2005555 (Refugee)

2005555 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 4412 (27 September 2023)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
REPRESENTATIVE:  Ms Karyn Anderson
CASE NUMBER:  2005555
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Pakistan
MEMBER:Mark Bishop
DATE:27 September 2023
PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 27 September 2023 at 9:21am
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Pakistan – Swat region – political opinion – member of local Village Defence Committee (VDC) – Awami National Party (ANP) – opposition to the Taliban – active in providing assistance to the Pakistani army – responsible for the death of a local Taliban commander – received direct threats from the Taliban – particular social group – known activists against the Taliban – secular residents of Swat Valley – a returnee from a western country – state protection – internal relocation – Pashtun ethnicity – decision under review remitted
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H, 5J, 36, 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 2 March 2020 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicant who claims to be a citizen of Pakistan applied for the visa on 30 April 2018. The delegate refused to grant the visa.
The Tribunal resolved the review application on the papers.
The applicant provided a copy of the decision record to the Tribunal. The applicant was represented in relation to the review.
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
Geographic and Demographic Matters
Governance Pakistan
Tribunal researches disclose the following
·Pakistan includes four provinces – Sindh (capital: Karachi), Punjab (capital: Lahore), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North-West Frontier Province and now including the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas; capital: Peshawar) and Balochistan (capital: Quetta). Islamabad has its own status as a 'Federal Capital Territory'.
·All four provinces have their own elected provincial assemblies and governments. There are 170 districts in Pakistan[1]. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is divided into 7 Divisions and 39 districts inclusive of the applicant’s District of Swat[2].
[1] "Dividing governance: Three new districts notified in G-B – The Express Tribune". The Express Tribune. Administrative Setup". ajk.gov.pk26 July 2015. Retrieved 5 April 2019
[2] 1], [Locality 1]
·[Locality 1] is a locality in Swat, Khyber Paktunkhwa. [Locality 1] is situated nearby to the locations of [specified] and [specified][3], and is approximately [number] km from the city of Mingora[4].
[3] [Source redacted]
[4] [Source redacted]
·No population data was located.
·It is located approximately [number] km from Karachi[5], [number] km from Lahore[6], and [number] km from Peshawar[7].
[5] [Source redacted]
[6] [Source redacted]
[7] [Source redacted]
·Research via CISNET and Google searches did not locate any evidence of terrorism related incidents occurring in [Locality 1] in recent years.
·A Google search conducted on [Locality 1][8] resulted in geographical locations and weather forecasts of the town, as well as tourism information about the area – no evidence of or articles about terrorism related activities in the area.
[8] [Source redacted]
Swat Valley
·The Swat valley is located in the Swat District Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan. At the time of the 2017 census the district had a population of 2,308,624, of which 1,171,947 were males and 1,136,545 females. Rural population was 1,612,803 (69.86%) while the urban population was 695,821 (30.14%)[9].
[9] is mostly inhabited by Pashtuns who make up 90.78% of the population[10].
[10] "District Wise Results / Tables (Census - 2017)". Bureau of Statistics
Karachi
·Karachi is the largest city in Pakistan and 12th largest in the world, with a population of over 20 million. It is situated at the southern tip of the country along the Arabian Sea coast. It is the former capital of Pakistan and capital of the province of Sindh[11].
[11] is Pakistan's most cosmopolitan city, linguistically, ethnically, and religiously diverse, as well as one of Pakistan's most socially liberal cities[12].
[12]
·Known as the "City of Lights" in the 1960s and 1970s for its vibrant nightlife[13], Karachi was beset by sharp ethnic, sectarian, and political conflict in the 1980s with the large-scale arrival of weaponry during the Soviet–Afghan War[14]. The city had become well known for its high rates of violent crime, but recorded crimes sharply decreased following a crackdown operation against criminals, the MQM political party, and Islamist militants, initiated in 2013 by the Pakistan Rangers[15]. As a result of the operation, Karachi dropped from being ranked the world's 6th-most dangerous city for crime in 2014, to 128th by 2022[16].
[13] Gayer, Laurent (2014). Karachi: Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for the City. Oxford University Press. p. 18. ISBN 978-0-19-023806-3.
[14] "2011 brings a violent and bloody year of ethnic conflict to Karachi, Pakistan". Public Radio International. 19 January 2012. Retrieved 16 October 2016.
[15] "Karachi's ranking improves on World Crime Index". Retrieved 2 May 2021.
[16] "Karachi's ranking improves on World Crime Index". Retrieved 2 May 2021.
·Karachi has a recorded population of 20,382,881 people[17].
