2008784 (Refugee) - [2025] ARTA 961

2008784 (REFUGEE) [2025] ARTA 961 (21 MARCH 2025)
DECISION AND
REASONS FOR DECISION
Respondent: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Tribunal Number: 2008784
Tribunal:General Member B Gogarty
Date:21 March 2025

Place:Melbourne
Decision:The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

Statement made on 21 March 2025 at 10:04am
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – Protection Visa – Malaysia – religion – Christian – Islam – married a Muslim in an interfaith marriage – family’s religion – not satisfied that the applicant was a Christian – lack of other compelling evidence – credibility concerns – decision under review affirmed

LEGISLATION
Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth)
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth), s 99
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 36, 65, 367A, 499
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 22 May 2020 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicant is a national of Malaysia who arrived in Australia on a [date] November 2019 and applied for a protection visa on 10 January 2020 (the application). On 22 May 2020, the delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that the applicant’s claims did not satisfy the criteria for refugee status or complementary protection under the Act (the “primary decision”).
On 25 May 2020, the applicant applied for a review of the primary decision to the Administrative Review Tribunal (AAT). The application was not finalised by 14 October 2024 when the AAT became the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). By virtue of the operation of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth), the application for review to the AAT is taken to be an application to the Tribunal.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 10 January 2025 to give evidence and present arguments. The matter was relisted for a second hearing to address matters arising on the materials before the Tribunal, which was held on 24 January 2025. References to “the hearing” are taken to be a reference to both hearings collectively unless it is necessary to distinguish between them. Both Tribunal hearings were conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Malay and English languages. Quotations in respect of the applicant’s oral statements in this decision are as they were translated into English by the interpreter at each respective hearing.
BACKGROUND
The applicant was born in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, where he lived for [number] years primarily with his parents. He is the second oldest of four siblings. His older brother, and younger brother and sister all live in Sabah. In [2013] the applicant married an Indonesian woman who he said he’d met on holiday in that country in 2012. After marrying in Indonesia, the couple returned to Malaysia where he lived with her for three years. During that time, they had two [children].
The applicant told the Tribunal that, sometime in early 2017 his wife and children moved back to Indonesia to life with his father-in-law and he has only had one opportunity to visit them since, namely in 2019 after which he returned to Malaysia briefly before coming to Australia.
He said he communicates with his family daily by video connection and is their sole financial support. On his evidence they attend a private school – he was uncertain if it was religious or not – and are cared for by their mother, who is a full-time parent and who has not held paid employment since she was married.
The applicant claims to be Christian and provided the Tribunal with copies of a certificate of baptism into the Roman Catholic (Christian) faith, from April 1993. However, he also provided an official marriage record from the Republic of Indonesia Office of Religious Affairs stating that his faith is Islam. At the hearing, he said that his mother and siblings are all Christian. His evidence of his nuclear family varied through his evidence although he admitted they are living in Indonesia and practicing or at least appearing to practice Islam.
The applicant said that he had completed college in Kota Kianabalu, and after starting college, dropped out some time in 2002. In 2003 he was employed at a [workplace] where he worked for 15 years in different roles, before he left to become a [occupation] for around a year before he left Malaysia for Australia.
When asked whether he had any debts in Malaysia the applicant said he did not. When asked if he had any assets in Malaysia, the applicant initially said that he owned vacant land in Kota Kinabalu. Asked what he intended to do with the land the applicant stated that he would like to one day build on the property but to rent it out to someone else. When the applicant was subsequently asked about whether he could sell the land to service recent debts he had accrued, he said that the vacant land is in fact held in his mother’s name.
The applicant said he left Malaysia on [date] November 2019. His evidence varied on why he had decided to depart (see paragraphs 16 and 37). Following his arrival in Australia the applicant worked a range of [roles] in South Australia and Victoria. The applicant said that he is currently unemployed and has accrued a credit card debt which is greater than his cash savings. He said he is using his remaining savings to support his family in Indonesia.
Following his arrival in Australia the applicant applied for a protection visa. The Department did not interview the applicant, and relied on the claims he made in the visa application. The delegate concluded that the applicant’s claims did not meet the threshold for protection under the Act because the applicant would be able to access durable protection from Malaysian authorities.
Claims in original application
Those claims were as follows:
“I left my country because i have been problem with shark leader group that happen because of i not able to pay them money back,i borrow some money from shark leader to support my family and survival after government increase tax due of country week economic in my country
…
If i return to my country they will keep find me and hount me down to get back them money back, otherwise i will get kill by them because of i not able to pay them money back yet plus the interests that increase by day make me suffer to find money topay them money back
…
By experience before they treat to kill me when they come to collect interests from me and they kick me ,punch my face.
…
No protection from them for case shark leader
…
No matter i go,they Will keep find me and hount me down to get back them money back” [mistakes in original]
At the hearing, the applicant said that everything in that original application was ‘incorrect’. The Tribunal has subsequently considered and rejected these claims (see paragraph 63). However, when asked about his personal information the details he gave largely aligned with what he gave in evidence to the Tribunal. The exception to this, as will be discussed are the details of his nuclear family and his religion.
The reasons for the delegate refusing the original application are briefly set out above (paragraph 12) Given the applicant admitted the claims made in the application were untrue it is not necessary to provide further detail of the delegate’s decision.
Pre-hearing form claims
After the applicant’s request for merits review of the delegate’s decision was received, and before it was constituted for hearing, the applicant was provided a pre-hearing form by the Tribunal. In that form the applicant was asked if he wished to provide any more information, evidence, or claims. On 5 September 2024 that form the applicant stated that he had two claims:
First reason:
I left my country primarily due to a dangerous situation involving a loan from a local loan shark group. I borrowed money from them to support my family after the government raised taxes during an economic downturn, which made it difficult for us to make ends meet. Unfortunately, I was unable to repay the loan on time, and the interest accumulated quickly, far beyond what I could afford. The loan sharks began to harass and threaten me, demanding repayment. On several occasions, they came to my home to collect the money, and when I couldn’t pay, they physically assaulted me, including kicking me and punching me in the face. Their threats escalated to the point where they made it clear that if I didn’t pay back the loan, they would kill me. I lived in constant fear of being hunted down, and it became clear that I could no longer stay in my country without risking my life.
Second reason:
I also moved to Australia for protection from religious persecution in Malaysia. My wife, originally from Indonesia, was a Muslim before converting to Christianity after our marriage. When she moved to Malaysia to live with me, we initially had no issues for the first two years. However, in mid-2016, I started receiving phone calls from the [a] Religious Council in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, questioning my Christian faith and demanding that I come to their office. I was reluctant to comply, fearing what might happen, and I chose not to attend the meetings. Despite this, they continued to call me persistently for nearly a year, creating immense stress and fear for my family’s safety. Concerned about the increasing pressure and potential consequences, I decided it was best for my wife and children to move back to Indonesia while I stayed in Malaysia to work and save money. After three years of living apart from them and in constant fear of persecution, I finally managed to save enough money to move to Australia, where I hoped to find safety and freedom from these threats.
At hearing the applicant stated that he had completed this form himself. The form was submitted using the same email address that the original application had been. That email address had also been used for correspondence between the applicant and both the AAT and Tribunal throughout the application and review process.
Criteria for protection visa
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
HEARINGS
First substantive hearing
At the first hearing the Tribunal had before it:
· The departmental and Tribunal file for the applicant, which included, inter alia:
a.The applicant’s original application;
b.The applicant’s pre-hearing information form;
c.A bundle of documents submitted on 3 January 2025, containing a baptism certificate, marriage certificate, wedding photographs, a copy of the identity and biometrics page of the applicant’s passport, a translated police report, and PDF copy of an online article from “The Merdeka Times” from 12 June 2023 entitled “The marriage of Islamic and non-Muslim individuals is not recognised in Malaysia – Minister of Religion”.
· The DFAT Country Information Report Malaysia, issued 24 June 2024 and other country information about illegal debt and interfaith marriages in Malaysia.
At the outset of the (first) hearing, the applicant explained to the Tribunal that his original application for protection, submitted on 10 January 2020, was not completed by him and contained false claims which were not true. The applicant was asked how this happened. He said that on his arrival in Australia, he was put in touch with a “friend of a friend”, who he later stated was not a friend, but someone falsely holding themselves out to be a migration agent that he paid to assist with his visa application. He said that person asked him to provide “my identity card, passport and claims, but I've never provided them”. Asked directly if this meant whether he did nor did not provide the person assisting him with his claims for protection he said “no, because I didn't know the process before, and they were telling me that this is done for the purpose of getting work rights”. The applicant stated that the purported agent proceeded to complete the application by writing their “own things” and without asking him any further questions. He stated that he was not provided with a copy of the application or a way to trace back what was written in it until around 2022 or 2023 – after his application was refused by the Department.
The applicant was then asked about his personal details and background. His answers are summarised above (paragraphs 5-25)
The applicant was asked about his liabilities and debts, and he owed money on an Australian credit card because of being currently unemployed in this country. He stated that he owned land in Malaysia, although after questioning about the nature of ownership he said the land was in his mother’s name. He also said that his wife and children live in a house in Indonesia which is unmortgaged, and in his wife’s name. He and his wife both own cars. The applicant agreed that while he was in debt and currently unemployed the situation was not yet critical and that he had no debts in Malaysia and Indonesia.
The applicant was asked whether he intended to live with his family again given he has not seen them for such a long time. He said that his family would stay in Indonesia, but that he would prefer to stay in Australia given the economy is better here, and “organise for [his family] to come here for holiday twice a year and I'll be visiting Indonesia two to three times a year.”
Asked why he feared returning to Malaysia, the applicant highlighted the late second claim about his interfaith marriage that he had added in his pre-hearing information form. The applicant claimed that:
·He is Christian and had married a Muslim in an interfaith marriage in Indonesia, because in Indonesia “Muslims can marry non-Muslims” and while the country is officially Islamic “they are not as strict as Malaysia”.
·After the two returned to Malaysia the couple registered their marriage with the (Malaysian) National Board of Registration as a non-Islamic couple.
·The Malaysian “Islamic Authority” had “for some reason” discovered his wife was a Muslim, possibly at the border where authorities would have seen her Indonesian Identity card which listed her religion.
·That members of the Islamic Authority had tried to contact him, had subsequently come to his house and wanted to see him but he didn’t open the door .
·While he did not talk to the members of the Islamic Authority, he guessed that they were trying to get him to come to their office and ask him to convert to Islam but he “didn’t want that”.
·After being called and visited by Malaysian authorities he told his wife to go back to Indonesia (with their children) “in case something big would happen”. This was some time in 2017.
·At some point after his family’s departure, the Malaysian religious authorities did manage to talk to the applicant on the telephone and they told him they knew his wife was Muslim and questioned why he had not registered his marriage as an Islamic one. He told authorities his wife was not a Muslim, but they asked him to come to their office, kept calling and came to his house but he ignored them.
·In 2019, a group of people, who he did not know came to his house and threatened to “kill me and hit [him] if [he is] not going to become Islam”. The people didn’t appear to be gangsters but stood outside his door yelling out asking him to go with them to “convert to Islam and have an Islamic wedding”. Other than the threats, they did not harm anyone or damage property.
·He did not call the police while the persons threatening him were at the house as he did not consider the police would be able to attend quickly enough. Initially he said his mother was in the house, but later he said that he was by himself. There were no other witnesses to the incident.
·After the incident he drove to the police station and reported the incident. The police took a statement but did not do any further investigation. A police report was provided in the pre-hearing bundle and dated 3 October 2019.
·After that, the calls continued but no one else visited his property.
·The applicant fled to Australia.
·Malaysian religious authorities continued to call his Malaysian number even after he left Malaysia and came to Australia.
The applicant was asked whether it is common for Malaysian border control to ask for country identity cards at immigration. He agreed that it was not, and they only check passports – which do not list a person’s religion – but “maybe they checked my wife’s” because “that’s the only place indicating she’s Islam”. The applicant was asked whether he had told Malaysian authorities that he was Christian, and his wife was Muslim. He said that they “didn’t let the authority know”. He said that his wife was not practicing Islam while in Sabah and that she had not, as far as he was aware, attended any mosque, participated in any Islamic ceremonies, or been part of any Islamic groups or collectives while living in Malaysia that might have otherwise made it clear to the authorities that she was a Muslim.

