2013338 (Refugee) - [2025] ARTA 855

2013338 (REFUGEE) [2025] ARTA 855 (17 MARCH 2025)
DECISION AND
REASONS FOR DECISION
Respondent:Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Tribunal Number: 2013338
Tribunal:General Member M Brereton
Date:17 March 2025

Place:Melbourne

Decision:The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant meets the following criteria:
·s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 17 March 2025 at 9:00am
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Pakistan – ethnicity and religion – Pashtun Turi and Shi’a Muslim – official position in student organisation – organised peaceful protest – threatened and present during two terrorist attacks – imputed as armed opposition or pro-US – profile more prominent than general population – recent country information – ethnic stereotyping and low-level societal discrimination – religious intolerance and official discrimination – complex and dynamic security situation, recent increase in attacks and government’s inconsistent response – real chance of harm in all areas and effective protection not available – decision under review remitted
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H(1)(a), 5J(1), (2), 5LA, 36(2)(a), 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
CASE
Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 21 August 2020 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicant who claims to be a national of Pakistan, applied for the visa on 4 October 2019. The delegate accepted most of the applicant’s claims as to his history but having regard to the then current situation in Pakistan, found that the applicant could relocate to another part of Pakistan and that it would be reasonable to do so.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 7 March 2025 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Urdu and English languages.
The applicant was represented in relation to the review.
BACKGROUND
The applicant arrived in Australia on [date] August 2019, as the holder of a student visa. He applied for a protection (Class XA Subclass 866) visa on 4 October 2019.
Evidence before the Department
Protection visa application
In his application for the protection visa the applicant claims that he is a [Age]-year-old male, married with one child. He is a Pakistani national, born in [Location], Parachinar, Kurram Agency, in what was then the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan. He claims to be a Shi’a Muslim, a Pashtun, and a member of the Turi tribal group. He claims to have been involved in a Shi’a Muslim student group and to have been the [official position] of that group and engaged in anti-Sunni protests. He claims to have been present at bombing incidents in Pakistan.
Supporting documents
The applicant provided the Department with his Pakistani passport and Pakistani identity documents, two submissions (one dealing with his substantive claims, the other dealing with COVID19 concerns), photographs, media articles, and country information.
The interview
The applicant attended an interview with the Department on 10 July 2020. The applicant was assisted by a representative and the interview was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter.
Summary of the delegate’s decision
The delegate accepted the applicant’s claims as to religion, ethnicity, political involvement, and general history. The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant or his family had been targeted personally. The delegate also looked at then-recent country information which suggested that the security situation in Pakistan was improving, and the authorities were regaining control. This information led the delegate to the view that the applicant does not face a real chance or real risk of relevant harm in Pakistan.
Evidence before the Tribunal
The Tribunal has before it the Departmental file and has listened to the recording of the interview with the delegate conducted on 10 July 2020.
Pre-hearing submissions
The applicant provided a pre-hearing submission dated 28 February 2025. This submission attaches:
a.statutory declaration of the applicant dated 28 February 2025;
b.Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Country Information Report Pakistan 2022;
c.United States Department of State Human Rights Report Pakistan 2023;
d.United States Department of State International Religious Freedom Report Pakistan 2023;
e.Amnesty International Report 2024;
f.International Centre for Peace Studies Report on Parachinar dated 14 December 2024; and
g.various news articles.
The applicant’s statutory declaration states that his primary protection claims made in October 2019 remain unchanged and he continues to rely on them. The remainder of the statutory declaration addresses issues raised in the delegate’s decision.
The hearing
The applicant attended the hearing on 7 March 2025 with his representative. He provided evidence and made submissions. These are considered below.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Criteria for protection visa
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
REASONS AND FINDINGS
The issue in this case is the applicant’s fear of harm as a Shi’a, Pashtun, and a Turi from Parachinar in Pakistan, who also has a political profile. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be set aside and remitted for reconsideration.
