2109636 (Refugee)
[2025] ARTA 1546
•1 June 2025
2109636 (Refugee) [2025] ARTA 1546 (1 June 2025)
DECISION AND
REASONS FOR DECISION
Respondent:Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
Tribunal Number: 2109636
Tribunal:General Member C Graydon
Date: 1 June 2025
Place:Melbourne
Decision:The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
Statement made on 01 June 2025 at 9:38am
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Lebanon – religion – Sunni Muslim – renounced Islamic faith – father will not accept liberal lifestyle – fears family violence and arranged marriage – fears Sharia Court – does not have a well-founded fear – volatile security situation – village location less at risk of conflict –protracted economic crisis – have their own land – well-established employment record – able to subsist – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth), s 106
Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 5AAA, 5H, 5J–5LA, 36, 65, 369, 499
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Caseload Legacy) Bill 2014 (Cth), Explanatory Memorandum
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2CASES
2010120 (Refugee) [2025] ARTA 550
Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 279
Chan Yee Kin Ors v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379
MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505
Re Ruddock; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 [2003] HCA 60
SZBEL v MIMIA (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
SZTGM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 28 July 2021 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicant who claims to be a national of Lebanon, applied for the visa on 7 June 2019.
The applicant sought review of the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant him a protection visa with the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) on 29 July 2021. The applicant was represented throughout the review by Mr Sam Issa, Principal Lawyer at Firmstone and Associates, as he was for much of the Department stage of his case.
On 14 October 2024, the AAT became the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). Under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (the Transitional Act), applications for review to the AAT that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are taken to be an application for review to the Tribunal. The Transitional Act gives the Tribunal the authority to continue and finalise any aspect of the review not already completed by the AAT. This decision and statement of reasons is made by the Tribunal.
On 4 February 2025 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant to place him on notice that his case would soon be constituted to a Member and requested that he complete a prehearing information form to assist in the scheduling of a hearing.
On 6 February 2025 the applicant responded, advising that he was available to attend a hearing on any days except between 7 to 17 April 2025 and that both him and his representative intended to attend the hearing. He also indicated that he did not plan to request the Tribunal to hear evidence from any witnesses and that he did not seek to submit any further documents in support of his case.
On 18 February 2025 the Tribunal invited the applicant to give evidence and present arguments at a hearing scheduled for 9.30am on 3 April 2025. In the hearing invitation it was stated that the Tribunal had considered the material before it but was unable to make a favourable decision on this information alone.
On 21 February 2025 the applicant responded that he intended to attend the hearing in person in Melbourne along with his representative via video conference link from Sydney. The Tribunal agreed to the representative’s participation by video conference and provided him with a link to join the hearing.
On Wednesday 2 April 2024 the Tribunal received an urgent request for postponement of the applicant’s hearing on medical grounds. The request was supported by a medical certificate issued by a general practitioner stating:
[The applicant] has a medical condition and will be unfit for work from 2 April 2025 to 3 April 2025 inclusive due to Chest Pain.
The Tribunal agreed to the request and rescheduled the hearing for 17 April 2025.
On 7 April 2025 the applicant requested a new hearing date after the 17 April 2025 due to his representative having a court commitment up until and including that day.
On 8 April 2025 the Tribunal agreed to the request and rescheduled the hearing for 29 April 2025 at 9.00am.
On 23 April 2025 the applicant submitted a response to the Tribunal to the rescheduled hearing invitation indicating that the applicant and his representative intended to attend the further re-scheduled hearing.
On 24 April 2025 the applicant’s representative sent an email advising the Tribunal that the applicant had instructed him to seek a written decision on the papers based on an attached authority which read:
I, [the applicant] authorise and instruct my legal representative Mr Sam Issa to request a decision on the passport before the Tribunal.
On 28 April 2025 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant’s representative advising that the submitted request ‘for a decision on the passport’ signed by the applicant was not an acceptable request for a decision on the papers. The Tribunal requested that if the applicant did in fact seek a decision on the papers, then an updated response to hearing form should be submitted to the Tribunal signed by the applicant. The Tribunal also requested that the form be submitted under cover of an email from the applicant’s representative, confirming that the applicant’s instructions to request a decision on the papers had been provided on the basis of him understanding the legal consequences of this request, given that the Tribunal was unable to make a favourable decision on his case based on the material before it.
On 28 April 2025 the applicant’s representative submitted a new response to hearing form signed by the representative, not by the applicant, indicating selection of a box ticked which reads in full:
No, I will not participate in the hearing, and consent to the Tribunal making a decision on the papers without taking any further steps to allow me to appear.
On 29 April 2025 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant advising that the hearing scheduled for that day had been cancelled by the Tribunal based on the applicant’s indication that he would not attend the scheduled hearing and had requested a hearing on the papers.
Nothing further has been heard by the Tribunal from the applicant or his representative since that date, 29 April 2025, to the date of this decision.
Circumstances in which the Tribunal may reach a decision without a hearing
The circumstances in which the Tribunal may reach a decision without a hearing are set out in s 106 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (ART Act). They include where an applicant requests the Tribunal to make its decision without holding a hearing of the proceedings: s 106(3) ART Act, which states:
(1) The Tribunal may make its decision in the proceeding in relation to the application after considering the documents and things given to the Tribunal and without holding the hearing of the proceeding if any of subsections (2) to (5) applies...