The applicant’s written and oral narrative was unclear about whether and when his wife’s religion was Muslim or Christian. Asked if his wife had renounced Islam, he said that she had renounced and became Christian when she came to Malaysia. Asked how that worked, the applicant stated, “she stopped practising it and she would go to the church every weekend together with me.” However, when asked why religious authorities would consider that she was still Muslim the applicant acknowledged she had not been to Shariah court to renounce her faith and convert to Christianity, because “she can’t do that as she’s not a Malaysian citizen” and further that “Malaysia is an Islamic country, so no one is allowed to renounce the religion, or they will be penalised”. Asked if his wife was currently practicing Islam, the applicant said she was, but that “she’s forced to practice it in Indonesia” because her father is still alive.
The applicant acknowledged that his wife is not a Malaysian citizen – he sponsored her to remain in the country while they were both there together – and that Malaysian authorities knew his wife had left Malaysia. However, he could not explain why authorities were still pursuing them after her departure or trying to force him to convert his faith despite her not living in the country with him. He said that, so long as Malaysian authorities have not been provided divorce paperwork, they “deem the relationship as valid” and will continue to demand that he convert to Islam.
The applicant said that he has maintained a Christian faith and continues to regularly attend Christian ceremonies. He said it was important that his children are Christian and that his children’s religion is currently “Christian” although his father-in-law “doesn’t know” this. He also said he was “not sure” if his children were instructed in Islam or Christianity and was not sure if they attended a religious or religiously affiliated school. He also said his wife has told his children to “learn Islam so that my father-in-law isn’t aware that they’re Christians”.
Later in the hearing when asked “do you expect your wife to convert to Christianity so that you can share in [Christian] religious ceremonies together, either at death or in relation to your children?”. The applicant responded:
“Of course, because this is the only religion I believe in, I wish for them to be Christians like myself, but it's hard for them there.
They have to pretend for [his wife’s] dad's sake.
So, if her dad passes away someday, then they could only become Christians.”
It was put to the applicant that country information about Sabah, where he (and his family) lived indicated that it was a relatively tolerant state both in terms of interfaith relations and interfaith marriages. It further put that the applicant’s wife and children left Indonesia in 2017, around two years before he says people visited his home to threaten him. The applicant agreed that Sabah is one of the “most tolerant states for Muslims and Christians” and that “it is quite common in Sabah … to find interfaith marriages”. However, he said that “the government is still the same” and “once the government comes across [interfaith marriages]” they would look for you and ask for you to convert”. He said the authorities “can arrest you and put you to gaol if you don't convert to Islam when your wife is a Muslim”. He said that, because of this, once he was contacted by Malaysian authorities he began to worry “if something like coming to my house would happen because there were many cases in Sabah with mixed marriages”, so he sent his family away from the country to avoid them being harassed.
The applicant was asked why he only raised the claim related to interfaith marriage in his pre-hearing form in 2025 and not in his original application or in his review application. The applicant reiterated that he had only become aware that false claims had been made on his behalf in 2022. He said that around that time he asked a friend who is “good with sorting out visas about how to amend my first claim” and had been told to wait until the first pre-hearing email and do it there. He said that, unlike the first person who had assisted him to fill out his original application this friend was a “genuine friend”.
The Tribunal raised with the applicant that, despite being told he could change his claims in his pre-hearing information form, he had chosen to retain his loan shark claim as his principal claim and, rather than withdraw it, chose to add his interfaith marriage claim. The applicant agreed that, given what he had discussed about his financial situation at the hearing, the first claim in his pre-hearing form was “untrue”. He stated he did not and that he wanted to “remove” and “take away the first one” because he was “not going to use that one anymore”. He said that his “genuine friend” had said he could leave the untrue statements in the form or take them away and he had chosen to leave them there because “I wasn't sure still at that time whether I wanted to keep that claim or cancel it” and that he was trying to “avoid changing too much in case my case would be rejected straight away”. He said “I didn't want to change it in case ART would ask why the changes happened” which he did not want to address until the hearing.
Asked why he feared returning to Malaysia the applicant stated:
“I'm afraid if I return, they would come back. Actually, I don't mind being hit or killed by them, but I just don't want to be converted into Islam. Once I'm some I'm a Muslim, I will be, I mean buried in a cemetery other than my families. My assets would be then taken over by the Islamic authorities, not my family. When I die, I would be buried somewhere not belong to my religion.”
The applicant was asked “do you expect your wife to convert to Christianity so that you can share in those religious ceremonies together, either at death or in relation to your children?” The applicant answered that “I wish for them to be Christians like myself, but it's hard for them there … if her dad passes away someday, then they could only become Christians.”
Issues identified after first substantive hearing.
Following the (first) hearing, the Tribunal reviewed all the oral and documentary evidence provided by the applicant as well as departmental records and country information. That review identified the following information:
·Departmental information. The original application form for a protection visa, containing the loan-shark claim the applicant had withdrawn at hearing, was submitted from the applicant’s current and active email personal address on 10 January 2020. The primary decision of the department summarised those claims – in the Tribunal’s view accurately and sufficiently to identify to the applicant their nature and substance – which was sent to him directly by email on 22 May 2020 to that personal email address. The applicant re-submitted that application back to the AAT as part of his review application directly by email on 25 May 2020 from his personal email address.
·This raised the issue that the applicant may not have been honest about not knowing about the false claims when the application was made, or at least before 2022 as he had claimed at the hearing.
·Police Report. In the bundle of documents submitted pre-hearing, the police report which the applicant says he made immediately after being threatened by persons he said were sent by Malaysian authorities contained an express statement that he did not ‘embrace the religion of Islam after marrying my wife who is from Indonesia and is a Muslim’.
·This raised an issue of a potential inconsistency with his evidence before the Tribunal that he and his wife had avoided telling authorities his wife was Muslim or that he was in an interfaith marriage and denied those things when asked so as to avoid persecution.
·Marriage certificate. The marriage certificate provided in the bundle of pre-hearing documents was issued by the Indonesian Office of Religious Affairs on [date] 2013. It is in the form of an official booklet, which country information indicates is called a ‘Buku Nikah’[1] The applicant’s marriage was listed as a Muslim union and his religion was listed as “Islam”. Review of country information indicated that interfaith marriages between Muslim and non-Muslims are not permitted in Indonesia, and that the Office of Religious Affairs officiates Islamic marriages after being provided proof that each party are Muslim or has converted to Islam.[2]
·This raised issues with the applicant’s claims that he was Christian, in an interfaith marriage, and unwilling to convert to Islam or to tell authorities he and his wife are of the same faith.
[1] Australian Embassy Indonesia “Marriage in Indonesia” (last accessed 17 February 2025)
[2] Australian Embassay Indonesia, Ibid; Eva F Nisa “The Bureaucratization of Muslim Marriage In Indonesia.” (2018) 33(2) Journal of Law and Religion 298. DOI: 10.1017/jlr.2018.28; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade DFAT Country Information Report, Indonesia (24 July 2023), [3.22]; Law Library of Congress “Indonesia: Inter-Religious Marriage – July 2010” (2010, Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center), 4 (last accessed 17 February 2025); A.Sultan Sulfian “The Urgency Of Marriage Registration In The Perspective Of Indonesian Marriage Law And Islamic Law."(2023) 6:1 Jurnal Al-Dustur, 79 DOI: 10.30863/aldustur.v6i1.4224
The information identified by the Tribunal after the hearing, and the potential issues arising from it, were set out in a letter to the applicant and sent to him on 16 January 2025. The applicant was invited to comment on the information and issues and nominated to do this by further hearing which was scheduled for 24 January 2025.
On 22 January 2025, the applicant submitted a second bundle of documents which contained:
a)    A PDF copy of a document dated 23 December 2013 from the Malaysian Marriage Register setting out details of the registration of the applicant’s Indonesian marriage under the Marriage and Divorce Law Reform Act 1976 (Malaysia). The proof of marriage is listed to an Indonesian document number and the applicant’s wife was identified by reference to her passport. No religions are listed on this document. The document has an image of an official signature and seal on it.
b)    An undated and unlabelled document in Microsoft Word format, which appears to be an interpretation of the PDF document in a) above into the English language. The document contains no signatures or official seals.
c)    A PDF copy of an Indonesian marriage certificate from [2013], with the same registration number as listed in the Malaysian Marriage Register certificate in a) above. The document does not list the religions of the parties but does state that the marriage was “conducted in acceptance with a Christian clergyman”. The document has an image of an official signature and seal on it.
d)    An undated and unlabelled document in Microsoft Word format, which appears to be an interpretation of the document in c) above into the English language. The document contains no signatures or official seals.
Further hearing
At the further hearing held on 24 January 2025, the Tribunal had before it:
·All the materials that were before it at the first substantive hearing (listed at paragraph ‎24);
·The letter notifying the applicant of the information identified and issues raised by the Tribunal sent to him on 16 January 2025 (summarised at paragraph 40 ‎40. );
·Additional country information about marriage law and procedure in Indonesia (set out in footnote 2 and otherwise footnoted in respect of the extracts below);
·The applicant’s bundle of materials submitted on 22 January 2025 (listed at paragraph ‎42)
Extracts of relevant country information before the Tribunal at the further hearing
The country information before the Tribunal included the below extracts which had led to the Tribunal inviting the applicant to a further hearing. They include an overview of “Marriage in Indonesia” from the Australian Embassy in Indonesia which stated, inter alia:
Couples must be of the same religion
Under Indonesian Law No.1 of 1974 concerning marriage (the ‘Marriage Law’), both parties must hold the same religion, if not, one party must convert to the other religion. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the process of converting to Islam is not a lengthy one.
…
Islamic Weddings
Muslim weddings are performed by the Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama) and they will issue the Marriage Books (Buku Nikah) as evidence of the marriage. There is usually no requirement for people to register such a marriage with the Civil Registry Office (Kantor Catatan Sipil). However, it is recommended that you arrange for a Marriage Certificate from the Civil Registry Office if you intend to relocate to another country.
Other Weddings
For non-Muslim marriages (Christian, Hindu, etc), couples have to lodge a Notice of Intention to Marry with the Civil Registry Office at least 10 days prior to the wedding. After the ceremony the marriage must be registered at the Civil Registry Office to be legal.
The country information also included a legal professional article written by an Indonesian Immigration Lawyer and published in 2024 that set out requirements and for interfaith marriage, which explained, inter alia:[3]
“Indonesian law requires that "Husband and wife must have the same religion, if not, one of the partners must make a written statement changing religion/changing religions."
… The registration of Muslim marriage is conducted at the Office of Religious Affair/Kantor Urusan Agama (KUA), and for other religions, the registration is conducted at the local civil registry office.
…
If the marriage is conducted at KUA, then the spouse needs to include a certificate of conversion to Islam, if the spouse were previously non-Muslim.”
[3] Tiffany Efny Tampubolon, “International Marriage in Indonesia, What You Need to Know?” (21 March 2024) Mondaq (last access 17 February 2025). Emphasis in original.
Extracts of relevant country information on Malaysia before the Tribunal included the following summary of laws relating to marriage registration and interfaith marriages DFAT:
Pursuant to s.104 of the [Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA)], a civil marriage contracted outside Malaysia is recognised as valid if all the following apply:
• It is contracted in a form required or permitted by the law of the country where it is contracted.
• Each of the parties had, at the time of the marriage, capacity to marry under the law of the country of his or her domicile.
• Where either of the parties is a citizen of or is domiciled in Malaysia, both parties had capacity to marry according to the LRA.
The couple need to re-register their marriage pursuant to s.31 of the LRA either at the nearest National Registration Department (NRD) office or at a Malaysian consulate. The reregistration of marriage must be made within six months after the date of marriage or within six months of arrival in Malaysia (before the expiry of 6 months and the couple return to Malaysia). A fine will be imposed for late registration.
A Muslim Malaysian couple who have had their marriage solemnised abroad in accordance with Islamic principles must register their marriage in the Syariah court for their marriage to be validly recognised. … If the couple fail to register their marriage but the solemnisation of their marriage is performed in accordance with the Islamic principles, they may still be considered as being married from the Islamic point of view. They however may be penalised for not registering their marriage and will be precluded from availing themselves of the rights and remedies under the respective state sharia enactments.
Inter-Faith and Inter-Ethnic Marriages
Sources indicate that inter-faith and inter-ethnic marriages have been on the rise in Malaysia. … However, some segments of society still resist such unions with some couples claiming they have faced general social disapproval, including from family and friends and from the community such as negative remarks, staring and ‘dirty looks’ and concerns from family members about compatibility and the potential to have to convert to Islam for those marrying a Malay. One recent academic article noted that the biggest obstacle faced by the inter-cultural community is societal negative attitudes. A local media article also noted that, more often than not, it is the children of such couples who face the brunt of social bigotry.
…
Muslim/Non-Muslim Marriages
An inter-faith marriage between a Non-Muslim and a Muslim is not permitted either under the civil law or the Syariah law. … A marriage between a Muslim and non-Muslim abroad would not be able to be registered with the Malaysian authorities. …A non-Muslim wishing to marry a Muslim must convert to Islam for the Syariah court to officially recognise the marriage. The state of Sabah, which is very ethnically diverse, reportedly has a high number of mixed marriages and consequently a high number of Muslim converts.
… DFAT assessed that Muslims who marry a non-Muslim face a high risk of official discrimination under Malaysian law in the form of refusal of official permission to convert. It also noted that Muslims wishing to marry non-Muslims may move to large urban centres to avoid attention. Little information could be found about the practical consequences of such unions in Malaysia. … As [interfaith] couples cannot legalise their marriage, the government considers children born of these unions illegitimate ….
In respect of the enforcement of religious laws (including Sharia laws relating to marriage) the following (extracted) material from the DFAT country report on Malaysia was before the Tribunal: [4]
“Islamic laws are typically enforced by [People’s Volunteer Corps] or police, as Islamic authorities tend to lack manpower.
[4] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade DFAT Country Information Report, Malaysia (24 June 2024), [3.57].
Country information specific to Sabah included the following assessment of religious tolerance in that jurisdiction made in 2014:[5]
“It is a common phenomenon for the members in a family in Sabah to embrace more than one religion. For instance, although the parents have no religions (pagans), the children are allowed to choose any denominations if they are Christians, or they can choose to embrace Islam through various factors (Suraya Sintang 2003). Despite embracing different religions, the relation between family members and neighbours is good and close (Mat Zin Mat Kib 2003).”
Responses given at further hearing
[5] Suraya Sintang "Peaceful Co-Existence in Religious Diversity in Sabah" (2014) 14:1 Global Journal of Human-Social Science,4.
At the further hearing, the applicant was asked if he had read the letter setting out the additional information and issues arising from it (set out above, paragraph 40) that had been identified by the Tribunal. He said that he had. The information and issues were each put to the applicant to provide him an opportunity to respond. The applicant’s replies are set out below.
Interfaith marriage
In relation to the documentary evidence indicating the applicant was married in a Muslim ceremony and had declared his religion to be Islam, the applicant stated at separate times:
“So when I when I was about to get married, maybe with my wife, my father in law asked me what was my religion. And then my wife said to me just mention Muslim because if I say that I am not. Muslim or I'm Christian then my father-in-law would not allowed us to get married.
…
So before I got married in Islamic way I have already got married in Christian way. So the Islamic marriage was only to trick my in-laws that I got married in Muslim way. So the Malaysian marriage certificate is not the Islamic one and I don’t want to go back to Malysia … because I don’t want to convert to Islam.”