·Karachi is described as overwhelmingly Muslim[18], with 85% of the population being Sunni Muslims while 15% are Shiites[19], but is considered one of Pakistan’s most secular cities[20].
Lahore
·Lahore is the second largest city in Pakistan after Karachi and is the capital of the Punjab province. Lahore is considered one of Pakistan’s major industrial and economic hubs[21] and is one of Pakistan’s most socially liberal[22], progressive[23], and cosmopolitan cities[24].
·Lahore is in the north-eastern portion of Pakistan bounded on the north and west by the Sheikhupura District, on the east by Wagah, and on the south by Kasur District[25]. It has a population of 11,126,285[26], with 80.9% of its population being Punjabis, 12.6% Urdu-speaking people and 2.7% being Pashtuns[27].
Peshawar
·Peshawar is Pakistan’s sixth most populous city with a population of over 1.97 million[28]. It is situated in the north-west of the country and is the capital of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa[29]. It is primarily populated by Pashtuns[30].
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
[17] "Announcement of Results of 7th Population and Housing Census-2023 (Sindh province)" (PDF). Pakistan Bureau of Statistics ( 5 August 2023. Retrieved 15 August 2023.
[18] Paracha, Nadeem F. (26 September 2014). "Visual Karachi: From Paris of Asia, to City of Lights, to Hell on Earth". Dawn. Pakistan. Retrieved 10 March 2016.
[19] "Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population". Pew Research Center. 7 October 2009. Retrieved 28 August 2010, "Pakistan – International Religious Freedom Report 2008". United States Department of State. 19 September 2008. Retrieved 28 August 2010.
[20] Abbas, Qaswar. "Karachi: World's most dangerous city". India Today. Retrieved 24 October 2016. Karachi, Pakistan's largest city, with a population of approx. 3.0 crore (Mumbai has 2 crore people) is the country's most educated, liberal and secular metropolis.”
[21] Lahore - Wikipedia
[22] Diminishing Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific: Why Some Subside and Others Don't. Routledge. 2013. ISBN 978-0-415-67031-9. Retrieved 8 April 2017. Lahore, perhaps Pakistan's most liberal city...”
[23] Craig, Tim (9 May 2015). "The Taliban once ruled Pakistan's Swat Valley. Now peace has returned". The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Archived from the original on 24 January 2022. Retrieved 11 February 2018. "We now want to dress like the people of Punjab," said Abid Ibrahim, 19, referring to the eastern province that includes Lahore, often referred to as Pakistan's most progressive city.”
[24] "Lahore attack: Pakistan PM Sharif demands swift action on terror". BBC. 28 March 2016. Archived from the original on 16 December 2021. Retrieved 19 August 2016. Lahore is one of Pakistan's most liberal and wealthy cities. It is Mr Sharif's political powerbase and has seen relatively few terror attacks in recent years
[25] Lahore - Wikipedia
[26] "Population of Major Cities Census – 2017 [pdf]" (PDF). Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 August 2017. Retrieved 30 August 2017.
[27] "Lahore (District, Pakistan) - Population Statistics, Charts, Map and Location". the original on 20 July 2022. Retrieved 20 July 2022
[28] Peshawar - Wikipedia
[29] "NWFP Introduction". Government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Archived from the original on 30 October 2007. Retrieved 12 December 2007.
[30] "Peshawar, pakols and namkeen karahi". Aurora Dawn. Archived from the original on 28 October 2019. Retrieved 30 October 2019.
Applicant’s Claims for Protection (Part 4 of Decision Record)
In the delegate’s decision, the delegate included a summary of claims from the applicant’s protection visa application[31] and statement of claims[32] as follows[33]:
[31] Department File [number], TRIM Reference [number]
[32] Department File [number], TRIM Reference [number]
[33] Department File [number], TRIM reference [number] pp.3-5
·He is a Pashtun and Sunni Muslim
·He was born and raised in the village [Village 1], [Locality 1], Swat District, Kyhber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)
·In about 2008, the socio-political situation in the Swat region became significantly unstable due to the insurgence of militant activities by the Tahrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP or Taliban)
·Although the Pakistan military were successful in toppling the Taliban’s ruling of Swat in 2009, the militants took refuge in the mountains and began launching guerrilla type attacks on the region after the army’s operation
·Towards the end of 2009, the Pakistan army arranged for the Village Defence Committees (VDC) (also known as Peace Committees or Lashkars) to be formed across all areas of Swat to defend the villagers against attacks from the TTP
·The applicant became a member of his village VDC in 2009 as every household in the village was required to provide at least one active family member. The applicant represented his family because his father was elderly and his older brothers were not socially active.
