2114819 (Refugee) - [2024] ARTA 948

2114819 (Refugee) [2024] ARTA 948 (28 October 2024)
DECISION AND
REASONS FOR DECISION
Representative:  Ms Shivya Nath
Respondent:  Minister for Home Affairs

Tribunal Number: 2114819

Country of Reference: Bahrain
Tribunal:Deputy President S Roushan
Date:28 October 2024

Place:Sydney
Decision:The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant meets the following criterion:
·s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 28 October 2024 at 1:16pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Bahrain – political opinion – opposition to the government – Al-Wefaq Party supporter – social media activist – detention – fear of killing – fear of torture – return visits to Bahrain – political activities in Australia – decision under review remitted
LEGISLATION
Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and transitional Provisions No1) Act 2024
Migration Act 1958, ss 5(1), 5H, 5J – 5LA, 36, 65, 367, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF REASONS
BACKGROUND

The applicant is [age] years old. He is a national of Bahrain. He arrived in Australia [in] October 2011 on a [Student] visa granted on 31 August 2011. Between November 2012 and February 2015, he travelled to Bahrain on three separate occasions, departing Australia [in] November 2012, [November] 2013 and [November] 2014. On each occasion, he remained in Bahrain for a period of 12 to 16 weeks.
On 16 March 2016, the applicant applied for a Protection visa. That application was refused on 22 October 2021 by a delegate for the Minister of Home Affairs under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicant applied for a review of the delegate’s decision to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).
On 14 October 2024, the AAT became the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). Under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (the Transitional Act), applications for review to the AAT that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are taken to be an application for review to the Tribunal. The Transitional Act gives the Tribunal the authority to continue and finalise any aspect of the review not already completed by the AAT.
This decision and statement of reasons is a review of the delegate’s decision by the Tribunal.
CLAIMS AND EVIDNECE
Evidence before the Department
Protection visa application
According to his Protection visa application, the applicant was born in [Town 1], Manama, Bahrain. He is Shi'a Muslim. He completed his schooling in Bahrain and obtained a [Qualification 1] from [University 1] in 2016. His parents and [siblings] continue to reside in Bahrain.
In response to questions in relation to his reasons for claiming protection in Australia, the applicant provided the following information.
The situation in Bahrain was always uncertain and people were being ‘prosecuted’ for their political opinion, religion, and race. There are no human rights and freedom of speech, the government acts with impunity to oppress the population and everyone feels unsafe and fearful. Many have died as a result of torture and mistreatment by the authorities. He will be ‘prosecuted and tortured by the regime’ and has had ‘many terrifying experiences’ in the past. He and his friends were arrested at a checkpoint and were accused of working for Iran after a [specified item] was discovered in their car. His father was able to secure his release, but his name ‘is recorded with the authorities’ and he is at risk of being arrested again. He was told to ‘stay away from their sight’ and eventually was able to return to Australia after his study break. A year later, he travelled back to Bahrain, and again witnessed the arrest and mistreatment of citizens by the authorities. He then returned to Australia ‘after spending a difficult time’. He is fearful of being ‘stopped, questioned, and insulted in the airport’, and being ‘prosecuted, tortured, or killed’ if he were to go back to Bahrain. He is also fearful of putting his family’s safety at risk of harm.
In support of his Protection visa application, the applicant submitted to the Department a detailed statement in English. Aspects of the statements appeared to exhibit linguistic features typical of machine translated text, including awkward phrasing and literal translation. The following is a summary of the applicant’s claims gleaned from the statement.
He was raised in a Shi’a family in Manama. His father was unable to secure ‘a decent job’ in Bahrain so he went overseas to work with a [company] in order to support the family.
On 14 February 2011, the applicant participated in the anti-government demonstrations. The demonstrations, which had started peacefully, were followed by ‘sit-ins [in] [two locations in] Bahrain’. The situation changed following the death of Ali Mushaima when thousands of people marched towards the Pearl Roundabout in Manama. They set up tents at the Roundabout, demanding ‘justice and political reforms’.