Identity
The applicant claims to be a Shi’a, a Pashtun, and a Turi from Parachinar in Pakistan. He has provided identity documents in support of these claims. He said that he does not have a right to enter or reside in any other country. The Tribunal has considered the evidence given to the delegate at interview and the country information considered by the delegate. The Tribunal has also assessed the applicant’s credibility at the Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal has no concerns as to the applicant’s identity and accepts that he is a Pakistani national, a Shi’a, a Pashtun, and a Turi from Parachinar. The Tribunal finds that Pakistan is the receiving country and country of reference for the purposes of this application.
CLAIMS
The applicant’s claims are inextricably linked with his personal and geographical identity. Before considering his personal claims, it is convenient to consider the country information relevant to the applicant’s broader identity. In doing so, the Tribunal acknowledges the age of the most recent report of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) (January 2022) and will also consider more recent information as cited below.
Region
The applicant is from Parachinar. Information before the Tribunal indicates that until 2018, a swathe of territory along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border known as the FATA and including the city of Parachinar was governed under colonial-era laws called the Frontier Crime Regulations. These laws deprived residents of some fundamental rights, including freedom of movement and access to justice, and exposed them to collective punishment. The former FATA agencies are now part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province.[1]
Pashtuns
[1] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), ‘DFAT Country Information Report Pakistan’, 25 January 2022, at [2.25].
DFAT provides the following information in relation to Pashtuns:
The Pashtuns are an ethnic group native to Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan. Pashtuns are stereotypically fair-skinned with light-coloured hair and eyes that distinguish them from other Pakistanis, although in reality Pashtuns are physically diverse. Pashtuns may also wear distinctive clothing, such as the red-and-black ‘Pashteen hat’, which has reportedly become a symbol of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM). Pashtun culture emphasises tribal and family relations, as well as customary norms known as Pashtunwali. Pashtuns speak an Eastern Iranian language called Pashto.
There are an estimated 20-25 million Pashtuns in Pakistan, the second largest ethnic group after Punjabis. Pashtuns traditionally live among their own tribes and sub-tribes in KP and the former FATA, though many migrate to urban areas. The largest Pashtun community in the world lives in Karachi. Pashtuns also live in Balochistan, Islamabad, Lahore and elsewhere.
Pashtun-majority areas have historically experienced high levels of tribal, intra-communal and politically motivated violence, a high concentration of military operations, and conflict-related displacement. However, the overall security situation for all Pakistanis, including Pashtuns, has (until recently) been improving in line with increased security across Pakistan.
Across Pakistan, ethnic stereotyping and the association of Pashtuns with the [Pakistan Taliban] (TTP) has led to official discrimination and ethnic profiling. In February 2018, the Punjab government issued a notice asking ‘the population of Punjab to keep an eye out for suspicious individuals who look like Pashtuns or are from the former FATA, and to report any suspicious activity.’ In areas where they are a minority, low-level societal discrimination against Pashtuns is common in the form of slurs and ethnic stereotypes. Pashtuns report frequent blocking of their [Computerised National Identity Cards] (CNICs) when relocating … which impedes access to property and assets. There are credible reports Pashtuns have been targeted for enforced disappearances, especially in conflict-affected regions such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.
DFAT assesses Pashtuns in conflict-affected areas such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan face a moderate risk of violence by state security forces, including enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings. Elsewhere in Pakistan, Pashtuns generally face a low risk of official and/or societal discrimination and a similar risk of violence to other ethnic groups in the same locations, although the risk increases if they come to the attention of authorities for any reason. Pashtuns involved with the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) or the Awami National Party (ANP) face specific, heightened risks, as do Shi’a Pashtuns.[2]
Shi’a
[2] DFAT, at [3.13]-[3.18].
DFAT provides the following information in relation to Shi’a:
Pakistan is home to the world’s second-largest Shi’a population (after Iran). An estimated 20-40 million Shi’a live throughout the country, constituting 10-20 per cent of the population. There are significant Shi’a communities in Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Shi’a are in the majority in the sparsely populated autonomous region of Gilgit-Baltistan but are a minority in Pakistan’s other regions.