·The VDCs collaborated with and assisted the Pakistan army to locate militants and their properties. As a VDC member, the applicant assisted the Pakistan army by “dobbing in” the local Taliban. He also participated in night patrols of his village with other VDC members and the army
·The applicant also joined the Awami National Party (ANP) around this time as the party’s political and social ideologies were the same as those held by the applicant’s family
·As part of the ANP, the applicant engaged in social and political activities. He promoted education, development and sports programs to youth in his local area to deter them from being brainwashed by the TTP. He encouraged the local youth to stand against the militants and their atrocities as he is opposed to how the Taliban and other militants kill innocent people for their own political agenda under the pretext of Islam
·In about August 2013, the applicant was warned and threatened by the Taliban (by phone) due to his anti-Islamic and anti-Taliban activities
·Less than a month later, the applicant’s car was fired at by the TTP as he and a friend drove home. The applicant’s friends was shot and died. The applicant was injured and received treatment. His car was also damaged
·He applicant was attacked by the TTP because he was a member of the VDC and the ANP who strongly opposed them and their ideologies
·After these incidents, in about September 2013, the applicant moved from one major city to another over a period of approximately 5 years, in order to be safe from the Taliban. He:
oInitially fled to Karachi and went into hiding. After a few months, he moved to Lahore as a result of sectarian violence and constant political conflict in Karachi (especially between the ANP and an opposing political party);
oLived in Lahore for about 18 months but was forced to move again out of fear for his safety after he was located by a former member of the Taliban, who was also from his village; and
oThen moved to Peshawar and stayed there for about 18 months
·The applicant returned to his village after about 5 years as he thought the problems in Swat were resolved
·Prior to leaving Swat, the applicant had provided information to the army about the location of a Taliban commander and a few other local Taliban which led to their capture and later, death. These men were captured before the applicant left his village but were killed by the army after he returned to his village
·After the killings, the applicant feared retribution by the Taliban, as he had assisted in the capture of these men, so he fled to Islamabad
·While in Islamabad, he searched for a way to depart Pakistan and was granted a Student visa to Australia
·The applicant fears if he returns to Pakistan he will be killed by the Taliban as a result of his:
oSocial and political activities with the VDC and ANP; and
oStrong opposition to the Taliban
·He fears that they will harm him on return as they are an extremely vengeful militant group whereby once a person is targeted their life is not spared
·The applicant will not be able to obtain effective protection from the Pakistani authorities as:
oThey do not have sufficient resources to combat the militants; and
oIt is almost impossible to prevent a militant attack as the perpetrators are in civilian clothing and the attacks are spontaneous
·He is unable to relocate in Pakistan as:
oHe previously relocated to several major cities but none of these felt safe and he was not able to settle there permanently; and
oThe TTP have a strong and extensive network of support and sympathisers across Pakistan
·The applicant also cannot relocate within Pakistan because of his ethnicity. As a Pashtun, he is at risk of being humiliated, blamed, mistreated and strongly discriminated against by other ethnic groups in other areas because of the perceived link between Pashtuns and the Taliban (given that the Taliban are Pashtuns). He cannot conceal his ethnicity as his National ID Card indicate Swat is his permanent place of residence, which is associated with Pashtuns.
·The applicant attended an interview on 25 March 2019 with his legal representative, and raised the following additional claim, as summarised by the delegate in the decision record[34]:
oThe applicant is also fearful of retribution on return from the family of the Taliban commander who was killed as a result of information the applicant provided to the Pakistan military. The applicant fears the Taliban commander’s family will avenge his death as per the “Pashtun Code”.
[34] Department File [number], TRIM reference [number] p.5
Delegate’s Findings of Fact )Part 5 of the Decision Record)
The delegate made the following findings of fact in the decision record[35].
[35] Department File [number], TRIM reference [number] p.10
The delegate accepted that:
·The applicant is a Pashtun
·The applicant is a low-level member of the ANP
·The applicant’s family in Pakistan are low level supporters of the ANP
·The applicant was a member of his local VDC
·The applicant fears being mistreated and discriminated against as a Pashtun in other areas of Pakistan on return

The delegate did not accept that:
·The applicant’s involvement with the ANP was of a high level in Pakistan
·His involvement with his local VDC was of a high level
·The applicant provided information to the Pakistan military that led to the capture and subsequent death of a local Taliban commander or other local Taliban members
·The applicant was personally of interest to or targeted by the Taliban for any reason while he was in Pakistan
·The applicant’s friend was killed in an attack on him by the Taliban
·The applicant relocated within Pakistan or departed Pakistan as a result of a fear of the Taliban
·The applicant fears retribution from Taliban family members on return on account of his VDC activities or for any other reason
Protection Visa Interview
An interview was held on 25 March 2019 at 9:14am at Department Office in Sydney. The applicant’s migration agent Rohan Akbar from Link Migration Services was also present. An Interpreter in the Pashto language was used to assist in the interview. The Tribunal provides the following transcript of the interview:
Discussion regarding involvement in VDC 33:26 to 41:36
D: So you said that you were a member of the VDC, when did you first become involved with the VDC?
