2101456 (Refugee)

2101456 (Refugee) [2021] AATA 5051 (8 October 2021)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER:2101456

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Ethiopia
MEMBER:Jason Pennell
DATE:8 October 2021
PLACE OF DECISION: Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 8 October 2021 at 4.12pm

CATCHWORDS

REFUGEE – protection visa – Ethiopia – Federal Court remittal – race – Oromo – political opinion – Oromo People’s Congress member – suspected member of the Oromo Liberation Front – particular social group – returned asylum seeker – arrests – torture – physical assault – employment – political activities in Australia – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION

Migration Act 1958, ss 5(1), 5AAA, 5H, 5J – 5LA, 36, 65, 91, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2

CASES

Calado v MIMA (1998) 81 FCR 450
Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379
Maningat v MIMA (Federal Court of Australia, Tamberlin J, 30 April 1998)
MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
MIEA v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and McIllhatton v Guo Wei Rong and Pan Run Juan (1996) 40 ALD 445
Nagalingam v MILGEA (1992) 38 FCR 191
Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155
V v MIMA (1999) 92 FCR 355

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1.This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
2.[Name] (‘the applicant’), who claims to be a citizen of Ethiopia, applied for the protection visa on 26 November 2013 and the delegate refused to grant the visa on 30 September 2014 on the basis that the applicant is not a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations.
3.The applicant provided the Tribunal with a copy of the primary decision record issued by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection dated 30 September 2014.
4.The applicant initially applied to the Tribunal (differently constituted, case number 1417018) (‘the First Tribunal’) for review of the delegate’s decision on 14 October 2014. On 27 June 2016 the First Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
5.[In] December 2018 the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) dismissed the applicant’s appeal of the First Tribunal’s decision.
6.[In] December 2020 the Federal Court of Australia (FCA) remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for reconsideration. As a result, the matter has been returned to the Tribunal for reconsideration (case number 2101456) (‘the Tribunal’).
7.The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 27 September 2021 to give evidence and present arguments. The hearing was conducted via video conference using the Microsoft Teams (MS) program. The Tribunal exercised its discretion to hold the hearing by video, determining it was reasonable to do so, having regard to the nature of this matter and the individual circumstances of the applicants. The Tribunal also had regard to its objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical and quick. The Tribunal is satisfied the applicant was given a fair opportunity to give evidence and present arguments.

The Tribunal also received oral evidence from [Witness A].
The applicant was represented in relation to the review by his registered migration agent.
The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Oromo and English languages.

RELEVANT LAW

The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b) or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

Refugee criterion

Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).
Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who, ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’
Sections 91R and 91S of the Act qualify some aspects of Article 1A(2) for the purposes of the application of the Act and the Regulations to a particular person.
There are four key elements to the Convention definition. First, an applicant must be outside his or her country.
Second, an applicant must fear persecution. Under s 91R(1) of the Act persecution must involve ‘serious harm’ to the applicant (s 91R(1)(b)), and systematic and discriminatory conduct (s 91R(1)(c)). Examples of ‘serious harm’ are set out in s 91R(2) of the Act. The High Court has explained that persecution may be directed against a person as an individual or as a member of a group. The persecution must have an official quality, in the sense that it is official, or officially tolerated or uncontrollable by the authorities of the country of nationality. However, the threat of harm need not be the product of government policy; it may be enough that the government has failed or is unable to protect the applicant from persecution.
Further, persecution implies an element of motivation on the part of those who persecute for the infliction of harm. People are persecuted for something perceived about them or attributed to them by their persecutors.
Third, the persecution which the applicant fears must be for one or more of the reasons enumerated in the Convention definition – race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The phrase ‘for reasons of’ serves to identify the motivation for the infliction of the persecution. The persecution feared need not be solely attributable to a Convention reason. However, persecution for multiple motivations will not satisfy the relevant test unless a Convention reason or reasons constitute at least the essential and significant motivation for the persecution feared: s 91R(1)(a) of the Act.
Fourth, an applicant’s fear of persecution for a Convention reason must be a ‘well‑founded’ fear. This adds an objective requirement to the requirement that an applicant must in fact hold such a fear. A person has a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution under the Convention if they have genuine fear founded upon a ‘real chance’ of being persecuted for a Convention stipulated reason. A ‘real chance’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far‑fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent.
In addition, an applicant must be unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country or countries of nationality or, if stateless, unable, or unwilling because of his or her fear, to return to his or her country of former habitual residence. The expression ‘the protection of that country’ in the second limb of Article 1A(2) is concerned with external or diplomatic protection extended to citizens abroad. Internal protection is nevertheless relevant to the first limb of the definition, to whether a fear is well-founded and whether the conduct giving rise to the fear is persecution.
Whether an applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations is to be assessed upon the facts as they exist when the decision is made and requires a consideration of the matter in relation to the reasonably foreseeable future.

Complementary protection criterion

If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).
‘Significant harm’ for these purposes is exhaustively defined in s 36(2A): s 5(1). A person will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or the death penalty will be carried out on the person; or the person will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. ‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’, ‘degrading treatment or punishment’, and ‘torture’ are further defined in s 5(1) of the Act.
There are certain circumstances in which there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country. These arise where it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; where the applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; or where the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the applicant personally: s 36(2B) of the Act.

Mandatory considerations

In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs (‘the Department’), and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (‘DFAT’) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

BACKGROUND

Identity and country reference

The applicant claims that he was born in [Town 1], [District 1], Ethiopia, on [date]. He claims to be a citizen of Ethiopia, does not hold any other citizenship and is not a national of any other country. The applicant claims to belong to the Oromo ethnic group in Ethiopia and is a Protestant.
The applicant provided the Department with a certified copy of an extract of his Ethiopian passport valid from [2013] to [2018] which confirms his date of birth and age.[1]
[1] Certified copy of an extract of the applicant’s Ethiopian passport, Dept File No: [Number], Folio 27
The document provided by the applicant is consistent with his evidence to the Tribunal in relation to his identity. There is no evidence to suggest that he has a right to enter and/or reside, whether temporarily or permanently, in any other country. Therefore, based on the information provided by the applicant, the Tribunal finds the applicant is a citizen of Ethiopia and as such his protection claims will be assessed against Ethiopia as the country of reference and ‘receiving country’ respectively.

Applicant’s migration history in Australia

The applicant was granted a [Student] visa on 23 July 2013 and arrived in Australia [in] October 2013.
The applicant lodged his protection visa application on 26 November 2013.[2] The applicant has remained in Australia since lodging his protection visa application.

Claims for protection
[2] Dept File No: [Number] Folio 47-50 &60-66

The applicant’s claims for protection are outlined in his application for a protection visa dated 26 November 2013 and detailed in the delegate’s decision dated 30 September 2014.[3] The applicant claims that he will suffer serious or significant harm if he is returned to Ethiopia for the following reasons:[4]
[3]    Primary decision record dated 30 September 2014, Tribunal case file 1417018, Doc ID No. [Number]
[4]    Applicant’s submissions dated 14 September 2021 @ p.3; AAT File No 2101456, Doc ID:[Number]
(a)his political opinion as a member of the Oromo People’s Congress (OPC) and an active spokesman and organiser:
(i)   on behalf of the OPC.
(ii) in support of improved conditions for the Oromo people generally.
(iii)in opposition to the policies of the elected government.
(b)his imputed political opinion as a suspected member of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).
(c)his race as an ethnic Oromo.
(d)his membership of a particular social group (PSG) being leaders or active and visible members or members known to the police and security authorities of organisations in Ethiopia supporting or advocating for improved conditions for Oromo people.
(e)his membership of a PSG, being Oromo people who have sought asylum abroad or who have advocated abroad for improved rights for Oromo people and who have returned to Ethiopia.

Documentation

The applicant provided the following written material to the Tribunal in support of his application:[5]
[5] Applicant’s submissions dated 14 September 2021 @ p.1-2; AAT File No 2101456, Doc ID: [Number]
·Applicant’s statement dated 11 March 2014.
·Applicant’s statement dated 28 February 2016.
·Applicant’s statement dated 5 April 2016.
·Applicant’s statement dated 16 August 2016.
·Statement by [Witness B] dated 24 February 2016.
·Statement by [Witness C] dated 26 February 2016.
·Statement by [Witness D] dated 25 November 2014.
·Statement by [Witness E] dated 31 March 2016.
·Statement by [Witness F] dated 4 April 2016 (unsigned).
·Statement by [Witness G] dated 4 April 2016 (unsigned).
·Statement of support [Witness H] dated 19 April 2016.
·Statement by [Brother A] dated 21 April 2016 (applicant’s brother).
·Statement by [Witness I] dated 20 April 2016.
·Statement by [Witness J] dated 20 April 2016.
·Statement by [Witness K] dated 15 August 2021.
·Statement by [Witness L] dated 14 September 2021.
·Statement by [Witness K] (undated).
·Statement by [Witness M] (undated).
·Statement by [Witness K] dated 15 August 2021.
·Legal submissions by [Representatives A] dated 29 February 2016.
·Legal submissions by [Representatives A] dated 5 April 2016.
·Legal submissions by [Representatives A] dated 3 May 2016.
·Legal submissions by [Representatives A] dated 26 May 2016.[6]
·Legal submissions by [Representatives A] dated 14 June 2016.[7]
·Legal submissions by [Representatives A] dated 20 June 2016.
·Legal submissions by [Representatives A] dated 14 September 2021.
·Various copies of [social media] posts made by the applicant.