3) This subsection applies if:
(a) the only parties to the proceeding are the applicant and a non-participating party to the proceeding or the hearing of the proceeding; and
(b) either:
(i) the decision is wholly in favour of the applicant; or
(ii) the applicant requests the Tribunal to make its decision without holding the hearing of the proceeding; and
(c) it appears to the Tribunal that the issues for determination in the proceeding can be adequately determined in the absence of the parties to the proceeding.
Based on ‘a request’ by the applicant
In order for the Tribunal to consider exercising its discretion to make a decision without holding a hearing where the decision is not wholly in favour of the applicant, the Tribunal must be satisfied under s 106(3)(b)(ii) that the applicant has made a ‘request’ to be provided with a decision, without a hearing.
In this case the applicant had twice earlier indicated to the Tribunal via his legal representative an intention to attend the scheduled hearings. This remained the position of the applicant until five days before the third re-scheduled hearing, when his representative sent an ‘Authority to request a decision’ from the applicant requesting a ‘decision on the passport’. When this was not accepted by the Tribunal as a request for a ‘decision on the papers’, the representative then submitted a completed Tribunal form indicating a request for a decision on the papers but signed by himself and not by the applicant, contrary to the Tribunal’s request. The last-minute change in the applicant’s position reversing his earlier stated intention to attend the hearing, combined with the less-than-ideal paperwork submitted by his representative, have made it more difficult for the Tribunal to be satisfied that the applicant made a clear ‘request’ for a decision on the papers, and where the applicant has a legal representative, that the request has been made in accordance with the applicant’s instructions.
The meaning of the requirement that ‘the applicant requests the Tribunal to make its decision without holding the hearing of the proceeding’ in s 106(3)(b)(ii) of the ART Act is clear. However, difficult factual issues may arise in its application in some cases. For example, where an applicant’s representative purports to make a request in accordance with s 106(3)(b)(ii) of the ART Act contrary to the applicant’s instructions, such a request would not be an effective request for the purposes of that section.[1]
[1] See 2010120 (Refugee) [2025] ARTA 550 (13 May 2025) [34].
Nonetheless, based on the totality of evidence before it, the Tribunal is satisfied that applicant did request a decision on the papers in the meaning of s 106(3)(b)(ii). This finding is based on holistic reading of the multiple communications received by the Tribunal from the applicant making or attempting to make such a request. These communications include the applicant’s authority dated 24 April 2025, albeit with an apparent typo, his representative’s email of the same date clearly stating he had been instructed by the applicant to seek a decision on the papers, followed by the re-submitted hearing response form provided by the representative, indicating the applicant’s request for a decision on the papers.
The Tribunal is satisfied that these various written responses can be properly constructed as a request to make a decision without holding a hearing of a proceeding as per s 106(3)(b)(ii) of the ART Act.
Whether the issues for determination can be ‘adequately determined’ without a hearing
To exercise its discretion under s 106(3)(c) to make a decision on the papers without a hearing based on the applicant’s request, the Tribunal must also consider whether it appears that the ‘issues for determination’ in the proceedings can be ‘adequately determined’ in the absence of the parties to the proceeding.
In reviewing a decision to refuse to grant a protection visa, the issues which the Tribunal are required to determine are:
·whether the applicant faces a real chance of persecution for one or more of the five reasons set out in s 5J(1)(a) for the purpose of s 36(2)(a) of the Act if returned to their receiving country and if not;
·whether there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of them being removed from Australia to their receiving country, there is a real risk that they will suffer significant harm for the purpose of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
In this case it appears to the Tribunal that the issues for determination in the proceeding can be adequately determined in the absence of a hearing. The Tribunal has before it a copy of the Department’s file. This includes a copy of the applicant’s identity documents and his protection visa application form, which contains his biographical information and a Statutory Declaration by the applicant dated 30 May 2019 setting out his protection claims. Contained in the Department’s file is also an audio recording of the applicant’s interview with a delegate of the Department of Home Affairs on 29 October 2020 and the Department’s decision, which also sets out some of this information.
Based on this information the Tribunal is able to determine the applicant’s identity and receiving country. It is also able to form conclusions about whether he meets the criteria for a protection visa in ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Act without seeking further evidence or submissions from the applicant, noting that the applicant has previously informed the Tribunal several times that he has no further documents or other information to submit to the Tribunal in support of his case.[2] In a recent decision made by the President and two Deputy Presidents of the ART, a distinction was confirmed between the Tribunal finding there is sufficient information to adequately determine the issues, yet still able to determine that there is insufficient evidence to substantiate the applicant’s protection claims.[3] That is the case in the current review. The Tribunal finds there is sufficient information to adequately determine the issues in this case in the absence of the parties in accordance with s 106(3)(c), while also determining that the applicant’s protection claims are not substantiated.
[2] Letters sent to the applicant on 2 August 2021, 4 February 2025, 18 February 2025, requested the applicant to provide any additional evidence relevant to their application as soon as possible however no additional information was provided in response to any of these requests.
[3] 2010120 (Refugee) [2025] ARTA 550 (13 May 2025) [60].
BACKGROUND
According to information contained in the protection visa application form the applicant is [age] years of age. He is from [Village 1], Akkar Governorate, Lebanon. He came to Australia in October 2017 on a student visa. He is a Sunni Muslim. His parents [and siblings] continue to live in [Village 1].
Evidence before the Department
Protection visa application
In his protection visa application form and accompanying Statutory Declaration of 30 May 2019, the applicant made the following claims.
