicant has twice left Australia: once for his weeklong honeymoon with [Ms N] to [Country 2] in 2018 and for just over five weeks when he returned to Lebanon in June-August 2018. Prior to this trip to Lebanon, the applicant suffered an injury to his back, and he had back surgery in Lebanon during that trip.
In terms of his employment experience, in Lebanon the applicant mostly worked in the [work sector 1], in [workplace 2s] in Jabal Mohsen, but he also worked in a [work task 3] role for a time (in Jabal Mohsen), sold [product] to [workplace 2s] in a side business of his own and did some [work task 5] work. Some of these roles took him outside Jabal Mohsen to other areas of Tripoli. In Australia, he has worked as [an occupation 3] in the [work sector 2], and a [workplace 2] worker, and is now [doing work task 5].
PROTECTION CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Evidence before the Department
Protection visa application (2019)
In his application and accompanying written statement, the applicant claimed he had been previously harmed and feared further harm from his ex-wife’s family ([Ms N’s] family). His claims can be summarised as follows:
He claimed that for a while following their marriage and honeymoon, he and [Ms N] were very happy together but later, problems started to occur. They fought when [Ms N] returned home and saw him smoking shisha. She screamed at him, kicked him, burnt his hand and foot from the coals and aggressively pushed him outside and slammed the door. She threw the bucket of hot coals at him, causing him to trip down the stairs and land on his back, causing a back injury which caused him pain ever since. They separated following this incident.
Their families convinced them to reunite and try to make their relationship work. The applicant still suffered back pain which was helped by physiotherapy. He returned to his [work sector 2] role. He worked hard to support his wife but doing a manual labour job with a back injury was very difficult, and without English skills he also struggled communicating on site. He tried talking to [Ms N] about his back problems and how he feared they would worsen with this work, but she was dismissive, telling him to go to work. He continued to work with his back worsening, and it became difficult to stand and walk. He begged [Ms N] to see he was not normal and there was something badly wrong with his back. When he couldn’t walk anymore, they went to see a doctor together.
Scans revealed problems with two discs in his back and the doctor said he should have consulted him from the start. The applicant commenced cortisol injections and was advised to stop physiotherapy, and if there was no improvement in two weeks his only option would be surgery.
The injections didn’t work; the applicant’s pain continued. He could barely walk and needed to lie down constantly. [Ms N’s] family would visit and chastise him for not being a man, saying he was lazy and should be working and was just lying about his back to get out of work and doing things, and just relying on his wife. [Ms N] knew his condition prevented him from working but she didn’t care. She and her family just kept criticising him and pressuring him to work. She stopped talking to him and he developed depression and anxiety from the stress and pressure.
The applicant’s father was unwell with cancer and had had surgery with a poor prognosis. The applicant returned to Lebanon to see his father in mid-2018. His wife was pregnant at the time, but agreed he should return for a month to visit.
The applicant loaded up on painkillers for the flight and returned to visit his parents. While there, he saw some doctors regarding his back pain and they advised he have an urgent operation, or risk more pain and serious problems in the future. It would be too expensive to have the surgery in Sydney so he called [Ms N] and advised that his only chance to fix his back was to have the surgery in Lebanon, so then he could get back to his normal self when he returned to Australia. She agreed. But he didn’t have the money for it and [Ms N’s] family didn’t approve of him having the surgery due to the cost. His family overseas helped him with his operation.
[Ms N] called him just after his surgery with the news that she had suffered a miscarriage. The applicant was very stressed, being on the other side of the world and unable to support her in this difficult time. Ten days after his surgery, she called and said she didn’t want him anymore. Her family also kept calling him telling him not to return to Australia. Her family was very upset about the miscarriage, and they blamed him for it, for not being there for his wife in a difficult time. They called his family and said he never should have left his wife while she was pregnant. He was supposed to stay in bed for a month lying down after his surgery, but he decided to leave Lebanon.
Before he left, he was in bed at his parents’ house when some of [Ms N’s] uncles[6] entered, looking for him. By the time his mother came into his room he was on the ground, unable to move. His mother begged them to leave him alone as he had just had back surgery, but they did not care. They are known thugs from the area, and they beat him. His mother screamed and cried but they would not stop until some neighbours came and helped. [Ms N’s] brothers left when they saw a lot of neighbours had come to help him. They threatened they would find him and kill him the next time they saw him.
[6] While they were initially referred to in the applicant’s application and statement as [Ms N’s] ‘brothers’, he clarified and Tribunal accepts his clarification, that it was intended to read ‘uncles’. [Ms N] does not have any brothers at all. Therefore, herein, the Tribunal also refers to them as her uncles.
His wife’s family in Lebanon are not an average family. They are very well known family as their sons are always committing crimes in their area and they have a very dangerous uncle. He is a murderer and is not allowed in Lebanon. They are a strong and tough family that are not scared of the law and are very dangerous. He hadn’t believed he would be targeted by them but following this incident he knew he was no longer safe in Lebanon and needed to leave. He was also anxious to return and see his wife to fix things with her, since she had said she didn’t want him anymore. His family helped him leave Lebanon straight away.
He arrived in Sydney and contacted [Ms N] when he got near the house. She refused to talk to him and said she didn’t want to see him at all. He wanted to be by her side after her miscarriage, but she just shut him out and was angry that he had come back to Australia. He tried fixing things with her, but she declined, saying she didn’t want anything to do with him, didn’t want him because of his back pain and couldn’t be with someone who couldn’t support her family. He tried convincing her he was better, but she accused him of lying and refused to give him the house keys (even though they co-owned the house). Her family and cousins started threatening him to get out of Australia. They said if he doesn’t leave, they will make his back even worse. He feared this. With screws in his back already he was particularly fearful of further damage.
He lived in fear in Sydney, expecting [Ms N’s] family to come out of anywhere. He left the entire state he was so scared, knowing what her family is capable of doing to him. He decided to go to his sister’s place in Melbourne.
While living with his sister, he received repeated threatening calls and texts, and his wife’s [brothers] overseas kept threatening his family, telling them they will hurt him when they see him. His family still calls him all the time saying her brothers visit their house every now and then, wanting to know his whereabouts. They are still looking for him after all this time. They want revenge more than ever knowing he left the country to avoid them.
The applicant does not want anything to do with [Ms N’s] family anymore. He left Sydney with nothing. He tried hard to please her in their marriage, but she took everything, including the house they both paid for.
The applicant fears that if he returns to Lebanon he will be targeted by his ex-wife’s family. He fears being killed, tortured or harmed because her family is a very dangerous one and have a lot of power from the area they control in Lebanon.
He cannot relocate within Lebanon and the authorities are not able to protect him from these individuals as they have people within the police departments that they pay off to control. They have ways of finding him, including by using their power and people they know in the Lebanese police to find him and bring him to them.
The applicant claims he can’t even return to Sydney as [Ms N’s] family knows dangerous people in Sydney that they will send after him.
Protection visa interview (2022)
In his protection visa interview on 26 April 2022, the applicant reiterated the above claims, clarified some critical points and provided more detail in response to the delegate’s questioning.
The clarifications included that he is an Alawite Muslim (not Sunni), that he lived only in Jabal Mohsen although he was born in Akkar, and that his ex-wife has no brothers, and that any references to such should read ‘uncle/s’. The Tribunal accepts these clarifications and draws no adverse inferences on these points.
The applicant also clarified that the threats issued by [Ms N] and her family in Australia were limited to those about getting him deported. He confirmed in this interview that they haven’t threatened to kill him “or anything like that”, but they threatened they won’t let him stay in Australia. The delegate clarified if anyone had threatened to harm him, and he confirmed that no one in Australia threatened to harm him; only the people in Lebanon threatened him harm him.
Where relevant, the other evidence from this interview is discussed in the sections below.
Supporting documents[7]
[7] Some of the documents provided to the Department are referenced above under ‘Background’.
The applicant provided the following supporting documentation to the Department:
·Documents purportedly relating to [Ms N’s] uncle ‘[Mr P]’ including a purported photograph of him with members of the Arab Democratic Party including its leader Rifaat Eid and a purported Lebanese Military Court judgement entered against [Mr P], and a further written statement from the applicant referring to these documents.
·Country information reports.
·A legal submission containing legal arguments, addressing various aspects of the country situation in Lebanon and referencing country information. Among the arguments, the submission asserts that the applicant is a member of the particular social groups ‘single divorced male’ and ‘abused males’ and will be harmed on these basis, and as a returnee from the west. It also makes submissions relevant to issues of relocation and state protection.
Evidence before the Tribunal
Tribunal hearing
On 6 June 2025 the applicant and his representative appeared before the Tribunal and the applicant gave evidence and present arguments in support of his case. Where relevant, this evidence is discussed in the consideration of claims and evidence below.
Supporting documents (provided pre-hearing and post-hearing)[8]
[8] Some of the documents provided to the Tribunal are referenced above under ‘Background’.
In bundles provided on 20 March 2025, 28 March 2025, 20 June 2025 and 15 July 2025, the applicant provided:
·Legal submissions, a statement responding to the delegate’s concerns, and a statement responding to concerns and issues raised in the Tribunal hearing.
·The family register from [Ms N’s] father’s side showing her father is brothers with [Mr P], and a copy (provided again) of the purported military court judgement against [Mr P]
·Medical reports regarding the applicant’s back problems and treatment in Lebanon and Australia
·Compilations of country information and country information.[9]
·A witness statement dated 16 June 2025 from [Mr Q] attesting that [Mr P] has returned to Lebanon and is living and working in Jabal Mohsin.
·Emails (both dated 18 June 2025) from the applicant and his partners to the applicant’s legal representative.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
[9] “Article 1”: Daily Star, ‘Army calms tensions in Tripoli after reported stabbing of Syrian’, 5/1/25;
Criteria for protection visa