It was reiterated to the applicant that this and other evidence suggested that he might have converted to Islam or, at least not held the level of conviction in Christianity that made him unwilling to tell authorities he was Muslim as his previous narrative suggested. The applicant stated:[6]
“So this is what I want to explain to you Member, honestly. So, before we got married, my wife fell pregnant and then I asked her a requested her to abort the baby. However, she didn't want to and she is Islam. That's why I [had to] marry her that way. So, I can [be] responsible for the baby.
…
I want to tell you this reason because I want to clarify to you the reason why my marriage is like this. The first reason is because my wife fell pregnant and then the second one is my father-in-law didn't allow my wife to get married to somebody who is not Islam.”
[6] Initial interpretation referred to “forcing” the applicant’s wife to marry her. This was later corrected to “I had to marry her this way”.
It was confirmed with the applicant that the later of the two certificates issued in Indonesia was the Muslim marriage certificate which was issued three days after the non-Muslim certificate. The applicant was asked about the practical procedure relating to the registration of his Muslim marriage and he stated:
“So actually, this is what we planned. We planned to get married on [date] 2013 and my wife said that she wanted to convert from Muslim to Christian. However, on our way to do our religious marriage course preparation my wife said we just do the Christian one first and then the Muslim one. So, I just followed what was said with my wife.”
The applicant was asked directly whether he had to provide any proof that he was Muslim to be registered as being in an Islamic marriage. He said that he was asked for his identification documents only and he just told a person he was Muslim and that was sufficient to obtain the certificate.
Police Report
In relation to the statement in the police report which revealed particulars of the applicant’s relationship which was apparently inconsistent with his oral evidence in the first hearing that he would not disclose to police, the applicant said:
“Ok, yes, in my police report that I stated that I had an interfaith marriage but actually my wife has already converted to Christian from Islam. But the Malaysian government found out that she is still Islam by looking at her ID card. That’s the reason I have two marriage certificates, one is in Christian and one is in Islam, because when I return to Malaysia I don’t want to be forced to convert to Islam.”
It was explained that telling the Malaysian authorities this appeared to contradict his various oral evidence that he risked arrest if those authorities became aware he was in an interfaith marriage, and by consequence, that he had denied to authorities he was in an interfaith marriage. It was also explained that the late submission of the document with such an inconsistent statement could be taken to suggest it was manufactured to support his late claim.
The applicant stated that he had never denied being in a mixed marriage to Malaysian authorities but when the record was put back to him, he agreed he had done this. He said that:
“The reason of this conflicting situation is because even though I report to the police the police would not process anything regarding my interfaith marriage or regarding my belief. Otherwise, the police would conduct any action further if it has been instructed by the religious leader. The reason I make the report to the police is because I got a threat by the religious leader people to ask me or to force to convert to Muslim … that’s why after I made the police report I made some money and I escaped to Australia because I had a fear because I fear if the religious leader know about my police report they will arrest me and put me in gaol. … I had to mention that because I know the motive … of the person who came to my house.”
Correspondence Records
In relation to the official correspondence records between the applicant and the department, which indicated that the applicant sent and received information relating to his original claims in 2020, the applicant stated:
“In 2020 after my visa was cancelled, I didn’t receive any information from the department, but I got the information from my [online immigration account] application that’s how I got the information … so after my visa was refused, I applied for appeal and my friend assisted me, but I didn’t know what was written in the application. Before 2022 I did not know what was the reason that everything happened, but after 2022 after I made a new account and all the content of my old email [with the department] went through there.”
The Tribunal read through the communication record between a person with the applicant’s email address and the department in 2020, material being submitted after the delegate’s decision, despite being about a matter that occurred prior to that decision, the applicant reiterated he had not discovered the claims made on his behalf until he created a new immigration account and that his friend had told him he could change his claim in his pre-hearing form. The applicant was asked to directly address the communications to and from his private email address in 2020:
“After my visa application was refused by the department in May 2020 my friend assisted me to lodge for an appeal because my friend informed that he knows how to lodge an appeal … actually, I know the reason, but I didn’t know that I could update the reason or withdraw the reason.
… in May 2020 my friend assisted me to write a reply for an appeal … so my friend didn’t let me know I can update the claim, but my friend only suggested … that I reply as … suggested … so your visa can be extended.
… so in 2022 when I created my immigration account then I know the whole claim that was proposed to the department and … that is the first time I knew about my first claim which was untrue then I went to Melbourne I asked my friend and my friend sad ‘do not take action on that’ until you get the pre-hearing email and then you can tell what is the true claim … [this] was in 2024.”
The applicant was asked how a friend helped him in 2020. He said that he showed the friend the decision on his phone at the time. The applicant acknowledged that he received the department decision by email – which the Tribunal noted to him was attached as a PDF to the email – in 2020 but that he did not “understand the detail about it”. That is, he understood that his visa was refused but not the reasons for that refusal as he could not “see the reasons written in that decision”. Asked what this meant the applicant said:
“I received the email regarding the decision and there is a high possibility the Department sent me the email with the attachment but maybe I didn’t open the attachment.”
It was pointed out that the email, which was sent to his private email address in 2020, had no content other than a sentence asking the applicant to see the attached information (that is the attached Decision record) and so to know that had visa application had been refused the applicant must have read the decision record. The Tribunal stepped through what the decision record stated and pointed out that, in reading the document, he must have read that the only claims made on his behalf were loan shark claims. The applicant said that he understood the issue arising from this information and stated:
“After I received the email I went to my friend’s house and showed my friend the email. Even though it mentioned about loan shark but there wasn’t any detail about it … but I didn’t know how to update it … but my friend just replied to the email”
The applicant then reiterated what he had been informed about waiting until the pre-hearing form to update his claims.
The applicant was asked if he had any other things to add and he stated he did not have anything else to say.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s separate admissions at hearing that his claim to be indebted to and at risk from loan-sharks in Malaysia in his original application for protection and his pre-hearing from to the review application are entirely untrue. The Tribunal finds that those claims to be untrue and that the events alleged in relation to them did not happen and makes no further findings of fact in relation to them.
Findings as to late interfaith marriage claim
In relation to the applicant’s second claim relating to his marriage, the Tribunal first considers the applicant’s reason that he made that claim, and presented evidence in support of it after the primary decision was made. The Tribunal is required to make an adverse inference if it is not satisfied that the applicant has a reasonable explanation for the late claim and evidence pursuant to s 367A of the Act. Considering why the applicant made late claims that it may have expected would be in the original application is also a question relevant to the Tribunal’s power and duty to assess the evidence.[7]For the reasons set out below, that the applicant does not have a reasonable explanation for making late interfaith marriage claims because the Tribunal does not accept his explanation as being reliable or credible.[8]
[7] EQU19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1182.
[8] See EGF20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs, in which Egan J accepted the Tribunal’s finding that an explanation provided by a party as to a bogus document was not credible supported a correlative finding there was no “reasonable explanation” for the bogus document under s. 91WA of the Act. [2022] FedCFamC2G 20, [47]-[48] (Egan J).
As set out, the explanation directly provided by the applicant at the first hearing was that another person had written his original application and that he had neither contributed to that application – other than providing some very minimal personal details – and that person had not given him access to the application before or after it was submitted, such that he did not discover false claims were made on his behalf in 2022. What is, in the Tribunal’s view, telling, is that the applicant never stated in his evidence that, on his arrival to Australia he had asked the person assisting him to make his interfaith marriage claims for him, and they had failed to do so. Rather, he stated that he had paid a person to assist him to obtain working rights, that person had asked him for his claims, and that he hadn’t provided them with any. Of itself this admission raises doubts about whether the interfaith claim was something that the applicant desired, or intended, to raise in 2020, or whether it was a secondary claim developed after the delegate dismissed his principal claim.
The Tribunal also considers that the applicant’s retention of the loan-shark claim in his pre-hearing form indicates that he was not as interested in correcting the record as positioning for different outcomes after the primary decision rejected his first claim. The Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s answer(s) as to why he retained the loan shark claim as his principal claim, most notably that he did not want to change anything until the hearing in case his matter was “rejected straight away”. That seemingly conflicted with another answer – which the applicant gave the Tribunal in different forms at different times in the hearing –that his friend had told him he should wait until the pre-hearing form to tell the Tribunal the ‘true claim’. The applicant did not use that form to clarify the record and give his ‘true claim’; rather, he rewrote his primary claim in a clearer, better expressed and more developed narrative, and then added an additional interfaith marriage claim. There was nothing in the form which suggested the applicant must, or directed him to, include his first claim. That decision was his, and by his evidence, he completed the application and put both claims before the Tribunal, because he was not, in his words, “sure still at that time whether I wanted to keep that claim or cancel it”. The Tribunal considers that statement revealing of the true intentions in respect of the pre-hearing form. Specifically, the Tribunal finds that the reason the applicant added the late claim about interfaith marriage was to present and preserve an alternative claim to the one rejected by the delegate, not to correct the record.
Most critically the Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s account about when he discovered the false claims were made on his behalf and, relatedly, when he became directly involved in the application process. The applicant’s evidence in this respect was inconsistent and appeared to shift only in response to contradictory evidence contradicting his version of events. Initially, he sought to put as much temporal distance as possible (2-3 years) between the preparation of the original application and his taking carriage of the matter, claiming he was unaware of the claims made on his behalf until 2022. Only after persistent questioning by the Tribunal and stepping through the documentary record of his communications with the Department did the applicant admit that he was in receipt of a copy of the delegate’s decision in 2020. Even then, he denied having read that decision himself until the documentary record established that he must have. At that point, he admitted that he was aware of the loan shark claims in 2020 (not 2022 as he had originally claimed), but that he did not know what to do about them until, depending on his different respective answers, either 2022 or 2024. The inconsistencies in his account, and the reactive way his evidence changed when inconsistencies were raised (but only after some time and when it was clear that the facts he asserted happened could not have) undermines the credibility and reliability of his explanation of how his claims were made and when he became aware of and directly involved in the proceeding. The Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s narrative about being unaware of the claims being made on his behalf and finds the events he says happened as part of that process did not happen.
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant may have had (paid and/or unpaid) assistance preparing his case. However, it is not satisfied on the evidence before it that assistance was provided at a distance, without his direction, nor without his knowledge or approval. That finding extends to the preparation of the original application, which was submitted from a user with his personal email address. The Department and Tribunal records indicate that the communications to and from the applicant were made through that email address to the Department, AAT and Tribunal throughout the course of his original and review application, The applicant also used that email address to submit his pre-hearing information form, which he acknowledged he had completed himself. The original application stated that the applicant did not have an authorised recipient for communication – that is communications about the application were to be sent to and from him directly – and that he did not receive any assistance in completing the form. The applicant also stated in his original application that he could read, speak, and write English. That along with the English language claims expressed in that form and all his other communications with the Department, AAT and Tribunal indicate that the applicant was able to read and comprehend English. The Tribunal is satisfied the applicant had the skills to write or at the very least understand what was written in the original application on his behalf. The Tribunal therefore finds the applicant was involved in the preparation and submission of his original application and was aware of the claims made in it.
Having not accepted the applicant’s assertion he was unaware of the claims in his original application and having found he added additional claims later for different reasons, the Tribunal finds there is no explanation, much less a reasonable one, as to why applicant failed to put his interfaith marriage claim before the delegate. Given the various materials provided by the applicant to the Tribunal in the pre-hearing bundles before the first and second hearing were submitted to advance his interfaith marriage claim, the Tribunal similarly finds the applicant does not have a reasonable explanation for presenting that evidence after the delegate’s decision was made. By virtue of the operation of s367A the Tribunal is required to draw an inference unfavourable to the credibility of the applicant’s interfaith marriage claim, and the evidence presented to advance it. More broadly, the Tribunal, for the reasons above, treats the entirety of the claim and the evidence presented to support it with caution and gives those things little weight.
Findings of fact
Noting that 367A does not mandate that the tribunal discount the applicant’s late claim or evidence altogether the Tribunal considers these things, but also notes that pursuant to s 5AAA of the Act it is the responsibility for the applicant to specify all particulars of his claim for protection. For the reasons below finds that the claim is not made out.
Findings relating the applicant’s family
Despite the applicant stating in his original application that he was unmarried and had no children at the time, the Tribunal accepts the following evidence from the applicant:
·     The documents the applicant has provided as proof that he was married in 2013 in Indonesia.
·     Having so accepted those documents, that:
a.The applicant participated in a Christian wedding ceremony which was registered at a Civil Registry Office on [date] 2013 in Indonesia
b.The applicant was married in a Muslim ceremony and declared his faith to be Islam to the Indonesian Office of Religious Affairs on [date] 2013.
·     The documents provided by the applicant as proof he and his wife registered an overseas civil marriage in Malaysia in [2013] pursuant to the Marriage and Divorce Law Reform Act 1976 and makes no findings as to the authenticity of the document.
·     By consequence of the above finding, that that the applicant’s wife lived with him in Malaysia from at least that time until a later date, which may have been in 2017.
·     That the applicant has two children who live with their mother in Indonesia.
Based on the country information the Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s assertion that Indonesia permits interfaith marriages.
Findings as to nuclear family’s religion
The Tribunal had some difficulty with the applicant’s evidence as to his family’s religion and did not consider his answers to be consistent, or credible. The applicant’s response to the inconsistencies raised by his police report (see paragraph 54), was an example of the internally and externally inconsistent answers he provided. In that answer, the applicant appeared to have stated his wife had converted to Christianity, but was still Muslim, and had been potentially in an interfaith marriage, or married as a Christian and a Muslim. Similarly, the applicant at various times claimed his wife had converted to Christianity after their marriage and directly stated his children are Christian, but at another time said he “wished” the family “could … become Christian” (see paragraph 39 ‎39. ), indicating that they are not yet Christians. The applicant also initially told the Tribunal he was in an interfaith marriage as that was permitted in Indonesia, and only after post-hearing analysis of the documentary evidence against country information revealed this could not be the case, produced a second document indicating he and his wife were married in two separate same-faith ceremonies, which he had not voluntarily disclosed at the first hearing or in any of his pre-hearing materials.

