2008612 (Refugee) - [2025] ARTA 1258

2008612 (REFUGEE) [2025] ARTA 1258 (28 FEBRUARY 2025)
DECISION AND
REASONS FOR DECISION
Representative:  Ms Rebecca Webb
Respondent:  Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Tribunal Number: 2008612

Tribunal:General Member H Kerwin
Date:28 February 2025

Place:Melbourne
Decision:The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant meets the following criteria:
·s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 28 February 2025 at 7:36pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Lebanon – religion – Alawite – particular social group – elderly single women – fear of killing – fear of physical assault – attack on home – access to health services – elder abuse in Australia – internal relocation – decision under review remitted
LEGISLATION
Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and transitional Provisions No1) Act 2024 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5(1), 5H, 5J – 5LA, 36, 65, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs on 20 May 2020 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
2. The applicant who is a national of Lebanon applied for the visa on 23 May 2017. The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis she did not meet:
a.the refugee criteria, because the applicant did not face a real chance of serious harm. Specifically, she would not be refused medical treatment, would be able to be supported by a sister living in Beirut to address her fears about her personal safety and manage any chance of harm on account of her economic status, she would receive the Lebanese pension, and there was ‘no information’ to suggest the applicant would be denied protection or assistance from the Lebanese authorities.
b.the complementary protection criteria because any harm arising from the economy or access to health services would not occur because of the intentions of the State (or any other actor), and because the applicant had not met other factors under s 5J(4) of the Act which do not as a matter of law arise for consideration under the complementary protection criteria.

3. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 16 December 2024 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic (Lebanese) and English languages.
4. The applicant was represented in relation to the review. The representative attended the Tribunal hearing.
5. On 14 October 2024, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) became the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). Under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (the Transitional Act), proceedings in the AAT that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are to be continued and finalised by the Tribunal. Anything done in relation to the proceeding before 14 October 2024 is taken to have been done by the Tribunal.
BACKGROUND
6. The applicant is [an age]-year-old Lebanese woman. The applicant’s nationality was not in issue before the primary decision maker and having reviewed her identity documentation and heard her oral evidence, I find the applicant is a Lebanese national and have treated Lebanon as her receiving country for the purpose of the Act.
7. She is a member of the Alawite sect, is a retired [deleted] and [an occupation 1], and has lived predominantly in Lebanon her whole life principally in the Northern Governate of Lebanon in and around Tripoli. She was divorced in 1996, having previously been married to a [Country 3] citizen living in Lebanon. She has not re-partnered.
8. In Australia, the applicant experienced financial abuse and other family violence from her Lebanese family, principally her brother’s family. This has included the unauthorised transfer of her entire savings, and the proceeds of the sale of her assets in Lebanon to her brother who encouraged her to move to Australia, live with his family, and deposit her savings into two accounts controlled by him. In addition, through this period, her movements and liberty were controlled, and ultimately the applicant left her brother’s home in Australia. She was without a home of her own in this period, and continues to not have permanent accommodation of her own. She lived temporarily with different relatives in Australia, and has been supported by not-for-profit services to seek legal assistance and gain some independence. She has been recognised as eligible for aged care in Australia.

I accept these matters to be true, based on the material before me. To the extent they are relevant to the resolution of the issues before the Tribunal, I discuss them further below under ‘Reasons and Findings’.
Evidence before the Department
I have reviewed the evidence before the Department, as set out below:
a.Protection visa application made by the applicant
b.Correction to Question 84 of the protection visa application to reflect that the applicant retired from [her occupation] in February 2000 (not 2001).
c.Legal submission dated 16 January 2020
d.Post-interview legal submission dated 24 January 2020
e.Photos of neighbourhood houses with damage to the exterior
f.Certificate of [deleted] issued on [date] December 1962 and English translation
g.Death certificate for [Person A] dated [in] August 2016
h.Driver’s License for the applicant in Lebanon dated [in] January 1982
i.Extract from applicant’s birth registration certificate reissued dated [in] March 2017
j.Extract from family register in Lebanon dated [in] March 2017
k.Pension Book from the Minister for Finance
l.Statement by [Person B] dated 16 March 2017 confirming that the applicant lives with her sister at an address in [Town 1].
m.Divorce Certificate dated [in] June 2006 recording a divorce dated [in] March 1996.
n.[A work certificate]
o.Employee Registration Card Issued by the National Social Security Fund
p.Further statement regarding the applicant’s pension
q.A collection of country information (which I have reviewed but which is footnoted to make this decision easier to read).[1]
r.Letter from [Doctor A] confirming (among other things) diagnosis of [specified medical conditions], dated 14 January 2020.
s.[Health Service 1] Discharge Summary dated in] March 2019 for the applicant after 3-day inpatient stay due to ‘exacerbation of [medical condition]’.
t.Photo of the applicant in a chair, of buildings in states of disrepair and some featuring what appears to be impact damage, as well as water damage on interior walls of a house.
u.Copy of the passport and a [Country 1] 5-year visitor visa for [name] (who is the applicant’s sister).
v.Article titled [title].
w.Original and English translation of Community Members’ Agreement at the [Community Organisation 1] including nomination of [Official A] to carry out religious public relations.
x.Original and English translation of the applicant’s Lebanese identity card
y.Original and English translations of document titled ‘Reference of Residence’ dated [in] January 2020 in respect of the applicant showing residence in [Town 1] in Tripoli.