Applicant’s evidence
[6] First Tribunal’s letter dated 12 May 2016, Tribunal case file 1417018, Doc ID No [Number]
[7] First Tribunal’s letter dated 31 May 2016, Tribunal case file 1417018, Doc ID No [Number]

In addition to the applicant’s oral evidence to the Tribunal, the applicant’s evidence was also provided by his statements[8] including his signed statement dated 16 August 2021.[9]
[8] Applicant’s statements dated 11 March 2014 (Dept File No: [Number], Folio 66, 108), 28 February 2016, 5 April 2016, and 16 August 2016 (AAT File No 2101456, Doc ID No [Number])
[9] Tribunal case file 2101456, Doc ID No [Number]
The applicant’s evidence was that he was born in [Town 1], [District 1], Ethiopia, on [date]. He is of Oromo ethnicity. His language is Afan Oromo but he also speaks Amharic and English.
His parents are ethnic Oromo. They are farmers engaged in raising different farm crops and run a [farm] consisting of approximately [number stock]. The applicant helped work the farm while he was attending school. The applicant’s father recently died. His mother remains living in Ethiopia.
The applicant attended his primary and secondary school in [Town 1] (grades 1–8) [between specified years]. The applicant then attended [Town 1] Secondary School and completed his Ethiopian school leaving certificate examinations (ESLCE) in [year]. The applicant then attended [a named] University from which he obtained a [Qualification 1] in [subject 1], specialising in [subjects 2]. In [year] the applicant attended [University 2] in Ethiopia at which he undertook postgraduate studies in [subjects 3].
After the applicant obtained his [Qualification 1] he was employed by [Agency 1] as an instructor at [College 1]. In August 2006 worked as [an occupation 1] for the [Agency 2] at [Organisation 1]. The applicant was then employed as a [subjects 2] expert by [Project 1] project in Ethiopia from June 2011 to September 2013.
The applicant’s evidence was that in or about September 2003, his brother, [Brother B], was accused by the Ethiopian government of affiliation with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). He was detained, interrogated and tortured in [Prison 1], where he died of [medical issue] [in] September 2003. The applicant’s evidence was that his brother’s funeral was attended by approximately 250 people. [Several] police officers observed the funeral. The applicant’s evidence was that he addressed the service during which he said words to the effect that ‘you were denied medical attention and your life came to pass after years of suffering. The inhuman treatment and persecution you and other innocent Oromos faced will never be forgotten by your family and millions of Oromos. Dictators will pass and time will come when they will be judged for their human rights violations.’
The applicant’s evidence was that after the funeral, the [police officers] came to the applicant’s brother’s house and took the applicant to [Police Station 1] where he was questioned about his funeral address. The applicant reproached the police for being inhuman and abusing their power. The police then beat the applicant until he lost consciousness. He found himself in another room the next day where they continued to intimidate him, telling him that they would kill him if he and his family continued to support the OLF. He was detained for two weeks during which time he was repeatedly interrogated and tortured by police. The applicant’s evidence was that he was released after the police warned him that they would kill him if they heard him speaking out against the government again.
Another of the applicant’s brothers, [Brother A], was also suspected by the Ethiopian government of having links with the OLF. [Brother A] was working on his father’s farm in [Town 1] when he heard that the police were looking to arrest him. As a result, he fled to [Country 1] in October 2003. The applicant’s evidence was that as a result of [Brother A’s] disappearance, the Ethiopian security police continued to harass the applicant’s family. In December 2003, his father, mother and [a sibling] were detained for two months.

In 2004, while the applicant was working at [College 1], the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO), a coalition member of the governing Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), was campaigning for the 2005 national election. The OPDO had cadres working at the applicant’s College spying on students and staff and reporting to the security police. In or about October 2004, [College 1] hosted OPDO meetings at which it was considered by the OPDO mandatory for Oromo College staff to attend. After the conference the OPDO cadres asked the applicant to join the party and take part in the 2005 election campaign by encouraging students at the College to attend meetings and make financial contributions. His evidence was that he was offered promotions and access to further education and other benefits from the ruling party if he agreed to be involved. The applicant’s response was that he was not interested in joining the OPDO due to its involvement in the arrest, torture and killing of innocent Oromos.
After this refusal the applicant was summoned to the office of [name], the senior OPDO cadre at the College. He interrogated the applicant about his refusal to join, the OPDO. He warned the applicant that there would be consequences in his life and employment, and he would be fired from his government job. The applicant knew that OPDO cadres continued to watch him.
[One day in] June 2005 students and opposition supporters at the College held a demonstration about alleged electoral fraud. The applicant attended the demonstration. That night at 8 pm security police came to the applicant’s house and took him to [Prison 2] for three weeks. The applicant’s evidence was that while he was detained, he was repeatedly interrogated, beaten and starved.
The applicant’s evidence was that because he refused to join the OPDO he was denied promotions and further study opportunities at the College. As a result, he was forced to leave.
In August 2006 the applicant was employed by the [Agency 2] and worked at [Organisation 1] as [an occupation 1].
In [year] the applicant commenced a [specified] degree at [University 2]. While he was at the University, he was an active member of the Oromo People’s Congress (OPC) political party. In or about February 2010, the OPC held a member meeting at [University 2]. The meeting was held at Harar town, and 150 students and party members attended. The applicant was a member of the organising committee for the meeting. The applicant’s evidence was that at 7.30 pm on [a day in] February 2010 he was snatched from his dormitory by two federal policemen and taken to the federal police office at [University 2]. The applicant was made to kneel and was beaten with a black stick. He was subsequently taken to [Police Station 2] and detained for five days where he was interrogated and beaten. He was released on the condition that he reported to security officials when they summoned him.
After being released, the applicant claims that he remained under surveillance while he was at [University 2].
In or about May 2011, while at the [University 2], the applicant commenced work in the [Project 1]. The applicant’s evidence was that as part of his duties, he travelled to remote areas for weeks to undertake project activities. As a result, he made many contacts within the farming community, which displeased the OPDO cadres at the University.
In August 2013 the applicant claimed that he was conducting a farm survey in [District 2]. The applicant’s evidence was that [District 2] was an area in which the farmers had been forced to participate in extended government meetings causing a dispute between the farmers and the government militia. The militia warned the applicant to leave the area in response to which he returned home.
The applicant’s evidence was that on or about [a date in] August 2013, secret police raided the applicant’s house. They searched his house and threatened to kill him in front of his wife and children unless he confessed to mobilising farmers against government militia. They dragged him into a truck and took him to [a named] detention centre for 10 days. He was repeatedly beaten. They told him he had two days to tell them everything or they would kill him. He told them that he was not involved in any political activity with the farmers. They could not find sufficient evidence to charge the applicant, so he was released on the condition that he report to police daily.
While working, OPDO cadres would watch everything he did with the farming community, and he could not go to project sites without being harassed by secret police.
The applicant claims that in September 2012, [the applicant applied for a training course, and] was selected for the training program. He was issued with an exit visa at [the] Airport after his agreement to return to Ethiopia after the training was scrutinised.
The applicant claims that in October 2013 the applicant was advised by his wife that security police had come to their house and interrogated her about his whereabouts and the date of his return. He fears he will be detained, interrogated and possibly killed if he returns to Ethiopia because he has failed to report to police on a daily basis. His travel to Australia could be seen by OPDO as an attempt to share information with Ethiopian opposition groups in exile.
The applicant acknowledged that Prime Minister Abiy was currently in power and, in his view, did undertake some reforms which improved the lives and political freedoms of the Oromo people. However, the applicant claims that once Prime Minister Abiy consolidated his power, two major parties representing Oromo people, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Oromo People’s Congress (OPC, now known as Oromo Federalist Congress), were not able to take part in the election. The applicant claims that leaders and members of these Oromo parties have been imprisoned.
The applicant fears he will not be safe should he be forced to return to Ethiopia, stating that he is committed to his political beliefs and strongly feels that the new government has betrayed Oromo people.[10] The applicant claims he will face persecution by the police, including imprisonment and possibly death due to his current beliefs and history.
[10] Applicant’s supplementary statement dated 16 August 2021 @ [7].
AAT File No 2101456, Doc ID: [Number]
The applicant believes his situation has worsened due to him being politically active in Australia. He claims to have made various posts and comments on [social media] which are critical of the current Ethiopian government, further claiming his online activism is being monitored by that government.[11]
[11] Applicant’s supplementary statement dated 16 August 2021 @ [8]-[9].
AAT File No 2101456, Doc ID: [Number]
The applicant claimed[12] to have attended a rally in [City 1] [in] February 2020 to bring awareness to and protest against the Ethiopian government’s treatment of Oromo people. The applicant also stated that it was likely that those who support the Ethiopian government were also present at this rally and would accordingly inform the government about his presence there as well. The applicant added[13] that, even if the Ethiopian government is not aware of his online activism on social media or his protesting, he believes he will be detained and interrogated on the basis that he has been away from the country for an extended period of time, and claims it will be assumed that he has been engaging in activities that have been exposing what has been occurring in Ethiopia.
[12] Applicant’s supplementary statement dated 16 August 2021 @ [10].
AAT File No 2101456, Doc ID: [Number]
[13] Applicant’s supplementary statement dated 16 August 2021 @ [11].
AAT File No 2101456, Doc ID: [Number]

COUNTRY INFORMATION

In accordance with the Ministerial Direction No. 84 made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal also had regard to the country information assessments prepared by DFAT. The Tribunal has referred to those parts of the DFAT Report on Ethiopia dated 12 August 2020 (‘DFAT Report’) reproduced in Annexure ‘A’ herein.