·His family are strict Sunni Muslims, although he does not have a strong faith himself. His father allowed him to study in Australia on condition that he live with his uncle, he left Lebanon to study in Australia and that he stayed with his uncle, who is also a strict Sunni Muslim.
·His uncle imposed on him expectations and restrictions that he did not agree with, such as demanding that he regularly attend the mosque and restricting his social life.
·He moved out of his uncle’s home and his father cut off his financial support to him and demanded that he immediately return to live in his uncle’s house. He further threatened that he would seriously harm him on his return to Lebanon.
·The applicant did not return to his uncle’s house. He enjoyed his personal freedom to do things prohibited in Islam such as going out and socialising, drinking alcohol, maintain relations with women and attending the mosque. He informed his uncle that he had stopped practising his Islamic faith and this increased the hostility between him and his father.
·If he is forced to return to Lebanon he fears he will be forced to publicly pronounce his faith pretend to be religious by attending the mosque and abstaining from drinking, socialising and having relations with women. He fears his parents will pressure him into an arranged marriage. He fears he could not exercise his freedoms and chosen lifestyle without serious or significant harm being imposed on him by his parents and close relatives. He fears that his liberal lifestyle would be unacceptable to his father who may harm or kill him, as may fundamentalist Muslims who do not accept his lifestyle.
·He would not receive effective state protection from these risks because religious or family disputes are dealt with by Sunni Sharia Courts, who would not protect his freedoms.
·He is unable to relocate elsewhere in Lebanon as he fears his father or close relatives will track him down and harm him and radical Islamists live throughout the country, and the lack of state protection applies to the whole of Lebanon.
The applicant also provided as part of his application a certified copy of his full Lebanese passport valid for a five-year period from [2017] to [2022].
Interview with the delegate
A delegate of the Department interviewed the applicant on 29 October 2020. During the interview the applicant added the following further information to his claims:
· He arrived in Australia [in] October 2017 on a student visa to study a [course]. His father sold family land to pay for his expenses. The first period of study went well.
· He moved out of his uncle’s house after around 12 months in October 2018 when his uncle placed unreasonable restrictions on him.
· His father cut off his financial support from that time and so he did not continue with his studies. He got a job as a [Occupation 1], which is the work he continues to do. He initially moved in with friends, and once he had a secured a full-time job around three years ago, he moved into his own accommodation.
· He reiterated that his parents and [siblings] all live in Lebanon and are all strict Muslims, including wearing Islamic dress, observing Ramadan, going to the mosque, maintaining distance from the opposite sex and not drinking alcohol.
· His father had a strict and authoritative style of parenting and used to beat him and his siblings for not doing homework. He used to be a soldier in the Lebanese Armed Forces for [a number of] years. He was in the [classification] rank of the army when he retired and he now lives on an army pension.
· After he left his uncle’s house, his mother asked him to go back to his uncle and to follow the rules of his father. He has maintained contact with her after the falling out with his father. She kept calling him when his father was not around from his sister’s phone, as she does not have her own phone. He contacts her by texting his sister to call him when she can. He is not in touch with any siblings except for this sister. He has not had further contact with his father or his uncle in Australia since the falling out in October 2018.
· He has other relatives living in Australia including two aunties from his father’s side of the family and one uncle from his mother’s side. He only remains in touch with his uncle.
· He does not want to return to Lebanon because he will be unable to maintain the lifestyle he has chosen to socialise with his friends including going to parties and clubs, and he will be unable to have relationships with girlfriends or drink alcohol as his family would abuse him and go against him if he did so.
· He was asked why he could not still maintain his chosen lifestyle in Lebanon. He said that he could only do so if he moved to the city. The delegate asked him if there were any reasons why he could not move to the city, given he was an adult and had significant employment history as a [Occupation 1] to help him start a new life in Lebanon. He responded that there was no government support available and that he would find it difficult to find a job and support himself without support from his family.
· He said he feared he would be in trouble with the Sharia Court for renouncing his religion based on him adopting an un-Islamic lifestyle. The Government would not help him as it was about changing his religion.
· He reiterated that he did not want to live according to his faith background and that he no longer has that faith.
· The delegate asked him why he had waited so long to lodge a protection visa application, having only applied in June 2019. He responded that his family had stopped supporting him and that he tried many ways to return to university study, including asking for help from his uncle on his mother’s side, but he could not assist him. As he did not want to return to Lebanon and wanted to ‘get on with my life in my own way’ in Australia, he applied for the visa.
· The delegate asked him when the last time was he spoke to his father. He said it was after he stopped supporting him but he could not recall the details of the last conversation they had, as he has tried to forget it as he just wanted his father out of his life. He recalled that they had talked about his father sending money to support him but his father had refused and said he must listen to his uncle as he was doing things that brought shame on the family.
· The delegate asked him how he knew that his father wanted to physically harm him on his return. He responded that his mother had warned him that his father wants to punish him and hurt him and he fears his father may punch him. His mother also told him that in Lebanon he would need to go back to being a Muslim again in front of the community. He clarified to the delegate that his father had never directly threatened him and they had never talked since the falling out. ‘Because he is a strong man, a hard man, he does not respect me or my freedom or my right to live my life.’
· The delegate asked if there were any other reasons he feared returning to Lebanon. He reiterated that he was worried he would lose his personal freedom and may be subjected to an arranged marriage and that he would be forced to revert to Islam and attend the mosque against his will. He confirmed that he had not converted to any other religion but he did not want to be a practising Muslim anymore.