In the Tribunal’s view selectivity, contradictions and inconsistencies were common across the applicant’s evidence as to his family’s religion. Given that is the case, and given the discordant evidence was made late, to support a late claim, for which the Tribunal is not satisfied there is a reasonable explanation, the Tribunal has given limited weight to the applicant’s evidence about his family’s religion. However, as his family’s religious status is a key integer to his late claim for protection related to his marriage, and s367A does not mandate that claim be treated as entirely void, the Tribunal has needed to look to the evidence provided to determine what his and his family’s religious status is. Given the concerns about the applicant’s reliability on this point, the Tribunal does so selectively.
The Tribunal considers the applicant’s wife to have always been Muslim and not to have converted to Christianity for the following reasons.
In respect of the applicant’s wife’s religion in Indonesia before she came to Malaysia, the Tribunal interprets the applicant’s pre-hearing form statement that his wife converted to Christianity “after our marriage” and his later oral answer to the direct question of when she converted that she “renounced [Islam]… not in Indonesia, in Malaysia”, to constitute an admission that she was Muslim prior to coming to Malaysia. The Tribunal considers the documentary materials about the ceremonies in Indonesia to support that admission, namely the civil ceremony was a Christian one, but does not record an official statement as to the parties’ religion whereas the Muslim one does (documenting the applicant and his wife as Muslim).
In respect of the applicant’s wife’s religion when she lived in Malaysia, the applicant initially stated that “when she went to Malaysia, she has actually renounced [Islam]”. However, when asked about the practicalities of conversion he only stated that she had attended Christian ceremonies with him. Given the applicant’s reliability on this point and the limited weight given to his submissions, the Tribunal has doubts that this happened regularly, if at all. However, it does not consider it must make a firm finding on this point given the other evidence. While the applicant’s admission that his wife’s pregnancy was the reason for the marriage was made very late in the proceeding, the Tribunal considers the circumstances to indicate that it was important for his wife not to terminate her pregnancy and to have a Muslim wedding because her religion is Islam (as he acknowledged), not simply because it was her father’s wishes. That is, the facts suggest that her religion was part of her core identity which did not change after she went to Malaysia. While the applicant said his wife went to church with him, he did not say that his wife had participated in open or secret ceremonial acts relevant to the adoption of the religion worshipped there, which might objectively indicate that she had renounced one religion and adopted another;[9] for instance, baptism which was the documentary evidence he relied upon as proof as his own Christianity. Nor did he provide any evidence she took formal measures to did so when she returned to Indonesia, either in terms of renouncing Islam or adopting Christianity, which she was, and remains able to do as a matter of law. Rather the Tribunal considers the more plausible explanation for his wife’s visits to church with him to be that she was relatively young, newly married mother, living in a foreign country with no other family support who would have attended Church for familial and social reasons. The Tribunal is not satisfied on the evidence before it that the applicant’s wife converted to Christianity, formally or informally while she was in Malaysia.
[9] Here the Tribunal considers that the meaning of convert for adopted by Kunc to be reflective of a general legal meaning of the word in Australia CarolynMargaret Hickin v Robyn Patricia Carroll & Ors (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 1059, [101] (Kunc J).
As set out above, despite the applicant at some stages stating that his family was Christian, he later stated that his wife presently is Muslim and practices Islam, and it was his wish that his nuclear family could become Christian. The Tribunal takes this to be an admission that his family are not presently Christian. The Tribunal notes the significant time his family have lived in Indonesia – for most of his children’s lives, and for his wife much longer than she lived in Malaysia – actively practicing Islam. The Tribunal also notes that, even if he should be granted a visa, he said he expected his family would continue to live in Indonesia. The applicant also denied having family at all in his original application, which when considered against other reliability problems affecting the broader claim, indicates that his family may be much more independent from him than he suggested at the hearing. Given all these things, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant’s family are simply waiting for his father-in-law to pass away to convert. Rather, their conduct and surrounding circumstances indicate that they are Muslims living in the world’s largest majority Muslim country,[10] who will remain living in that country practicing Islam for the reasonably foreseeable future. The Tribunal is not satisfied that any of the applicant’s nuclear family are Christian, have converted to Christianity, or are genuinely intending to convert to Christianity.
Findings as to applicant’s religion
[10] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade DFAT Country Information Report Indonesia, (July 2023), [3.18].
The Tribunal had some difficulty with the applicant’s evidence about his own religion, for similar reasons to the evidence about his family’s. While he stated in his original application that he was Christian, he made no mention of being in an interfaith marriage, or indeed any marriage – he claimed to have no wife or family – and his claims at that time were entirely unrelated to his religious status. The Tribunal has considered and dealt with that above, concluding there is no reasonable explanation for making the late claim as to his interfaith marriage. The adverse inference and generally limited weight given to the broader claim might have been balanced by the fact that the applicant had placed evidence before the delegate that he was Christian, and the Tribunal’s subsequent satisfaction that his wife was, at all relevant times, a Muslim. However, the applicant subsequently presented the Tribunal with a document in support of the interfaith claim which, after closer scrutiny (rather than voluntary admission by the applicant), revealed him to have declared himself to be Muslim. Up until that point, the applicant had claimed that he and his wife had been married in an interfaith marriage because that was permitted in Indonesia. Country information also revealed that to be untrue. It was only after the irregularities and inconsistencies were put to the applicant post-hearing that he produced a further (albeit earlier) record of civil marriage before a Christian clergyman. The selective use of evidence, inconsistencies within it, and other concerns discussed below, raise doubts for the Tribunal about the reliability of the applicant’s evidence about his own religion, including whether he genuinely holds a religion at all.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that the earlier certificate is a legitimate legal record of marriage. By the applicant’s own admission his wife was a Muslim at the time, he says he was a Christian and the ceremony was officiated by a Christian Minister. Such a union is, according to the country information, prohibited by law Indonesia (see paragraph 44). That might also be true of the second record of marriage, so long as the applicant remained genuinely and openly Christian at that time. However, there are important differences between the documents which indicate that was not the case.
The initial marriage document the applicant submitted to the Tribunal was is a religious record (Buku Nikah) containing statements of faith, recording that each respective party is Muslim, carrying official legal weight, by a state entity responsible for Islamic unions. That body both conducts the religious ceremony and registers the marriage. The later civil record he submitted on the other hand is literally that, a (likely legally void) civil registration of a ceremony conducted elsewhere, which Indonesian authorities appear, on the country information, not to interrogate beyond the certificate provided to them. The Tribunal is not satisfied the Indonesian authorities would have directly sought evidence about the applicant’s religion for his first, civil marriage. For the reasons below the Tribunal considers the Indonesian authorities would have sought evidence as to his religion for his second, Muslim marriage.
The temporal order each respective marriage record, along with his baptism certificate suggest that applicant was a Christian, but that he converted to Islam so that he could, as he put it be “responsible for the baby” he had conceived with a Muslim woman. When the possibility of his conversion was put to him, he denied it and stated he remained Christian despite the Muslim ceremony. After extended questioning by the Tribunal about how this could have happened, the applicant represented a very informal process in which he merely “mentioned” he was Muslim to an official and a week later he was married. Given the generally unreliable nature of the applicant’s evidence about his marriage and the minimal weight afforded to it, the Tribunal does not accept this answer as plausible, particularly given the country information that, having once been Christian, the applicant was required to provide a certificate of conversion to Islam.
