2205136 (Migration) - [2023] AATA 1960

2205136 (Migration) [2023] AATA 1960 (24 March 2023)
DECISION RECORDS
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
REVIEW APPLICANT ONE:  [Name]
VISA APPLICANT (1):  [Name]
CASE NUMBER:  2205832
VISA APPLICANT (2)  [Name]
CASE NUMBER:  2205136
VISA APPLICANT (3)  [Name]
CASE NUMBER:  2205833
REVIEW APPLICANT TWO:  [Name]
VISA APPLICANT ([4]):  [Name]
CASE NUMBER:  2205834
VISA APPLICANT ([5]):  [Name]
CASE NUMBER:  2205139

MEMBER:Michael Judd
DATE:24 March 2023
PLACE OF DECISION: Perth
DECISIONS: The Tribunal affirms each decision not to grant the visa applicants a Visitor (Class FA) visa.

Statement made on 24 March 2023 at 3:28pm

CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – Visitor (Class FA) visa – Subclass 600 (Visitor) – genuine temporary entrant – business interests in home country – property ownership – security issues in Pakistan – Hazara ethnicity – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 65, 359
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2, cls 600.211, 600.321, 600.612
CASES
Hasran v MIAC (2010) 183 FCR 413
Hasran v MIAC [2010] FCAFC 40
M v MIMA (2006) 155 FCR 333
Usman v MIMIA [2005] FMCA 96
Xue v MIAC, [2009] FMCA 421
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 378 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.

STATEMENT OF DECISIONS AND REASONS
APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW

These are five (5) applications for review of decisions made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 10 March and 22 March 2022. The decisions were to refuse to grant the five visa applicants Visitor (Class FA) visas under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The five visa applicants applied for the visas on 12 March 2021 and 3 February 2022 respectively. They are all close family of the two review applicants [Review Applicant 2] and [Review Applicant 1]. The two review applicants are married and reside in Melbourne.
At the time the visa applications were lodged, Class FA contained one subclass, Subclass 600 (Visitor), with a number of different streams. In this case the five visa applicants applied for the visas seeking to satisfy the primary criteria in the Sponsored Family stream.
The criteria for a Subclass 600 visa are set out in Part 600 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). Relevantly to this case, they include cl 600.211, which requires the visa applicants to satisfy the Minister (in this case the Tribunal) that they genuinely intend to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa is granted.
The delegate refused to grant the five visas on the basis that the visa applicants did not meet cl 600.211 because they did not meet the relevant criteria in clause 600.211 in Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations pertaining to genuine intention to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa is granted, having regard to the matters in clauses 600.211 (a) (b) and (c).
THE TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS
As stated, the two review applicants, [Review Applicant 1], and [Review Applicant 2], are married to each other. They both were invited to, and appeared before, the Tribunal by Teams Audio system on the 9^th of February 2023 to give evidence and present arguments. Both review applicants were offshore at time of hearing, purportedly in Pakistan on the date of the hearing. The Tribunal received evidence from the review applicants but had insufficient time to speak to any of the five Pakistan based visa applicants on the day of the hearing. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Hazaragi and English languages. The review applicants had earlier consented to the hearings proceeding as joint hearings as the general background to all applications was similar.
For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the five (5) decisions under review should be affirmed.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The issue in this case is whether cl 600.211 is met with respect to each visa applicant, which requires the Tribunal to be satisfied that the visa applicants genuinely intend to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose(s) for which the visa is granted, having regard to whether the applicants have complied substantially with the conditions to which the last substantive visa, or any subsequent bridging visa, held by the applicants was subject; whether the applicants intend to comply with the conditions to which the Subclass 600 visa would be subject; and any other relevant matter.
In the present cases, each visa applicant seeks a visa for the purposes of visiting the respective review applicants and their family. It is accepted that this is a purpose for which a visa in the Sponsored Family stream may be granted: cl 600.231. There are no indications that any of the five visa applicants are seeking visas for business or medically related purposes.
In considering whether the visa applicants genuinely intend to stay temporarily in Australia for this purpose, the Tribunal must consider whether the visa applicants have complied substantially with the conditions of the last substantive visa held, or any subsequent bridging visa (cl 600.211(a)). None of the visa applicants have entered Australia previously; as such weight can not be accorded to compliance. That being so, the Tribunal does not accord weight negatively against the merits of the applications by reason of inability to show compliance.
The Tribunal must also consider whether each visa applicant intends to comply with the conditions to which the Subclass 600 visa would be subject (cl 600.211(b)). The conditions to which a visa in the circumstances of this case would be subject are as follows (cl 600.612):
·8101 – must not work in Australia;
·8201 – must not engage in study or training in Australia for more than 3 months;
·8503 – not entitled to a substantive visa, other than a protection visa, while remaining in Australia; and
·8531 – must not remain in Australia after end of permitted stay.