· The delegate asked him if his siblings in Lebanon were already married. He said none were married yet but that in Lebanon the age of marriage is around eighteen or nineteen years old and he is already beyond that and that in Lebanon he would just have to marry whoever his parents wanted him to.
· His representative, who was present throughout the interview, added that as the applicant had renounced Islam to his uncle this means that if he returned to Lebanon he would have to publicly pronounce his reversion back to Islam, which he does not want to do.
No written submissions or further information was provided by the applicant following the interview.
Delegate’s decision
The applicant’s protection visa application was refused on 28 July 2021. The decision record indicates that the delegate was not satisfied the applicant was owed protection as a refugee or under the complementary protection provisions. In terms of the delegate’s findings of fact, the delegate accepted that the applicant is not a practising Muslim and does not practice any religion. The delegate also accepted that he had been subject to strict parenting by his father. However the delegate did not accept the applicant’s claims that his father would kill him if he returned to Lebanon due to his lifestyle or that he was threatened by his father for renouncing Islam. The delegate found that the applicant had embellished his claims to strengthen his chances of being granted a protection visa.
In assessing the claims accepted by the delegate against the available country information, the delegate noted country information indicating there is a right to freedom of religion in Lebanon, including the freedom to convert to other religions and found that the applicant would not face harm by authorities or any state actor in Lebanon for choosing not to participate in prayers or attend a mosque. The delegate stated that while atheism is considered unacceptable in Lebanon, the applicant would not be minded to publicly denounce is Sunni Islam religion in Lebanon as his main reason for not following Islam was a desire to behave freely and not due to any meaningful disagreement with Islam. Given the delegate’s finding that the applicant had not been seriously harmed or threatened by his father in the past, it found he would be unlikely to face this in the future. The delegate further added that if he did face serious harm, from his father or other family member, country information indicates that he would be able to receive adequate protection from the authorities if required. Finally, the delegate did not accept the applicant’s claim of fearing harm from his father and not wanting to participate in religious activities amounts to serious harm as defined in the Act.
Evidence before the Tribunal
The applicant lodged an application for review of the delegate’s decision on 29 July 2021.
Tribunal invited the applicant to provide further information or submissions in support of his case in letters dated 2 August 2021, 4 February 2025 and 18 February 2025, however no additional information was provided in response to any of these requests nor up until the time of decision.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Criteria for protection visa
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
REASONS AND FINDINGS
The issue in this case is whether the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36 of the Act and cl 866.221 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations.
While the applicant declined to give oral evidence to the Tribunal, the Tribunal, with reference to his protection visa application form and certified copy of his Lebanese passport is satisfied that he is a citizen of Lebanon. There is nothing before the Tribunal to suggest he has citizenship of any other country, or any right to enter and/or reside in any third country. Consequently, the Tribunal is satisfied s 36(3) of the Act does not apply. For the purposes of this protection eligibility assessment, Lebanon is the ‘receiving country’ against which his claims are assessed.
For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.
Tribunal’s findings and assessment against the refugee criteria
The Tribunal notes that s 5AAA of the Act places obligations on applicants for protection visas to specify all particulars of their claims and to provide sufficient evidence to establish their claims. It is also established that, while an inquisitorial process, it is for an applicant to make their case.[4] The fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish the genuineness of the fear or that it is ‘well-founded’ or that it is for the reason claimed. It remains for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that the statutory elements are made out and a decision-maker is not required to make the applicant’s case for them. The Tribunal proceeds in this matter on the basis of the applicant’s claims based on the information before it.
[4] SZBEL v MIMIA (2006) 228 CLR 152; at [40]; Re Ruddock; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 [2003] HCA 60 at [57].
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant was born into an observant Sunni Muslim family in [Village 1] and that his father took a strict approach to parenting him and his siblings, including at times using corporal punishment to discipline them for not completing homework or similar.
The Tribunal also accepts the applicant’s evidence that his father has expectations that his children will continue to observe the Sunni Muslim faith and practices as adults. The Tribunal accepts that in the patriarchal social order in Lebanon, as head of the family, the applicant’s father may hold considerable power to pressure his children and other family members to meet these expectations.
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s father agreed to support his study in Australia based on him living under the supervision of his uncle, also an observant Sunni Muslim. The Tribunal accepts that while studying, the applicant enjoyed freedoms which were not considered acceptable to his uncle, including socialising with his friends, drinking alcohol, having girlfriends and not attending the mosque. It accepts that these behaviours were reported by the applicant’s uncle to his father.
The Tribunal also accepts that the applicant decided to leave his uncle’s house so that he would not continue to be subject to this pressure from his uncle and to avoid the conflicts predictably arising from him not adhering to his uncle’s house rules. The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s claim that his father disapproved of his decision to leave his uncle’s house and to maintain his freer chosen lifestyle and ceased providing financial support to the applicant for his studies and upkeep.
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant wanted to continue his studies and sought help from his mother’s relatives living in Australia but they were unable to assist him so he stopped his studies and started working. He maintained contact with his mother and [a sister]. His mother urged him to return to his uncle’s house and told him that his father was angry with him and would punish him for his behaviour upon his return to Lebanon.
The Tribunal notes that for a person to meet the refugee criteria, they must fear persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in s 5J(1)(a) (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion), and according to s 5J(4)(a) that reason must be the ‘essential and significant’ reason for the persecution feared.