Most Pakistani Shi’a (except Hazaras) are not physically or linguistically distinguishable from Sunnis, and national censuses do not distinguish between them. [The National Database and Registration Authority] (NADRA) collects sectarian information during the application process for identity documents, but CNICs do not identify a cardholder’s religion, and passports do not distinguish between Sunni and Shi’a. Some Shi’a may be identifiable by common Shi’a names, such as Naqvi, Zaidi or Jafri. Similarly, ethnic or tribal names can reveal a person’s ethnicity or tribal affiliation: nearly all Hazaras and Turis are Shi’a, as are many Bangash. Ritual self-flagellation during Shi’a religious festivals can leave distinctive, permanent scars, which have been used by militants to identify Shi’a for execution.
Shi’a face rising religious intolerance and official discrimination in the form of blasphemy accusations. Over 70 per cent of blasphemy cases are against Shi’a. Anti-Shi’a sentiment is seen in politics: in July 2020, the Punjab Provincial Assembly passed a law to ‘protect the foundation of Islam’ which would criminalise Shi’a beliefs about the Companions of the Prophet (the Governor returned it for revision).
Sectarian tensions often flare during Muharram, when Shi’a mourn the killing of the Prophet Mohammad’s grandson and his family, a key event in the Sunni-Shi’a schism. In 2020, over 40 Shi’a were charged with blasphemy following Muharram, including clerics accused of insulting the Companions of the Prophet during ritual processions. Thousands of Sunni protesters took to the streets in Karachi and Islamabad chanting anti-Shi’a slogans. There were targeted killings of Shi’a in multiple cities. The Karachi head of the [Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan ] (TLP) openly threatened beheadings for Shi’a ‘blasphemers’. Videos of these incidents circulated on social media. Authorities have attempted to curb sectarian hatred during Muharram, for instance by banning firebrand Sunni and Shi’a clerics from leaving home and by cutting off mobile phone services in major cities during processions.
Shi’a have historically been targeted by sectarian terrorist groups such as the TTP, [Lashkar e Jhangvi] (LeJ) and [Islamic State] IS. These groups have attacked Shi’a individuals, places of worship, shrines and religious schools, as well as Shi’a travelling to Iran or Iraq for religious pilgrimage. The frequency of these attacks has steadily declined since 2013. Terrorist attacks targeting Shi’a killed five and injured 14 in 2020 (not including attacks targeting Shi’a Hazaras, see Hazaras), compared with 32 deaths in 2019 and 471 deaths in 2013. This is a result of the overall improvement in the security situation in Pakistan, as well as increased security provided by the Pakistani police for Shi’a places of worship and processions. Nevertheless, sectarian terrorist groups retain the capacity and intent to carry out attacks against Shi’a anywhere in the country. At least three people were killed and 50 injured in the bombing of a Shi’a procession in Bahawalnagar, Punjab in August 2021.
DFAT assesses Shi’a in Pakistan face a moderate risk of sectarian violence, although the situation has improved considerably in recent years. Seventy per cent of blasphemy accusations, which carry the death penalty, are against Shi’a. They face a moderate risk of societal discrimination in the form of anti-Shi’a protests and community violence. Some Shi’a face specific, heightened risks (see Hazaras, Turis, Bangash).[3]
Turis
[3] DFAT, at [3.55]-[3.61].
DFAT provides the following information in relation to Turis:
The Turis are a Shi’a Pashtun tribe of around 500,000 people. Most Turis live in and around Parachinar and Kurram Agency in the former FATA (now part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Turis are not generally distinguishable from other Pashtuns by appearance, but are identifiable by tribal names, accents, and residence in known Turi areas.
