2102366 (Refugee) - [2023] AATA 2790

2102366 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 2790 (29 May 2023)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
REPRESENTATIVE:  Ms Rebecca Webb (MARN: 1277121)
CASE NUMBER:  2102366
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Ethiopia
MEMBER:Jason Pennell
DATE:29 May 2023
PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 29 May 2023 at 11.10am

CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – Protection Visa – Ethiopia – race – Oromo ethnicity – religion – an Orthodox Christian – imputed and actual political opinion – a supporter of the OLF –membership of the particular social group – journalists in Ethiopia – single women/mothers in Ethiopia – gender-based violence – effective protection measures are not available to the applicant – applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION

Migration Act 1958, ss 5, 36, 65, 91, 499

Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2

CASES

MIMA v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
[The applicant] who claims to be a citizen of Ethiopia, applied for the protection visa on 12 August 2014. The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that the applicant is not a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations.
The applicant initially applied to the Tribunal (differently constituted, (Case No 1619347) (‘the first Tribunal’) for review of the delegate’s decision on 17 November 2016. On 20 April 2020 first Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
The applicant then applied for judicial review to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA). [In] February 2021 the proceeding was remitted by consent on the basis that the decision by the first Tribunal was affected by jurisdictional error. As a result, the applicant application for review was returned to the Tribunal for re hearing.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 24 April 2023 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Amharic and English languages. The applicant was represented in relation to the review by her legal representative, Ms Rebecca Webb of Refugee Legal.

RELEVANT LAW

The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

Refugee criterion

Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).
Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Sections 91R and 91S of the Act qualify some aspects of Article 1A(2) for the purposes of the application of the Act and the Regulations to a particular person. There are four key elements to the Convention definition.
First, an applicant must be outside his or her country.
Second, an applicant must fear persecution. Under s 91R(1) of the Act persecution must involve ‘serious harm’ to the applicant (s 91R(1)(b)), and systematic and discriminatory conduct (s 91R(1)(c)). Examples of ‘serious harm’ are set out in s 91R(2) of the Act. The High Court has explained that persecution may be directed against a person as an individual or as a member of a group. The persecution must have an official quality, in the sense that it is official, or officially tolerated or uncontrollable by the authorities of the country of nationality. However, the threat of harm need not be the product of government policy; it may be enough that the government has failed or is unable to protect the applicant from persecution.
Further, persecution implies an element of motivation on the part of those who persecute for the infliction of harm. People are persecuted for something perceived about them or attributed to them by their persecutors.
Third, the persecution which the applicant fears must be for one or more of the reasons enumerated in the Convention definition - race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The phrase ‘for reasons of’ serves to identify the motivation for the infliction of the persecution. The persecution feared need not be solely attributable to a Convention reason. However, persecution for multiple motivations will not satisfy the relevant test unless a Convention reason or reasons constitute at least the essential and significant motivation for the persecution feared: s 91R(1)(a) of the Act.
Fourth, an applicant’s fear of persecution for a Convention reason must be a ‘well-founded’ fear. This adds an objective requirement to the requirement that an applicant must in fact hold such a fear. A person has a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution under the Convention if they have genuine fear founded upon a ‘real chance’ of being persecuted for a Convention stipulated reason. A ‘real chance’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent.
In addition, an applicant must be unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country or countries of nationality or, if stateless, unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to return to his or her country of former habitual residence. The expression ‘the protection of that country’ in the second limb of Article 1A(2) is concerned with external or diplomatic protection extended to citizens abroad. Internal protection is nevertheless relevant to the first limb of the definition, to whether a fear is well-founded and whether the conduct giving rise to the fear is persecution.
Whether an applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations is to be assessed upon the facts as they exist when the decision is made and requires a consideration of the matter in relation to the reasonably foreseeable future.

Complementary protection criterion

If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).
‘Significant harm’ for these purposes is exhaustively defined in s 36(2A): s 5(1). A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. ‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’, ‘degrading treatment or punishment’, and ‘torture’, are further defined in s 5(1) of the Act.
There are certain circumstances in which there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country. These arise where it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; where the applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; or where the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the applicant personally: s 36(2B) of the Act.

Mandatory considerations

In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs (‘the Department’), and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (‘DFAT’) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

APPLICANT’S CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Applicant’s identity and country of reference

The applicant claims that she was born on [date] in [Town 1], South Ethiopia, Ethiopia[1] and claims to be a citizen of Ethiopia. The applicant provided the Department with a copy of her Ethiopian passport biodata page, which confirms the date and place of the applicant’s birth.[2]
[1] Application for Protection Visa dated 12 August 2014, Dept File No [DELETED], ff1-29 & 234.
[2] Applicant’s passport Dept File No [DELETED], ff 32 & 231.
The documents provided by the applicant are consistent with her evidence to the Tribunal in relation to her identity. There is no evidence to suggest the applicant has a right to enter and/or reside, whether temporarily or permanently, in any other country. Therefore, based on the information provided by the applicant, the Tribunal finds that the applicant is a citizen of Ethiopia and as such her protection claims will be assessed against Ethiopia as the country of reference and ‘receiving country’ respectively.

Migration history

The applicant was granted a class FA subclass 600 (Business Visitor visa) on 15 July 2014 and arrived in Australia on [date] July 2014. She applied for a protection visa on 13 August 2014 and was granted a Bridging A (subclass 010) visa in association with this application. The applicant has held successive Bridging A visas since the expiry of her Business Visitor visa on 20 August 2014. She has not departed Australia since her arrival.

Applicant’s Claims for protection

The applicant’s claim for protection was contained in her protection visa application[3] as follows:
[3] Application for Protection Visa dated 12 August 2014, Dept File No [DELETED], f. 234
‘Why did you leave that country?
I left my country to attend [an event] held in Melbourne. Prior to coming here, my family and I had suffered constant discrimination, abuse and intimidation by the ruling government of Ethiopia. I have been denied of my basic human right to cohabit with other fellow Ethiopians.
After I arrived in Australia and while undertaking my [event], I received the most depressing news from my family in Ethiopia. I was informed of security agents abducting my brothers and confiscation of my property.
The family I left behind have been subjected to ruthless physical abuse and threats by the government agent’s accused me of collaborating with antigovernment movement "Oromo Liberation Front" agents and activists. The government agents subjected them to harsh interrogation, harassment, torture and physical and psychological abuse.
Just recently the current EPRDF ruling government and its security agents have brutally engaged in another ethnic cleansing campaign, where my whole family have been attacked because of our Oromo ethnicity and linked with the OLF group. Authorities have shamelessly sat back and enjoyed while it encouraged its local agents to torture and persecute my families from their livelihood just because of our Oromo ethnicity and to surrender our dignity.
We have been tortured imprisoned and our families have been forcefully displaced after our properties were confiscated. The whereabouts of large numbers of my relatives have not been known to me, as some of them have been brutally beaten and forced to flee the country.
Have you experienced harm in that country?
Yes. In 2005 I was detained by security forces for participating in peaceful demonstration protesting election fraud by the government. At that time, I was a student and did not precisely know what happened during the election. What I know was that the Oromo Congress candidate won the vote and the government reacted violently to this. The government murdered our candidate, whose name was [Name 1]. My family were repeatedly warned by government cadre about me because they suspected that as Oromo Student i had campaigned and gave vote for Oromo Congress candidates. They wanted to teach us a lesson by making us feel afraid of opposing the government. There are no media reports about this incident because journalists in Ethiopia are afraid to write about it. If an Ethiopian journalist ever wrote about what happened and still happening in all regions of Oromia, the government would probably kill that journalist or prison lifetime.
Shortly after I completed my studies at school of journalism [in] Addis Ababa, I was able to gain employment as a reporter for [Employer 1]. In this capacity, I was privileged to meet with other journalists who specialized in Oromo Culture and social issues. We were passionate to contribute our professional and social responsibility for the betterment of our Oromo people life. Myself, as a team member with my friend [and] other co-workers we conducted reports on the benefits of investment activities to local indigenous Oromo farmers.
Hence the team suggested that a public consultation prior to any decision on their land, fair compensation, and training on alternative source of income to optimize the benefit of investment to the country in general and indigenous Oromo farmer in particular. The result of the findings were presented to all office [members]. After that, I was targeted by politician cadres as anti-development and puppet of Oromo Liberation front and/or Oromo Congress.
Politics in Ethiopia particularly in Oromia is very volatile and people have always approached me to know my political opinion. I was locked in a system. I was troubled & saddened. because I know what it means and the consequences of being in the radar of Ethiopian security. Due to this constant surveillance on me, | had to finally take up a temporary assignment to work as a reporter of [Employer 1] and left for [Country 1] where I worked for about 18 months. After I returned in March 2014, I have been detained and brutally treated for one week suspected of providing information and supporting of the local Oromo Liberation Front through my connections and access of information as News reporter.
What do you fear may happen to you if you go back to that country?
I AM FEARFULL OF RETURNING BACK TO ETHIOPIA BECAUSE OF THE UNFORSEEN PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE DEVELOPED SINCE I HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY. I AM FEARFUL OF FACING THE FATE OF THOSE WHO I HAVE WITNESSED BEING ELIMINATED FOR JUST BEING UNDESIRABLE ETHNIC OROMOS AND CONSPIRATORS OF ANTIGOVERNMENT MOVEMENTS.
I AND MY FAMILY HAVE BEEN OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO SECURITY AGENTS. WE HAVE BEEN IMPLICATED WITH MOBILIZING AND ORGANIZING THE OROMOS TO RISE UP.
THE BRUTAL AND CORRUPT REGIME HAS MOBILIZED ITS SECURITY AND MILITARY RESOURCES TO | DEHUMANAIZ AND DEMONIZE MY FAMILY AND FELLOW OROMOS, ALL IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE SURE WE ARE DEEPLY ALIENATED FROM EACH OTHER. THE GOVERNMENT HAS USED VERY CRAFTED AND INUMAN TACTICS TO FOMENT INNER DIVISIONS WITHIN EACH GROUP THROUGH A CALCULATED MISUSE OF POLITICS.
IN THIS REGARD, MANY OF MY FAMILY MEMBERS AND COLLIGUES SUSPECTED OF CONSPIRING TO INSITE UNREST AMONG THE OROMOS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED FOLLOWING A RECENT ANTIGOVERNMENT CAMPAIGN. MY FAMILY AND I HAVE NOW BECOME PRIME SUSPECTS OF ORGANIZING THESE CAMPAIGNS THAT WE HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH.
SINCE I HAVE ARRIVED IN AUSTRALIA, MY BROTHERS ANDA FEW OF MY CLOSE ASSOSCIATES HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND I AM NOW EXTREMELY CONCERNED FOR THEIR WELLBEING AS NO INFORMATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED ABOUT THEIR WHEREABOUTS TO ME.
THIS GOVERNMENT IS COMITTED TO GROSS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHT AND RULE OF LAW. THUS, I REMAIN HERE IN MELBOURNE SEEKING PROTECTION AND SAFETY FROM HARM AND DANGER BEING PERPETRATED BY THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA.
IF I RETURN TO ETHIOPIA, I WILL BE AT EXTREME RISK. I AM FEARFUL FOR SECURITY OF EXTENDED FAMILIES, COLLEGUES AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATES I LEFT BEHIND.
Who do you think may harm/mistreat you if you go back?
I fear mistreatment from the government who has always been against Oromo. We have no right in that country. They want Oromo only to serve them. I also fear harassment from Ethiopians who hate Oromo people. I know my life is not of any value in the government sight, and I don’t have any protection from ongoing ethnic tensions. It is because of these fears I finally decided to apply for protection here in Australia. I want to stay in Australia so that I could be safe.
Why do you think this will happen to you if you go back?
I AM EXTREMELY FEARFUL FOR MY LIFE BECAUSE OF MY OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH VARIOUS AUTHORITIES DUE TO MY OROMO ETHNICITY. MY FAMILY AND I HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO CONTINUED ABUSE AND DISCRIMINATION AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND OBSERVED A LOT OF INJUSTICE AND BRUTALITY TO MY CLOSE ASSOCIATES.
LIKE OTHERS WHO TRIED TO STAND IN THE WAY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND BRUTALLY TREATED BY GOVERNMENT AGENTS, IN THE PAST I HAVE HAD MY SHARE OF CRUEL TREATMENT FOR MY PERSONALOPINION AND BELIEF.
GOVERNMENT SECURITY HAS RAIDED MY FAMILY HOME SINCE I LEFT ETHIOPIA AND MOST RECENTLY ON [DATE]/08/2014, MY BROTHERS HAVE BEEN ABDUCTED AND THEIR WHEREABOUTS IS CURRENTLY UNKONWN. SECURITY FORCES HAVE SUBJECTED MY FAMILY TO FORCEFUL INTEROGATION SUSPECTED OF BEING LINKED TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE LOCAL OROMO LIBRATION FRONT. THEY HAVE BEEN BEATEN, TORTURED AND INTERROGATED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION OF MY INVOLVEMENT WITH THE MOVEMENT BEFORE AND AFTER I LEFT THE COUNTRY.
THE PAST DETENTION AND HORRENDOUS TREATMENT IN THE HANDS OF BRUTAL AGENTS STILL LINGERING FRESH IN MY MIND, COMPOUNDED WITH THIS SUDDEN DEVELOPMENT ON MY IMMEDIATE FAMILY, I AM EXTREMELY CONCERNED FOR MY SAFETY WHILE I REMAIN EXTREMELY WORRIED FOR MY BROTHER'S LIFE.
MY TRAUMATIC PAST AND CURRENT MISTREATMENT ON MY FAMILY MEANS I AM EXTREMELY FEARFUL FOR MY LIFE AND MY CLOSE FAMILY MEMBERS. I WILL BE MISTREATED IN THE HANDS OF THE CURRENT ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT POLICE AND SECURTY AGENTS.AND THEREFORE, I CAN NOT FEEL SAFE TO RETURN BACK WHILE THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IS IN POWER.
Do you think the authorities of that country can and will protect you if you go back?
No. ABSOLUTELY "NO". BECAUSE THE "EPRDF" GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO WEAKEN OR ELIMINATE POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND CONTROL ALL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL LIFE IN THE COUNTRY BY A SINGLE POLITICAL GROUP SYSTEM IT CONTROLS.
FURTHERMORE, THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY TO PROTECT THE INNOCENT, PEACE LOVING AND LAW-ABIDING CITIZEN. IN THIS REGARD IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO SEEK PROTECTION FROM SUCH DICTATORIAL AND BRUTAL REGIME.’

