Decision
Reasons for decision
I have also had regard to the information provided by the UNHCR to the former RRT. In this response the UNHCR state that Bidoons ‘seem to ignore the possibility for them to regularise their situation’ or ‘have rejected the Iraqi nationality and continue to claim their Kuwaiti origins.’[4] The UNHCR report goes on to state that the Bidoons who did not take up the Makremiayah constitute the majority of Bidoons in Iraq.[5][4] UNHCR Country Advice for the RRT, 2010, IRQ37184, Iraq Bidoons, 9 September UNHCR Country Advice for the RRT, 2010, IRQ37184, Iraq Bidoons, 9 September >I have carefully considered the country information and the documents and claims made by the applicant in light of this information. I consider that there are a number of clear findings that can be made.Firstly, I find that the applicant was born in Kuwait, lived much of his life there, [worked for an Employer] and married and had four of his children there. I base these findings on the consistent information of the applicant, which is consistent with country information about the situation for Bidoons in the Kuwait/Iraq region before Operation Desert Storm and on the documentation the applicant provided when he first arrived in Australia. the genuineness of these documents has never been directly impugned and there is no detailed information before me to suggest that they are not genuine.It follows that I find that the applicant and his family were removed to Iraq in 1994. Again, the documentation he has provided from Iraqi authorities around this time supports this. I turn then to whether the applicant availed himself of the Makremiayah. There are several lines of evidence which tend to indicate he did not. He provided evidence that he did not have the requirements to do so – a documented linkage to Iraq from 1957, a declaration that Kuwait was not their place of birth, and a connection with a local tribe in the area. I have had regard to the DFAT information that officials were reportedly flexible with these requirements, but I also note that both DFAT and UNHCR note that the majority of Bidoon did not gain citizenship under the Makremiayah. The reasons for this are not clear, it may be that these families were unable to provide evidence they met the requirements, and in particular that they may not have wished to renounce their association with Kuwait. In this regard I note the ‘Group of righteous owners’ letter, which appears to indicate that the applicant continued to identify as a Kuwaitit as at the date of this letter, 1999. I have had regard to and accept the submissions that the letter is a form of identification of those who were removed from Kuwait and seek to return there and assert their rights, and that this reflects the fact that the applicant did not consider himself as Iraqi at that time. I have had regard to the fact that the claims of the applicant may be at odds with the country information in some respects. I note that the Iraqi Personal Status card for the applicant records his place of birth as Basra, Iraq, and that this might indicate a willingness of the local officials to provide the applicant and his family with some form of documentation short of Iraqi citizenship and an identity card, or it may have been a precursor document with which the applicant was then able to access citizenship under the Makremiayah as this appears one of the requirements. I am also curious about the difference between the personal status cards and an Iraqi identity card, I accept that there is likely a difference between the two but the fact that the applicant and his family were able to obtain some documentation, which allowed them some rights of remaining, health and schooling, appears at odds with the contemporaneous country information that those Bidoon with documents are citizens and those without documents are not and have no documentation or rights to health or education. However, I also acknowledge that the country information is broad brush and may not take account of variations in the situation for differing groups of ‘undocumented’ Bidoon. Ultimately, my concerns about these documents do not rise to the level of certainty with which I am able to make a firm finding that the applicant and his family obtained Iraqi citizenship through the Makremiayah. Further, there is information, in the form of the letter from the ‘Group of righteous owners’ and the consistent testimony of the applicant which go against this.I find on balance that the applicant and his family did not take up citizenship under the Makremiayah. I am certainly not satisfied to the requisite level of satisfaction required when making such a consequential decision under Subdivision C of Division 3 of Part 2 of the Act. Was there, therefore, another opportunity where the applicant took up Iraqi citizenship prior to his protection application? According to him, there is not. According to the cancellation delegate, the fact that his wife and children held Iraqi documents demonstrates that he did. There are several difficulties with the delegate’s reasoning.Firstly, the country information from around the time the applicant made his protection application indicates that, at least according to DFAT in 2010, Bidoon were not able to (legitimately) access Iraqi citizenship after 2003. I say legitimately because DFATs source for this conclusion appears to be the Iraqi government, where they say that ‘The Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement has no record of registration of Bidoon since 2003.’ This does not discount the possibility that Bidoon such as the applicant were able to acquire genuine or non-genuine identity document such as a passport through corrupt channels. I note that the DFAT brief report in 2011 claimed that Bidoon had been able to acquire citizenship, but the method was not explained. At the least this lacuna in the country information needed to be explored by the cancellation delegate. It was not.Secondly, the cancellation delegate appears to assume that because the applicant’s wife and children were issued with identity documents in 2013, they were Iraqi citizens prior to this time. I can see no logical and probative evidence before me to support this reasoning. Thirdly, and related to this point, the cancellation delegate appears to assume that the fact the children hold Iraqi passports demonstrates that they must have acquired Iraqi citizenship by descent from their father, the applicant. Again, this does not necessarily follow. The cancellation delegate has referred to the Iraqi nationality law which appears to allow the father and the mother to pass on their citizenship by descent, so it is not clear why it is assumed that it was their father. But more importantly, citizenship by descent is generally exercised where the parent is an Iraqi at some point prior to the birth of the child. In this case, the cancellation delegate has not explained whether they believe the applicant was an Iraqi citizen from birth (and therefore has provided a large number of fraudulent documents), or alternatively, how the children acquired their citizenship by descent if the applicant or their mother became naturalised Iraqi citizens. In this regard I also accept his evidence that his identifying himself as an Iraqi citizen in the sponsorship form for his wife’s spouse visa was inadvertent and does not reflect the true situationThe applicant did not concede that there had been non-compliance in the ways particularised in the s. 107 notice. A statutory power, such as the power to cancel a visa, requires the existence of provable facts to ground such power.[6] The delegate must reach a state of satisfaction that these facts exist, a real state of satisfaction, as the Court explained in Zhao, must be reached on consideration of available material, and cannot just cancel the visa ‘because the visa holder has failed to show cause why it should not. … A visa cannot be cancelled because the decision-maker has identified a possible ground of cancellation which the visa holder has not been able to rebut.’[7] While it is the case that administrative law does not readily lend itself to a concept of the onus or standard of proof, such concepts are not irrelevant. That is to say, where a statutory power requires the satisfaction of the relevant delegate of that power, and where that power potentially has a profound impact on the lives of those affected, as does a cancellation of a permanent visa, then it appears to me that a consideration of the gravity of the consequences should be borne in mind when deciding what level of satisfaction the delegate should reach in order to ground the power.[8] This is particularly the case in cancellation cases such as these where the claims of the applicant to be a stateless Bidoon at the relevant time of the lodging of his protection visa were accepted by two delegates and the independent reviewer. [6] Mian v MILGEA (1992) 28 ALD 165 at 169; Singh v MIEA [1994] FCA 1534 at [14]. [7] Zhao v MIMA [2000] FCA 1235 at [25] and [32]. [8] Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336.In this case, I am not satisfied that the particularised non-compliance in the s. 107 notice has been made out. The potential non-compliance does not reach the level of satisfaction required to ground the power. It is not disputed that the applicant has provided some contradictory pieces of evidence, most relevantly his responses about his and his families nationality in the 2013 spouse visa application and has returned to his claimed country of former habitual residence from which he sought protection. But I find that these facts do not rise to the level required. They do not establish the non-compliance. In relation to the return of the applicant to Iraq, he has explained and provided documentary evidence of the compelling circumstances under which he returned, and I am willing to accept that he returned taking the precautions he claims. It is demonstrably not the case that returning temporarily to a country would place a person in the same precarious situation as living his life there. I place no weight on his returns to Iraq as signifying that his responses to questions 42 and 47 of his Form 866C, as well as his claims in the associated statutory declaration, are incorrect. I am not satisfied to the requisite state that his answers and responses in this regard are incorrect. Having carefully considered the information before me, the documents the applicant has provided and the country information, I find that I am not satisfied to the requisite state that his responses in relation to his and his families status as stateless persons (Questions 20, 22, 23 of Form 866C and his responses in relation to his wife and children in his Form 866B) at the time he made his protection visa application were incorrect. I find that there is no non-compliance in relation to the applicant’s nationality, status as a stateless person, that of his family, nor of his claimed fear of harm if returned to Iraq or Kuwait established by the information in the s. 107 notice that reaches the level required to ground the power to cancel the visa. For these reasons, the Tribunal finds that there was no non-compliance by the applicant in the way described in the s 107 notice. It follows that the discretionary power to cancel the applicant’s visa does not arise.As the Tribunal is not satisfied that there was non-compliance by the applicant in the way described in the notice given under s 107 of the Act, it follows that the discretionary power to cancel the applicant’s visa does not arise.DECISIONThe Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes a decision not to cancel the applicant’s Subclass 866 (Protection) visa.Sean BakerMemberATTACHMENT – Migration Act 1958 (extracts)5Interpretation(1)In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:bogus document, in relation to a person, means a document that the Minister reasonably suspects is a document that:(a) purports to have been, but was not, issued in respect of the person; or(b) is counterfeit or has been altered by a person who does not have authority to do so; or(c) was obtained because of a false or misleading statement, whether or not made knowingly.97InterpretationIn this Subdivision:application form, in relation to a non‑citizen, means a form on which a non‑citizen applies for a visa, being a form that regulations made for the purposes of section 46 allow to be used for making the application.passenger card has the meaning given by subsection 506(2) and, for the purposes of section 115, includes any document provided for by regulations under paragraph 504(1)(c).Note:Bogus document is defined in subsection 5(1).98Completion of visa applicationA non‑citizen who does not fill in his or her application form or passenger card is taken to do so if he or she causes it to be filled in or if it is otherwise filled in on his or her behalf.99Information is answerAny information that a non‑citizen gives or provides, causes to be given or provided, or that is given or provided on his or her behalf, to the Minister, an officer, an authorised system, a person or the Tribunal, or the Immigration Assessment authority, reviewing a decision under this Act in relation to the non‑citizen’s application for a visa is taken for the purposes of section 100, paragraphs 101(b) and 102(b) and sections 104 and 105 to be an answer to a question in the non‑citizen’s application form, whether the information is given or provided orally or in writing and whether at an interview or otherwise.100Incorrect answersFor the purposes of this Subdivision, an answer to a question is incorrect even though the person who gave or provided the answer, or caused the answer to be given or provided, did not know that it was incorrect.101Visa applications to be correctA non‑citizen must fill in or complete his or her application form in such a way that:(a)all questions on it are answered; and(b)no incorrect answers are given or provided.107Notice of incorrect applications(1)If the Minister considers that the holder of a visa who has been immigration cleared (whether or not because of that visa) did not comply with section 101, 102, 103, 104 or 105 or with subsection (2) in a response to a notice under this section, the Minister may give the holder a notice:(a) giving particulars of the possible non‑compliance; and(b) stating that, within a period stated in the notice as mentioned in subsection (1A), the holder may give the Minister a written response to the notice that:(i)if the holder disputes that there was non‑compliance:(A)shows that there was compliance; and(B)in case the Minister decides under section 108 that, in spite of the statement under sub‑subparagraph (A), there was non‑compliance—shows cause why the visa should not be cancelled; or(ii)if the holder accepts that there was non‑compliance:(A)give reasons for the non‑compliance; and(B)shows cause why the visa should not be cancelled; and(c) stating that the Minister will consider cancelling the visa:(i)if the holder gives the Minister oral or written notice, within the period stated as mentioned in subsection (1A), that he or she will not give a written response—when that notice is given; or(ii)if the holder gives the Minister a written response within that period—when the response is given; or(iii)otherwise—at the end of that period; and(d) setting out the effect of sections 108, 109, 111 and 112; and(e) informing the holder that the holder’s obligations under section 104 or 105 are not affected by the notice under this section; and(f) requiring the holder:(i)to tell the Minister the address at which the holder is living; and(ii)if the holder changes that address before the Minister notifies the holder of the Minister’s decision on whether there was non‑compliance by the holder—to tell the Minister the changed address.(1A)The period to be stated in the notice under subsection (1) must be:(a) in respect of the holder of a temporary visa—the period prescribed by the regulations or, if no period is prescribed, a reasonable period; or(b) otherwise—14 days.(1B)Regulations prescribing a period for the purposes of paragraph (1A)(a) may prescribe different periods and state when a particular period is to apply, which, without limiting the generality of the power, may be to:(a) visas of a stated class; or(b) visa holders in stated circumstances; or(c) visa holders in a stated class of people (who may be visa holders in a particular place); or(d) visa holders in a stated class of people (who may be visa holders in a particular place) in stated circumstances.(2)If the visa holder responds to the notice, he or she must do so without making any incorrect statement.108Decision about non‑complianceThe Minister is to:(a)consider any response given by a visa holder in the way required by paragraph 107(1)(b); and(b)decide whether there was non‑compliance by the visa holder in the way described in the notice.109Cancellation of visa if information incorrect(1)The Minister, after:(a) deciding under section 108 that there was non‑compliance by the holder of a visa; and(b) considering any response to the notice about the non‑compliance given in a way required by paragraph 107(1)(b); and(c) having regard to any prescribed circumstances;may cancel the visa.(2)If the Minister may cancel a visa under subsection (1), the Minister must do so if there exist circumstances declared by the regulations to be circumstances in which a visa must be cancelled.