In the early hours of 17 February 2011, the encampment was attacked by ‘mercenaries’, who used live ammunition and gas canisters on the demonstrators. The applicant witnessed many being killed and decided to ‘retreat’ with others, but they were again confronted by a ‘brigade of mercenaries’. He and his friends were chased by a car occupied by the ‘military forces’. One of his companions was arrested, but the applicant managed to hide in a building and was picked up by his father a few hours later.
As a supporter of the Al-Wefaq Party and ‘a frontier of this movement’, he continued to participate in marches and demonstrations until 13 March 2011, when the Bahraini and Saudi armed forces attacked the demonstrators in Pearl Roundabout. The confrontation resulted in many demonstrators sustaining injuries, including one of his friends. The applicant and others subsequently went to [a location] to assist student demonstrators at that location, but they were prevented from entering the [location] and one of his relatives was injured during the confrontation. That evening, they received news that regime ‘thugs’ were attacking various neighbourhoods, so he decided to go to [a named] neighbourhood where clashes took place, with many sustaining ‘serious injuries’. He also participated in another demonstration in Pearl Roundabout where he and others were injured in confrontations with the police. That night, he found himself trapped in an area turned into a ‘warzone’ by military forces. A friend offered him refuge, and on the following day, they navigated through checkpoints to reach Bahrain Airport, helping another friend flee the country. Returning to his neighbourhood in Manama, he witnessed police attacks and the arrest of others.
The government subsequently imposed a ‘national safety curfew’, which was lifted on 11 June 2011 and demonstrations resumed. He joined the peaceful protests and participated in ‘sit-ins’ organised by the Al-Wefaq, where he volunteered as a ‘regulator’. For ‘months’ he participated in these pro-democracy protests, attended the funerals of ‘martyrs’ and narrowly escaped prosecution ‘several times’. Many of his friends were arrested, and he began receiving ‘threatening messages’ on social media due to his online activities and his familial relationship with [Mr A], a known ‘political opponent’ of the regime, who had been arrested multiple times and [‘exiled’]. [Deleted].
His affiliation with the Al-Wefaq and his participation in peaceful demonstrations, where he was often photographed holding a large flag, impacted his ‘reputation’ in society. Despite the adverse attention, he remained committed to calling for reforms as a peaceful demonstrator.
After graduating from high school, his family decided he should study abroad in Australia. He arrived in Australia [in] October 2011, but nearly a year later, he reluctantly decided to visit his family in Bahrain. Upon returning to Bahrain, he ‘could not stand idly by and not participate in marches.’ On one occasion, he and his friend were arrested at a checkpoint after officers found [an item] of Bahrain in their car. The authorities ‘fabricated’ charges against them, accusing them of working for Iran and attempting to destabilise security. His brother was informed of his arrest, and his father was able to secure his release on the condition of a ‘pledge’. He lived in constant fear of arrest, as his name was ‘recorded’ with the authorities, making him the ‘first suspect accused’ for any incident. After his holiday, he returned to Australia.
A year later, he again visited Bahrain, only to witness the authorities arresting and killing citizens. He then returned to Australia after enduring ‘a difficult time’. His studies in Australia were affected by the news of his friends’ arrests and the deaths of many people he knew. Upon hearing of the ‘martyrdom’ of a relative, he felt compelled to return to Bahrain, despite his father’s strong objections. His return was a ‘shock’ to his family and friends, who were ‘almost certain’ the authorities wanted to arrest him. He was able to pass through the airport safely and spent nearly three months working with his brother in a [business 1]. He tried to distance himself from political activities, surprising his friends, especially after one of his closest friends was arrested.
One day, after returning home from work, he was approached by officers from Bahraini ‘central intelligence’, who informed him that he was wanted by the authorities. They interrogated him, attempting to link him to political activities and threatened him and his family with serious consequences if he did not confess. Despite the intimidation, he insisted that he was no longer politically active and was simply on a study holiday while [working]. He was eventually released and decided to leave Bahrain and return to Australia as soon as possible. He feels safe in Australia and has decided to seek protection from the threats he faced in Bahrain.