The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT reports) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
The DFAT reports considered include the most recent DFAT report published in 2023, and earlier reports.
REASONS AND FINDINGS
The issue in this case is whether the applicant meets the criteria for grant of a protection visa due to facing a real chance or real risk of being seriously or significantly harmed in Lebanon now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Tribunal accepts some, but not all, of the applicant’s claims and although it has sympathy for him, for the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the applicant does not meet the criteria and so the decision under review should be affirmed.
Receiving country
The applicant has provided documentary evidence of his identity and Lebanese nationality, and a credible biographical narrative. The Tribunal notes he also provided biometrics to the department and his identity was not of concern to the delegate.
The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s claimed Lebanese nationality, his identity and that he originates from Tripoli. The Tribunal finds that Lebanon is the relevant ‘receiving country’ and that the applicant would return to Tripoli, where he always lived and still has family.
There is no evidence to suggest that the applicant has a right to enter and reside in a third country. The Tribunal finds that s.36(3) does not apply.
Protection assessment
Risk of harm from [Ms N’s] family
Having analysed all the claims and evidence in this matter, the Tribunal accepts several aspects of the applicant’s claims:
It accepts the applicant and [Ms N] were married in early 2018, that their relationship broke down and that they separated in around late 2018 and officially divorced in April 2020. It accepts the applicant’s description of how his problems with [Ms N] started, how his back injury occurred, and about [Ms N] and her family giving him a hard time, accusing him of being lazy and not providing for [Ms N] when he was injured and immobile and unable to work. It accepts he went to Lebanon in mid-2016 and had back surgery and that while there, [Ms N] suffered a miscarriage.
The Tribunal accepts that during his recovery in Lebanon and following the miscarriage, the applicant was confronted by some of [Ms N’s] uncles or relatives who became aggressive towards him and assaulted him. The Tribunal notes the delegate’s concerns about the applicant not being able to specifically identify them apart from the uncle ‘[Mr R]’, but it accepts the applicant’s explanations, including about his not knowing them well, and having a poor memory of the incident due to being in recovery from surgery and on painkillers at the time, his wife having miscarried and intending to leave him and his father having cancer.
The Tribunal accepts his relationship with [Ms N], which was already fractious, broke down completely in the few months after his return, by late 2018. It accepts that he went to live with his brother in Sydney, and then to live with his sister in Melbourne.
The Tribunal accepts the applicant suffered verbal and emotional abuse from [Ms N] and her family during their relationship and in the aftermath of their relationship breakdown. This manifested through their criticisms, coercing him to continue working while he was injured and not accepting his need for rest and recovery, their blaming him for the marriage breakdown and miscarriage, and their threats of getting him deported from Australia. It accepts that the effects of this verbal and emotional abuse on the applicant was both psychological and physical in the sense that due to their emotional abuse his back injury worsened as a result of trying to work and not appear lazy. It accepts the applicant has struggled with his mental and physical recovery.
However, for the reasons below, the Tribunal considers the applicant has exaggerated the family’s ongoing problems towards him, and the dangers and threat posed to him by [Ms N’s] uncles and other family members. The Tribunal is not satisfied there is an ongoing threat towards the applicant.
The Tribunal shares some of the same concerns as the delegate, which are set out in the decision he provided to the Tribunal. For example, as the decision indicates, the applicant’s evidence vacillated between it being several members of [Ms N’s] family that are known criminals and thugs and dangerous or only [Mr P]. It also vacillated between [Mr P’s] whereabouts and whether he was in exile in [Country 1] (Departmental interview) or imprisoned (post-interview submissions). The Tribunal also shares the delegate’s concerns over the claim that [Mr P] persecuted the applicant during his last visit to Lebanon when the applicant has never seen [Mr P] and there is no indication [Mr P] was involved in the claimed assault while the applicant was recovering from surgery at home. The Tribunal also shares the delegate’s concerns about the applicant’s claims of [Ms N’s] family being prepared to cease their assault on the applicant on the intervention of neighbours despite their purportedly being known dangerous criminals or thugs who command fear in the community. The Tribunal also has concerns about the purported photographs of [Mr P] with the Arab Democratic Party only being identified as such by the applicant’s own caption, and of the lack of any evidence specifically linking [Mr P] with the Arab Democratic Party. It also shares the concern (explored further below) regarding reconciling the applicant’s claims regarding [Mr P] both holding power and connections in the police force such that he will be able to harm the applicant at will, with his claims of [Mr P] being the subject of an arrest warrant and life imprisonment.
The Tribunal also has other concerns.
The applicant claims that [Ms N’s] family in Tripoli are well known, dangerous criminals and thugs and the Tribunal raised with the applicant that it was difficult to understand why he got involved with [Ms N] and her family at all given he had claimed they were known to be dangerous. He responded that only two of them are dangerous ([Mr P], and [Mr R]). The Tribunal put to him that he described them as dangerous people who were involved in the fighting and wanted by the authorities and queried why he was prepared to get involved with her family knowing this. He responded that he wasn’t dealing with them, he was dealing with [Ms N], and he loved her. The Tribunal acknowledges that love can take precedence in unlikely scenarios, but it is nonetheless hard to believe the applicant, whose family had avoided any involvement in the conflict in Tripoli and no other associations with known criminals so eagerly pursued a marriage that would draw him into a known, feared, dangerous family of criminals and thugs.
The applicant claims that he remains under threat and will be at risk if he returns to Lebanon but his evidence about the threats and the ongoing risk to him has been problematic. At the hearing, the applicant’s evidence was that he doesn’t know much about [Ms N] anymore, except that she is in Sydney. He is no longer in contact with her; their last contact occurred in Sydney months before their (2020) divorce.
The Tribunal raised with the applicant that his past problems and incidents with [Ms N] and her family had occurred in the heat of their relationship problems and that a significant amount of time has since passed. It was pointed out to him that tensions had been running high at the time, with his immobilisation and inability to work and the family’s criticisms of him for this, his going to Lebanon during [Ms N’s] pregnancy and miscarriage and the family’s pressures on him about what they expected from him in the marriage, and the continued breakdown of the relationship after he returned to Sydney. It was put to the applicant that the incidents and threats occurred seven to eight years ago and his situation with [Ms N] is very different now. It was put to him that there are no recent indicators of threats or [Ms N’s] family showing interest in him or his whereabouts. It was put to him that he has been divorced from [Ms N] for five years and he hasn’t heard from her family in all that time, and his family in Lebanon have not been facing problems from any of her relatives there either.
While in the visa application and his pre-hearing submission responding to the delegate’s concerns the applicant said [Ms N’s] family continue to visit his family home looking for him, when asked in the Tribunal hearing if his family had told him of any approaches or calls to them, he made no mention of this. Rather, he mentioned that ‘people’ ask his mother every now and then when they meet on the street whether he is back in Lebanon, or coming back, and that ‘someone’ asked his brother why he no longer visits Lebanon, it was put to him that these may be innocent interactions without motive from people who haven’t seen him a while. The applicant disagreed and said they might be something “behind the scenes” but the Tribunal advised it had doubts about whether there was any sinister intention behind such enquiries. It was put to the applicant that there didn’t appear to be any recent indicators of threats or of the family showing interest in him or his whereabouts and the Tribunal doubted that anyone from [Ms N’s] family would be motivated to harm him if he returned. It was put to him that there appears no evidence that [Mr P] has been in Lebanon in the last several to 10 years and that by his own evidence, [Mr P] is a highly wanted person by the Lebanese authorities. It raised doubts with the applicant that [Mr P] – even if he does return to Lebanon – would take an interest in the applicant and be motivated to harm him.
The Tribunal also put the applicant on notice that his claim about the Lebanese authorities not protecting him was in issue. It raised with the applicant issues regarding his claimed reasons for not reporting any of the incidents or threats to the Lebanese authorities. He had said he refrained for the sake of his wife, as they weren’t separated at the time. It was put to him that that he is now long divorced and so why, if he still feels the threats against him are serious, has he still not reported them? He said there is no law in Lebanon, and the authorities are not capable of protecting him. It was put to him that his evidence indicated that the Lebanese authorities have been prepared to take action against [Mr P] already.[10] The Tribunal asked why he believes the authorities would be uninterested in reports about [Mr P] threatening people. The applicant responded that the authorities only intervene when someone is dead, and they would need ‘hardcore’ evidence to act. Yet he gave a different impression earlier in the hearing when he claimed that in threatening phone calls to him, [Mr P] and his friend were being careful about what they said for fear of being recorded and reported. When asked why they would be concerned about such things, the applicant referred to [Mr P] having prior convictions.
[10] The applicant had given evidence that [Mr P] was in exile, that [Mr P] and his brothers were dangerous individuals wanted by the authorities and had been sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for terrorism and other offences
While it is possible that two things can be true at the same time, as the Tribunal put to the applicant, his claims about the authorities are hard to reconcile. On the one hand he claims [Mr P] is powerful, and so well connected with the Lebanese authorities that he (the applicant) would not be helped by the authorities. But he also claims that [Mr P] is a known, wanted criminal in Lebanon who has already been convicted and sentenced in absentia while in exile to life imprisonment, and would be worried about his phone call being recorded and reported on.
The applicant was invited to comment on all issues put to him and the Tribunal has considered his responses and further claims and evidence, much of which was provided in the post-hearing submissions:
·He responded that the threats posed by [Ms N’s] family are serious and ongoing, and that “these threats have been consistent for several years, especially after his divorce from [Ms N] in 2021”. He submitted that [Ms N’s] family, particularly her uncle [Mr P], has in the past been very clear about his intentions to harm the applicant. However, the applicant has not proffered any more details, examples or evidence of any such ongoing threats. His earlier evidence to the Department and Tribunal suggest that the incidents and threats occurred in 2018, starting a while after their marriage and honeymoon in February 2018 and all occurring up to the point that they separated at the end of that year.
·The applicant submitted that he has been warned by family and friends that [Mr P] is actively asking of his current location and publicly making threats that he will harm him as soon as he finds him. It was submitted that he is unable to provide any official documentation but has been able to obtain witness testimonies and personal messages that support his claims.
·The purported messages were not provided, but the applicant provided a witness statement from ‘[Mr Q]’ from Jabal Mohsen dated 16 June 2025 referring to [Mr P’s] profile and his return to Lebanon. [Mr Q] states that [Mr P] is a fugitive from justice and is wanted by the security and judicial authorities. He further states that according to “reliable and direct information”, [Mr P] is currently residing in “Jabal Mohsen – [Location 1] – Tripoli, Lebanon and is employed by Rifaat Eid of the Arab Democratic Party as a [position deleted] at [information deleted], located in [Location 2], across from the gas station”. However, the sources of this ‘reliable and direct information’ referenced by [Mr Q] was not disclosed and the Tribunal has concerns that this statement was only provided after the Tribunal’s putting to the applicant that [Mr P] has not been in Lebanon for several years. The Tribunal also does not consider it plausible that [Mr P] (or Rifaat Eid) has been working in Tripoli and not been located and apprehended by the authorities. It is similarly implausible that [Mr P] would be actively asking about the applicant and publicly making threats when he is wanted by the Lebanese authorities. Country information also does not support that Rifaat Eid or other exiled senior Arab Democratic Party members have returned to Lebanon, nor that Rifaat Eid maintains a residence in Tripoli. The Tribunal finds that the evidence proffered in this statement is not credible.
·In an email dated 18 June 2025 the applicant also refers to submitting a recent photograph of “the defendant” (whom the Tribunal takes to mean ‘[Mr P]’) working at a local company in Jabal Mohsen and a residency statement confirming [Mr P’s] brother [Mr R] also resides in the area. However, the applicant has not provided the referenced photographs or residency statement and in fact refers in the email to being unable to obtain them.
·In the email of 18 June 2025, the applicant also submitted that while he is unable to provide direct evidence that [Mr P] is planning to harm him, he lives in fear due to [Mr P’s] past threats and violent behaviour. He submitted that [Mr P’s] history of aggression towards him has left him feeling unsafe, and he believes that given the opportunity, [Mr P] will attempt to harm him again. His post-hearing submission also asserts that [Mr P] previously used violence against him. In the email he submitted that his fear is heightened by the fact that [Mr P] remains in the same region in Lebanon and is regularly seen by both the police and people he knows. He said he cannot place his family or friends at risk by asking them to provide further details or confront him. However, similarly to the above, the Tribunal finds it implausible that [Mr P] is working in Tripoli and regularly seen by the police and people the applicant knows yet has not been apprehended. The Tribunal has already noted its concerns above about the applicant’s claim to the delegate of [Mr P] having ‘persecuted’ him during his last visit to Lebanon, and in the same vein it has concerns with his response to the Tribunal about [Mr P] attempting to harm him ‘again’.
·Regarding state protection, the applicant submitted post-hearing that that he has previously attempted to seek help from the Lebanese authorities, but that he was “rejected from exercising his legal right to be safe given the fact that Lebanon is politically unstable, and corruption is controlling the law”. However, he has given no substantiating detail about what form of help he sought, nor when he sought it, who from, or what it was in relation to, and in his previous evidence to the Department and the Tribunal he made no mention of having attempted to seek any kind of help from the authorities for any reason. To the contrary, his previous evidence and the post-hearing submission itself addressed reasons why he hadn’t sought to report it.