Turis have faced significant violence due to their sectarian affiliation, opposition to the Taliban and other Sunni militant groups, and territorial disputes with other Pashtun tribes. Groups such as the TTP have targeted Turis for their Shi’a faith (see Shi’a). From 2009 to 2014, militants frequently stopped and killed Turis travelling on roads in and around Kurram Agency. A series of terrorist bombings targeting Turis in Parachinar killed 120 people in 2017.
The security situation has improved considerably in recent years, although local experts say the underlying triggers for conflict in Turi areas remain. DFAT is aware of at least two sectarian attacks in Turi areas in 2020: an IED blast in an imambargah (Shi’a place of worship) in the Shorko area of Lower Kurram in May, which killed one person; and a blast at Turi Bazaar in Parachinar in July, which killed one person and injured 14 others.
Security operations in the former FATA between 2014 and 2017 damaged schools, healthcare centres and other infrastructure. While some reconstruction has occurred, local experts say medical, education and other services in the tribal areas remain inadequate. Turis can and do relocate to other parts of Pakistan, but like other groups their ability to do so is heavily dependent on financial means, as well as having personal, family and tribal networks in the new location. Turis relocating to other parts of Pakistan would not be immediately distinguishable from other Pashtuns by non-Pashtun ethnic groups.
DFAT assesses that Turis face a similar risk of official and societal discrimination to other Pashtuns based on ethnicity (see Pashtuns). Turis in Kurram face a moderate risk of sectarian violence from militant groups because of their Shi’a faith. Turis in other parts of the country face a similar risk of violence to other non-Hazara Shi’a (see Shi’a).[4]
[4] DFAT, at [3.62]-[3.66].
Specific Claims

The delegate considered the applicant’s evidence at the interview and relevant country information and accepted the following claims:
a.The applicant has [brothers]. [Some] of them are living in [Country]. One brother is living in Islamabad, working with the [employer 1], and the other brother is at university in Islamabad.
b.The applicant’s parents live in Parachinar with his wife, his child, and his youngest brother.
c.The applicant’s father runs a family [business] in Parachinar.
d.The applicant completed his high school in Parachinar. In 2013, he went to Islamabad to study a Bachelor of [Subject] degree, at the [University].
e.The applicant was employed as [an occupation 1] in Parachinar in May 2019 and as [an occupation 2] at the [Employer 2], KP government department (May 2019 - Aug 2019).
f.The applicant told his friends whilst living at a school dormitory in Islamabad not to tell anyone that he came from Parachinar because this was a time when Turi students were being kidnapped.
g.The applicant’s cousin was killed in June 2008 while driving a truck in a convoy to Parachinar.
h.The applicant joined the Imamia Student Organization (ISO)[5] at the [University] in Islamabad in 2013.
i.The applicant became the [official position] of the ISO in November 2015.
j.The applicant organized a peaceful protest in January 2016 at the [University] in Islamabad against a terrorist attack on 21 January 2016 at a university in KP, during which a lot of students and teachers were killed.
k.The applicant received two phone threats from an unknown caller, following the protest.
l.The applicant was present during two terrorist attacks and bomb explosions in Parachinar in June 2017.
[5] The ISO’s main purpose is to advocate for, and service the religious needs of, Shi’a students in Pakistan.
The Tribunal has listened to the interview with the delegate, considered the information cited by the delegate, and has also considered the applicant’s evidence and engagement at the Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has been a witness of truth in relation to his past and accepts the claims as set out above.
The delegate did not accept that:
a.The applicant has been active in armed opposition to Sunni extremist and militant groups.
b.The applicant has been perceived as pro-US and pro-Iran because of his sectarian identity as Turi Pashtun Shi’a and his political profile.
c.The applicant would continue to face serious harm from the Taliban and other Sunni extremists on return to Pakistan because of his sectarian Turi Pashtun Shi’a profile and because of his political profile as a former [official position] of ISO.
d.The applicant is unable to settle and stay in any part of Pakistan because of his sectarian Turi Pashtun Shi’a profile and because of his political profile as a former [official position] of ISO.
e.The Pakistan government is unable or unwilling to protect him as a Turi Pashtun Shi’a, and a former [official position] of ISO.
