2101456 (Refugee) - [2021] AATA 5051

2101456 (Refugee) [2021] AATA 5051 (8 October 2021)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER:2101456

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Ethiopia
MEMBER:Jason Pennell
DATE:8 October 2021
PLACE OF DECISION: Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 8 October 2021 at 4.12pm

CATCHWORDS

REFUGEE – protection visa – Ethiopia – Federal Court remittal – race – Oromo – political opinion – Oromo People’s Congress member – suspected member of the Oromo Liberation Front – particular social group – returned asylum seeker – arrests – torture – physical assault – employment – political activities in Australia – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION

Migration Act 1958, ss 5(1), 5AAA, 5H, 5J – 5LA, 36, 65, 91, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2

CASES

Calado v MIMA (1998) 81 FCR 450
Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379
Maningat v MIMA (Federal Court of Australia, Tamberlin J, 30 April 1998)
MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
MIEA v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and McIllhatton v Guo Wei Rong and Pan Run Juan (1996) 40 ALD 445
Nagalingam v MILGEA (1992) 38 FCR 191
Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155
V v MIMA (1999) 92 FCR 355

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1.This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
2.[Name] (‘the applicant’), who claims to be a citizen of Ethiopia, applied for the protection visa on 26 November 2013 and the delegate refused to grant the visa on 30 September 2014 on the basis that the applicant is not a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations.
3.The applicant provided the Tribunal with a copy of the primary decision record issued by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection dated 30 September 2014.
4.The applicant initially applied to the Tribunal (differently constituted, case number 1417018) (‘the First Tribunal’) for review of the delegate’s decision on 14 October 2014. On 27 June 2016 the First Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
5.[In] December 2018 the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) dismissed the applicant’s appeal of the First Tribunal’s decision.
6.[In] December 2020 the Federal Court of Australia (FCA) remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for reconsideration. As a result, the matter has been returned to the Tribunal for reconsideration (case number 2101456) (‘the Tribunal’).
7.The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 27 September 2021 to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading 2101456 (Refugee)

Details

AGLC: 2101456 (Refugee) [2021] AATA 5051
Case: [2021] AATA 5051
Decision Date: 8 October 2021

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) considered the case of an applicant seeking a protection visa, who claimed to fear persecution in Ethiopia. The applicant alleged that he would face serious harm due to his ethnicity as an Oromo, his imputed political opinion as a member of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and his actual political opinion as a member of the Oromo People's Congress (OPC). The Tribunal had to determine whether the applicant met the criteria for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The Tribunal was required to assess the applicant's claims regarding his fear of persecution based on his ethnicity and political opinions. Specifically, it needed to consider whether the Ethiopian authorities would likely seriously harm him due to his Oromo ethnicity, his alleged past or present association with the OLF, or his membership and activities within the OPC. This involved evaluating the applicant's evidence in conjunction with available country information regarding the political and social situation in Ethiopia, particularly concerning the Oromo people and opposition groups.

The Tribunal accepted the applicant's evidence that his brother had been detained and died in prison due to his involvement with the OLF, and that the applicant himself had been detained and beaten following his brother's funeral due to suspicions of OLF involvement. It also accepted that the applicant had been detained and interrogated for refusing to join the OPDO and for mobilising farmers against government militias. Furthermore, the Tribunal accepted the applicant's evidence of his opposition to the Ethiopian government and his support for improved conditions for the Oromo people, and his past membership and involvement in organising meetings for the OPC. However, despite accepting his opposition to the government and his views on Oromo self-determination, the Tribunal did not accept that there was a real chance of serious harm as a member of the OPC due to the passage of time and lack of evidence of continued involvement. Nevertheless, based on the cumulative findings regarding his ethnicity and imputed political opinion, the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations and was a refugee.