Supporting evidence
In support of his claims, the applicant submitted a letter from [Mr B], Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), dated [in] March 2016. [Mr B] stated:
The Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy is a UK-based non-profit organisation focusing on advocacy, education and awareness for the calls for democracy and human rights in Bahrain. It works with international NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to promote the implementation of human rights and effective accountability in Bahrain, while also providing support to victims of human rights abuses and documenting abuses in Bahrain.
Recent research conducted by BIRD has concluded that individuals in Bahrain that have taken part in any form of dissent including through public protest or social media are at risk of arbitrary detention. Furthermore, based on our casework, BIRD considers that there is a significant risk that anyone returned to Bahrain to face criminal charges relating to dissent will not face a fair trial and will be subjected to torture or other forms of ill and degrading treatment or punishment.
According to information received, since 2015, [the applicant] has been actively campaigning against [details deleted]. He has been assisting a torture victim in Australia [details deleted]. BIRD has moreover received documentation, including photographic evidence, suggesting that [the applicant] has been involved in peaceful anti-government protests in Bahrain. BIRD considers all individuals whom have taken part in this campaign, and in protests, are at risk of reprisals in Bahrain, specifically ill treatment and torture.
In light of this, I have concluded that it is of the utmost importance that [the applicant's] application for asylum be urgently granted and that he receives all the support and care possible for his effective rehabilitation.
The interview
The applicant attended a telephone interview with the Department on 19 January 2021.
At the interview, the applicant expanded upon his written claims and advanced new ones, including being associated with and having supported [Mr C, a Bahraini activist] [details deleted]. He also claimed that the last time he exited Bahrain, a stamp was put in his passport saying that he had to report to a police station within three months. These claims and, where relevant, other aspects of the applicant’s oral evidence at the interview are referred to in the analysis further below.
On 9 March 2021, the applicant submitted to the Department a video clip (without sound) [featuring] [Mr C], [the applicant and others]. In the short clip, the applicant appears to be speaking to the others present.
The applicant also submitted to the Department a letter from [a] marriage celebrant and religious scholar from Victoria, stating that the applicant is a Shi'a Muslim and attends Shi'a religious activities.
The delegate’s decision
The delegate found that the applicant ‘may have spontaneously attended some protests’ in Bahrain in 2011. However, on the basis of the applicant’s inability to recall certain specific details, he considered that the applicant had exaggerated the extent of his protest activity and was not satisfied that he could be regarded as a political activist. The delegate also placed weight on the applicant’s return trips to Bahrain, including his ability to enter and exit Bahrain on multiple occasions since 2011 without encountering any difficulties, and his delay in lodging his Protection visa application in finding that the applicant did not genuinely fear being harmed in Bahrain for the reasons claimed. The delegate further noted that the applicant had provided no information to substantiate his close connection to [Mr C] and did not accept his claim that he would be harmed in Bahrain due to this connection. The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant is a refugee as defined by s 5H(1) of the Act. The delegate was also not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed to Bahrain, there is a real risk they will suffer significant harm under s 36(2A) of the Act. The delegate found that the applicant is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations.
Evidence before the Tribunal
On 22 October 2021, the applicant applied for a review of the delegate’s decision to the Tribunal.
On 9 August 2024, the applicant appointed Ms Shivya Nath as his representative.
Pre-hearing submissions
On 13 August 2024, Ms Nath made submissions and provided the following documents in support of the review application:
a.Statutory Declaration, declared by the applicant on 13 August 2024;
b.Letter of support from [Mr D];
c.Letter of support from [Mr C];
d.Letter of support from [NGO 2];
e.Screenshot of an email from the applicant’s uncle;
f.Photographs depicting the applicant attending a protest and holding up the Bahraini flag and photographs of the applicant together with [Mr C].
In his Statutory Declaration, the applicant reiterated the claims he had previously put forward and provided additional information in relation to his participation in protest activities in Bahrain. He also introduced the following new claims.
