2102052 (Refugee)

2102052 (Refugee) [2024] AATA 4395 (14 August 2024)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER: 2102052
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Nigeria
MEMBER:David McCulloch
DATE:14 August 2024
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicants protection visas.

Statement made on 14 August 2024 at 3:14pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – Protection Visa – Nigeria – religion – Christians – attack on the family home in November 2011 was opportunistic – credibility issues are very significantly adverse to the credibility of the claims made by the applicant – not satisfied that the risk of harm relates to all areas of Nigeria – it would be reasonable to expect the applicants to relocate to an area of Nigeria where they would not be at a real risk of significant harm – decision under review affirmed

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5, 56, 65, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2
CASES
MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155
Yao-Jing Li v MIMA (1997) 74 FCR 275
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 27 January 2021 to refuse to grant the applicants protection visas under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicants who claim to be citizens of Nigeria, applied for the visas on 17 December 2015. The delegate refused to grant the visas.
The first named applicant (‘the applicant’) appeared before the Tribunal on 8 August 2024 at 9.30am to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal also received oral evidence from Mr [A], a friend of the applicant’s, who appeared in person. The Tribunal also heard evidence from [Mr B], the applicant’s husband, who appeared by telephone from [Country 1].
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b) or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Sections 36(2)(b) and (c) provide, as an alternative criterion, that the applicant is a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen mentioned in ss 36(2)(a) or (aa) who holds a protection visa. Section 5(1) of the Act provides that one person is a ‘member of the same family unit’ as another if either is a member of the family unit of the other or each is a member of the family unit of a third person. Section 5(1) also provides that ‘member of the family unit’ of a person has the meaning given by the Regulations for the purposes of the definition. The expression is defined in reg 1.12 of the Regulations to include spouse and dependent children.
The Tribunal is satisfied that the other applicants, who are minors, are the dependent children of the applicant.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration. The Tribunal has before it the DFAT Country Information Report – Nigeria, 3 December 2020.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The issue in this case is the credibility of the applicant and whether, on accepted claims, protection criteria are fulfilled. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.
The migration history of the applicant’s is detailed in the decision of the delegate as follows (the applicants are described therein as applicant 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively which references the order in which the applicants are listed in the covering page of this decision):

Date Event

09/01/2012 [Temporary visa] by [Mr B] (Applicant 1’s husband). Applicants 1,2,3 and 4 included in application.

08/03/2012 [Temporary] visa granted to [Mr B]. Applicants 1,2,3 and 4 granted [Temporary] visas as dependants.

[Date]/04/2012 Applicants arrived in Australia as the holders of a [Temporary] visa.

[Date]/11/2014 [Mr B] departed Australia on [Temporary] visa.

[Date]/11/2014 [Mr B] arrived in Australia.

[Date]/01/2015 [Mr B] departed Australia on [Temporary] visa.

[Date]/11/2015 [Mr B] arrived in Australia.

17/12/2015 Permanent Protection (XA 866) visa application lodged by [Mr B] and Applicants 1,2,3 and 4.

[Date]/12/2015 [Mr B] departed Australia on [Temporary] visa.

[Date]/03/2016 [Mr B] arrived in Australia.

[Date]/03/2016 [Mr B] departed Australia on [Temporary] visa.

[Date]/10/2016 [Mr B] arrived in Australia.

[Date]/11/2016 [Mr B] departed Australia on Bridging visa B.

[Date]/03/2017 [Mr B] arrived in Australia.

[Date]/03/2018 [Mr B] departed Australia on Bridging visa B.

06/03/2019 [Mr B] - Tourist Stream (OFFSHORE) (Web)(FA 600) refused.

[Date]/03/2019 [Mr B]’s Protection visa application refused as he departed Australia.

04/04/2019 [Mr B] - Review No Jurisdiction.

09/05/2019 [Mr B] - Tourist Stream (OFFSHORE) (Web)(FA 600) refused.

05/11/2019 Protection visa interview conducted with Applicant 1.

12/02/2020 Information before the Department indicates that [the fourth applicant] is a citizen of [Country 2] and Nigeria - s91Q referral.

13/01/2021 [The fourth applicant] - s91Q allowed -valid application.