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL
Prior to conducting the hearing on 9 February 2023 the Tribunal had reviewed all departmental files and documents and information lodged before the Tribunal for the purposes of the review. The Tribunal noted that no further evidence had been lodged from the date(s) of the applications for review with respect to all five decisions. The dates of lodging the applications for review were 6 April 2022, 7 April 2022, 20 April 2022 respectively.
The review applicants and their respective visa applicants are as follows:
a.[Review Applicant 1]:
i.[Visa Applicant 3] – he is his brother;
ii.[Visa Applicant 1] – she is his mother; and
iii.[Visa Applicant 2] – he is his father.
b.Review Applicant [Review Applicant 2]:
i.[Visa Applicant 5] – he is her father; and
ii.[Visa Applicant 4] – she is her mother.
On 16 January 2023 the Tribunal issued invitations to both review applicants to attend hearings with respect to all five visa applicants, scheduled for 9 February 2023. Prior to the hearings, written consent was secured from both review applicants to hold joint hearings. The Tribunal considered this to be an appropriate course and use of its time, considering the similarities of the five visa applicants and applications.
Evidence obtained at the joint hearing held on 9 February 2023
Both review applicants provided their evidence by Teams Audio as they were located offshore in Pakistan at the time.
Evidence of [Review Applicant 1]:
[Review Applicant 1] presented no ‘new’[1] evidence for the hearings. He testified that he had been living in Australia for fifteen years. In relation to the three visa applicants, being his father, mother and brother, he confirmed the purpose of their intended visits was to spend time with him and his family; there were no medical or business purposes.
[1]
[Review Applicant 1] was born in Quetta Pakistan in [specified year]. He confirmed his parents remain married and are living together in Quetta. His father runs a [product 1] business.
The brother lives with their parents. His [other siblings] live in [Country 1] and [Country 2] respectively. He also has [other family members], one of whom lives in Pakistan and another is soon to move to [Country 3].
[Review Applicant 1] completed the equivalent of [grade] in Pakistan; he commenced a bachelor’s degree in Pakistan but did not complete it. He came to Australia in July 2007 upon a student visa whereupon he studied [subjects]. He gained permanent residency in 2010 or 2011 and citizenship in 2014.
He married his wife, [Review Applicant 2], in 2010 in Pakistan in an arranged marriage; she joined him in Australia in 2014; she gained citizenship in 2019. They are both ethnic Hazara, as are the broader families. Ethnicity is a matter of relevance to the Tribunal in its assessments – see below.
In relation to his applicant mother [Visa Applicant 1], he testified that she is a housewife in Quetta; her health is good. She has previously travelled to [specified countries] in the past. She has never entered Australia. The review applicant testified that an earlier application for visitor visa had been lodged for his father eight or nine years ago; this had been refused by the department.
He confirmed that his mother wanted to stay in Australia briefly ‘only for a couple of months’. In relation to his father, the visa applicant [Visa Applicant 2], the review applicant testified to the effect that his father was aged between [age range] and operates the ‘[Business 1]’ in Quetta. The business commenced around 20 years ago. He claimed that his father owns the business and a couple of houses, all located in Quetta. The review applicant has provided no documentary evidence or information establishing the ownership and operation of this business as at time of decision.
He claimed that his parents and brother would reside with him and his family in Australia during the intended visit. In relation to his applicant brother [Visa applicant 3], the review applicant confirmed he is older than his brother who is aged about [age]. His brother lives with his parents in Quetta. His brother works for his father in the [product 1] business and is not married. He was not aware if his brother was currently in a relationship. His brother is healthy. His brother travelled to [specified countries] in previous five years and did not experience any issues with immigration officials during those trips.
The review applicant confirmed that he and his wife reside in [Town 1] near Melbourne and operate a profitable [product 2] business by the name of ‘[Business 2]’, a business they have operated for eight years. The Tribunal accepts this evidence.
He and his wife have two children aged [ages], who were born in Australia. His wife helps him operate the business; they own four residential premises which are held in his name. The business has about ten employees. This is accepted.
He testified that he has tried to return to Pakistan about once per year as his parents are now aging, however this has proven difficult because of the pandemic. It is also now challenging to return to Pakistan with his family because of his business commitments and the expense and logistics involved in returning the entire family. He stated that if his parents and brother come to Australia, [Business 1] will be operated by his [specified relatives]. He believes the applicants wish to come to Australia in May or June 2023 when his business is at its quietest.
Evidence received from review applicant [Review Applicant 2]
The review applicant is [age] years old. Having been present during the testimony of her husband, she did not wish to clarify any aspect of his evidence. In relation to her mother, [Visa Applicant 4], she believed she was aged [age range] and in good health. Her father, [Visa Applicant 5], is aged about [age] and is in good health. Both are still living together in Quetta. Her father is retired and receives a government pension. She has [specified family members], one of whom lives in [Country 2].