He was inspired by the ideas of the leader of AI-Wefaq, Mr Isa Qassim, and joined Al-Wefaq in 2009. He was [age] years old at the time of the 14 February Revolution and was allowed to become ‘a working member of the AI-Wefaq Party in the [named] Department’. His role during this time was ‘to [share information] about the persecution of people in Bahrain at the hands of the government’. The Revolution ‘was an extremely significant event for him’ and ‘the catalyst of [his] political activism’.
As the demonstrations continued in 2011, he and his [relatives] ‘created a secret group through our [messaging service]’ to communicate with each other. However, this network grew and became a network through which they organised protests in the villages and started to create anti-government media content.
During one of his return trips to Bahrain in November 2013, he ‘assisted with organising protesting through [his] political network in the villages’. In the following year when he again returned to Bahrain to visit his family, his ‘best friend’, [named], was arrested. The applicant was subsequently ‘questioned for hours’ by officers from the ‘central intelligence agency’ in relation to his ‘involvement’ with his friend’s arrest. He was told that his friend had given them his name and that he was suspected of being a part of the anti-government movement.
In 2015, the applicant’s political network was ‘exposed’ after one of its members was arrested and tortured. He was subsequently informed by his uncle that his [relatives] who were all members of the same network had been arrested and had disclosed details about the network and the applicant’s name under the duress of torture. As he knew he would not be safe in Bahrain, he made enquiries with other Bahrainis in Australia about making a protection visa application, but he was advised not to lodge his application before the expiry of his student visa.
The hearing
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 14 August 2024 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal also received oral evidence from [Mr E] and [Mr C]. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic and English languages. The representative also attended the Tribunal hearing. The relevant aspects of the applicant’s evidence were referred to in the reasons below.
On 28 August 2024, Ms Nath made further submissions and provided the following documents in support of her submission:
a.    A further letter of support from [Mr D] dated 26 August 2024;
b.    Screenshot of the applicant’s [social media] posts, including posts featuring the Al-Wefaq symbol;
c.     Screenshots of the applicant’s [messages] dated [in] June 2012;
d.    Photograph of the applicant with Mr Qassim of the Al-Wefaq party;
e.    Images of anti-government posters created by the applicant;
f.   Screenshot of the applicant’s [Database] profile, [details deleted];
g.    Photograph of the applicant together with [name] and [Mr C];
h.    Photograph of the applicant together with [name] [Mr C];
i.   A Sydney Morning Herald article titled ‘Warnings of abuse of Australian surveillance tech in police state Bahrain’.
In her covering submission, Ms Nath addressed the credibility concerns raised by the Tribunal at the hearing, particularly in relation to claims not previously disclosed by the applicant in his Protection visa application and the applicant’s claimed activities in Australia.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Criteria for a protection visa
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b) or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).

Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
Analysis, reasons and findings
The applicant claims to fear harm in Bahrain as a consequence of his participation in anti-government protests between 2011 and 2014 and his related political activities in Australia.
The 2011 uprising in Bahrain was part of the broader wave of protests known as the Arab Spring, which swept across the Middle East and North Africa. The Bahraini uprising began on 14 February 2011, when tens of thousands of demonstrators, mostly Shi'a Muslims, took to the streets to demand political reforms, greater freedoms, and an end to the ruling Al Khalifa family's grip on power.[1]
[1] Human Rights Watch (HRW), Bahrain: Stop Attacks on Peaceful Protesters, 15 February 2011, Bahrain: Stop Attacks on Peaceful Protesters | Human Rights Watch (hrw.org); HRW, Targets of Retribution: Attacks against Medics, Injured Protesters, and Health Facilities, 18 July 2011, Targets of Retribution: Attacks against Medics, Injured Protesters, and Health Facilities | HRW.