ASSESSMENT OF CLAIMS AND FINDINGS

The issue in this case is whether the applicant is a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations pursuant to s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.

Credibility

When assessing claims, the Tribunal must make findings of fact in relation to the claims. In doing so, the Tribunal is mindful of the difficulties faced by refugee applicants, including issues related to the use of interpreters, nervousness and anxiety in a Tribunal environment, and stress caused by separation from home and family. There may also be memory issues resulting from the lapse of time, and cultural issues which affect how an applicant answers questions. The benefit of the doubt should be given to an applicant who is generally credible but unable to substantiate all his or her claims. All this is considered in these findings.
The mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is ‘well-founded’ or that it is for the reason claimed. Similarly, that an applicant claims to face a real risk of significant harm does not establish that such a risk exists, or that the harm feared amounts to ‘significant harm’. It remains for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that all of the statutory elements are made out. A decision-maker is not required to make the applicant’s case for him or her. It is the responsibility of the applicant to specify all particulars of the claim to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and to provide enough evidence to establish the claim. The Tribunal does not have any responsibility or obligation to specify, or assist in specifying, any particulars of the claim, or to establish or assist in establishing the claim,[14] nor is the Tribunal required to accept uncritically all the allegations made by an applicant.[15]
[14] s 5AAA Migration Act 1958.
[15] MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596, Nagalingam v MILGEA (1992) 38 FCR 191, Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70.
A reasonable approach needs to be adopted when making a finding in relation to an applicant’s credibility.[16] Care must be taken that the approach does not result in an exclusion from consideration of the totality of some evidence where a portion of it could reasonably have been accepted.
[16] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and McIllhatton v Guo Wei Rong and Pan Run Juan (1996) 40 ALD 445 per Foster J @ p.482
If an applicant’s account appears credible, they should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt.[17] However, such a benefit should only be given when all available evidence has been obtained and checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility. The applicant’s statements must be coherent and plausible and must not run counter to generally known facts.

The accepted facts
[17] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva, 1992 at para 196.

Having considered the applicant’s evidence, the Tribunal accepts and finds that the applicant:
(a)was born in [Town 1], [District 1], Ethiopia, on [date].
(b)is of Oromo ethnicity.
(c)speaks Afan Oromo, Amharic and English.
(d)has parents who are ethnic Oromo farmers.
(e)attended his primary and secondary school in [Town 1] (grades 1– 8) [between specified years].
(f)attended [Town 1] Secondary School and completed his Ethiopian school leaving certificate examinations (ESLCE) in [year].
(g)attended [a named] University and obtained a [Qualification 1] in [subject 1], specialising in [subjects 2].
(h)undertook postgraduate studies in [subjects 3] from [University 2] in [year].
(i)was employed by [Agency 1] as an instructor at [College 1].
(j)commenced worked as [an occupation 1] for the [Agency 2] at [Organisation 1] in August 2006.
(k)from June 2011 to September 2013 was employed as a [subjects 2] expert by [Project 1] project in Ethiopia.

The applicant’s relevant grounds

The applicant submits that his claims fall within the scope of s 5J(1)(a) of the Act based on his race as an ethnic Oromo, his actual and imputed political opinion, and as a member of a PSG.
The Tribunal is required to apply the applicant’s claim in relation to his race as an ethnic Oromo in the ‘widest sense.’[18] The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status provides a guide as to race as a well-founded fear of persecution.[19] It states:[20]
‘68.Race, in the present connexion, has to be understood in its widest sense to include all kinds of ethnic groups that are referred to as “races” in common usage. Frequently it will also entail membership of a specific social group of common descent forming a minority within a larger population. Discrimination for reasons of race has found world-wide condemnation as one of the most striking violations of human rights. Racial discrimination, therefore, represents an important element in determining the existence of persecution.
………………..
70. The mere fact of belonging to a certain racial group will normally not be enough to substantiate a claim for refugee status. There may, however, be situations where, due to particular circumstances affecting the group, such membership will itself be sufficient ground to fear persecution.’
[18] Calado v MIMA (1998) 81 FCR 450 at 455.
[19] Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 392, per Mason CJ.
[20] UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status at paras 68-70.
In this case, based on the applicant’s evidence, the Tribunal has accepted that the applicant is an ethnic Oromo. Accordingly, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s claim falls within the scope of s 5J(1)(a) of the Act by reason of his race.
In addition, the applicant claims that he will be persecuted upon his return to Ethiopia by reason of his actual and imputed political opinion. That is, as a member and advocate of the OPC and as a suspected member of the OLF.
The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status[21] notes that ‘[H]holding political opinions different from those of the Government is not in itself a ground for claiming refugee status, and an applicant must show that he has a fear of persecution for holding such opinions.’ That is, that applicant must hold opinions not tolerated by the authorities and such opinions will come to the notice of the authorities or will be attributed to the applicant by the authorities upon his return to Ethiopia.
[21] UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, paragraphs 80-86; Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 392.
The Full Federal Court in V v MIMA[22] observed in relation to a person’s political opinion that:
(a)it is enough that a person holds (or is believed to hold) views opposed to the government and is persecuted for that reason;[23]
(b)it is not necessary that a person be a member of a political party or other public organisation or that the person’s opposition to the instruments of government be a matter of public knowledge;[24]
(c)‘political opinion’ is not limited to party politics in the sense that expression is understood in a parliamentary democracy;[25]
(d)the holding of an opinion inconsistent with that held by the government of a country explicitly by reference to views contained in a political platform or implicitly by reference to acts reflective of an unstated political agenda will be the holding of a political opinion;[26]
(e)‘political opinion’ may be shown by repeated conduct which is never (or rarely) converted into articulate political protest of the kind familiar to Australian society.[27]
[22] V v MIMA (1999) 92 FCR 355 at 363. It is noted that the Court’s observations were made in the context of dealing with the Convention.
[23] ibid.
[24] ibid.
[25] V v MIMA (1999) 92 FCR 355 at 367.
[26] ibid.
[27] V v MIMA (1999) 92 FCR 355.
The applicant’s fear of persecution based on his political opinion is therefore a question of fact, having regard to all the circumstances.[28] In this case, the applicant submits[29] that he has a well‑founded fear of persecution by reason of actual political opinion as a supporter of the OPC and imputed political opinion as a supporter of the OLF. On the evidence presented to the Tribunal by the applicant and the supporting statements provided, the Tribunal accepts that his claim falls within the scope of s 5J(1)(a) of the Act by reason of his actual and/or imputed political opinion.
[28] Maningat v MIMA (Federal Court of Australia, Tamberlin J, 30 April 1998) at 4.
[29] Representative’s submissions dated 15 February 2021.
The applicant claims to have a well-founded fear of persecution within the scope of s 5J(1) of the Act as a member of a PSG, that is, as person known to the authorities in Ethiopia advocating for improved conditions for Oromo people, and, alternatively, as an Oromo person who has sought asylum having advocated abroad for improved rights for Oromo people.
Section 5L of the Act[30] stipulates that an applicant will be treated as being a member of a particular social group if:
(a)The applicant has a characteristic that is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)The applicant shares or is perceived as sharing the characteristic; and
(c)If any of the following apply:
(i)   the characteristic is shared by each member of the group;
(ii)     the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the applicant should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)     the characteristic distinguishes the group from society;
[30] In Applicant A (1997) 190 CLR 225 re: Dawson J.
For the reason expressed below, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant is a person who has advocated on behalf of the Oromo people, both in Ethiopia and while in Australia. As such, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant is a member of a PSG pursuant to s 5J(1) as claimed.
The applicant’s well-founded fear
Section 5J of the Act states that for the purposes of application under the Act, a person has a well‑founded fear of persecution ‘if the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ and that there is a real chance that they will be persecuted for one or more these reasons in the event they are returned to their receiving country. In Chan v MIEA[31] the Court held that a ‘well‑founded fear’, for the purposes of the Convention, involved both a subjective and objective element. That is, the definition will be satisfied if an applicant can show genuine fear founded upon a ‘real chance’ of persecution. That is, there must be a state of mind (fear of being persecuted) and a basis (well-founded) for that fear.[32]
[31] (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 396.
[32] (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 396. See also MIEA v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 263 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
However, to hold a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ on an objective basis, the applicant’s claim must be more than merely plausible or credible. In Chan v MIEA, Dawson J stated:[33]
Well‑founded” must mean something more than plausible, for an applicant may have a plausible belief which may be demonstrated, upon facts unknown to him or her, to have no foundation.
[33] Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379 per Dawson J at 397.

In MIEA v Guo, the Court stated that:[34]
Conjecture or surmise has no part to play in determining whether a fear is well‑founded. A fear is “well‑founded” when there is a real substantial basis for it. As Chan shows, a substantial basis for a fear may exist even though there is far less than a 50 per cent chance that the object of the fear will eventuate. But no fear can be well-founded for the purpose of the Convention unless the evidence indicates a real ground for believing that the applicant for refugee status is at risk of persecution. A fear of persecution is not well-founded if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation.
[34] MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 572; cf MIEA v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 293.

In this case, the applicant claims that, if he is returned to Ethiopia, there is a real chance he will suffer serious harm by the authorities by reason of his political opinion or his ethnicity. For the reasons detailed below, the Tribunal does accept that the applicant has a well‑founded fear of persecution on an objective basis if he is returned to Ethiopia.