The Tribunal notes that the applicant has not claimed to have been active in armed opposition or to have been perceived as pro-US. These claims are made in the pre interview submissions and are put on the basis that this will be imputed from his cumulative profile. The Tribunal finds that the applicant has not been involved in actual armed opposition or been accused of pro-US sympathies. The Tribunal will further consider the imputation aspect.
Recent Country Information
The Tribunal has considered the information cited below and acknowledges that the security situation in Pakistan is complex and dynamic. At the time of the delegate’s decision (2020), all indicators were that Pakistan was entering a period of relative calm after a protracted period of unrest. The DFAT information from 2022 suggests that this early optimism was misplaced, although the violence had not returned to the high levels of the past. The task before the Tribunal, however, is to consider what the real chance or real risk of relevant harm is now, or in the reasonably foreseeable future. While it might be said that the only prediction that can be made is that Pakistan is unpredictable, it is useful to consider more recent information that comes from a variety of sources.
The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS)[6] reported that “with at least 685 fatalities and 444 terror attacks suffered, 2024 turned out to be the deadliest year for Pakistan’s civil and military security forces in a decade. Equally alarming were the cumulative losses of civilians and security personnel, i.e. 1612 fatalities, accounting for over 63% of the total recorded this year. … The overall fatalities recorded this year were a record 9-year high, and over 66% more than 2023. On average, nearly seven lives were lost daily, with November emerging as the deadliest month across all metrics, compared to all other months of the year. The violence took the heaviest toll on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which topped in human losses with 1616 fatalities, followed by Balochistan with 782 fatalities.” Compared to 2023, 2024 saw an over 66% surge in violence, over 55% more injuries, and around 49% more incidents. CRSS also states that the “fatalities recorded this year (exceed) the 2016 level (2432) and highest since 2015 (4366). Moreover, the data collected over the last 10 years shows a sharp downward trend from 2015 to 2020, with fatalities declining each year by around 33% on average. This 6-year long declining and in fact, an encouraging trend in Pakistan’s security landscape, was followed by resurgence in 2021. This is evident from the fact that violence in Pakistan constantly surged by 38% spike in 2021, 15% in 2022, 56% in 2023 and 66% in 2024 (almost 44% yearly surge in violence on average since 2021).”
[6] Center for Research and Security Studies, ‘Annual Security Report 2024’, 2024 MARKS DEADLIEST YEAR FOR PAKISTAN’S SECURITY FORCES, RECORD HIGH FATALITIES IN A DECADE | CRSS
The Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)[7] puts the 2024 increase in attacks at 70%, noting that out of the total 521 attacks in 2024, 335 were carried out by the religiously inspired militant groups —an increase from 208 in 2023. These groups mainly included Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), affiliated local Taliban factions such as Hafiz Gul Bahadur group and Lashkar-e-Islam, as well as Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K). These attacks resulted in 520 deaths and left 633 others injured. PIPS agrees with CRSS that the highest level of attacks is in KP, followed by Blaochistan.
[7] Pak Institute for Peace Studies, ‘Pakistan Security Report 2024 – An Abridged Version’, 1 January 2025, Overview_PIPS-Security-Report-2024.pdf.
The Tribunal has also considered a recent report by an independent analyst about the deteriorating situation in Parachinar.[8] This report notes:
In November 21, 2024, gunmen in Pakistan killed at least 38 Shiite travelers going from the city of Parachinar to Peshawar. The attack occurred in the Ochat area of the Lower Kurram region in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province — a highly volatile area with a history of sectarian clashes. In the aftermath of the killings, attacks broke out in different parts of Kurram region, and mobs of Shiite and Sunni tribes targeted each other’s villages and burnt markets and residential areas. Within a few days, more than 130 people lost their lives and hundreds were injured. This violence forced families to flee to different parts of KP in search of safety.