The Tribunal remitted the matter for reconsideration with a direction that the applicant satisfies the criterion set out in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

From the country information[93] the Tribunal accepts that the situation in Ethiopia remains dangerous and volatile with considerable inter-ethnic tensions. It is feared by opposition parties that the Abiy government has turned against Oromo leaders, notably arresting Jawar on terrorism charges, and returned to imperial-style domination. The action of the government against the opposing parties has appears to have been systematic and discriminatory in an attempt to maintain control. [93] The Guardian. ‘As Ethiopia’s army declares daily victories, its people are being plunged into violence’ Alex de Waal 24 November 2020 >The Tribunal has taken into consideration the fact that the opposition parties in Ethiopia represent the varying ethnic groups in the country. In the case of the Oromo, the authorities have continued act against the OLF and OLA. While politically motivated, the actions of the government have the effect of persecuting ethnic Oromo on a systematic and discriminatory manner. As a result, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s fear of persecution involves systematic and discriminatory conduct. Therefore, based on the applicants evidence and the available country information, the Tribunal accepts that there is a real chance the applicant will be seriously harmed as a result of being an ethic Oromo in the event that he is returned to Ethiopia.Applicant imputed political opinion100.The applicant claims that there is a real chance he will be seriously harmed if he is returned to Ethiopia due to his imputed political opinion as a member of the OLF.[94] The applicant’s evidence was that his [Brother B], was jailed for three (3) years in 2000 for his association with the OLF. His evidence was that his brother died in [Prison 1] [in] September 2003. The applicant provided witness statements referred to above from [Witness J], [Witness G], [Witness M], [Witness E], [Witness C], [Witness H], [Brother A] and [Witness I] (the witness statements). The Tribunal accepts the evidence provided in the statements. Relevantly, all the witnesses in their statements refer to the fact that they know the applicant and his brother and confirm that the applicant’s brother died in prison in or about 2003. Therefore, based on the applicant’s evidence and the evidence provided in each of the witness statements, the Tribunal accepts and finds that the applicant’s brother was detained due to his involvement in the OLF and died in prison in or about September 2003 as claimed.[94] Applicant’s submissions dated 14 September 2021 @ p.3; AAT File No 2101456, Doc ID:[Number]101.The applicant’s evidence was that his brother’s funeral was conducted [in] September 2003 at which approximately one hundred and fifty (150) attended including [number] police officers. The applicant claims that at the funeral he gave a eulogy in which he criticised the authorities for their treatment of his brother. The applicant claims that he was subsequently taken from his brother’s home and detained for two (2) weeks at [Police Station 1] where he was interrogated about his alleged involvement with the OLF and beaten. 102.Further, the applicant claims that his [Brother A] had been questioned by the authorities on a number of occasions on suspicion of being connected with the OLF.[95] After witnessing the applicant being detained, he fled to [Country 1] and has since been relocated to [Country 2].[96] The applicant claimed that his mother, father and [another sibling] were detained for approximately two (2) months by the security police as a result of [Brother A’s] disappearance.[95] Applicant’s statement dated 11 March 2014. [96] Statement of [Brother A] dated 16 April 2016. 103.The country information[97] reports that the OLF was established in 1973 with the purpose of promoting Oromo self-determination. It was one of several armed groups that fought against the government of Mengistu Hailemariam. When Mengistu Hailemariam was overthrown in 1991, the OLF was briefly part of a transitional government led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition. However, the OLF always had an uneasy relationship with the TPLF who controlled the EPRDF. As a result, the OLF left the transitional government in 1992 and continued to wage a low-level armed struggle against the government. As a result, it is reported that thousands of OLF fighters, supporters and suspected supporters were arrested and subjected to interrogation, torture and extrajudicial killing by the Ethiopian authorities.[98] In 2010, the UN Committee Against Torture reported its concern over the ongoing and consistent allegations of the use of torture by the police, prison officers and other members of the security forces against alleged supporters of insurgent groups, including the OLF.[99][97] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ethiopia: The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), including origin, mandate, leadership, structure, legal status, and membership; treatment of members and supporters by authorities (2014-2015), 7 May 2015, ETH105146.E, available at: ibid[99] ibid104.A report by Amnesty International[100] reported that the Oromo people had ‘long been subject to repression based on an imputed opposition to the government.’ It reported[101] that between 2011 and 2014, at least 5,000 Oromos were arrested based on their actual or suspected peaceful opposition to the government. These include thousands of peaceful protestors and hundreds of opposition political party members. It reported that the government, at that time, anticipated a high level of opposition in Oromia, and signs of dissent were sought and regularly suppressed with both actual and suspected dissenters being detained without charge and killed. [100] Amnesty International 'Because I Am Oromo': Sweeping Repression in the Oromia Region of Ethiopia’ dated 24 October 2014. ibid105.It is reported that a Human Rights Watch Researcher commented on the treatment of politically active Oromos, who are perceived to be part of the OLF by the government, as follows:[102][102] Human Rights Watch 27 Apr. 2015 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ethiopia: The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), including origin, mandate, leadership, structure, legal status, and membership; treatment of members and supporters by authorities (2014-2015), 7 May 2015, ETH105146.E, available at: the vast majority of interrogations involving Oromos, there are accusations that they are either members of OLF, or are involved in the Oromo opposition, which many take to mean OLF. There is very rarely any evidence that there is a connection to the OLF, rather anyone who expresses dissent, mobilizes for mainstream politics, or is involved in Oromo cultural associations, are at risk of being associated to the OLF. If you have a family connection from the past to OLF, you are at particular risk. Torture and mistreatment in detention is common among the Oromo, particularly those who have been accused of having connections to the OLF.106.The applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal was that he is opposed to the policies of the Ethiopian government and is a supporter for improved conditions for the Oromo people as claimed. For the reasons expressed below, the Tribunal accepts the applicant’s evidence in relation to his political view. 107.Based on the evidence provided to the Tribunal and the available country information, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s brother was detained by the authorities as claimed. In addition, the Tribunal accepts and finds that the applicant was detained by the authorities after his brother’s funeral as claimed. 108.In addition, the Tribunal accepts while he was at [College 1], he was detained and interrogated by the authorities after refusing to join the OPDO as claimed. Finally, the Tribunal accepts that he was detained and beaten on suspicion of mobilising farmers against the government militias because of his work with farming households as part of his responsibilities with [Project 1].109.The applicant claims that he supports the OLA and that he would not repress his political views upon his return to Ethiopia. The applicant evidence was that he was greatly concerned over the condition of the Oromo and that if he was returned to Ethiopia he would advocate for and work towards the goal of self-determination of the Oromo people. Based on the applicants evidence the Tribunal accepts that there is a real chance that the he will be seriously harmed by the authorities as a likely supporter or member of the OLA if he was returned to Ethiopia.Applicant’s actual political opinion110.The applicant claims that he will be seriously harmed if he is returned to Ethiopia because of his political opinion as a member of the Oromo People’s Congress (OPC). The applicant claims to be opposed to the policies of the Ethiopian government and is an active supporter for improved conditions for the Oromo people. He claims that he is an active spokesman and supporter of the OPC. 111.The OPC was originally founded in April 1996 as the Oromo National Congress by Dr Merera Gudina as a federalist and Oromo nationalist opposition political party in Ethiopia. Prior to the 2008 election, it changed its name to OPC.[103] The OPC then merged with Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement, forming the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), in 2012.[104] Prior to the 2021 Ethiopian general election, (that was scheduled for May 2020), OFC agreed to form an electoral coalition with Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Oromo Nationalist Party (ONP).[105][103] ibid[105] Africanews, "Major Oromia parties agree merger for Ethiopia's 2020 polls", Shaban, Abdur Rahman Alfa, 11 September 2018. applicant provided the Tribunal with copies of a [social media] post from 2016 to 2020 by him expressing his views in relation to certain events in Ethiopia. The applicant also claimed to have attended a rally in February 2020[106] in [City 1] organised by the Oromo Committee to bring awareness to the Oromo situation in Ethiopia. Based on the [social media] posts provided and the applicant’s own evidence to the Tribunal in relation to his political views, the Tribunal accepts he is opposed to the policies of the Ethiopian government and is a supporter for improved conditions for the Oromo people as claimed.