For the Indonesian authorities to require a certificate of conversion to marry a person who was a non-Muslim, it follows that they must ask all persons seeking to be married for proof of their religion and possibly religious history to determine whether such a certificate is necessary. The Tribunal concludes that the applicant must have been asked for and provided evidence (genuine or not) to Indonesian authorities that he was Muslim or had converted to Islam. Whether the applicant genuinely converted or not is not clear because the applicant would not admit he had provided proof other than the bare mention that he was a Muslim to an authority.
The applicant insisted in the hearings (but not original application) that he was married. He provided, amongst other things, photographic evidence of his wedding and wife. He initially treated his Buka Nikah as evidence of his marriage it may be assumed that he considers that document to be validly made and a legal record of the union and concomitant family responsibility that attaches to it. For that to be the case, and because the earlier certificate could not, even on his evidence, be legal, it may be implied that the applicant considers the latter marriage certificate to be a legal record of marriage. That may also imply that he provided genuine certification of Islamic conversion to Indonesian authorities, such that the record is one of a same-faith union as required by Indonesian law. However, the Tribunal can go no further than implication given the limited reliable evidence and makes no finding as to whether the applicant provided genuine or false evidence about being Muslim to Indonesian authorities. However, based on the findings of fact in relation to his marriage, why it occurred (the conception of his child to a Muslim mother) and that his family is and remains Muslim, the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant was a Christian at the time of his marriage. In the Tribunal’s view, the applicant either converted to Islam or did not hold a religious faith and was willing to tell authorities that he is whatever religion that is necessary for official purposes and provide evidence (legitimate or otherwise) to that effect.
The Tribunal does not consider there is reliable evidence to indicate the applicant changed his religion when he returned to Malaysia. In particular, the Tribunal considers that the registration of the civil marriage certificate in Malaysia merely constituted a lodgement of an overseas certificate and that certificate being in the appropriate legal form. It does not, in the Tribunal’s view, alter the fact that a later legal and religious document was made which clearly stated the couple was in a Muslim marriage and both were of the Islamic faith. The Tribunal notes the country information, specifically that from the Australian Embassy in Indonesia, which recommends that couples who have been issued with an Islamic Buku Nikah (marriage book) should obtain a certificate from a Civil Registry Office if they intend to move to another country. Given the applicant already held such a certificate by virtue of participating in a non-Islamic ceremony in Indonesia, it is, in the Tribunal’s view, likely that the couple simply chose to lodge that certificate with Malaysian authorities when they moved to that country. The Tribunal makes no firm finding on this point other than to reject the explanations put by the applicant, or any potential implication that registration of the certificate constituted a declaration of the couple’s religion.
The Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s explanation that he held two marriage records to avoid having to convert to Islam when he arrived back in Malaysia. This was a late and new explanation provided by the applicant after the Tribunal highlighted inconsistencies in his documentary evidence (questions and replies about the police report at paragraph 54). Beyond these credibility considerations is the simple fact that the reason the applicant had two marriage records was that he had been officially married as a Muslim after providing proof of conversion to Islam. That is, he had already done in Indonesia what he said he was trying to avoid being forced to do when he returned to Malaysia.
In respect of the 3 October 2019 police report containing references to the applicant being a Christian and in an interfaith marriage, the Tribunal does not accept these statements as proof of his claim. Beyond the limited weight the Tribunal gives all the applicant’s late evidence and late claims about his interfaith marriage is the incongruence between his evidence that he hid his interfaith status from authorities, and the very specific statements to those authorities that he was in an interfaith marriage with a Muslim. Given that is the case, the police report reads more as a manufactured statement to an external audience to support the late claims made by the applicant than one made to police to obtain their protection. This is not least because making such a report would place him at risk of arrest from those very same police, who, according to the country information are responsible for the enforcement of Islamic laws (see paragraph 47). The Tribunal does not consider the police report to be a reliable document and does not accept it as proof of any of the applicant’s claims, including that he was in an interfaith marriage at the time.
The Tribunal finds that on [date] 2013 the applicant was married in an Islamic ceremony and declared himself to religious and state officials to be of the Islamic faith. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there is any objectively reliable evidence that his religion or faith changed after that date. The Tribunal is therefore not satisfied that the applicant was a Christian after that date and finds that he either remains a Muslim or does not hold a religious faith and is willing to tell authorities that he is whatever religion that is necessary for official purposes and provide evidence (legitimate, truthful or otherwise) to that effect.
Findings about other evidence
The Tribunal has accepted that after he and his wife returned to Malaysia, he registered his civil marriage with (Malaysian) National Board of Registration as a non-Islamic couple. The Tribunal finds that the registration does not reflect the applicant’s true marriage status and accepts the country information that indicates he may risk a fine from Malaysian authorities for improper or late registration of his later Islamic marriage record.
The Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s assertion that the Malaysian authorities must have discovered his wife’s religion on entry into the country. As he acknowledged at hearing, such documents are not checked at the border, and passports, which are checked do not identify a person’s religion. The applicant did not provide an alternative explanation for why Malaysian authorities may have “become aware” of his wife’s religion and it is not for the Tribunal to make a case for the applicant, particularly a speculative one.
For the reasons set out above (paragraph ‎87), the Tribunal does not accept the police report provided by the applicant is reliable evidence or proves his claims in any way. As such, it also does not accept that the report proves he was harassed by religious authorities on account of his marriage or that people came to his home and harassed him there. The Tribunal also does not accept the documentary or oral evidence of the applicant in respect of these things which the police report purported to prove.
The Tribunal is also unconvinced by the applicant’s story about his interaction with Malaysian Islamic authorities because, on his own evidence, he was he was willing to tell Indonesian Islamic authorities (when asked at his marriage ceremony) that he was Muslim. The Tribunal also finds that the applicant must have provided documentary proof that he had converted to Islam. Given that is the case, the Tribunal does not accept as plausible that the applicant would have denied or withheld these things from authorities if he genuinely considered his or his family’s welfare to be at risk. On his evidence, the authorities asked him to “convert [to] Islam and have an Islamic wedding”. The applicant had already had an Islamic wedding, and held documentary proof of that, which also said his religion was Islam. It is not credible he would not have provided his Buka Nikkah (marriage) document to the people who were threatening him and his family. Similarly, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant would willingly convert to Islam and enter an Islamic marriage to ‘trick’ his father-in-law, but when later asked about his marriage status by authorities would choose to send his wife and two young children to another country indefinitely rather than hand over documentary evidence of his Islamic marriage which he had in his possession.
The Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s concern about being buried in a different cemetery to his family’s or his assets not going to his family on his death explain this discordant behaviour. That is because, as the Tribunal has determined, at all the material times his nuclear family – that is his wife and children – are Muslim.
The Tribunal finds that the applicant did not send his wife back to Indonesia to avoid harassment by Malaysian authorities as it does not accept that Malaysian authorities harassed him while he was in Malaysia on account of his marriage. There is no other objectively reliable evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that the applicant sent his wife back to Indonesia because of actual or perceived risks from Malaysian authorities.
The Tribunal also does not accept the applicant’s assertion that he has continued to be pursued by Malaysian authorities after his arrival in Australia, given that he makes such an assertion to advance other evidence that the Tribunal does not accept and as a claim it gives little weight.
The Tribunal has considered all the materials and things the applicant placed before it and, barring the positive findings of fact set out above, does not accept any of the other claims and evidence presented to support the review application.
REASONS AND FINDINGS