Weeks later, the situation remains tense. Recently, the two sides organized a sit-in at Parachinar — the headquarters of Kurram district — to register their protest against the violence plaguing their communities. The sit-in continued even after a peace deal was signed, with demands for reopening roads and ensuring safety in public travel. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has labeled the current situation in the region a “humanitarian crisis.”
Conflict dynamics in Kurram involve the interplay of tribal land disputes, sectarian clashes, and the presence of terrorist groups. The fault lines in the Kurram region gave the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — also notorious for its anti-Shia stance — grounds to strengthen its presence by exploiting sectarian and land disputes between Sunni Pashtun tribes and their Shia counterparts. TTP’s activities in the region have intensified the sectarian rift, bringing other Sunni militant organizations, such as the Islamic State, and anti-Sunni militant groups, such as the Zainebiyoun Brigade, to the Kurram region.
[8] Afeera Firdous in South Asian Voices, ‘Why is Parachinar Stuck in an Endless Loop of Violence?’, 10 January 2025, Why is Parachinar Stuck in an Endless Loop of Violence? – South Asian Voices. According to her biography on this site, Afeera Firdous is an independent analyst based in Islamabad. She has done her M.Phil. from Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence University Islamabad. She previously worked as a Research Lead with a digital media channel, Pakistan Now. She also hosted the Pakistan Pivot podcast for Pakistan Now. She is also Non-Resident Research Fellow at Africa-Asia Dialogue (South Africa) and Center for Security Studies Policy and Research (University of Lahore). Her areas of research include counter terrorism and extremism, non-proliferation and disarmament issues, cybersecurity and AI.
In addition to tribal and political violence, KP continues to report religious violence and unrest. The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) reported that on 4 May 2023, seven Shi’a teachers were shot dead at a school in Kurram, in KP Province. Another episode of violence in the same province erupted in October 2023 when a Shi’a man was accused of insulting the wife of Prophet Muhammad. Between 40-70 deaths and 40-200 injuries were reported. At least 25 people were also killed during Sunni-Shi’a sectarian clashes over a land dispute in September 2024. In July 2024, ‘dozens of people on both sides were killed in connection with this conflict.’[9]
[9] European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), ‘Pakistan – Country Focus’, December 2024, at p 114.
The applicant’s pre-hearing submission quotes from a recent report from the International Centre for Peace Studies which notes:
From the data above, it is clear that 2024 has been a year of renewed violence, with bombings, ambushes, and targeted killings continuing to devastate the Shia community. The perpetrators of these attacks often belong to militant groups with a strong anti-Shia ideology, including ISIS-Khorasan and local sectarian outfits like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.[10]
The Pakistani government’s response to the ongoing violence in Parachinar has been widely criticized for being ineffective and inconsistent. While there have been military operations in the region, including airstrikes and ground assaults aimed at clearing out militant hideouts, these measures have often been insufficient in addressing the root causes of sectarian violence. Many local residents argue that the government has failed to provide adequate protection to the Shia community, and that its security forces have often been complicit in sectarian discrimination. One of the most significant failures of the state has been its inability to bring perpetrators to justice. Despite the high-profile nature of many attacks, the prosecution of those responsible has been rare. This impunity has emboldened extremist groups and further marginalized the Shia population.[11]
[10] International Centre for Peace Studies, ‘Understanding Attacks on the Shias in Parachinar’, 14 December 2024,
[11] Ibid.
DFAT also notes that Turis have faced significant violence due to their sectarian affiliation, opposition to the Taliban and other Sunni militant groups, and territorial disputes with other Pashtun tribes. Groups such as the TTP have targeted Turis for their Shi’a faith.[12]
[12] DFAT, at [3.60].
