2119205 (Refugee) - [2025] ARTA 1394

2119205 (Refugee) [2025] ARTA 1394 (12 June 2025)
DECISION AND
REASONS FOR DECISION
Respondent:Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Tribunal Number: 2119205
Tribunal:General Member V Price
Date:12 June 2025

Place:Melbourne
Decision:The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant meets the following criteria:
·s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 12 June 2025 at 2:18pm

CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection – Turkey – political opinion – parents from two other countries – relatives affiliated with anti-government organisations – surveillance, harassment and relocation, and one relative arrested and mistreated – applicant’s studies and association with Kurdish and leftist students – participation in major protests, and injury – detention, mistreatment and harassment, and mental health – interrogated and threatened during return visit, and parents’ house raided – continuing interest but no activities in Australia – mental health treatment – spontaneous, detailed and consistent evidence – country information – border control and law enforcement database – modification of behaviour not reasonable – religion – long-term relationship in Australia, conversion to Christianity and partner visa application in progress – decision under review remitted
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H(1)(a), 5J(1), 36(2)(a), (3), 65, 367A
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
CASES
Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379
MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 26 November 2021 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicant is an adult female who states that she is national of Türkiye. She is of [Nationality 1/Nationality 2] heritage and follows the Catholic faith, having been baptised into the church in Australia. She applied to the Department for the visa on 15 June 2018 claiming protection on the basis of her actual and imputed political opinion. The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that she did not meet the requirements of s 36(2) of the Act.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 17 April 2025 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Turkish and English languages.
The applicant was represented in relation to the review. The representative attended the Tribunal hearing.
BACKGROUND, CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The applicant’s background and claims for protection were set out in the protection visa application, and in her written and oral evidence to the Department and to the Tribunal. Her evidence is summarised below.
Background
The applicant was born in [City] and has a [sibling]. Her father is [Nationality 1], and her mother has [Nationality 2] heritage. Her father is [an occupation 1] and is employed in a [workplace] that produces [product]. Her mother was [an occupation 2], but she has now retired. Her parents own their own home and continue to reside in [City]. Her [sibling] is studying, and [also] resides in [City].
The applicant completed primary and secondary education before undertaking a degree in [Subject 1] at university in Istanbul. She worked for a short time in [work task] in the [work sector] before coming to Australia in January 2018 as a student. In Australia, she completed a Certificate IV in [Subject 2] and began, but did not complete, a Diploma in [Subject 3].
The applicant is currently employed full-time at a [company] providing [services], which is headquartered in regional Victoria. Prior to this she worked as [an occupation 3], as [an occupation 4] and for a [company].
The applicant is in a long-term de facto relationship with an Australian citizen. They have lodged an application for a partner visa, but the applicant nonetheless wanted to pursue the protection visa application.
Protection Claims
The applicant’s [relatives] were affiliated with Devrimci Yol (also known as Dev Yol),[1] and were under surveillance by the authorities. Her [relative 1] was arrested a few times in the 1980’s and was subjected to mistreatment on those occasions. Her [relatives] eventually migrated to a different area of the country to avoid harassment from the authorities, and her [relative 1] stepped away from actively engaging in politics to avoid further problems.
[1] This is a radical left revolutionary party founded in the 1970s and banned by the government: see United Kingdom Home Office (UKHO), ‘Turkey Country Assessment,’ 1 April 2003, page 107; 'The banning of left wing parties.', 27 July 1993; and UKHO, 'Turkey March 2007', 14 March 2007.
Nonetheless, her family maintained an interest in politics, discussed politics, and always held views contrary to the current government. In part due to this background, the applicant developed an interest in politics and decided to undertake tertiary studies in this area. She attended university in Istanbul, studying [Subject 1].
At university she became friends with Kurdish and left learning students and attended many demonstrations. She protested the targeting of female students by campus security, the actions of then Prime Minister Erdogan who was targeting universities and academics, the mistreatment and discrimination of ethnic Kurds, and a visit of the Prime Minister to the school. She also attended a mass funeral for a teenage boy killed by police during the Gezi Park incident (below). The applicant was beaten and harassed by authorities at all of these events, and her attendance was documented by the authorities who filmed the crowds.