[106] Applicant’s supplementary statement dated 16 August 2021 @ [10].113.The applicant claims the while he was at [University 2], he was an active member of the OPC and on the organising committee responsible for arranging member meetings for the OPC. The applicant claims that because of his involvement with the OPC, he was detained, interrogated and beaten at [Police Station 2] for five days. The applicant’s evidence was that he was released on the condition that he reported to security officials when they summoned him. Based on the applicant’s evidence and the country information referred to above, the Tribunal accepts that he was a member of the OPC and involved in arranging meetings on campus. Accordingly, it accepts that he was detained as claimed.114.However, notwithstanding the fact that the Tribunal has accepted his opposition to the Ethiopian government and his political views concerning the independence of the Oromo people, due to the passage of time and the lack of any evidence of his continued membership or involvement with the OPC, the Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance that he would be seriously harmed as a member of the OPC or as an active spokesman or organiser of the party if he is returned to Ethiopia.CONCLUSION115.Therefore, having regard to all the circumstances and findings above, considered individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 5J(1)(a) and s 5J(1)(b) of the Act and finds that the applicant is a refugee pursuant to s 5H of the Act. As such, the Tribunal finds that the applicant does satisfy the criterion set out in s 36(2)(a).116.For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations. Therefore, the applicant satisfies the criterion set out in s 36(2)(a) of the Act.DECISION117.The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.Jason PennellSenior Member‘Annexure A’RECENT HISTORY2.1Ethiopia, formerly Abyssinia, is a multi-ethnic federal republic in East Africa. Ethiopia is Africa’s oldest independent country — with the exception of a five-year Italian occupation (1936-41), it was never colonised. In 1974, a Communist military junta known as the Derg (‘Committee’) overthrew the long-serving Emperor, Haile Selassie, and abolished Ethiopia’s monarchy, the House of Solomon, which dated to antiquity. The Derg pursued policies of nationalisation and collectivisation, and Ethiopia descended into civil war between junta and rebel forces. Between 1976 and 1978, the Derg killed thousands of its opponents (the campaign of ‘Red Terror’). Rebel forces from the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a multi-ethnic alliance led by the Tigrayan people, ousted the Derg in 1991, ending Ethiopia’s civil war. The Derg’s leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, was granted asylum in Zimbabwe. The EPRDF and its successor, the Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP), have ruled Ethiopia since. In 1993, Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia and established its own state, rendering Ethiopia landlocked. A border dispute between the two countries triggered a two-year war (1998-2000), in which 100,000 people were killed (see Security Situation). Ethiopia is one of the most drought-prone countries in the world. Drought-induced famines in 1973-74 and 1984-85 resulted in more than 1 million deaths. Its capital city, Addis Ababa, is a major diplomatic hub, as seat of the African Union and the UN Economic Commission for Africa.2.2Ethiopia held its first multi-party elections in May 1995. The EPRDF won this and all other subsequent elections, bringing stability and economic growth but restricting political dissent and media and civic freedoms for most of its time in power. The EPRDF was disbanded in December 2019 (see Political System). Ethnic Tigrayans, a minority, wielded outsized influence during most of the EPRDF’s rule, fostering resentment among the considerably larger Amhara and, in particular, Oromo ethnic groups. Meles Zenawi, a Tigrayan who led the removal of the Derg, served as prime minister from 1995 until his death in 2012. Zenawi was succeeded by his deputy, Hailemariam Desalegn, an ethnic Wolayta — Ethiopia’s first peaceful transition of power in modern times.2.3Large-scale anti-government protests beginning in 2014, centred in Oromia and, later, Amhara states, prompted the declaration of a State of Emergency, under which over 20,000 people were arrested and 1,000 killed (see 2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency). Protesters demanded greater political rights, leading to the resignation, in February 2018, of Prime Minister Desalegn. His successor and current prime minister, Abiy Ahmed (appointed in April 2018), embarked on an ambitious reform agenda, and the human rights situation has improved significantly under his watch. Among other reforms, Abiy has lifted restrictions on freedom of expression, released political prisoners, removed terrorist designations of previously exiled opposition groups, expanded the space for civil society, and initiated reform of legislation used previously to arrest and prosecute government critics. In parallel, Abiy has pursued high-profile diplomatic initiatives across East Africa. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for his peacebuilding efforts with Eritrea, culminating in the signing of an agreement to formally end their war. Abiy is Ethiopia’s first prime minister from the Oromo ethnic group. 2.4After an initial period where violence subsided significantly, ethno-nationalism, inter-ethnic clashes and associated displacement again increased, though not nearly to the levels witnessed preceding Abiy’s election. Abiy’s reform agenda has met some resistance, and his government was the subject of a purported coup attempt in June 2019. 