The United States Department of State (USDOS) reported in 2023:
Civil society organizations and media outlets said that armed sectarian groups connected to organizations banned by the government, including TTP and the anti-Shia group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, continued to perpetrate violence and other abuses against religious minorities. Groups designated as terrorist organizations by the United States and other governments, such as ISIS, also committed violent acts. Among the targets of these attacks were Shia Muslims, particularly the predominantly Shia Hazara community, and government security personnel. Data on sectarian attacks varied because no standardized definition existed among reporting organizations of what constituted a sectarian attack. When reporting on attacks that had a suspected sectarian motive, journalists said they often refrained from reporting the victim’s sectarian identity to avoid stoking tensions.[13]
[13]United States Department of State (USDOS), ‘Report on International Religious Freedom: Pakistan’,
On 6 March 2025, suicide bombers attacked a military base in Bannu, in KP, killing 18 people including children. 42 others were wounded. A militant group linked with the Pakistani Taliban has claimed responsibility.[14] A Google Maps search shows that Bannu is about 150 kilometres from Parachinar and sits on one of the main roads into and out of KP.
[14] ABC News, ‘Twin suicide bombing attack kills at least 18 people in Pakistan’, 6 March 2025, Twin suicide bombing attack kills at least 18 people in Pakistan - ABC News.
The Tribunal has considered the above information carefully. All the above recent information paints a consistent picture that militants, Sunni extremists, and other extremist groups remain active in KP and pose a threat to those who, actually or by implication, oppose them. This threat extends to the security forces and the violence that was thought to be abating in 2020 has increased and continues to do so.
The criterion in s 5J(1)(a) contains a subjective requirement, that an applicant must in fact hold a fear of being persecuted, while s 5J(1)(b) imposes an objective standard, that there be a real chance the person would be persecuted. A ‘real chance’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent.[15]
[15] Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379.
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant is a Shi’a, Pashtun, and a Turi. The Tribunal also accepts that he was a member of, and later [official position] of, his university’s branch of the ISO in Islamabad and that he organised protests against the ongoing violence in KP. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant received some personal threats as a result of this. The applicant does not claim that his family has been targeted or that people have been looking for or asking about him in KP. Nevertheless, the Tribunal considers there to be a small, but nonetheless real chance that his return to KP will be noticed and remarked upon. The applicant’s return, religious and ethnic profile, age, and links with the ISO are all elements that when considered cumulatively, are likely to give rise to an adverse imputation or adverse interest from anti-Shi’a and/or pro-Sunni extremists in what is a largely lawless and volatile area. The Tribunal finds that the applicant will have a profile in Parachinar, and KP more broadly, that will make him a more prominent target there than the general population.
Having regard to these circumstances and the country information cited above, the Tribunal finds that the applicant faces a real chance of harm, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, should he return to KP. This harm will be at the hands of extremist groups who target Shi’a and perceived anti-Sunni persons there. This harm will be for the essential and significant reasons of the applicant’s religion and his imputed political opinion as a supporter of Shi’as and Shi’a students. The information before the Tribunal indicates that this harm can take the form of death, violence, kidnapping, and other conduct which may be considered serious harm as contemplated by the Act, and that it would be systematic and discriminatory conduct.
The Tribunal must next consider whether the real chance of serious harm relates to all areas of Pakistan (s 5J(1)(c)). The applicant claims that he will face harm anywhere in Pakistan because of his cumulative profile.
The information before the Tribunal shows that there are an estimated 20 to 40 million Shi’as in Pakistan with significant Shi’a populations in major cities such as Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi. DFAT reports these large urban centres have ethnically and religiously diverse populations and offer some anonymity for people fleeing violence by non-state actors. In recent years the Pakistani government has increased security procedures for Shi’a religious events such as Ashura commemorations. In 2022 and 2023 such events took place peacefully. The country information indicates the risk for Shi’as (absent any other profile) in Islamabad is low.
The applicant has a complex personal profile and the Tribunal notes that his activities with the ISO took place in Islamabad. The information before the Tribunal suggests that extremists are more active in some areas of Pakistan than others, but there have still been attacks and incidents in Islamabad. The Tribunal finds that while the chance of the applicant being identified as, or imputed to be, a Shi’a and/or anti-Sunni and being harmed in Islamabad, or any where else in Pakistan outside KP, is low, it is not so low that it could be classified as remote. The Tribunal finds that the real chance of harm thus extends to all areas of Pakistan.