The applicant’s claims as a refugee
Applicant an ethnic Oromo

The applicant claims that as an ethnic Oromo, there is a real chance that he will be seriously harmed by reason of state-sanctioned violence that targets Oromo people in Ethiopia. He claims that as an ethnic Oromo, he will face serious harm by both state and non-state actors.
The country information[35] states that the Oromo people are the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia (approximately 35 per cent of the population). They reside predominantly in Oromo State, which surrounds the capital Addis Abba. There are significant Oromo communities in Addis Abba, Amhara State and SNNP State.[36] It reported the Oromos practise predominately Christianity and Islam in equal numbers and speak Oromiffa. By virtue of its proximity to the capital, the Oromo State is one of the more developed parts of the country.[37]
[35] DFAT Report, p.22
[36] ibid
[37] ibid
Its reported that in the past, the Oromo have not held the level of political and economic influence commensurate with their size. A major source of historical frustration has been the fact that their pollical influence has been subservient to smaller ethic groups.[38] The ethnic Amhara dominated political and economic influence during the period of military and monarchy rule. Similarly, the Tigrayans held great influence over the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) [39] which ruled Ethiopia for 27 years causing the Oromo and Amhara to feel marginalised and harbour considerable resentment toward the Tigrayans while the EPRDF were in power.
[38] ibid
[39] 'Tens of thousands gather in Ethiopia’s capital to condemn Tigray rebels', Anadolu News Agency, 22 July 2021, >
From 2014 to 2018, large-scale anti-government protests occurred in both the Oromia and Amhara states which prompted a declared state of emergency under which approximately 20,000 people were arrested and 1,000 people killed.[40] It is reported that the Oromo were the most vocal opponents of the ruling party during this period, a result of which they bore the brunt of the associated arrests and detentions.[41] The protests ultimately led to the resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn in February 2018.
[40] DFAT Report, p.9
[41] DFAT Report @ p.22
The DFAT Report[42] assesses that while there was widespread violence and detention of protestors throughout the Oromo State between 2014 and 2018, it was not ethnically motivated but reflected the then federal government’s sensitivity to political opposition.[43]
[42] ibid.
[43] ibid
In April 2018, Abiy Ahmed (‘Abiy’) was elected Prime Minister. As a result, it is reported[44] that the Oromo influence at the federal level expanded significantly in circumstances where, for the first time in its history, the Ethiopian leader was Oromo. In addition, the Oromo were the single largest ethnic group in the federal cabinet (the Council of Ministers).[45] Abiy merged the EPRDF with three of the country’s four main ethno-regional political organisations – the Oromo Democratic Party, Amhara Democratic Party and Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement – and five regional allies to form the Prosperity Party. The TPLF, which had founded the EPRDF and held the reins in both the party and the Ethiopian state for over 25 years, rejected the merger and later withdrew entirely, but continued to rule in the Tigray region.[46]
[44] ibid
[45] ibid
[46] 'Can Ethiopia’s election help overcome age-old structural divisions?', Tegbaru Yared, Institute for Security Studies, 30 July 2021, http//: issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/psc-137.pdf.
It is reported that under Abiy’s leadership, the human rights situation in Ethiopia improved.[47] Oromo political prisoners were released[48] and restrictions on opposition political organisations[49] were lifted. In June 2018, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an opposition party dedicated to the Oromo self-determination, was delisted as a terrorist organisation. It signed a peace agreement with the federal government and agreed to disarm. The OLF now operates as a registered political party.[50]
[47] ibid.
[48] DFAT Report @ p.22; 'Can Ethiopia’s election help overcome age-old structural divisions?', Tegbaru Yared, Institute for Security Studies, 30 July 2021, http//:issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/psc-137.pdf
[49] DFAT Report @ p.22.
[50] ibid
However, despite the optimistic start to the Abiy’s leadership, Human Rights Watch[51] reports that the security and human rights situation in Ethiopia has deteriorated amid growing unrest and political tensions. It is reported that the OLF as an opposition party now faces considerable government harassment.[52] In addition, as a result of mistreatment of OLF fighters by the government, the military wing of OLF, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), officially separated from OLF leadership[53] and has continued the armed struggle for self‑determination for the Oromo people in Oromia, creating political insecurity in the region. It is reported that abuses by government security forces, attacks on civilians by armed groups, deadly violence along communal and ethnic lines and a political crisis have all lead to human rights abuses.[54]
[51] Human Rights Watch- Ethiopia Events 2020, Ethiopian Insight, ‘Guji Oromo need freedom from liberators’ 3 August 2020 by Nagessa Dube; Oromo Legacy Leadership Advocacy Association, ‘The Security Situation in Oromia’, by Beresa Abera Jebena
[54] ibid
On 29 June 2020 the popular Oromo singer Hachalu Hundessa was assassinated triggering protests which were met by a heavy-handed security response resulting in large‑scale property destruction and violence by civilians.[55] Hundessa’s songs captured the struggles and frustrations of the Oromo people during the 2014–2018 anti-government protest movement.[56] The government’s response, which included cutting internet services across the country, inflamed concerns that the people were being silenced and that human rights abuses and communal violence was not being addressed.[57] It is reported that the attacks heightened the existing social and political tensions, which were further exacerbated by the arrest of members of opposition parties for their alleged connection with the violence. Bekele Gerba (Bekele), deputy leader of the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), and Jawar Mohammed (Jawar), founding director of Oromia Media Network and prominent member of the OFC,[58] were imprisoned on 30 June 2020, charged with terrorism, following a crackdown by the government after Hundessa’s murder.[59] In response, Jawar accused the government of locking up anyone they suspected of being a strong opponent in the next election, claiming that the OFC was more popular than the government.[60] It was reported[61] that the detention of journalists and opposition party members raised concerns that the investigative authorities had not moved on from past practices of arresting first and investigating later.
[55] Human Rights Watch- Ethiopia Events 2020, Human Rights Watch ‘Ethiopia Cracks Down Following Popular Singers Killing’ 1 July 2020 Laetita Bader, Human Rights Watch ‘Ethiopia Cracks Down Following Popular Singers Killing’ 1 July 2020 Laetita Bader, africsnews.com, 2 January 2020; Borkena Ethiopian News "Why Ethiopian gov't arrested Jawar Mohammed, Bekele Gerba". 6 June 2020 BBC News "Jawar Mohammed: Top Ethiopia opposition figure 'proud' of terror charge". 21 September 2020; Human Rights Watch ‘Ethiopia: Opposition Parties Held without Charge.’ 15 August 2020
The Ethiopian government has continued to use military force in the Oromo region to deal with OLA rebels. It is reported that the ongoing conflict between the OLA and Ethiopian security forces has killed and displaced scores of civilians. It was reported[62] in August 2020 that since April 2018, the OLA, the armed splinter group of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), has killed more than 700 civilians in East and West Gujii zones and committed other atrocities against the civilians including torture, rape, sexual abuse, robbery vandalism and arson.[63] Abductions for ransom are common.
[62] Ethiopian Insight, ‘Guji Oromo need freedom from liberators’ 3 August 2020 by Nagessa Dube; ibid

The government undertook a counter insurgency campaign in southern and western Oromia which resulted in serious human rights violations and abuses against local communities.[64] In March 2021 Eritrean army troops were sent to Oromia region to halt advances by the OLA. [65] It is reported[66] that arrests and summary executions have become commonplace in parts of Oromia as the Ethiopian security forces waged war on armed Oromo separatists. Civilians have been treated brutally with indiscriminate repression of local dissents. Oromia‑based opposition parties, including the OFC, have condemned the militarisation of the region, particularly considering reports of abuse committed against civilians. They’ve called for the peaceful resolution of a conflict that the government has been accused of attempting to conceal, going as far as shutting down internet and phone services to the conflict zone.[67]

[64] Human Rights Watch- Ethiopia Events 2020, Eritrea Hub. ‘Report: 'Eritrean troops despatched to Oromia’ 22 March 2021; The Economist,’ A hidden war threatens Ethiopia’s transition to democracy’ 21 May 2020; ibid

In 2020 the Abiy government postponed national elections due to the coronavirus, causing tensions between opposition parties and the Abiy government. The opposition parties opposed the postponement of elections as they viewed it as a move by the ruling party to exploit the pandemic to ensure the government’s survival. They claimed that the government would lose its legitimacy by stretching its power beyond October 2020 and pressed for a coalition government to be formed.[68] Bekele called for the parties to convene to discuss how to govern the country.[69]

[68] Quartz Africa, ‘Ethiopia’s decision to delay its election for Covid will have consequences for its democratic goals’ 18 June 2020 by Zecharias Zelalem; qz.com/africa/1870457/ethiopias-abiy-election-delay-infuriates-opposition-on-democracy/

[69] ibid

The OFC and the OLF were planning to participate in the 2021 election but boycotted the election and did not run[70] claiming that it would be hard for them to participate due to the high levels of arrests and detainments of its members and supporters, including Jawar.[71]

[70] Borkena.com. "Oromo Liberation Front takes queue after OFC, opted out of Election". 3 May 2021. borkena.com/2021/03/05/oromo-liberation-front-takes-queue-after-ofc-opted-out-of-election/

[71] stratfor.com. "Ethiopia: Oromo Opposition Party to Boycott 2021 Elections". 9 December 2020. >