JA: In 2009
D: How did you become involved?
JA: First there was a Peace Committee established, and then the VDC came into existence and the military was saying that from each household one person needs to become a member of the VDC. My father was old, my other brothers were not socially active, and I was against the Taliban, I wanted to do something, so I joined the VDC.
D: What activities were you doing against the Taliban at the time?
JA: Because the Pakistani military was from the Punjab area, they didn’t have information about the local people. So I passed on information to the military about the Taliban such as their names and their houses. Local people from the village, there were not many educated, they didn’t speak Urdu, I could so I facilitated communication between the local people and the military. And I also did night duty and we were there to identify people who were unknown who came and visited the area, and we would inform the military.
D: How often did you do night duties?
JA: That was once a week, my turn came once a week.
JA: If there was an issue, local people brought it to the VDC and the VDC would report it to the military.
D: What kind of issues?
JA: Issues related to transport, or activities against the Taliban. If unknown people were noticed – noted in the area.
Discussion regarding applicant’s specific role in VDC 41:36 to 44:04
D: So what intel or issues did you personally provide to the army?
JA: I identified the local commander in our area and other Taliban members to the military
D: How did you identify them?
JA: I knew these people because they had committed cruelty towards the local people and had killed children.
D: Were these acts done before everyone in the village?
JA: Yes in front of all the people from the village
D: So would it be fair to say that everyone in the village were aware of this local Taliban and the existence of these people in the village? Not just you personally?
Reporting local Taliban Commander 44:04 to 45:50
JA: Yes, all of them knew the Taliban but some of them were not part of the VDC and some were scared to notify and report but I wasn’t because I was against the Taliban.
D: So who did you report this information to?
JA: I provided first to the chairman of the VDC, then the Chairman of the VDC reported to the military.
D: And when did you make this report?
JA: I did that from 2009 until 2013
D: So that was your duties in the VDC?
JA: Yes
D: Okay, but when did you provide the specific intel about the local Taliban commander to your VDC Chairman?
JA: 2010
Discussion regarding applicant’s role in the ANP 45:50 to 55:32
D: So you also mentioned that you joined the political party, the Awami National Party. When did you join that?
JA: I was a part of the ANP when I was a student, a college student. Then in 2008 I joined the national youth organisation of the party. I was [an office bearer] of the union council.
D: What was your role as [office bearer]?
JA: The Taliban were enlisting young people and brainwashing them and using them as terrorists. I was contacting the youth, young people, and educating them that what the Taliban was doing was not right.
D: How were you educating them?
JA: I was organising sports activities and there I would educate the youth that what the Taliban was doing was not right.
D: So this was while you were joining the Youth party of the ANP. When did you join the main party of the ANP?
JA: Before that I was a member but in 2009 I became the [office bearer] of youth – national youth. That was of the higher level and it happened in 2009. It was of the level of the union council.
D: Did you hold any other roles in the ANP after that?
JA: No
D: So did you engage in any other activities as the union [office bearer]?
JA: Main duties were organising sports activities and educating the youth against the Taliban, giving them awareness.
D: You said earlier that you would do this while you organised some sport and educated them there. Were there any other ways you provided this education?
JA: Other than that whenever I met young members of the society I talked with them and made sure they were aware of what was happening. And I encouraged them to focus on their education. I educated them so they wouldn’t be deceived or tricked by the Taliban.
Discussion re. family in VDC or ANP 58:55 to 59:40
D: Were your family involved in politics or the VDC?
JA: In VDC it was just me because from each household there was one person in the VDC. And my family was part of the ANP because they liked the party.
D: Were they members or just supporters?
JA: Supporters
Discussion re. attack on car in 2013 59:40 to1:05:38
D: When were you first fearful for your safety in Pakistan?
JA: It was the first time in 2013 when I received the threats from the Taliban saying that they would kill me because I was against the Taliban and Islam. And then a month after that, the Taliban attacked me. It happened when I went to mingle at the bazaar, and then I was on my way back home, I was with a very close friend. So while we were on our way back home, we were fired at. We were fired at from the left side. When they fired, I lost control and hit a tree, and then went unconscious. My friend was seated on the left side and he was hit and was killed.
D: Did you see who fired at you?