This matter largely centred upon what the Tribunal was able to accept from a claim raised, in a temporal sense, long after a protection visa was applied for and a decision about it made. Provisions such as s367A and 5AAA of the Act indicate that Parliament expects applicants to put their entire case as early as they can to avoid unreliability and manufacture at a later date.[11] Indeed, even in the absence of such a provision, the fact finding obligations of the Tribunal require it to assess not only the bare content of evidence provided but the legal, procedural, temporal, and other relevant circumstances relating to the claims and evidence in determining whether they are credible and reliable.
[11] EQU19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1182, [51].
While the applicant attempted to explain why he added a late claim and adduced late evidence, significant difficulties arose in substantiating his narrative once inconsistencies with the procedural record emerged. The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to provide a credible or reasonable explanation for the lateness of his claim due to inconsistencies and contradictions in his narrative, compounded by unreliable and manufactured supporting evidence. His account of his interfaith marriage was similarly undermined by post-hearing analysis revealing that he was not in an interfaith marriage and that he and his wife were married in a same-faith ceremony twice, but most recently as members of the Islamic faith. His explanations shifted to reconcile these contradictions, including the introduction of new details and revised construction of earlier documentary evidence he had voluntarily presented to the Tribunal as a sham document, easily obtained under minimal scrutiny. Yet those newer explanations conflicted with contradictory country information, which painted a very different picture of relevant law, procedure, and practice than the applicant had described.
In the Tribunal’s view, there was very little in the applicant’s narrative about his interfaith marriage and interrelated faith claims that could be relied upon as credible and genuine, other than the marriage records he had submitted and those parts of his background information which did not relate to his marriage or his and his family’s religion. Given that was the case the Tribunal was not able to accept that the applicant experienced any of the threats of harm, or actual harm on account of his marital status while he lived in Malaysia that he stated he did. Considering the totality of the evidence before it, the Tribunal must also conclude that the applicant will not face any harm on account of his marital status if he is returned to Malaysia in the near future. That is not least because, based on the findings of fact, the Tribunal is not satisfied that Malaysian authorities are aware of, or concerned about his wife’s religion, nor that they have ever sought to inquire about it or act upon it.