In or about September 2020, tensions between the TPLF and the central government escalated when Tigray authorities defied the Abiy government and held their own regional election, an act that was declared illegal by the central government. In October 2020, the Abiy government cut ties with Tigray and suspended funding for the Tigray region, an action that was perceived by the northern region as a ‘declaration of war’.[72]

[72] BBC News ‘Ethiopia’s Tigray war: The short, medium and long story’, dated 29 July 2021, >

Armed clashes between the TPLF and federal forces commenced on 3 November 2020, when the TPLF attacked the Northern Command of the Ethiopian army stationed across Tigray, including in the regional capital Mekelle. The TPLF killed soldiers and looted military hardware. On 4 November 2020, the government responded by launching a massive law enforcement operation in Tigray aimed at quelling what it considered an insurgency.[73] Three weeks after launching military operations, following the retaking of Mekelle, the Abiy government declared victory.[74] While fighting between Tigray and federal forces persisted, TPLF leaders remained on the run.[75] While designated a terrorist organisation by the Abiy government, the TPLF consider themselves the legitimate regional government of Tigray.[76] In late June 2021, Tigray forces (now rebranded the Tigray Defence Force (TDF)) regrouped and recaptured Mekelle.[77] Abiy has tightened a ‘blockade’ around Tigray, choking the region’s entry points from receiving aid and cutting off power and communications infrastructure.[78]

[73] Anadolu News Agency 'Tens of thousands gather in Ethiopia’s capital to condemn Tigray rebels', dated 22 July 2021, Reuters, 'As Tigray war intensifies, Ethiopia parades new army recruits' dated 28 July 2021, ww.reuters.com/world/tigray-war-intensifies-ethiopia-parades-new-army-recruits-2021-07-27/.

[75] Al Jazeera 'Ethiopia regions send troops to back fight with Tigray rebels' dated 15 July 2021, ww.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/15/ethiopia-regions-send-troops-to-back-fight-with-tigray-rebels.

[76] BBC News ‘Lalibela: Ethiopia's Tigray rebels take Unesco world heritage town’ dated 5 August 2021, ww.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58101912.

[77] The Australian 'Ethiopia regions send troops to back fight with Tigray rebels', 16 July 2021, ww.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/ethiopia-regions-send-troops-to-back-fight-with-tigray-rebels/news-story/8936fd7916b642a50c849e291d5547df.

[78] The Economist 'In Ethiopia’s civil war, Tigrayan forces take the offensive', 31 July 2021, USAID, 'Ethiopia – Tigray Conflict Fact Sheet #10 Fiscal Year (FY) 2021', 30 July 2021,p.2,https//:reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2021_07_30%20USG%20Tigray%20Crisis%20Fact%20Sheet%20%2310.pdf; The New Humanitarian ‘Aid neutrality under fire in Ethiopia’s widening conflict’, 22 July 2021, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 'Ethiopia - Tigray Region Humanitarian Update, Situation Report', 26 July 2021, https//:reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia/.

In response to Tigrayan offensives, Abiy reversed his ceasefire decision and mobilised militia forces throughout the country’s ethnic regions. On 18 July 2021, Abiy declared a ‘total war’ on the TPLF – contingents of Special Forces (professional soldiers) and local militia have been sent from all of Ethiopia’s regions (save Tigray) to encircle the ‘rebel region’.[79] The country information reports that the conflict in Tigray has inflicted an enormous humanitarian and human rights toll on the people of the region. It is reported[80] that thousands of people have died in the fighting with approximately 2 million people being displaced and more than 5 million relying on emergency food aid. Further, it has been reported that the military operations to quell the TPLF have been accompanied by ‘numerous civilian massacres, looting, and other human rights abuses amidst a worsening food situation’.[81] A July 2021 report[82] published by researchers at Belgium’s Ghent University states that ‘[w]hile no numbers exist for the total amount of civilian casualties’ 2,805 deaths are ‘well-documented’ and an additional 9,642 civilian deaths have been documented from (social) media reports, NGO reports and press releases. The researchers also highlight 245 massacres during the post-November 2020 conflict,[83] some of which human rights groups such as Amnesty International have labelled ‘crimes against humanity’.[84] Sources also describe ‘a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing in Tigray’ in which ‘fighters supporting the Abiy government […]’ were ‘deliberately and efficiently rendering Western Tigray ethnically homogeneous through the organized use of force and intimidation. […] Whole villages were severely damaged or completely erased’.[85]

[79] Africa Confidential, 'No good options on the table', 22 July 2021, 20210723134934.

[80] Reuters 'As Tigray war intensifies, Ethiopia parades new army recruits' dated 28 July 2021, The New Humanitarian ‘Aid neutrality under fire in Ethiopia’s widening conflict’ dated 22 July 2021, ww.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2021/7/22/Ethiopian-government-accuses-aid-Tigray-rebels-disinformation.

[82] Sofie Annys et al, Ghent University ‘Tigray: Atlas of the humanitarian situation’, dated July 2021, pp.23, 27. ibid.

[84] The New York Times ‘Ethiopia’s War Leads to Ethnic Cleansing in Tigray Region, U.S. Report Says’ dated 26 February 2021 updated 1 April 2021 by Declan Walsh, Ibid; National Public Radio, ‘9 Things To Know About The Unfolding Crisis In Ethiopia's Tigray Region’ dated 5 March 2021, >

On 7 August 2021, the United Nations reported that fighting in Tigray had pushed 400,000 people into famine-like conditions,[86] while a report by Amnesty International dated 10 August 2021 refers to widespread subjection of women and girls in Tigray to sexual violence by members of the Ethiopian National Défense Force (ENDF), the Eritrean Défense Force (EDF), the Amhara Regional Police Special Force (ASF), and Fano, an Amhara militia group.[87]

[86] The Australian 'Ethiopia threatens to deploy “entire defensive capability” after rebel advances', dated 7 August 2021, Amnesty International ‘Ethiopia: Troops and militia rape, abduct women and girls in Tigray conflict – new report’,10 August 2021, ‘Ethiopia: “I don’t know if they realized I was a person”: Rape and sexual violence in Tigray, Ethiopia’, Amnesty International, 10 August 2021, 20210811161042.

Human Rights Watch[88] reports that longstanding grievances and polarisation over historical and complex issues concerning land, politics and identity have led to violence among ethnic communities in Ethiopia. In 2019 and 2020 violence on 22 University campuses in Oromo and Amhara regions caused approximately 35,000 students to flee.[89] In January 2020, conflict erupted between the Amhara and Oromo groups over the use of the old national flag and decorations during the Orthodox Christian celebration of Epiphany and caused many casualties and lost of property.[90] In what has been viewed as a broadening of the Tigrayan conflict, on 11 August 2021 the OLA leader Kumsa Diriba announced that the group had formed an alliance with the TPLF and that there were plans among opposition groups to establish a ‘grand coalition’ against the government.[91] The coalition with the TPLF has been formed in opposition to the government forces despite the atrocities that were inflicted on Oromo people by the TPLF prior to 2018.[92]

[88] Human Rights Watch, ‘Ethiopia Events 2020’, ibid

[90] ibid

[91] Associated Press, "Ethiopia Armed Group Says it Has Alliance with Tigray Forces", Anna, Cara, 12 August 2021, Ibid

From the country information[93] the Tribunal accepts that the situation in Ethiopia remains dangerous and volatile with considerable inter-ethnic tensions. It is feared by opposition parties that the Abiy government has turned against Oromo leaders, notably arresting Jawar on terrorism charges, and returned to imperial-style domination. The action of the government against the opposing parties has appears to have been systematic and discriminatory in an attempt to maintain control.
[93] The Guardian. ‘As Ethiopia’s army declares daily victories, its people are being plunged into violence’ Alex de Waal 24 November 2020 >
The Tribunal has taken into consideration the fact that the opposition parties in Ethiopia represent the varying ethnic groups in the country. In the case of the Oromo, the authorities have continued act against the OLF and OLA. While politically motivated, the actions of the government have the effect of persecuting ethnic Oromo on a systematic and discriminatory manner. As a result, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s fear of persecution involves systematic and discriminatory conduct.
Therefore, based on the applicants evidence and the available country information, the Tribunal accepts that there is a real chance the applicant will be seriously harmed as a result of being an ethic Oromo in the event that he is returned to Ethiopia.