The delegate summarised the applicant’s claims for protection in the Protection Visa Decision Record[4] dated 14 November 2016 as follows:
[4] Dept File No [DELETED] ff. 67-71
·     She was born in [Town 1] in Oromo, South-eastern Ethiopia.
·     She is Orthodox Christian and of Oromo ethnicity.
·     Her father was Oromo, and her mother was part Oromo, part Tigray and Guraga. They have both passed away from medical problems.
·     Her youngest brother is in Awassa, and her other two brothers whereabouts are unknown as they were detained by the authorities.
·     ‘In around March 2014’ she became engaged to her boyfriend, [Mr A], but they are not in contact anymore.
·     That growing up her father would always talk about the Oromo people and their issues in Ethiopia, such as loss of their land, but she does not know if he was involved in any political groups.
·     Two of her mother’s brothers faced problems with the authorities because of their political activities and they fled Ethiopia. Their whereabouts are unknown.
·     In 2005 she participated in a protest regarding the general election outcome and was detained by police for 15 days. She was assaulted and threatened, then released after being forced to sign a document saying she would not participate in demonstrations again. The authorities warned her parents if the applicant was involved in ‘any other activities’.
·     She studied journalism as she decided she wanted to write about current issues in Ethiopia, including exposing information about the government to the public.
·     She obtained a passport in 2010 because she needed it to buy a condominium and did not have an identity card from Addis Ababa.
·     She started to work for “[Employer 1]” in 2011. She claims it is critical of the government and the way that Ethiopian people are treated. Claims she wrote articles in Amharic which were translated into English.
·     As part of her role, she would travel around Ethiopia to gather information, travelling with colleagues who were also reporters or photographers, and would write articles including about Oromo farmers encourages them to develop their own land.
·     After working ‘for around 8-9 months in Addis Ababa, she started to receive calls on her mobile phone from unidentified people accusing her of supporting the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and to stop provoking Oromo people. She was scared. Her colleague also received calls.
·     She went to [Country 1] to visit her [relative] and her boss suggested she go there to work too, reporting on the political climate at the time and sending articles back for the magazine.
·     She ended up staying longer than planned to continue reporting for her boss, and during this time her [relative] lost her passport, so she had to get a new one while there.
·     During her time in [Country 1], she went to an area [where] there were a lot of Oromo people, and on one occasion she went to the OLF office based there but had no other connection to the OLF.
·     ‘One day’ she was attacked by two men on motorbikes and people laughed at her. After this she felt unsafe and returned to Ethiopia.
·     A few days after returning an unknown caller spoke to her and commented that she was back in Ethiopia.
·     A few days later two men from Ethiopian security stopped her on her way to work, detained her in prison for a week and assaulted her. She was then released without questioning.
·     Her family advised her other journalists were taken to prison at the same time, and others not arrested had fled Ethiopia.
·     A few days later she returned to work but 10 days later she received a letter summoning her to the local police station where she was told they knew she supported the OLF and had worked with them in [Country 1]. She denied the accusations and was released with a warning not to be involved with the OLF.
·     She returned to work and was terrified, until her boss advised she was to go to Australia for [an event].
·     After arriving in Australia, she lost communication with her brothers in Ethiopia, eventually talking to a neighbour who advised her security raided the house and arrested her brothers.
·     The neighbour advised her not to return to Ethiopia as the security officers had been asking for the applicant’s documents during the raid of the house.
·     While at the [event] colleague and another journalist were arrested and detained, their whereabouts are unknown.
·     She decided with her colleague not to return to Ethiopia and sought help in Australia.
·     She still does not know where her brothers are, and when her fiancé did not talk to her about her family, she stopped talking to him.
·     Her youngest brother spoke to her and advised he is in hiding and the other two are detained.
·     She fears being arrested and detained, tortured or killed by the authorities if she returned to Ethiopia, because she is Oromo, has worked as a journalist, and was suspected of being involved with the OLF.
·     The fact she did not return to Ethiopia after the [event] in Australia will also be a problem for her with the authorities, as it will indicate she is against them.
·     She cannot live in other areas of Ethiopia because she needs to show her identity card and would be targeted by the authorities.
·     At the applicant’s PV interview, she claimed since arriving in Australia she has been somewhat involved in political activities.

The Applicant’s evidence.