The applicant’s evidence about the threats and dangers posed by the uncles and other family members has been problematic overall. While he refers to being threatened by some family members in-person, and also being threatened via phone or text, he has not provided any credible supporting evidence. In relation to the post-hearing material, the Tribunal finds it is not credible that the threats have been consistent for several years, especially after his divorce from [Ms N] in 2021, or that [Mr P] ‘again’ attempted to harm him. It also finds the contents of [Mr Q]’s statement are not credible, and nor is the applicant’s post-hearing claim about attempting to seek help. Overall, the issues and concerns shared with the delegate, and those raised by the Tribunal at hearing have not been alleviated by the applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal. The Tribunal has considered the supporting documentation including the purported family register and military court judgement, but it has concerns about their veracity given the other issues discussed above. The Tribunal also considers that were [Mr P] convicted and sentenced in absentia for the crimes described and were he close to Rifaat Eid, there would be additional open source evidence about him.
Overall, the Tribunal does not find it credible that [Mr P], [Mr R] or anyone else from [Ms N’s] family or associated with them has threatened to kill him or intends to harm him on return.
The Tribunal accepted above that the applicant faced verbal and emotional abuse from [Ms N] and her family, that [Ms N] caused his initial back injury and that it was worsened as a result of his being pressured to work and not rest. It also accepts they threatened to have him deported from Australia. The Tribunal has accepted too that the applicant has suffered psychologically and has faced difficulties recovering from the mental and physical harm he experienced in those respects. However, noting the applicant and [Ms N] have long been separated and have been divorced for five years, that the Tribunal does not accept the claims regarding the uncles’ and other family members’ threats and that the applicant no longer has anything to do with the family, the Tribunal finds he does not face a real chance or a real risk of being persecuted or significantly harmed in these ways again. Nor does it accept they have any sway in his remaining or being removed from Australia. It does not accept the applicant faces a real chance or a real risk of being verbally, emotionally or physically abused by [Ms N] or her family, or now or in the reasonably foreseeable future in Lebanon, nor of the family effecting his removal.
The Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant faces a real chance of persecution, or a real risk of significant harm from [Mr P], [Mr R], [Ms N] or any other members of her family, or persons associated with them. He does not meet s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) in relation to this matter.
The Tribunal notes the applicant’s submissions about his facing a risk of harm in Lebanon on the basis of being a single, divorced male and an abused male. However, the applicant has not substantiated these claims with credible evidence showing that these things will be a problem and the country information does not support that he would be so identified or would face a real chance or real risk of being targeted or otherwise harmed on this basis. The Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant faces a real chance of persecution, or a real risk of significant harm for these reasons. He does not meet s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) in relation to these claims.
Risk of harm from Arab Democratic Party, Hezbollah or other groups
The applicant claims to fear that the Arab Democratic Party or Hezbollah will harm him.
At the protection visa interview the applicant said he fears Hezbollah because they are a gang with complete control over the country and have no one to oppose them, and no democracy. When asked if he has ever done anything relating to his feelings for Hezbollah, he confirmed he has not, and said he never expressed anything against them. He said the only reason he fears Hezbollah is because [Mr P] and his brothers fall under it due to the Arab Democratic Party’s connections with Hezbollah. He added that [Mr P] wouldn’t have personal connections with Hezbollah, but maybe his boss would have, “or something like that”.
At the Tribunal hearing the applicant said he equates the groups as being the same – Hezbollah as the main party and the Arab Democratic Party beneath them. He indicated that these groups have connections with [Mr P]. He also referred to Hezbollah’s links with Rifaat and the Amal Movement and the Arab Democratic Party and their being known allies who do favours for each other.
The legal submission confirms that [Mr P] is the reason for the applicant’s fear of Hezbollah. [Mr P] has ties to Hezbollah who have complete control over Lebanon’s affairs, and the applicant fears being targeted by Hezbollah and harmed in tensions and bloodshed initiated by Hezbollah. In the post-hearing submission, he submitted that he believes [Mr P] continues to be connected with dangerous groups. However, the applicant has provided no substantiating evidence of such.
The Tribunal has not found it credible that [Mr P] or anyone has been threatening and wants to harm the applicant. Nor does the Tribunal find it credible that [Mr P] or any of [Ms N’s] uncles or family members are powerful and connected with the Arab Democratic Party, or Hezbollah. The Tribunal does not accept the applicant faces a real chance or a real risk of any harm (serious, significant or otherwise) from any such groups, or the authorities on the basis of any such connections.
It is correct though, that while significantly weakened now, Hezbollah have been a powerful force in Lebanon. DFAT advises that Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shi’a organisation comprising political and social elements, as well as a military wing the strength of which is believed to have exceeded that of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Hezbollah has run its own economic, financial, and social services institutions; and had its own judicial and internal security structures, including detention centres. It has long been a powerful player in Lebanon’s economy, politics, and media, and it has exercised effective control over parts of Lebanese territory, particularly in South Lebanon, southern Beirut, and parts of the Beka’a Valley.[11]
[11] DFAT, ‘DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon', 26 June 2023, 20230626100419
In addition to political activists, Hezbollah’s perceived adversaries include journalists seeking to report on ‘red line’ topics, including: Hezbollah’s weapons; Hezbollah’s relationship with security authorities; its role in politically-motivated assassinations; and its role in the Syrian civil war. In-country sources report that Hezbollah is particularly attuned to and oppressive of critics within the Shi’a community. Those within the Shi’a community without wasta who criticise Hezbollah face a high risk of societal discrimination, harassment and violence by state or non-state forces. Hezbollah allows adherents of non-Shi’a religions to worship freely in the areas under its control.[12]
[12] DFAT, ‘DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon', 26 June 2023, 20230626100419
The evidence before the Tribunal does not indicate the applicant has ever sought to oppose or criticise Hezbollah, or that he would be considered an adversary of Hezbollah for any reason. Nor is there credible evidence of the applicant opposing or being against the Arab Democratic Party. Nor is there evidence of his opposing or voicing his opinion against any other group or in relation to any issue. Further, the applicant has not claimed to have committed any crimes in Lebanon, Australia or any other country which may bring him to the attention of Hezbollah or the Lebanese authorities.
Overall, the country information the country information before the Tribunal does not support that the Arab Democratic Party or Hezbollah targets and harms ordinary civilians, including Alawites.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that either Hezbollah or the Arab Democratic Party, any branch of the authorities or any other party or group has any adverse or other interest in the applicant. The evidence also does not indicate that any such groups or authorities will have any such interest in him if he returns.
The Tribunal is satisfied the applicant does not face a real chance of being harmed by Hezbollah or the Arab Democratic Party or the authorities, or any other group in retaliation for any issue with [Mr P] or [Ms N] or their family, or for any reason.
The Tribunal finds the applicant does not face a real chance of any harm, nor a real risk of any harm from Hezbollah or the Arab Democratic Party or any other group now or in the reasonably foreseeable future for any reason. He does not meet s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) in relation to such things.
Risk of harm as a member of the Alawite community
The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s clarification that he is not a Sunni Muslim - he is an Alawite Muslim from Jabal Mohsen, which is a predominately Alawite area. Given his clarification, at the hearing, it was suggested to the applicant that the Tribunal would disregard the claims raised in the written submission/statement early in the primary process about his fearing harm on the basis of being a Sunni Muslim, to which the applicant agreed. The Tribunal finds the applicant is not a Sunni Muslim, and he does not face a real chance or a real risk of any harm in Lebanon on the basis of being a Sunni Muslim.
The Tribunal has considered the risk posed to the applicant as a member of the Alawite sect in Lebanon. The Tribunal notes this claim was raised in the context of targeting for religious reasons, and imputed political opinion and as a member of the Alawite group.
Alawite Muslims are a minority sect of Shi’a Muslims. They consider themselves to be moderate Shi’as, and follow a branch of the Twelver School of Shi’a Islam, with some syncretistic elements. Alawites interpret the Pillars of Islam (the five duties required of every Muslim) as symbols rather than duties. There are also other differences regarding the holidays they observe and their performance of their religious practices.[13]
