2113875 (Refugee)
[2024] AATA 3112
•25 March 2024
2113875 (Refugee) [2024] AATA 3112 (25 March 2024)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW: Application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection XA subclass 866 Visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’)
APPLICANT’S REPRESENTATIVE: Unrepresented
CASE NUMBER: 2113875
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Uzbekistan
MEMBER:Kate Chapple
DATE:25 March 2024
PLACE OF DECISION: Brisbane
DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
Statement made on 25 March 2024 at 1:13pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – Protection Visa – Uzbekistan – race – Russian ethnicity – her advanced age – loss of her Uzbekistan pension entitlement – membership of the particular social group – a failed asylum seeker returning to Uzbekistan – adverse attention of the Uzbekistan authorities would amount to serious and targeted harm – decision under review remitted
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5, 36, 65, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL
Protection visa application
Protection visa application lodged 18 October 2018 setting out the following claims (spelling and grammatical errors not corrected):
1.1.[reason applicant left Uzbekistan] Uzbekistan was always dangerous since foil of USSR and became increasingly worse since approx. 1994. The written language eventually changed to Latin from Cyrillic for example. Many Russians who could afford to left, environment became hostile to all Russians. To give an example of how dangerous Uzbekistan can be, I was always afraid for the safety of my own daughter [as] many Russian girls were raped, even by officials. They would be taken to the police station for example overnight under the accuse of "vagrancy" for just being out for a night of leisure and there they would take advantage of the girls. I had a person I knew of the equivalent of the FBI in our hometown to call on should something have happened to my daughter. Even when still engaged to her husband [name], a police commissioner asked my daughter to go sit with him because in his eyes, she was like a prostitute because not with a local but instead a foreigner. As a lone lady, I had already moved out of Uzbekistan and had permanent residence in [Country 1] since 2000 with the help of my Daughter and Son in Law. The fact I wanted to escape Uzbekistan forever can be also demonstrated through the fact my son in law always wanted to have me move to Australia permanently. First contributory visa went smoothly, things were going very well for them with a house in mortgage and plenty of work here. Then the market turndown, his unemployment and his semi-bankruptcy caused him to not have the money to pay the second part of the visa. This is the only reason why we are in this situation, requesting this visa. Our passport shows Uzbekistan citizen in English, in Cyrillic, it states we are "RUS", the discrimination is there on our own documents.
1.2.[what applicant thinks will happen to her if she returns to Uzbekistan] If I were to return to Uzbekistan, being all old lady of [age]. knowing I am the mother of a "wealthy' now foreigner daughter, I would be taken advantage of for sure by the authorities under form of constant bribes, not to mention the ill-intentioned locals who would surely consider me an easy target. I am safe here in Australia with my Daughter and Son in Law. I have also attached some information found on the Internet to demonstrate the situation in Uzbekistan, which is a corrupt police state and a dictatorship. People who we, my Daughter and I, have been in contact with in Uzbekistan have confirmed the country has become very dangerous for Russian nationals.
1.3.[harm experienced by applicant in Uzbekistan] The night of my daughter in law’s engagement, we were walking home, several of us, including my daughter, husband to be and a few other friends, when we were approached and attacked by locals because they demanded my daughter give them my Daughters flowers she'd received at the party earlier, she refused due to how aggressively she was asked; this is an example of how easy it is to get in to trouble with Uzbeks, any excuse to fight and cause trouble. Luckily nothing more than a few scratches and bruises on all of us, but it could have been a lot worse as others were coming, a mob was forming. I ran to the nearby SNB base, similar to FBI, and banged on the front door. Luckily a few officers in uniform came out and dispersed the small crowd that was already gathering. Again, any excuse to resort to violence, especially when Russians are involved in smaller numbers or weaker, as in if I were there alone at my age. The above experience was the tipping point for me, it had never happened before, and I decided to leave once and for all. I've heard through my daughter's friends still there., it's only gotten worse.
1.4.[help sought by applicant in Uzbekistan] Only knocked on SNB base door at the time when it happened. They dispersed the group but made no arrests. They don't usually when it's Uzbek on Russian.
1.5.[reason applicant didn’t relocate within Uzbekistan] There is no safe place in Uzbekistan for Russian people like me. Uzbekistan nationals of Uzbek origin come first, hence why I moved to [Country 1] as mentioned above, to definitively leave the country once and for all.
1.6.[reason applicant thinks she’ll be harmed or mistreated if she returns to Uzbekistan] As mentioned above, being a [age]-year-old lady and alone, of course I would be an easy target and they would surely come to know I am a foreigner's mother, now that my daughter is Australian. They would demand bribe money surely and of course harm me if I do not pay them for protection. Could be anybody, even a member of the police force, you never know.
1.7.[reason applicant thinks Uzbekistan authorities won’t protect her] The police are not particularly interested in Russian people in Uzbekistan as mentioned above. They survive thanks to bribes being paid to them seeing their salaries are very low. There are simply not enough of them to guarantee safety and security, especially at night.
1.8.[reason applicant thinks she would not be able to relocate to an area in Uzbekistan where she would not be harmed] As mentioned above, there are no safe areas, apart if I could afford to live in very rich and exclusive complexes with security guards. which I cannot. On my son in law’s advice, I also sold my house in [Country 1] before coming to Australia, cancelling my permanent residency there, I cannot go back to [Country 1] anymore now. We really didn't imagine he would go semi-bankrupt.
The following online articles:
2.1.Uzbekistan’s Forced Labor problem – Cotton campaign (Harvest 10.11.2018)
2.2.The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: An Evolving Threat (RadioFreeEurope Radio Liberty 31 May 2014)
2.3.Scholars Warn of Danger of Radical Islam in Uzbekistan (RadioFreeEurope Radio Liberty 29 July 2003)
2.4.Victims in Uzbekistan raise awareness about female trafficking dangers (Refworld 19 August 2003)
2.5.Smartraveller.com advice – Uzbekistan (DFAT 22 June 2018)
Decision record dated 21 September 2021 relating to the delegate’s refusal decision.
Departmental audio file relating to the interview with the applicant.
Departmental case file relating to the applicant.
Application for review
Application for review lodged 10 October 2021.
Statement by applicant (undated; submitted 19 October 2021).
Statement by applicant’s son-in-law (undated; submitted 11 October 2021).
The Tribunal wrote to the applicant inviting her to attend a hearing on 21 March 2024 and to provide pre-hearing submissions.
Prior to the hearing, the applicant provided to the Tribunal confirmation that she intended to participate in the hearing and a request that the Tribunal take witness evidence from her daughter and son-in-law. The applicant did not provide any further documents or submissions.
The Hearing
The applicant and the witnesses appeared before the Tribunal at a hearing conducted in person on 21 March 2024, with the assistance of an interpreter (via video link) in the Russian and English languages. The applicant was unrepresented.