The most notable interaction she had with authorities was during her participation in the ‘Gezi Park Resistance’ in June 2013. She attended almost every day of the protest and was injured when the police fired gas bullets and pepper spray into the crowd. She and her friend attempted to smuggle first aid supplies into protest area. They obtained supplies from her friend’s father who was a doctor. However, she and her friend were caught by security and arrested. The applicant was detained for a day.
During this period, the applicant was a single woman, residing in a conservative area in Istanbul. Her neighbours did not approve of her and would maliciously report her to the authorities for breaching noise restrictions. They accused her of being a prostitute or promiscuous and hung intimate apparel outside her home to intimidate her.
She completed her degree and returned home to stay with her parents, experiencing a period of mental ill health due to her detention, treatment by the authorities, and the constant harassment from her neighbours. Her father suggested she leave the country for her own health and study overseas.
The applicant returned home in November 2016. On arrival into the airport, she was detained and interrogated by undercover police. They asked about her political activities in Australia, her reasons for travelling to Türkiye and why she held a green passport. The significance of her passport colour is that many in Gulenist movement held green passports at that time. The applicant was not part of this movement but held a green passport because of her mother’s previous status as a [work sector] employee. She was accused of being on a mission and they threatened to send her to jail. She was terrified, but they did eventually let her go.
In 2017, she went to stay at the home of a friend, [Mr A], who she knew from university. [Mr A] is Kurdish and was politically active and was, unknown to the applicant, a member of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). He was arrested during this time, and the applicant was questioned about him and their relationship and activities. She was arrested and held in detention for two days. During this time, she was interrogated, accused of being a member of the PKK and beaten. She was released with a warning and told she would be monitored. She went to [Mr A]’s home, left his house keys with a neighbour and returned to her parents’ home. She does not know what happened to [Mr A].
Her father wanted her to return to Australia. However, her passport had expired and when she attended the office to get a new one, she was interrogated for about two hours. The officer told her they had suspicions regarding her affiliation with [Mr A] and asked more questions about the PKK. Again, they let her leave with a warning, and she did ultimately get a passport, and was able to leave the country, returning to Australia at the beginning of 2018.
The police raided her parents’ home in 2019, largely focusing on the applicant’s room. They confiscated her books on history and politics, and every copy of her university thesis which criticised the government’s treatment of women. Her parents sold their home and moved after that incident.
She was seeing a specialist for her mental ill health in Australia but is not on any medication. She remains interested in Turkish politics and follows the situation in the country. However, she has refrained from active engagement in demonstrations or other activities here. If she had to return to Türkiye she would continue to fight against injustice and to stand up for herself.
She fears that she will be arrested and detained on return to Türkiye due to her actual and imputed political views, her association with [Mr A], and her own past activities.
Supporting material before the Tribunal
The following material was before the Tribunal in relation to the application:
·The applicant’s protection visa application form.
·Statements by the applicants dated 14 June 2018 and 14 April 2025.
·Legal submissions dated March 2021 and 8 April 2025.
·Medical Report from the applicant’s treating medial professional dated 20 February 2021.
·An audio recording of the applicant’s interview with the Department delegate.
·Identity documents confirming the applicant’s nationality.
The Tribunal has had regard to the above evidence and material in assessing this mater, as well as country information regarding the circumstances in Türkiye as set out below.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Criteria for protection visa
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
REASONS AND FINDINGS
Nationality, area of return and s.36(3)
The applicant provided a copy of her national identity card and passport confirming that she was born in [City] and holds Turkish nationality. I accept that she is a national of Türkiye, find that this is her receiving country, and that she would return to [City] where her family continues to reside.
There is nothing in the evidence before me to indicate that the applicant has a current right to enter and reside in another country, apart from Türkiye, and I am not satisfied that she does. I find that s 36(3) does not apply in this case.
Issue/s for consideration
The issues in this case are whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Türkiye or, if not, whether she faces a real risk of significant harm in that country.
For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be set aside and remitted for reconsideration.
New Evidence s 367A of the Act.
In accordance with s 367A of the Act, if the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant does not have a reasonable explanation for not raising or presenting claims or evidence before the primary decision was made, the Tribunal is to draw an adverse inference regarding the credibility of those matters.