[13] Britannica Online Encyclopedia, 'Alawite', 4 April 2018, CXBB8A1DA24928
The Alawite community has been concentrated in Syria, where the sect became politically dominant from the early 1970s. Alawite communities also reside in Turkey and Lebanon, and in the Golan Heights, with a small number in Israel.[14]
[14] Britannica Online Encyclopedia, 'Alawite', 4 April 2018, CXBB8A1DA24928; Joshua Project, ‘Alawite in Israel’, joshuaproject.net/people_groups/print/18805/IS#:~:text=The%20Alawites%20are%20a%20religious,smaller%20number%20are%20in%20Israel, accessed 31 July 2025
In Lebanon, Alawites are an officially recognised religious group – alongside three other Muslim groups and 14 other groups.[15] While Muslims make up an estimated 69.3 per cent of Lebanon’s population, Alawites are small in number – combined with Ismailis they make up less than six per cent of the Muslim population. The majority of Lebanon’s Alawites live in Akkar province, and in the neighbourhood of Jabal Mohsen in Tripoli where the applicant is from.[16]
[15] DFAT Country Information Report Lebanon – June 2023, June 2023
[16] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), ‘DFAT Country Information Report – Lebanon’, 18 December 2015, CISEC96CF14155; DFAT, ‘DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon', 26 June 2023, 20230626100419; ‘Lebanese Fear Arrival Of 29,000 Alawite Syrians May Exacerbate Local Tensions’, The Media Line, 12 April 2025, 20250617090502
The Alawite community has traditionally been supportive of the former Alawite-led (Al-Assad) Syrian regime, and this has exacerbated tensions with the Sunni community, which has traditionally been anti-Syrian regime.[17] These tensions have repeatedly escalated in Lebanon, particularly in Tripoli, where the Alawite and Sunni communities live in close proximity to each other in Jabal Mohsen (Alawites) and neighbouring Bab al-Tabbaneh (Sunnis). The meeting point between the two suburbs (‘Syria Street’) has been a recurring flashpoint for sectarian fighting.[18]
[17] DFAT, "DFAT Country Information Report - Lebanon", 18 December 2015, CISEC96CF14155
[18] DFAT, 'DFAT Country Information Report Lebanon’, 23 October 2017, 23 October 2017, CISEDB50AD6014
During the Lebanese Civil War (1975 – 1990), Lebanese Alawites in the Arab Democratic Party based in Jabal Mohsen aligned with Syria and fought alongside the Syrian Army against the Sunni Islamist Tawhid Movement (‘al-Tawhid’ or ‘IUM) in Tripoli, which was based mainly in Bab al-Tabbaneh. In 1985, Syrian forces entered Tripoli and aided by their local Alawite allies, waged a bloody fight against the IUM in Bab al-Tabbaneh, killing hundreds of its members.
Over time, Syria’s presence strengthened the position of the previously marginalised Alawite community there and residual resentment festered between the sectarian groups.[19] Hostilities in Syria have spilled over into Lebanon multiple times.[20] The conflict in Syria exacerbated the traditional hostility between the Alawite and Sunni communities, and resulted in regular rounds of armed sectarian clashes in 2013 and 2014 between the competing Alawite militias (who supported Al-Assad and were aligned with Hezbollah) in Jabal Mohsen and the Bab al-Tabbaneh Sunni Muslim militias (who supported the rebels trying to oust al-Assad).[21] Many have been killed and wounded. In January 2015 Sunni extremists also attacked a Jabal Mohsen café killing nine Alawites and injuring 35.[22]
[19] International Crisis Group, ‘Lebanon’s Politics: The Sunni Community and Hariri’s Future Current: Middle East Report No 96 – 26 May 2010, available at: accessed 31 July 2025; Now Lebanon, "Sects and the City", 1 April 2013, CIS29437
[20] Now Lebanon, "Sects and the City", 1 April 2013, CIS29437
[21] Now Lebanon, "Sects and the City", 1 April 2013, CIS29437; DFAT,‘DFAT Country Information Report – Lebanon’, 18 December 2015, CISEC96CF14155; DFAT, 'DFAT Country Information Report Lebanon’, 23 October 2017, CISEDB50AD6014
[22] DFAT, 'DFAT Country Information Report Lebanon’, 23 October 2017, CISEDB50AD6014
However, since April 2014 when they implemented a security plan in Tripoli, the Lebanese authorities have taken an active approach and worked with the local Alawite and Sunni community leaders to quell the violence. There have been no further incidents like the January 2015 bombing in the area and the official security plan, backed by the major political factions, led to a notable reduction in Alawite-Sunni incidents and increased stability across Tripoli.[23] More recently, there was a targeted recruitment campaign designed to broaden LAF’s representation, including with 1000 young men from Tripoli and Akkar improve local confidence in the LAF. 1000 young men from Tripoli and Akkar were recruited which has helped calm the situation in Tripoli.[24] The country reporting indicates that in recent years there has still been outbreaks of renewed violence, but the security forces have responded and succeeded in ceasing any fighting or violence.
[23] DFAT, "DFAT Country Information Report - Lebanon", 18 December 2015, CISEC96CF14155
[24] DFAT, ‘DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon', 26 June 2023, 20230626100419
Consistent with its previous reporting, DFAT’s most recent country information advice prepared for protection status determination purposes indicates that violence between Alawites and Sunnis in Tripoli is localised and relatively low level, with political rather than religious motivations, and that the Lebanese authorities are generally committed to preventing violence between religious communities. More broadly, DFAT advises that members of recognised religious groups do not face official discrimination on religious grounds. It assesses further that members who reside in areas where they are a minority may face low-level societal discrimination, however it would unlikely include violence.[25]
[25] DFAT, ‘DFAT Country Information Report – Lebanon’, 18 December 2015, CISEC96CF14155; DFAT, ‘DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon', 26 June 2023, 20230626100419
The Tribunal recognises that the fall of the Assad regime in Syria has heavily impacted Alawites. Alawite properties in Syria have been confiscated and families evicted from their homes under the guise of their being Al-Assad loyalists. In March 2025, there were mass killings of Alawites in Syria. Sunni armed groups and transitional Government security operations in Syria are blamed for targeted Alawite neighbourhoods and villages in Syria’s and villages in Hama, Lattakia, and Tartous (Syria’s coastal region) killing up to 1,600 people, predominantly Alawite civilians burning homes and causing forced displacement.[26] The international community including Australia condemned the atrocities.[27] ACAPS, a humanitarian data and analysis organisation assesses there will likely be more attacks in Syria targeting minority groups, such as Alawites and Druze.[28]
[26] Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), 'SYRIA Risk analysis: escalating sectarian tensions and humanitarian implications, July–December 2025', 22 July 2025, 20250725105206; The New Arab, ‘UN says more than 21,000 people fled Syria coastal violence for Lebanon’, 26 March 2025 newarab.com/news/over-21000-people-fled-syria-coastal-violence-lebanon-un,
[27] ‘Joint statement on the violence in Syria’ from the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 16 March 2025
[28] ACAPS, 'SYRIA Risk analysis: escalating sectarian tensions and humanitarian implications, July–December 2025', 22 July 2025, 20250725105206
Reporting indicates that Jabal Mohsen’s Alawites feel a precariousness and vulnerability, They are concerned about a resurgence of Sunni groups - revitalised from their rebel victory in Syria – at a time Alawites’ position is weakened with the loss of political cover formerly afforded by the Assad family’s power in Syria, the loss of the once commanding presence of the Arab Democratic Party in Jabal Mohsen, and the weakening of Hezbollah who historically represented the Lebanese Alawites.[29] The reporting confirms the flight of Alawites from Syria into Lebanon, with tens of thousands of Syrians already seeking refuge in Lebanon, including thousands of Alawites arriving in Akkar and Jabal Mohsen.[30] There is speculation that this and any further influx will worsen the pressure on already strained resources and needs, and drive up the sectarian tensions in Bab al-Tenneh and Jabal Mohsen.[31] Also heightening fears is that the region has reportedly become flooded with cheap, smuggled firearms following the December collapse of Syria’s army.[32] There were sporadic outbreaks of violence as recently as April and March 2025.[33]
[29] InkStick, ‘In Northern Lebanon, separated by a Street called Syria’, 9 January 2025, 20250617085754 (Article 6 submitted by the applicant); ‘Lebanese Fear Arrival Of 29,000 Alawite Syrians May Exacerbate Local Tensions’, The Media Line, 12 April 2025, 20250617090502
[30]Syria Direct, ‘Thousands of Alawites seek refuge in Lebanon, where locals lead the response’, 14 March 2025, https:// syriadirect.org/thousands-of-alawites-seek-refuge-lebanon-locals-lead-the-response/?utm_source=chatgpt.com; Pravda Syria, ‘ Over 10,000 refugees from Syria have taken refuge in Alawite villages in northern Lebanon’, 10 March 2025,
[31] Dawn Media, ‘Assad's Fall Threatens to Reignite Decades of Sectarian Strife in Northern Lebanon’, 15 April 2025, 20250617085420; The National, ‘Lebanon fears sectarian violence as 10,000 Syrian Alawites flee across border’, 10 March 2025, 20250617085619; InkStick, ‘In Northern Lebanon, Separated by a Street Called Syria’, 9 January 2025, 20250617085754 (Article 6 submitted by the applicant); The Media Line, ‘Lebanese Fear Arrival Of 29,000 Alawite Syrians May Exacerbate Local Tensions’, 12 April 2025, Times, ‘Lebanese forces ‘heavily focused’ on preventing conflict as Syrian Alawites flee across border’, 12 March 2025 (‘Article 2’)
[33] L’Orient Today, Tensions in Tripoli due to the alleged presence of a former Assad regime officer’, 21 March 2025, 20250617090125; Dawn Media, ‘Assad's Fall Threatens to Reignite Decades of Sectarian Strife in Northern Lebanon’, 15 April 2025, 20250617085420