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s religious beliefs and practices is the ‘significant and essential’ reason for the applicant’s fear of harm. In the applicant’s case, his primary claim is fear of harm due to his decision to cease following Muslim practices and an Islamic ‘way of life’, according to the expectations of his father. In essence, the applicant does not want to practice Islamic anymore and wants to his maintain his chosen lifestyle that involves activities that are considered to be un-Islamic in his family and community, including the freedom to socialise with his friends, have girlfriends, drink alcohol and to abstain from regular prayer or attendance at the mosque.
However to meet the refugee criteria, the Tribunal also needs to be satisfied that the applicant faces a ‘real chance’ of treatment amounting to ‘serious harm’ within the meaning of s 5J(5) of the Act.
The Tribunal accepts that based on the applicant’s description of the personality of his father, his parenting approach and his military profile, the applicant’s father may well express his strong disapproval and disappointment in the applicant for defying his expectations, and not adhering to the Islamic practices and lifestyle he expects members of his household to adhere to. He may verbally abuse the applicant. Given the applicant’s mention of his father’s previous use of corporal punishment against him as a child on occasions, he may use a degree of physical violence to express his displeasure of the applicant.
However while there may be continuing discord in the applicant’s relationship with his father in the foreseeable future, there is insufficient information before me to conclude there is a real chance or real risk of his father subjecting him to either one-off or ongoing behaviour that would constitute ‘serious harm’. The information provided by the applicant about the history of his father’s use of violence against family members, does not indicate a real chance of treatment amounting to serious harm. In response to the delegate’s question whether he had ever seen his father hurt anyone, he responded that his father would scream and yell at his mother but he never saw him physically abuse her. He would hit him and other siblings on occasions, such as for not completing their homework. He had never seen him hurt anyone otherwise. In response to the question whether his father had ever killed anyone he said that perhaps he had in the army, he did not know, but he was not aware of any other violent incidents by his father outside of that specific context.
The evidence available suggests that while the applicant’s father has taken a strict approach to parenting and has used corporal punishment at times on his children in the past as a method of discipline. However, the applicant is no longer a child and there is no indication that the applicant’s father would still see it as his role to use physical force to ‘discipline’ his now adult son. The available evidence is that his father does not use physical violence against other family members including his mother and his now-adult siblings or against other people outside of the family household. In addition, the applicant is under no obligation to continue living in his father’s household. He has other extended family and friends in his home area and could live outside his father’s house but still within his community.
I have also considered the applicant’s father’s behaviour since the applicant arrived in Australia. Beyond cutting off financial support to the applicant in 2018, the applicant’s father has never directly or specifically threatened the applicant with other harm for eschewing the Islamic lifestyle he expected of him during his time spent in Australia. The evidence is that the applicant has had no contact with his father since the time his father withdrew financial support for him in October 2018. There is no indication that his father has tried to pressure or threaten him via his uncle who is in Australia, and with whom the applicant has also had no contact with since he moved out of his house in October 2018. The applicant’s evidence at the interview was that he believed his father would punish him upon his return to Lebanon based on his mother telling him this, but without any specific details relating to the seriousness of the threat or the nature of the punishment his father may use.
While his father may well be disappointed with the applicant and may continue to pressure the applicant to comply with his expectations that he maintain an Islamic lifestyle, as he did by cutting off financial assistance to the applicant, I do not accept that the applicant’s father would be motivated to subject the applicant, now [an age]-year-old man, to treatment amounting to ‘serious harm’ in the meaning of s 5J(5) of the Act. This provision requires a genuine threat to the person’s life or liberty, or significant physical harassment or ill-treatment of the person. In this case I do not accept there is a genuine threat made against the applicant’s life by his father. If the applicant feels constrained in his father’s household, he can move out. I also do not accept that the applicant’s father would use significant physical harassment or physical mistreatment against the applicant given the limited information provided regarding a history of family violence by the applicant’s father.
The applicant has also claimed to fear being forced to marry someone chosen by his parents. Again, this claim is very vague and speculative. No details or evidence has been provided regarding whether there is in fact any plan for his parents to select someone they expect him to marry or who that might be. At the Department interview, the applicant’s evidence was that the applicant is the [birth order] in his family. He was [age] years old at that time and told the delegate that none of his [siblings] were married yet. There is no evidence to suggest an established pattern in his family of forced or early marriage. Nor is there any information regarding how his parents would go about actually forcing the applicant, [an age]-year-old man, to marry against his will, especially as he is a man who would be living in a patriarchal society. If there was any plan made by his parents to select a spouse for him, and while he could potentially face pressure from them to do so, there is no information to suggest that he would face a risk of serious harm for refusing to. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant faces a real risk of being forced to marry against his wishes or to marry someone not of his choice.
Based on the limited, vague and general information that the applicant has provided, I do not accept that his father has issued any kind of credible threat against the applicant, or that he would seriously harm or abuse the applicant on his return or that he and his wife would force the applicant into a marriage against his will on his return to Lebanon. In conclusion, I do not accept that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm from his father or his parents more generally. There is also no evidence that he faces a risk of harm from other close relatives. His uncle in Australia has taken no actions against him. The applicant has provided no detail regarding the identity or motivation of any other family member he claims may wish to harm him. I do not accept that the applicant’s extended family presents any credible threat to him.