In addition to her oral evidence provided to the Tribunal, the applicant’s evidence to the Department was contained in protection visa application[5] and her statutory declaration dated 19 October 2015[6] (‘the first statutory declaration’) and her statutory declaration dated 15 April 2023[7] (‘the second declaration’).
[5] Application for a Protection (Class XA) visa, submitted 13 August 2014, Dept file No. [DELETED], f 32
[6] Applicant’s statutory declaration dated 19 October 2015; Dept File No [DELETED] f. 177
[7] Applicant’s statutory declaration dated 15 April 2023; AAT file No 2102366 Doc ID:10962059
The applicant’s evidence as that she was born on [date] in [Town 1] in Oromia, south-eastern Ethiopia. The applicant’s evidence was that her parents have both passed away. Her mother passed away in or about 2009 from illness and her father passed away in or about 2011 due to [a medical condition]. Her father was ethnic Oromo and her mother a mix of Tigrayan and Gurage. Her evidence was that her parents were ‘traders’ selling crops at the local market. The applicant’s evidence was that because her father was Oromo, she was also considered to be Oromo. Accordingly, she claims she is an ethnic Oromo.[8]
[8] Applicant’s statutory declaration dated 19 October 2015 [2]-[6]; Dept File No [DELETED] f. 177
The applicant’s evidence is that she is an Orthodox Christian. The applicant can read, speak, and write Amharic and Oromo.[9]
[9] ibid
The applicant’s evidence was that she has three [brothers]. The applicant’s evidence was that her youngest brother is living in Awassa. However, her other two brothers faced problems with the authorities because of their political activities. Her evidence was that they were detained by the authorities. The applicant does not know where they are but believes they have fled Ethiopia.[10]
[10] ibid
The applicant’s evidence as that she lived with her family in [Town 1] until she was [age] years old when they moved to [Town 2] town, approximately [number] km south of the capital, Addis Ababa. The applicant attended primary and secondary school in [Town 2] town, completing [a grade] in 2004. After completing school, the applicant worked with her parents for a couple of years. In 2008 the applicant commended a Diploma of Journalism [in] Addis Ababa. In 2011 the applicant commenced work at [Employer 1] in Addis Ababa as a News Reporter. [11]
[11] ibid
The applicant’s evidence was that in or about March 2014, she became engaged to her boyfriend, [Mr A] and they intended to get married in 2015. However, the applicant claims in or about September 2014 he disappeared, and she has not seen hm since.[12]
[12] ibid
The applicant’s evidence was that while she was growing up growing up, she would hear her father speak about Oromo issues including the fact that Oromo land had been taken from people. The applicant was not aware if her father was involved in politics, but her evidence was that he spoke about exposing the government at that time and believed that the Oromo people had been treated unfairly.[13]
[13] ibid
The applicant’s evidence[14] was that in 2005, while she was still at school, a general election was held in Ethiopia. The Oromo candidate, [Name 1], was elected to parliament for the Oromo Congress (now known as the Oromo Federalist Congress). The applicant’s evidence was that after the election demonstrations occurred claiming that the election had not been conducted fairly. The applicant claims that she attended a protest. Her evidence was that she walked with some friends from her school to the centre of [Town 2] to show their support for [Name 1]. When they reached the town centre, many police arrived in dark blue vans arrived to disperse the crowd. They started hitting the people in the crowd with sticks causing them run away. The applicant’s evidence was that she was grabbed by two police officers and dragged into a van.
[14] Applicant’s statutory declaration dated 19 October 2015 [12]-[30]; Dept File No [DELETED] f. 177
The applicant’s evidence was that she was placed in van with about 10 other people. They were beaten with sticks before the van was locked and driven away. The applicant’s evidence was that while they were in the van the police officers asked why they had been disturbing civilians. The applicant claims that they drove for several hours before being forcibly removed from the van. The applicant was taken to an office where she was asked her name and to sign some paperwork. The applicant was not able to say what the paperwork was for.
The applicant’s evidence was that she was taken to a cell with three other female students. The applicant’s evidence was that the cell was empty and cramped. It did not have any window. The applicant claims that before leaving the cell, the police hit her with their hands and wooden sticks. They left her in the cell overnight.
The applicant’s evidence was that the next day two police officers returned to the cell and started hitting the applicant and the three other women again asking why they had disturbed the city. That evening, the applicant and the other were given some bread and tea. They were taken to separate toilet.
On the third day the applicant claims that a police officer came her cell smelling of alcohol. He dragged the applicant out of the cell into another room. The applicant was scared that he was going to rape her, so she screamed until another officer arrived. The officer pulled her attacker away and took the applicant back to her cell.
The applicant’s evidence was that she was held in the cell for 15 days. Each day the applicant and the other occupants were beaten and asked questions about their ‘objectives.’ The applicant’s evidence was that after about 10 days they were taken outside each day for around 30-45 mins. During this time the applicant spoke to other inmates and discovered she was in [a named] prison in [a town], Ethiopia.
The applicant was released with the other three students she has shared the cell with. The applicant’s evidence was that they were warned not to repeat their behaviour and were forced to sign a document promising not to participate in demonstrations again. They were released at the gate of the prison.
One of the girls with whom the applicant shared the cell, known to the applicant as [name], had a friend in [town], Ethiopia. When they were released the applicant and the three girls went to a shop and asked to use the phone. They contacted [her] friend, who picked them up gave them some money so they could travel back to [Town 2]. When she arrived home her parents said that they feared she was dead. The applicant’s evidence was that after recovering for a while at home, she returned to work. After the applicant returned home, her parents received a letter from the authorities warning them that they would be detained if the applicant was caught in any further protests.
The applicant’s evidence was that after she returned home, she discovered that [Name 1] had been killed.
The applicant did not experience any further problems during the time she was in high school. Her evidence was that during this time she would regularly travel to Addis Ababa on weekends and stay with family friends.
Applicant as a Journalist
In September 2008 the applicant commenced a Diploma of Journalism [in] Addis Ababa. During this time, she did not experience any issues and completed her diploma in 2010. In 2011 she commenced work at [Employer 1], a [magazine]. The applicant claims that the magazine is critical of the government and the way that Ethiopian people are treated. The applicant’s evidence was that the magazine is written in English and distributed outside of Ethiopia but still possible to purchase in Ethiopia.
The applicant’s evidence was that the magazine had two offices in Addis Ababa. She worked from the office located in [an] area. Her boss’s name was [Name 2]. An internet search by the Tribunal showed that [Name 2] is the owner of [Employer 1]. As a reporter the applicant would write articles in Amharic and these articles were then edited and translated into English to be published.
The applicant’s evidence was that as part of job she would travel to different parts of the city and sometimes to other cities and rural areas in Ethiopia to gather information. Sometimes I would travel with other colleagues, reporters, or a photographer. Some of the applicant’s articles were directed at Oromo farmers encouraging them to develop their own land. In late 2011, the applicant claims that she worked on a project with a colleague [in] which she consulted with Oromo farmers and reported to the Land Commissioner for the area. In addition, the applicant claims that she published an article critical of the government concerning underprivileged people in Addis Ababa who had been forced for their homes so that they could be demolished, and the land sold by the government to developers.
The applicant’s evidence was that after about 8 months in Addis Ababa, she and her colleagues started to receive calls from unidentified people telling her to stop provoking Oromo people and accusing her of supporting the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The applicant claims that the calls were terrifying and made her frightened about what might happen.
On 3 October 2012 the applicant travelled to [Country 1] to report on the revolution in [Country 1]. The applicant initially went to [Country 1] on a temporary basis (one month) to report on the political situation that was occurring. When she arrived in [Country 1], she was given a six-month visa. The applicant’s evidence was that it was not safe in [Country 1]. Nevertheless, she regularly attended public protests at [a location] and other parts of the city for the purposes of reporting on them.
The applicant initially stayed with her [relative], but after one month the applicant was asked by her employer to remain in [Country 1]. As a result, she moved to share a house with two other people. Her evidence was that she lived in an area [which] has a large Oromo population. Over time I became aware that Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) had an office in the area which she visited once. Her evidence was that she has not otherwise had any other connection to the OLF.
The applicant’s evidence was that one day she went to the market to purchase some injera[15]. The applicant’s evidence was that on the way home she was struck on the chest by two men on motorbikes causing her to scream and loose the injera. As a result of the incident the applicant refused to stay in [Country 1] any longer and arranged to return home to Addis Ababa. The applicant returned to Ethiopia on [date] March 2014.
Applicant’s detention – March 2014
[15] Injera is a sour fermented pancake/flatbread with a slightly spongy texture, traditionally made of teff flour. In countries such a Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan injera is a staple food similar to bread or rice elsewhere (see Mekonnen, Yohannes. Ethiopia: the Land, Its People, History and Culture. 29 January 2013, Yohannes Mekonnen at p. 362)
After about three or four days after the applicant had returned to Ethiopia from [Country 1], she received call from a stranger confirming that she had just returned to Ethiopia. The applicant’s evidence was that few days later, while on the way to work, the applicant was approached by two Ethiopian security officers. Upon approaching the applicant, they displayed their ID cards to the applicant and asked her for her ID card. They then informed the applicant that she was wanted for questioning. The applicant was instructed to get into their car, a blue and white police car. The applicant resisted and questioned why she had to go with them upon which they forced her into the car. The applicant claims that she was drive to [a prison], located in Addis Ababa. The applicant was able to identify the prison because she was taken during the day and was able to read the sign on the outside of the prison as they entered. The applicant’s evidence was that when they arrived at the prison, she was taken to a dark room. The applicant recalls that she could hear people screaming in the surrounding rooms. Once in the room she was kicked and beaten. She does not recall what was said to her at that time. After she was beaten, she was left locked inside the room. The applicant was not given anything to eat or drink for the rest of the day. The applicant claims that the room had a wooden floor and no furniture. When the security officers returned, she was taken to another room with lots of women where she was held for one week.
The applicant’s evidence was that she was detained for a week during which she was beaten and tortured many times. The applicant’s evidence was that after a week, she was selected with three other women and released. The applicant was not required to sign anything upon being released. Upon being released she went to a shop nearby the prison and used the telephone to call her family. The applicant’s brother with a neighbour came to collect her. They explained that many journalists had been detained and taken to prison with those who had not been detained fleeing the country. Her neighbours could not believe that she had been released because people who are taken by security officers were often never seen again.
Following her release from prison, the applicant returned to work after a few days’ recovery. Her evidence was that her colleagues had not experienced any issues, but other journalists had been detained. The applicant’s evidence was that the magazine’s photographers, who had been working in Afar, had also been detained and released.
Ten days after she was released, the applicant claims she received a letter from the police summoning her to attend the local police station for questioning. The applicant attended the police station as summoned upon which she was taken to an office with an officer sitting behind a computer. The officer informed her that they had information that she was supporting the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a terrorist organisation. The officer accused the applicant of working for the OLF in [Country 1] and asked if she was going to continue these activities in Ethiopia. The applicant denied the allegations. The police questioned her for about an hour and then released her with a warning not to be involved with the OLF.