The applicant gave evidence, summarised by the Tribunal as follows:
12.1.The applicant is aged [age], Russian born and speaking. She lived with her now adult children in Qarshi near the Afghanistan border. She has a son born in [year] who at age [age] went to Moscow to attend college and live; he remains in Moscow and she has no contact with him. She has a daughter born in [year] who met her Australian-born husband in Uzbekistan in 1999, went to live in [Country 1] in 2000 and then Australia in 2002, and is an Australian citizen; she is very close to her daughter and son-in-law. The applicant and the father of her children lived together in an unregistered union; he left when the daughter was born.
12.2.Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the declaration of independence of Uzbekistan in 1991, life was beautiful in the applicant’s home city. There were many people from Russia there and many international building projects. Financially, it was very difficult for her as she cared for herself and her two children on a single meagre wage as a [occupation] without any welfare support.
12.3.Following dissolution and independence, for a time there were no noticeable differences to life in Uzbekistan for the applicant. Relationships between Russians and Uzbeks remained good. However, one day in 1996, a union representative approached the applicant and others in the workplace telling them they needed to collect their passports for checking and they would later be returned. Two days later, they were given Uzbekistan passports; they never saw their Russian passports again. The passport indicated on its face that the applicant was a Uzbekistan citizen and Russian. This amounted to a conferral on the applicant of Uzbekistan citizenship and a renouncement of her Russian citizenship, to which she did not consent.
12.4.The applicant became a [Position 1] of a [workplace] and also the [Position 1] of a [centre], which involved travelling to regions of Uzbekistan [doing specified work]. While, officially, she was appointed to these roles, she was told by others in the workplace that a Russian could never hold such positions. The applicant was accused of stealing wages from her colleagues, and although the accountant told the police investigators that she didn’t have access to wages, she was told she should leave or there would be consequences for her. She left and went to work at a [Workplace 1]. The applicant believes, had she remained in the roles, colleagues would have fabricated fraudulent documents to implicate her in wrongdoing. She was alone with no connections, and she didn’t know the Uzbek language; charges would have been laid against her and she would have been jailed. She was also told very clearly that she had a beautiful daughter and Afghanistan was not far away.
12.5.The applicant’s work at the [Workplace 1] was very difficult. She had lost all her friends and life was hard. In around 1999, her daughter was at university and areas of Uzbekistan were undergoing gas exploration. It was then that her daughter met her husband who was working for [a company]. The applicant’s life then changed for the better as she had a male living in the house, she felt protected, and her financial situation improved. She became very close to her son-in-law and regarded him as a son. The three of them went travelling together.
12.6.In 2000, the applicant’s daughter and son-in-law went to live in [Country 1], and the applicant joined them there. She had an apartment [in] Uzbekistan. There was an unofficial regulation that Uzbeks should not buy anything from Russians who were leaving the country, and there was a limit on the amount of money that could be taken out of the country. The applicant managed to sell her apartment for 900 dollars, which she illegally gave to a local who returned the sum to her in Moscow. The applicant left Uzbekistan after 32 years with a single suitcase. She told the authorities that she was going to visit her daughter in [Country 1], but privately never intended to return. She went to the Uzbekistan embassy in [Country 1] and was granted permanent residency. To be granted citizenship, the applicant was only required to express her wish, however she didn’t want to as she considered herself Russian.
12.7.The applicant was paid the Uzbekistan pension for two to three months, however once she left the country, she received nothing. In 2002, she returned to Uzbekistan briefly on two occasions to finalise some matters. She contacted the authorities about her pension and was told that she had lost her entitlement to the pension when she left the country notwithstanding that she is a Uzbekistan citizen, and she should return to [Country 1]. She is aware of many Russian people in a similar situation to her own who ceased receiving a Uzbekistan pension having moved to [Country 1].
12.8.The applicant lived with her daughter and son-in-law in [a city], [Country 1]. There were many Russians there, she had lots of friends, life was comfortable, though it still felt like a foreign country. Her son-in-law bought the apartment they lived in, which was sold when he and her daughter went to live in Australia in 2002. When they left, the applicant bought a studio unit for herself. She received the minimum [Country 1] pension and her daughter and son-in-law helped with all additional financial support.
12.9.The applicant came to Australia in January 2014. Her solitude in [Country 1] was such that she needed to be with her only family. She sold her studio unit and, in doing so, gave up permanent residency status. She came to Australia hoping that she could remain. Her son-in-law looked after the visa issues, and in time arranged for her to apply for a protection visa.
12.10.When asked by the Tribunal about her understanding of the current situation in Uzbekistan, the applicant responded that there is nothing good there; there is a very different attitude to Russians. She has no hope of living there; once she crosses the border, she has no rights or registration, her passport has expired, all her friends have left for different countries. On arrival she would need to live on a reservation for five years with no entitlements, work rights or pension, or ability to buy real estate; she would wait five years before the government decides whether to accept her back as a citizen.
12.11.The applicant loves living in Australia with her family, her daughter, son-in-law, and three grandsons. She also has many friends from all over the world she sees weekly, and she is studying English.
The applicant’s son-in-law gave evidence, speaking to the claims referred to in paragraph 1.3 of this decision record and the issues covered in his statement referred to in paragraph 8 of this decision record.
The applicant’s daughter gave evidence about growing up in Uzbekistan after the Soviet Union fell: the mistreatment of Russian girls, their vulnerability to attack and abuse on the streets, attracting further adverse attention if known to have a foreign partner, and her personal experiences of these things.
Country information
Examples were found of failed asylum seekers who were arrested, tortured and prosecuted on their return to Uzbekistan. Recent human rights reports also indicate that people arriving from abroad are questioned in airports and local police offices. It is reported that the emergence of Islamic State and its global recruitment efforts have increased Uzbekistan’s efforts to combat religious and other forms of extremism[1] with an April 2017 Freedom House report stating that the National Security Service has ‘registered more than 150,000 Uzbeks living abroad under the guise of countering terrorism’.[2] It is worth noting that citizens of the former USSR states reportedly make up the third largest number of foreign fighters in Islamic State.[3] The alleged Islamic State sympathiser accused of the attack in Stockholm in April 2017 was an ethnic Tajik from Uzbekistan whose application for asylum had been rejected; he had reportedly been on a wanted list in Uzbekistan for those suspected of religious extremism.[4]
[1] ‘Uzbek 'Extremists' Blacklisted After Prolonged Absence’, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 27 November 2016.
[2] ‘Nations in Transit 2017 – Uzbekistan’, Freedom House, 3 April 2017.
[3] ‘ISIS and Central Asia: A Shifting Recruiting Strategy’, The Diplomat, 17 May 2016.
[4] ‘Sweden truck attack suspect tried to join Islamic State: source’, Reuters, 12 April 2017.
An April 2017 New York Times article reports on asylum seekers in Sweden, including Uzbekistanis, and states that ‘Six Uzbeks whose asylum applications were rejected in Norway were prosecuted and given long prison sentences when they were returned to Uzbekistan in 2014, according to Memorial, a human rights group.’[5] This incident was documented by the Association for Human Rights in Central Asia (AHRCA) and in newspaper articles.[6] AHRCA reported that the men were featured in a propaganda film shown on Uzbekistani national television in which they ‘were presented as “false witnesses”, “traitors to the Motherland” and “religious extremists”’. They were reportedly tortured while in detention.