Given historical and recent events, the Tribunal accepts that Alawites in Lebanon are fearful for their own safety and existence, fearing similar scale civilian targeting and further local sectarian fighting.
However, some of the applicant’s submissions about the situation are unverified and the Tribunal considers they underplay the effective responses by the Lebanese security forces over the last decade. For example, the applicant has made an unsubstantiated assertion about [Mr P] having links with the perpetrator groups of the Syrian Alawite massacres. He also provided an ambiguous source[34] regarding hate speech and targeted threats against Alawite residents and refugees escalating tensions towards violent clashes. His allegation about the security forces engaging in the biassed enforcement, disproportionately targeting Alawites while allowing other sectarian militias to operate freely, is also not referenced or otherwise supported in the material before the Tribunal.
[34] The submissions reference the following source, but the Tribunal is not satisfied it exists: “NGO Statements: Human rights groups warned that such threats risk inciting violence similar to the 2008–2014 period of recurring clashes in Tripoli… Source: Human Rights Watch Lebanon desk (statements via local NGOs, March 2025)”
Further, while the applicant provided several reports about the March 2025 attack on a minor from Syria’s Idlib by a man from Jabal Mohsen and the resultant protests and roadblocks, and other tensions resulting in gunfire,[35] the Tribunal notes it was consistently reported that the tensions were not stoked by any foreign meddling or political incitement, and the army moved quickly to contain the tensions, deploying heavily in Tripoli. Sunni and Alawite figures in the city were contacted to help defuse the tensions and prevent the unrest spilling further. The man turned himself over to the authorities and the military’s intervention and these efforts were successful in restoring calm to these neighbourhoods.[36]
[35] Asharq Al Awsat, ‘Army Defuses Tensions in Northern Lebanon Caused by Syrian Coast Unrest’, 25 March 2025, 20250617090334; Asharq Al-Awsat, ‘Army eases tensions in Tripoli following clashed linked to Syrian violence”, 10 March 2025 (‘Article 5’); Daily Star, ‘Amry tensions in Tripoli after reported stabbing of Syrian’, (‘Article 1’); Aawsat.com, ‘Army defuses tensions in Northern Lebanon caused by Syrian coast unrest’, March 2025 (‘Article 3’)
[36] Asharq Al Awsat, ‘Army Defuses Tensions in Northern Lebanon Caused by Syrian Coast Unrest’, 25 March 2025, 20250617090334; Asharq Al-Awsat, ‘Army eases tensions in Tripoli following clashed linked to Syrian violence”, 10 March 2025 (‘Article 5’); Daily Star, ‘Amry calms tensions in Tripoli after reported stabbing of Syrian’, (‘Article 1’); Aawsat.com, ‘Army defuses tensions in Northern Lebanon caused by Syrian coast unrest’, March 2025 (‘Article 3’);
The effectiveness of the army’s response is a common thread in the reporting before the Tribunal. While the Tribunal notes DFAT’s advice regarding the under-resourcing and various other short comings of the Lebanese Armed Forces, Internal Security Forces and the police, DFAT itself and other sources more widely have nonetheless reported that the Lebanese authorities are focussing efforts on maintaining security in Tripoli and northern Lebanon. Over the past decade, and in the recent outbreaks, Lebanese Army and intelligence services intervened, stopping the fighting, imposing security cordons, roadblocks and increased motorised and foot patrols, and at one point established a security belt around Jabal Mohsen.[37] Sources have reported that “Lebanese security forces are heavily deployed in Tripoli and surrounding areas where they are heavily focussed on preventing conflict.” There is acknowledgement of some fragility and “a growing fear that the situation could spiral out of control, but security forces have so far managed to maintain calm and prevent any alarming clashes.” [38]
[37] L’Orient Today, Tensions in Tripoli due to the alleged presence of a former Assad regime officer’, 21 March 2025, 20250617090125; Asharq Al Awsat, ‘Army Defuses Tensions in Northern Lebanon Caused by Syrian Coast Unrest’, 25 March 2025, 20250617090334; The Media Line, ‘Lebanese Fear Arrival Of 29,000 Alawite Syrians May Exacerbate Local Tensions’, 12 April 2025, 20250617090502; The National, ‘Lebanese security forces 'heavily focused' on preventing conflict as Syrian Alawites flee across border’, 13 March 2025, 20250617090941; ‘Lebanon fears sectarian violence as 10,000 Syrian Alawites flee across border’, The National, 10 March 2025, 20250617085619
[38]The National, Lebanese security forces 'heavily focused' on preventing conflict as Syrian Alawites flee across border’, 13 March 2025, 20250617090941; Tehran Times, ‘Lebanese forces ‘heavily focused’ on preventing conflict as Syrian Alawites flee across border’, 12 March 2025 (‘Article 2’) ;
Current and former officials from the Tripoli area have also been meeting to discuss ways to ease tension and prevent further conflict.[39] At the national level, the Lebanese Prime Minister has stressed the government’s commitment to sustainable security stability in Tripoli and to dealing with security violations without lenience.[40]
[39] Tehran Times, ‘Lebanese forces ‘heavily focused’ on preventing conflict as Syrian Alawites flee across border’, 12 March 2025 (‘Article 2’)
[40] The Media Line, ‘Lebanese Fear Arrival Of 29,000 Alawite Syrians May Exacerbate Local Tensions’, 12 April 2025, 20250617090502
Reporting given by the applicant also highlights that although there is concern, there is also optimism. Some inhabitants and media reporting is acknowledging that the Assad regime had stoked hatred and tensions, and that tensions reduced after the Arab Democratic Party leadership left Lebanon. Some feel the neighbourhoods now have an opportunity to heal and eventually forge new ties. There is little appetite on either side to see a return to violence. At the ground level both Sunnis and Alawites have expressed a desire for peace and emphasised their issue is not with ordinary civilians of the other sect.[41]
[41] InkStick, ‘In Northern Lebanon, separated by a street called Syria’, 9 January 2025, 20250617085754 (Article 6 submitted by the applicant);
Overall while there are heightened tensions and there have been some recent outbreaks and Lebanese authorities concede that they have been unable to prevent some incidents including some recent shootings, the reporting confirms the heavy deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces in Tripoli and Lebanon’s north in order to prevent any escalation of tensions.[42] The Tribunal is satisfied that due to these efforts, any larger scale violence has been abated and there is political and operational will to protect civilians, as well as capability. The Tribunal is not satisfied the situation change in the reasonably foreseeable future such that the risk to ordinary civilian Alawites who do not seek to involve themselves in conflict, will face a real chance or real risk of being harmed.
[42] Tehran Times, 'Lebanese forces 'heavily focused' on preventing conflict as Syrian Alawites flee across border', Tehran Times, 12 March 2025; Naharnet, 'Army contains tensions in Tripoli after reports of Syrian being stabbed', Naharnet Newsdesk, 9 March 2025
The Tribunal has not accepted the applicant’s claims about being personally threatened and at risk from [Mr P], [Mr Q], Hezbollah or the Arab Democratic Party, or any known groups, political parties or militants. The evidence does not indicate that he has ever been associated or involved with any militia groups or political groups, that he has ever been politically active or outspoken in any way or that he even follows or supports any group or political ideology. Nor does it indicate alignment to any religious movement beyond being an ordinary Alawite civilian. The Tribunal is not satisfied he has had any involvement in the Tripoli or any other sectarian or political conflict or that he would seek to involve himself upon return.