2.5Abiy had committed to holding free and fair elections in 2020, although these have been postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak in the country. Abiy declared a five-month State of Emergency on 8 April 2020 in response to the outbreak. The State of Emergency, while valid only until September 2020, limits some human rights, particularly those around association and movement. While these reflect the types of restrictions in place internationally, there is scope for abuse. However, the response has generally been accepted as necessary by opposition parties who see it as proportionate to the threat posed by COVID-19.Corruption2.19Ethiopia has a strong anti-corruption legal framework. The Criminal Code, the Revised Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Establishment Proclamation, and the Revised Anti‑Corruption Law criminalise all major forms of corruption, including active and passive bribery; bribery of foreign officials; and money laundering. Facilitation payments are illegal, and public servants are forbidden from accepting gifts or hospitality that may influence their decision-making. Under the Criminal Code, corruption on the part of public servants is punishable by between one and 10 years in prison. Government officials are legally obligated to register their wealth and personal property (non-compliance carries financial and criminal penalties). In January 2017, the federal government established a Corruption Directorate within the Federal Police Commission to investigate cases of systemic corruption. Since the election of Prime Minister Abiy, the directorate has been involved in the investigation of a number of high-profile cases, with some publicised success. For example, in an address to Parliament in November 2019, Abiy outlined that the Government of Ethiopia had identified tens of millions of US dollars that had been illegally obtained and held overseas (mostly in the UAE), and was in the process of negotiating with the relevant banks for their return. The Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate complaints of administrative mismanagement by the executive branch.2.20In practice, corruption seems to be widespread, including in the civil service. According to the GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal, common corrupt practices include the payment of facilitation payments and bribes to process documents, to keep land leased from the state and to obtain government contracts. Local sources told DFAT that a bribe is often required to obtain a national identification card, driver’s licence and permits for establishing a business. Sources also told DFAT that the police readily accept bribes in exchange for waiving the issuance of traffic infringements (the going rate is reportedly 50 birr, or approximately AUD2.50). While corruption occurs, it is less widespread by regional standards. Ethiopia ranked 96th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index— an improvement of 18 places from a year earlier. 2.54In June 2019, the chief of staff of the National Defence Force (head of the military), General Seare Mekonnen, and the president of Amhara State, Ambachew Mekonnen, were assassinated in concurrent events in Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar (Amhara State). Both were allied to Prime Minister Abiy, who characterised the assassinations as a failed coup attempt. The alleged ringleader, Brigadier General Asaminew Tsige, the chief of security in Amhara State, was killed by government forces. Tsige, who had advocated for greater regional autonomy, had been pardoned and released from prison in 2018 (he was serving a life sentence for his alleged involvement in a failed 2009 coup attempt by Ginbot 7). Federal government forces were deployed to Amhara State and Addis Ababa, and a weeklong internet blackout was imposed nationally, in the wake of the alleged coup. Abiy was earlier the subject of a grenade attack at a progovernment rally in Addis Ababa. The authorities described the June 2018 incident as a failed assassination attempt, and five people were charged with terrorism offences. The attack killed two people and injured more than 100.RACE/NATIONALITY3.1Article 25 of the constitution stipulates all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection regardless of race, nationality, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status. Article 46 of the constitution provides the basis for Ethiopia’s states to be delimited ‘on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned’. In effect, this involves the creation of states that are broadly consistent with the geographic locations of major ethnic groups. Traditionally, ethnically-motivated societal violence has been rare, although ethnic-based clashes have increased since 2018 (see Security Situation), fuelled largely by competition for resources and enabled, in part, by the lifting of restrictions on freedom of expression and an associated rise in hate speech and misinformation (see Media). With the exception of the ethnic Anuak people of Gambela State, most ethnic groups in Ethiopia are indistinguishable by their physical appearance, partly as a result of inter-marriage.3.2Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic society, and ethnic groups enjoy extensive rights. Under the Ethiopian Constitution every ‘nation, nationality and people’ (a reference to all ethnic groupings which constitute Ethiopia) has the right to speak their language and promote their culture. Every nation, nationality and people also has the constitutional right to self-determination, including the right to regional statehood within Ethiopia’s federal system — a right recently asserted by the Sidama (see Security Situation). Several conditions must be met for regional statehood, including: approval by a two-thirds majority of the members of the relevant state legislature; and a majority vote in a referendum organised by the federal government (the referendum must be organised within one‑year of the request for regional statehood being received). 