[5] ‘Their Asylum Requests Denied, Thousands Stay in Sweden (Some for Years)’, New York Times, The, 28 April 2017.
[6] ‘Uzbekistan: a trial of «traitors of the Motherland» took place’, Association for Human Rights in Central Asia, 24 December 2014; ‘No shelter: The harassment of activists abroad by intelligence services from the former Soviet Union’, The Foreign Policy Centre, 23 November 2016, p.30; ‘Torture and death for Uzbek Muslims in jail’, Al Jazeera, 7 January 2015.
AHRCA states:
6 young men were sentenced to 12-13 years of imprisonment. They were accused of being a member of so called “Islamic movement of Turkistan” which is declared to be a terrorist organisation. They were sentenced under the following Articles of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan: 159 “Attempts to Constitutional Order of Republic of Uzbekistan”, 244-1 “Production and Dissemination of Materials Containing Threat to Public Security and Public Order”, 244-2 “Establishment, Direction of or Participation in Religious Extremist, Separatist, Fundamentalist or Other Banned Organizations”, and 246 “Smuggling”.[7]
[7] ‘Uzbekistan: a trial of «traitors of the Motherland» took place’, Association for Human Rights in Central Asia, 24 December 2014.
The New York Times article also notes that in 2012, the European Court of Human Rights said that involuntary returns to Uzbekistan ‘should be exercised only with extreme caution, given the country’s human rights record.’ The article quotes an asylum lawyer who states: ‘Generally, Uzbeks are extremely scared because they run into problems when they go back to Uzbekistan…It’s considered treason to apply for asylum’.[8]
[8] ‘Their Asylum Requests Denied, Thousands Stay in Sweden (Some for Years)’, New York Times, The, 28 April 2017.
A 2013 European Migration Network query on forced return to Uzbekistan includes EU countries responses to whether failed asylum seeker returnees to Uzbekistan face harm. This query was from the Belgian Immigration Office which states that it ‘was brought to the attention of the Belgian Immigration Office that the Uzbek legislation foresees that people who left the country without permission, overstayed or applied for asylum abroad are subject to imprisonment (up to 5 years) and fines (at least 1000 Euros).’ The response from The Netherlands is quite detailed and notes that the aforementioned legislation relates to illegal exit. The response from The Netherlands also states that they have ‘no clear information’ on the treatment of failed asylum seekers on their return to Uzbekistan.[9]
[9] ‘Ad-Hoc Query on Forced Return to Uzbekistan’, European Migration Network, 18 April 2013.
The latest Freedom House Nations in Transit report states that:
[P]eople arriving from abroad were questioned in airports and local police offices for hours about their trips and lives abroad. Although such practices were already common, they significantly expanded in 2016, including even people who had been outside the country for only a few days. The NSS has named and shamed the parents of some people living abroad to demand their return with threats, such as annulling their citizenship.[10]
[10] ‘Nations in Transit 2017 – Uzbekistan’, Freedom House, 3 April 2017.
A November 2016 Radio Free Europe article also reports that there are a growing number of citizens thought to be living abroad and ‘blacklisted as extremists’. According to a police source, the ‘suspects face immediate arrest on their return’ and ‘police and security services across the country have hundreds of similar lists of suspected members of “religious-extremist organizations.”’ The article reports that the suspects’ family members at home face harassment by security forces.[11]
[11] ‘Uzbek 'Extremists' Blacklisted After Prolonged Absence’, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 27 November 2016.
A November 2016 report by The Foreign Policy Centre (FPC)[12] provides the following details under the heading ‘What happens to those who return to Uzbekistan’:
[12] The Foreign Policy Centre describes itself as a ‘a UK-based, independent, progressive foreign affairs think tank’ (‘About us’, The Foreign Policy Centre).
Since 2012, we have been receiving information that residents of Uzbekistan who stay abroad for more than 3 months are scrutinised by passport control in the airport upon arrival. This has been documented in cases of those returning from a number of countries including Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Turkey and Egypt. This is due to the fact that there are considerable Uzbek diasporas in those countries. In a separate office room in the airport, they are interviewed by an SNB officer who often introduced himself as a counterintelligence department officer. First, he examines their passports and asked them standard questions about why they left to go abroad and what they did there. He also shows them photos of both familiar and unfamiliar persons and asked which of those persons the interviewee communicated with and under which circumstances.[13]
The FPC report details the example of a pregnant woman in 2013 who reportedly was detained at the airport on her return from Sweden. She was interrogated for 11 hours before a relative secured her release. She was unable to get permission to leave the country and she was criminally charged for leaving the country without an exit visa (she claimed that she did not violate the passport regime). She then left the country secretly.[14]
In 2016 Amnesty International released a report on forced returns, including of asylum seekers, to Uzbekistan from Russia. This details the use of torture on forced returnees from Russia.[15]
The Amnesty International 2017 report states that ‘authorities increased pressure on relatives of those suspected or convicted of crimes against the state, including individuals working or seeking protection abroad’. This relates to those nationals who are ‘suspected of criminal activity, or labelled as opponents or a threat to national security’:
The authorities used the threat of bringing charges of membership of a banned Islamist group against a detained relative to prevent families from exposing human rights violations and seeking help from human rights organizations at home and/or abroad.
Local mahalla (neighbourhood) committees continued to collaborate with security forces and local and national authorities in closely monitoring residents of their mahallas for any signs of behaviour or activities considered improper, suspect or illegal. Mahalla committees publicly exposed residents and their families and took punitive action against them.
In February, mahalla members informed the wife of Aramais Avakian that local residents had decided to expel her and her children from their neighbourhood because of the “actions of her terrorist husband” and because she had given interviews to foreign journalists, slandered local officials and brought Uzbekistan into disrepute.[16]
Human rights reports concur that torture is routinely used in Uzbekistan.[17]
[13] ‘No shelter: The harassment of activists abroad by intelligence services from the former Soviet Union’, The Foreign Policy Centre, 23 November 2016, p.32.
[14] ‘No shelter: The harassment of activists abroad by intelligence services from the former Soviet Union’, The Foreign Policy Centre, 23 November 2016, pp.32-33.
[15] Amnesty International Report 2016-2017’, Amnesty International, 23 February 2017, NG2A465F54, pp.391-392; ‘Fast-track to Torture: Abductions and Forcible Returns from Russia to Uzbekistan’, Amnesty International, 21 April 2016.
[16] ‘Amnesty International Report 2016-2017’, Amnesty International, 23 February 2017.
[17] ‘Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Uzbekistan’, US Department of State, 3 March 2017; ‘Fast-track to Torture: Abductions and Forcible Returns from Russia to Uzbekistan’, Amnesty International, 21 April 2016.