z.Original and English translations of a second, different, document titled ‘Reference of Residence’ dated [in] January in respect of the applicant showing residence in Jabal Mohsen in Tripoli
[1] Report titled ‘Assessment of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Syrian refugees and vulnerable Lebanese in Tripoli (Lebanon)’ dated May 2020; Reuters article titled ‘Banks smashed as protests turn violent in Lebanon’s Tripoli’ dated 28 April 2020; Associated press report titled ‘Lebanon faces grave threat to stability’ dated 11 May 2020; A highlighted version of the DFAT Country Information Report for Lebanon; Smart traveller update for Lebanon dated 5 January 2020; Arab News articled dated 13 January 2020 titled ‘Rising Crime in Lebanon blamed on economic slump amid livelihood crisis’; Undated opinion piece titled ‘US’ Lebanon policy should not be guided by Israeli perspective’; Article titled ‘Lebanon’s Monetary Crisis Forces Thieves to Change Their Tactics’; ABC News article titled ‘Inside Tripoli: Lebanon’s jihadi city’ dated 22 September 2016; Telegraph titled ‘Who are the Alawites?’ dated 3 April 2016; The National article titled ‘Lebanon gripped by ‘night of terror’ as ISIS fighter attacks Tripoli dated 4 June 2019; The National articled titled ‘Lebanon’s Tripoli: residents say negligent state breeds extremism’ dated 4 June 2019; Article without a source titled ‘Lebanese protestors close road; scuffles injure 14 soldiers’; Associated Foreign Press article titled ‘In Lebanon's Tripoli, crushing poverty fuels protests’ dated 13 November 2019; Associated Foreign Press article titled ‘Lebanon in ‘week of wrath’ protests over political vacuum, economic crisis’ dated 15 January 2020; Human Rights Watch release titled ‘Lebanon: Little Action on Corruption, Economic crisis’ dated 14 January 2020; Carnegie article titled ‘Lebanon’s Free Fall’ date 19 December 2019; Opinionista article titled ‘Lebanon’s future hangs in the balance’ dated 10 January 2020; Article titled ‘Living Conditions Suffocate the Lebanese, Exacerbate their Suffering’;
Links were also provided for the UNICEF 2018 [Town 1 variant] Neighbourhood Profile, and a neighbourhood profile for Jabal Mohsen. I have reviewed these documents.
An interview was conducted by the Department on 20 January 2020 in the presence of the applicant’s then legal representative, as well as her brother (being the person referred to above in connection with the financial abuse which was later disclosed by the applicant) who attended at that time in the role of the applicant’s support person.
Evidence before the Tribunal
Pursuant to directions made by the Tribunal on 16 December 2024, the applicant filed with the Tribunal:
a.Written legal submissions dated 6 January 2025.
b.Statutory declaration made by the applicant dated 9 December 2024.
c.Letter from [Doctor B] dated 6 December 2024.
d.Assessment Summary by [Ms A], [from a named] Aged Care Assessment Service dated 26 November 2024 (aged care assessment).
Material also before the Tribunal is:
a.Email from [name], a caseworker at [Agency 1], dated 15 November 2023 identifying that the applicant has disclosed significant family violence and elder abuse from members of her family. The email identified the applicant’s brother as the person using violence and explains that he currently has control of her visa application.
b.Email from [Relative A] dated 29 July 2024 who identifies herself as the applicant’s niece seeking information about the applicant’s case.
c.Email from Refugee Legal prompted by [Relative A] email dated 30 July 2024 to the Tribunal reiterating that the applicant has previously experienced family violence and its concerns about contact from third parties in this matter.
I discuss these documents where relevant further under ‘Reasons and Findings’. At this point, I note the applicant’s 6 January 2025 submissions articulated that she feared the following sources of persecution from extremists and militants from other Muslim sects and the broader Lebanese community:
a.direct targeted serious harm (including threats to life or liberty, death and significant physical harassment and ill-treatment);1)
b.direct and indirect threats to her life or liberty communicated to the applicant amounting to serious harm (that is, separate and distinct from any harm that may follow those threats)2F;;direct targeted serious harm (including threats to her life or liberty, death and significant physical harassment and ill-treatment for non-convention reasons but where the authorities may discriminatorily withhold protection;
c.direct and indirect threats to her life or liberty communicated to the applicant by extremists and militants from other Muslim sects and the broader Lebanese community amounting to serious harm (that is, separate and distinct from any harm that may follow those threats) where the authorities are not equipped and do not have the will to assist her; and
d.ongoing cumulative serious discrimination that causes her significant economic hardship that threatens her capacity to subsist.
The harm was claimed to arise for reason of (either separately or cumulatively):
a.Her Alawite religion;
b.Her imputed political opinion;
c.Her membership of a particular social group, namely:
i.Women in Lebanon;
ii.Single/divorced women in Lebanon;
iii.Elderly women in Lebanon;
iv.Elderly women in Lebanon without family support;
v.People with disabilities in Lebanon.
In terms of the complementary protection criteria, the applicant claimed that there was a real risk of:
a.arbitrary deprivation of life perpetrated by extremists and militants from other Muslim sects and the broader Lebanese community;
b.cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment and degrading treatment or punishment perpetrated by extremists and militants from other Muslim sects and the broader Lebanese community; and
c.harm of the kind whereby she would be compelled to act discretely and modify her appearance and profile to hide her religion and marital status so as to avoid significant harm.
The applicant also appeared before the Tribunal on 15 January 2025 to give evidence and make submissions.
Conscious of the applicant’s age, health and her recent experience of family violence, and following discussion of the best way to maximise the applicant’s ability to give evidence in her case with the applicant’s representative at the 16 December directions hearing, [Ms B] attended as a support person. Multiple breaks were taken. The hearing was conducted with an in-person interpreter. I discuss the applicant’s oral evidence and her representative’s oral submissions where relevant below, but in summary, the applicant gave evidence regarding:
a.Her experiences in Australia and her loss of her assets and financial security, including her level of distress and fear about these events, and its ongoing effect on her;
b.Her past experiences of physical harassment, stalking, two attempted attacks (foiled by Christian neighbours with whom she had a long-running relationship) against her, social exclusion, as well as loss of employment because she was known to be Alawite. Evidence was also given about immediate violence in her community, including major damage to her home, in the context of Alawite-Sunni conflict in Tripoli. The applicant had evident difficulty placing these events into a clear chronology but I do not (as I discuss below) consider this reflects a lack of credibility on her part.
c.The current location of her family members outside Lebanon, including her sister who is now estranged to her, who she does not have a relationship with, and who is resident either permanently or frequently in [Country 1].
d.Her previous reclusive behaviour in Lebanon living as a single Alawite woman without family protection or support.