The applicant also claimed that unrelated Sunni Muslims living in the area may be motivated to harm him. I find that upon his return to Lebanon, the applicant is most likely to return to his home village of [Village 1], as he has never lived in any other part of Lebanon. [Village 1] has a population of around [number] people[5] and is comprised almost exclusively of Sunni Muslims. I accept that the level of acceptance and tolerance for different levels of religious observance can vary significantly within Sunni villages in Akkar and Northern Lebanon more generally. I accept that non-practicing Muslims in a conservative community may face social pressure or criticism, particularly if their lifestyle choices are seen as deviating from established norms, as may be in the applicant’s case. However this kind of treatment, social pressure and criticism, that the applicant may face, does not meet the definition of ‘serious harm’. The applicant has not put forward any information and the Tribunal has also been unable to locate any information, in support of a view that in [Village 1], his home area, the applicant would be subjected to particularly elevated or extreme levels of social pressure from the community or from extremist Sunni groups, such that it could come anywhere approaching a real chance of treatment amounting to serious harm.
[5] [Information deleted]
Regarding the applicant’s claim that returning to [Village 1] would prevent or curtail his ability to abstain from practice of the Sunni religion and to lead a lifestyle considered un-Islamic by observant Muslims, the Tribunal further notes that while s 5J(3) of the Act extends refugee protection to a person faced with being forced to, or not to, practice a religion, I find that the applicant does not face a risk of being forced to practice Sunni Islam in his home area. While he may receive social and familial disapproval for abstaining from Sunni Islamic practices, he would not be forced to participate in Muslim practices and he would not face treatment amounting to serious harm for abstaining from participating in Muslim practices or for practising a non-Islamic lifestyle. While the applicant seeks a liberal lifestyle, including to freely socialise and mix with members of the opposite sex or to drink alcohol if he chooses, the applicant’s lifestyle preferences as set out above cannot be characterised as ‘fundamental’ to his ‘identity or conscience’ as protected under s 5J(3)(a) or such that they prevent him from ‘ceasing to be involved in the practice of his or her faith’, as per s 5J(3)(c)(i).
I also do not accept the applicant’s claim that he would be required to publicly profess his allegiance to Islam upon his return to Lebanon. While he says that his mother has told him he would be required to do this, there is no evidence that he could be forced to do so by a Sharia Court or any other authority. There are criminal offences under the Lebanese Criminal Code for blaspheming or otherwise insulting a religion carrying a maximum penalty of one year’s imprisonment, along with laws against defamation and contempt for religion, which stipulate a maximum prison term of three years. However there is no real chance of the applicant facing prosecution under these provisions as he has not insulted or blasphemed against Islam, but rather he has simply ceased practice of Islam. The prospect of him facing any difficulties under these laws is negligible in his circumstances, especially as prosecution under these provisions is rare.[6]
[6] DFAT Country Information Report Lebanon, 26 June 2023, [3.31].
The applicant’s evidence regarding his religion is that he is no longer a Muslim and nor has he converted to any other religion. He has not claimed to be an atheist or agnostic and nor has he indicated any plan to publicly pronounce himself an atheist on his return. While atheism is not considered widely acceptable in Lebanon,[7] even if he did declare himself an atheist, while he may face social ostracism and criticism, there is no country information to support a view that he would face prosecution or legal sanction, nor treatment from community members or others amounting to serious harm. I note that DFAT country information indicates that religious affiliation is no longer printed on National ID cards but is still recorded by the government on a person’s Personal Status Record (PSR), which governs access to a number of important services. ‘Secular’ is not available as a category; in-country sources report that those who have attempted to be listed as secular can have their sect left blank on a print-out of their PSR but their original sect affiliation will be unchanged in government records.[8]
[7] 'Freedom of Thought Report 2020 - Lebanon', Humanists International, 14 October 2020; Associated Press, 'Fearing ostracism or worse, many nonbelievers hide their views in the Middle East and North Africa', 5 October 2023.
[8] DFAT Country Information Report Lebanon, 26 June 2023, [3.20].
The applicant has not claimed he wishes to change his official status as a Sunni Muslim in his civil documentation in Lebanon. However I have considered a scenario where he may wish to do so. I find that while he could remove reference to his Sunni sect background from his PSR, he would be unable to expunge this status from his government records. While this may make it more difficult for him to apply for public positions, run for public office and in personal status matters,[9] I do not accept that this would in itself, amount to a form of serious harm.
[9] L’Orient le Jour (L’Orient Today), ‘Does a recent court decision smooth the way for sectless candidates? It's complicated', 31 March 2022; 'Freedom of Thought Report 2020 - Lebanon', Humanists International, 14 October 2020, p.2; 'National Report on Freedom of Religion and Belief: Lebanon', Search for Common Ground, July 2023, pp.31,35,44.
The applicant has not raised any other claims that would potentially engage the criteria relating to recognition as a refugee or under complementary protection criteria. Notably, the applicant has not raised any claims or provided any information regarding the current situation in Lebanon with regards to how the volatile security situation or the protracted economic crisis in Lebanon, might impact upon him in particular. This is despite him having legal representation throughout this review and having had multiple opportunities to provide such information, including by giving oral evidence at a hearing.
However the Tribunal is mindful of its duty to assess any residual claims arising from the applicant’s known circumstances, including any other risks foreseeably facing him upon return to Lebanon, a country in the midst of significant upheaval, where conditions have notably significantly deteriorated since the delegate’s decision in 2021. These changed conditions include the dynamic external security situation with regards to the fragile ceasefire with Israel and the risks to the applicant of future re-escalation of armed conflict or any impacts of the previous period of intense conflict on the applicant;[10] any impacts or risks to the applicant caused by the fall of the al-Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, including upon Sunnis in Akkar and Northern Governorates in Lebanon;[11] and the continuing impacts of protracted economic crisis in Lebanon.