Applicant imputed political opinion
100.The applicant claims that there is a real chance he will be seriously harmed if he is returned to Ethiopia due to his imputed political opinion as a member of the OLF.[94] The applicant’s evidence was that his [Brother B], was jailed for three (3) years in 2000 for his association with the OLF. His evidence was that his brother died in [Prison 1] [in] September 2003. The applicant provided witness statements referred to above from [Witness J], [Witness G], [Witness M], [Witness E], [Witness C], [Witness H], [Brother A] and [Witness I] (the witness statements). The Tribunal accepts the evidence provided in the statements. Relevantly, all the witnesses in their statements refer to the fact that they know the applicant and his brother and confirm that the applicant’s brother died in prison in or about 2003. Therefore, based on the applicant’s evidence and the evidence provided in each of the witness statements, the Tribunal accepts and finds that the applicant’s brother was detained due to his involvement in the OLF and died in prison in or about September 2003 as claimed.
[94] Applicant’s submissions dated 14 September 2021 @ p.3; AAT File No 2101456, Doc ID:[Number]
101.The applicant’s evidence was that his brother’s funeral was conducted [in] September 2003 at which approximately one hundred and fifty (150) attended including [number] police officers. The applicant claims that at the funeral he gave a eulogy in which he criticised the authorities for their treatment of his brother. The applicant claims that he was subsequently taken from his brother’s home and detained for two (2) weeks at [Police Station 1] where he was interrogated about his alleged involvement with the OLF and beaten.
102.Further, the applicant claims that his [Brother A] had been questioned by the authorities on a number of occasions on suspicion of being connected with the OLF.[95] After witnessing the applicant being detained, he fled to [Country 1] and has since been relocated to [Country 2].[96] The applicant claimed that his mother, father and [another sibling] were detained for approximately two (2) months by the security police as a result of [Brother A’s] disappearance.
[95] Applicant’s statement dated 11 March 2014.
[96] Statement of [Brother A] dated 16 April 2016.
103.The country information[97] reports that the OLF was established in 1973 with the purpose of promoting Oromo self-determination. It was one of several armed groups that fought against the government of Mengistu Hailemariam. When Mengistu Hailemariam was overthrown in 1991, the OLF was briefly part of a transitional government led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition. However, the OLF always had an uneasy relationship with the TPLF who controlled the EPRDF. As a result, the OLF left the transitional government in 1992 and continued to wage a low-level armed struggle against the government. As a result, it is reported that thousands of OLF fighters, supporters and suspected supporters were arrested and subjected to interrogation, torture and extrajudicial killing by the Ethiopian authorities.[98] In 2010, the UN Committee Against Torture reported its concern over the ongoing and consistent allegations of the use of torture by the police, prison officers and other members of the security forces against alleged supporters of insurgent groups, including the OLF.[99]
[97] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ethiopia: The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), including origin, mandate, leadership, structure, legal status, and membership; treatment of members and supporters by authorities (2014-2015), 7 May 2015, ETH105146.E, available at: ibid
[99] ibid
104.A report by Amnesty International[100] reported that the Oromo people had ‘long been subject to repression based on an imputed opposition to the government.’ It reported[101] that between 2011 and 2014, at least 5,000 Oromos were arrested based on their actual or suspected peaceful opposition to the government. These include thousands of peaceful protestors and hundreds of opposition political party members. It reported that the government, at that time, anticipated a high level of opposition in Oromia, and signs of dissent were sought and regularly suppressed with both actual and suspected dissenters being detained without charge and killed.
[100] Amnesty International 'Because I Am Oromo': Sweeping Repression in the Oromia Region of Ethiopia’ dated 24 October 2014. ibid
105.It is reported that a Human Rights Watch Researcher commented on the treatment of politically active Oromos, who are perceived to be part of the OLF by the government, as follows:[102]
[102] Human Rights Watch 27 Apr. 2015 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ethiopia: The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), including origin, mandate, leadership, structure, legal status, and membership; treatment of members and supporters by authorities (2014-2015), 7 May 2015, ETH105146.E, available at: the vast majority of interrogations involving Oromos, there are accusations that they are either members of OLF, or are involved in the Oromo opposition, which many take to mean OLF. There is very rarely any evidence that there is a connection to the OLF, rather anyone who expresses dissent, mobilizes for mainstream politics, or is involved in Oromo cultural associations, are at risk of being associated to the OLF. If you have a family connection from the past to OLF, you are at particular risk. Torture and mistreatment in detention is common among the Oromo, particularly those who have been accused of having connections to the OLF.
106.The applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal was that he is opposed to the policies of the Ethiopian government and is a supporter for improved conditions for the Oromo people as claimed. For the reasons expressed below, the Tribunal accepts the applicant’s evidence in relation to his political view.
107.Based on the evidence provided to the Tribunal and the available country information, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s brother was detained by the authorities as claimed. In addition, the Tribunal accepts and finds that the applicant was detained by the authorities after his brother’s funeral as claimed.
108.In addition, the Tribunal accepts while he was at [College 1], he was detained and interrogated by the authorities after refusing to join the OPDO as claimed. Finally, the Tribunal accepts that he was detained and beaten on suspicion of mobilising farmers against the government militias because of his work with farming households as part of his responsibilities with [Project 1].
109.The applicant claims that he supports the OLA and that he would not repress his political views upon his return to Ethiopia. The applicant evidence was that he was greatly concerned over the condition of the Oromo and that if he was returned to Ethiopia he would advocate for and work towards the goal of self-determination of the Oromo people. Based on the applicants evidence the Tribunal accepts that there is a real chance that the he will be seriously harmed by the authorities as a likely supporter or member of the OLA if he was returned to Ethiopia.
Applicant’s actual political opinion
110.The applicant claims that he will be seriously harmed if he is returned to Ethiopia because of his political opinion as a member of the Oromo People’s Congress (OPC). The applicant claims to be opposed to the policies of the Ethiopian government and is an active supporter for improved conditions for the Oromo people. He claims that he is an active spokesman and supporter of the OPC.
111.The OPC was originally founded in April 1996 as the Oromo National Congress by Dr Merera Gudina as a federalist and Oromo nationalist opposition political party in Ethiopia. Prior to the 2008 election, it changed its name to OPC.[103] The OPC then merged with Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement, forming the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), in 2012.[104] Prior to the 2021 Ethiopian general election, (that was scheduled for May 2020), OFC agreed to form an electoral coalition with Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Oromo Nationalist Party (ONP).[105]
[103] ibid
[105] Africanews, "Major Oromia parties agree merger for Ethiopia's 2020 polls", Shaban, Abdur Rahman Alfa, 11 September 2018. applicant provided the Tribunal with copies of a [social media] post from 2016 to 2020 by him expressing his views in relation to certain events in Ethiopia. The applicant also claimed to have attended a rally in February 2020[106] in [City 1] organised by the Oromo Committee to bring awareness to the Oromo situation in Ethiopia. Based on the [social media] posts provided and the applicant’s own evidence to the Tribunal in relation to his political views, the Tribunal accepts he is opposed to the policies of the Ethiopian government and is a supporter for improved conditions for the Oromo people as claimed.
[106] Applicant’s supplementary statement dated 16 August 2021 @ [10].
113.The applicant claims the while he was at [University 2], he was an active member of the OPC and on the organising committee responsible for arranging member meetings for the OPC. The applicant claims that because of his involvement with the OPC, he was detained, interrogated and beaten at [Police Station 2] for five days. The applicant’s evidence was that he was released on the condition that he reported to security officials when they summoned him. Based on the applicant’s evidence and the country information referred to above, the Tribunal accepts that he was a member of the OPC and involved in arranging meetings on campus. Accordingly, it accepts that he was detained as claimed.
114.However, notwithstanding the fact that the Tribunal has accepted his opposition to the Ethiopian government and his political views concerning the independence of the Oromo people, due to the passage of time and the lack of any evidence of his continued membership or involvement with the OPC, the Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance that he would be seriously harmed as a member of the OPC or as an active spokesman or organiser of the party if he is returned to Ethiopia.
CONCLUSION
115.Therefore, having regard to all the circumstances and findings above, considered individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 5J(1)(a) and s 5J(1)(b) of the Act and finds that the applicant is a refugee pursuant to s 5H of the Act. As such, the Tribunal finds that the applicant does satisfy the criterion set out in s 36(2)(a).
116.For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations. Therefore, the applicant satisfies the criterion set out in s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
DECISION
117.The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Jason Pennell
Senior Member