After the hearing, the applicant filed:
a.Further legal submissions dated 7 February 2025.
b.Statutory declaration of [Ms B] dated 6 February 2025.
c.Second statutory declaration of the applicant dated 6 February 2025.
d.Email by [Relative A] (the applicant’s sister) dated 23 January 2025.
e.Email from [Ms B] to [Doctor B].
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Criteria for protection visa
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
REASONS AND FINDINGS
The issue in this case is whether the applicant meets either the refugee or the complementary protection criteria. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision should be set aside and the application remitted for reconsideration because the applicant meets the refugee criteria. I explain why below.
I accept that the applicant will face a real chance of serious harm if she returns to her home area now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, specifically extreme financial hardship threatening her ability to subsist (including to receive necessary healthcare for her survival). I make this finding on the basis of the specific cluster of attributes particular to the applicant, and her profile when considered in light of the particular security, humanitarian and economic circumstances in Lebanon presently and relevant indications about the range of real possibilities for the country in the reasonably foreseeable future.

I deal first with the relevant country information, then with the applicant’s profile. After that, I explain my reasoning in terms of the refugee criteria.
Country information
Relevant economic context
Country information before the Tribunal indicates that the Lebanon is in severe socioeconomic and financial crisis.[2] This situation is entrenched.[3] Multiple causes are often cited,[4] most notably:
a.governmental failure;
b.the economic pressure caused by high numbers of refugees fleeing conflict to Lebanon especially from Palestine and Syria. (Following the fall of the Syrian Assad regime, new flows of Alawite Syrians into Lebanon are now fleeing feared retribution for the Assad regime’s Alawite heritage and favouritism); and
c.the explosion at the Port of Beirut.
[2] DFAT Country Information Report – Pakistan, 26 June 2023 (DFAT Country Information Report – Pakistan).
[3] World Report 2024: Lebanon | Human Rights Watch
[4] Ibid; DFAT Country Information Report – Pakistan.
Among other things, these circumstances have relevantly manifested in: the devaluation of the Lebanese currency to the point the national currency has lost 98% of its value;[5] and the weakening of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) because members of the LAF are paid using the heavily devalued Lebanese currency.[6] Access to prescription medicine was initially unavailable,[7] but is currently available but no longer subsidised by the State resulting in very inflated prices to purchase medicines.[8] As a researcher at the Carnegie Middle East Centre summarised in May 2024:
Since 2019, Lebanon has experienced the most severe socioeconomic and financial crisis in its history. The economy has contracted for five consecutive years, with GDP falling from $55 billion in 2019 to $22 billion in 2022. The national currency has lost 98 percent of its value; inflation has been in triple digits for four years; and poverty and unemployment rates have increased significantly—with severe implications for social cohesion and stability. Well over 50 percent of the population is estimated to be under the national poverty line, and 74 percent of people aged sixty-five and above are estimated to be income-vulnerable. Social protection systems prior to the crisis were already weak, fragmented, underfunded, regressive, and incapable of meeting the needs of the poor and vulnerable. The crisis further weakened the state’s ability to protect the population, as the collapse of public finances reduced funding for social programs, including health, education, social safety nets, and public pensions.
The current status of the Lebanese pension of relevance to the applicant
[5] Pension Reform in Lebanon: Good Intentions, Uncertain Outcomes | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
[6] Lebanon: Hundreds protest devaluation of lira and pensions | Middle East Eye
[7] Lebanese health care racked by medicine shortages - The Lancet
[8] Lebanon: Government must address medication shortages and healthcare crisis - Amnesty International
Provision of the pension in Lebanon was an important element of the delegate’s reasoning. As to pensions in Lebanon since the primary decision, reports indicate that by 2023 State pensions paid in the local currency had lost more than 98 percent of their value.[9] Protests were widespread in response.[10] Pension reform has been approved for the country but it is ‘likely to face challenges related to benefits, solvency and coverage’.[11] In any event, the new scheme only applies to people in particular categories under the age of 49 with an opt in system for older people who are: Lebanese residing in Lebanon who are self-employed workers, domestic workers, employers and non-permanent agricultural workers; Lebanese working abroad.[12] These categories exclude the applicant as [an age] year old retired worker. On the basis of this new country information, much of it arising after the delegates decision, I do not consider the applicant would receive a pension that would materially alter her circumstances in Lebanon, if she received a pension at all.
Ageism in Lebanon and intersectional risks for elderly women, exacerbated for divorced women, and people without children and families
[9] Lebanon: Hundreds protest devaluation of lira and pensions | Middle East Eye
[10] Ibid.
[11] Pension Reform in Lebanon: Good Intentions, Uncertain Outcomes | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
[12] International Labour Organization, ‘New Pension System at the National Social Security Fund in Lebanon The new scheme explained in 21 Questions & Answers’. Accessed online: wcms_909323.pdf
Country information suggests that in the economic context described above, older people, are acutely affected including because of reported ‘ageism’. Studies conducted with older people across Lebanon by Chahine for the International Labor Organization in 2022 indicates that older women in Lebanon face specific difficulties including due to societal factors including their lack of education and exclusion from employment (which I do not consider applies to the applicant) and limited economic independence and means (which does apply to the applicant, including because of the control of her entire life savings by her brother).[13] A study of age discrimination and its effects on Lebanese people living within and outside Lebanon[14] found that: ‘Women in Lebanese society, particularly in these age groups, have less access to social power than men, especially since they tend to be less educated or less economically independent.’[15] The study concluded, though, that across the whole ageing population, ‘the perception of negative age-related stereotypes was highly prevalent’.[16] And, apart from social and financial needs, older people in Lebanon ‘who are indeed entitled to state health coverage are rarely reimbursed for medical and healthcare expenses, leading them to avoid care or desperately skip doses of their drugs to reduce self-incurred costs’.[17] Analysis by Hachem in 2023 stated that ‘[o]lder people may receive sporadic aid from civil organisations but often rely on their families for support and welfare.’[18]
[13] A glimmer of hope amidst the pain [electronic resource] : voices of older people on social protection and the need for a social pension in Lebanon / by Maya Abi Chahine ; International Labour Organization, HelpAge International.