The review applicant confirmed she had attended college in Pakistan. She confirmed that her family members had not suffered any harm in Pakistan directly, however one of her cousins had been killed in 2004 in a terrorist incident in Quetta. She confirmed her parents had no current reasons to fear for their safety; if they did have such reasons, she believes that she would have been told. She confirmed her parents had never travelled to Australia. They had, however travelled previously to [another country]. She confirmed that her parents would be staying with her and her husband. She stated that the applications for her parents had been made after the applications by her husbands’ family. She reinforced that her parents had their lives to return to in Pakistan and would not overstay.
Further oral evidence received from [Review Applicant 1]
After hearing his wife give evidence, [Review Applicant 1] confirmed there were no aspects of his wife’s evidence that he needed to clarify. He reinforced that both his father and brother had longstanding business interests in Quetta, as did he in Australia, and that this would be a strong incentive for his family to return home at the end of the visit. He claimed his family have strong connections to their home area of Quetta and have close extended families. He wanted them to visit him in Australia so they could see for themselves his success in life and the growth of his business in Australia. He confirmed he and his wife (and children) would be returning to Australia [in] March 2023; the Tribunal accepts they have returned onshore.
At the conclusion of the day’s hearing, the Tribunal advised both review applicants that it was aware of country information about Pakistan, and Quetta in particular, that needed to be put to them both for their comment or responses. There was insufficient time available to put the information to the review applicants pursuant to section 359AA of the Act during the hearing. It advised that it would write to them both to identify the country information and seek their comments and responses prior to the next hearing date. It was also considered likely by the Tribunal that it would need to receive evidence from Pakistan from the five applicants on the next scheduled hearing date.
The section 359A Migration Act letters served on both review applicant
On 9 February 2023 the Tribunal issued letters to both review applicants pursuant to section 359A of the Migration Act. These letters identified information sourced from the most recent DFAT country information report dated January 2022, and from the more current Australian Government ‘Smart Traveller’ website.
Having considered the import of the information, the Tribunal considered that in the absence of receiving comment or responses from the review applicants, the information would, if accepted, be the reason or a part of the reason for affirming the decisions under review. The information strongly suggested that there remain very significant security concerns within the Quetta area and surroundings, and particularly so for people of Hazara ethnicity, such as the applicants. Considered in entirety, the information suggested to the Tribunal that there may currently be strong incentives for Quetta based persons of Hazara ethnicity to have reasons to fear for their safety, such that there would be incentives not to return. Put differently, it appeared that, subject to any comments or responses from the review applicants, there may be strong incentives for each of the five visa applicants not to depart Australia. The specific information included in both section 359A Migration Act letters is annexed to this decision, marked as Annexure 1.
The section 359A letters were served via the nominated email addresses as provided for both review applicants for the purposes of the review. The letters invited both to comment on or respond to the information by 23 February 2023, and that if there were no comments or responses by that date, the Tribunal may rely on the information in making a decision, which may include affirming the decisions under review. The letters clearly identified that if comments or responses were unable to be provided by 23 February 2023, the review applicants may have sought an extension of time by which to respond; no requests were received.
Because of there being no comments or responses received within time, by force of law the review applicants have lost any entitlements they may otherwise have had under the Act to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments. As such, the decisions with respect to each visa applicant are made based upon all evidence and information before the Tribunal as at time of decision, including the summarised oral evidence obtained at the hearing.
On 1 March 2023, [Review Applicant 1] notified the Tribunal by email that he believed he has an online interview (second Tribunal hearing) on 15/03/2020 and that he thought that he had until 15/03/2022 to provide supporting documents. He explained that the reason it was taking time to respond was that his parent’s passport had expired and that they have applied for a new passport which would be received in a few days. He requested an additional week until 10/03/2023 to provide all supporting documents.
There was no correspondence from [Review Applicant 2] with respect to why she did not respond to the section 359A letter, however.
On 2 March 2023 the Tribunal responded to [Review Applicant 1] utilising [his] nominated email address as follows:
The presiding member, member Judd, has been appraised of your email of 1 March 2023 seeking further time by which to provide comments or responses to the Tribunal’s letter dated 9 February 2023. This letter was titled ‘Invitation to comment on or respond to Information’. The Tribunal notes that no request for further time was received from your wife, [Review Applicant 2]; as such the below only applies to you.
The Invitation to comment on or respond was issued in accordance with the provisions of section 359A of the Migration Act; it provided a firm date by which comments or responses must (in the absence of extension) be received by. In your circumstances, the date was 23 February 2023. You did not provide comments or responses within this time frame, and neither did [Review Applicant 2]. Your request for extension was received seven days outside of the required response time frame. The Tribunal is not empowered to extend the period to respond to an invitation where the request for extension is received after the initial prescribed period has expired.[2] The Full Federal Court has stated that (see Hasran v MIAC) ‘the gate closes on an applicant who fails to respond to a letter under s 359A within the prescribed time and that there is simply no discretion to extend the time to respond.[3] Put simply, the Tribunal cannot grant an extension to enable responses or comments with respect to the information which was set out in the letter.
