2206412 (Migration) [2022] AATA 5272 (30 August 2022)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER: 2206412
DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Antoinette Younes
DATE:30 August 2022
PLACE OF DECISION: Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision to cancel the applicant’s Subclass 050 (Bridging (General)) visa.
Statement made on 30 August 2022 at 3:34pm
CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – cancellation – Bridging E (Class WE) visa – Subclass 050 (Bridging (General)) – ground for cancellation – charged with an offence – making a child amenable to sexual activity – consideration of discretion – Direction No.63 – government’s view – best interests of any children – does not have full insight into the nature of his offending – Department’s Procedures Advice Manual PAM3 – non-refoulement obligations – decision under review affirmedLEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 116Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), r 2.43
CASES
Ibrahim v MHA [2019] FCAFC 89
WKMZ v MICMSMA [2021] FCAFC 55Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 501K of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision dated 13 August 2019 made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs to cancel the applicant’s Subclass 050 (Bridging (General)) visa under s 116 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’).
The delegate cancelled the visa under s 116(1)(g) of the Act on the basis that the applicant had been charged with a criminal offence. The issue in the present case is whether that ground for cancellation is made out, and if so, whether the visa should be cancelled.
This matter was before the Tribunal (differently constituted) previously and, by judgement of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2), it was remitted to the Tribunal [in] 2022, to be determined according to law.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 6 July 2022 to give evidence and present arguments. He requested an adjournment to prepare his case in full. The Tribunal agreed and adjourned the hearing. The applicant appeared again before the Tribunal on 10 August 2022.
The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Persian language.
For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa should be affirmed.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Under s 116 of the Act, the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that certain grounds specified in that provision are made out. Relevantly, to this case, these include the ground set out in s 116(1)(g). If satisfied that the ground for cancellation is made out, the decision maker must proceed to consider whether the visa should be cancelled, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, which may include matters of government policy.
Does the ground for cancellation exist?
Section 116(1)(g) - prescribed ground
A visa may be cancelled under s 116(1)(g) if the…
Continue reading 2206412 (Migration)
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- 2206412 (Migration) [2022] AATA 5272
- Case
- [2022] AATA 5272
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Tribunal included whether the applicant's charge constituted a prescribed ground for visa cancellation under the Migration Regulations 1994, specifically regulation 2.43(1)(p)(ii), which relates to being charged with an offence. Furthermore, the Tribunal had to consider the exercise of discretion regarding cancellation, guided by Direction No. 63, which mandates consideration of specified primary and secondary factors.
The Tribunal reasoned that the applicant had indeed been charged with a relevant offence, satisfying the ground for cancellation. In exercising its discretion, the Tribunal gave significant weight to the government's view that such grounds should be applied rigorously. It noted the applicant's conviction and the court's observations regarding the seriousness of the offence and the applicant's limited insight into his offending behaviour. While acknowledging potential hardship to the applicant, including impacts on his business and mental health, and considering the impact on his relationships, the Tribunal found these factors did not outweigh the public interest considerations and the seriousness of the offending conduct. The Tribunal also noted that the applicant's claims of fear of harm in returning to Iran had been legally exhausted.
Consequently, the Tribunal affirmed the decision to cancel the applicant's Bridging E visa.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As that ground does not require mandatory cancellation under s 116(3), the Tribunal must proceed to consider whether the visa should be cancelled.Consideration of discretion In considering whether a Bridging E visa should be cancelled on the basis of the prescribed grounds in reg 2.43(1)(p) or (q) the Tribunal must comply with Direction No.63, Bridging E visas - Cancellation under section 116(1)(g) – Regulation 2.43(1)(p) or (q), made under s 499 of the Act. This Direction requires the Tribunal to take into account specified primary and secondary considerations, where relevant, and specifies how these considerations are to be weighed in determining whether the Bridging E visa should be cancelled. The Direction states that primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than any secondary considerations, one primary consideration may outweigh the other primary consideration and information from independent and authoritative sources should generally be given greater weight than information from other sources. The primary considerations are:·The Government’s view that the prescribed grounds for cancellation at reg 2.43(1)(p) and (q) should be applied rigorously in that every instance of non-compliance should be considered for cancellation. The applicant has been charged and now convicted of the offence of “making a child amenable to sexual activity”. There is no evidence before the Tribunal of any other instance of non-compliance. The Tribunal has considered the Court’s remarks[4] where Her Honour [Judge B] makes the following observations:… You told [the psychologist] that you only attracted to women of your age, and that it is your view that any adult/child sexual contact is wrong and that you have no desire to engage in sexual activity with children. You told her that the conversations that you had were part of wider chats in online groups. You told her that when you were arrested you had to look at the arrest information to remember the specific conversations with the complainant.I cannot accept that you did not understand the nature of the conversations you are having with a person that you believe to be 14 years old. You initiated a sexually explicit conversation, and also sent pictures of your penis. That is not general chit chat.[the psychologist] is of the opinion that your engagement in the broader online chat appears to have been motivated by both social activity and sexual drive. I accept that this was the case here. [The psychologist] also opines that you did not have full insight into the nature of your offending.… sexual offending including children is extremely serious. This is reflected in the severity of the penalty imposed by Parliament. The Chief Justice has recently outlined that the purpose of s.63B of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act is to stop sexualisation of children by adults. Of itself, that sexualisation causes considerable damage to society and can, of course, lead to unlawful sexual activity. General deterrence and protection and safety of the community are important considerations in sentencing you. It is for that reason that Parliament has deemed the offence that you have committed to be a serious sexual offence for the purposes of the Sentencing Act 2017.[5][4] Sentencing Remarks, [date] 2020.[5] Sentencing Remarks, [date] 2020, pp 3-4.