To the extent that the applicant provided additional claims and evidence that was not before the Department delegate, I find this was provided to counter the findings in the primary decision and in response to the questions posed by the Tribunal. I find there are reasonable explanations for failing to provide the new evidence before the making of the primary decision. I find that s 367A of the Act does not apply. I am not required to draw an adverse inference of the credibility of any new claims and evidence, and I do not do so.
Refugee Assessment[2]
[2] Relevant aspects of country information and the analysis of that information have been adapted from ART decisions 2102231 and 210094 but have been considered in the context of this particular matter.
The applicant’s oral evidence to the Tribunal was consistent with that provided to the Department, and with her written statements. Her evidence was highly detailed, spontaneous, and demonstrated a thorough knowledge of Turkish politics, which the Tribunal finds indicative of genuine lived experience. Her evidence was also consistent with independent information regarding the circumstances in Türkiye as discussed below.
Background in Türkiye and religious conversion
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s father is of [Nationality 1] heritage and that her mother has [Nationality 2] heritage.
I accept that her [relatives] were active in the Dev Yol, a radical left revolutionary party, considered to have connections to the PKK, which was banned by the government.[3] The applicant’s evidence regarding the treatment of her [relatives] by the authorities is consistent with information that actual or suspected members of left wing and banned organisations were subject to adverse attention from the authorities, including monitoring, arbitrary arrest and criminal prosecution.[4] I accept that her [relatives] were arrested and beaten for their involvement with Dev Yol, that her [relative 1] relocated within the country, and gave up active participation in political activism.
[3] United Kingdom Home Office (UKHO), ‘Turkey Country Assessment,’ 1 April 2003, page 107; 'The banning of left-wing parties.', 27 July 1993; UKHO, 'Turkey March 2007', 14 March 2007; Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRBC), 'Turkey Information on the current activities of the Dev-Yol revolutionary movement, its organization and its membership', 1 February 1993; DFAT Cable. ‘Country Information Report No. 93/96’, 31 January 1996; and DFAT Cable, ‘Country Information Report No 747/96 20 August 1996.
[4] United Kingdom Home Office (UKHO), ‘Turkey Country Assessment,’ 1 April 2003, page 65-73; 'The banning of left-wing parties.', 27 July 1993; UKHO, 'Turkey March 2007', 14 March 2007, pages 88- 89.
However, I accept that he and his family remained interested in politics, these matters were discussed at home, and that given this environment, the applicant also developed an interest in politics. I accept she undertook studies in [Subject] at university in Istanbul, befriended left-leaning and Kurdish students, and became involved in various demonstrations including advocating for pro-Kurdish issues, women’s rights on campus, and against the actions of the government, including visits of high-profile government figures to the campus.
The applicant claimed to have participated in the ‘Gezi Park Resistance’ in June 2013. Between May to July 2013 protestors gathered in Taksim Square, advocating for human rights, secularism and economic development among other issues.[5] Kurdish groups were also prominent in supporting the protests in Istanbul. Security forces used excessive force against the largely peaceful protesters, using batons, pepper spray, tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition against the crowd: eight people were killed by the police, and over 3500 people were detained.[6] Authorities targeted individuals providing medical aid to the protesters, and a 14 year old boy, Berkin Elvan, who was on his way to buy bread, was hit in the head with a teargas cannister.[7] He died in hospital nine months later and his death sparked further protests in Istanbul, with thousands, possibly millions, attending his funeral. Moments after the burial, police used tear-gas and water cannons against mourners.[8]
[5] DFAT, ‘Country Information Report Turkey’, 2 June 2014 (DFAT 2014 Turkey Report) at [3.83] –[3.85]; Human Rights Watch (HRW) 'A weekend of police abuse', 18 June 2013 (HRW 2013 Report); The Guardian, 'Turkey protests police use teargas and water cannon to clear Taksim Square', Guardian (Unlimited) (UK), 12 June 2013; HRW, ‘World Report 2014 Turkey', 21 January 2014 (HRW 2014 Report).
[6] DFAT 2014 Turkey Report at [3.83] –[3.85]; HRW 2013 Report; HRW 2014 Report; and The Guardian, 'Turkey protests police use teargas and water cannon to clear Taksim Square', Guardian (Unlimited) (UK), 12 June 2013.