100. While the fact (but not the reason) the applicant registered his civil marriage in Malaysia is accepted by the Tribunal, there is no other objective material that that indicates that the applicant faces a risk of foreseeable harm from that registration other than a possible financial penalty if he decides to withdraw it and register his most recent Muslim certificate instead. The Tribunal does not consider such a penalty to amount to serious or significant harm as described by the Act. Of course, if the applicant and his family choose to declare (by conversion or otherwise) themselves Christian before their return to Malaysia then it may be that he does not even need to disturb the registration of his overseas civil marriage. Whether that is the case in practice or not falls outside the scope of the Tribunal’s consideration given it has chosen to rely on the current factual findings alone.
101. Based on the evidence and its findings of fact, the Tribunal is not satisfied that Malaysian authorities would harass him to convert to Islam on his return to Malaysia on account of his marriage. His wife and family live overseas and the Tribunal is not satisfied the authorities know or are concerned about their, or his religion. Even if the Tribunal is wrong, and Malaysian authorities do ask the applicant about his marriage status, it is satisfied the applicant can and, on the evidence before it, would provide those authorities with documentary proof of a Muslim marriage, in which his declared faith is Islam. Having found no harassment occurred in the past, the lack of other compelling evidence from the applicant, and considering the country information before it (including the high level of religious tolerance in Sabah), the Tribunal is satisfied that Malaysian authorities would not pursue him further, much less harass, threaten, or harm him. To be clear that means the Tribunal does not accept that any of the risks the applicant claims will happen to him on account of his religion, or his marriage will occur on his return to Malaysia.
102. The Tribunal therefore concludes that:
a.There is no real chance of serious harm to the applicant if he is returned to Malaysia in the reasonably foreseeable future for the purposes of 5J(1) of the Act; and
b.The tests for real chance and real risk being the same, the Tribunal also finds the applicant would not face a real risk of significant harm for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

103. There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s 36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s 36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2).
104. The applicant does not satisfy essential criteria for any available ground for the grant of a protection visa under the s 36 of the Act.
DECISION
105. The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Date of hearings: 10 January 2025; 24 January 2025.
Representative: None
ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…

cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…

degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b) that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…

torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…

receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a) a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b) if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…

5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…

5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note: Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

(d) the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a) protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…

36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

(c) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…