3.3All major ethnic groups are represented in the federal government and bureaucracy, and political parties represent the interests of Ethiopia’s various ethnic groups. DFAT assesses official discrimination – including systematic state-sanctioned discrimination, denial of public services and higher detention rates – based on race and/or ethnicity is rare. This assessment is consistent with the constitutional prohibitions on discrimination, and reflects the need for governments to maintain their legitimacy through inclusiveness, given Ethiopia’s ethnic diversity. Different ethnic groups have a history of co-existence in Addis Ababa, and discrimination on ethnic grounds is not common there. One source described ethnicity as a ‘non-factor’ in Addis Ababa — most people consider themselves from Addis Ababa as opposed to a particular ethnic group. Violence based on ethnicity is not common in Addis Ababa, but is a growing concern in regional states. Inter-ethnic relations have deteriorated since 2018, and DFAT assesses the situation for ethnic minorities at the regional state-level is increasingly challenging, and they face a growing risk of violence at the hands of the majority community.3.4Societal discrimination based on ethnicity can occur, but is predominantly in the form of positive discrimination in favour of a particular ethnic group rather than active discrimination against people of a different race or ethnicity. Official policies can limit opportunities for some groups; for example, the use of Oromiffa as the language of instruction in schools in Oromia State can limit opportunities for ethnic Oromos in the public sector if they do not also speak Amharic and English. Similarly, ethnic groups that constitute a minority within regional states are at a disadvantage from a linguistic perspective, insofar as their languages do not enjoy official status in those states.Oromos3.5The Oromo people are the single largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, at nearly 35 per cent of the population. They live mostly in Oromia State, which surrounds the federally-administered Addis Ababa. According to the 2007 national census (the most recent), there are significant Oromo communities in Addis Ababa (534,000), Amhara State (450,000) and SNNP State (236,000). While recent data is hard to come by, roughly similar numbers of Oromos practise Islam and Christianity (both Orthodox and Protestant). Oromos speak Oromiffa (also known as Afaan Oromo), which is the language of administration and schooling in Oromia State. By virtue of its location surrounding Addis Ababa, Oromia State is one of the more developed parts of the country.3.6Ethnic Oromos’ level of political and economic influence has traditionally been incommensurate to their size. Oromos argue they have long been subservient to smaller ethnic groups — a major source of historical frustration. While Oromos were represented in federal government and held positions of influence during the EPRDF’s rule, ethnic Tigrayans predominated politically and economically. Likewise, ethnic Amharas dominated during the periods of military and monarchic rule. The displacement of Oromos from traditional land on which Addis Ababa is built is another historical grievance for the Oromo community. Oromos were the most vocal of Ethiopia’s ethnic communities during anti-government protests from 2014 to 2018 and bore the brunt of associated arrests and detentions (see 2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency).3.7Oromo influence at the federal level has expanded significantly since the April 2018 election of Abiy as prime minister — the first time in Ethiopia’s modern history an Oromo has led the country. The Oromo were the single largest ethnic group in the federal cabinet (the Council of Ministers) at the time of publication and were represented in the senior ranks of the public service and the military. Oromo political prisoners, including those arrested for their involvement in the 2014-18 protests, have been released. The OLF, an opposition party dedicated to Oromo self-determination, was delisted as a terrorist organisation in June 2018 and returned from exile in Eritrea in September 2018. The OLF signed a peace agreement with the federal government in August 2018 and agreed to disarm. It now operates as a registered political party and plans to contest forthcoming national and regional elections. Despite these gains, historical grievances remain. The resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn, his subsequent replacement by Abiy and Ethiopia’s democratic opening has triggered a resurgence of Oromo nationalism. Ethnic Oromos have been involved in many of the inter-ethnic clashes and associated displacement that has occurred since 2018, both as instigators and victims (Oromos have been targeted in Benishangul-Gumuz and Somali states). The killing of prominent Oromo singer and activist, Hachalu Hundessa, in June 2020 – who had been increasingly outspoken on the economic and political marginalisation of the Oromo people – sparked renewed Oromo protests (see Security Situation).3.8While there was widespread violence against, and detention of, protesters across Oromia State between 2014 and 2018, DFAT assesses this was not ethnically motivated, but reflected the then-federal government’s sensitivity to political opposition. The situation for government critics, including ethnic Oromos, has improved significantly since April 2018. DFAT assesses that individuals who are part of, or have links to, armed OLF factions engaged in criminal activities and clashes with government forces are likely to be of interest to the authorities, and face a moderate risk of arrest and detention. The risk of arrest and detention faced by OLF members who participate peacefully in the political process is low. DFAT assesses, overall, Oromos face a low risk of official discrimination based on their ethnicity, including with respect to employment in the public sector. DFAT assesses that, excluding in Addis Ababa, Oromos face a moderate risk of violence in areas or states where they constitute a