As a result of the police interview the applicant became scared for her safety. At about this time her boss at the magazine arranged for her to travel with him to the [event] in Australia in July 2014. The applicant’s boss made the travel arrangements to attend the [event] and they departed Ethiopia on [date] July 2014. The applicant travelled to [Melbourne].
Applicant in Australia
The applicant attended [event] in Melbourne. During the [event] the applicant was contacted by her brothers in Ethiopia using [social media] which was normal. However, after the [event] the applicant initially attempted to contact her [brother], but his phone was turned off. She then tried to contact her other brothers but was not able contact them. Friends in Ethiopia told her that they had not seen them for one or two days. The applicant finally spoke with one of her neighbours, [who] told her that the security forces had raided their house and forcibly arrested the applicant’s brothers. [The neighbour] said to the applicant that they had been taken because of her and warned her not to return.
In addition, the applicant also discovered that her colleague, [and] another journalist had been arrested and detained. The applicant does not know what happened to them. As a result, the applicant and her colleague, [name], ran away and hid from their boss. They were afraid that he would have stopped them and forced them to return. They explained their circumstances to a taxi driver who took them to [a] [Church]. The Church arranged a place for them to stay. The people who helped them told the applicant about being able to apply for a protection visa and took them to the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre.
Approximately six months after the applicant arrived in Australia a friend of her youngest brother, [told] her that he was in Awassa. He told the applicant that her other brothers had been detained but did not know where they were.
The applicant fears that if she is returned to Ethiopia, she will be targeted because she is an ethnic Oromo, because she is a journalist and is suspected of being involved with the OLF. She claims she will be arrested and detained. She fears that he will ‘disappear’ like her brothers. She claims that if she is detained, she will be interrogated, physically or psychologically assaulted, tortured, raped or even killed.

Applicant’s supporting documentation

The applicant provided the following written material to the Tribunal in support of her first merits review application:
·Statutory declaration of the applicant dated 19 October 2015.[16]
[16] Dept File No [DELETED] f. 71.
·Legal submissions dated 13 January 2020[17]
[17] AAT file No 1619347, Doc ID: 6783015.
·Statutory declaration of the applicant dated 13 Jan 2020[18]
[18] ibid.
·The applicant’s [Employer 1] Reporter ID card valid 11 July 2014 to 30 December 2016.[19]
[19] Dept File No [DELETED], ff. 30-31.
·Certified copies of papers from [Employer 1] dated May 2013[20]
[20] AAT file No 1619347, Doc ID: 6783015.
·Screenshots of the applicant’s [social media] posts[21]
[21] ibid.
·Further legal submissions dated 6 February 2020[22]
[22] AAT file No 1619347, Doc ID: 6879153.
·Further legal submissions dated 13 March 2020, including the following sources of country information: [23]
[23] AAT file No 1619347, Doc ID: 7040840.
·Legal submissions dated 17 April 2023[24]
[24] AAT file No 2102366, Doc ID: 10962059.
·Statutory declaration of the applicant dated 16 April 2023[25]
[25] ibid.
·Screenshots of the applicant’s social media posts[26]
[26] ibid.
·Photos of the applicant at protests in Canberra[27]
[27] ibid.
·Letter from [a] friend of the applicant, dated 8 April 2023[28]
[28] ibid.
·Birth certificate of the applicant’s child, [name], born [date][29]
[29] ibid.
·Birth documents[30]
·Screenshots of birth registration of [name], born [date][31]
·The Washington Post, "Ethiopia's first shot at real democracy could be derailed before elections are held" (9 March 2020)
·Human Rights Watch, "Ethiopia: Communications Shutdown Takes Heavy Toll" (9 March 2020).
·AIIAfrica, "Ethiopia: Is Ethiopia Ready to Hold August 2020 Election?" (9 March 2020).
·France24, "Ethiopia's Abiy faces outcry over crackdown on rebels" (29 February 2020).
·ArabNews, "Ethiopia: 29 injured in 'bomb attack' at pro-Abiy rally" (23 February 2020).
·Borkena, "Mayor confirms two followers of Orthodox Church killed in Addis as they defend against demolition of church, denies he ordered it" (5 February 2020).
·Borkena, "Ethiopian Christians march in Addis Ababa as police shooting victims laid to rest" (6 February 2020).
·Africa News, "Ethiopian journalist seeks asylum in UK, jabs touted press freedom" (24 January 2020).
[30] ibid
[31] AAT file No 2102366, Doc ID: 10962059.

COUNTRY INFORMATION

In accordance with Ministerial Direction No. 84 of 24 June 2019 made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal also had regard to the country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The Tribunal has referred to the latest DFAT report on Ethiopia dated 12 August 2020 (the DFAT Report’) marked as ‘Annexure A’ to this decision.

CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

The issue in this case is whether the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as outlined in s 36(2)(a) or s 36 (2)(aa) of the Act. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.

Credibility

When assessing claims, the Tribunal must make findings of fact in relation to the claims. In doing so, the Tribunal is mindful of the difficulties faced by refugee applicants, including issues related to the use of interpreters, nervousness and anxiety in a Tribunal environment, and stress caused by separation from home and family. There may also be memory issues resulting from the lapse of time, and cultural issues which affect how an applicant may answer questions. The benefit of the doubt should be given to an applicant who is generally credible but unable to substantiate all his or her claims. All this is considered in these findings.
The mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is ‘well-founded’ or that it is for the reason claimed. Similarly, that an applicant claims to face a real risk of significant harm does not establish that such a risk exists, or that the harm feared amounts to ‘significant harm’. It remains for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that all of the statutory elements are made out. A decision-maker is not required to make the applicant’s case for him or her. It is the responsibility of the applicant to specify all particulars of the claim to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and to provide enough evidence to establish the claim. The Tribunal does not have any responsibility or obligation to specify, or assist in specifying, any particulars of the claim, or to establish or assist in establishing the claim,[32] nor is the Tribunal required to accept uncritically all the allegations made by an applicant.[33]
[32] s 5AAA Migration Act 1958.
[33] MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596, Nagalingam v MILGEA (1992) 38 FCR 191, Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70.
A reasonable approach needs to be adopted when making a finding in relation to an applicant’s credibility.[34] Care must be taken that the approach does not result in an exclusion from consideration of the totality of some evidence where a portion of it could reasonably have been accepted.
[34] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and McIllhatton v Guo Wei Rong and Pan Run Juan (1996) 40 ALD 445 per Foster J @ p.482
If an applicant’s account appears credible, they should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt.[35] However, such a benefit should only be given when all available evidence has been obtained and checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility. The applicant’s statements must be coherent and plausible and must not run counter to generally known facts.

The accepted facts

[35] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva, 1992 at para 196.

Having considered the applicant’s evidence, the Tribunal accepts and finds that the applicant:
(a)was born on [date] in [Town 1] in Oromia, south-eastern Ethiopia
(b)moved to [Town 2] town with her family when she was about [age] years old
(c)has parents who have both passed away
(d)had a father who was ethnic Oromo, and a mother who was a mix of Tigrayan and Gurage
(e)is ethnic Oromo[36]
[36] Applicant’s statutory declaration dated 19 October 2015 [2]-[6]; Dept File No [DELETED] f. 177
(f)is an Orthodox Christian
(g)can read, speak and write Amharic and Oromo[37]
(h)has three [brothers]
(i)attended primary and secondary school in [Town 2] town, completing [a grade] in 2004
(j)worked with her parents for a couple of years after completing school
(k)commended a Diploma of Journalism at [a] College in Addis Ababa in 2008
(l)commenced work at [Employer 1] in Addis Ababa as a News Reporter in 2011[38]
(m)Had a father who believed that the Oromo people had been treated unfairly[39]

The applicant’s relevant grounds

[37] ibid

[38] ibid

[39] ibid

The applicant submits that her claims fall within s 5J(1)(a) of the Act on the following basis:
(a)Her race/ethnicity as Oromo/mixed-race.
(b)Her religion as Orthodox Christian.
(c)Her actual and imputed political opinion; and
(d)Her membership of the particular social group, namely:
(i) Journalists in Ethiopia.

(ii) Oromo Journalists.
(iii)Women in Ethiopia
(iv)Single women/mothers in Ethiopia.

In relation to the applicants race, the Tribunal is required to apply the applicant’s claim in relation to her race as an ethnic Oromo in the ‘widest sense.’[40] The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status provides a guide as to race as a well-founded fear of persecution.[41] It states:[42]
68. Race, in the present connexion, has to be understood in its widest sense to include all kinds of ethnic groups that are referred to as “races” in common usage. Frequently it will also entail membership of a specific social group of common descent forming a minority within a larger population. Discrimination for reasons of race has found world-wide condemnation as one of the most striking violations of human rights. Racial discrimination, therefore, represents an important element in determining the existence of persecution.
…
70. The mere fact of belonging to a certain racial group will normally not be enough to substantiate a claim for refugee status. There may, however, be situations where, due to particular circumstances affecting the group, such membership will itself be sufficient ground to fear persecution.
[40]    Calado v MIMA (1998) 81 FCR 450 at 455
[41]    Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 392, per Mason CJ
[42]    UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status at paras 68-70
In this case, based on the applicant’s evidence, the Tribunal has accepted that she belongs to the Oromo ethnic group as claimed. Accordingly, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s claims fall within the scope of s 5J(1)(a) of the Act by reason of her race.
In addition, the applicant claims that she will be persecuted upon her return to Ethiopia by reason of her actual or imputed political opinion as a supporter of the OLF. The applicant claims that she will be viewed as being an OLF supporter because she was detained because of attending the demonstration against the government and that she was a supporter of OLF candidate, [Name 1]. In addition, the applicant claims that because of her work as a journalist she would be imputed with the political opinion of supporting the OLF.
The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status[43] notes that ‘[H]holding political opinions different from those of the Government is not in itself a ground for claiming refugee status, and an applicant must show that he has a fear of persecution for holding such opinions.’ That is, that applicant must hold opinions not tolerated by the authorities and such opinions will come to the notice of the authorities or will be attributed to the applicant by the authorities upon his return to Ethiopia.
[43] UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, paragraphs 80-86; Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 392
The Full Federal Court in V v MIMA[44] observed in relation to a person’s political opinion that:
(a)it is enough that a person holds (or is believed to hold) views opposed to the government and is persecuted for that reason;[45]
(b)it is not necessary that a person be a member of a political party or other public organisation or that the person’s opposition to the instruments of government be a matter of public knowledge;[46]
(c)‘political opinion’ is not limited to party politics in the sense that expression is understood in a parliamentary democracy;[47]
(d)the holding of an opinion inconsistent with that held by the government of a country explicitly by reference to views contained in a political platform or implicitly by reference to acts reflective of an unstated political agenda will be the holding of a political opinion;[48]
(e)‘political opinion’ may be shown by repeated conduct which is never (or rarely) converted into articulate political protest of the kind familiar to Australian society.[49]
[44]    V v MIMA (1999) 92 FCR 355 at 363. It is noted that the Court’s observations were made in the context of dealing with the Convention
[45] ibid
[46] ibid
[47]    V v MIMA (1999) 92 FCR 355 at 367
[48] ibid
[49]    V v MIMA (1999) 92 FCR 355
The applicant’s fear of persecution based on her political opinion, in all the circumstances, is a question of fact.[50] Based on the applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal by the applicant, the Tribunal accepts that her claim falls within the scope of s 5J(1)(a) of the Act by reason of her imputed political opinion.
[50] Maningat v MIMA (Federal Court of Australia, Tamberlin J, 30 April 1998) at 4
The applicant to claims that she has a well-founded fear of persecution within the scope of s 5J(1)(a) of the Act as a member of a PSG, as a
(a)Journalists in Ethiopia.
(b)Oromo Journalists.
(c)Women in Ethiopia
(d)Single women/mothers in Ethiopia.
(a).
Section 5L of the Act[51] states:
[51] In Applicant A (1997) 190 CLR 225 re: Dawson J
Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person's family) if:
(a) a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)any of the following apply
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic.
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member's identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it.
(iii) the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