The causes of the uprising were multifaceted. The Bahraini people, particularly the Shi’a majority, had long faced institutionalised discrimination, economic hardships, and political repression. The government's slow pace of democratisation, widespread corruption, and high unemployment rates further fuelled discontent. Additionally, the Bahraini government's close ties with Saudi Arabia and the influence of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) played a significant role in shaping the political landscape.[2]
[2] See Aya Majzoub, Nine Years After Bahrain’s Uprising, Its Human Rights Crisis Has Only Worsened, HRW, 25 February 2020, Nine Years After Bahrain’s Uprising, Its Human Rights Crisis Has Only Worsened | Human Rights Watch (hrw.org); Isabel Debre, A decade after 2011 protests, Bahrain suppresses all dissent, Star Tribune, 12 February 2021,
The protests initially focused on the Pearl Roundabout in the capital, Manama, where demonstrators set up a camp reminiscent of Cairo's Tahrir Square. The Bahraini government's response was swift and brutal. Security forces used tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition to disperse the crowds, resulting in numerous casualties.[3] The situation escalated when the GCC, led by Saudi Arabia, sent troops to Bahrain to support the government's crackdown.[4]
[3] BBC, Bahrain protests: Police break up Pearl Square crowd, 17 February 2011,
[4] Targets of Retribution, n1, above.
The consequences of the uprising were profound. The Bahraini government declared a state of emergency and launched a widespread campaign of repression against protesters and dissidents. Thousands of people were arrested, including prominent opposition leaders, human rights activists, and journalists. Many were subjected to torture and ill-treatment while in custody. The government also dismissed hundreds of public sector employees suspected of supporting the protests.[5]
[5] See Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 23 November 2011, Targets of Retribution, n1, above; and HRW, No Justice in Bahrain: Unfair Trials in Military and Civilian Courts, 28 February 2012,
In response to international pressure, the Bahraini government established the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) to investigate the events of 2011. The BICI report, released in November 2011, confirmed the use of excessive force by security forces and documented numerous human rights abuses.[6]
[6] BICI, ibid.
The applicant has provided consistent evidence throughout the process regarding his participation in the anti-government protests in Bahrain since they erupted in February 2011. The delegate accepted that the applicant had ‘spontaneously attended some protests’ in 2011 but found that he had exaggerated the extent of his protest activity, ‘given his inability to recall key events and key details of his claimed involvement’. Having considered the totality of the applicant’s evidence, I do not share the delegate’s views in this regard. The delegate’s assessment appears to have been based on the applicant’s oral evidence at the interview. The interview was conducted in January 2021, some 10 years after the 2011 demonstrations. Apart from the problematic nature of interview, which I have discussed below, it would be unreasonable to expect the applicant to recall the minutiae of the events that had taken place a decade earlier. I am prepared to accept that, as a young Shi’a Muslim, the applicant had actively and deliberately participated in numerous anti-government protests in 2011 and, occasionally, during his return trips to Bahrain. I find the applicant’s participation in these protests was genuinely motivated by his opposition to the government of Bahrain and the ruling monarchy.
Nevertheless, the applicant introduced a number of new claims before the Tribunal that raised concerns in my mind in relation to their reliability. These claims related to his role in the demonstrations, the extent of his activities between 2011 and 2014 and their consequences.
As ‘new’ claims are identified as such when compared to claims originally raised or not raised before the primary decision was made, it is necessary to consider the circumstances in which the applicant had provided his evidence at each stage prior to the primary decision being made.
The applicant was unrepresented when he lodged his Protection visa application. The statement provided by him in support of his application was long and detailed. However, based on style, syntax and the expressions used it was evident to me that the author did not have a strong command of the English language and had relied, at least partly, on machine translation tools. The claims were presented in a free-flowing narrative of past events and without a real understanding of the applicable legal criteria or the nature of the information required to support the claims made. I accept the applicant’s evidence at the hearing that he had presented his ‘story’ in general terms and had not put forward all of the information required.
The applicant was provided with the opportunity to expand upon his claims and present more details at the departmental interview. The interview, however, was conducted by telephone and despite the presence of an Arabic interpreter, the interview was primarily conducted in English. It was clear from the audio recording of the interview that the applicant had either misunderstood questions asked by the delegate, or he had struggled to meaningfully articulate his responses to the questions asked.