That stated, you may wish to provide further documents or information with respect to the substantive issues for the five applications which were explained to you by the member at the hearings. These issues are as follows:
Whether the applicants genuinely intend to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa is granted, having regard to:
(a) whether the applicants have complied substantially with the conditions to which the last substantive visa, or any subsequent bridging visa, held by the applicants was subject; and
(b) whether the applicants intend to comply with the conditions to which the Subclass 600 visa would be subject; and
(c) any other relevant matter.
[2] Hasran v MIAC (2010) 183 FCR 413at [45]–[48]. This confirms earlier obiter comments in M v MIMA (2006) 155 FCR 333and previous authority from the Federal Magistrates Court; Xue v MIAC, [2009] FMCA 421 at [45]–[46], Usman v MIMIA [2005] FMCA 966.
[3] Hasran v MIAC (2010) 183 FCR 413 at [45]–[48].

The Tribunal’s email specified that any further documents or information would need to be lodged by close of business on 10 March 2023.
On 6 March 2023 the review applicant [Review Applicant 1] again wrote to the Tribunal by email advising as follows:
I am very grateful for your patience and understanding. I was unable to reply back and send you my response during the time specified as I was suffering with health issues and also my dependent children which resulted in this delay plus applied for new passport. Attached is the response statement of the Visa applicants as per your request. I kindly request you to please grant us an opportunity to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues in the review. I was facing compelling circumstances which resulted in the delay. Also again i would like to thank you for your reminders.
For the reasons outlined in paragraph 37 above, the Tribunal has no power in the circumstances to extend the time by which comment or responses can be provided in response to the section 359A letter. Both review applicants had ‘lost’ the opportunity to further attend before the Tribunal go give evidence and present arguments. That did not, however, operate to prevent further documents or information being presented to support the applications for review.
No further evidence was received from [Review Applicant 2]. Her husband, [Review Applicant 1], provided further documents in the 6 March 2023 email, being as follows:
a.A copy of the Pakistan passport for his mother [Visa Applicant 1];
b.A document dated [in] May 2011 which appears to be a property sale agreement for a plot of land for a cantonment in Quetta in favour of visa applicant [Visa Applicant 2], father of [Review Applicant 1]. The Tribunal accepts the document to be genuine; it is, however, reflective of a situation some twelve years ago and as such, only limited positive weight can be accorded to it;
c.An executed sales deed with respect to the same property dated [in] August 2011 in favour of the visa applicant [Visa Applicant 2]; again, whilst the Tribunal accepts the document to be genuine, it reflect a situation twelve years ago and as such, only limited positive weight can be accorded to it; and
d.What appears to possibly be a copy of a business card for the [product 1] business discussed above, referring to the business ‘[Business 1]’ in Quetta. The Tribunal accepts that visa applicants [Visa Applicant 2] and [Visa Applicant 3] may have operated a [product 1] business at a point in time, however the document on its face does not establish that the business is still operative in Quetta. It would be anticipated that copies of bank statements, business registrations or invoices may have been able to be lodged but were not. The Tribunal considers that only limited positive weight can be accorded to the business card as to the present operations of the [product 1] business.
The review applicant [Review Applicant 1] also lodged an unsigned document titled ‘Purpose of Visit’ which purports to be a joint statement from all three visa applicants for which [Review Applicant 1] is review applicant. The full text of the statement is as follows:
I would like to inform you briefly about myself, my family and our proposed visit and tour plan, as me, my wife, [Visa Applicant 1] and my son [Visa Applicant 3 name variant] are the applicants mentioned in the application for visitor’s visa for Australia. My name is [Visa Applicant 2]. I live with my wife and children in Quetta, Pakistan. I have spent all my life in Pakistan. My older son [Review Applicant 1] has been living in Australia for the last 15 years. The rest of all my immediate family members are settled in Pakistan.
I am a businessman and I have been in business since 1980. I own [a] business of [in products 1]. I have a strong and successful business. I am also the member of Chamber of commerce and Industry. I am also an active residential and commercial real estate investor and have property portfolio. Main source of my income is from my [product 1] business as I am a well-known and prominent businessman in my industry. I also have an established passive income stream generated through my property portfolio. I also have money saved up in the deposit account in Bank.
My youngest son [Visa Applicant 3] lives in Pakistan. After finishing his studies he has taken part and now a shareholder of the business. Now he is a well experienced and manages the business well. He has taken most of the responsibilities in the recent years. Over the years I have worked hard to prosper in my business and planned to get my family a better life. I am grateful that I am well-off and have a strong financial backup.
My eldest son [Review Applicant 1] is an Australian citizen. He is married and lives with his wife and two younger children in Melbourne. He has a well-established and successful [product 2 business] for the last 9 years. It’s one of [Review Applicant 1]’s wishes for us to visit him in Australia and see his family and business because he has been away from us for the last 15 years. He wants us to be his guest and have an opportunity to serve us in Australia that’s why he is sponsoring us to visit Australia.