[14] (PDF) Perception of Ageism and Self - Esteem among Lebanese Elders at Home and Abroad
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid 32
[17] Full article: Lifelong learning: The red-headed stepchild of Lebanon’s National Strategy for Older People
[18] Full article: Lifelong learning: The red-headed stepchild of Lebanon’s National Strategy for Older People
Similar analysis regarding the intersectional harms arising from discrimination against older women is raised by the Lebanese Ministry for Social Affairs, working in conjunction with the United Nations Population Fund. The National Strategy for Older Persons in Lebanon 2020-2030[19] states that:
For decades, Lebanon has been living through many conflicts, wars and invasions, and has been affected by regional security crises. In the midst of these wars and conflicts, the needs of older people are often overlooked in governmental policies and programmes and in the initiatives of humanitarian aid agencies that usually focus on younger age groups. Studies have also shown that ageing phenomena and health problems among older people have accelerated as a result of conflicts whose effects do not end with the end of the crisis but extend for years after. Older women pay the highest price in war because of discrimination and cross-sectoral deprivation suffered by women for life.
[19] Lebanese Republic Ministry of Social Affairs, ‘National Strategy for Older Persons in Lebanon 2020-2030’. Accessed online: online_-_final_english_strategy_for_online_use_1.pdf
Further, the informants in Chahine’s study of older Lebanese people explained that their situation was worsened where they were a widow or where their children could not provide for them.[20] This coheres with a related point raised in DFAT’s most recent country information report[21] highlighting the central importance of wasta in navigating inequality in public services (with significant implications for those without it):
Entrenched patronage networks monopolise the economy and public service, and municipalities are sometimes unable to enforce regulations due to political interference. Bribes and irregular payments are often exchanged when applying for public utilities, and the use of connections (wasta) is a common way to navigate the public administration. A survey of youth in 2020 found corruption affected nearly ‘every aspect of daily life, including health care,’ with one respondent stating: ‘if I want to go to proper hospital, I need wasta’.
Discrimination and conflict involving members of the Alawite sect
[20] A glimmer of hope amidst the pain [electronic resource] : voices of older people on social protection and the need for a social pension in Lebanon / by Maya Abi Chahine ; International Labour Organization, HelpAge International. See also, Full article: Lifelong learning: The red-headed stepchild of Lebanon’s National Strategy for Older People.
[21] DFAT Country Information Report - Lebanon, [2.14].
There is well-documented history of discrimination, tension and conflict between Alawite and Sunni communities in Lebanon, particularly in Tripoli. In DFAT’s June 2023 assessment, the situation at that time was described in this way:[22]
Relatively low-level and localised violence occurs between communal groups (such as between Alawites and Sunnis in Tripoli, or Shi’a Hezbollah and Sunni or Christian groups in Beirut). In October 2021, for example, supporters of Shi’a organisations Hezbollah and Amal protested in a Beirut Christian neighbourhood, sparking a deadly battle with gunmen suspected to be from the (Maronite) Lebanese Forces. In-country sources report regular armed clashes in Tripoli between rival families and crime gangs. However, in-country sources also reported in December 2022 that the situation in Tripoli has improved following a targeted recruitment campaign designed to broaden LAF’s representation and improve local confidence in the LAF; reportedly, 1000 young men have recently been recruited from Tripoli and Akkar which has helped calm the situation in Tripoli.
UN Sources report that intercommunal tensions between Lebanese and Syrians are rising as the economic crisis continues. While there are presently few violent clashes between communities, in July 2022 UN sources reported that the situation was worsening, with an increase of vigilantism. In a 2019 survey by the UN, only 4 per cent of Lebanese saw relations with Syrian refugees as negative; in 2022, that number rose to 51 per cent. However, sources expressed the view that the situation would not break into open violence without ‘political instigation’.
[22] Ibid, [2.34]-[2.35].
Other context is important. First, prior to the period of study for the 2023 DFAT Report, the conflict in Tripoli between Alawite and Sunnis was not low-level. Reliable country information describes targeted attacks on Alawites in Northern Lebanon (where their minority community is concentrated and where the applicant has resided). Alawite buildings were burned and destroyed. Protection money was sought by aggressors. Field research conducted by Human Rights Watch in 2013[23] documented killing of at least 141 people since June 2008. Analysis by Human Rights Watch concluded that:
While the clashes have affected both Sunnis and Alawites in these neighborhoods, Tripoli’s small Alawite community of tens of thousands people face additional dangers as a result of the increasing violence directed against them.