I am of the view that these circumstances form the bases of reasonable explanations for why the applicant had not disclosed his claims in full in his Protection visa application or had raised new claims at the review stage. I am, therefore, not inclined to draw an adverse inference unfavourable to the credibility of his claims.[7]
[7] See s 367A of the Act.
I have, however, formed the view that the applicant has exaggerated aspects of his claims. For example, in his Statutory Declaration of 13 August 2024, the applicant claimed that he was allowed to become ‘a working member of the AI-Wefaq Party in the [named] Department’. His role during this time was ‘to [share information] about the persecution of people in Bahrain at the hands of the government’. While I am prepared to accept that the applicant aligned himself with and strongly supported Al-Wefaq and prepared pamphlets and posters to carry and distribute during the protests, he was never formally ‘a working member’ of AI-Wefaq assigned to its ‘[named] Department’. I also accept that the applicant was part of a [messaging service] group chat, which also included his [relatives] and some close friends, to enable them to communicate with each other and share other content during the uprising. However, I do not accept his evidence that this group chat evolved to become a ‘network’ through which he and his [relatives] ‘organised’ protests and promoted anti-government activities. These claims were unsubstantiated, and I did not find the applicant’s evidence in this regard at the hearing to be persuasive.
I have found that the applicant had actively participated in numerous anti-government protests in 2011, and occasionally during his return trips to Bahrain. I accept that the applicant was stopped and interrogated by the authorities at checkpoints on two separate occasions in 2011 and 2012. However, I reject his claim in his written statement to the Department that, as a consequence of being interrogated on those occasions, his name was ‘recorded’ with the authorities, making him the ‘first suspect accused’ for any incident. I find that he did not have a significant adverse political profile and was not considered to be a prominent target as evidenced by his ability to enter and exit Bahrain without incident on three separate occasions between 2011 and 2014. I am prepared to accept his evidence that he was interrogated by undercover intelligence officers during his last visit to Bahrain in November 2014 after his friend was arrested. As submitted by Ms Nath in her prehearing submission, the applicant was interrogated on this occasion so that it could be determined ‘whether he had any involvement with his friend’s crime’. Although his passport was subsequently stamped, requiring him to report ‘to the nearest public security centre within three months’, he was not arrested or detained and was able to depart Bahrain in February 2015 without further incident.
However, consistent with the country information before me (outlined further below), I accept that the continual crackdown of the authorities and suppression of dissent over the years has resulted in arrest and interrogation of thousands of Bahraini nationals suspected of involvement in anti-government activities, including the applicant’s friends and relatives in the period after the applicant’s last visit to Bahrain. I consider it likely that these arrests might have resulted in the disclosure of the applicant’s name and details as a dissident to the authorities under duress and mistreatment, giving him more prominence. However, as I have found that the applicant has exaggerated his claims to have been part of a ‘network’ responsible for organising protests, I do not accept that any information disclosed to the authorities by friends or relatives in relation to him concerned this claimed network or his alleged connection to it.
I accept that the applicant has consistently opposed the Bahraini government and ruling monarchy and has continued expressing his dissenting views in Australia since his last visit to Bahrain in 2014. In reaching this view, I have placed weight on the 2016 letter of support from BIRD, stating that, since 2015, the applicant has been ‘actively campaigning against [details deleted] [and] has been assisting a torture victim in Australia [in] this regard’.
I also have ample persuasive evidence before me to support the claim that the applicant has always been a friend of and closely associated with [Mr C], a [Bahraini activist]. This evidence included sworn testimony by [Mr C] at the hearing. I accept that the applicant was instrumental in persuading [Mr C] to seek refuge in Australia after he had fallen foul of the ruling authorities in Bahrain for his dissident views. I accept that [details deleted], the applicant was closely involved in a public high-profile campaign to [support Mr C]. I accept [Mr C’s] evidence at the hearing that the applicant had subsequently [supported Mr C]. This involvement is further evidenced by letters of support from [name], [a leader from NGO 2] and [Mr D], and oral testimony of [Mr E], [another leader from NGO 2], at the hearing.