Uzbekistani men aged 60 years and women aged 55 years who do not meet the qualifying conditions for the social insurance old-age pension are eligible for the social assistance old-age pension, a benefit of a minimum of 396,500 soms monthly in November 2018[18] (equal to AUD 67.73 at 1 November 2018[19], AUD 49.01 at 1 January 2021)[20]. Health care is generally available to residents of Uzbekistan,[21] who are eligible for medical benefits.[22]
Qualifying conditions for social assistance for old age, disability and being an orphan were stated as: old-age social pension (social assistance, income tested): Age 60 with less than 25 years of covered employment (men) or age 55 with less than 20 years of covered employment (women).
Social assistance benefits were stated as: old-age social pension (social assistance, income tested): 243,300 soms a month is paid (November 2018). [equal to AUD 41.56 at 1 November 2018,[23] AUD 30.07 at 1 January 2021][24] Benefit adjustment: Benefits are adjusted based on changes in the cost of living.[25] The total cost of social assistance was stated to be met by the Government.[26]
The United States (US) Department of State’s most recent annual report on human rights in Uzbekistan, for the year 2019, stated: The government continued to use an estimated 12,000 neighborhood (mahalla) committees ... The committees provided various social support functions, including the distribution of social welfare assistance to the elderly, single parents, or families with many children; intervention in cases of domestic violence; and adjudication of disputes between residents, but they also served as a way to feed information about local community members to the government and law enforcement entities. Mahallas in rural areas tended to be more influential than those in cities.[27]
[18] 'Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Asia and the Pacific, 2018' (SSA Publication No. 13-11802), [United States of America] Social Security Administration, [21] March 2019, pp.23 & 275-280 ‘Uzbekistan’ at pp.275 & 276.
[19] ‘Currency Converter’, Currency I Have: Uzbekistan Som UZS Amount: 396,500 > Currency I Want: Australia Dollar AUD, Date: Nov 1, 2018, OANDA website, ‘Currency Converter’, Currency I Have: Uzbekistan Som UZS Amount: 396,500 > Currency I Want: Australia Dollar AUD, Date: Jan 1, 2021, OANDA website, ‘Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Asia and the Pacific, 2018’ (SSA Publication No. 13-11802), [United States of America] Social Security Administration, [21] March 2019, pp.275-280 ‘Uzbekistan’ at p.278.
[22] ‘Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Asia and the Pacific, 2018’ (SSA Publication No. 13-11802), [United States of America] Social Security Administration, [21] March 2019, pp.275-280 ‘Uzbekistan’ at p.277, 20190403103626.
[23] ‘Currency Converter’, Currency I Have: Uzbekistan Som UZS Amount: 243,300 > Currency I Want: Australia Dollar AUD, Date: Nov 1, 2018, OANDA website,
[24] ‘Currency Converter’, Currency I Have: Uzbekistan Som UZS Amount: 396,500 > Currency I Want: Australia Dollar AUD, Date: Jan 1, 2021, OANDA website, 'Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Asia and the Pacific, 2018' (SSA Publication No. 13-11802), [United States of America] Social Security Administration, [21] March 2019, pp.275-280 ‘Uzbekistan’ at p.276, 20190403103626.
[26] 'Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Asia and the Pacific, 2018' (SSA Publication No. 13-11802), [United States of America] Social Security Administration, [21] March 2019, pp.275-280 ‘Uzbekistan’ at p.275, 20190403103626.
[27] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 - Uzbekistan', United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 11 March 2020, p.14 Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: … f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence, 20200317131507.
Women in rural areas of Uzbekistan are disadvantaged, and healthcare is less available to all people in rural areas.[28]
A 2012 study of ‘Elderly Health’ in Uzbekistan stated (citing a 2002 reference) that, traditionally, people ‘in declining years’ usually live with, and are taken care of by, their children: usually a son.[29] The study, a survey in Tashkent City and Tashkent Region in November 2007 to May 2008 of 682 persons aged 65 years or older (214 men and 486 women), stated:
Elderly people usually depend on pensions as a source of income. Of those who need additional monetary support from others, most of their additional financial help comes from their sons. In Uzbek culture, men earn much more than women, and women are usually employed in a lower paying job in addition to their normal household chores. Support from the son is usually most common after beginning to receive a pension, and although support from sons is usually inadequate, most of the elderly were happy with support from their daughters.[30] [sic]
The March 2018 UN OHCHR compilation of information in UN documents on Uzbekistan noted, regarding the ‘Right to health’:
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was concerned about the low number of hospitals and of highly qualified health-care personnel in rural areas and the absence of national health insurance. ... The country team stated that Presidential Decree No. 2857 of March 2017 on improving primary health care had included a plan to decrease the number of primary health-care facilities.[31]
OHCHR’s compilation had a page on the rights of women,[32] including: The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women noted with concern the disadvantaged status of women in rural areas and regretted the lack of measures to address their poverty and ensure their ownership and use of land and access to a number of rights.[33]
[28] 'Compilation on Uzbekistan - Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights', (A/HRC/WG.6/30/UZB/2), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 8 March 2018, p.8 paragraph 61 (& p.14 endnote 118) and p.9 paragraph 72 (& p.15 endnote 143).
[29] ‘Elderly Health And Its Correlations Among Uzbek Population’, Goolbahor Pulatova, Md. Harun-Or-Rashid, Yoshitoku Yoshida and Junichi Sakamoto, Nagoya Journal of Medical Science (Nagoya University School of Medicine/Graduate School of Medicine), v.74(1-2), February 2012, pp.71-82 at p.72, on NCBI [National Center for Biotechnology Information] PMC US National Library of Medicine National Institutes of Health’s website (accessed from Elderly Health And Its Correlations Among Uzbek Population’, Goolbahor Pulatova, Md. Harun-Or-Rashid, Yoshitoku Yoshida and Junichi Sakamoto, Nagoya Journal of Medical Science (Nagoya University School of Medicine/Graduate School of Medicine), v.74(1-2), February 2012, pp.71-82 at pp.80 & 22 reference 30, on NCBI [National Center for Biotechnology Information] PMC US National Library of Medicine National Institutes of Health’s website, 20210107145137 (accessed from as quoted here omits original’s reference ’30) Mee W. Women in the Republic of Uzbekistan. 2001; Available from: df.’.
[31] 'Compilation on Uzbekistan - Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights', (A/HRC/WG.6/30/UZB/2), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 8 March 2018, p.8 paragraph 61, 20200317132826; as quoted here omits original text’s reference endnotes 118 & 120 (which are on p.14).
[32] 'Compilation on Uzbekistan - Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights', (A/HRC/WG.6/30/UZB/2), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 8 March 2018, pp.9-10 paragraphs 69-79
[33] 'Compilation on Uzbekistan - Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights', (A/HRC/WG.6/30/UZB/2), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 8 March 2018, p.9 paragraph 72; as quoted here omits original text’s reference endnote 143 (which is on p.15).
Uzbekistan gained independence after the break-up of the USSR in 1991. Uzbekistan ascribed citizenship to those who resided in it at independence.[34] All citizens of Uzbekistan alive in 1991 are thus former USSR citizens.