[10] Al Jazeera, ‘Hezbollah leader says Lebanese gov’t must do more to end Israeli attacks’, 27 April 2025;[11] Macaron, J. ‘Lebanon Braces for Monumental Changes in Next-Door Syria’ Wilson Center, 17 January 2025.
I find that in the current circumstances in Lebanon, there is a foreseeable risk of further escalation of conflict with Israel in Lebanon due to the fragility of the ceasefire.[12] I note that during the previous period of intense conflict in 2024, there were Israeli airstrikes across many locations in Lebanon, however these were concentrated on southern Lebanon and to a much lesser extent, areas close to crossing points with Syria and isolated attacks in Shia areas of Beirut.[13] There were very few airstrikes in Akkar, with the main target areas being close to the border with Syria.[14] The main impacts of the previous escalation in armed conflict on people in Akkar was the sudden influx of internally displaced people from southern Lebanon, which placed great strain on local capacities to host those displaced from their homes.[15] There was also fear that some amongst those fleeing from the south, may be people targeted by Israel for their suspected associations with Hezbollah and that this may place the wider host population at risk.[16]
[12] Al Jazeera, ‘Hezbollah leader says Lebanese gov’t must do more to end Israeli attacks’, 27 April 2025;[13] BBC, Lebanon: Satellite imagery reveals intensity of Israeli bombing, 24 October 2024; Al Jazeera, ‘Israel pounds Beirut suburbs with heavy daytime air strikes’ 12 November 2024.
[14] Al Jazeera, ‘Deadly Israeli strike shatters sense of ‘safety’ in remote north Lebanon’, 13 November 2024; Al-Monitor ‘War reaches Lebanon's far north after rare, deadly Israeli strike’ 6 December 2024.
[15] Fawaz, M., ‘On the Ground With Lebanon’s Displaced Population, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 11 October 2024,
[16] Reuters, Mass displacement in Lebanon war revives spectre of sectarian strife, 16 October 2024.
Based on the available country information it seems likely that if there is a re-intensification of Israeli bombardment of Lebanon, similar geographic areas will again be targeted. Given the lack of targeting of [Village 1] or areas around it in previous bombardments, in my assessment there is a not a real chance of the applicant being injured or killed in [Village 1] even if there is re-intensification of the conflict by Israel. I further find that while [Village 1] may face a further influx of displaced people, placing further strain on available resources, this would not place the applicant at risk of being unable to subsist as he would be a local person with access to housing and locally grown food supplies through his network of family, friends and members of the local community.
Regarding the impacts of the fall of the al-Assad regime in Syria, this has also fundamentally impacted on the situation in Lebanon for certain groups. Those who are members of minority groups in Lebanon which were perceived to be associated with, or to have benefited from, the al-Assad regime, have likely become more vulnerable in Lebanon now. This is especially since many thousands of members of those same minority groups have fled into Lebanon in 2025 due to reprisal or revenge attacks against them in Syria and may face similar issues now in Lebanon.[17] Conversely, the situation of Sunni groups in Lebanon has strengthened, due to the new transitional President in Syria being from a Sunni background and having led several extremist Sunni groups during the civil war in Syria.[18] Sunni communities and Sunni extremist groups in the northern parts of Lebanon, including Akkar and Northern Governorates, have celebrated the ascendance of Sunni leadership in Syria, due to the interconnectedness of the politics between the two countries.[19] I therefore find that as a Sunni Muslim, the applicant is not at any increased risk due to the change of leadership in Syria and associated impacts on sectarian groups, including Sunnis, in Lebanon.
[17] Astley, A.M., ‘Assad's Fall Threatens to Reignite Decades of Sectarian Strife in Northern Lebanon’ 15 April 2025, DAWN.
[18] Ahmed al-Sharrah, (nom de guerre Mohammed al-Jolani), became the transitional Syrian President in January 2025 and is a former leader of the al-Nusra Front, a recognised terrorist organisation that operated in Syria during the civil war. He was also formerly the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group established after the al-Nusra Front was disbanded.
[19] Abdulnour, R., ‘In Tripoli, a joy tinged with apprehension after Assad's fall’,11 December 2024, L’Orient Today.
I turn to the impacts of the protracted economic crisis in Lebanon commencing in 2019, exacerbated further since 2024 by Israel’s aerial attacks in Lebanon, which caused mass displacement of people, de-stabilised food security and destroyed core civilian infrastructure. I accept that the proportion of the Lebanese population living below the poverty line is now estimated at 60%[20] and that 3.7 million out of Lebanon's 5.7 million population, now require humanitarian aid.[21] I note that according to aid agencies, those who continue to be at highest risk of the most severe economic hardship include refugees from Syria and other countries, vulnerable minority groups within Lebanon or individuals who are vulnerable due to age, gender, disability or health issues and those who lack secure accommodation and family or sect support of any kind.[22] In my assessment the applicant does not fall within the profile of these categories of people facing the most acute economic hardship in Lebanon.
[20] Ghoson, S. ‘Lebanon’s Economic Crisis Pushes 60 Percent of the Population Into Poverty, Lebanese American University’, 25 January 2025.
[21] Lebanese Response Plan, 2024, ‘Lebanon Response Plan 2024 - Chapeau Document’, ReliefWeb.
[22] Ibid; REACH Initiative, ‘Socio-economic vulnerability in Lebanon: Impact and outlook of conflict escalation’ October 2024.