[7] DFAT 2014 Turkey Report at [3.83] –[3.85]; HRW 2013 Report; HRW 2014 Report; and The Guardian, 'Turkey protests police use teargas and water cannon to clear Taksim Square', Guardian (Unlimited) (UK), 12 June 2013; 'Turkey clashes after boy hurt at Istanbul protest dies', British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 11 March 2014; Funeral of Turkish boy Berkin Elvan brings thousands to Istanbul streets | Turkey | The Guardian, 12 March 2014; In pictures: Turkey mourns boy killed in protests - BBC News, 12 March 2014; and Amnesty International, ‘Can Turkey Open a fresh chapter following the death of Berkin Elvan’, 13 March 2014 (AI, 2014 Report).
[8] AI, 2014 Report.

The applicant’s evidence accurately identified the location of the protests, the duration of the event, the issues in dispute, and the authorities’ use of force against the crowd. Her evidence regarding how she and her friend obtained the medical supplies was entirely plausible and she provide specific detail about her attempts to smuggle these supplies into the demonstration, including the colour of her bag, and the location at which she entered the park. She provided specific details regarding her arrest and her detention, and the events surrounding the death of Berkin Elvan and the subsequent protests. Her evidence was consistent with independent information before me, and I accept that these events occurred as claimed.
I accept the applicant attended the Gezi Park Resistance, that she, along with others, was shot with gas bullets and pepper spray, that she and her friend tried to smuggle in medical supplies to the crowd, and that she was arrested and detained for a day. I accept that she was beaten during her arrest and detention. I also accept she attended Berkin Elvan’s funeral and was injured by the authorities in their violent attempts to disperse the crowds.
The applicant’s evidence regarding the harassment she experienced from her neighbours was highly detailed, internally consistent with her previous evidence, and is also consistent with information that there were areas of the country in which conservative values regarding women and their traditional role in society led to discrimination against women.[9] I accept that the applicant was harassed by her neighbours as she claimed.
[9] DFAT 2014 Report at [3.99] - [3.110].
I accept the applicant returned to [City] after her studies, and that she was experiencing mental ill health at that time. I accept she came to Australia shortly thereafter to study and returned to home in 2016. The applicant claimed to have been detained and questioned on entry into Türkiye on her entry into the country, questioned about her passport, and accused of involvement in the Gulenist movement.
The Gulen Movement is a civil society movement involving religious, educational and social organisations.[10] The movement was highly influential, with many of the members holding key government positions with the police, judiciary and intelligence agencies. As a result of their government work, these individuals held ‘green passports’ reserved for civil servants and their families, mayors, former parliamentarians and high-ranking members of the government.[11] The movement also owned schools, study centres, businesses, and media outlets.[12]
[10] DFAT, ‘Country Information Report Türkiye’, 16 May 2025 (DFAT Turkey 2025 Report), at [3.67] – [3.81]; UKHO 'Country Policy and Information Note Turkey: Gülenists', October 2023 (UKHO Gulenist 2023 Report); The Year in Review: Crackdown on the Gülen Movement - Stockholm Center for Freedom, 29 January 2021 (SCF 2021 Report); Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Türkiye February 2025, (NMFA 2025 Report) page 43-50; and DFAT, ‘Country Information Report Turkey’, 2016, at [4.80] – [4.82] (DFAT 2016 Report).
[11] Gülen Movement leader’s "green passport” revoked | Daily Sabah; Court revokes Gulen's Turkish passport | Middle East Eye; DFAT 2025 Report at [5.39] –[5.40].
[12] DFAT Turkey 2025 Report at [3.67] – [3.81]; UKHO Gulenist 2023 Report; SCF 2021 Report; and NMFA 2025 Report.
Following the attempted coup in 2016, the state removed large numbers of suspected Gulenists from the civil service, military, police, judiciary and academia, and conducted mass arrests against actual or suspected Gulenists.[13] Many of those detained were convicted of terrorism and imprisoned, and many reported they were tortured by the police and other state agencies.[14] Relevantly, emergency decrees authorised the confiscation of passports of individuals under investigation or prosecution, as well as those of their family members, and between 2016 and 2021, more than 230,000 passports belonging to suspected government opponents were cancelled, the majority of which were green passports.[15] Reporting by the Finish Immigration Service (FIS) cites travelling abroad among the criteria considered by the state for connecting individuals to the Gulen movement.[16]
[13] DFAT Turkey 2025 Report at [3.67] – [3.81]; UKHO Gulenist 2023 Report; SCF 2021 Report; and NMFA 2025 Report.