[34] 'Comparative Report: Citizenship in Central Asia' (RSCAS/GLOBALCIT-Comp. 2018/1), Tiulegenov M, Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT), May 2018, p.1.
There is no information about adverse treatment of ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan for their ethnicity in recent major global annual reviews of human rights practices by US Department of State, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House or UN OHCHR.[35] The US Department of State reported regarding ‘National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities’ during 2019:
[35] Nothing is stated in 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 - Uzbekistan', United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 11 March 2020, including in ‘Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons’ p.31 ‘National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities’; nor in Human Rights Watch’s review ‘from late 2018 through November 2019’ - 'World Report 2020. Events of 2019', Human Rights Watch (HRW), pp.619-624 ‘Uzbekistan’, 14 January 2020 - nor in 'Freedom in the World 2020 - Uzbekistan', Freedom House, 5 March 2020; nor in the most recent OHCHR annual global human rights report - 'United Nations Human Rights Report 2019', United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR), 5 June 2020, pp.338-343 ‘Central Asia’.
The law does not require Uzbek language ability to obtain citizenship, but language often was a sensitive issue. Uzbek is the state language, and the constitution requires that the president speak it. The law also provides that Russian is “the language of interethnic communication.”
Officials reportedly reserved senior positions in the government bureaucracy and business for ethnic Uzbeks, although there were numerous exceptions.
Complaints of societal violence or discrimination against members of ethnic minority groups were rare.[36]
[36] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 - Uzbekistan', United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 11 March 2020, p.31 ‘Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons’ ‘National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities’.
The global annual review of migration in 2019 by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) stated, of ‘migration corridors involving European countries’:
… One of the more striking features of the main migration corridors involving European countries is that most are intraregional corridors. The Russian Federation features heavily in the main corridors. Russian-born populations in former member States of the Soviet Union – such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – formed some of the largest European migrant corridors in 2019. However, it is important to note that these Russian-born populations only became international migrants after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991; before that, they were internal migrants within the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation was also the second largest destination of migrants in Europe after Germany.[37]
[37] 'World Migration Report 2020', International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2019 [launched 27/11/2019], p.89.
IOM tabulated UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) figures of 1.1 million ‘Uzbekistan - Russian Federation’ migrants and around 0.9 million Russian Federation - Uzbekistan migrants in 2019.[38]
[38] 'World Migration Report 2020', International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2019 [launched 27/11/2019], p.89 ‘Figure 16. Top 20 migration corridors involving European countries, 2019’, p.94 including footnote 230, & p.470 reference ‘United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) 2019 International Migrant Stock 2019. UN DESA Population Division, New York. Available at Rights Group International’s World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples (November 2017 at earliest) entry on Uzbekistan, stated about ‘Russians and Ukrainians’:
… According to 2017 government estimates, the total number of Russians is now 750,00 [sic for 750,000] (2.3 per cent) and the number of Ukrainians is 70,700 (0.2 per cent).
The Slavic minorities are almost exclusively urban, 45 per cent of them residing in the Tashkent Oblast, with much of the rest in other industrial centres.
Russians and Uzbeks have remained largely separate communities. Recognizing the need for Russian specialists, after independence the government offered them various incentives to retain their services. But the growing ‘Uzbekisation’ of the country led most Russians and other Slavs to leave the country.
Historical context … The dominant position of Russians and other Russian-speakers – exemplified and effected through the Russian language – started to weaken with the adoption of Uzbek as the state language in October 1989. The initial law stipulated an eight-year transition period, but this was superseded after independence with its replacement with another language law in 1995 which put the Russian language in the same group as other national minority languages. It is also from this period that Uzbekistan started to set itself apart from most of its Central Asian neighbours in the visible face of the Russian legacy and on its treatment of the Russian language. Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian country which did not include a provision for the Russian language in its post-Soviet Constitution. While others also replaced Cyrillic with a Latin alphabet, Uzbekistan quickly went one step further and also replaced Russian (and Soviet) signs, topographical and street names with Uzbek names. Even the burning of Russian-language books occurred on a number of occasions in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Uzbekistan has since independence been one of the Central Asian states most vehemently opposed to dual citizenship – a perhaps not so subtle invitation for Russians and other Slavs to think seriously about leaving the country.
The switch to a national currency in Uzbekistan in November 1993 and recurring incidents of violence directed against Russian-speakers contributed as accelerators to the wave of emigration by 2005.
Current issues …Though not initially apparent, Uzbekistan has through various means adopted an ‘Uzbekisation’ of the state and its institutions, which has resulted in Russians and other Russian-speaking minorities feeling more and more out of place, and in practice excluded or disadvantaged in a number of public spheres – often through language requirements.
Since Russians, Ukrainians and other Slavic minorities are by and large not fluent in the Uzbek language, the country’s only official language, the immediate and – in the context of Uzbekistan – discriminatory result was their limited access to civil service jobs and to high political office. By some estimates, the number of Russian-language or mixed Russian/Uzbek-language schools dropped from 1,147 in 1992 to 813 in 2000. Ironically, Uzbekistan’s relationship with Russia improved in the wake of the 2005 Andijan massacre of anti-government protestors, leading to an increased emphasis on Russian in education as the Russian government – unlike others which condemned the country for the atrocities committed against a civilian population – supported the regime’s response to the demonstrations.
The drive to make Uzbek the language of instruction at state universities and for most positions in government remains one of the main obstacles to educational and employment opportunities of many Russians. Some of the cultural claims of members of the Russian minority include greater use of the Russian language on state media, now that almost all of the content of the main state television stations is in Uzbek.[39]
In 2016 United Kingdom-based Equal Rights Trust, reporting on ‘Discrimination on the Basis of Ethnicity’ in Uzbekistan, cited 2004 and 2006 information on ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan:
… Russian remains a widely used language in Uzbekistan, and the Russian minority has historically enjoyed a privileged position. ... In 2006, the Centre for International Development and Conflict Management found that ethnic Russians had found it difficult to adapt to their loss of privileged status in Uzbekistan, and that while the state did not openly discriminate, there were emerging signs of discrimination in hiring practices of the civil service and high-level government positions. A 2004 survey of ethnic Russians living in Uzbekistan by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs found that 58.7% of questioned wished to resettle in the Russian Federation. The main reasons for this desire were given as poverty (55%), economic opportunities (27%) and family reunion (25%). Discrimination was either not included in the list of questions of the survey, or was ignored by interviewees.[40]
[39] ‘World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. Uzbekistan. Russians and Ukrainians’, Minority Rights Group International, undated [November 2017 at earliest], Accessed 7 January 2021; there is nothing on Russians at the ‘Current issues’ tab.
[40] After the Padishah. Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Uzbekistan’, (The Equal Rights Trust Country Report Series: 8), Equal Rights Trust, [19] December 2016, p.136 including footnotes 649-651; as quoted here omits original text’s reference footnotes ‘649 Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, “Assessment for Russians in Uzbekistan”, University of Maryland, 2006, available at: ‘650 Inosmi.ru, “Why Russians leave Uzbekistan”, 16 April 2013, available at and ‘651 Ibid.’.