minority.POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED)3.33The constitution enshrines extensive protections in relation to political opinion. Article 25 provides for equality under the law, without discrimination on the grounds of political or other opinion; Article 29 provides for freedom of expression; Article 30 provides for freedom of assembly, peaceful demonstration and petition; Article 31 provides for freedom of association; and Article 38 provides for the right to vote, be elected and be a member of a political organisation regardless of colour, race, nation, nationality, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion. Organisations formed in violation of appropriate laws and/or with the intent to subvert the constitutional order are prohibited. Organisers of large public gatherings must notify the authorities 48 hours in advance and obtain a permit. 3.34In practice, political freedoms were significantly curtailed before April 2018. Members of opposition groups, human rights activists, and independent commentators such as journalists and bloggers who opposed the government’s policies were regularly harassed and detained. The ATP was used extensively to restrict political freedoms and arrest and prosecute government critics, particularly individuals with suspected affiliations to proscribed groups Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF. Against this background, many opposition leaders and dissidents left Ethiopia. Individuals who were not members of the EPRDF reportedly faced discrimination in public sector employment, including impediments to career progression. Anti-government protests were often dispersed through force, and participants arrested. 3.35Freedom of political expression has expanded since 2018. More than 10,000 political prisoners have been released since 2018 (a process initiated by the Desalegn Government), including senior opposition leaders Andargachew Tsege of Ginbot 7 and Merera Gudina and Bekele Gerba of the OFC. In June 2018, parliament lifted its terrorist designations of Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF. These groups subsequently renounced armed struggle and returned to Ethiopia, where they operate as registered political parties. In July 2018, federal parliament amnestied thousands of individuals charged with treason and other crimes against the state. This has enabled high-profile opposition figures, including Berhanu Nega of Ginbot 7, to return from exile and resume their political activities. According to the federal government, over 13,000 people have been released under the amnesty law. Political opposition parties now operate with greater freedom, although some report intimidation and obstacles to holding rallies due to a lack of protection in regional states. In January and February 2020, over 100 OLF supporters were reportedly arrested across Oromia State, while some members of the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) – an opposition party formed in 2018 that espouses Amhara nationalism – were detained in connection to the alleged coup attempt in June 2019 (see Security Situation). DFAT is unable to verify if these arrests were politically motivated. A local source involved in politics told DFAT they were able to express their political views freely without fear of arrest and prosecution. Anti-government protests are common — in January 2020, large-scale anti-government protests took place in Amhara State in relation to the abduction of 27 ethnic Amhara university students in Oromia State. Protesters accused Prime Minister Abiy of not doing enough to secure the students’ release. 3.36In June 2018, the government established an Advisory Council for Legal and Justice Affairs comprising independent legal professionals to review and recommend reforms to laws that had been used to restrict political, civic and press freedoms (namely, the ATP, the Charities and Societies Proclamation, and the Freedom of Information and Mass Media Proclamation). The Advisory Council has a three-year mandate. The Charities and Societies Proclamation was repealed and replaced by the Organization of Civil Society Proclamation in February 2019 (see Human Rights Organisations). The new law is in operation, and has been well received by civil society organisations. A revision of the ATP was adopted on 2 January 2020. It is a significant improvement on the previous ATP but has still drawn criticism from civil society groups, including Amnesty International, who fear it could still be used against those critical of government. Replacement legislation for the Freedom of Information and Mass Media Proclamation was before federal parliament at the time of publication. While these laws remain in force, they have been used only sporadically since April 2018.3.37Human rights organisations have particularly welcomed the government’s commitment to review and revise the ATP, which was widely considered to fall short of international human rights standards. The old ATP contained a broad definition of ‘terrorist acts’, and was used extensively to arrest and prosecute critics of government policy before April 2018. Under the ATP, detainees could be held without charge for 28-day periods up to a maximum period of four months. In practice, many were held for considerably longer. Bail was not available for persons charged with terrorism offences. Those charged under the ATP can face up to 20 years’ imprisonment. 3.38 Under the new ATP, a person must incite terrorist acts to be prosecuted (rather than simply ‘encouraging terrorism’) and workers’ rights to strike have been strengthened (illegal strikes that affected public services used to be classed as terrorist acts). However, Amnesty International believes opportunities to abuse power still remain. For example, the proclamation criminalises ‘intimidation to commit a terrorist act’. 