‘Annexure A’
RECENT HISTORY
2.1Ethiopia, formerly Abyssinia, is a multi-ethnic federal republic in East Africa. Ethiopia is Africa’s oldest independent country — with the exception of a five-year Italian occupation (1936-41), it was never colonised. In 1974, a Communist military junta known as the Derg (‘Committee’) overthrew the long-serving Emperor, Haile Selassie, and abolished Ethiopia’s monarchy, the House of Solomon, which dated to antiquity. The Derg pursued policies of nationalisation and collectivisation, and Ethiopia descended into civil war between junta and rebel forces. Between 1976 and 1978, the Derg killed thousands of its opponents (the campaign of ‘Red Terror’). Rebel forces from the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a multi-ethnic alliance led by the Tigrayan people, ousted the Derg in 1991, ending Ethiopia’s civil war. The Derg’s leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, was granted asylum in Zimbabwe. The EPRDF and its successor, the Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP), have ruled Ethiopia since. In 1993, Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia and established its own state, rendering Ethiopia landlocked. A border dispute between the two countries triggered a two-year war (1998-2000), in which 100,000 people were killed (see Security Situation). Ethiopia is one of the most drought-prone countries in the world. Drought-induced famines in 1973-74 and 1984-85 resulted in more than 1 million deaths. Its capital city, Addis Ababa, is a major diplomatic hub, as seat of the African Union and the UN Economic Commission for Africa.
2.2Ethiopia held its first multi-party elections in May 1995. The EPRDF won this and all other subsequent elections, bringing stability and economic growth but restricting political dissent and media and civic freedoms for most of its time in power. The EPRDF was disbanded in December 2019 (see Political System). Ethnic Tigrayans, a minority, wielded outsized influence during most of the EPRDF’s rule, fostering resentment among the considerably larger Amhara and, in particular, Oromo ethnic groups. Meles Zenawi, a Tigrayan who led the removal of the Derg, served as prime minister from 1995 until his death in 2012. Zenawi was succeeded by his deputy, Hailemariam Desalegn, an ethnic Wolayta — Ethiopia’s first peaceful transition of power in modern times.
2.3Large-scale anti-government protests beginning in 2014, centred in Oromia and, later, Amhara states, prompted the declaration of a State of Emergency, under which over 20,000 people were arrested and 1,000 killed (see 2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency). Protesters demanded greater political rights, leading to the resignation, in February 2018, of Prime Minister Desalegn. His successor and current prime minister, Abiy Ahmed (appointed in April 2018), embarked on an ambitious reform agenda, and the human rights situation has improved significantly under his watch. Among other reforms, Abiy has lifted restrictions on freedom of expression, released political prisoners, removed terrorist designations of previously exiled opposition groups, expanded the space for civil society, and initiated reform of legislation used previously to arrest and prosecute government critics. In parallel, Abiy has pursued high-profile diplomatic initiatives across East Africa. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for his peacebuilding efforts with Eritrea, culminating in the signing of an agreement to formally end their war. Abiy is Ethiopia’s first prime minister from the Oromo ethnic group.
2.4After an initial period where violence subsided significantly, ethno-nationalism, inter-ethnic clashes and associated displacement again increased, though not nearly to the levels witnessed preceding Abiy’s election. Abiy’s reform agenda has met some resistance, and his government was the subject of a purported coup attempt in June 2019.
2.5Abiy had committed to holding free and fair elections in 2020, although these have been postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak in the country. Abiy declared a five-month State of Emergency on 8 April 2020 in response to the outbreak. The State of Emergency, while valid only until September 2020, limits some human rights, particularly those around association and movement. While these reflect the types of restrictions in place internationally, there is scope for abuse. However, the response has generally been accepted as necessary by opposition parties who see it as proportionate to the threat posed by COVID-19.
Corruption
2.19Ethiopia has a strong anti-corruption legal framework. The Criminal Code, the Revised Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Establishment Proclamation, and the Revised Anti‑Corruption Law criminalise all major forms of corruption, including active and passive bribery; bribery of foreign officials; and money laundering. Facilitation payments are illegal, and public servants are forbidden from accepting gifts or hospitality that may influence their decision-making. Under the Criminal Code, corruption on the part of public servants is punishable by between one and 10 years in prison. Government officials are legally obligated to register their wealth and personal property (non-compliance carries financial and criminal penalties). In January 2017, the federal government established a Corruption Directorate within the Federal Police Commission to investigate cases of systemic corruption. Since the election of Prime Minister Abiy, the directorate has been involved in the investigation of a number of high-profile cases, with some publicised success. For example, in an address to Parliament in November 2019, Abiy outlined that the Government of Ethiopia had identified tens of millions of US dollars that had been illegally obtained and held overseas (mostly in the UAE), and was in the process of negotiating with the relevant banks for their return. The Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate complaints of administrative mismanagement by the executive branch.
2.20In practice, corruption seems to be widespread, including in the civil service. According to the GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal, common corrupt practices include the payment of facilitation payments and bribes to process documents, to keep land leased from the state and to obtain government contracts. Local sources told DFAT that a bribe is often required to obtain a national identification card, driver’s licence and permits for establishing a business. Sources also told DFAT that the police readily accept bribes in exchange for waiving the issuance of traffic infringements (the going rate is reportedly 50 birr, or approximately AUD2.50). While corruption occurs, it is less widespread by regional standards. Ethiopia ranked 96th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index— an improvement of 18 places from a year earlier.