[23] Lebanon: Sectarian Attacks in Tripoli | Human Rights Watch
At that time, Human Rights Watch claimed that ‘Security forces in Tripoli have in particular failed to provide Alawites with adequate protection and to arrest, disarm, and punish those responsible for attacks even though the identities of many of the attackers are known,’ providing publicly available information in support of that assertion, as well as individual testimony including in the context of a stabbing.[24] Alawite individuals were targeted merely in the course of travel outside Jabal Mohsen enclave.[25] A major, acknowledged, driver of the conflict was the sectarian politics of Syria around the Alawite-dominated Assad regime spilling over into Lebanon, including because of Tripoli’s proximity to Syria, the influx of refugees from Syria to Tripoli, and that Tripoli hosts the major Alawite enclave in Lebanon.[26]
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
This particular sectarian tension is well-worn. The Carnegie Middle East Centre described the situation in 2024 in the following way: [27]
Tripoli’s conflict dynamics… [are] often explained as being a by-product of the Lebanese Civil War, which primarily involved a conflict between the Sunnis and Alawite communities. In the 1970s, the two sects supported different warring sides: the Sunnis overwhelmingly supported the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), whereas the Alawites supported the Syrian army; armed confrontation resulted in the occupation of the city by the Syrian army, which suppressed all opposing Sunni groups.
[27] Carnegie Middle East Center, ‘The Roots of Crisis in Northern Lebanon,” April 2014. Accessed online: >
Second, after the most recent DFAT assessment, two key dynamics have changed.
First, in December 2024 the Assad regime fell in Syria. There have been accounts of violence against Alawites (now no longer protected by the regime) in Syria in the aftermath.[28] Alawite (and Shi’ite) refugees are attempting to seek asylum in large numbers in Lebanon, entering the country in the North and seeking safety in the Alawite community in Lebanon.[29] Some Syrians who fled the Assad regime are attempting to return home.
[28] Fear grips Alawites in Syria's Homs as Assad 'remnants' targeted
[29] Syrian Shi'ites and other minorities flee to Lebanon, fearing Islamist rule | Reuters; Thousands queue to flee Syria as ethnic minorities fear post-Assad future | The Independent
There is uncertainty in expert reporting currently about how the new Sunni leadership in Syria will relate to Alawite Syrians. There is uncertainty and concern about what this shift means for the position of Alawite people in Lebanon, including because of the real threat of a resurgence of violence against Alawites and heightened discrimination. At one extreme, as the applicant’s representative captured in her detailed overview of the country information favourable to her client’s case, a conflict analysis dated 14 January 2022 published by the Centre for Operational Analysis and Research, an independent consultant body with clients including the UNDP and USAID, concluded that the most likely scenario in Tripoli in Lebanon would see conflict resume again, including with the key effect that ‘armed clashes would resume’, and ‘[t]he Alawites will be more vulnerable than ever, given the near total absence of the state and their complete encirclement by Sunnis.’[30]
[30] Conflict Analysis – Tripoli - COAR Global.
In the alternative, some reporting this year has reiterated that in Lebanon, there is greater social cohesion between communities with views shared that they should live together ‘as one’.[31] I also note that, as yet, the Tribunal is not aware that conflict has spiked with the initial flow of refugees from Syria or with the initial days of the new Syrian regime and the removal of the Assad and his Alawite-led government. Despite this, other more moderate predictions do raise concern regarding the real possibility of increased tension and conflict targeting Alawites because of increased pressure from Alawite Syrian refugees, as well as the regime change and the weakened protections politically in Lebanon. Michael Young, of the Carnegie Institute for Middle East, in January 2025 commented that with the Assad family out of power in Syria, the ADP is no longer present as it once was in Jabal Mohsen and:
Without the Assads, the Alawites have suddenly become very, very vulnerable against a revitalized Sunni community…The political protection that Jabal Mohsen may have enjoyed, I don’t think it is there anymore.[32]
[31] In Northern Lebanon, Separated by a Street Called Syria - Inkstick
[32] In Northern Lebanon, Separated by a Street Called Syria - Inkstick
On 5 January 2025, ‘hundreds’ protested in Tripoli’s main square occurred demanding the release of (Sunni) Islamists who were jailed in the context of Lebanese fighters travelling to oppose the Assad forces in Syria. Linked to this, it was reported that ‘Tensions had been simmering for years between the city's Sunni Muslim district of Bab al-Tebbaneh and nearby Jabal Mohsen, where the majority of residents are from the minority Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shiite Islam to which Assad belongs’.[33]
[33] Lebanon rally calls for release of Islamists jailed during Syria war - AL-Monitor: The Middle Eastʼs leading independent news source since 2012
In the UN’s May 2024 conflict mapping exercise (published before the fall of the Syrian Assad regime), it stated:
a.the region has a history of sectarian tensions and conflicts, notably between Sunni Muslims and Alawites. Historical grievances related to these conflicts may still influence current dynamics
b.competition for limited resources can exacerbate tensions within the community and may even trigger national conflicts. The scarcity of resources, including jobs and housing, can also lead to tensions.
c.Cultural norms and traditions are important in Tripoli, with different communities maintaining their customs. There are social hierarchies based on religious and national identities, affecting community cohesion. Community organizations, often along sectarian lines, play a significant role in Tripoli’s social fabric.
d.Jabal Mohsen/Tebbeneh’s proximity to Syria and historical ties to Syrian politics can influence its dynamics by dividing the community between supporters and opponents of the Syrian government. The presence of Syrian refugees has strained local resources and intensified competition for jobs and services. Regional tensions and conflicts can spill over into those neighborhoods, affecting stability.
As the applicant referred the Tribunal to, an overall appraisal of the situation of Alawite members in Lebanon more generally provides that:[34]
Two trends evidence a growing apprehension among the Alawite community in Lebanon. Firstly, notwithstanding their recognition as an official Lebanese sect, Alawites have historically been persecuted for their beliefs, displaced from Lebanese urban centres to its surrounding mountains. Today the majority of Lebanese Alawites appear to be consolidating in their historical urban mountain enclave of Jabal Mohsen, on the outskirts of Tripoli. This is despite the fact that the historic neighbourhood itself has become notoriously impoverished, deprived of public services and subject to sporadic bouts of violence with neighbouring Sunni militants and more recently extremist Islamic groups.