The sole purpose of me, my wife and my son is to visit my son [Review Applicant 1] in Australia and be his guest for a month and shall return back to Pakistan because we have established business to look after and manage our commercial and residential investments. Our absence from Pakistan for a longer period means we will lose our business and suffer financial losses as we have debtors and creditors of the business also the utility bills, business expenses, employees and property liabilities which is under our name and responsibility would adversely effect on our financial portfolio.
I cannot afford to live in Australia permanently as I have strong social ties in my community in Pakistan as majority of my family members are settled in Pakistan. Also I don’t have any friends and other family and relatives in Australia. I don’t see my future in Australia having spent most of my life in Pakistan. I find it hard thinking to leave behind my years of hard work, my first family, my siblings and relatives and specially my friends and community without them I won’t be able to survive . I agree with your point there were people who fled to Australia during the past years but my circumstances is totally different and me and my family are totally happy to live in Pakistan as we never had any issues in our lives to abandon our home-land.
My son [Review Applicant 1] could have applied for Parent Visa if I ever wanted to live in Australia but I have totally refused and opted to casually visit him and only on temporary basis and return back to Pakistan whenever I wanted. I request your kind authority to please consider our application for Visitors visa. I am willing to make a security deposit to ensure you that we are genuine temporary visitors and would comply with our visa conditions as per the conditions mentioned and shall return back to Pakistan.
I would be very grateful to you in this regard.
Yours sincerely,
[Visa Applicant names]
ASSESSMENT
The Tribunal notes that no documents or information were included with the letter at paragraph 39 above that would support the claims concerning the business involvements of the [Review Applicant 1’s] father and brother or the activities of the [product 1] business; nor were bank records produced to support the claim the business is trading. No evidence was provided as to the living arrangements of [Review Applicant 1’s] family in Quetta, or property and asset ownership such that might provide incentive for them to depart Australia. [Visa Applicant 2] appears to acknowledge the country information but only fleetingly; the specific information concerning the safety of Hazaras in Quetta currently was not addressed. [Review Applicant 2] has not responded to the section 359A letter in any sense.
The Tribunal must assess and determine on an individual basis whether the five visa applicants genuinely intend to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa is granted, having regard to:
(a) whether the applicants have complied substantially with the conditions to which the last substantive visa, or any subsequent bridging visa, held by the applicants was subject; and
(b) whether the applicants intend to comply with the conditions to which the Subclass 600 visa would be subject; and
(c) any other relevant matter.
The Tribunal can give no positive considerations to previous compliance with conditions of Australian substantive or bridging visa for each of the five visa applicants, by reason of the fact none have previously entered Australia. That stated, this is not accorded any negative weight.
The primary conditions that the five applicants would face would be:
a.Not to work in Australia – the Tribunal accepts this would be unlikely with respect to each;
b.Not to study or undertake training for more than 3 months – the Tribunal accepts the five applicants would not do so;
c.Must leave before the visa expires – see discussion following.
The country information as set out in Annexure 1, considered cumulatively, establishes to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that:
a.The security situation in Pakistan generally has deteriorated since 2001;
b.The causes of insecurity include religious extremism and ethnic conflicts, sectarian hatred, economic hardship, and the situation with the Taliban control of Afghanistan;
c.Most terrorist attacks are occurring in the KPT and Balochistan. Quetta is located in Balochistan; Terrorist group TTP attacks have increased in Pakistan since the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan; the attacks have mostly occurred in Balochistan. Areas of particular TTP influence include Quetta;
d.IS continues to have a presence in Pakistan, including the bombing of a mosque in Quetta in January 2020 that killed 15 people;
e.Ethnonationalist groups in Sindh and Balochistan carry out attacks against the Pakistani military and government, often causing civilian casualties.
f.Violent crime occurs across Pakistan;
g.There are 600,000 to 1 million ethnic Hazaras in Pakistan, most are Shi’a Muslims of the Twelver sect. Most live in enclaves in Quetta due to the security situation in Balochistan. Hazaras outside Quetta tend not to live in enclaves to reduce ethnic profiling, discrimination and attack;
h.Militant groups including LeJ and IS considers Hazaras to be infidels who are worthy of killing. A 2019 report by the NCHR said at least 2000 Hazaras had been killed by militants in Pakistan since 1999 in incidents including bomb blasts, suicide attacks and targeted killings;
i.The Hazara community in Quetta live in two enclaves called Hazara town and Mariabad. The Pakistani government provides security in these communities including checkpoints and searches. Hazaras who leave Quetta are required to notify security agencies. Medical, education and other services inside enclaves are basis; food and essentials must be brought in from elsewhere in Quetta;
j.Hazaras must leave the enclaves if needing to attend hospitals, leaving them exposed to attacks. Sectarian militants have attacked Hazara religious processions, places of worship and pilgrims on their way to Iran;
k.Many students have given up on the hope of Higher education due to the risks of travelling; whether Hazaras can relocate strongly depends on personal resources and family connections;
l.Few Hazaras now apply for jobs in the military and public service due to discrimination and the fear of attacks; there are high rates of unemployment; Hazaras have suffered lethal attacks outside public offices whilst trying to obtain passports and identification. Many Hazaras no longer feel safe leaving the enclaves;
m.DFAT assesses that Hazaras in Balochistan face a high risk of violence from militants on the basis of their ethnic and sectarian identity; Hazaras face a higher risk than other Shi’a due to their distinctive appearances and segregation;
n.Reporting since late 2022 indicates that the threat of terrorist attack remains very high especially in Balochistan and the KPK provinces, which suffer regular, and sometimes large scale, terrorist attacks. Terrorist attacks could occur anywhere and at any time in Pakistan
When this information is assessed against the evidence as provided by the two review applicants, on balance, the weight of the evidence is that there is currently very significant dangers being faced by persons of Hazara ethnicity living in or near Quetta city, as the applicants do. The two review applicants have provided no evidence or information to cast any doubt upon this country information, notwithstanding having been given ample opportunity to have done so by the Tribunal. The weight of the evidence strongly supports a finding that all five visa applicants face a degree of danger and risk that would be strong motivation to discontinue living in the Quetta/Balochistan area; this translates, in the view of the Tribunal, to there being very strong motivators for the five applicants not to depart Australia prior to cessation of their visas. It would appear very likely that the five visa applicants will seek the protection of Australia in the event they come onshore.