The Tribunal notes above the reference to the protection visa application of Mr [B], the applicant’s husband. This application was refused because Mr [B] departed Australia.
The application forms for the protection visa indicates the following in relation to the applicants.
The applicant does not list a date of birth. She was married on [date] October 2005 and the relationship with her husband began on 1 June 2003. The applicant travelled to [Country 2] from [date] August 2010 until [date] October 2010 to visit her brother. From January 1985 until October 2004 the applicant lived in [an] [accommodation]. From October 2004 until November 2005 the applicant lived at an address in Jos, Plateau State. From November 2005 until April 2012 the applicant lived at another address in Jos, Plateau State. The applicant finished secondary school in April [year]. She studied at [a university] from May [year] until June [year].
The applicant sets out her work history in Nigeria. From 2004 until August 2005 she was a [occupation] at [workplace]. From 2005 until February 2006 she was [occupation] at [a workplace]. From 2006 until April 2012 she worked as [occupation] at [a workplace] in Nigeria.
The application form provides the following in terms of claims for protection. Reference is made to general lawlessness and violence in Nigeria being a reason for the applicant leaving the country. Reference is made to her children being unable to live a normal life. There are frequent school closures. Teachers are shot in class. There is reference to indiscriminate invasions and attacks. Reference is made to the risk of displacement and loss of life if returned to Nigeria. In response to the question as to harm experienced in Nigeria, an answer is given that there has been emotional harm and lives destroyed by attackers, bloodshed and houses destroyed. It is indicated that no part of the country is safe.
The second named applicant (applicant’s son) was born on [date]. He followed his father to Australia to undertake a [program]. He indicates that he could be killed if returned to Nigeria. It is indicated that there are gunshots every day and dead bodies on the road. His father told him killings are still going on. Authorities don’t seem to care.
The third named applicant (daughter 1) was born on [date]. She indicates that she needs her father’s protection. She experienced emotional harm in Nigeria.
The fourth named applicant, (daughter 2), indicates that she is seeking protection in Australia so that she does not have to return to Nigeria. Questions as to specific fears or harm faced are not provided.
As noted above, at the same time as the protection visa applications by the applicants, the applicant’s husband made an application for a protection visa, being the principal applicant. The Tribunal notes the following from his application form for the protection visa.
He does not provide a date of birth but was born in [City] Nigeria. He was married on [date] October 2005 with the relationship beginning on 1 June 2003. He has previously travelled to [Country 2] and [Country 1]. He finished secondary school in Jos in [year]. From [year] until August [year] he undertook and completed studies at [a university]. He studied a [degree] at [a university] from November [year] until August [year]. From June 1999 until October 2004 he completed a program in [an area]. In terms of relevant employment history from August 1999 until April 2012 the applicant was [occupation] at [a workplace]. In Australia from March 2013 until December 2014 he was [occupation] in a [workplace] in [suburb], New South Wales. From April 2012 until December 2014 he was a [student] at [a university] in Sydney. From February 2015 until the date of application he was [occupation] at [a workplace] in [Country 1].
In his application form for the protection visa the applicant’s husband indicates that his primary reason for leaving Nigeria was to obtain a [degree] from a reputable university in Australia. He wanted to study to provide a base to return home to establish a [project] between Nigeria, Australia and [Country 1]. However, Nigeria and especially Jos, Plateau State is not a safe place. The children of the applicant’s husband are fully established in Australia and protection is requested for them, the applicant and himself.
It is indicated that there is a risk of death for the family if returned to Nigeria. Pictures are attached of brutal killings and publications as to the reasons for the killings.
In terms of whether harm was experienced in Nigeria it is indicated that in 2001 while returning from Lagos to Jos, Jos was in a state of war. Christians were being killed and the applicant’s husband could not enter the town. There was a need to sleep in the bush for two days without food or water. This killing spree has continued unabated today. The government is highly corrupt. The applicant’s husband was attacked by five youths in November 2011. They were purportedly described as Muslim youths. The applicant’s husband was lucky to escape death because of the intervention of police. Four assailants/militants were killed. The applicant’s husband employs the services of policemen who mount guards around their home. Militants, terrorists and Fulani herdsmen have no regard for security officers. The applicant’s husband has attempted to move to Abuja but it was very difficult to get a job. The applicant’s father-in-law left Jos to another area three years ago. However, the crisis is everywhere in Nigeria.
The applicant’s husband also provided an additional 19 page written statement outlining reasons to claim protection and detailing the situation in Nigeria. It confirms that he came to Australia to pursue studies but determined that it was dangerous to return to his home area. Reference is made to the relationship between Muslims and Christians in his home area. Reference is made to harm perpetrated by Muslims. Various related and supporting documents are provided.
The applicant provided a subsequent written statement to the Department including pictures and internet links. The Tribunal notes the following from this information. Information is provided under the heading ‘some of my scary experiences during living and before leaving Nigeria’. The applicant indicates that she has been caught up in several ‘scary’ and deadly moments in Nigeria. Reference is made to attacks on Christians at the marketplace and generalised harm in Nigeria. Attacks are ongoing. Reference is made to the risk from Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen. Reference is made to the horrors that Muslims can unleash. Various pictures of attacks, fires, bodies and scenes of destruction are provided with descriptions under each. Reference is made to problems occurring in all ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) countries.
The Departmental file also contains various reports of attacks and harm perpetrated in Nigeria including by Boko Haram. Academic articles also appear on the Departmental file relating to the sharia conflict and religion and politics.
The applicant has provided various additional documents, reports and submissions to the Tribunal in relation to ongoing violence perpetrated by Fulani herdsmen, Muslims and Boko Haram in Nigeria with reference to particular difficulties being faced in the applicant’s home area. A submission by the applicant addresses various credibility issues raised by the delegate.
The Tribunal notes the following as relevant from the interview that took place between the delegate and the applicant on 5 November 2019.
The applicant indicated that the weekend before the interview, herdsmen came and attacked the property of her parents killing animals and destroying crops. Her parents had to leave the village and move elsewhere. Other houses were on fire and there was no help. Individuals in other homes were burned alive.
In terms of questions asked as to other harm faced, the applicant referred to her employment at [a workplace] in Nigeria. She indicated that in February or March 2012 before they obtained the visa for Australia the [premises] were attacked and burnt down while the applicant was present at work. This happened on Friday at about midday. The applicant indicated that because of the buildings of her employer being burnt down she had to stop work.
The applicant was asked about other harm and she said that a week before they came to Australia the family had to run away from their [home]. There was an invasion by a herdsman dressed as a policeman. Many surrounding houses were burned down, although the home of the applicant’s was not. When asked how many homes were burned down the applicant indicated more than 20. The applicant indicated that many people were killed including the applicant’s nanny. They did not return home before leaving for Australia.
The delegate asked questions about returning home and the need to obtain possessions for the purpose of the trip to Australia. In response, the applicant indicated that her husband returned home with the protection of a village group but only for the purpose of obtaining relevant documents.
Independent information
For the purpose of this decision, the Tribunal made the following research request of the Country of Origin Information Services Section of the Department. The following response was provided on 1 August 2024 (additional reading references not included):
PLEASE PROVIDE UPDATED INFORMATION ABOUT THE RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC DEMOGRAPHY OF CENTRAL NIGERIA.
Nigeria is divided into 36 states, which are then grouped into six geopolitical zones. The North-Central Region (in green on the map below) is also known as the ‘Middle Belt’[1] and consists of six states and one territory: Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau and Federal Capital Territory (FCT).[2]
[1] 'Climate Change, Ethnicity and Neglect Fuel Violence in Nigeria’s Kaduna State', Promise Eve, Inter Press Service (IPS), 19 June 2024, 20240625091126
[2] 'Nigeria - Country Focus', European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 11 July 2024, p.16 (p.17 of PDF), 20240716082718
Figure 1 – Nigeria’s Geopolitical Zones[3]
[3] 'Nigeria - Country Focus', European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 11 July 2024, p.16 (p.17 of PDF), 20240716082718
Religious demography
COIS did not find detailed information on religious demography in the North-Central Region states.[4] According to the US State Department’s June 2024 report on international religious freedom ‘Christians and Muslims reside in approximately equal numbers in the North Central Region.’[5] A March 2024 report by Christian advocacy group Open Doors states that the North-Central Region has ‘17,001,400 Christians (51%) out of a population of 33,588,000.’[6]
[4] Sources consulted include CISNET, government and non-governmental reports, domestic and international media outlets, ECOI, and targeted internet searches
[5] 'International Religious Freedom Report for 2023 - Nigeria', US Department of State, 26 June 2024, p.5, 20240627140827
[6] 'Nigeria: Full Country Dossier', Open Doors, March 2024, p.17 (p.18 of PDF), 20240717155310
Ethnic demography
The website of Nigeria’s federal government, Nigeria.gov.ng, contains profiles of each state, including brief information on ethnic groups in each state.[7]
[7] See
Benue State
The profile for Benue states that the ethnic groups in Benue are ‘Tiv, Idoma, Igede, Etulo, Abakpa, Jukun, Hausa, Akweya and Nyifon.’[8] It states that ‘[t]he Tiv are the dominant ethnic group, occupying fourteen (14) local government areas, while the Idoma and Igede occupy the remaining nine local government areas.’[9]
[8] 'Benue', Federal Republic of Nigeria, n.d., Accessed 31 July 2024, 20240731095057
[9] 'Benue', Federal Republic of Nigeria, n.d., Accessed 31 July 2024, 20240731095057
Kogi State
The profile for Kogi states ‘[t]here are three main ethnic groups and languages in Kogi: Igala, Ebira, and Okun (similar to Yoruba) with other minorities like Bassa, a small fraction of Nupe mainly in Lokoja, the Ogugu subgroup of the Igala, Gwari, Kakanda, Oworo people (similar to Yoruba), Ogori Magongo and the Eggan community.’[10]
[10] 'Kogi', Federal Republic of Nigeria, n.d., Accessed 31 July 2024, 20240731094634
Kwara State
The profile for Kwara states that ‘[t]he principal groups residing in Kwara State are the Yoruba, Nupe, Bariba and Fulani. Major languages are English (official) and Yoruba.’[11]