Uzbekistan has a national ‘residency permit and domestic passport system’.[41] Specific rules apply to residency registration in Tashkent city and region.[42] Proposed reforms to the system apparently retain specific ‘restrictions for persons seeking to register in Tashkent city or region on a permanent or temporary basis’.[43]
[41] 'Free Movement and Affordable Housing - Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan', Seitz W, World Bank Group, January 2020, p.18.
[42] ‘Urgent Opinion on Planned Reforms of the System of Residence Registration. Uzbekistan’ (Opinion-Nr.: MIG-UZB/372/2020 [JG]), Thomas A, OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 30 April 2020, p.7 paragraph 16,
[43] ‘Urgent Opinion on Planned Reforms of the System of Residence Registration. Uzbekistan’ (Opinion-Nr.: MIG-UZB/372/2020 [JG]), Thomas A, OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 30 April 2020, p.1.
A January 2020 World Bank Group paper noted that Uzbekistan inherited ‘a residency permit and domestic passport system’ from the Soviet Union (from which it gained independence in 1991):[44]
[44] 'Free Movement and Affordable Housing - Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan', Seitz W, World Bank Group, January 2020, p.18; as quoted here omits original’s footnote ‘12 Details regarding rules and administration of the propiska system are summarized in appendix A.’ An interview with the report’s author is ‘William Seitz on Uzbekistan’s Propiska Problem’, Putz C, The Diplomat, 19 February 2020.
Registration in a person’s place of residence is referred to as a propiska, which often also refers to a person’s domestic passport. The system is implemented by the Ministry of Internal Affairs ... [45]
[45] 'Free Movement and Affordable Housing - Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan', Seitz W, World Bank Group, January 2020, p.18; as quoted here omits original’s footnote ‘12 Details regarding rules and administration of the propiska system are summarized in appendix A.’
While other former Soviet Republics largely eliminated the propiska system, Uzbekistan made it stricter: a 1999 presidential decree made the capital, Tashkent, a ‘“closed city” to which only previously registered families and certain government officials were permitted to move’ and to purchase housing, and 2011 regulation required similar registration in Tashkent’s oblast (region).[46]
[46] 'Free Movement and Affordable Housing - Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan', Seitz W, World Bank Group, January 2020, p.18; as quoted here omits original’s footnote ‘12 Details regarding rules and administration of the propiska system are summarized in appendix A.’
Berlin-based NGO Uzbek Forum for Human Rights (formerly Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, UGF) stated that the propiska system had had ‘significant discriminatory effects on citizens living outside the capital, particularly with regard to employment opportunities which are in short supply in the regions’.[47] UGF had made a submission to the UN Human Rights Committee in May 2019 stating that the propiska system had made it ‘especially difficult to obtain valid residency permits in Tashkent and the Tashkent region as well as several other major cities’, ‘forcing many citizens of rural areas … to live and work in urban areas without registration, leaving them vulnerable to extortion, exploitation, and legal consequences’.[48]
[47] ‘Propiska: Uzbekistan Abolishes Soviet-Style Residency Restrictions’, Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, 18 February 2020.
[48] ‘Propiska: Uzbekistan Abolishes Soviet-Style Residency Restrictions’, Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, 18 February 2020.
The World Bank Group paper estimated that 52.3 per cent of the national total of people with Non-permanent Registration Status lived in Tashkent city (230,527 people, or 9.4 per cent of Tashkent city’s population), as did 14.8 per cent of the national total of people without legal registration (67,297 people, or 2.8 per cent of Tashkent city’s population).[49]
The paper noted ‘significant concentrations of people living without registration in other urban areas outside of the capital, most notably in the city of Samarkand’ and estimated that 50.5 per cent of the national total of people without legal registration lived in Samarkand (229,920 people, or 6.4 per cent of Samarkand’s population), as did 1.2 per cent of the national total of people with Non-permanent Registration Status (5322 people, or 0.1 per cent of Samarkand’s population).[50]
An April 2020 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Urgent Opinion on Planned Reforms of the System of Residence Registration. Uzbekistan summarised current legislation on ‘The System Of Residence Registration In Uzbekistan’: [51]
15. … As stated in a recent research paper published by the World Bank Group, a person without a local propiska (either permanent or temporary) in Uzbekistan is not permitted to apply for identification documents, register a marriage, obtain pensions or other social benefits, send his/her children to public schools, obtain legal employment, or register a business, among other restrictions.8 At the same time, a 2018 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers states that while citizens are obliged to register in places of permanent or temporary residence, the absence of a propiska at the place of temporary residence may not be a ground for refusing services to a citizen.9
16. In particular, special rules apply to the city and region of Tashkent, meaning that individuals may only reside there legally if they fulfil one of the requirements set out in a list annexed to the 2011 Act on the List of Categories of Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan Subject to Permanent Residence in Tashkent City and Tashkent Province.10 These include persons who are already registered or have acquired property in the city or province of Tashkent and their close and immediate relatives, as well as persons returning to Tashkent city/province after a time of absence, citizens appointed or elected to public office or who are “highly qualified specialists” invited to work for certain types of state bodies (for the duration of their terms) and military personnel provided with housing there. Spouses of persons holding permanent residency in Tashkent city/province may also become permanent residents if the couple has lived there together for one year after being married. If the marriage is dissolved within one year after permanent residence has been acquired, the spouse loses the right to permanent residence in Tashkent city/province.
17. Permanent or temporary registration in Uzbekistan is regulated by the Presidential Decree on Additional Measures for Passport System Development in the Republic of Uzbekistan.11 The absence of propiska is considered a violation of the “rules of the passport system” under Article 223 of the Administrative Code of Uzbekistan and incurs a fine of up to five minimum wages.12
18. Visitors to Tashkent need to register temporarily within ten days of arrival,13 and may obtain a temporary residence permit for a period of 5 days to 6 months.14 As of 2018, exceptions have been introduced for seasonal workers,15 which may receive temporary registration without a rent agreement, and undergo a somewhat simplified registration procedure.
19. Non-residents of Tashkent are apparently only allowed to buy property there in new buildings, not those on the secondary housing market (which are substantially cheaper),16 and may thereby obtain a permanent residence permit. The purchase should be conducted via bank transfers. The state registration fee for notarizing the purchase is 5 %.17
20. According to the 2019 Presidential Decree on Measures to Fundamentally Improve the Processes of Urbanization, people are now apparently able to apply for work outside of the region where they are registered and may apply for temporary residence permits in urban areas (including Tashkent) upon receipt of a formal employment contract.18 [52]
[49] 'Free Movement and Affordable Housing - Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan', Seitz W, World Bank Group, January 2020, p.19.
[50] 'Free Movement and Affordable Housing - Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan', Seitz W, World Bank Group, January 2020, pp.18 & 19 ‘Table 2: Estimated of Non-permanent Registration Status Mahalla Records and Implied Population Totals’.
[51] As did 'Free Movement and Affordable Housing - Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan', Seitz W, World Bank Group, January 2020, pp.19-20, and ‘Propiska: Uzbekistan Abolishes Soviet-Style Residency Restrictions’, Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, 18 February 2020.