Given that the arrival of Syrian refugees into Lebanon has included members of the rebel Free Syrian Army, as well as anti-Assad Salafi networks, the Alawite community in Tripoli has not been spared from what some observers have been quick to designate as sectarian ‘spill-over’ from the war in Syria. While it is generally acknowledged that Lebanese Alawites are not active in providing resources to support the Assad regime’s war effort, the perceived association has proven deadly for Alawite civilians, both old and new, now living in Lebanon. Among various drivers of communal tensions between Lebanese and Syrians, the political situation within Lebanon and the region is increasingly significant alongside economic competition and other factors. This may be partly to gain better access to services and representation – given the inherent systemic bias toward larger faiths and sects – but also to better facilitate social integration. This could too be evidence of taqiyya, the historic practice of religious dissimulation in a climate of latent persecution. Aside from the continuous threat of violent attacks, these indicators speak to a more persistent everyday issue facing Alawites in Lebanon: that of economic and social discrimination. Alawite residents of Jabal Mohsen in particular have expressed the view that they have been abandoned by the Lebanese state as punishment for their perceived disloyalties.
[34] Alawites in Lebanon - Minority Rights Group

The second change in dynamic since the publication of the most recent DFAT report is the further weakening of the LAF. The engagement of the LAF is often cited as having led to the decrease in violence in Northern Lebanon between Sunni and Alawite factions, and this view is also reflected in the 2023 DFAT report. In that DFAT Report, a view from unnamed sources in 2022 was that ‘the situation in Tripoli has improved following a targeted recruitment campaign designed to broaden LAF’s representation and improve local confidence in the LAF; reportedly, 1000 young men have recently been recruited from Tripoli and Akkar which has helped calm the situation in Tripoli.’[35] In June 2023, though, DFAT also reported that:
Lebanon’s economic crisis has meant that members of the security forces have suffered the same slump in real income as have other civil servants, affecting their ability to support themselves and their families. Security forces have been ‘struggling to manage the consequences of compounding crises, with LAF officers and soldiers needing to increase and intensify operations across Lebanon since 2019, despite a more limited resource environment and increasing desertions. According to military sources cited in international media, desertions from the LAF since 2019 may be as high as 5,000. In-country sources report that members of the security forces have been among those who attempted irregular migration from Lebanon.
Security forces in Lebanon are factionalised and often fail to coordinate effectively, sometimes competing openly and even clashing within and across units and services…
The LAF, comprising an army, air force, and navy, is responsible for territorial defence, maintaining internal stability and security, and undertaking relief operations in coordination with public and humanitarian institutions. The LAF reportedly consists of 96,000 active personnel and 20,000 reserve personnel. The LAF has traditionally been a non-sectarian organisation, respected by all faiths and normally above sectarian conflicts. Some in-country sources report that in incidents in 2021 in Tripoli and Baalbek, groups attacked the LAF, thereby breaking the traditional ‘red line’ (the notion that communal groups might fight each other but do not engage the LAF). However, more recent reports have suggested that a recruitment drive of young men in Tripoli by the LAF has strengthened its credibility.
International media sources report that the salary of a junior officer in the LAF in July 2021 was worth about 7.5 per cent of what it was a year earlier and that many soldiers had resorted to growing their own food due to supply limitations. The LAF is reportedly worried that soldiers will go absent without leave (AWOL) in order to support themselves and their families. DFAT has no information about recent punishment for being. In-country sources report that end-of-service pensions, normally an incentive for long-term loyal service, are effectively worthless due to the currency devaluation and that some LAF are joining other Lebanese and Syrian refugees in exploring migration options, including irregular migration. In September 2022, retired servicemen clashed violently with security forces outside Parliament as a protest against their financial situation.
[35] DFAT Country Information Report – Lebanon, [2.34].
Since then, the resources of the LAF appear to have weakened further. In October 2024, a soldier’s monthly salary was ‘now worth around $220 per month, and many [soldiers] resorted to working second jobs’.[36] In February 2025 the United States announced a suspension of all aid to Lebanon, with President Trump wanting to reportedly see ‘achievement’ first, according to a US government officer. Further reported statements include that:[37]
a.‘All U.S. aid to Lebanon has been suspended for revision and ensuring that it conforms to Washington’s policy’
b.‘Washington will not distribute funds if the American people don’t get anything in return’
c.‘There will be no aid to the Lebanese Army and the rest of institutions based on promises.’
[36] As Hezbollah and Israel battle on the border, Lebanon's army watches from the sidelines | AP News
[37] Trump reportedly halts Lebanon aid, wants to see 'achievements' first — Naharnet. See also: Could Trump’s aid freeze to Lebanon army threaten fragile Israel ceasefire? - AL-Monitor: The Middle Eastʼs leading independent news source since 2012
On 18 February 2025, however, the US ambassador to Lebanon informed Lebanon’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants that there would be a ‘continuation of US aid to Lebanon, especially to the Lebanese Army’.[38] The Tribunal is not aware of what this reassurance is intended to include or exclude.
Gender in Lebanon
[38] Rajji informed by Johnson of continued US aid to army, receives ambassadors of Iran and Jordan - MTV Lebanon
In practice, DFAT reports that ‘women face considerable societal obstacles to gaining employment’ and ‘Men sometimes exercise control over female relatives, including restricting their activities outside the home’; ‘female political participation is also low;[39] and ‘[w]omen also face a moderate risk of official discrimination in that inadequate legislation, lack of enforcement, and long-standing traditional values and gender roles continue to restrict their full participation in the workforce and community, particularly for women from rural and socially conservative communities.[40] DFAT further assesses that ‘women in Lebanon face a moderate risk of family and sexual violence; this risk increases for members of vulnerable communities including those in rural areas, conservative religious groups and in Syrian refugee communities.’[41]
[39] DFAT Country Information Report - Lebanon, [3.54].
[40] Ibid, [3.62].
[41] Ibid.