In addition, I accept the applicant’s claims, supported by [Mr C’s] testimony and photographs submitted following the hearing, that he hosts or participates in regular monthly meetings with other Bahraini expatriates and dissidents to discuss the state of politics in Bahrain, and contributes to opposition forums and support for [NGO 2].
The sources I have consulted indicate that since 2011, the Bahraini authorities have continued to suppress dissent and curtail freedoms.[8] The government has maintained a zero-tolerance policy towards political opposition, imprisoning, exiling, or silencing anyone who criticises the regime. The authorities have targeted not only Shi’a political groups and religious leaders, but also human rights activists, journalists and online opponents. Mass trials have become commonplace and political parties have been dismantled.[9] Many opposition leaders and activists remain imprisoned under harsh conditions. Prominent figures such as Hassan Mushaima, Abdulwahab Hussain, and Abdulhadi al-Khawaja are serving life sentences following trials that have been widely criticised as unfair. Reports indicate that these individuals, along with others, have been subjected to torture and denial of medical care while in custody.[10] The Bahraini government has failed to hold officials accountable for these abuses, perpetuating a culture of impunity.[11]
[8] Nine Years After Bahrain’s Uprising, n2, above.
[9] Isabel Debre, n2, above.
[10] Amnesty International, Bahrain: ‘No one can protect you’: Bahrain’s year of crushing dissent, 7 September 2017, HRW, You Can’t Call Bahrain a Democracy, 31 October 2022, HRW, World Report 2024: Bahrain, World Report 2024 | Human Rights Watch (hrw.org).
[11] US Department of State, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bahrain, April 2024,
The Bahraini government has also implemented legal measures to further isolate political dissidents. The ‘political isolation laws’ enacted in 2018 prevent former opposition members from participating in political activities, effectively silencing dissenting voices. These laws also extend to former prisoners, who face significant barriers in obtaining necessary documents for employment or education, thereby hindering their reintegration into society.[12] Moreover, the Bahraini authorities have shown a pattern of targeting and harassing critics, both domestically and internationally. Human rights organisations have been denied access to the country, and foreign journalists face significant restrictions. According to the US Department of State, the government limited freedom of expression and press freedom through prosecutions of individuals under libel, slander, and national security laws that targeted both professional and citizen journalists.[13] The government has also employed advanced surveillance technologies to monitor and intimidate activists, further exacerbating the climate of fear and repression.[14] The US Department of State reported:
The law prohibited any speech authorities considered a challenge to public order or accepted morals. While individuals openly expressed critical opinions regarding domestic political and social matters in private settings, those who shared such opinions publicly, including in traditional or social media, could face questioning. The Ministry of Interior acted on complaints from individuals or groups about certain posts and brought “offenders” in for questioning. Depending on the complaint, investigation, and assessed violation of the law, individuals were released without charge or charged and tried. The penal code allowed penalties of no less than one year and no more than seven years of imprisonment, plus a fine, for anyone who “offends the monarch of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the flag, or the national emblem.” According to an October Freedom House report, in 2022 at least 41 activists and journalists were arrested, detained, interrogated, or prosecuted for speech-related matters, including their online activity.[15]
[12] HRW World Report 2024, n10, above.
[13] US Department of State, n 11, above.
[14] HRW World Report 2024, n10, above: Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2023/24: Bahrain, Human rights in Bahrain Amnesty International.
[15] US Department of State, n 11, above.