(d)the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

In MIMA v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR [52] the High Court, when considering the refugee convention, found that it would be open for the Tribunal to declare that 'women in Pakistan' meets the description of PSG. On the issue of such a large group His Honour Chief Justice Gleeson stated that:[53]
'The size of the group does not necessarily stand in the way ... There are instances where the victims of persecution in a country have been a majority. It is power, not number, that creates the conditions in which persecution may occur.'
[52] MIMA v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1
[53] MIMA v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1 at [33]

In this case the applicant claims that being an Oromo female from Ethiopia is a characteristic that is so fundamental to her identity or conscience that she should not be forced to renounce it. In addition, it is a characteristic that distinguishes the group from the rest of society. That is, Oromo women in Ethiopia, or alternatively Oromo women in Ethiopia who have advocated for Oromo rights. As such, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant is a member of a PSG pursuant to s 5L. Accordingly the Tribunal accepts her claim falls within the scope of s 5J(1)(a) of the Act.
For the reason expressed below, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant is a person who advocates for the benefit of the Oromo people, both in Ethiopia and while in Australia. As such, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant is a member of a PSG pursuant to s 5J(1)(a) of the Act as claimed.
Finally, the applicant claims that she falls within s.5J(1)(a) of the Act by reason of her religion as an orthodox Christian. The scope of ‘religion’ within the context of the Convention was considered in MIMA v Darboy[54] in which the Federal Court referred to the following passage from the High Court’s judgment in Church of the New Faith:
The canons of conduct which he accepts as valid for himself in order to give effect to his belief in the supernatural are no less a part of his religion than the belief itself. Conversely, unless there be a real connexion between a person’s belief in the supernatural and particular conduct in which that person engages, that conduct cannot itself be characterised as religious.
[54] [1998] FCA 931 (Moore J, 6 August 1998). (See also Wang v MIMA (2000) 105 FCR 548 and Liu v MIMA [2001] FCA 257 (Cooper J, 16 March 2001) at [19]–[22])
The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status provides an overview of the scope of ‘religion’[55] as:
71‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Human Rights Covenant proclaim the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which right include the freedom of a person to change his religion and his freedom to manifest it in public or private, in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
72Persecution for “reasons of religion” may assume various forms, e.g. prohibition of membership of a religious community, of worship in private or in public, of religious instruction, or serious measures of discrimination imposed on persons because they practise their religion or belong to a particular religious community.
73Mere membership of a religious community will normally not be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status. There may, however, be special circumstances where mere membership can be a sufficient ground.’
[55] UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status at [71]–[73] >
The question of whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of religion may arise in a variety of factual circumstances and may include the application of generally applicable religious-based laws, departing from orthodox religious beliefs or transgressing social mores, conversion, apostasy and mixed marriage.[56] It will often depend on the motivation of the persecutor or in circumstances where any fear is caused by the operation of generally applicable laws, whether there is a persecutory intent or nature to those laws or to the way they are applied.[57]
[56] To be an apostate does not require conversion from one faith to a different faith but does require abandonment or rejection of the first faith: WZAOO v MIAC (2012) 134 332 at [12], citing W161/01A v MIMA [2002] FCA 285
[57] VCAD v MIMIA [2004] FCA 1005 per Kenny J, at [35]

It has been held that persecution for reasons of religion will often involve prohibition against, restrictions on, or punishment for, a particular religious practice.[58] It requires an assessment in the light of all the circumstances, including, where relevant, the ‘central tenets’ of the religion, how an applicant is likely to manifest his or her religious beliefs and the likelihood of that manifestation attracting a persecutory reaction from the authorities.[59]
[58] Wang v MIMA (2000) 105 FCR 548; Woudneh v Inder (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Gray J, 16 September 1988); MIMA v Zheng [2000] FCA 50 (per Hill, Whitlam & Carr JJ, 10 February 2000)
[59] Pei Lan He v MIMA [2001] FCA 446 (Ryan J, 23 April 2001)
In this case, the applicant claims that she will be persecuted if she is returned to Ethiopia as an Orthodox Christian. The applicant provided the Tribunal with little evidence in relation to the persecution she claims she will suffer as an Orthodox Christian upon her return to Ethiopia. In circumstances where the available country information[60] states that the risk of official and societal discrimination or violence is low in Ethiopia the Tribunal has found below that there is no real chance she will be seriously harmed if she is returned to Ethiopia by reason of her religion. Nevertheless, the Tribunal accepts that her claim based on her religion falls within s 5J(1) of the Act.

The applicant’s well-founded fear

[60] DFAT Report at p.27

Section 5J of the Act states that for the purposes of an application under the Act, a person has a well‑founded fear of persecution ‘if the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ and there is a real chance that they will be persecuted for one or more these reasons in the event they are returned to their receiving country. In Chan v MIEA[61] the Court held that a ‘well‑founded fear’, for the purposes of the Convention, involved both a subjective and objective element. That is, the definition will be satisfied if an applicant can show genuine fear founded upon a ‘real chance’ of persecution. There must be a state of mind (fear of being persecuted) and a basis (well-founded) for that fear.[62]
[61] (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 396
[62] (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 396. See also MIEA v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 263 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ
However, to hold a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ on an objective basis, the applicant’s claim must be more than merely plausible or credible. In Chan v MIEA, Dawson J stated:[63]
“Well‑founded” must mean something more than plausible, for an applicant may have a plausible belief which may be demonstrated, upon facts unknown to him or her, to have no foundation.
[63] Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379 per Dawson J at 397

In MIEA v Guo, the Court stated that:[64]
Conjecture or surmise has no part to play in determining whether a fear is well‑founded. A fear is “well‑founded” when there is a real substantial basis for it. As Chan shows, a substantial basis for a fear may exist even though there is far less than a 50 per cent chance that the object of the fear will eventuate. But no fear can be well-founded for the purpose of the Convention unless the evidence indicates a real ground for believing that the applicant for refugee status is at risk of persecution. A fear of persecution is not well-founded if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation.
[64] MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 572; cf MIEA v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 293
In this case, the applicant claims that, if she is returned to Ethiopia, there is a real chance she will suffer serious harm by the authorities by reason of her ethnicity, her imputed political opinion or as a member of a PSG. For the reasons detailed below, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant has a well‑founded fear of persecution on an objective basis if she is returned to Ethiopia.