A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country: s 5J(2). Section 5LA(1) provides that effective protection measures are available if protection against persecution could be provided to the person by either the relevant State, or a party or organisation (including an international organisation) that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of its territory, and that State, party or organisation is willing and able to offer such protection.
A relevant State, party or organisation is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if the person can access the protection, and the protection is durable and, in the case of protection by the relevant State, the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system: s 5LA(2).
The applicant claims that he will be unable to get protection from the authorities. The information cited above in relation to KP indicates that the situation there is not under control and the Tribunal finds that the applicant will be unable to obtain effective protection against persecution in KP. Turning to other areas of Pakistan, DFAT reports that internal migration is widespread and common, but it depends on having both the financial means and family, tribal and/or ethnic networks to establish oneself in a new location. Large urban centres such as Karachi, Islamabad and Lahore have ethnically and religiously diverse populations, and offer some anonymity for people fleeing violence by non-state actors and some groups, such as Pashtuns, occupy enclaves in these cities. DFAT assesses that groups facing official discrimination will face discrimination in all parts of the country.
In April 2024, the United States Department of State reported that (emphasis added):
Pashtuns were targeted and killed by both antistate militants and security forces because of their political affiliation or beliefs, antimilitancy stance, or criticism of the government. PTM leaders and activists claimed they had been threatened, illegally detained, imprisoned without trial, banned from domestic and international travel, and censored. Anti-Taliban Pashtun activists and political leaders were targeted and killed, allegedly by militants, in Sindh, Balochistan, and KP. Pashtuns from the former FATA complained they were frequently profiled as militants, based on their tribe, dress, appearance, or ancestral district of origin. Pashtun activists claimed that they were subject to military censorship and that sedition laws were used to stifle PTM and other Pashtun critics of the government.[16]
[16] USDOS, 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2023 - Pakistan', 22 April 2024, type="1">
This Tribunal has also referred in previous decisions to a media article by a freelance journalist based in Peshawar which suggests that this suspicion and discrimination against Pashtuns is increasing. The author suggests that the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM), a nonviolent organisation that advocates for Pashtun rights, is being met with increasing hostility from the government. The author notes that the increasingly strained relationship between the Pakistani Army and the Afghan Taliban has placed Pakistani Pashtuns in a precarious situation, being viewed by the Army as working for the interests of the Afghan Taliban.[17]
[17] The Citizen, ‘A Tale of Struggle and Resilience for Pashtuns in Pakistan’, 17 February 2024, >
The Tribunal has considered whether the applicant’s brother being [an occupation 1] lessens the chance that the applicant will be profiled or stereotyped. The applicant’s evidence is that his brother lives in police accommodation and the applicant will not be able to live with him. The Tribunal does not consider that the applicant’s relationship to his brother will offer him any particular protection or advantage.
The Tribunal has considered the above information together with the applicant’s particular and personal profile. All of the information considered by the Tribunal indicates that Pashtuns outside their home areas are treated with suspicion by the local population, and have reported facing profiling, harassment, and blocking of official documents. The Tribunal also takes into account the applicant’s personal profile as set out above, including his role with the ISO and his imputed opposition to Sunnis and support for Shi’as. Having regard to all these factors, the Tribunal finds that there is a small, but none the less real chance that the applicant will face significant harassment or ill-treatment outside KP and that this is therefore serious harm as contemplated by the Act. These difficulties result from official discrimination and thus the state will be one of the agents of harm. The Tribunal finds that the applicant cannot obtain effective protection in relation to the real chance of serious harm.
Having regard to all the above, the Tribunal finds that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution should he return to Pakistan, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).
DECISION
The Tribunal sets aside and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
Date(s) of hearing:  7 March 2025
Representative:  Mr Navid K. Baghi
ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
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cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
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5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
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36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
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(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
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