Despite some recent gestures by the government, such as the release of certain prisoners, these actions have been largely symbolic and have not addressed the underlying issues of political repression and human rights abuses. The releases often exclude prominent opposition figures, and those released continue to face restrictions on their freedoms and rights.[16]
[16] Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain, Restricted Freedom … The Bahraini Government’s failure to Implement Transitional Justice for Released Individuals, 1 July 2024,
In a comprehensive report, titled “You Can’t Call Bahrain a Democracy: Bahrain’s Political Isolation Laws”, Human Rights Watch offered an in-depth analysis of Bahrain’s political isolation laws introduced in 2018, which explicitly prohibit individuals who had been members of dissolved political parties from running for election. This legislative change was part of a broader strategy to suppress political opposition in Bahrain. Specifically, the law targets those who were involved with political groups that the government had previously dissolved on charges of posing a threat to national security. These dissolved groups include major opposition parties such as Al-Wefaq and Wa’ad, which were dismantled by the Bahraini authorities in 2016 and 2017, respectively. The law not only prevents former members of these groups from standing for election but also bars them from participating in broader aspects of political life, including holding leadership positions in civil society organisations.[17] The report stated:
The 2018 political isolation laws explicitly target members of previously dissolved political groups, as well as former convicts – even if pardoned or convicted on abusive speech or assembly related charges – and even those previously deemed to have “disrupted” constitutional life in Bahrain.[18]
[17] You Can’t Call Bahrain a Democracy, n10, above.
[18] Ibid.

A significant aspect of the political isolation laws is the requirement for candidates seeking public office to obtain a Good Conduct Certificate. This certificate is issued by the Bahraini Ministry of Interior and serves as a clearance of any criminal or political charges. However, the certificate has been used as a tool to further marginalise opposition figures. Individuals who have been detained, even briefly, for political reasons or who have been convicted under Bahrain's broadly defined anti-terrorism laws are typically denied this certificate. This effectively disqualifies them from participating in elections or holding public office. The issuance of Good Conduct Certificates is highly selective and often biased, reflecting the government's intent to exclude specific individuals and groups from political participation.[19]
[19] Ibid.
According to HRW, the political isolation laws, combined with the selective issuance of Good Conduct Certificates, have created an environment where political and civil rights are severely restricted. Former members of opposition groups, government critics, and even individuals who have simply expressed dissenting opinions are systematically excluded from public life. This exclusion extends beyond politics, affecting their social and economic opportunities as well.[20] The report documents several cases where individuals were denied Good Conduct Certificates due to their political past, illustrating the repressive nature of the certification process. The report argues that these laws and practices contribute to a broader strategy by the Bahraini government to maintain control by eliminating any meaningful opposition. This systematic disenfranchisement erodes the prospects for a vibrant civil society and undermines the possibility of free and fair elections in Bahrain.[21]
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
On the basis of the evidence before me, I find that the applicant continues to oppose the government of Bahrain and that he would continue to give expression to his views if he were to return to his country of nationality. I find that he has a political profile, built over many years and as a result of participation in protests in Bahrain and engaging in certain activities in Australia, including his association with and support for [Mr C], that would bring him to the adverse attention of the government of Bahrain. I am satisfied that as a consequence, there is a real chance that the applicant would be subjected to harm, including threats to his life or liberty, significant physical harassment and significant physical ill treatment at the hands of the Bahraini authorities. I am satisfied that such treatment amounts to serious harm under s 5J(4)(b) of the Act. I find that the essential and significant reason for the persecution feared by the applicant is his real or imputed political opinion.
I am satisfied that the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of Bahrain. I am also satisfied that the only reason the applicant would seek to limit or restrict the expression of his views is his fear of harm. Hence, I am satisfied that he could not take reasonable steps to modify his behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution as such modification would be contrary to the requirements of s 5J(3) of the Act. As the applicant’s fear of harm is from the authorities, I find that effective state protection against the harm he fears is not available to him in Bahrain.
For the reasons given above, I find that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Bahrain. I am satisfied that there is no presently existing right, however expressed, for the applicant to enter and reside in any other country. Section 36(3) therefore does not apply. I am, therefore, satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).
DECISION
The Tribunal sets aside and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
Date of hearing:  14 August 2024
Representative for the Applicant: Ms Shivya Nath
ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…
5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…
36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…