100. Taking into account this, and the applicant’s other circumstances and country information discussed above particularly about the security forces’ response, even taking into account that he is an Alawite male from Jabal Mohsen, I am not satisfied the applicant now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, faces a real chance of harm arising from any religious based targeting or sectarian fighting in Lebanon.
101. In reaching this finding, the Tribunal has considered that the applicant may need to move in and out of the Jabal Mohsen area for work and other purposes. The reporting does not indicate that Alawites – even Alawite males from Jabal Mohsen – are being targeted and harmed outside his home area. It finds he does not face a real chance of being harmed on the basis of these profile factors now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. Based on the country advice, the Tribunal is not satisfied that he would face a real chance or risk of violence for reasons of his profile as an Alawite, even in other parts of Lebanon.
102. In terms of discrimination, the applicant would be returning to live in a majority Alawite area of Tripoli. The Tribunal is not satisfied he would face official or societal discrimination in that context. Even if he were to travel to other areas of Tripoli or Lebanon, the Tribunal is not satisfied he would face anything more than low level discrimination, which would not amount to serious or significant harm.
103. The Tribunal finds the applicant does not meet s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) on the basis of being an Alawite male from Jabal Mohsen.
General security situation

104. The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s concerns about the general security situation in Lebanon, Syria and the region – including the impacts from broader instability in Syria, and the armed conflict with Israel.
105. The applicant has submitted a UN news report[43] regarding the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. He also raised concerns about the prospect of his return noting that updates from DFAT’s Smart Traveller website[44] advise Australian travellers not to travel to Lebanon “due to the volatile security situation and the risk it could deteriorate with little notice”. The updates refer to the situation in the Middle East and in particular to the risk of Israeli airstrikes in Beirut, southern Lebanon and the Beka’a Valley. The updates warn that “the security situation remains dangerous” and to avoid suspected areas of military activity, noting a risk that the conflict could spread to other areas in Lebanon, and local security areas could deteriorate with little notice. They also advise to avoid any demonstrations and protests, and they warn of the potential for Beirut airport to close without warning, and to other travel disruptions.
[43] United Nations media centre, ‘UN experts alarmed by Israel-Lebanon conflict, strongly condemn escalation and urge immediate protection for civilians’ 30 September 2024
[44] DFAT, Smart Traveller, ‘Lebanon: Latest Update’ current at 6 May 2025 (‘Article 4’) and 20 June 2025.
106. The Tribunal is mindful however, that while informative and regularly updated, the Smart Traveller advice is a travel advisory designed to help Australians travel overseas safely, reduce their risks and avoid problems. It is not a risk assessment for protection status determination purposes, and in this context should be considered alongside the personalised attributes and experience of the applicant and other country information.
107. The Tribunal has found above that the applicant does not face a real chance of being seriously or significantly harmed in Tripoli or other areas of Lebanon on account of his being an Alawite male from Jabal Moshen. The Tribunal takes into account that he is a Lebanese citizen who previously lived, worked and took care of himself in Lebanon and has known and supportive family and other networks, and that he would be returning to live in Jabal Mohsen where he has familiarity, and networks, and not in the Beka’a Valley, southern Lebanon or Beirut although he will likely transit through there, and may move in and out of his home area, as needed from time to time.
108. While the recent Israeli attacks in the past year were a significant destabilising development across the region, the attacks in Lebanon were targeted in the Hezbollah and Shi’a areas in Beirut and the southern Lebanon and the Beka’a Valley; few attacks were made on northern areas of Lebanon.[45] A ceasefire agreement was reached in November 2024 and while there have been some breaches, Hezbollah has been significantly weakened and is not focussing on rebuilding to fight Israel at this time, and the ceasefire is generally holding.[46] The Tribunal notes the recent Israeli assassination of a key Hamas commander near Tripoli in July and the reporting on Syria’s purported negotiations with Israel and speculation about Syria seeking sovereignty over Tripoli.[47] However, the evidence does not indicate that civilians are being targeted in the north or that the speculation over Syria’s claims to Tripoli have any substantive basis of coming to fruition – and it certainly does not indicate such things would occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.
[45] AP News, ‘Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah start a ceasefire after nearly 14 months of fighting’, 27 November 2024; BBC (Visual Journalism Team), 'Israel-Hezbollah conflict in maps: Ceasefire in effect in Lebanon', BBC News, 28 November 2024
[46] Ian Aikman, BBC News, 'Lebanon ceasefire deal extended as initial deadline passes', 27 January 2025; Nurit Yohanan, The Times of Israel, 'Hezbollah chief threatens response to continued Israeli ‘aggression’ in Lebanon', 30 March 2025; David Doaud, Atlantic Council, ‘Weakened by Israel, Hezbollah turns to spin games to hold support’, 15 April 2025, atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/weakened-by-israel-hezbollah-turns-to-spin-games-to-hold-support/; BBC News, ‘What is Hezbollah and why has it been fighting Israel in Lebanon?’, 15 February 2025 The New Arab Staff * Agencies, ‘Israeli military says it struck ‘key’ Hamas figure in north Lebanon’s Tripoli’, 8 July 2025; The New Arab Staff, ‘Is Syria demanding Tripoli and parts of Lebanon in exchange for peace with Israel?’, 4 July 2025
109. The Tribunal considers that while credible risks may remain to those in southern areas, the evidence does not indicate that civilians in Tripoli or northern Lebanon (which are not Hezbollah controlled or Shi’a majority areas and have only seen isolated attacks in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict)[48] face a real chance or a real risk of being harmed in the conflict.
[48] DFAT, ‘DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon', 26 June 2023, 20230626100419
110. The Tribunal notes that the applicant will likely return to the Tripoli area and Jabal Mohsen by first transiting through Beirut. The applicant’s time in Beirut will be transitory and brief, and substantially lower than residents in Beirut and the south. The Tribunal finds that the chance or risk that the applicant would be harmed during his brief period in Beirut before reaching his home area, would be very small, such that is remote.
111. Having considered all the circumstances, while the Tribunal accepts the security situation in the region is volatile and that insecurity affects several parts of Lebanon to varying degrees, it is not satisfied there is a real chance or risk of the applicant facing harm arising from the general security situation if he were to return to Lebanon now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. It finds he can also lawfully access Tripoli without facing a real chance or real risk of being seriously or significantly harmed.
112. The Tribunal finds the applicant does not meet s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) for reasons related to the general security situation.
Risk of harm on returning from the west
113. The applicant’s submissions raise concerns about crime and about him harmed including kidnapped due to being perceived as a wealthy returnee from a western country. Some submissions refer to the risk being exacerbated by his religious profile as a Sunni Muslim, but as above, the Tribunal is satisfied he is not a Sunni Muslim.
114. DFAT advises that Lebanon has a long history of migration and return, and there are an estimated 16 million Lebanese in the diaspora overseas, with many retaining close family or business relationships within Lebanon and therefore returning frequently as a result. Lebanese citizens who have sought protection elsewhere have not committed a crime by doing so, and a returning asylum seeker would be unlikely to face stigma either in their home community or in Beirut. Overall, DFAT is not aware of any evidence suggesting an asylum seeker returning to Lebanon would be distinguishable from the broader community or susceptible to any form of discrimination or violence based on having sought asylum abroad.[49]
[49] DFAT, ‘DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon', 26 June 2023, 20230626100419
115. The Tribunal accepts nonetheless that all of Lebanon is affected by varying degrees of crime. However, the country information does not indicate that persons with the applicant’s profile including returnees from Australia, or the west are systematically targeted for money or any perception of wealth and the applicant has not provided any specific evidence substantiating as to why he believes he may be so identified or perceived. Tribunal is not in any case satisfied the applicant would be perceived as wealthy or that he has any other profile factors that would lead him to be specifically targeted by criminal elements in Jabal Mohsen or Tripoli, or in his transitory time in Beirut. The Tribunal is not, on the evidence, satisfied that the applicant would face a real chance or a real risk of being harmed in Lebanon as a consequence of criminality.
116. The Tribunal is mindful of the applicant’s Australian citizen partner and children. However, as above, Lebanese are commonly living and travelling abroad while maintaining their close links in Lebanon, and the country information does not indicate that persons with Australian or other western country family members are targeted and harmed in Lebanon. The Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant will face a real chance or real risk of any harm arising from having lived in Australia or the west or for having an Australian (or western) citizen partner and children.
Economic situation
117. Jabal Mohsen is known to be a poorer area of Lebanon, and the Tribunal has considered the applicant’s ability to subsist and avoid serious and significant harm in the midst of Lebanon’s economic crisis, and with the influx of refugees into Lebanon. The Tribunal has considered the serious implications of these and other events, particularly with respect to employment, housing and access to services and necessities. Country information notes that poverty rates have doubled since 2019. Unemployment is high and there are pressures on the availability and cost of rental accommodation and other services, and basic goods and medicines. DFAT reported that the supply of basic goods including medicines, food and fuel is unpredictable, and they are sometimes rationed, and most subsidies are no longer applied. [50]
[50] DFAT, ‘DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon', 26 June 2023, 20230626100419; IMF, ‘Lebanon: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2023 Article IV Mission’, 23 March 2023
118. However, the applicant’s mother and sister still reside in the family home and the evidence does not suggest he could not live with them, at least initially. He also has diverse and extensive employment experience. He previously worked in [workplace 2s] in Jabal Mohsen, but he also worked in a [work task 3] role for a time (in Jabal Mohsen), sold [product] to [workplace 2s] in a side business of his own and did some [work task 5] work, and in Australia he has worked as [an occupation 3] in [work sector 2], and a [workplace 2] worker, and is now [doing work task 5]. The Tribunal considers that the applicant’s varied work experience - including in the local area but also outside - will be conducive to his employability upon return. The country information does not support that persons of the applicant’s profile face discrimination of a nature which denies or prevents obtaining employment or access to services and basic necessities.