In the circumstances, the Tribunal finds that all five visa applicants do not genuinely intend to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa is granted. The Tribunal has not identified any other relevant matters for the purposes of cl 600.211(c).
For the above reasons the Tribunal is not satisfied that each of the five visa applicants genuinely intend to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa is granted and finds that the requirements of cl 600.211 are not met with respect to each individual applicant.
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the five decisions not to grant the five visa applicants a Visitor (Class FA) visa.
Michael Judd
Member

ANNEXURE 1
The particulars of the information are:
Information extracted from the current ‘DFAT Country Information Report –
Pakistan’: dated 25 January 2022
2.8 The pandemic and government measures to contain it have had a major impact on the
economy. Growth fell to negative 0.47 per cent in fiscal year 2020, the first contraction in
decades. The World Bank estimates half the working population either lost their jobs or faced
reduced hours. In the same period, 40 per cent of households suffered moderate to severe food
insecurity. The national poverty rate stood at 24 per cent in 2020. Assuming the pandemic is
contained, the World Bank expects growth to gradually recover, but sectors such as agriculture
will remain weak, and poverty is likely to remain high.
As much as 70 per cent of healthcare costs are borne as out-of-pocket expenses by patients,
and catastrophic healthcare expenditures can push households into poverty, especially in rural
areas.
Page 2 of 6
Following improvement over recent years, the security situation in Pakistan has deteriorated
since mid-2021. Causes of insecurity include domestic politics, religious extremism, ethnic
conflicts, gender [1] based issues, sectarian hatred, economic hardship, petty and organised
crime, tensions with India and the situation in Afghanistan. 2.35 Terrorist attacks increased in
2021, following a six-year downward trend noted by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
(see figure 1). There were 146 terrorist attacks in 2020, killing 220 people and injuring another
547. PIPS recorded 97 terrorist attacks from January-July 2021, which killed 300 people and
injured another 765. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other domestic jihadist groups
carried out most of these attacks. International jihadist groups and domestic ethnonationalist
groups also carried out attacks. See also Armed groups. 2.36 Most terrorist attacks target
civilians or security forces, vehicles and outposts. Places of worship, schools, and other buildings
have also been targeted. Attacks usually involve improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or gun
attacks, although rocket, grenade and suicide bomb attacks also occur. Most attacks happen in
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (especially North Waziristan) and Balochistan, although Punjab and Sindh
(especially Karachi) are also targeted. There were no attacks in Islamabad, Gilgit-Baltistan or
Azad Kashmir in 2020. 2.37 While the large-scale security operations carried out in 2014-17 have
mostly wound down, Pakistan Armed Forces continue to conduct operations against terrorist
groups who attack its interests and in response to specific threats and incidents. There has been
an uptick in these operations commensurate with the recent increase in terrorist attacks.
According to PIPS, security forces carried out 47 operations or raids in 2020 compared to 28 in
2019. Since 2018, Pakistan has taken concerted action to address terrorist financing and money
laundering on the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
2.39 A number of domestic jihadist groups and networks operate in Pakistan. Some are sectarian
while others mainly oppose the Pakistani state. The most prominent is the TTP, an umbrella
group established in 2007 that is responsible for some of Pakistan’s most notorious terrorist
attacks, including the attack on the Army School in Peshawar in 2014 and the attempted
assassination of prominent female education advocate Malala Yousafzai in 2012. The TTP’s
short-term goal is to undermine the influence of the Pakistani state, especially in Pashtun areas.
Its long-term goal is to overthrow the state and establish Sharia (Islamic law) and an Islamic
caliphate. The TTP is independent from the Afghan Taliban, although they are ideologically
aligned. Pakistan wants the Taliban to deny hostile militants a presence in Afghanistan. In
October 2021, the government announced it was conducting negotiations with TTP elements. In
November 2021, it announced it had agreed to a one-month ceasefire with the TTP.