[14] DFAT Turkey 2025 Report at [3.67] – [3.81]; UKHO Gulenist 2023 Report; SCF 2021 Report; and NMFA 2025 Report.
[15] DFAT Turkey 2025 Report at [3.67] – [3.81]; UKHO Gulenist 2023 Report; SCF 2021 Report; and NMFA 2025 Report.
[16] Finish Immigration Service (FIS), ‘Turkey - Individuals associated with the Gülen movement' June 2024,(FIS Report) page 22 -23.
The applicant’s evidence regarding her interrogation on arrival into Türkiye in 2016 is plausible given the context of the political situation at that time, and as the applicant held a green passport (due to her mother’s role as [a work sector employee]) often associated with Gulenists. It is also consistent with information that overseas travel can be sufficient to raise concerns of association with the movement. Moreover, the applicant’s oral evidence was detailed and presented in a manner indicative of genuine lived experience. I accept that she was held for questioning at the airport and accused of association with the Gulen movement, was threatened and intimidated, but was ultimately released.
The applicant also claimed that in 2016 she was arrested and detained due to her friendship with her Kurdish friend [Mr A], who the authorities asserted was a member of the PKK. The PKK, represented Kurdish interests and advocated for a separate Kurdish state, and led an insurgency opposed by the Turkish Security forces, in which approximately 40,000 people have been killed, and another 3 million displaced.[17] The conflict escalated following the collapse of a ceasefire in 2015, resulting in violence in urban centres in Kurdish-majority regions, and the death of hundreds of civilians, security forces and PKK members.[18] Kurdish civilians, journalists, activists and others believed to be associated with the PKK were arrested and detained, with some claiming to have been tortured during questioning.[19] Factors indicative of PKK support were said to be subject to the state’s discretion and ebbed and flowed according to developments in the conflict or by the election cycle.[20]
[17] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.13]- [3.14]; and NMFA 2025 Report, page 15
[18] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.6].
[19] DAFT 2020 Report at [2.60]; [2.62], [3.6], [3.7]; NMFA 2025 Report page 15; DFAT 2025 Report at [3.14] – [3.15]
[20] UKHO 2023 report page 37.
In this case, the applicant’s evidence regarding her arrest and detention on visiting her friend [Mr A] was specific in the minute details, including for example: the physical state of [Mr A] when he was bought into the home and her feelings on seeing him; the conduct of the authorities in searching [Mr A]’s home; the conditions in which she was held and detained; the questions she was asked; the reasons for her release; and having to find a way to return [Mr A]’s house key that was still in her possession. Details such as these speak strongly to the genuine nature of this experience.
Her evidence is also consistent with the independent information above on the political environment in Türkiye at that time, not only with the Gulenists, but also given the escalation of the conflict with the PKK following the collapse of the 2015 ceasefire agreement and the treatment of individuals actually or imputed to be associated with the PKK. I accept the applicant was detained, questioned on her association with [A] and the PKK, and that she was mistreated during this time. I accept she was ultimately released.
I accept her evidence that she had to apply for a new passport as hers expired and that she was subject to additional questioning as part of this process. This is entirely plausible considering the information above on the environment in the country at the time, her past involvement in political activism, her travel abroad and her association with [A]. Her evidence, which I accept, is that she was ultimately able to obtain a passport and to return to Australia. I also accept that her parent’s home was subsequently searched, copies of her thesis were seized and that her parents moved. Again, this is consistent with her profile and the political situation and the known activities of the authorities at that time.
I accept she has not been politically active in Australia, but remains interested in politics, and that she still follows the situation in Türkiye. Her evidence demonstrated her knowledge remains current and that she is passionate about political affairs in her home country.
The applicant’s evidence regarding her mental ill health was supported by reports from her treating doctor and I accept that the applicant is experiencing symptoms of anxiety and depression. I accept her evidence that she is not currently on medication.