[11] 'Kwara', Federal Republic of Nigeria, n.d., Accessed 31 July 2024, 20240731095713
Nasarawa State
The profile for Nasarawa states that ‘[t]here are 29 languages spoken as first languages in Nasarawa State. Most languages are small minority languages. Major languages are Agatu, Basa, Eggon, Gbagyi, Gade, Goemai, Gwandara, Ham, Kofyar, and Lijili. One language – Basa-Gumna – is extinct.’[12]
[12] 'Nasawawa', Federal Republic of Nigeria, n.d., Accessed 31 July 2024, 20240731100128
Niger State
The profile for Niger states that ‘[t]hough there are three most pronounced ethnic groups which are Nupe, Gbagyi and Hausa, there are many other groups living happily with one another Kadara, Koro, Barab, Kakanda, GanaGana, Dibo, Kambari, Kamuku, Pangu, Dukawa, Gwada and Ingwai. Tribes like Igbo, Yoruba and numerous others from other States also settled happily in Niger State.’[13]
[13] 'Niger', Federal Republic of Nigeria, n.d., Accessed 31 July 2024, 20240731100427
Plateau State
The profile for Plateau states:
The state has over forty ethno-linguistic groups. Some of the indigenous tribes in the state are the Berom, Afizere, Amo, Anaguta, Aten, Bogghom, Buji, Challa, Chip, Fier, Gashish, Goemai, Irigwe, Jarawa, Jukun, Kofyar (comprising Doemak, Kwalla, and Mernyang), Montol, Mushere, Mupun, Mwaghavul, Ngas, Piapung, Pyem, Ron-Kulere, Bache, Talet, Tarok, Youm and Fulani/Kanuri in Wase. People from other parts of country have come to settle in Plateau State; these include the Igbo, Yoruba, Ibibio, Annang, Efik, Ijaw, and Bini. Each ethnic group has its own distinct language, but as with the rest of the country, English is the official language in Plateau State; Hausa is also a medium of communication and commerce as is the case in most parts of the North and Middle Belt of Nigeria.[14]
[14] 'Plateau', Federal Republic of Nigeria, n.d., Accessed 31 July 2024, 20240731100926
Federal Capital Territory (FCT)
The FCT profile states that ‘[t]he indigenous inhabitants of Abuja are the Gbagyi (Gwari) as the major language, Bassa, Gwandara, Gade, Ganagana, Koro.’[15]
[15] 'Federal Capital Territory', Federal Republic of Nigeria, n.d., Accessed 31 July 2024, 20240731101343
PLEASE PROVIDE UPDATED INFORMATION ABOUT TENSIONS BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE REGION.
As noted in question 2 of COIS’ 2020 Q&A, Nigeria: 20200506070746 – [redacted] State – Middle Belt – Demographic Information – Religious Violence – Boko Haram – Fulani Herdsmen, there are multiple dimensions to conflict in Nigeria’s North-Central Region. Conflict between pastoralists (predominantly Christian) and herders (predominantly Muslim) persists, exacerbated by the effects of climate change and diminishing natural resources. At the same time, Boko Haram is active in the region, as are criminal gangs/bandits.
A June 2023 report by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), Issue Update: Ethnonationalism and Religious Freedom in Nigeria, states:
Ethnonationalist fighters in Nigeria have politicized religion and attacked civilians based on ethnoreligious identity. These fighters commit some of the most egregious atrocities and human rights violations of any actors in the country. This is particularly true in northcentral Nigeria, where ethnonationalist fighters affiliated with the predominantly Muslim Fulani community attack vulnerable Christian civilians with impunity.[16]
[16] 'Issue Update: Ethnonationalism and Religious Freedom in Nigeria', United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), 9 June 2023, p.1, 20230913115925
A June 2024 Inter Press Service article notes that the conflict between predominantly Christian farmers and predominantly Muslim herders is increasingly being seen in ethnoreligious terms:
In recent years, the conflict has shifted from being a battle for resources to being interpreted as an ethno-religious crisis between the indigenous ethnic groups in the Middle Belt, who are predominantly Christian, and the Fulani, who are predominantly Muslim and are seen as settlers.
For many Christian groups in Nigeria and outside the country, the attacks have been termed an “Islamic war of expansion”. This view is coming on the backdrop of concerns suggesting that Nigeria is one of the most dangerous places to be a Christian following the rise of jihadist groups and politically motivated killings that have targeted Christians. According to a report, 90 per cent of the nearly 5,000 Christians killed for faith-based reasons last year were in Nigeria.
Even before US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Nigeria in February, Christian advocacy and religious freedom groups in the US criticized President Joe Biden’s administration for not including Nigeria on its religious freedom watchlist.
Some Muslims in the North perceive attacks on Fulani communities by Christians as an assault on Islam, prompting calls for retaliation from some quarters.
These clashes, typically occurring in villages, can quickly spiral into violent confrontations between Christians and Muslims in northern towns, leading to devastating consequences.
Muslim groups in Nigeria have consistently denounced the killings perpetrated by both sides, asserting that the attacks are not driven by religious motives.[17]
[17] 'Climate Change, Ethnicity and Neglect Fuel Violence in Nigeria’s Kaduna State', Promise Eve, Inter Press Service (IPS), 19 June 2024, 20240625091126
The US State Department’s June 2024 report on international religious freedom states that ‘[n]umerous fatal clashes occurred throughout the year [2023] in the North Central Region between predominantly Christian farmers from various ethnic groups and predominantly Muslim herders.’[18]
[18] 'International Religious Freedom Report for 2023 - Nigeria', US Department of State, 26 June 2024, p.3, 20240627140827
The report notes several attacks in the North-Central Region:
On December 24, armed gunmen launched coordinated attacks on more than 17 villages in Plateau State, killing more than 150 persons, mostly Christians, and injuring and displacing thousands of others. Between mid-April and early July, attackers reportedly killed more than 200 persons, most of them Christian, in the Mangu Local Administrative Area in Plateau State.
[…]
In March, Fulani herdsmen killed at least 60 Christians in Benue State, according to media outlets.
[…]
According to media outlets, in September, Fulani herdsmen killed 10 Christians in Plateau State, where 27 others were slain in August. Some Christian leaders said they believed herdsmen’s attacks were motivated by a desire to take over Christians’ lands as desertification has made it difficult for them to sustain their herds, while others said that in many cases the attackers were bandit groups that disguised themselves as herdsmen. Fulani leaders said the killings were reprisals for earlier killings of Fulani herders.[19]
[19] 'International Religious Freedom Report for 2023 - Nigeria', US Department of State, 26 June 2024, p.3, 20240627140827
A 2024 report by Nigerian think tank Nextier SPD[20], Battlefields and Ballots, states:
[20] Nextier SPD (Security, Peace, and Development) is a development consulting firm, based in Nigeria, ‘that uses evidence-based research to advance and build knowledge.’ Its work includes ‘policy research, impact assessment, violent conflict tracking, political and security risks analysis, strategic planning, technical assistance, project and programme management, and community and stakeholder engagement’
In the North Central region, the most devastating incident unfolded on Christmas Eve in Plateau state. Gunmen targeted remote villages, resulting in the tragic loss of over 140 lives and extensive property damage. This attack was linked to the ongoing conflict between herders and farmers in the region.
[…]
Ethno-religious tensions were starkly evident in the North Central assault, underscoring the enduring conflicts between herders and farmers competing for limited resources.[21]
[21] 'Battlefields and Ballots: Nigeria in 2023 and First Quarter of 2024', Nextier, 11 May 2024, p.18 (p.19 of PDF), 20240719154237
The report says that ‘the North Central has seen a rise in gunmen attacks due to armed banditry, farmer-herder crisis and religious intolerance in the region.’[22] According to the report, Benue and Plateau states recorded the highest number of casualties from gunmen ‘due to farmer-herder crisis and ethno-religious tensions.’[23]
[22] 'Battlefields and Ballots: Nigeria in 2023 and First Quarter of 2024', Nextier, 11 May 2024, p.18 (p.19 of PDF), 20240719154237
[23] 'Battlefields and Ballots: Nigeria in 2023 and First Quarter of 2024', Nextier, 11 May 2024, p.20 (p.21 of PDF), 20240719154237
The report further states:
Numerous fatal intercommunal clashes continued throughout the year in the North Central Region between predominantly Christian farmers from various ethnic groups and predominantly Muslim herders. In March, Fulani herdsmen killed at least 60 Christians in Benue State, according to media outlets. In his Easter message, Archbishop Ignatius A. Kaigama of Abuja stated that “from Boko Haram to banditry and kidnapping, the threat of violence and terrorism, the stories are both heart-breaking and fear-inspiring just as the terrible events of Good Friday were over two thousand years ago.” In April, herdsmen killed 33 Christians in Runji village in Kaduna State. A local government spokesperson said the attackers, “maimed and burned mostly women and children, set houses ablaze, and raided several houses within the community.” Also in April, media outlets reported armed Fulani herdsmen killed 18 Christians and wounded a pastor in Plateau State. According to media reports, in September, Fulani herdsmen killed 10 Christians in Plateau State, where 27 others were slain in August.
Between mid-April and early July, attackers reportedly killed more than 200 persons, most of them Christian, in the Mangu Local Administrative Area in Plateau State. Joseph Gwankat, president of the Mwaghavul Development Association in Mangu, said 54 villages had been attacked, hundreds of persons were missing, and more than 18,000 were displaced. According to the Vanguard newspaper, the displaced were being housed in camps hosted by the Church of Christ in Nations.
On December 24, unknown armed gunmen launched coordinated attacks on more than 17 villages in Plateau State, burning houses, killing more than 150 persons, mostly Christians, and injuring and displacing thousands of others. Officials and some survivors blamed the killings on the farmer-herder crisis in Nigeria and ongoing competition over land and water resources, while others, including Christian religious leaders, stated that the Christmas killings were part of an organized effort to drive Christian farmers from their lands. The Chief Imam in Jos, the capital of Plateau State, said the killings were revenge for earlier killings of herders and theft of their
DO SOURCES INDICATE CURRENT ONGOING VIOLENCE IN THE AREA AGAINST CHRISTIANS BY BOKO HARAM OR FULANI HERDSMEN?
Sources indicate there is ongoing violence in North-Central Region against Christians. The situation is complex, with multiple actors engaging in violence, and complicated by issues around land and resources.
Violence against Christians
The May 2024 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2024 Annual Report notes the difficulties involved in verifying numbers, perpetrators, and motives for violence against Christians:
The specific perpetrators of and motivation behind individual attacks are often difficult to verify. Nigerian Christian leaders typically blame armed Fulani herders for attacks that are ethnoreligious in nature. It is also difficult to verify precise numbers of victims, with different sources providing varying estimates. For example, a report by the Nigerian nongovernmental organization Intersociety claimed that violent insurgent groups and armed gangs, along with Nigerian government forces, accounted for 8,222 Christian deaths across Nigeria in 2023. Another report asserted that in 2023, extremists in Benue State killed 414 people from predominantly Christian communities while injuring, raping, or kidnapping 100 more. Others reported that between May and June 2023, violent groups killed 450 Christians in three northeastern states.