Applicant’s circumstances and profile
I make the following relevant findings regarding the applicant’s circumstances and profile, based on the material before including her oral evidence before the Tribunal, interview before the primary decision-maker, her two statutory declarations, evidence before the Tribunal of her divorce, the written letters of [Doctor B], the applicant’s aged care assessment, and the statutory declaration of [Ms B].
I confirm I have no concerns regarding the credibility of the applicant’s evidence. At times, I do not accept that the feared severity of harm or likelihood of it occurring is as the applicant genuinely fears. I also do not accept that all events which the applicant attempted to locate in her life chronology and frequently placed in the 1970s during the Lebanese civil war are entirely contained to this period. It was clear during the hearing that the applicant had difficulty providing clear chronological evidence of her experiences across her life. I accept that this is most likely a result of her age, identified memory issues by health practitioners and asessors, and both past and recent trauma. In this respect, she was particularly focussed in her memory on three main periods of her life:
a.a period in about the 1970s through to 1990 when she was stalked, her employment was undermined, and serious harm including rape was threatened against her because of being an Alawite woman.
b.a period when she lived in Jabal Mohsen and was subject to active conflict, though the applicant was inclined to also place this in the 1970s.
c.her experience of elder abuse in Australia and particularly the loss of her personal and financial security in her current life.
In terms of the applicant’s current profile I accept the following:
a.The applicant is [an age] year old woman who is a member of the Alawite sect. I accept this is the case based on the applicant’s detailed evidence of her lifelong experiences as being Alawite, the corroborative written evidence of [Ms B], and because I accept the applicant’s explanation at her Departmental interview that her official Lebanese religious nomination (which is not Alawite, in contrast to many members of her family) was arranged by her father so she would not experience the same degree of official discrimination in employment. The applicant appeared at the hearing, and in all of the official photographs as a woman without a headscarf, providing further indication she is not a member of the Shiite Jaafari religion, as she is recorded in her Lebanese family register. Many members of her family are Alawite. One of her family members, also marked on the familial register as records as Shiite Jaafari, is reflected in meeting records of the [Community Organisation 1] (provided to the delegate) with responsibilities in the 1990s for religious public relations. This approach is corroborated by country information which indicates that ‘some sources suggest… that many [Alawites] were forced to convert to mainstream Sunni or Twelver Shi’a branches to secure employment in civil service’.[42] I accept she is, as the primary decision maker also accepted, Alawite, and that this is the way that she has been and will be perceived in her everyday life in Lebanon regardless of her official record.
[42] Alawites in Lebanon - Minority Rights Group, ‘Historical context’.
b.The applicant has a range of medical conditions. These are: [several medical conditions specified]. Her aged care assessment notes that the applicant also has new health issues of [health issue specified] and has demonstrated some short-term memory loss at assessment. The applicant is recommended to be approved for residential respite care and permanent care.
c.In Australia, medical treatment has been provided under the Medicare scheme. I note that the primary decision-maker placed weight on a finding they made which was made that the applicant’s family had been involved in financing her medical care in Australia. The basis for this finding is not clear to the Tribunal. Further, the applicant gave clear evidence at the Tribunal hearing regarding her process of obtaining Medicare in Australia. She had earlier described paying for her own care. This is consistent with the applicant’s evidence at hearing as well, which was (in an unrelated period of the hearing to the discussion of the delegate’s decision) that she had put all of her savings into the two bank accounts of her brother and his family so that she could provide for herself when needed. Further, in light of the financial abuse of the applicant which is now known and the eligibility of the applicant for Medicare now and in the past, it seems extremely unlikely that her past care was funded by her brother and his family or that this would be done in the future.
d.The applicant is divorced. She was previously married to a [Country 3] man.
e.The applicant has no children.
f.The applicant has no immediate relatives in Lebanon. Her family progressively left the country from the 1970 onwards for a range of reasons related to the sectarian conflict and discrimination against them.
g.The applicant has a sister who still resided in Lebanon in part of the 2010s. The sisters do not stay in touch. I accept the applicant’s evidence of this supported by the written evidence of [Ms B] that the applicant’s sister refused to visit the applicant in [City 1] when [Ms B] previously visited Lebanon, and that the sisters were not on good terms at that time. At the latest, by the time the applicant left Lebanon in 2017 this sister had left Beirut and was in [Country 1] with her child. She has subsequently obtained a [Country 1] visa for an extended stay. This sister spends, at least, periods of extended time in [Country 1] with her child who resides there now. This sister also has another child in [Country 2] and the applicant suspects she will go to that child’s home if she moves from [Country 1].
h.In or about 2017, the applicant sold all her assets, including carpets and her home in Jabal Mohsen when she departed Lebanon. She was encouraged to do this by her brother. She placed her savings in two bank accounts, controlled by her brother and his family. The accounts were depleted by her brother and his family. The applicant’s movements were controlled by her brother when she arrived in Australia. Sometime before November 2023 (when the applicant became involved with her [Agency 1] caseworker) the applicant left her brother’s house. She was temporarily housed for extended family in Australia who ‘passed her around’ as [Ms B] described the situation. Some family members resent her because she lost the funds that they consider were due to them (presumably as an inheritance).
i.She does not have secure accommodation, as confirmed by the evidence of the recent aged care assessment. The applicant currently resides with [Ms B], her niece. [Ms B] also supports her mother in Australia, who lives in aged care.
j.The applicant has been leaving [Ms B’s] home in the context of stress around the time of the hearing and becoming disoriented with strangers assisting her to return home. I accept that she has lost considerable confidence and feels ashamed at her loss of financial and personal independence as both [Ms B] (in her written statement) and the applicant explained to the Tribunal.