The applicant’s detailed evidence was that she is in a long-term relationship with an Australian citizen of [Country 3] heritage, and that she has converted to Catholicism after her partner introduced her to the faith. I accept these matters and find she is now a practicing Catholic.
Assessment of future harm in Türkiye
DFAT states that Türkiye is politically diverse, with a wide range of political views and ideologies represented in parliament, other levels of government and in the community.[21] The Constitution nominally guarantees freedom of political opinion, assembly and expression, subject to restrictions on national security grounds.[22] However, the government has been increasingly cracking down on political dissent, using counter-terrorism legislation, criminal defamation suits and other state of emergency laws to do so.[23]
[21] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.55].
[22] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.55].
[23] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.55].
In March 2025 the PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire, and in May 2025 they disbanded.[24] However, given the recency of this event, the durability of this situation is unclear, as is the impact it will have on treatment and conditions faced by ethnic Kurds and those deemed to support the PKK or separatist causes. A recent media report noted that the disbanding of the PKK‘…does not guarantee peace. Rather it paves the way for agreeing a tricky legal framework for securely disarming the PKK, which is designated a terrorist group by Turkey and its Western allies.’[25] DFAT advises that Kurdish politicians, human rights defenders and political activists face a high risk of official discrimination throughout the country including monitoring, harassment, arrests and prosecution for alleged terrorist activities, regardless of their actual involvement.[26]
[24] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.15].
[25] Daren Butler and Ece Toksabay, ‘Kurdish PKK ends 40-year Turkey insurgency, bringing hope of regional stability’, Reuters 13 May 2025; The PKK’s decision to Disband May Offer a Historic Change at Peace’, International Crisis Group, 16 May 2025; and Ozge Genc, ‘Will the PKK’s Historic Disbandment Transform the Turkish Republic? - Middle East Council on Global Affairs’, 17 May 2025
[26] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.17].
Mass arrests of suspected Gulenists continues to occur. In December 2023, over 400 police officers were suspended for alleged Gulenist connections, at least 650 people were arrested in January and February 2025, and there are also reports of 4,902 operations against the Gulen members resulting in the detention of 6,727 people and the arrest of 935 individuals.[27] DFAT states that Turkish nationals living abroad with suspected links to the Gulen Movement may have their activities monitored and surveilled, especially if they have a high profile and established record of supporting the Gulen Movement. Monitoring may occur online or physically, including by persons acting for, or on behalf of, the Turkish state.[28] The FIS continues to state that travel abroad is a risk factor for being identified with the Gulen Movement.[29]
[27] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.77].
[28] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.79].
[29] FIS Report, page 22 -23.
There have been instances of Turkish nationals with suspected links to the Gulen Movement living abroad being abducted and forcibly returned to Türkiye.[30] DFAT assesses that those accused of membership of the Gulen Movement face a high risk of official discrimination in the form of arrest, prosecution and physical abuse while in detention, a high risk of societal discrimination, including stigma and through the publication of their names.[31]
[30] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.80].
[31] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.81].
Opposition politicians and their supporters also face a range of challenges and restrictions, including in relation to their freedom of expression, association and assembly.[32] DFAT sates that police still routinely use excessive force when confronting and apprehending protesters, even when protesters were non-violent and did not resist arrest.[33] There were about 3,487 cases of protesters being ‘beaten and wounded’ by police in 2023 alone.[34] DFAT assesses protesters who attempt to demonstrate against government policies or over ‘sensitive’ social issues, such as the rights of women, face a moderate risk of official discrimination in the form of arbitrary arrests and a moderate risk of official violence in the form of excessive force by police responders.[35]
[32] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.82] –[.3.83]; and United States Department of State (USDOS), ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2023’, 20 April 2024 (UDSOS 2024 Report), pages 1, 38-41.
[33] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.96] –[3.102].
[34] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.101].
[35] DFAT 2025 Report at [3.102].
Those detained for association with the PKK, the Gulen movement and/or political or other offences, face physical ill-treatment during interrogation and detention. The United States Department of State (USDOS), Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have reported that mistreatment includes beatings, electric shocks, stress positions, sexual threats and assaults, and a denial of food, water and medical treatment.[36] A 2023 report on Torture in its Various Dimensions in Türkiye reported that 1,201 individuals alleged they were subject to torture and other forms of ill-treatment in 2022, most while in official custody or during transportation by law enforcement.[37] DFAT states that ‘extreme’ forms of torture such as electrocution and ‘reverse hanging’, are much less common than in the past but beatings remain common, especially to extract confessions during interrogations. [38]
[36] DFAT 2025 Report at [4.8] –[4.12]; see also UDSOS 2024 Report, pages 1, 3-5.