3.39According to the federal government, about 300 people were arrested in connection to the alleged coup attempt in June 2018 (see Security Situation). DFAT understands a significantly higher number of people were arrested, including activists, journalists, government officials and members of the NaMA. The majority of arrests occurred in Amhara State; over 40 were detained in Addis Ababa. Most were subsequently released, including 22 in October 2019. A total of 58 people (45 in Amhara State and 13 in Addis Ababa) were charged under the ATP. In February 2020, the federal government said it had dropped charges ‘for the national good’ against some individuals – including NaMA members – suspected of involvement in the alleged attempt, as part of a broader pardon of high-profile detainees.3.40Local sources told DFAT that, traditionally, being a member of the EPRDF increased one’s chances of gaining employment in the public sector and earning subsequent promotions, including in the judiciary, police, and public schools and universities. DFAT heard anecdotally that, while the practice of ruling party members being advantaged in public sector employment and promotions persisted, it was not as pronounced under the current federal government. 3.41DFAT assesses tolerance for political dissent has increased considerably since April 2018. Opposition political parties are able to organise and operate significantly more freely, particularly in Addis Ababa, and their members face a low risk of harassment, arrest and detention by virtue of their political affiliations and views. DFAT assesses Ethiopians can openly criticise the ruling party.2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency3.42Ethiopia witnessed large-scale anti-government protests from 2014 to 2018 in Oromia and Amhara states (which, collectively, account for 60 per cent of Ethiopia’s population). The protests began in Oromia State (Ethiopia’s most populous) in April 2014, triggered by the federal government’s plan to expand the municipal boundaries of Addis Ababa into Oromia State, which it abuts. The federal government justified the Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan on the grounds it was necessary to cater for the rapid growth of the capital; critics claimed the encroachment would displace Oromo farmers and result in land seizures. The protests were put down through force, but re-emerged in November 2015. The government scrapped the Master Plan in January 2016; however, protests intensified across Oromia State and evolved into calls for greater political rights and the release of ethnic Oromo political prisoners. The Qeerroo, an Oromo youth movement, was at the forefront of these protests. Parallel protests emerged in neighbouring Amhara State in July 2016 (Ethiopia’s second-most populous state), triggered by historical Amhara grievances over the loss of traditional Amhara land stemming from the demarcation of the border between Amhara and Tigray states. Like in Oromia State, the protests in Amhara State morphed into calls for broader reform. The protests in Oromia and Amhara states saw violent confrontations between government forces and protesters, including the use of live bullets.3.43The federal government declared a countrywide State of Emergency in October 2016 after protesters torched farms and businesses (a State of Emergency is constitutionally permissible in the event of a breakdown in law and order that threatens the constitutional order and is beyond the capacity of regular law enforcement agencies to control. It must be approved by a two-thirds majority in the House of Peoples’ Representatives within 15 days of being declared). The State of Emergency gave authorities broad powers to detain people and search private property without court orders, limit travel and the right to association and protest, and impose curfews and media restrictions (including on social media). The practical effect of the State of Emergency was to formalise and expand practices that were largely already in place. The State of Emergency was lifted in August 2017, but reinstated in February 2018, following the resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn. The State of Emergency was subsequently lifted in June 2018, two months ahead of schedule3.44DFAT understands the authorities arrested and detained around 26,000 people under the State of Emergency. This number includes journalists, bloggers, opposition party members and large numbers of people who were thought to have participated in anti-government protests, including children. Arrests and detentions were not limited to protest organisers or high-profile opponents of the government. Large numbers of detainees were subjected to a ‘rehabilitation and re-education’ program, mostly lowprofile participants who were released following their completion of the program (see Arbitrary Arrest and Detention). Some of those arrested under the State of Emergency claim to have been tortured (see Torture). The majority of those arrested and imprisoned for their participation in the protests have since been released. Over 1,000 civilians are estimated to have died during the course of the protests.3.45Anti-government protests can and do occur. DFAT assesses that, since April 2018, participants in peaceful protests face a low risk of arrest and detention. DFAT further assesses that participants in peaceful protests, including organisers, are likely to be of little ongoing interest to the authorities.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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