54. In terms of her experiences in Lebanon, I accept the following:
a.She was employed initially at an [agency] during the Lebanese civil war. In this period, [her manager] told her he did not want her to [work] there anymore because she was Alawite. She spoke with the head of the [related] department and negotiated a transfer to [work] at [another agency] in [another town].
b.In or about this same time:
i.other [colleagues] made derogatory comments about her because of her being Alawite, including that she was a religious extremist.
ii.Her tyres were let down and petrol syphoned from her car including to prevent her from travelling to [work].
iii.Frequently when she was going to work members of the Sunni community would threaten to harm her, including by chanting threats at her.
iv.She fled a violent conflict involving guns which arose between customers and an Alawite icecream vendor after the customer called the Alawite vendor a dog. A taxi driver took her home and told her to go up to her house.
v.She was followed travelling to and from work. On one occasion three people followed her in a car and entered her building. Her neighbour’s son intervened after she told them she was scared and that she had been followed. The men told the neighbours son who was Sunni that they were pursuing the applicant because she was Alawite and they wanted to kill and rape her. After this, the applicant sometimes slept in this neighbour’s house to be safe.
vi.School boys would escort her home after work to protect her on her homeward journey because of fear that she was travelling alone and she was at risk of attack as an Alawite woman. (Her husband was in [Country 2]; later they divorced, as already set out above, when the applicant learned he had remarried in [Country 2]).
c.In the period of the civil war in Lebanon, the applicant lived for at least part of the time [at a location] in Tripoli. She ultimately felt unsafe outside the Alawite enclave given the harassment she was experiencing whenever she had to travel and because she was readily recognisable as being Alawite.
d.Subsequently the applicant moved to Jabal Mohsen. She bought a house there. She lived in this property and, at another time, in a rented property in the area. When the applicant lived in Jabal Mohen, conflict was occurring between Sunni and Alawite neighbourhoods and the applicant’s house was damaged by the impact of armed conflict. I have viewed the photos, accept they are genuine, and that they cohere with the recollections of the applicant. On the material before me and the applicant’s conceded issues placing timeframes on events, I cannot make a finding as to the specific time period this set of events occurred. It is not necessary to do so to resolve the issues in this case.
e.In or around 2000, the applicant did not leave her house often because she feared for her safety. She feared she would be attacked as a single Alawite woman by Sunni men.
f.At some point between 2008 and 2017, the applicant left Tripoli and was living in [City 1], very near to Tripoli. She was retired. She received a government pension. She lived there until she moved to Australia. In [City 1], she had moved to a Maronite Christian area in an attempt to be safer from the sectarian fighting (principally between Alawite and Sunnis, with the dynamics already covered above in the country information discussion) in Jabal Mohsen. She lived in an apartment. She was assisted by an older Christian couple who had lived in the apartment and provided support to her informally, including doing her shopping because they had a driver who could take them out. Also, in the earlier period of her stay in [City 1] the applicant visited her sister and her husband. She did stay at the residence. However, she did not live in any permanent way with this sister. Later in this period and at latest by 2014, her sister refused to visit her. They are now estranged.
g.By 2017, the Christian couple had died and the applicant was living alone. In this time, the applicant was reclusive and frightened to travel outside her home, including to Tripoli. The applicant’s sister was not in Lebanon.
h.In more recent years in Lebanon, the severity of the harassment of the applicant as an Alawite woman declined, though she continued to experience adverse comment on the street. She also continued to have a high subjective fear of violent attack which affected her behaviour. In 2014, she warned her family to be careful about their dress, so as not to attract violent attack because they would be readily recognisable as Alawites without headscarves.

In making these findings, I have also considered the question whether the applicant ever lived with her sister. Ultimately, I accept the applicant’s evidence at hearing that she did not live permanently with her sister at any point. I accept she visited and stayed with her sister at various times when she lived in [City 1]. There is conflicting documentary evidence before the Tribunal about where the applicant lived at different times. This is not surprising given the temporary movement of people during conflict. Ultimately, I accept the applicant’s evidence which is consistent with [Ms B’s] evidence of the situation when she visited that the sisters were not living together. It is also relevant that at the time of her delegate interview and during the preparation of her evidence about her residential history and protection visa application, the applicant did not have control over her application and was not aware of the evidence being provided to the delegate. She signed documents at her brother’s home, and had not previously met her lawyer until the day of the hearing. I do not mean to suggest that the applicant’s then lawyer was aware of this situation: in his written submission to the delegate it is clear he considered the applicant was heavily reliant on her brother and that his close involvement in the matter was in the nature of support.
Real chance of serious harm arises in all areas of the receiving country
Real chance of serious harm in the applicant’s home area

Taking into account the precarious situation in the applicant’s home area first, I consider there is a real chance of extreme financial hardship that would threaten the applicant’s ability to subsist if the applicant returned to her home area in the Northern Governate now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
I accept, as is evidenced across the country information excerpted above, that there is a generalised underlying situation of economic collapse, political instability and regional and sectarian conflict in the applicant’s home area. This does not itself mean that the applicant meets the criteria for a protection visa.

In the circumstances set out above, I do not consider that the applicant could take reasonable steps to modify her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution. Where relevant, I have also already discussed this above.
In the circumstances set out above, I do not consider that there are effective protection measures available in Lebanon that could affect the outcome of this case. I have already detailed the multiple challenges affecting the ability of the LAF to materially change the situation the applicant would find herself in. I do not otherwise consider, in the context of the many limitations on the means of Lebanese authorities, that there are Lebanese authorities that could lessen the chance of serious harm to her such that the applicant would no longer meet the refugee criteria.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).
DECISION
The Tribunal sets aside and remits the application for a protection visa for reconsideration, in accordance with the order that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
Date of hearing: 15 January 2025
Representative for the Applicant: Ms Rebecca Webb
ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…
5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…
36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…

CBC article titled “‘We are in a dark tunnel’: Lebanese fear economic collapse more than the Iran-US conflict” dated 10 January 2020.