The applicant’s claims as a refugee
Applicant as an ethnic Oromo

The applicant claims that as an ethnic female Oromo, there is a real chance that she will be seriously harmed by reason of the state-sanctioned violence that targets Oromo people in Ethiopia. In particular, the applicant claims who has worked as a journalist advocating Oromo rights and who has advocated for Oromo rights more generally, she is particularly vulnerable to being seriously harmed by both state and non-state actors.
The country information[65] states that the Oromo people are the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia (approximately 35 per cent of the population). They reside predominantly in Oromo State, which surrounds the capital, Addis Ababa. There are significant Oromo communities in Addis Ababa, Amhara State and SNNP State.[66] It is reported the Oromos practise predominantly Christianity and Islam in equal numbers and speak Oromia. By virtue of its proximity to the capital, Oromo State is one of the more developed parts of the country.[67]
[65]    DFAT Report, p.22
[66]    ibid
[67]    ibid
It’s reported that in the past, the Oromo have not held a level of political and economic influence commensurate with their size. A major source of historical frustration has been the fact that their political influence has been subservient to smaller ethic groups.[68] The ethnic Amhara dominated political and economic influence during the period of military and monarchy rule. Similarly, the Tigrayans held great influence over the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF),[69] which ruled Ethiopia for 27 years, causing the Oromo and Amhara to feel marginalised and harbour considerable resentment toward the Tigrayans while the EPRDF were in power.
[68] ibid
[69] Anadolu News Agency 'Tens of thousands gather in Ethiopia’s capital to condemn Tigray rebels', 22 July 2021, >
Consistent with the available country information, the applicant’s evidence was that her father would speak to her about Oromo issues including the fact that Oromo land had been taken from people. Her evidence was that he believed that the Oromo people had been treated unfairly and spoke about exposing the injustices inflicted on the Oromo people by the government at that time.[70] The Tribunal accepts that her father was opposed to the government because of its treatment of the Oromo people as claimed.
[70] ibid
The applicant claims that she participated in the protests in 2005 relating to voter irregularities in the Ethiopian general election. The applicant claims that because of having attended the protest she was detained by the authorities and beaten while in custody. The country information[71] states that voting irregulates occurred in the general election in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 which where all won by the EPRDF. In 2005 the opposition parties made significant gains winning 174 of 547 seats in the House of representatives on record turnout of 90 percent.[72] The opposition parties disputed the election result and launched large protests which turned violent. It’s reported that clashes with government authorities left approximately 200 dead with around 4,000 people being arrested. In 2007, 30 opposition leaders were handed life sentences for their involvement in the protests but immediately pardoned.[73]
[71] DFAT Report at p.16
[72] ibid
[73] ibid
In addition, the applicant’s evidence was that the elected candidate, [Name 1], was killed by the authorities because of the unrest. The country information[74] confirmed the applicant’s evidence that [Name 1] was an opposition politician elected to parliament. It was reported[75] that he was shot dead by security forces, in Negale Arsi, 250km south of the Addis Ababa, due to the post-election unrest. Therefore, based on the applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal, it accepts and finds that the applicant participated in the protests after the general election and that she was detained and harmed by the Ethiopian authorities as clamed.
[74] [Source deleted]
[75] ibid
In 2014 to 2018, large-scale anti-government protests occurred in both the Oromia and Amhara states, which prompted a declared state of emergency under which approximately 20,000 people were arrested and 1,000 people killed.[76] It is reported that the Oromo were the most vocal opponents of the ruling party during this period, as a result of which they bore the brunt of the associated arrests and detentions.[77] The protests ultimately led to the resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn in February 2018. The DFAT Report[78] assesses that while there was widespread violence and detention of protestors throughout the Oromo State between 2014 and 2018, it was not ethnically motivated but reflected the then Federal Government’s sensitivity to political opposition.[79]
[76]    DFAT Report, p.9
[77]    DFAT Report, p.22
[78]    ibid
[79]    ibid
In April 2018, Abiy Ahmed (Abiy) was elected Prime Minister. Due to the fact that Abiy is Oromo, it is reported[80] that the Oromo influence at the federal level expanded significantly, with the Oromo being the single largest ethnic group in the federal cabinet (the Council of Ministers).[81] Abiy merged the EPRDF with 3 of the country’s 4 main ethno-regional political organisations – the Oromo Democratic Party, Amhara Democratic Party and Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement – and 5 regional allies to form the Prosperity Party. The TPLF, which had founded the EPRDF and held the reins in both the Party and the Ethiopian state for over 25 years, rejected the merger and later withdrew entirely, but continued to rule in the Tigray region.[82]
[80]    ibid
[81]    ibid
[82]    'Can Ethiopia’s election help overcome age-old structural divisions?', Tegbaru Yared, Institute for Security Studies, 30 July 2021, http//: issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/psc-137.pdf
It is reported that under Abiy’s leadership, the human rights situation in Ethiopia improved.[83] Oromo political prisoners were released[84] and restrictions on opposition political organisations[85] were lifted. In June 2018, the OLF, an opposition party dedicated to Oromo self-determination, was delisted as a terrorist organisation. It signed a peace agreement with the federal government and agreed to disarm. The OLF now operates as a registered political party.[86]
[83] ibid
[84] DFAT Report, p.22; 'Can Ethiopia’s election help overcome age-old structural divisions?', Tegbaru Yared, Institute for Security Studies, 30 July 2021, http//:issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/psc-137.pdf
[85] DFAT Report, p.22
[86] ibid
However, despite the optimistic start to Abiy’s leadership, Human Rights Watch[87] reports that the security and human rights situation in Ethiopia has deteriorated amid growing unrest and political tensions. It is reported that the OLF as an opposition party now faces considerable government harassment.[88] In addition, because of mistreatment of OLF fighters by the government, the military wing of OLF, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), officially separated from OLF leadership[89] and has continued the armed struggle for self‑determination for the Oromo people in Oromia, creating political insecurity in the region. It is reported that abuses by government security forces, attacks on civilians by armed groups, deadly violence along communal and ethnic lines and a political crisis have all lead to human rights abuses.[90]
[87] Human Rights Watch- Ethiopia Events 2020, ETHIOPIAN INSIGHT, ‘GUJI OROMO NEED FREEDOM FROM LIBERATORS’ 3 AUGUST 2020 BY NAGESSA DUBE; Oromo Legacy Leadership Advocacy Association, ‘The Security Situation in Oromia’, by Beresa Abera Jebena
[90] ibid
On 29 June 2020 the popular Oromo singer Hachalu Hundessa was assassinated, triggering protests, which were met by a heavy-handed security response resulting in large‑scale property destruction and violence by civilians.[91] Hundessa’s songs captured the struggles and frustrations of the Oromo people during the 2014–2018 anti-government protest movement.[92] The government’s response, which included cutting internet services across the country, inflamed concerns that the people were being silenced and that human rights abuses and communal violence was not being addressed.[93] It is reported that the attacks heightened the existing social and political tensions, which were further exacerbated by the arrest of members of opposition parties for their alleged connection with the violence. Following a crackdown by the government after Hundessa’s murder, Bekele Gerba (Bekele), Deputy Leader of the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), and Jawar Mohammed (Jawar), founding Director of Oromia Media Network and prominent member of the OFC,[94] were charged with terrorism and imprisoned on 30 June 2020.[95] In response, Jawar accused the government of locking up anyone they suspected of being a strong opponent in the next election, claiming that the OFC was more popular than the government.[96] It was reported[97] that the detention of journalists and opposition party members raised concerns that the investigative authorities had not moved on from past practices of arresting first and investigating later.
[91] Human Rights Watch- Ethiopia Events 2020, Human Rights Watch ‘Ethiopia Cracks Down Following Popular Singers Killing’ 1 July 2020 Laetita Bader, Human Rights Watch ‘Ethiopia Cracks Down Following Popular Singers Killing’ 1 July 2020 Laetita Bader, africsnews.com, 2 January 2020; Borkena Ethiopian News "Why Ethiopian gov't arrested Jawar Mohammed, Bekele Gerba". 6 June 2020, BBC News "Jawar Mohammed: Top Ethiopia opposition figure 'proud' of terror charge". 21 September 2020; Human Rights Watch ‘Ethiopia: Opposition Parties Held without Charge.’ 15 August 2020
The Ethiopian government has continued to use military force in the Oromo region to deal with OLA rebels. It is reported that the ongoing conflict between the OLA and Ethiopian security forces has killed and displaced scores of civilians. It was reported[98] in August 2020 that since April 2018, the OLA, the armed splinter group of the OLF, has killed more than 700 civilians in the East and West Gujii zones and committed other atrocities against civilians, including torture, rape, sexual abuse, robbery, vandalism and arson.[99] Abductions for ransom are common.
[98] ETHIOPIAN INSIGHT, ‘GUJI OROMO NEED FREEDOM FROM LIBERATORS’ 3 AUGUST 2020 BY NAGESSA DUBE; Ibid