In June, violent actors in Plateau State reportedly killed at least 29 people, including several Christians, and later in the month killed 19 villagers, including Christians in Jos South and Mangu. In September, bandits in Kaduna State attempted to kidnap a priest and then set fire to his home, killing Catholic seminarian Na’aman Danlami. In November, armed gunmen reportedly killed one person and kidnapped at least 150 people in Zamfara State for ransom. In Plateau State, assailants attacked Christian villages killing over 190 people the weekend before Christmas, including Baptist minister Solomon Gushe and his family. Intersociety claimed that the coordinated Christmas week massacre was so deadly because of collusion between armed groups and government officials.[24]
[24] 'United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2024 Annual Report', United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), May 2024, p.37 (p.42 of PDF), 20240502111923
The InterSociety[25] report referred to above by the USCIRF states that, between January 2023 and January 2024, there were 1,450 Christians killed in Benue, 1,400 in Plateau, and 730 in Niger.[26]
[25] InterSociety is a Nigerian non-government organisation (NGO). According to its website: ‘Our mission is to support, protect, promote, and advance democracy, rule of law and human rights; expose perpetrators of heinous crimes (state actors and non-state actors) and bring them to accountability; and seek compensations for their victims. These we vigorously pursue by supporting and conscientizing individuals, organizations, and nations through research, investigation, documentation, publication, and campaign to realize their civil, political, economic, social, democratic, environmental, and cultural rights and responsibilities as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, a growing body of public international law and codified statutes of the UN Member-States’
[26] 'Jihadist Genocide Of Christians In Nigeria Bloodiest In 2023: 8,222 Hacked To Death From Jan-Jan', International Society for Civil Liberties ＆ Rule of Law (Intersociety), 14 February 2024, p.3, 20240725163130
A January 2023 report by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that violence against Christians has increased in recent years, although it is difficult to say how many attacks have specifically targeted Christians:
The number of Christian victims of violence increased markedly during the reporting period. ACLED reported a 21% increase in violent incidents targeting Christians in 2021 compared to 2020. Over the first half of 2022, ACLED recorded a 25% increase since 2021 in violence specifically targeting Christians. In 2022 in particular, there was a sharp increase in attacks on church buildings and people associated with them. The Christian advocacy group Open Doors ranked Nigeria number 7 among countries where Christians are persecuted, the highest ranking Nigeria has been given by Open Doors.
Although Christians frequently were victims of violence, it is not always possible to say how many attacks specifically targeted Christians, since religion, ethnicity and the struggle for land and resources are closely linked. Muslims and Christians were both perpetrators and victims of violence. Tensions between farmers and nomadic herders contributed to an increase in violence on both sides. Also, although Boko Haram’s violence is certainly partly religiously motivated, not all the violence used by this group has religious motives. Thus Boko Haram attacked not only Christians, but anyone they considered to be opponents of Boko Haram or supporters of the government, such as journalists, teachers, schoolchildren and health workers. The increase in the number of Christian victims since 2020 should be seen as part of the increase in violence against all citizens, regardless of their religion.[27]
[27] 'General Country of Origin Information Report Nigeria', Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2023, pp.46-47, 20230510142720
The June 2023 USCIRF report, Issue Update: Ethnonationalism and Religious Freedom in Nigeria, outlines the situation concerning militant Fulani herdsmen:
Ethnonationalist groups fighting for greater power for ethnic Fulani operate in northcentral and northwest Nigeria and overwhelmingly target civilians with violence. In northcentral Nigeria especially, Christians represent the majority of victims of this violence.
A predominantly Muslim ethnic group, Fulani also have experienced significant persecution and statelessness across West Africa for several decades. A primarily pastoralist community, Fulani represent one of the largest ethnic groups in Nigeria. In recent decades, Fulani in Nigeria have expressed a growing sense of disenfranchisement in the country, as they have elsewhere in West Africa. The sense of marginalization among Fulani communities in Nigeria stems primarily from federal and state government preference for developing the agriculture sector over the livestock sector, especially in the face of ecological shocks and growing resource competition. Government authorities have also failed to curb the flow of weapons and protect pastoralists’ property in the face of growing criminality—a grievance felt by members of other ethnic groups and livelihoods as well.
With leadership decentralized, the objectives of armed actors fighting for Fulani ethnic empowerment in northcentral Nigeria are difficult to discern. Evidence suggests that some of these fighters seek to establish an ethno-state affording governing power disproportionately or exclusively to Fulani elites. These militias take advantage of state absence and poor security performance to attack and displace civilians, overwhelmingly targeting Christian communities in northcentral Nigeria. Conscripting from predominantly pastoralist communities, these ethnonationalist militias benefit from pastoralists’ physical stamina, terrain knowledge, military culture, and availability of arms to conduct asymmetric warfare, resulting in some of the highest casualty attacks in the country.’[28]
[28] 'Issue Update: Ethnonationalism and Religious Freedom in Nigeria', United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), 9 June 2023, p.2, 20230913115925
The report notes that a number of groups are responsible for violence in North-Central Region:
Ethnonationalists in northcentral Nigeria share the landscape with many other armed actors, including criminal gangs, self-defense militias, and militant Islamist groups. Given this complex array of armed actors and the lack of government investigation into violent incidents, discerning the perpetrator of any individual attack often proves difficult. However, ethnonationalist armed groups operate in the region, are well armed, and frequently show disdain for human rights. These groups are likely responsible for significant attacks against Christian communities in northcentral Nigeria.[29]
[29] 'Issue Update: Ethnonationalism and Religious Freedom in Nigeria', United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), 9 June 2023, p.2, 20230913115925
The report concludes that ‘[i]n northcentral Nigeria, ethnonationalists fighting to promote Fulani interests target Christian civilians based on ethnoreligious identity and are among the armed actors that attack worshippers in their military pursuits there and elsewhere in northern Nigeria.’[30]
[30] 'Issue Update: Ethnonationalism and Religious Freedom in Nigeria', United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), 9 June 2023, p.4, 20230913115925
A June 2024 Inter Press Service article states:
In recent years, tensions between farmers and cattle herders have escalated in Nigeria’s north-central states, often referred to as the Middle Belt. This region has witnessed a series of violent clashes. For instance, last year in Zangon Kataf district, Kaduna state, 33 people lost their lives in an attack by Fulani herders on a farming village.
Similarly, in Bokkos district, Plateau state, over 200 individuals were brutally murdered during a herder-led attack on Christmas Eve last year.
According to Human Rights Watch, approximately 60,000 people have been killed and over 300,000 have been displaced across the region due to the conflict.[31]
[31] 'Climate Change, Ethnicity and Neglect Fuel Violence in Nigeria’s Kaduna State', Promise Eve, Inter Press Service (IPS), 19 June 2024, 20240625091126
The May 2024 report Battlefields and Ballots states that Plateau has experienced particularly high levels of violence:
The farmer-herder conflict, predominantly in North Central Nigeria, remains one of the deadliest security threats after terrorism and banditry in the North East and North West, respectively. Although the conflict between farmers and herders initially emerged in Northern Nigeria, it has since become a nationwide crisis, described as a “national catastrophe.” While every state in Nigeria is affected to some extent, certain states stand out due to the frequency, severity, and extent of attacks within their borders.
Notably, in the North Central region, states such as Plateau, Benue, Nasarawa, and Niger have experienced remarkably consistent and devastating levels of violence. Plateau State has been a hotbed for this conflict in 2023 with 360 casualties from 48 incidents. Of the 48 incidents, the three-day violence in May, which claimed the lives of 85 people, recorded the highest casualty count from the conflict all year. Like other similar attacks, the conflict was a continuation of tit-for-tat killings. The conflict, mostly between herders and farmers from the Berom and Irigwe ethnic groups, is frequently portrayed as ethno-religious. However, researchers claim that climate change and the paucity of pastoral land drive farmers and herders against one another, regardless of identity.[32]
[32] 'Battlefields and Ballots: Nigeria in 2023 and First Quarter of 2024', Nextier, 11 May 2024, p.28 (p.29 of PDF), 20240719154237
Please see the graph below for statistics on the states most affected by the farmer-herder conflict.
Figure 1 – Farmer-Herder Conflict in 2023 – Most Affected States[33]
[33] 'Battlefields and Ballots: Nigeria in 2023 and First Quarter of 2024', Nextier, 11 May 2024, p.30 (p.31 of PDF), 20240719154237
The 2024 Freedom in the World – Nigeria report states:
A rolling conflict between farmers and the Fulani, a seminomadic Muslim ethnic group, continued to destabilize northern Nigeria in 2023. The Fulani have abandoned degraded grasslands in the north, coming into increased conflict with farmers as they travel south to find new grazing lands. In May 2023, 100 people were reportedly killed in a clash between farmers and herders in north-central Nigeria.[34]
[34] 'Freedom in the World 2024 - Nigeria', Freedom House, 29 February 2024, Section F3, p.15, 20240301083354
Specific incidents of violence against Christians
COIS consulted the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED)[35] dataset on Nigeria for the period July 2022 – July 2024, and found the following instances of violence involving Christians in the North-Central Region:
[35] ACLED uses a wide range of sources, including media sources. To see the source for a recorded event,
Benue State
·‘On 5 May 2023, an unidentified armed group killed four civilians in Hirnyam village (Guma, Benue). The victims included a catechist and his wife.’[36]
[36] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG31254, 20240719115518
·‘On 2 April 2023, suspected armed pastoralists attacked Christians at a vigil ground where they were worshipping at Akenawe (Logo, Benue) coded to Ugba. One person was killed, five persons sustained varying degrees of machete wounds and four others including the resident pastor were abducted. Other sources report that three persons were abducted and two people sustained machete cuts.’[37]
[37] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) ‘is a disaggregated data collection, analysis, and crisis mapping project. ACLED collects information on the dates, actors, locations, fatalities, and types of all reported political violence and protest events around the world. The ACLED team conducts analysis to describe, explore, and test conflict scenarios, and makes both data and analysis open for free use by the public’
·‘On 22 December 2022, an unidentified armed group abducted a catholic priest along Okpoga-Ojapo road (Okpokwu, Benue). The abductee is the chaplain of St Mary's hospital Okpoga, there are no reports about ransom demands. The police spokesperson in the state claimed that the abductee was released in the evening of the same day after pressure was mounted on the abductors.’[38]