119. The Tribunal also notes that the applicant’s siblings still reside in his home area and the evidence does not indicate they have been unable to obtain work and sustain a living. He has given evidence that his brothers and brothers-in-law in Lebanon are all employed in [varied roles], some within Jabal Mohsen, and some elsewhere in Tripoli or the country. On the evidence, while the Tribunal accepts the situation will be challenging, and he will likely not earn a comparable wage for his family that he has been earning in Australia, but it is not satisfied that the applicant will be prevented from or otherwise unable to find employment and it considers he can draw upon his family’s job networks to find work in some kind of industry. He will have access to family support and networks to support his re-integration.
120. The Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant will face significant economic hardship, be denied the capacity to subsist or access to services or that he would otherwise face a real chance of serious harm, or that economic challenges will arise due to any of the reasons in s 5J(1)(a) of the Act.
121. The Tribunal is also not satisfied it would involve any intentional act or omission necessary to constitute significant harm. Further, the Tribunal is satisfied these economic challenges are faced by the population of the country generally and are not faced by the applicant personally, and as such under s.36(2B)(c) there would be taken not to be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm in Lebanon.
Mental health
122. In his email dated 18 June 2025 the applicant also submits that the situation with [Mr P] has significantly impacted his mental health. He lives in constant anxiety, and the fear affects every aspect of his daily life. His current partner [Ms O] has also written to the Tribunal advising that the applicant has been mentally and emotionally overwhelmed, has fallen into a deep state of depression and is constantly anxious and withdrawn. The possibility of returning to Lebanon is taking a heavy toll on him and he is genuinely scared of doing back, due to it being unsafe and also losing his close daily connection with his children.
123. While the Tribunal has not accepted the applicant’s claims regarding the threats or situation with [Mr P], it accepted that the applicant has been otherwise affected by his relationship with [Ms N] and the way he was treated by her and her relatives. The applicant has not claimed to have a diagnosed psychological condition, and he has not claimed either that his evidence has been affected by any mental conditions. But the Tribunal is prepared to accept that he has struggled with his mental health since the problems in his marriage, and it also accepts the submissions from [Ms O] about his fear and anxiety about returning in general, and about being separated from her and their children.
124. Advice from DFAT about mental illnesses, including anxiety, depression and PTSD, are that they are common in Lebanon, and have worsened as a result of multiple nationwide crises. DFAT states:
“Mental health services are scarce, especially outside Beirut. The economic crisis has led to a mass exodus of mental health professionals from Lebanon. In country sources report that people with a mental illness have traditionally been subject to considerable stigma, especially those with more noticeable symptoms, who are perceived as ‘incompetent, aggressive, violent’ and unable to participate in the community. In-country sources told DFAT there is a widespread belief that the mentally ill should simply ‘snap out of it,’ however, also reported that the considerable stresses of the August 2020 port blast had led to an increased openness around mental illness, especially anxiety and depression.”[51]
[51] DFAT, ‘DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon', 26 June 2023, 20230626100419