100.The government undertook a counter insurgency campaign in southern and western Oromia, which resulted in serious human rights violations and abuses against local communities.[100] In March 2021 Eritrean army troops were sent to Oromia region to halt advances by the OLA. [101] It is reported[102] that arrests and summary executions have become commonplace in parts of Oromia as the Ethiopian security forces waged war on armed Oromo separatists. Civilians have been treated brutally with indiscriminate repression of local dissent. Oromia-based opposition parties, including the OFC, have condemned the militarisation of the region, particularly considering reports of abuse committed against civilians. These opposition parties have called for the peaceful resolution of a conflict that the government has been accused of attempting to conceal, going as far as shutting down internet and phone services to the conflict zone.[103]
[100] Human Rights Watch- Ethiopia Events 2020, Eritrea Hub. ‘Report: 'Eritrean troops despatched to Oromia’ 22 March 2021; The Economist,’ A hidden war threatens Ethiopia’s transition to democracy’ 21 May 2020: ibid
101.In 2020 the Abiy government postponed national elections due to the Coronavirus, causing tensions between opposition parties and the Abiy government. The opposition parties opposed the postponement of elections as they viewed it as a move by the ruling party to exploit the pandemic to ensure the government’s survival. They claimed that the government would lose its legitimacy by stretching its power beyond October 2020 and pressed for a coalition government to be formed.[104] Bekele called for the parties to convene to discuss how to govern the country.[105] The OFC and the OLF were planning to participate in the 2021 election but boycotted the election and did not run,[106] claiming that it would be hard for them to participate due to the high levels of arrests and detainments of its members and supporters, including Jawar.[107]
[104] QUARTZ AFRICA, ‘ETHIOPIA’S DECISION TO DELAY ITS ELECTION FOR COVID WILL HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR ITS DEMOCRATIC GOALS’ 18 JUNE 2020 BY ZECHARIAS ZELALEM; QZ.COM/AFRICA/1870457/ETHIOPIAS-ABIY-ELECTION-DELAY-INFURIATES-OPPOSITION-ON-DEMOCRACY/
[105] ibid
[106] Borkena.com. "Oromo Liberation Front takes queue after OFC, opted out of Election", 3 May 2021, borkena.com/2021/03/05/oromo-liberation-front-takes-queue-after-ofc-opted-out-of-election/
[107] stratfor.com, "Ethiopia: Oromo Opposition Party to Boycott 2021 Elections", 9 December 2020, or about September 2020, tensions between the TPLF and the central government escalated when Tigray authorities defied the Abiy government and held their own regional election, an act that was declared illegal by the central government. In October 2020, the Abiy government cut ties with Tigray and suspended funding for the Tigray region, an action that was perceived by the northern region as a ‘declaration of war’.[108]
[108] BBC News ‘Ethiopia’s Tigray war: The short, medium and long story’, dated 29 July 2021, clashes between the TPLF and federal forces commenced on 3 November 2020, when the TPLF attacked the Northern Command of the Ethiopian army stationed across Tigray, including in the regional capital Mekelle. The TPLF killed soldiers and looted military hardware. On 4 November 2020, the government responded by launching a massive law enforcement operation in Tigray aimed at quelling what it considered an insurgency.[109] Three weeks after launching military operations, following the retaking of Mekelle, the Abiy government declared victory.[110] While fighting between Tigray and federal forces persisted, TPLF leaders remained on the run.[111] While designated a terrorist organisation by the Abiy government, the TPLF consider themselves the legitimate regional government of Tigray.[112] In late June 2021, Tigray forces (now rebranded the Tigray Defence Force (TDF)) regrouped and recaptured Mekelle.[113] Abiy has tightened a ‘blockade’ around Tigray, choking the region’s entry points from receiving aid and cutting off power and communications infrastructure.[114]
[109] Anadolu News Agency 'Tens of thousands gather in Ethiopia’s capital to condemn Tigray rebels', dated 22 July 2021, Minister Abiy has committed to strengthening and upholding freedom of the press, and the media environment has improved significantly under his government. All imprisoned journalists, including bloggers, were released in 2018 — the first time since 2004 that no journalists were in prison, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. In June 2018, the federal government restored access to 264 previously banned websites (including Al Jazeera, the BBC, blogs critical of the government, and websites belonging to the Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF) and lifted its bans on ESAT and the OMN. Charges against ESAT and the OMN were dropped in May 2018, and they have since established operations in Ethiopia, where they operate without restriction. Anti-government bloggers are active. Work to amend the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation and the Computer Crime Proclamation is ongoing, with a view to strengthening press freedoms. Reporters Without Borders ranked Ethiopia 110 out of 180 countries in the 2019 World Press Freedom Index representing an improvement of 40 places from a year earlier — the biggest improvement by any country since the Index was launched in 2002. Ethiopia has improved still further in 2020, jumping another 11 places to 99. The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, speaking following a December 2019 visit, described Ethiopia’s progress toward freedom of expression under Abiy as ‘remarkable’.
3.52While press freedoms have improved since April 2018, concerns remain. At least three journalists were arrested and charged under the ATP, two of them in connection to the alleged coup attempt in June 2019. A third journalist was arrested for violating the ATP after recording an interview with a lawyer outside an Addis Ababa court. DFAT heard that the military remains sensitive to criticism. In July 2019, the Ministry of Defence said it planned to charge journalists and media outlets for ‘publishing defamatory information’ about the national armed forces. In February 2019, two journalists were temporarily detained by the Oromia Regional Police for reporting on authorities’ demolition of illegally built homes and allegations of forced displacement. A local source told DFAT there were limits on what the media could report, and that journalists continued to self-censor. According to this source, to avoid adverse official attention, journalists observed a number of redlines in their reporting, including reporting that uncovered wrongdoing by political elites and establishment figures.
3.53DFAT heard journalists generally felt secure and could operate freely in Addis Ababa but faced a growing risk of harassment and intimidation – including physical attacks – from non-state actors (including the Qeerroo in Oromia State) in regional states who disagreed with their reporting. A source told DFAT that the situation for journalists gets progressively worse the further out one ventures from Addis Ababa. The source claimed that the risk of harm from government forces, in contrast, has declined significantly.
3.54Internet services are wholly state-run. The authorities frequently suspend the internet, including, but not only, during periods of political and social unrest. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the internet was suspended on eight separate occasions in 2019, including for the purpose of preventing cheating during end-of-school-year exams in June and as a preventive measure against cyberattacks against Ethiopia’s financial institutions in December. The internet was blocked for more than one week following the alleged coup attempt of June 2019. An internet blackout in place in western Oromia State, the site of armed clashes between OLF factions and government forces, since 3 January 2020, was lifted in April 2020 to help with communication around the COVID-19 pandemic.
3.55The lifting of curbs on freedom of expression has facilitated a rise in hate speech and misinformation and contributed to inter-ethnic clashes. DFAT heard hate speech and misinformation on social media is a growing problem, particularly on [social media] (Ethiopia had 4.5 million [social media] subscribers at December 2018). In February 2020, parliament adopted legislation to combat hate speech and misinformation. Under the new law, those convicted of disseminating hate speech and misinformation – defined as rhetoric that fuels discrimination ‘against individuals or groups based on their nationality, ethnic and religious affiliation, sex or disabilities’ – face a fine of up to 100,000 birr (approximately AUD4,700) and five years’ imprisonment. ‘Dissemination’ includes creating or sharing social media posts that result in violence or disturbance of public order (but not liking or tagging such content). Parliamentarians who voted against the law expressed concern it could be used to curtail free speech. A local journalist told DFAT they feared the law could be used to limit media freedom. Defamation remains a criminal offence.
3.56DFAT assesses that freedom of expression, including of the press, has expanded significantly since April 2018. Outside of a State of Emergency (such as that in place to deal with COVID-19) independent media can and do operate freely, and people can speak freely in public places, including against the government. DFAT further assesses that journalist and bloggers can openly criticise the government without fear of arrest and prosecution.
Women
3.57Article 35 of the constitution enshrines a range of rights for women, including: equality with men in the enjoyment of constitutional rights and protections; equal rights in marriage; the entitlement to affirmative measures to remedy the historical legacy of inequality and discrimination against women and to enable women to participate in society equally with men; the right to maternity leave at full pay; equal rights with the respect to the use, transfer, administration and control of land and the inheritance of property; equal rights in employment, including in relation to pay and promotion; and the right of access to family planning education, information and capacity. Article 34 stipulates that marriage can be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. Gender equality is a priority for the current federal government.
3.58Ethiopia scores highly in international rankings for gender equality in political participation. In October 2018, Ethiopia elected a female president (the only African female head of state at the time of publication). In parallel, Prime Minister Abiy appointed women to half of all positions in the Council of Ministers, including the ministers of defence, trade and industry, and peace (with the latter responsible for overseeing the federal police and all civilian intelligence agencies). Abiy has also appointed women to head the Supreme Court and the NEBE. Women hold 37.3 per cent of seats in the current federal parliament. Some state legislatures have an even higher representation of women. The World Economic Forum ranks Ethiopia 82nd out of 153 countries in its 2020 Global Gender Gap Index, including 16th for political participation (ahead of the likes of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Switzerland and the UK).
3.59Local sources told DFAT that, while women’s political participation has increased, the situation for the average Ethiopian woman remains challenging. Women aged 15-24 have higher literacy rates than men, but girls are more likely to be out of school than boys, particularly in rural areas (see Education). Women typically have fewer employment opportunities than men, in both urban and rural areas, and their participation in the labour force (at 74.2 per cent) is significantly lower than that of men (86.5 per cent). This is influenced by a number of factors, including societal discrimination, traditional norms and attitudes regarding gender roles, and women’s generally lower levels of educational attainment. Early marriage is widespread, and negatively impacts the ability of girls to attain an education and participate in the labour force (see Children). DFAT heard that it is common in rural areas for young girls to be married off in order to ease the financial burden on the girl’s family, particularly during times of drought. Women often lack financial independence, particularly in rural areas. Ethiopia ranks 125th out of 153 countries for economic participation and 140th for educational attainment in the 2020 Global Gender Gap Index.
3.60According to local sources, access to sexual reproductive health services is limited. The fertility rate is 3.9 children per woman, but regional variations exist (the fertility rate in Somali State is 7.1). Abortion is allowed in some circumstances, including: where the life and physical health of the woman is at risk; in instances of rape, incest and foetal impairment; if a woman has physical or mental disabilities; or if she is younger than 18 years of age. Most abortions now occur in health facilities. Local sources told DFAT that, while professional abortion services exist, women often do not know where to find them. Abortion carries significant social stigma.
3.61DFAT heard anecdotally that divorce is not uncommon in urban areas and divorce rates are increasing overall. Women’s growing economic independence in urban areas and the availability of legal aid services and courts were cited as contributory factors. Being a single woman or seeking divorce from one’s husband is widely accepted in major urban areas and carries less social stigma compared to rural areas. According to local sources, single or divorced women may face greater economic challenges but not societal discrimination in urban areas.
Gender-Based Violence
3.62Gender-based violence is a criminal offence punishable by up to 20 years’ imprisonment. In practice, the law is rarely enforced. Marital rape is not explicitly prohibited. A local source told DFAT the authorities largely consider events behind closed doors to be private matters.
3.63Gender-based violence is widespread in Ethiopia. Typically, gender-based violence is intimate-partner based and occurs in domestic settings. Local sources told DFAT gender-based violence is a countrywide phenomenon that occurs across all ethnic groups and religions. An Ethiopian Demographic Health Survey from 2016 found that 23 per cent of women aged 15-49 had experienced physical violence, and 10 per cent had experienced sexual violence. A 2018 academic study found almost half of women had experienced gender-based violence in their lifetimes. According to the UNDP, 28 per cent of women aged 15 and older have experienced intimate partner violence. DFAT heard anecdotally violence against women is most prevalent in Afar and Somali states, where the vast majority of the population is Muslim and the family legislative framework is based on traditional practices and sharia law (see Judiciary). Local sources told DFAT refugee and IDP women and girls are particularly vulnerable to gender-based violence, including, in the case of Gambela State, rape perpetrated by men making cross-border incursions from South Sudan.
3.64Societal norms and a lack of financial independence mean violence against women is under-reported, and victims generally do not seek legal remedies, particularly in rural areas. According to reports, men widely consider hitting or beating their wife to be justified in certain circumstances, including where a wife has burned her husband’s food, argued with him, left the house without telling him, neglected the children or refused to have sexual intercourse with him. A local source told DFAT there was an acceptance among many women to tolerate domestic violence and submit to the sexual desires of their husbands.
3.65The authorities have taken measures to combat gender-based violence. In 2010, the federal government developed a Strategic Plan for an Integrated and Multi-Sectoral Response to Violence against Women and Children and Child Justice in Ethiopia. Protection units for women and children operate in some police stations and prosecution offices, and there are special benches dealing specifically with violence against women in federal and regional courts. The government has committed to establishing a free hotline service for victims of gender-based violence. According to local sources, there are 11 shelters countrywide for women escaping domestic violence. Shelters typically accommodate between 20 and 50 women. A woman can stay in a shelter for a maximum of 1.5 years. Shelters include counselling services and childcare centres, allowing women to bring their children and to pursue employment. Some shelters are government-run, while some are administered by NGOs with UN support. Some local charities provide financial assistance to victims of physical and sexual abuse. One such charity, Agar, operates in Addis Ababa and Oromia and Amhara states.
3.66Local sources told DFAT that, while services for victims of gender-based violence exist, including shelters, they are insufficient. Demand for shelters is reportedly increasing, particularly among younger women, but they remain scarce — space constraints mean women are often turned away. Of the 11 shelters currently in operation, three are located in Addis Ababa, and only one in Oromia State (covering a population of over 30 million). There are no shelters in Afar, Gambela and Somali states. DFAT heard anecdotally that reporting of gender-based violence is increasing, but remains low overall, largely due to women’s economic dependence on men. DFAT assesses women in Ethiopia face a high risk of domestic violence and sexual harassment. Sexual assault, including spousal rape, is common.
3.67DFAT assesses support services for women escaping from domestic violence have improved but are insufficient overall.
Female Genital Mutilation
3.68Article 35 of the constitution prohibits laws, customs and practices that oppress or cause bodily or mental harm to women. The Criminal Code explicitly outlaws Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), which is punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Ethiopia has committed to eliminating FGM by 2025 and launched a national roadmap to this end in August 2019, led by the Ministry of Women, Children and Youth (a National Strategy and Action Plan on Harmful Traditional Practices against Women and Children, including FGM, was previously adopted in 2013). In 2017, the Ministry of Health banned the medicalisation of FGM in all public and private medical facilities in the country. In parallel, the authorities and NGOs have sought to change cultural and societal attitudes to FGM by working with communities, including schools and religious institutions.
3.69While the incidence of FGM has declined, it remains widespread, particularly in rural areas. The law against FGM is rarely enforced — DFAT is not aware of recent prosecutions. According to the UNDP, 65.2 per cent of women and girls between the ages of 15 and 49 have undergone FGM. Local sources told DFAT that the incidence of FGM is highest in Muslim-majority Afar and Somali states, where rates are near-universal. While the practice of FGM is most common among Muslims, it is not exclusive to them — FGM occurs in Amhara and Tigray states, for example, although the practice has declined in these areas since 2014 (FGM is least prevalent in Tigray State, at 23 per cent). FGM is performed predominantly in the home, usually by an older woman with mid-wife experience. Only a small percentage of FGM procedures are performed by health professionals.

COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION CLAIMS

Arbitrary Deprivation of Life

Deaths in Custody
4.5There is no reliable publicly available information on deaths in custody in the Ethiopian prison system. The US Department of State and the UK Home Office have previously reported that prison conditions are harsh and, in some cases, life threatening (see Detention and Prison). In September 2016 more than 20 inmates died during a fire at Qilinto Prison, on the outskirts of Addis Ababa. The authorities charged 38 prisoners for causing the fire.
………………………………
TORTURE
4.8Article 28 of the constitution defines torture as a crime against humanity and bars the legislature and other state institutions from pardoning or providing amnesty to individuals who commit torture. Article 19 of the constitution stipulates that evidence obtained through coercion is inadmissible. The Criminal Code provides for a fine or imprisonment for public servants who treat detained persons in a manner that is incompatible with human dignity, including physical or mental torture.
4.9Despite these legal protections, prior to 2018 the use of torture was widespread in police stations, prisons and other places of detention, both as a form of punishment and for the purpose of obtaining information and extracting confessions from detainees. According to human rights organisations, common methods of torture included beatings, burning, electric shocks, waterboarding, tying prisoners in stress positions, and prolonged periods of solitary confinement. Individuals belonging to groups designated as terrorist organisations and others perceived to oppose the federal government and its policies – including journalists, bloggers and civil society activists – were at particular risk of torture and other ill-treatment. Torture was known to occur at the Federal Police Crime Investigation Sector, a federal police detention facility in Addis Ababa commonly known as Maeke’lawi, and in Jijiga Central Prison (known as Jail Ogaden) in Somali State. Most of those reportedly subjected to torture in Jail Ogaden were suspected of having affiliations to the ONLF.
4.10The current federal government has identified the prevention of torture as a core priority. In July 2018, Prime Minister Abiy, in an address to parliament, acknowledged that government forces relied on torture, which he characterised as state terrorism. Abiy has committed to holding perpetrators of torture to account and ending a culture of impunity. In July 2018, the federal attorney-general announced investigations into torture and ill-treatment in detention facilities. Over 60 senior officials were subsequently arrested, including for suspected acts of torture. Their trials were ongoing at the time of publication. The authorities also issued an arrest warrant for Getachew Assefa, the former longtime director of the NISS, for alleged torture, causing deaths during interrogations and detaining members of opposition groups (Assefa has evaded arrest to date). Maeke’lawi was closed in April 2018. Jail Ogaden was closed in September 2018, and some administrators, including the jail’s former head, have been arrested for suspected human rights violations committed under their command. Restrictions on access to detention centres by independent bodies for monitoring purposes have been loosened (see Detention and Prison).
4.11DFAT understands that, at the time of publication, the EHRC was not receiving extensive complaints of torture by the authorities. Multiple sources told DFAT they were hearing significantly less frequent claims of torture, including by the police and inside prisons, suggesting the practice is less common today.
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
4.12Article 18 of the constitution affords Ethiopians the right to protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 424 of the Criminal Code prohibits treatment of prisoners or suspects ‘in an improper or brutal manner, or in a manner which is incompatible with human dignity’. Such acts are punishable with up to 10 years’ imprisonment.

4.13In practice, prisoners have reported incidents of physical punishment. There are credible reports of individuals detained in connection to the 2014-18 protests and/or for suspected affiliations to previously-outlawed opposition groups being mistreated, including being subjected to beatings, overcrowding, extreme heat, lack of water and solitary confinement. The current federal government has committed to addressing such abuses as part of its wide-reaching reform agenda (see Detention and Prison).
Arbitrary Arrest and Detention
4.14The constitution stipulates that no person may be subject to arbitrary arrest and detained without charge or conviction. Under the Criminal Code, ‘unlawful arrest or detention’ is punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment. In practice, before April 2018 critics of the federal government were regularly detained on arbitrary grounds and often held for extended periods without charge. Under the State of Emergency, effective from October 2016-August 2017 and then from February-June 2018, authorities were allowed to arrest and detain individuals without a court warrant and hold detainees for longer than proscribed under normal regulations. According to the US Department of State, security forces went door-to-door after some protests, and arrested and arbitrarily detained opposition party members and supporters, whom they accused of inciting violence.
4.15There are fewer reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions since the change in federal government in April 2018 and the lifting of the State of Emergency. Some members of the OLF and the NaMA claim to have been the subject of arbitrary arrest and detention (in connection to the failed June 2019 coup attempt in the case of the NaMA) (see Political Opinion (Actual or Imputed)).
4.16In September 2018, security forces detained 3,000 people in Oromia State and Addis Ababa in response to rising criminality. Those arrested included individuals found gambling and – despite not constituting criminal offences– smoking shisha (a tobacco mix smoked in a water pipe) and consuming khat. Most were subsequently released.
4.17Successive governments have detained people – primarily youth – for ‘rehabilitation and re-education’ purposes in military-run camps. This includes people involved in the 2014-18 protests. About 1,200 people – detained in connection to the September 2018 unrest in Oromia State that accompanied the return from exile of the OLF – were sent for rehabilitation at a military facility. Most have since completed their rehabilitation and been released. Rehabilitation occurs outside of the judicial process — those undergoing rehabilitation are not charged and prosecuted. Amnesty International reports that rehabilitation processes continued throughout 2019. DFAT understands rehabilitation can last between one and several months, and includes education and physical exercise components. DFAT understands that rehabilitation does not involve torture or other forms of ill-treatment. Those undergoing rehabilitation are released without charge on completion of their program. The authorities claim rehabilitation boosts the employment prospects of those who undergo it and supports national unity.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

STATE PROTECTION
5.1Ethiopia has an extensive security and intelligence apparatus, a legacy of its previous political systems. The state exercises control over most of the country, and it has largely been effective in maintaining law and order and protecting the population from major crimes, including terrorism. The security and intelligence apparatus was used in the past to monitor and suppress dissent, and had a history of using force to quell instances of unrest, including large-scale anti-government protests. Prime Minister Abiy has sought to impose greater discipline and accountability on the security forces, including by punishing past wrongdoings, as part of broader efforts to strengthen the professionalism and civilian oversight of the security forces (local sources claim this has had a deterrent effect on government forces). According to the national report it submitted ahead of its most recent UPR (May 2019), the federal government is developing legislation on police use of force and accountability, and plans to establish an independent mechanism to which complaints of ill-treatment by security and law enforcement authorities can be submitted, but this is not yet legislated. Regional state governments are making parallel efforts to reform law enforcement at the state level. A proliferation of ethnic-based militias since 2018 has challenged state authority and eroded the rule of law in some parts of the country, particularly in western Oromia State.
5.2Government forces have shown greater restraint toward protesters since April 2018. Local sources told DFAT that non-state actors now posed a greater threat to safety than did government forces. In a report presented to federal parliament in January 2020, the EHRC claimed that human rights violations committed by government forces had declined, with most violations now perpetrated by non-state actors.
5.3DFAT assesses that, overall, federal and regional security forces are largely effective at maintaining law and order and in providing protection from threats by non-state actors, particularly in major urban centres. However, DFAT assesses that the emergence of armed, invariably ethnic-based non-state actors has increasingly challenged the state’s monopoly on the use of force and its concomitant ability to provide protection in remote areas and along borders separating Ethiopia’s regional states.
…………………………….
Detention and Prison
5.24Article 21 of the constitution states that all persons held in custody and imprisoned upon conviction and sentencing have the right to be treated in a way that respects their human dignity. The law prohibits detention in any facility other than an official detention centre.
5.25In practice, prison conditions are difficult and fall short of international standards. According to the US Department of State, food, water and sanitation facilities are inadequate. Medical services are also limited, particularly in regional prisons. Overcrowding is a problem in many places of detention. Children are sometimes incarcerated with adults, although male and female prisoners are typically separated.
5.26A number of unofficial detention centres were known to operate in the past. Some people arrested in relation to the 2014-18 protests were reportedly held in unofficial places of detention, including military bases, local administration offices and makeshift detention centres in government-owned properties. Mistreatment of prisoners – particularly those imprisoned on political grounds and/or under the ATP – was previously common.
5.27The current federal government has taken steps to improve prison conditions, including by cracking down on ill-treatment and torture and improving physical prison infrastructure. To alleviate overcrowding, it is building four new prison facilities, while committing to improving water supply, medical and sanitation services, and amenities in existing prisons. These efforts were ongoing at the time of publication. One local source told DFAT that the cleanliness of prisons, including the availability of sanitation facilities, has improved.
5.28Several secret detention centres administered by the NISS have been closed following criminal investigations by the federal Attorney-General. The Maeke’lawi federal police detention facility in Addis Ababa and Jail Ogaden in Somali State, where torture was known to occur, were closed in April and September 2018, respectively (see Torture). Senior officials overseeing prisons where serious violations are alleged to have occurred have been dismissed and detained. DFAT heard that allegations of ill-treatment and torture in places of detention have decreased significantly since April 2018.
5.29The current federal government has also loosened restrictions on prison access by monitoring bodies, a right that was previously restricted. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Justice for All – Prisons Fellowship of Ethiopia (an NGO), the Office of the Attorney General and the EHRC have access to places of detention across Ethiopia, and conduct regular visits. The Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate prison conditions. The EHRC publishes an annual report on conditions in police stations and prisons.