2.40 TTP attacks within Pakistan have increased since the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan
in August 2021. These attacks have occurred mostly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan,
but also Punjab and Sindh.
Besides conducting terrorist attacks, the TTP acts as an ‘alternative state’ in some parts of
Pakistan, collecting taxes and customs duties, and acting as police and courts. Areas of particular
TTP influence include (but may not be limited to) Waziristan and surrounding districts, Tank,
Quetta, Kuchlak Bypass, Pashtun Abad, Ishaq Abad, Farooqia Town and parts of Karachi.
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2.42 Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda both have a presence in Pakistan and have carried out
attacks there, either directly or through proxies. Both groups are motivated to expand their
influence and recruit fighters to their cause. They have targeted Pakistani military and
government representatives, and religious and ethnic minorities, and also carried out anti-
Western attacks. Besides LeJ, Al Qaeda has frequently collaborated with the TTP to carry out
attacks. Al Qaeda’s capability in Pakistan has been reduced, but the group is still active. Two
suspected Al Qaeda terrorists were reportedly killed in an encounter with police in Dera Ghazi
Khan in November 2020. Recent IS attacks in Pakistan include the bombing of a mosque in
Quetta in January 2020 that killed 15 people, and an attack in January 2021 that killed 11 Hazara
miners in Balochistan. Many fighters for Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP, the local
branch of IS active in Pakistan and Afghanistan) are former TTP fighters, and the group has also
carried out attacks in coordination with LeJ, including a 2016 attack on a Quetta police station.
2.44 Ethnonationalist groups in Sindh and Balochistan carry out attacks against the Pakistani
military and government, often causing civilian casualties. These include the Baloch Liberation
Army and the Baloch DFAT Country Information Report – PAKISTAN - January 2022 16
Liberation Front, both of which carried out multiple deadly attacks in 2020, as well as the
Sindhudesh Liberation Army. The goals of these groups include independence or greater
autonomy for their provinces. Civil disorder 2.45 Political and religious groups stage protests
across the country. These can draw large crowds and turn violent. International events can
prompt demonstrations or violent protests. Demonstrations relating to blasphemy and other
religious issues can also draw wide – and rapid – support
2.49 Violent crime occurs across Pakistan, including armed robbery, assault, carjacking and
kidnapping. According to UN Office on Drugs and Crime data, Pakistan has a homicide rate of
3.1 murders per 100,000 population, about average for the region and lower than the global
average of 6.1 murders per 100,000 population. Islamabad has a lower crime rate than other
major cities due to its large security presence. Crime rates in Lahore and Karachi have also
dropped in recent years due to police crackdowns. Violent crime in rural areas and in Gilgit-
Baltistan is generally lower. 2.50 Criminal gangs exist in Pakistan. Their activities include drug
trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, human trafficking, and child sexual exploitation. Some are
politically connected.
2.50 With the Taliban seizing power in Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistan bolstered security
along its land border with Afghanistan. Pakistan has completed over 90 per cent of a border
fence between the two countries, but its border with Afghanistan remains porous and susceptible
to irregular migration and people smuggling, movement of terrorists and extremists, and transit
of narcotics and other illicit goods. As the economic and human rights situation in Afghanistan
deteriorates, further displacement of Afghans across the border to Pakistan is possible.
3.3 The Hazaras are an ethnic group of distinctive East Asian appearance, native to the Hazarajat
region of Afghanistan. Their language, Hazaragi, is a variety of Persian that is mutually intelligible
with Dari. There are an estimated 600,000 to 1 million Hazaras in Pakistan. Most are Shi’a
Muslims of the Twelver Sect, although some belong to the Ismaeli sect, and a small number are
Page 4 of 6
Sunni. 3.4 Large groups of Hazaras migrated to Pakistan from Afghanistan in the late 19th
century, during the 1978-89 Afghan War, and following the Taliban takeover in 1996. Most livein
enclaves in Quetta due to the security situation in Balochistan. Smaller populations live in
Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. Hazaras outside Quetta tend not to live in enclaves to reduce
the risk of ethnic profiling, discrimination and attack. Hazaras participate in regional politics, and
there are two MPs from the Hazara Democratic Party (HDP) in the Balochistan provincial
assembly
3.5 Militant groups including, LeJ and IS (see Armed Groups) consider the Hazaras ‘infidels’ who
are ‘worthy of killing’. A 2019 report by the NCHR said at least 2,000 Hazaras had been killed by
militants in Pakistan since 1999 ‘in various incidents including bomb blast, suicide attacks and
target killings. No one has been held accountable for these attacks. Hazara political and religious
leaders have been targeted for assassination. In April 2019, a bombing in Hazarganji market
killed 24 people, many of them Hazaras. In January 2021, IS militants killed 11 Hazara miners in
Mach. While there have been no attacks outside Balochistan since 2014, Hazaras have
previously been targeted in Karachi, Peshawar and elsewhere. Militant groups retain the intent
and capacity to attack Hazaras throughout Pakistan.