[37] DFAT 2025 Report at [4.8] –[4.12].
[38] DFAT 2025 Report at [4.8] –[4.12].
DFAT advises that the Turkish authorities maintain databases for immigration and law enforcement officers.[39] The General Information Gathering System provides information on arrest warrants, previous arrests, travel restrictions, military service records and taxation status, and is available at most air and seaports across the country. A border control information system used by the police also collates information on past arrivals and departures. The Judicial Records Directorate maintains records of past sentences, and the Central Civil Registration System (MERNIS) maintains information on civil status information.
[39] DFAT 2025 Report at [5.25] –[5.29].
DFAT advises that Türkiye’s sophisticated information databases mean failed asylum seekers are likely to come to the attention of the government if they have a criminal record, or if they are a member of a group of particular interest. Groups of particular interest include, among others: members of the Gulen Movement, Kurdish or opposition political activists, and human rights activists.[40] The UKHO states that on arrival into the country a person of interest will be taken into police custody, interrogated, the public prosecutor’s office is notified and then any necessary legal process follows.[41]
[40] DFAT 2025 Report at [5.25] –[5.29].
[41] UKHO PKK Report page 14-15.
The Court has stated that a ‘real chance’ of harm means something that is more than remote, insubstantial, or a far-fetched possibility.[42] However, a person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of it occurring is well below 50 percent.[43] In Chan v MIEA[44] the Court held that an applicant for refugee status may have a well-founded fear of persecution even though there is only a 10 per cent chance that he will be persecuted.[45]
[42] Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379; MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559.
[43] Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379; MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559.
[44] (1989) 169 CLR 37.
[45] Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 429.
In this case, I have accepted above that the applicant holds political views against the current government, she has Kurdish friends, she has been detained and questioned by authorities on several occasions in the past, including for her direct participation in political activism, and her imputed association with both the Gulen movement and the PKK, and that her thesis was confiscated by the authorities from her parents’ home. I also accept she has resided abroad since 2018.
Having regard to the country information before me, and considering her cumulative profile, I find there is a real chance that on her arrival into Türkiye she will be of interest to the authorities and that she will be questioned about her past activities, her relationship with [Mr A] and her time in Australia. I accept there is a real chance she will be imputed to support the PKK, and/or the Gulenist movement. I also accept there is a real chance that she will be taken into police custody for further investigation and that during this process she will face mistreatment amounting to serious harm, including being beaten.
Even if she is not identified on arrival into the country, given her past activism, and her clear interest in the current political environment in Türkiye, I find that she will continue to be politically active on return and will attend demonstrations against the authorities. I find that she faces a real chance of treatment amounting to serious harm during the protests, including violence perpetrated by security forces against demonstrators. I also find there is a real chance she will be arrested, detained, and questioned about her past activities. I find that these is a real chance that she will face significant physical ill-treatment during that process.
On the totality of the evidence before me, I find that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm on return to Türkiye now or in the reasonably foreseeable future for the essential and significant reason of her actual or imputed political opinion. I find the harm arises from the state, that it is systematic and discriminatory, and that the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the country. I find that effective protection is not available to the applicant for the harm she fears.
I find that it would not be reasonable for the applicant to modify her behaviour, as to do so conflicts with a characteristic fundamental to her conscience, and requires her to conceal an immutable characteristic, and to alter or conceal her political beliefs. These are impermissible modifications for s 5J(3) of the Act and I find this provision does not apply.
I find the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution on return to Venezuela.
The applicant has raised other credible claims pertaining to her [Nationality 1/Nationality 2] heritage, her [relative 1]’s past political activities and her religious conversion. However, given my findings above, I do not need to reach a concluded view on these matters.
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).
DECISION

The Tribunal sets aside and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
Date of hearing:  17 April 2025
Representative:  Ms Gabriella Claudia Lauricella
ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
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cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
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degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
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5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
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5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
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36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
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(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
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