[52] Urgent Opinion on Planned Reforms of the System of Residence Registration. Uzbekistan’ (Opinion-Nr.: MIG-UZB/372/2020 [JG]), Thomas A, OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 30 April 2020, pp.7-9 paragraphs 15-20; its reference footnotes are: ‘8 William Seitz: Free Movement and Affordable Housing – Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan, World Bank Group: Policy Research and Working Paper, January 2020, p. 19. 9 Annex 1 to the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministries No 845 of 22 October 2018, as cited in William Seitz: Free Movement and Affordable Housing – Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan, World Bank Group: Policy Research and Working Paper, January 2020, Appendix G, p. 67. 10 See the Republican Law No. NO. ZRU-296 on the List of Categories of Persons – Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Subject to Permanent Residence in Tashkent City and Tashkent Region, of 15 September 2011, last amended in 2019, and its Annex on the list of categories of citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan subject to permanent residence in Tashkent city and Tashkent province. 11 Presidential Decree on Additional Measures for Passport System Development in the Republic of Uzbekistan No. UP-426229 of 5 January 2011. 12 Кодекс Республики Узбекистан Об Административной Ответственности (available in Russian at: See also, Gazeta.uz, Tashkent citizens do not have to register in oblasts – MIA, published on 12 June 2019, at: (in Russian). 13 See the table outlining all proposed changes at available in Uzbek and Russian. See also Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. PKM-4130 of 16 February 2012, cited in William Seitz: Free Movement and Affordable Housing – Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan, World Bank Group: Policy Research and Working Paper, January 2020, Appendix A, p. 48. 14 William Seitz: Free Movement and Affordable Housing – Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan, World Bank Group: Policy Research and Working Paper, January 2020, Appendix A, p. 48. 15 See Addition to the Cabinet of Ministers’ Resolution (16 February 2012) of 13 February 2018, as cited in William Seitz: Free Movement and Affordable Housing – Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan, World Bank Group: Policy Research and Working Paper, January 2020, Appendix G, p. 65. 16 Uzbek Forum for Human Rights: Propiska: Uzbekistan Abolishes Soviet-Style Residency Restrictions, published on 18 February 2020, at: See also William Seitz: Free Movement and Affordable Housing – Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan, World Bank Group: Policy Research and Working Paper, January 2020, pp. 19-20. 17 See Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 527 of 19 July 2017, as amended in 2018, cited in William Seitz: Free Movement and Affordable Housing – Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan, World Bank Group: Policy Research and Working Paper, January 18 William Seitz: Free Movement and Affordable Housing – Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan, World Bank Group: Policy Research and Working Paper, January 2020, p. 20. See also Uzbek Forum for Human Rights: Propiska: Uzbekistan Abolishes Soviet-Style Residency Restrictions, published on 18 February 2020, at: type="1">
Corruption in Uzbekistan has been described as ‘pervasive’,[53] ‘rampant’,[54] and ‘widespread’,[55] and is reported to be endemic in the public and private sectors.[56] Uzbek police are reported to solicit bribes to supplement their salaries and to routinely justify the arrest of suspected religious extremists or political opponents by planting contraband, filing dubious charges of financial wrongdoing, or inventing witness testimony.[57] Uzbekistan’s judiciary is reported to be ‘subservient to the president’,[58] and does not operate with full independence or impartiality.[59] In addition, the Prosecutor General’s Office and other law enforcement bodies occasionally exerted inappropriate pressure on members of the judiciary to render desired verdicts.[60] It has also been reported that the Uzbek judiciary is vulnerable to corruption.[61] However, efforts by the Uzbek government and law enforcement agencies to combat corruption have been reported.[62]
[53] 'Freedom in the World 2022 - Uzbekistan', Freedom House, 24 February 2022, Section C2; 'BTI 2022 Country Report Uzbekistan', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 23 February 2022, p.42.
[54] 'BTI 2022 Country Report Uzbekistan', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 23 February 2022, pp.8 and 33.
[55] 'Freedom in the World 2022 - Uzbekistan', Freedom House, 24 February 2022, Section G2.
[56] 'OSAC Country Security Report Uzbekistan', Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), 14 June 2022, p.8.
[57] 'OSAC Country Security Report Uzbekistan', Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), 14 June 2022, p.4; 'Freedom in the World 2022 - Uzbekistan', Freedom House, 24 February 2022, Section F2.
[58] 'Freedom in the World 2022 - Uzbekistan', Freedom House, 24 February 2022, Section F1.
[59] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Uzbekistan', US Department of State, 12 April 2022, Section 1.e, p.9.
[60] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Uzbekistan', US Department of State, 12 April 2022, Section 1.e, p.9.
[61] 'BTI 2022 Country Report Uzbekistan', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 23 February 2022, p.11.
[62] 'Freedom in the World 2022 - Uzbekistan', Freedom House, 24 February 2022, Section C2; 'BTI 2022 Country Report Uzbekistan', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 23 February 2022, p.12.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The Tribunal notes that s 5AAA(2) of the Act provides that it is the applicant’s responsibility to specify all particulars of his protection claim and to provide sufficient evidence to establish the claim.
In considering the applicant’s claims and evidence, the Tribunal has taken account of the Department of Home Affairs ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’, and the country information set out in this decision record.
The Tribunal notes the country information reports in relation to failed asylum seeker returnees to Uzbekistan that:
23.1.There are examples of people arriving from abroad who have been questioned in airports and local police offices (Freedom House reported that this practice significantly expanded in 2016), and also examples of people who have been arrested and tortured and prosecuted. An example is cited of six Uzbeks whose asylum applications were rejected in Norway, and they were prosecuted and given long prison sentences when they returned to Uzbekistan in 2014. The men were presented in a propaganda film shown on national television as “false witnesses”, “traitors to the Motherland” and “religious extremists”.
23.2.Citizens of the former USSR states reportedly make up the third largest number of foreign fighters in Islamic State, and it is the emergence of Islamic State that has increased Uzbekistan’s efforts to combat religious and other forms of extremism. There are a growing number of Uzbekistan citizens thought to be living abroad and blacklisted as extremists.
23.3.Since 2012, residents of Uzbekistan who stay abroad for more than three months are scrutinised by passport control in the airport upon arrival, questioned about the reasons for going abroad and what they did there, and individuals they communicated with. An example is cited of a pregnant woman returning from Sweden who was interrogated for 11 hours before a relative secured her release, and then criminally charged for leaving the country without an exit visa, despite claiming that she didn’t violate the passport regime.
23.4.A 2016 Amnesty International report details the use of torture on forced returns, including failed asylum seekers, to Uzbekistan from Russia.
23.5.Involuntary returns to Uzbekistan should be exercised only with extreme caution given the country’s human rights record. Human rights reports concur that torture is routinely used in Uzbekistan.