3.6 The Hazara community in Quetta lives in two enclaves: Hazara town and Mariabad. The
Pakistani government provides security in these communities, including vehicle checkpoints and
searches on entry and exit. Government forces also provide security for Hazara religious
processions (see Shi’a) and Hazarganji market. Hazaras who leave Quetta are required to notify
the security agencies. Local sources report Frontier Corps routinely harass Hazaras at
checkpoints. Human Rights Watch has reported that retired members of the Frontier Corps have
described Hazaras as ‘agents of Iran’ and ‘untrustworthy’. 3.7 Medical, education and other
services inside the enclaves are basic. Food and other essentials must be brought in from
outside, and prices are reportedly double those elsewhere in Quetta. Those who can afford to
travel to Karachi for medical treatment do so, while others must attend Quetta hospitals outside
the enclaves, where they have been attacked in the past. Sectarian militants have also attacked
Hazara religious processions, places of worship, and pilgrims on their way to Iran. 3.8 Schools
exist within the enclaves, but there is little opportunity for higher education. Many Hazara
students have abandoned the hope of higher education due to the risk of travelling. A small
number of wealthier Hazaras send their children to study at universities in Lahore or Islamabad,
where they reportedly feel safer. 3.9 Many Hazaras in Quetta provide services to their own
communities within the enclaves; others move to other cities across Pakistan to work. Whether
a Hazara can relocate strongly depends on their personal resources and family connections. In
the past Hazaras were often employed in the military and public service, but few now apply for
these jobs due to discrimination and fear of attacks. Since the IS attack in Mach in January 2021,
Hazaras are reportedly too scared to work in the Baloch mining industry, previously an important
source of income. High rates of unemployment and limited prospects have reportedly led to a
sense of hopelessness among Hazara youth in Quetta. 3.10 While most Hazaras in Pakistan can
obtain formal identification such as Computerised National Identity Cards (CNICs), Hazaras
claim National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) officials at times cause delays for
Hazaras. Hazaras have suffered lethal attacks outside the NADRA office in Quetta while trying
to obtain passports and CNICs. As a result, many Hazaras do not feel safe leaving the enclaves
Page 5 of 6
to apply for documentation. 3.11 DFAT assesses Hazaras who live in the enclaves in Quetta face
a moderate risk of societal discrimination in the form of impeded access to higher education,
medical services, employment and affordable food. Within and outside the enclaves, Hazaras
face a moderate risk of official discrimination, including by government officials and security
forces, in the form of obstruction at checkpoints and denial of or delay in access to identity
documentation, employment and services. DFAT assesses such discrimination reflects
widespread individual prejudice rather than official policy. 3.12 DFAT assesses Hazaras in
Balochistan face a high risk of violence from militants on the basis of their ethnic and sectarian
identity. Outside Balochistan the risk of violence for Hazaras is moderate. Hazaras face a higher
risk of violence than other Shi’a due to their distinctive appearance and segregation. Outside
Balochistan, DFAT assesses Hazaras face a low risk of societal or official discrimination but
notes relocation to these areas is difficult or impossible for many.
Current Information from the Australian Government ‘Smart Traveller’ website:
Latest update:
Terrorist groups hostile to foreign interests operate in Pakistan. The threat of
attack remains very high. We continue to advise reconsider your need to travel to Pakistan, and
do not travel to some areas of Pakistan. Reporting since late 2022 has identified the potential for
increased attacks in Islamabad, including at major hotels. In response, heightened security
arrangements are in place, including an increased security force presence and additional
checkpoints. Some public events have been banned. Australian officials in Islamabad have been
advised to increase vigilance and limit travel within the city. Political protest action has increased
in recent months which can impact travel and can turn violent. You should exercise heightened
vigilance, review your personal security plans and monitor the media for latest updates (See
‘Safety’).
Reporting since late 2022 has identified the potential for increased attacks in Islamabad,
including at major hotels. In response, heightened security arrangements are in place, including
an increased security force presence and additional checkpoints. Some public events have been
banned. Australian officials in Islamabad have been advised to increase vigilance and limit travel
within the city. You should exercise heightened vigilance, review your personal security plans
and monitor the media for latest updates. Terrorist groups hostile to foreign interests operate in
Pakistan. The threat of attack remains very high, especially in Balochistan and KPK provinces,
which suffer regular, and sometimes large-scale terrorist attacks. If you travel to Pakistan, you
should remain cautious and vigilant, including in major cities. Counter-terrorism operations occur
across the country. Terrorist attacks could occur anywhere and at any time. Previous attacks
have included the use of grenades, firearms, and bombing, including suicide bombs. Some
terrorist attacks in Pakistan have involved multiple explosions, one after the other.Security
officials may cut mobile phone services when the threat of terrorism is high or straight after an
incident.If you go to Chitral district or Gilgit Baltistan, travel by commercial aircraft, not by road,
as the safety and security risks are significant.

‘New’ evidence being from date of application for Tribunal review