[38] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG29297, 20240719115518
·‘On 6 July 2022, an unidentified armed group ambushed and abducted a catholic priest along Oturkpo-Ugbokolo road (Otukpo, Benue). The abductee was released on 8 July, there are no reports about ransom payment.’[39]
[39] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG25518, 20240719115518
Kogi State
·‘On 4 June 2024, a Kogi militia abducted a pastor's wife from her residence in Lokoja (Lokoja, Kogi). The abductors were said to have trailed the woman from an eatery to her house and sporadically opened fire to scare off the people before they took her away. They demanded a 32-million-naira ransom for the release of the hostage.’[40]
[40] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG36968, 20240719115518
·‘On 14 November 2023, the Kogi militia killed a pastor held hostage after collecting a million naira ransom in Obajana (Lokoja, Kogi). The pastor was abducted on 11 November 2023, and the abductors demanded a 20 million naira ransom for his release.’[41]
[41] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG32768, 20240719115518
·‘On 2 April 2023, an unidentified armed group in their hundreds attacked civilians in Oganenigu (Dekina, Kogi) and killed 10 persons including the APC ward chairman of Oganenigu and a pastor who initially fled but went back to the church when he thought the assailants had left. Hundreds of houses were also set ablaze, other sources report that at least 50 houses were burnt by the assailants who shot people on sight when they arrived.’[42]
[42] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG30840, 20240719115518
Kwara State
·‘On 11 November 2023, an unidentified armed group killed two civilians at Agbeku community (Ifelodun, Kwara) and abducted three others including a pastor when they invaded a church auditorium and the victims' residence, one person was shot and critically wounded. A ransom of 50 million naira was demanded for the release of the abductees.’[43]
[43] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG33763, 20240719115518
Nassarawa State
·‘On 13 October 2023, a mob killed a man who was accused of stealing another person's genital at One Man Village in Karu LGA (Nassarawa). The victim was an evangelist who was preaching in the area before he was accused and killed.’[44]
[44] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG33138, 20240719115518
·‘On 24 November 2022, an unidentified armed group abducted a catholic priest alongside several church members at an unspecified location in Nassarawa state, coded to Lafia (Lafia, Nassarawa). The abductees were en route to Abuja, there are no reports about ransom demands.’[45]
[45] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG28792, 20240719115518
Niger State
·‘Around 29 May 2024 (week of), a Niger militia killed a pastor whom they had abducted from Sarkin Pawa (Muya, Niger). The victim was abducted alongside his wife and other people, they were released after an unspecified amount was paid as ransom, before the pastor was shot while they were walking away. Location coded to where the victims were abducted.’[46]
[46] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG36966, 20240719115518
·‘On 21 May 2024, a Niger militia abducted a pastor, his wife and an unspecified number of others at Sarkin Pawa (Muya, Niger). The pastor's wife and other abductees were released after an unspecified amount was paid as ransom, the pastor was later killed (coded separately).’[47]
[47] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG37007, 20240719115518
·‘On 13 May 2024, a Niger militia killed four civilians at Majure village, 10km away from Sarkin Pawa (Muya, Niger). The victims who were killed on a farm near a church consisted of one pastor and three church members, other sources report two church members. At least 20 villagers were also abducted.’[48]
[48] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG36604, 20240719115518
·‘On 23 December 2023, the Niger militia killed a Redeemed Christian Church pastor in Garam (Tafa, Niger). The militia abducted thirteen people, including a five-year-old son of the deceased pastor. They abandoned the baby by the riverside when he could not cross to the other side of the river. The militia demanded a 50 million naira ransom for each hostage.’[49]
[49] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG34241, 20240719115518
·‘On 1 August 2023, a Niger militia abducted a catholic priest and a seminarian from their residence in Gyedna village (Tafa, Niger) coded to Sabon Wuse which is about one hour away. The assailants shot sporadically when they invaded the village to scare residents and fled with the victims towards the village's boundary with Gwaram. There are no reports about ransom demands.’[50]
[50] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG32129, 20240719115518
·‘On 17 January 2023, Catholic women and youths marched to demonstrate against the killing of a Reverend Father in Kafin Koro (Paikoro, Niger). The Reverend Father was burned alive inside his house by an armed group, coded separately. The demonstration turned violent when the police shot and killed one of the youths. The youths then set the Kaffin-Koro Divisional Police Headquarters ablaze. 1 fatality reported.’[51]
[51] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG29562, 20240719115518
·‘On 15 January 2023, Niger Communal Militia attacked a Reverend Father of Saint Peter and Paul Catholic Church in his house in Kafin Koro (Paikoro, Niger). The militiamen set the house on fire and burnt the Reverend Father alive when they couldn't access his house. A colleague of the father was shot in the shoulder when trying to escape from the scene. It was reported that the militia members divided themselves into two; a group went to the father's residence, and the other stood guard in town to prevent interference. 1 fatality reported.’[52]
[52] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG29626, 20240719115518
Plateau State
·‘On 3 June 2024, a Plateau militia shot and killed five people, including a pastor and his wife, in Kimakpa, coded to Kwal (Bassa, Plateau). The assailants attacked their victims in the middle of the night. Two other persons were injured during the attack.’[53]
[53] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG37179, 20240719115518
·‘On 1 February 2024, an unidentified armed group abducted two catholic priests from their parish at Pankshin (Pankshin, Plateau) and demanded a ransom of 25 million naira. The abductees were released a week later, two of the abductors were arrested in Ogun state and one of them was the priests' parishioner.’[54]
[54] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG34982, 20240719115518
·‘Property destruction: On 30 January 2024, suspected Fulani herders razed a CAC church in Maiduna (Bokkos, Plateau). No further details.’[55]
[55] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG34881, 20240719115518
·‘On 23 January 2024, a mob of Muslim and Christians clashed in Mangu town (Mangu, Plateau) over claims of a foiled cattle rustling attempt. The clash spread to different parts of the town, at least 8 persons were killed, mosques, churches and houses were set ablaze. Soldiers were deployed into the town to calm the tension which continued [coded separately].’[56]
[56] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG34706, 20240719115518
·‘On 29 November 2023, an unidentified armed group abducted three people, including a pastor from Raddi Village, coded to Bassa (Bassa, Plateau). The hostages were later released when the police attacked the militia in Bauch State, coded separately.’[57]
[57] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG33974, 20240719115518
·‘On 17 September 2023, an unidentified armed group attacked the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA) in Nuku, Maigemu (Jos East, Plateau). There was no fatalities or injuries.’[58]
[58] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG32925, 20240719115518
·‘On 13 September 2023, an unidentified armed group in large numbers abducted four persons from Maigemu district (Jos East, Plateau). The abductees included one clergyman and three others, there are no reports on ransom demands.’[59]
[59] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG32728, 20240719115518
·‘On 11 June 2023, an unidentified armed group shot and killed a man at his home at Gana-Ropp community in Barkin Ladi (Plateau). The victim was a pastor with COCIN.’[60]
[60] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG31633, 20240719115518
·‘On 24 May 2023, a suspected Fulani militia killed a clergyman in his compound at Npat village in Mangu LGA (Plateau). The victim's cattle were rustled by the assailants.’[61]
[61] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG31375, 20240719115518
·‘On 5 March 2023, an unidentified armed group killed a pastor and his two sons in Ganawuri community (Riyom, Plateau) coded to Ganawuri Hills. The attack was a reprisal for the killing of three persons previously [coded separately].’[62]
[62] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG30288, 20240719115518
·‘On 9 November 2022, an unidentified armed group abducted two clerics along Maraban Jama'a community, coded to Bukuru (Jos South, Plateau). A ransom of 10 million anira was demanded, the victims were released on 10 November after an unspecified amount was paid as ransom.’[63]
[63] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG28603, 20240719115518
·‘On 7 November 2022, an unidentified armed group abducted two clerics whom they beat up, at Bisichi (Barkin Ladi, Plateau). A ransom of 10 million was demanded, the victims were released on 10 November after an undisclosed amount was paid as ransom.’[64]
[64] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG28657, 20240719115518
·‘On 11 September 2022, an unidentified armed group forcefully entered the residence of a pastor, shot his wife in the leg, abducted him and one other person from Ganawuri community, coded to Ganawuri Hills (Riyom, Plateau) when they invaded they area and shot sporadically for several hours. The second abductee was a school principal who was rescued by a local defense militia [no clash was reported], a ransom of 20 million was demanded for the pastor's release.’[65]
[65] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG26320, 20240719115518
·‘On 4 July 2022, an unidentified armed group abducted the wife of the pastor in charge of ECWA church headquarters in Jos (Jos North, Plateau). The abductee was taken away when the abductors invaded the church staff house and shot sporadically to scare people away; the pastor engaged the assailants [means not stated] before he escaped, there are no reports about ransom demands.’[66]
[66] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG25500, 20240719115518
Federal Capital Territory (FCT)
·‘On 28 January 2024, an unidentified armed group of about seven abducted three Christian worshippers while they were praying at Idu Gbagyi mountain in Karmo, coded to near by Idu (Abuja Municipal, FCT). The abductees were rescued by police operatives who trailed the abductors.’[67]
[67] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG34814, 20240719115518
·‘On 10 March 2023, an unidentified armed group numbering about 20 abducted nine persons from Kuchibiyi in the Kubwa area (Abuja Municipal, FCT). The abductees include a pastor, his wife and children. Some of the abductees were released, at least 11 others were still held and 50 million naira was demanded as ransom.’[68]
[68] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG30547, 20240719115518
A report of an incident outside the date parameters of the ACLED dataset states that, on 24 July 2024, ‘Fulani attackers killed 18 Christians in a late-night assault’ in ‘Mbacher village, a predominantly Christian community in Benue state’s Katsina-Ala County’.[69]
[69] 'Fulanis Kill 18 Christians in Benue State, Nigeria', Morning Star News, 24 July 2024, 20240726092206
WHAT ACTION HAS THE GOVERNMENT TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO ANY VIOLENCE AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN THE REGION?