2.54In June 2019, the chief of staff of the National Defence Force (head of the military), General Seare Mekonnen, and the president of Amhara State, Ambachew Mekonnen, were assassinated in concurrent events in Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar (Amhara State). Both were allied to Prime Minister Abiy, who characterised the assassinations as a failed coup attempt. The alleged ringleader, Brigadier General Asaminew Tsige, the chief of security in Amhara State, was killed by government forces. Tsige, who had advocated for greater regional autonomy, had been pardoned and released from prison in 2018 (he was serving a life sentence for his alleged involvement in a failed 2009 coup attempt by Ginbot 7). Federal government forces were deployed to Amhara State and Addis Ababa, and a weeklong internet blackout was imposed nationally, in the wake of the alleged coup. Abiy was earlier the subject of a grenade attack at a progovernment rally in Addis Ababa. The authorities described the June 2018 incident as a failed assassination attempt, and five people were charged with terrorism offences. The attack killed two people and injured more than 100.
RACE/NATIONALITY
3.1Article 25 of the constitution stipulates all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection regardless of race, nationality, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status. Article 46 of the constitution provides the basis for Ethiopia’s states to be delimited ‘on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned’. In effect, this involves the creation of states that are broadly consistent with the geographic locations of major ethnic groups. Traditionally, ethnically-motivated societal violence has been rare, although ethnic-based clashes have increased since 2018 (see Security Situation), fuelled largely by competition for resources and enabled, in part, by the lifting of restrictions on freedom of expression and an associated rise in hate speech and misinformation (see Media). With the exception of the ethnic Anuak people of Gambela State, most ethnic groups in Ethiopia are indistinguishable by their physical appearance, partly as a result of inter-marriage.
3.2Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic society, and ethnic groups enjoy extensive rights. Under the Ethiopian Constitution every ‘nation, nationality and people’ (a reference to all ethnic groupings which constitute Ethiopia) has the right to speak their language and promote their culture. Every nation, nationality and people also has the constitutional right to self-determination, including the right to regional statehood within Ethiopia’s federal system — a right recently asserted by the Sidama (see Security Situation). Several conditions must be met for regional statehood, including: approval by a two-thirds majority of the members of the relevant state legislature; and a majority vote in a referendum organised by the federal government (the referendum must be organised within one‑year of the request for regional statehood being received).
3.3All major ethnic groups are represented in the federal government and bureaucracy, and political parties represent the interests of Ethiopia’s various ethnic groups. DFAT assesses official discrimination – including systematic state-sanctioned discrimination, denial of public services and higher detention rates – based on race and/or ethnicity is rare. This assessment is consistent with the constitutional prohibitions on discrimination, and reflects the need for governments to maintain their legitimacy through inclusiveness, given Ethiopia’s ethnic diversity. Different ethnic groups have a history of co-existence in Addis Ababa, and discrimination on ethnic grounds is not common there. One source described ethnicity as a ‘non-factor’ in Addis Ababa — most people consider themselves from Addis Ababa as opposed to a particular ethnic group. Violence based on ethnicity is not common in Addis Ababa, but is a growing concern in regional states. Inter-ethnic relations have deteriorated since 2018, and DFAT assesses the situation for ethnic minorities at the regional state-level is increasingly challenging, and they face a growing risk of violence at the hands of the majority community.
3.4Societal discrimination based on ethnicity can occur, but is predominantly in the form of positive discrimination in favour of a particular ethnic group rather than active discrimination against people of a different race or ethnicity. Official policies can limit opportunities for some groups; for example, the use of Oromiffa as the language of instruction in schools in Oromia State can limit opportunities for ethnic Oromos in the public sector if they do not also speak Amharic and English. Similarly, ethnic groups that constitute a minority within regional states are at a disadvantage from a linguistic perspective, insofar as their languages do not enjoy official status in those states.
Oromos
3.5The Oromo people are the single largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, at nearly 35 per cent of the population. They live mostly in Oromia State, which surrounds the federally-administered Addis Ababa. According to the 2007 national census (the most recent), there are significant Oromo communities in Addis Ababa (534,000), Amhara State (450,000) and SNNP State (236,000). While recent data is hard to come by, roughly similar numbers of Oromos practise Islam and Christianity (both Orthodox and Protestant). Oromos speak Oromiffa (also known as Afaan Oromo), which is the language of administration and schooling in Oromia State. By virtue of its location surrounding Addis Ababa, Oromia State is one of the more developed parts of the country.
3.6Ethnic Oromos’ level of political and economic influence has traditionally been incommensurate to their size. Oromos argue they have long been subservient to smaller ethnic groups — a major source of historical frustration. While Oromos were represented in federal government and held positions of influence during the EPRDF’s rule, ethnic Tigrayans predominated politically and economically. Likewise, ethnic Amharas dominated during the periods of military and monarchic rule. The displacement of Oromos from traditional land on which Addis Ababa is built is another historical grievance for the Oromo community. Oromos were the most vocal of Ethiopia’s ethnic communities during anti-government protests from 2014 to 2018 and bore the brunt of associated arrests and detentions (see 2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency).
3.7Oromo influence at the federal level has expanded significantly since the April 2018 election of Abiy as prime minister — the first time in Ethiopia’s modern history an Oromo has led the country. The Oromo were the single largest ethnic group in the federal cabinet (the Council of Ministers) at the time of publication and were represented in the senior ranks of the public service and the military. Oromo political prisoners, including those arrested for their involvement in the 2014-18 protests, have been released. The OLF, an opposition party dedicated to Oromo self-determination, was delisted as a terrorist organisation in June 2018 and returned from exile in Eritrea in September 2018. The OLF signed a peace agreement with the federal government in August 2018 and agreed to disarm. It now operates as a registered political party and plans to contest forthcoming national and regional elections. Despite these gains, historical grievances remain. The resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn, his subsequent replacement by Abiy and Ethiopia’s democratic opening has triggered a resurgence of Oromo nationalism. Ethnic Oromos have been involved in many of the inter-ethnic clashes and associated displacement that has occurred since 2018, both as instigators and victims (Oromos have been targeted in Benishangul-Gumuz and Somali states). The killing of prominent Oromo singer and activist, Hachalu Hundessa, in June 2020 – who had been increasingly outspoken on the economic and political marginalisation of the Oromo people – sparked renewed Oromo protests (see Security Situation).
3.8While there was widespread violence against, and detention of, protesters across Oromia State between 2014 and 2018, DFAT assesses this was not ethnically motivated, but reflected the then-federal government’s sensitivity to political opposition. The situation for government critics, including ethnic Oromos, has improved significantly since April 2018. DFAT assesses that individuals who are part of, or have links to, armed OLF factions engaged in criminal activities and clashes with government forces are likely to be of interest to the authorities, and face a moderate risk of arrest and detention. The risk of arrest and detention faced by OLF members who participate peacefully in the political process is low. DFAT assesses, overall, Oromos face a low risk of official discrimination based on their ethnicity, including with respect to employment in the public sector. DFAT assesses that, excluding in Addis Ababa, Oromos face a moderate risk of violence in areas or states where they constitute a minority.
POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED)
3.33The constitution enshrines extensive protections in relation to political opinion. Article 25 provides for equality under the law, without discrimination on the grounds of political or other opinion; Article 29 provides for freedom of expression; Article 30 provides for freedom of assembly, peaceful demonstration and petition; Article 31 provides for freedom of association; and Article 38 provides for the right to vote, be elected and be a member of a political organisation regardless of colour, race, nation, nationality, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion. Organisations formed in violation of appropriate laws and/or with the intent to subvert the constitutional order are prohibited. Organisers of large public gatherings must notify the authorities 48 hours in advance and obtain a permit.
3.34In practice, political freedoms were significantly curtailed before April 2018. Members of opposition groups, human rights activists, and independent commentators such as journalists and bloggers who opposed the government’s policies were regularly harassed and detained. The ATP was used extensively to restrict political freedoms and arrest and prosecute government critics, particularly individuals with suspected affiliations to proscribed groups Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF. Against this background, many opposition leaders and dissidents left Ethiopia. Individuals who were not members of the EPRDF reportedly faced discrimination in public sector employment, including impediments to career progression. Anti-government protests were often dispersed through force, and participants arrested.
3.35Freedom of political expression has expanded since 2018. More than 10,000 political prisoners have been released since 2018 (a process initiated by the Desalegn Government), including senior opposition leaders Andargachew Tsege of Ginbot 7 and Merera Gudina and Bekele Gerba of the OFC. In June 2018, parliament lifted its terrorist designations of Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF. These groups subsequently renounced armed struggle and returned to Ethiopia, where they operate as registered political parties. In July 2018, federal parliament amnestied thousands of individuals charged with treason and other crimes against the state. This has enabled high-profile opposition figures, including Berhanu Nega of Ginbot 7, to return from exile and resume their political activities. According to the federal government, over 13,000 people have been released under the amnesty law. Political opposition parties now operate with greater freedom, although some report intimidation and obstacles to holding rallies due to a lack of protection in regional states. In January and February 2020, over 100 OLF supporters were reportedly arrested across Oromia State, while some members of the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) – an opposition party formed in 2018 that espouses Amhara nationalism – were detained in connection to the alleged coup attempt in June 2019 (see Security Situation). DFAT is unable to verify if these arrests were politically motivated. A local source involved in politics told DFAT they were able to express their political views freely without fear of arrest and prosecution. Anti-government protests are common — in January 2020, large-scale anti-government protests took place in Amhara State in relation to the abduction of 27 ethnic Amhara university students in Oromia State. Protesters accused Prime Minister Abiy of not doing enough to secure the students’ release.
3.36In June 2018, the government established an Advisory Council for Legal and Justice Affairs comprising independent legal professionals to review and recommend reforms to laws that had been used to restrict political, civic and press freedoms (namely, the ATP, the Charities and Societies Proclamation, and the Freedom of Information and Mass Media Proclamation). The Advisory Council has a three-year mandate. The Charities and Societies Proclamation was repealed and replaced by the Organization of Civil Society Proclamation in February 2019 (see Human Rights Organisations). The new law is in operation, and has been well received by civil society organisations. A revision of the ATP was adopted on 2 January 2020. It is a significant improvement on the previous ATP but has still drawn criticism from civil society groups, including Amnesty International, who fear it could still be used against those critical of government. Replacement legislation for the Freedom of Information and Mass Media Proclamation was before federal parliament at the time of publication. While these laws remain in force, they have been used only sporadically since April 2018.
3.37Human rights organisations have particularly welcomed the government’s commitment to review and revise the ATP, which was widely considered to fall short of international human rights standards. The old ATP contained a broad definition of ‘terrorist acts’, and was used extensively to arrest and prosecute critics of government policy before April 2018. Under the ATP, detainees could be held without charge for 28-day periods up to a maximum period of four months. In practice, many were held for considerably longer. Bail was not available for persons charged with terrorism offences. Those charged under the ATP can face up to 20 years’ imprisonment.
3.38 Under the new ATP, a person must incite terrorist acts to be prosecuted (rather than simply ‘encouraging terrorism’) and workers’ rights to strike have been strengthened (illegal strikes that affected public services used to be classed as terrorist acts). However, Amnesty International believes opportunities to abuse power still remain. For example, the proclamation criminalises ‘intimidation to commit a terrorist act’.
3.39According to the federal government, about 300 people were arrested in connection to the alleged coup attempt in June 2018 (see Security Situation). DFAT understands a significantly higher number of people were arrested, including activists, journalists, government officials and members of the NaMA. The majority of arrests occurred in Amhara State; over 40 were detained in Addis Ababa. Most were subsequently released, including 22 in October 2019. A total of 58 people (45 in Amhara State and 13 in Addis Ababa) were charged under the ATP. In February 2020, the federal government said it had dropped charges ‘for the national good’ against some individuals – including NaMA members – suspected of involvement in the alleged attempt, as part of a broader pardon of high-profile detainees.
3.40Local sources told DFAT that, traditionally, being a member of the EPRDF increased one’s chances of gaining employment in the public sector and earning subsequent promotions, including in the judiciary, police, and public schools and universities. DFAT heard anecdotally that, while the practice of ruling party members being advantaged in public sector employment and promotions persisted, it was not as pronounced under the current federal government.
3.41DFAT assesses tolerance for political dissent has increased considerably since April 2018. Opposition political parties are able to organise and operate significantly more freely, particularly in Addis Ababa, and their members face a low risk of harassment, arrest and detention by virtue of their political affiliations and views. DFAT assesses Ethiopians can openly criticise the ruling party.
2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency
3.42Ethiopia witnessed large-scale anti-government protests from 2014 to 2018 in Oromia and Amhara states (which, collectively, account for 60 per cent of Ethiopia’s population). The protests began in Oromia State (Ethiopia’s most populous) in April 2014, triggered by the federal government’s plan to expand the municipal boundaries of Addis Ababa into Oromia State, which it abuts. The federal government justified the Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan on the grounds it was necessary to cater for the rapid growth of the capital; critics claimed the encroachment would displace Oromo farmers and result in land seizures. The protests were put down through force, but re-emerged in November 2015. The government scrapped the Master Plan in January 2016; however, protests intensified across Oromia State and evolved into calls for greater political rights and the release of ethnic Oromo political prisoners. The Qeerroo, an Oromo youth movement, was at the forefront of these protests. Parallel protests emerged in neighbouring Amhara State in July 2016 (Ethiopia’s second-most populous state), triggered by historical Amhara grievances over the loss of traditional Amhara land stemming from the demarcation of the border between Amhara and Tigray states. Like in Oromia State, the protests in Amhara State morphed into calls for broader reform. The protests in Oromia and Amhara states saw violent confrontations between government forces and protesters, including the use of live bullets.
3.43The federal government declared a countrywide State of Emergency in October 2016 after protesters torched farms and businesses (a State of Emergency is constitutionally permissible in the event of a breakdown in law and order that threatens the constitutional order and is beyond the capacity of regular law enforcement agencies to control. It must be approved by a two-thirds majority in the House of Peoples’ Representatives within 15 days of being declared). The State of Emergency gave authorities broad powers to detain people and search private property without court orders, limit travel and the right to association and protest, and impose curfews and media restrictions (including on social media). The practical effect of the State of Emergency was to formalise and expand practices that were largely already in place. The State of Emergency was lifted in August 2017, but reinstated in February 2018, following the resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn. The State of Emergency was subsequently lifted in June 2018, two months ahead of schedule
3.44DFAT understands the authorities arrested and detained around 26,000 people under the State of Emergency. This number includes journalists, bloggers, opposition party members and large numbers of people who were thought to have participated in anti-government protests, including children. Arrests and detentions were not limited to protest organisers or high-profile opponents of the government. Large numbers of detainees were subjected to a ‘rehabilitation and re-education’ program, mostly lowprofile participants who were released following their completion of the program (see Arbitrary Arrest and Detention). Some of those arrested under the State of Emergency claim to have been tortured (see Torture). The majority of those arrested and imprisoned for their participation in the protests have since been released. Over 1,000 civilians are estimated to have died during the course of the protests.

3.45Anti-government protests can and do occur. DFAT assesses that, since April 2018, participants in peaceful protests face a low risk of arrest and detention. DFAT further assesses that participants in peaceful protests, including organisers, are likely to be of little ongoing interest to the authorities.

[2021] AATA 5051

8 October 2021

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Immigration

Administrative Law

Legal Concepts

Judicial Review

Natural Justice

Procedural Fairness

Statutory Construction

Jurisdiction

Appeal