The Tribunal notes the country information reports that the Uzbekistan government provides income-tested social assistance benefits such as the old-age social pension for women aged 55 with less than 20 years of covered employment and uses neighbourhood (mahalla) committees to provide various social support functions such as distribution of social welfare assistance to the elderly. Mahallas also feed information back to the government and local law enforcement entities about local community members. Elderly people usually depend on pensions as a source of income, and additional financial help mostly comes from their sons as men earn much more than women in Uzbek culture.
The Tribunal notes the country information reports that women in rural areas of Uzbekistan are disadvantaged and healthcare is less available to all people in rural areas.
The Tribunal notes the country information reports that there is no information about adverse treatment of ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan for their ethnicity in recent major global reviews of human rights, however recurring incidents of violence against Russian-speakers contributed as accelerators to the wave of emigration by 2005. Russians and Uzbeks have remained largely separate communities. Since independence, Uzbekistan became vehemently opposed to dual citizenship, and the growing ‘Uzbekisation’ has led most Russians and other Slavs to leave the country.
The Tribunal notes the country information reports that Uzbekistan has a national residency permit and domestic passport (‘propiska’) system, which makes it especially difficult to obtain valid permits in the capital and its region and several other major cities, forcing people in rural areas to live and work in urban areas without registration, leaving them vulnerable to extortion, exploitation, and legal consequences.
The Tribunal notes the country information reports that corruption in Uzbekistan has been described as ‘pervasive’, ‘rampant’, and ‘widespread’, and endemic in the public and private sectors, and that Uzbekistan’s judiciary does not operate with full independence or impartiality.
The Tribunal has made an assessment of the credibility of the applicant’s claims and evidence having regard to the Migration and Refugee Division Guidelines on the Assessment of Credibility.
The Tribunal considers the applicant’s oral and written evidence a truthful account of her life and experiences in Uzbekistan and [Country 1] before coming to Australia in 2014.
The Tribunal considers the witnesses’ oral and written evidence a truthful account of the matters attested to.
The Tribunal considers it is likely the applicant was discriminated against in Uzbekistan by the state or agents of the state following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and declaration of independence of Uzbekistan on the basis of her Russian ethnicity in the following ways:
32.1.By having her Russian passport confiscated and replaced with a Uzbekistan passport without her consent, and thereby effectively having her Russian citizenship renounced and Uzbekistan citizenship imposed without her consent.
32.2.By being identified as having Russian ethnicity on the face of her Uzbekistan passport.
32.3.By being subjected to pressure and threat to leave her [Position 1] roles or risk being falsely implicated in illegal wrongdoing.
32.4.By being prohibited from selling her apartment in Uzbekistan and from taking money out of Uzbekistan on departure and having to find alternative, illegal means of doing so.
32.5.By being denied her entitlement to a Uzbekistan pension after leaving Uzbekistan.
The Tribunal considers there is insufficient evidence before it to make a finding that the harm occasioned to the applicant’s daughter and son-in-law whilst in Uzbekistan was targeted at them by reason of Russian ethnicity or connection with Russian ethnicity.
The Tribunal notes there is no reference in the country information to returnees to Uzbekistan being required to live on a reservation for five years with no entitlements, work rights or pension, or ability to buy real estate.
The Tribunal considers the applicant, as a failed asylum seeker returning to Uzbekistan from a Western country after 24 years, is likely to draw the adverse attention of the state authorities on her arrival in the country.
The Tribunal considers it is not necessary for the applicant to be a person of proven terrorist or religious or other extremist profile to draw the adverse attention of the Uzbekistan state authorities as her failure to seek asylum is sufficient to raise the imputation of a profile or conduct that is against the state.
The Tribunal considers the adverse attention of the Uzbekistan state authorities could include questioning of the applicant at the airport and/or police office, followed by her arrest, torture and prosecution. Torture is routinely used in Uzbekistan, corruption is endemic, and the judiciary does not operate with full independence or impartiality.
The Tribunal considers the adverse attention of the Uzbekistan authorities would amount to serious and targeted harm such as to engage Australia’s refugee obligations.
The Tribunal considers that the applicant’s vulnerability to serious and targeted harm as a result of the adverse attention of the Uzbekistan authorities would be exacerbated by her Russian ethnicity, her advanced age, her not being Uzbek speaking, the loss of her Uzbekistan pension entitlement, the absence of any familial or social network in Uzbekistan and access to living accommodation, and, as a result, her vulnerability to being the target of bribery and corruption, extortion, exploitation and legal consequences.
The Tribunal considers that the applicant would be unable to seek protection from the Uzbekistan authorities as they would be the perpetrators of the serious and targeted harm against her.
The Tribunal considers that the applicant would be unable to relocate to an area in Uzbekistan to reduce the chance of serious and targeted harm as her vulnerability to serious and targeted harm would arise upon her entry into the country.
The Tribunal considers that the applicant would be unable to modify her behaviour to reduce her vulnerability to serious and targeted harm as her vulnerability would arise as a result of her returnee failed asylum seeker status and the pre-existing exacerbating factors.
The Tribunal considers that the applicant’s delay in applying for a protection visa is reasonably explained by the circumstances surrounding the application for and refusal of the contributory parent visa.
Application of law
The issue in this case is whether the applicant meets the refugee criterion, and if not, whether she is entitled to complementary protection. Attachment A sets out the applicable law.
The Tribunal finds that:
45.1.The applicant is a citizen of Uzbekistan and non-citizen in Australia.
45.2.The applicant is a member of a particular social group being a returnee failed asylum seeker.
45.3.The applicant fears being persecuted in Uzbekistan for the essential and significant reason of her membership of the particular social group.
45.4.There is a real chance that, if the applicant returned to Uzbekistan, she would be persecuted for her membership of the particular social group.
45.5.The persecution would involve serious and targeted harm to the applicant.
45.6.The real chance of persecution relates to all areas of Uzbekistan.
45.7.There are no effective protection measures available to the applicant in Uzbekistan.
45.8.The applicant could not take reasonable steps to modify her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in Uzbekistan.
45.9.The applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution as defined in s 5J of the Act.
45.10.The applicant is outside Uzbekistan, her country of nationality, and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail herself of the protection of Uzbekistan.
CONCLUSION
The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
DECISION
The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
Kate Chapple
MemberATTACHMENT A
Summary of applicable law
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B).
Relevant extracts from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a) severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b) pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d) arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b) that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a) for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b) for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c) for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d) for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e) for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a) a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b) if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
5H Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a) in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b) in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note: For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
5J Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a) the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b) there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c) the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note: For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note: For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a) conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b) conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c) without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a) that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b) the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c) the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a) a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b) significant physical harassment of the person;
(c) significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d) significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e) denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f) denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a) disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b) disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note: Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a) a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b) the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c) any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d) the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a) protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b) the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a) the person can access the protection; and
(b) the protection is durable; and
(c) in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
36 Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a) a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a) the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b) the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c) the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d) the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e) the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a) it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b) the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c) the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Immigration
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Administrative Law
Legal Concepts
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Judicial Review
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Natural Justice
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Procedural Fairness
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Jurisdiction
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Standing
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