Sources indicate that the government has in place various early warning systems aimed to prevent attacks in the North-Central Region, and has taken security action, incorporating police, military and other security services. However, sources also indicate that the government has faced criticism for not effectively protecting civilians from violence in the North-Central Region.
The US State Department’s April 2024 report on human rights practices states that ‘[t]he government’s efforts to address tensions among ethnic groups typically involved focused security actions, incorporating police, military, and other security services, often in the form of a joint task force.’[70]
[70] '2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Nigeria', US Department of State, 22 April 2024, Section 6, p.31, 20240423143933
The US State Department’s June 2024 report on international religious freedom states:
According to several local NGOs, various early warning systems operating throughout the North Central and North West Regions prevented attacks. These systems capitalized on training local individuals to sense rising communal tension, including between religious communities, and report it to authorities before it could grow to violence.[71]
[71] 'International Religious Freedom Report for 2023 - Nigeria', US Department of State, 26 June 2024, p.11, 20240627140827
According to the June 2023 USCIRF report, Issue Update: Ethnonationalism and Religious Freedom in Nigeria, ‘[i]n the face of catastrophic violence against civilians, government response has been insufficient to meet its obligations to ensure security and justice for victims, especially in northcentral Nigeria.’[72] The report further states:
[72] 'Issue Update: Ethnonationalism and Religious Freedom in Nigeria', United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), 9 June 2023, pp.2-3, 20230913115925
Communities allege that government security forces deliberately avoid responding to warnings of violence until after attacks have taken place. When they do respond, Christian civilians have reported in several instances that security forces responded with stronger force to alerts of impending violence against Muslim communities than against Christian communities, raising questions of institutional bias. Local authorities have made no discernable efforts to communicate with civilians to address these perceptions or build trust with local communities. Local politicians reportedly exploit interethnic tensions to advance their political agendas. In the absence of strong federal response, some state and local officials call for civilians to take up arms and defend themselves, leading to militarization of identity groups and increases in human rights abuses associated with poorly trained vigilante groups operating with little-to-no accountability.[73]
[73] 'Issue Update: Ethnonationalism and Religious Freedom in Nigeria', United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), 9 June 2023, pp.2-3, 20230913115925
A May 2023 report by the USCIRF notes that authorities have encouraged civilians to arm themselves rather than rely on protection from the state:
Authorities in Nigeria frequently encourage civilians to arm themselves for self-protection rather than providing security through transparent and accountable state-backed forces. This strategy has had devastating ramifications for interfaith trust, escalating ethnoreligious violence impacting many groups in the region, including Fulani Muslims.
[…]
In 2023 a bomb blast at a cattle market between Nasarawa and Benue states killed more than 50 Fulani Muslim civilians in a region that government neglect has left rife with sectarian tension.
Government failure to protect the rights of Fulani Muslim civilians hasve [sic] also had indirect consequences for Christian civilians, as abuses have led some members of Fulani communities to arm themselves and conduct reprisal attacks based on ethnoreligious identity. In October 2022, after assailants killed five Fulani Muslim civilians in northcentral Nigeria, suspected armed Fulani-affiliated assailants stormed a local Christian village and fired indiscriminately, killing 18 people in alleged retaliation. Christian communities across Nigeria are threatened by gruesome, deadly attacks from by armed groups that exploit Fulani civilian grievance to pursue violent, criminal, and political aims.[74]
[74] 'Issue Update: Abuses Against Fulani Muslim Civilians', United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), May 2023, p.3, 20230913120434
The May 2024 report, Battlefields and Ballots, outlines government responses to address conflict between predominantly Muslim herders and predominantly Christian farmers:
In response to the Christmas Eve attack, Vice President Kashim Shettima visited the victims of the attack. At the same time, President Bola Tinubu condemned the killings and ordered the provision of relief materials to the survivors. The government has also deployed security forces to affected areas to quell violence and restore order. However, the effectiveness of these deployments has been questioned due to allegations of bias and inadequate resources.
Efforts have been made to facilitate dialogue and mediation between farmers and herders, often involving traditional and community leaders. These initiatives aim to promote peaceful coexistence and resolve grievances through non-violent means. This includes initiatives to strengthen community policing, conflict resolution mechanisms, and economic development programmes. Several peace moves have been initiated to trace the root causes and broker peace between warring groups. For example, some stakeholders convened in Mangu and Riyom Local Government Areas of the State to discuss solutions to the crisis.
Various policy interventions have been proposed to address the underlying causes of the conflict, including land reforms, grazing reserves, and ranching programs. However, implementing these policies has been slow and often faced resistance from various interest groups. The farmer-herder attacks, especially in the worst-hit state of Plateau, have prompted responses such as the inauguration of the Security and Information Centre (SIC) by Plateau State Governor Caleb Mutfwang.[75]
[75] 'Battlefields and Ballots: Nigeria in 2023 and First Quarter of 2024', Nextier, 11 May 2024, pp.30-31 (pp.31-32 of PDF), 20240719154237
The May 2024 annual report by USCIRF states:
Violence across Nigeria impacted freedom of religion or belief as the government failed to prevent attacks against faith-based organizations or worshipers, with some accusing it of fomenting such attacks. Nigerian government officials were often slow to react to information about possible attacks or to respond after attacks occurred. In some cases, those impacted by violence directly criticized a lack of government accountability and called for further steps to protect religious freedom. Both the police and army drew criticism for not stemming the activities of violent insurgent groups such as Boko Haram, Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP), and Fulani gangs that often worked in collaboration with them.[76]
[76] 'United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2024 Annual Report', United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), May 2024, p.36 (p.41 of PDF), 20240502111923
The report goes on to state that ‘[t]he government, at both the federal and state levels, continued to tolerate egregious criminal activity and violence by armed groups that targeted religious communities and negatively impacted religious freedom.’[77]
[77] 'United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2024 Annual Report', United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), May 2024, p.37 (p.42 of PDF), 20240502111923
PLEASE BRIEFLY PROVIDE INFORMATION AS TO THE LEVEL OF RISK FOR CHRISTIANS GENERALLY OR FROM BOKO HARAM AND FULANI HERDSMEN IN LAGOS.
COIS found limited information on the level of risk for Christians in Lagos.[78]
[78] Sources consulted include CISNET, government and non-governmental reports, domestic and international media outlets, ECOI, and targeted internet searches
Lagos City is located in Lagos State in Nigeria’s south, and has a population of almost 16 million.[79] The dominant religion in Lagos City is Christianity but there is also a significant Muslim population.[80]
[79] CIA, ‘Nigeria - The World Factbook’ (Geography), updated 12 December 2023, cited in 'Country Policy and Information Note - Nigeria: Internal relocation', UK Home Office, July 2024, p.83, 20240730094632
[80] 'International Religious Freedom Report for 2023 - Nigeria', US Department of State, 26 June 2024, p.5, 20240627140827
A November 2023 research response by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada states:
4.2 Situation of Christians in Lagos
The US International Religious Freedom Report for 2022 notes that Christianity is the "dominant" religion in the Southwest, including in Lagos (US 2023-05-15, 6).
The ACLED representative noted that since 2021 their organization has recorded no cases of "political violence targeting Christians" in the city of Lagos (ACLED 2023-10-05). However, the same source described the following 5 instances of such violence [in Local Government Areas (LGAs) within Metropolitan Lagos] over the same time period (ACLED 2023-10-05):
·In early August 2021 in Ketu, Kosofe LGA, a Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) pastor was shot and killed at the pulpit by an "unidentified cult militia";
·On 26 September 2021 in Festac, Amuwo-Odofin LGA, a man was abducted from his church by "unidentified armed men." No ransom demands have been reported;
·On 27 September 2021 in Dopemu, Agege LGA, a pastor and his wife were abducted by "an unidentified armed group." The group initially demanded 100 million NGN in ransom for the couple, but ultimately released the wife and reduced the ransom to 50 million NGN;
·On 25 January 2022 in Jakande, Eti-Osa LGA, a pastor was attacked and beaten by an "armed group," as was a congregation member who attempted to intervene. "[R]eports indicate" that the attack is tied to a leadership struggle within the church;
·On 26 January 2022 in Ikoyi, Eti-Osa LGA, a pastor was "physically assaulted by a mob," which also invaded the church with a bulldozer and took down the fence and trees (ACLED 2023-10-05).[81]
[81] 'NGA201703.E Nigeria: Situation of Christians, including those living in northern cities, in Lagos, and in Abuja; state protection (2021–November 2023)', Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 10 November 2023, 20231201084304
COIS consulted the most recent ACLED dataset and found the following additional incident in Lagos:
·‘On 15 May 2024, a suspected cult militia attacked a Christian preacher in Festac (Amowo-Odofin, Lagos) over his preaching against cultism and gang violence. The community members rescued the preacher.’[82]
A 2023 report by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, states:
According to a confidential source, the federal government and the states gave priority in terms of the security situation to the country’s political centres, such as Abuja, Lagos, Kano and Port Harcourt. Nevertheless, there were major security concerns in two of Nigeria’s largest cities in 2022: Lagos and Abuja.
In Lagos, the authorities announced an operation against bandits in early October 2022 after the commercial centre of Lagos was partially closed in August due to a threat of attacks.[83]
In a January 2023 interview with Nigerian news source The Guardian, Dr Adewumi Badiora, a member of the African Cities Research Consortium who teaches at Olabisi Onabanjo University, stated:
Cities like Lagos are considered as one of the fairly peaceful cities in the country. Although, certain violent crimes have become increasingly common in Lagos as well. For instance, there are rising criminal activities like armed robbery, assaults, thefts, Gender Based Violence (GBV), cultism and banditry, as well as drug abuse and related harms in Lagos.[84]
[82] 'ACLED Dataset - Nigeria - 2022-2024', Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), 17 July 2024, Event ID NIG36809, 20240719115518
[83] 'General Country of Origin Information Report Nigeria', Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2023, p.31, 20230510142720
[84] ‘Migration stimulates crime, insecurity in Lagos’, Chinedum Uwaegbulam, Guardian, The (Nigeria), 22 January 2023, 20240801135058
Hearing, credibility, findings and assessment

The mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is ‘well-founded’ or that it is for the reason claimed. It remains for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that all of the statutory elements are made out: MIEA v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596. Although the concept of onus of proof is not appropriate to administrative inquiries and decision‑making (Yao-Jing Li v MIMA (1997) 74 FCR 275 at 288), the relevant facts of the individual case will have to be supplied by the applicant himself or herself, in as much detail as is necessary, to enable the examiner to establish the relevant facts. A decision maker is not required to make the applicant’s case for him or her: Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169–70; Luu & Anor v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 at 45. Nor is the Tribunal required to accept uncritically any and all the allegations made by an applicant: Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437.
The Tribunal is satisfied that all of the applicants are citizens of Nigeria. For the reasons given in the decision of the delegate, the Tribunal also determines that daughter 2 is a citizen of [Country 2].
This finding would make relevant whether daughter 2 has a right to enter and reside in [Country 2] which, in the event of the Tribunal determining that she is otherwise owed protection in terms of Nigeria, could, subject to certain conditions, result in her not being owed protection because of her right to enter and reside in [Country 2]. However, given the decision of the Tribunal that none of the applicants is owed protection in relation to Nigeria a determination in this respect is unnecessary.
The Tribunal has numerous and significant credibility concerns as to claims in relation to claimed harm faced in Nigeria.
Firstly, the applicant has not been consistent in terms of claimed very impactful events that happened in the week leading up to the applicants coming to Australia.
As indicated above, the applicant in the interview with the delegate indicated that there was an attack on the family home in the week before coming to Australia in which the nanny was killed. She indicates that apart from her husband returning to the property to collect documents the family did not return to the home before coming to Australia.
The Tribunal in the hearing questioned the applicant at length about harmful issues faced in Nigeria and no evidence was provided of this attack in the week before the applicants came to Australia. In the hearing, the applicant specifically indicated that they left for the airport to travel to Australia from the family home. The applicant’s husband confirmed this in his evidence in the hearing.
Neither claim of this very significant and impactful event was referred to in the detailed written claims for protection provided before the interview by either the applicant or the applicant’s husband.
The Tribunal put to the applicant at the hearing that these matters are significantly undermining of her credibility. In response, the applicant indicated that this event did occur but there is a mistake as to timing. She indicated that it happened in 2011.
The Tribunal noted to the applicant that such a claim is inconsistent with clear evidence she gave in the interview that this event happened in the week before they came to Australia including in giving evidence that they were not able to return to the home, other than her husband who attended the home briefly, while accompanied, to pick up necessary travel documents.
The applicant did not provide an understandable explanation for the inconsistency which is significantly undermining of her credibility.
Secondly, the applicant has not been consistent in terms of evidence in the delegate interview as to her workplace being attacked and burnt down in the months before coming to Australia leading to her ceasing work there. In the interview the applicant indicated that in February or March 2012 her work premises were burnt down in an attack, and from this point she stopped working.
The Tribunal indicated to the applicant that in questions asked in the hearing as to difficulties faced in terms of her workplace she provided no evidence of this event. The applicant in response to multiple questions in the hearing referred to surrounding tensions because of Muslims in the marketplace near to her work, but provided no evidence of the workplace being attacked and burnt to the ground.
In response to this inconsistency, the applicant indicated that she fled the workplace never to return and heard from others that the workplace had been burnt down, but it might have been other premises.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that this explains the inconsistency other than on the basis that the applicant has not been truthful.
Thirdly, the applicant has not previously provided evidence consistent with claims made in the hearing of multiple episodes when the family home was attacked requiring the family to flee the home and stay elsewhere for one or two nights at a time. Further, the applicant’s husband has given inconsistent accounts of the frequency of such attacks and fleeing.
In the hearing, the applicant indicated that from around 2008 on almost a weekly basis there were incidents affecting the family home resulting in the family having to flee the home for one to two nights at a time.
The Tribunal in the hearing asked the applicant’s husband about such occurrences and he said that there were perhaps two to three occasions when they had to flee the family home and stay in a hotel.
The Tribunal notes that neither the detailed written claims of the applicant’s husband nor the applicant’s referred to multiple instances when there were attacks and it was needed to flee the family home. Further, there is a significant discrepancy in the frequency of such events as between the evidence of the applicant and the applicant’s husband, with the former indicating that the events occurred almost weekly from 2008 whereas the applicant’s husband indicated there may have been two to three instances of having to flee the family home.
The applicant did not provide explanations for the inconsistencies and lack of prior written claims of such occurrences in a way that explained them to the Tribunal. The applicant referred to different understandings of the word ‘flee’.
The failure to make claims of multiple attacks on the family home causing the family to have to flee home for nights at a time, and the difference in evidence between the applicant and the applicant’s husband as to how often these events occurred, are undermining of the credibility of this claim and the broader credibility of the applicant, and the applicant’s husband.
Fourthly, there are credibility concerns as a result of the applicant making false claims as to what certain photographs provided to the Department depict in terms of claims of harm.
The Tribunal notes that, after the interview with the delegate, the applicant provided a further submission including various photographs with captions providing details of what is being photographed. As indicated in the delegate’s decision, one of the photographs is labelled ‘People and property is at Inferno in Jos close to Jos University teaching Hospital (APIN). You could see body still burning at the time the photo is shot (I used to work there), April, Midday 2012’. The delegate in the decision comments that a Google image search revealed that this image is actually related to an explosion that occurred at the University of Maiduguri Mosque in January 2017.
The Tribunal also notes that another photograph provided in this submission is described by the applicant as ‘Burnt Property and buildings close to our home in [address], April, Midnight 2012’. The delegate notes that an Internet image search revealed that this image was used in a ‘Guardian Nigeria News’ article which relates to an explosion that occurred in the northeast city of Yola in June 2015.
The Tribunal has itself checked the citations in the delegate’s decision of these two images provided by the applicant and confirmed that they are in fact images described by the delegate on the websites referred to.
The Tribunal put to the applicant that these images provided as part of her submission which are clearly incorrectly described to falsely support claims of harm faced in Nigeria in 2012 are seriously undermining as to her truthfulness and credibility. They reinforce the credibility issues identified above that these two images depicting harmful events are not mentioned by either the applicant or her husband in initial written claims for protection.
In response the applicant provided confused explanations of sourcing these photographs relating to events close to where she is from but maintaining she did not have knowledge that the photographs were depicting events other than what the applicant has claimed. The applicant indicated that her husband provided the photographs.
The Tribunal considers that either the applicant’s husband and/or the applicant have knowingly provided photographs which falsely claim to depict events of harm related to the applicants. This is undermining of the credibility of the various claims of harm advanced.
Mr [A] gave evidence to the Tribunal indicating that he came to Australia in April 2011 to undertake [further study]. He had gained Australian citizenship through being granted a protection visa. He had [worked at the same workplace] as the applicant’s husband. He referred to the applicants suffering severe persecution, being chased out of their home and houses being burned.
Mr [A] did not provide detail of harm faced by any of the applicants or the applicant’s husband that persuaded the Tribunal as to the truth of harm claimed beyond the written claims made by the applicant’s husband for the protection visa.
Cumulatively considered, these credibility issues are very significantly adverse to the credibility of the claims made by the applicant. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a truthful or credible witness.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant’s workplace was attacked and burnt to the ground in 2012 or that the applicant left this workplace for that reason. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there was an attack on the family home in the week prior to the family leaving for Australia causing the family to have to flee the home and not being able to return, other than a brief accompanied visit by the applicant’s husband to retrieve travel documents.
The Tribunal is also not satisfied that there have been any other occasions on which the family home has been attacked causing the family to have to flee the home for one or two nights.
Having made these adverse findings, the Tribunal, in contrast, is persuaded as to the truth of a number of harmful events claimed by the applicant’s husband.
Based on oral evidence in the hearing of the applicant’s husband consistent with written claims, the Tribunal does accept that in 2001 when returning from Lagos to Jos, he had to spend two nights in the bush because of significant unrest in his home area.
The Tribunal also accepts evidence of the applicant’s husband that there was an attack on the family home in November 2011 from five youths who were attempting to gain entry into the premises. The applicant’s husband indicated in the hearing that the individuals got past the main gate but not further when they were stopped by police. The applicant’s husband indicated that some of the individuals were killed by police, which the Tribunal is prepared to accept.
The Tribunal accepts from independent evidence that there are very significant tensions in the Middle Belt of Nigeria. The significant focus of difficulties is harm faced by Christian farmers from Muslim herdsmen. While the focus of harm is in rural areas, the Tribunal does accept instances of harm faced by Christians and others in urban areas of the Middle Belt. There are multiple accounts in the research response extracted from 2022 of harm faced by Christians in Plateau State where the applicants are from.
For the reasons given, however, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant or the applicant’s husband have been specifically targeted for harm or are part of any ongoing plan or vendetta to harm them. The Tribunal considers that the attack on the family home in November 2011 was opportunistic and not part of a premeditated intent to attack or harm the applicants or the applicant’s husband.
Based on the weight of independent evidence, the Tribunal is prepared to accept that the applicants as Christians face a real chance of serious harm or significant harm in the Middle Belt of Nigeria as a result of their Christianity. This is based on the quite significant reports of harm suffered by Christians in the area. This determination errs on finding that there is the risk of requisite harm in an urban area of the Middle Belt, albeit that the bulk of difficulties faced in the area are in rural areas towards Christian farmers from Faluni herdsmen.
The issue then arises as to whether the applicants could avoid a risk of requisite harm by relocating to another part of Nigeria. The Tribunal notes from the independent evidence that Christianity is the dominant religion in Lagos albeit with a significant Muslim population. There are reports of some harm faced by Christians in Lagos. However, the Tribunal does not have evidence that would support the position that every Christian in Lagos faces a real chance of serious or significant harm as a result of their religion.
In the hearing, the applicant maintained that there were more Muslims in Lagos than Christians and that there remains a risk in that place of requisite harm. The applicant indicated that in practical terms it is difficult to get employment when you are not from the area and it is not practical or reasonable to expect the family to relocate there.
The applicant’s husband was asked about the potential for the family to relocate to Lagos. In his evidence in the hearing, he gave evidence of obtaining further [qualifications] in [Country 1]. The Tribunal put to the applicant’s husband that with his significant qualifications it might be thought he could obtain employment in Lagos. He responded that he could, although he may not be able to obtain employment of the nature or level that he would wish in terms of the progression of his career.
There is no independent evidence before the Tribunal which persuades it that every Christian in Lagos faces a real chance of serious or significant harm based on their Christianity. The Tribunal is not satisfied that if the applicants or the applicant’s husband were to return to Nigeria and live in Lagos they would be targeted for specific harm for any reason.
Thus, for the purpose of the protection criteria the Tribunal is not satisfied that the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of Nigeria.
The Tribunal is also not satisfied, for the purpose of the complementary protection criterion, that it would be unreasonable to expect the applicants or the applicant’s husband to relocate to another part of Nigeria to avoid harm. Both the applicant and the applicant’s husband are [qualified], with the applicant’s husband having gained educational and practical qualifications in both Australia and [Country 1]. The applicant and the applicant’s husband have demonstrated resilience and mobility in terms of travel to Australia, and for the applicant’s husband, leaving his family to gain qualifications in [Country 1].
The Tribunal does not consider it would be unreasonable for the applicant or any of the family in light of that history and qualifications to relocate to a safer part of Nigeria, such as its capital Lagos with a very large population and what the Tribunal considers would be employment opportunities given the applicant’s and the applicant husband’s skills and experience. The Tribunal does not consider there exists a real risk of significant harm to the applicants in Lagos.
In summary, the Tribunal, for the purpose of this decision, accepts that the applicants face a real chance of serious harm based on their religion in their home area. The Tribunal, for the purpose of this decision, accepts that the applicants face a real risk of significant harm in their home area.
However, for the purpose of the complementary protection criterion, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the risk of harm relates to all areas of Nigeria. For the purpose of the complementary protection criterion, the Tribunal considers that it would be reasonable to expect the applicants to relocate to an area of Nigeria, such as Lagos, where they would not be at a real risk of significant harm.
For the reasons given above the Tribunal is not satisfied that any of the applicants are persons in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations. Therefore the applicants do not satisfy the criteria set out in s 36(2)(a) or (aa) for a protection visa. It follows that they are also unable to satisfy the criteria set out in s 36(2)(b) or (c), and cannot be granted the visa.
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicants protection visas.
David McCulloch
Member

ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…
5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
written (a)    a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…
36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…

please go to the row of the event ID number (e.g.NIG31254), and check the ‘Source’ column

[2024] AATA 4395

14 August 2024

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Immigration

Administrative Law

Legal Concepts

Judicial Review

Natural Justice

Procedural Fairness

Statutory Construction

Jurisdiction

Standing

Date	Event
09/01/2012	[Temporary visa] by [Mr B] (Applicant 1’s husband). Applicants 1,2,3 and 4 included in application.
08/03/2012	[Temporary] visa granted to [Mr B]. Applicants 1,2,3 and 4 granted [Temporary] visas as dependants.
[Date]/04/2012	Applicants arrived in Australia as the holders of a [Temporary] visa.
[Date]/11/2014	[Mr B] departed Australia on [Temporary] visa.
[Date]/11/2014	[Mr B] arrived in Australia.
[Date]/01/2015	[Mr B] departed Australia on [Temporary] visa.
[Date]/11/2015	[Mr B] arrived in Australia.
17/12/2015	Permanent Protection (XA 866) visa application lodged by [Mr B] and Applicants 1,2,3 and 4.
[Date]/12/2015	[Mr B] departed Australia on [Temporary] visa.
[Date]/03/2016	[Mr B] arrived in Australia.
[Date]/03/2016	[Mr B] departed Australia on [Temporary] visa.
[Date]/10/2016	[Mr B] arrived in Australia.
[Date]/11/2016	[Mr B] departed Australia on Bridging visa B.
[Date]/03/2017	[Mr B] arrived in Australia.
[Date]/03/2018	[Mr B] departed Australia on Bridging visa B.
06/03/2019	[Mr B] - Tourist Stream (OFFSHORE) (Web)(FA 600) refused.
[Date]/03/2019	[Mr B]’s Protection visa application refused as he departed Australia.
04/04/2019	[Mr B] - Review No Jurisdiction.
09/05/2019	[Mr B] - Tourist Stream (OFFSHORE) (Web)(FA 600) refused.
05/11/2019	Protection visa interview conducted with Applicant 1.
12/02/2020	Information before the Department indicates that [the fourth applicant] is a citizen of [Country 2] and Nigeria - s91Q referral.
13/01/2021	[The fourth applicant] - s91Q allowed -valid application.