Turning more specifically to the applicant’s situation on return to Lebanon, I note he is a Sunni and therefore not a member of a minority or vulnerable sect. I further note that he is a young man and he is healthy enough to be a full-time [Occupation 1] and therefore does not appear to fit into any of the specified risk categories based on individual vulnerability. As per my earlier finding, he will most likely be returning to his home community in [Village 1], where he has family and community. Even if he continues to have a falling out with his father, he remains in contact with other members of his family including his mother and his sister and he has extended family and friends in the neighbourhood, providing him with a degree of a social support network. His family have their own land and would therefore be able to subsist, despite the protracted economic crisis in Lebanon. The applicant would be returning to Lebanon as a young man with a well-established employment record in Australia and developed skills as a [Occupation 1]. While I accept that the applicant would not be able to find a job at the same level of income he can earn in Australia, I find that he would likely be able to find some work, which would at minimum enable him to subsist. If he is unable to cover all his living expenses through his own employment income, he has family members and community as a safety net. He therefore also does not fit within the category of people at risk of acute financial hardship due to lack of secure housing or any family or community support. I therefore conclude that he would not face economic hardship to the degree that his ability to subsist would be under threat, as per the definition of ‘serious harm’ contained in s 5J(5)(c) of the Act, such that it ‘threatens the person’s capacity to subsist’ or, under s 5J(5)(f), it involves a ‘denial of capacity earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.’
I have considered multiple dimensions of the applicant’s claims and his wider profile against the refugee criteria and found that he does not face a real chance of serious harm from his father, his parents, his extended family or local community due to his religious identity, including his decision not to practice Islam or observe an Islamic lifestyle. He also does not face a well- founded fear of forced marriage and nor does he face a real chance of serious harm in the foreseeable future due to him returning to Lebanon, a country facing significant security and economic challenges. I have also considered the cumulative impact of these integers and find that the applicant will not face a real chance of serious harm due to the combination of these factors.
As such, I am not satisfied the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm for the reasons claimed and considered, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. It follows that he does not meet the refugee criteria set out in s 36(2)(a).
Assessment under complementary protection criteria
Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa). Section 36(2)(aa) refers to a ‘real risk’ of an applicant suffering ‘significant harm’. These terms drawn from the complementary protection criteria are addressed in turn.
In MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505, the ‘real risk’ test was held to impose the same standard as the ‘real chance’ test applicable to the assessment of ‘well-founded fear’ in the Refugee Convention definition. That reasoning appears equally applicable to the now codified statutory refugee criterion in s 5J(1)(b) of the Act.[23] A ‘real chance’ has been found to be one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility and a well-founded fear of persecution may exist even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent: Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 279.
[23] See Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Caseload Legacy) Bill 2014 (Cth), pp.170-1 at [1169] and [1180]).
‘Significant harm’ for the purposes of the complementary protection criteria is exhaustively defined in s 36(2A): s 5(1). Relevantly, it includes ‘cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’, which is exhaustively defined in s 5(1) of the Act to mean an act or omission by which:
(a)severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature.[24]
[24] SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; SZTGM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362 at [26]–[27] and [114]. ‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’ does not include an act or omission which is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR), nor one that arises only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the ICCPR. These exceptions are not relevant to the circumstances of the present case.
As set out above, I am not satisfied there is a real chance that the applicant will experience serious harm in Lebanon because of a risk of violence or other forms of mistreatment from his father, parents or local community due to his religious identity or practices. I am also not satisfied for the reasons set out above, that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm due to him facing physical harm or threats to his life in the event of a re-escalation of conflict with Israel, nor due to financial hardship caused by the continuing challenging economic situation in Lebanon. I am also not satisfied that these risks when cumulatively assessed, may result in the applicant facing a real chance of serious harm in Lebanon.
Similarly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Lebanon, there is a real risk[25] that he will suffer significant harm for any of these reasons, or any other reason, in Lebanon. The Tribunal also notes that under s 36(2B)(c) the definition of ‘significant harm’ excludes risks faced by the population of the country generally and requires an applicant to demonstrate risks that are faced by the applicant personally. There is no information before the Tribunal suggesting that the applicant faces any personalised risk in the current security and economic context in Lebanon beyond those already assessed above.
[25] A real risk, as with a real chance, being one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility, Chan Yee Kin Ors v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379.
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).
Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa).]
There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s 36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s 36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2).
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Date of hearing: Non applicable.
Representative: Mr Sam Issa (MARN: 9475894)
ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a) severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b) pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d) arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b) that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a) for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b) for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c) for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d) for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e) for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a) a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b) if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
5H Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a) in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b) in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note: For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…
5J Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a) the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b) there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c) the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note: For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note: For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a) conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b) conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c) without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a) that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b) the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c) the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a) a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b) significant physical harassment of the person;
(c) significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d) significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e) denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f) denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a) disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b) disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note: Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a) a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b) the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c) any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d) the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a) protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b) the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a) the person can access the protection; and
(b) the protection is durable; and
(c) in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…
36 Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a) a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a) the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b) the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c) the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d) the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e) the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a) it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b) the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c) the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…
Associated Press ‘Israeli jets strike Beirut's southern suburbs for third time since ceasefire’, 27 April 2025; OCHA, ‘Lebanon: Flash Update #65 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 28 March 2025’.
Associated Press ‘Israeli jets strike Beirut's southern suburbs for third time since ceasefire’, 27 April 2025; OCHA, ‘Lebanon: Flash Update #65 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 28 March 2025’.
0
7
0