125. The information indicates that while there has traditionally been a lack of understanding and empathy around mental health in the Lebanese community, with the regrettable increase in commonality of mental health conditions and considerable stresses on the population as a result of recent crises, there has also been some shift towards openness. It does not indicate that the stigma results in people being targeted for harm as a result of having a mental health condition in the nature of depression or anxiety. It is possible that the applicant could have PTSD but even then, the Tribunal’s observations of him were not that he would be perceived as incompetent, aggressive or violent, and he has not claimed to be affected in such way - and again, the information does not indicate such persons are harm on the basis of their condition.
126. The Tribunal accepts that mental health services are under significant strain, and access to medication is unpredictable due to the economic crisis and other pressures but country information does not indicate that mental health conditions of themselves contribute to a person having a risk profile, or that treatment for such conditions in Lebanon is intentionally withheld from persons of any profile, or for any reasons. The applicant would be returning to an area where he has family support, and the Tribunal is not satisfied that should it be required the applicant would be intentionally withheld or denied treatment or necessary medications. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicants’ state of mental health and the environment to which he would be returned would lead to his facing a real chance of any serious harm, nor a real risk of any form of significant harm, for reasons relation to mental health now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
127. The Tribunal acknowledges the applicant’s fears and anxieties around return, and his dread about being separated from his family, and that should he require it, he may face difficulties obtaining treatment due to the pressures and limitations on the system. However, the Tribunal is not satisfied his conditions or the environment to which he will be returned give rise to his having a well-founded fear of persecution. Nor, noting it would require an intention act or omission, are the substantial grounds for believing he will face a real risk of harm amounting to significant harm for mental health related reasons as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Lebanon.
128. The applicant does not meet s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) in relation to these matters.
Family in Australia

129. The post-hearing submission asserts the applicant will be vulnerable as he has a partner and children that are Australian citizens and danger will be imposed on his family with no access to resources, justice or safety. However, the Tribunal is satisfied that his Australian citizen family members will not be returning with him so it does not accept this claim. The email from the applicant’s partner [Ms O] indicates she and the children would remain in Australia and not move to Lebanon with the applicant.
130. [Ms O’s] email also however, refers to the toll the absence and scarcity of visits would have on them as a family. The post-hearing submission also asserts his removal from Australia will extinguish the ability of him having a meaningful relationship with his children, and this would not be in the best interests of his children.
131. The Tribunal acknowledges the applicant and [Ms O] want to remain together as a family. But their separation from each other, and the applicant’s separation from their children including step-children does not of itself give rise to protection under the refugee or complementary protection criteria.

The Tribunal accepts that if the applicant is removed to Lebanon, it will be emotionally very difficult and may add to their financial challenges if they are not living together and sharing resources. However, being separated from a partner and/or children does not give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution as defined in s 5J of the Act, as the fear of persecution is not for one or more reasons set out in s 5J(a) and does not involve systematic and discriminatory conduct as required by s 5J(4)(c).

133. With regard to complementary protection, court authorities – specifically judgments in SZRSN v MIAC and GLD18 v MHA – confirm that separation from one’s family members in Australia or another country, where the claimed harm arises from the act of removal itself, will not meet the definitions of ‘significant harm’ in s 36(2A). [52]
[52] SZRSN v MIAC [2013] FCA 751 (upholding the reasoning at first instance SZRSN v MIAC [2013] FMCA 78); GLD18 v MHA [2020] FCAFC 2 at [36]–[58]; AWC21 v MHA [2022] FCA 1568 WZARI v MIMAC [2013] FCA 788
134. The applicant does not meet s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) for the reason that his is facing the prospect of separation.
135. While it may not be in the children’s best interests for the applicant to be separated from them and living in Lebanon, the Tribunal’s task in this matter is only to determine whether his circumstances meet the criteria in s.36(2) of the Act and the Tribunal is not on the evidence satisfied that they do.
Conclusions
136. The Tribunal has considered all of the applicant’s claims – individually, and cumulatively, but even when his overall profile and circumstances are considered together, it is not satisfied that the applicant’s circumstances meet s36(2).
137. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).

Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa).
There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s 36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s 36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2).
Ministerial Intervention

140. The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s case and the ministerial guidelines relating to the discretionary power set out in departmental policy ‘Minister’s guidelines on ministerial powers (s351, s417 and s501J)’.
141. The Tribunal considers that it is appropriate in this case, to refer the applicant’s case to the Department for consideration for referral to the Minister, who has a discretion to substitute for a decision of the Tribunal another decision that is more favourable to the applicant, if the Minister thinks that it is in the public interest to do so.
142. Pursuant to the Department’s Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3), cases that should be bought to the Minister’s attention include those with one or more unique or exceptional circumstances, which include but are not limited to:
·strong compassionate circumstances that if not recognised would result in serious, ongoing and irreversible harm and continuing hardship to an Australian citizen or an Australian family unit, where at least one member of the family is an Australian citizen or Australian permanent resident
·compassionate circumstances regarding the age and/or health and/or psychological state of the person that if not recognised would result in serious, ongoing and irreversible harm and continuing hardship to the person
·circumstances not anticipated by relevant legislation; or clearly unintended consequences of legislation; or the application of relevant legislation leads to unfair or unreasonable results in a particular case

143. The Tribunal notes that the applicant is in a committed relationship with his Australian citizen partner and is a committed father to their two young children, and step-father to his partner’s other two children. Submissions have been made about their concerns for the applicant’s safety on return to Lebanon and the impact this will have on his family here. Significantly, the separation of the applicant from his partner, children and step-children has also been emphasised as not being in the interests of the family, and as being particularly detrimental and not in the best interests of his children and step-children here. The applicant and his partner are also concerned about security risks in Lebanon and the region should his partner and children wish to visit him and as such, they may be separated from each other for some time.
144. The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s case and the ministerial guidelines relating to the discretionary power set out in the policy and has decided it will refer the matter to the Department.
DECISION
145. The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Hearing date: 6 June 2025
Representative: Ms Emily Amal Saraya (MARN: 9904834)

ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…

cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…

degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b) that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…

torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…

receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a) a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b) if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…

5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…

5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

5K Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:

(a) disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b) disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note: Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

(d) the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a) protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…

36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

(c) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…

“Article 2”: Tehran Times, ‘Lebanese forces ‘heavily focused’ on preventing conflict as Syrian Alawites flee across border’, 12 March 2025; “Article 3”: Reuters, ‘Army defuses tensions in Northern Lebanon caused by Syrian coast unrest’, 25 March 2025; “Article 4”: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), ‘Smart Traveller: Lebanon: Latest Update’, 6 May 2025’; “Article 5”: Asharq Al-Aswat, ‘Army eases tensions in Tripoli following clashes linked to Syrian violence’, 10 March 2025; “Article 6”: Ink stick media, ‘In Northern Lebanon, separated by a street called Syria’, 9 January 2025; ‘Joint statement on the violence in Syria’ from the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 16 March 2025; UN press release article: ‘UN experts alarmed by Israel-Lebanon conflict, strongly condemn escalation and urge immediate protection for civilians’, 20 September 2024; DFAT update: ‘Smart Traveller: Lebanon: Latest Update’, 20 June 2025; The New Arab Staff * Agencies, ‘Israeli military says it struck ‘key’ Hamas figure in north Lebanon’s Tripoli’, 8 July 2025; The New Arab Staff, ‘Is Syria demanding Tripoli and parts of Lebanon in exchange for peace with Israel?’, 4 July 2025