JA: No. But a month before that the Taliban called me and threatened me that they would kill me because I was working against them.
D: Do you have any documentation of the injuries you sustained as a result of the attack? Or that your friend sustained?
JA: After that I went to a private clinic so if you want, I will try to get a letter from that place. A letter that I was treated there.
D: You also mentioned that your car was badly damaged. Do you have any documentation in relation to the damage to your car?
JA: I have documents of the vehicle but the vehicle was not insurance because there is no insurance in that area. So when an accident happens you repair the vehicle yourself.
D: Did you report the incident to the police?
JA: No.
D: Why not?
JA: The police were carrying out activities against the Taliban. But there wasn’t any specific person to go after at this time. The police knew that it was something that was done by the Taliban but the Taliban at that time were not just wondering freely, they were undercover in civilian clothes.
Discussion re. telephone threats received from Taliban 1:05:38 to 1:08:51
D: Can you describe the threats you first received from the Taliban?
JA: They called me and told me that I was working against Islam and the Taliban, and I had identified the Taliban and others to the military. And for that reason they would kill me. And that Taliban commander that I identified and showed to the military was later on killed by the military.
D: When was he killed?
JA: 2013
D: Was this before or after the phone calls?
JA: They had been arrested before the telephone call. This commander was killed later on. But other members of the Taliban were killed before.
D: So when was the commander killed?
JA: 2013
D: Did you report the – the threatening phone calls to police?
JA: No. Because they were already involved in activities with the military against the Taliban. And the Taliban were continuing activities in civilian clothes. It was difficult to identify them.
Discussion re. escaping to Karachi 1:08:51 to 1:14:35
D: How were you identified by the Taliban?
JA: When I was attacked, after that I went to Karachi to be safe there. In Karachi there was also problems between the ANP and MQM party and there were clashes between the parties and people were being killed.
D: Were you engaged in any political activities in Karachi for the ANP?
JA: No I wasn’t involved. But when I went to Karachi I was contacting the members of the ANP and seeking their help – protection. I told them I was there seeking protection but during that I was also being noticed by MQM members knowing I was also part of the party.
D: Earlier I asked you how you were identified by the Taliban and you didn’t answer my question. So how were you identified by the Taliban?
TA: Because the situation was bad in Karachi I went to Lahore. And in Lahore I was there for a year and a half and then I was, someone from our village saw me and that one who saw me was a member of the Taliban
D: Where did you stay when you went to Lahore?
JA: [unclear] Bazaar
D: And how did you find that accommodation?
JA: I approached a real estate agent and told them that I was looking for a room and they arranged it.
D: Where did you stay when you were living in Karachi?
JA: [Location]
D: And how did you find that accommodation
JA: Through a real estate agent
D: Were you engaged in any work in Karachi?
JA: No because of the result of that incident, I was mentally not okay to do work
D: Did you work in Lahore?
JA: While in Lahore I was feeling a little better, so I did some [work].
D: And how long did you work in that job for?
JA: When I got there, I was looking for work, it took like 3 months or so. Then I found work and worked for a year.
Discussion re. being spotted in Lahore 1:14:35 to 1:21:40
D: You spoke earlier about being spotted by a former Taliban villager. Could you explain to me more about that?
JA: I went outside to the bazaar and there I saw a few members of the Taliban from my village. I was identified by them and they identified me and knew that I was someone who was working in the area against them. Those were some of those Talibans that when the army launched their investigation they disappeared.
D: Why were they interested in you and your activities against the Taliban so many years later?
JA: From 2009 to 2012, the army was very much in control of the area, like about every 5 km apart they had check posts. So they were searching for people and arresting people there. But after that when their control loosened then the Taliban started to in civilian clothes target people, they became active.
D: After Lahore, where did you go?
JA: After that incident when I was spotted by the Taliban members in Lahore, I started to feel insecure in that area thinking that they would now look for me. So I moved to Peshawar.
D: And what did you do there?
JA: I was there for about a year and half. I did [some] work. I was contacted by my father advising me to return home. Telling me that the situation had improved. I could return and stay with the family there and saying it had been a long time that I was away and they had not seen me.
D: So when did you return home?
JA: 2017 I don’t remember the exact date.
Discussion re applicant’s return to Swat and death of Taliban commander 1:21:40 to 1:26:55
D: And what happened when you returned?
JA: About a month and half after my return, the military killed that Taliban commander that I had identified and they returned the dead body to the Taliban. So after that because the Taliban knew that I was the person that had identified and reported the Taliban to the military, the risk to me doubled.
D: Earlier you said that when the Taliban commander was killed. Twice you said it was 2013. You now said it was in 2017.
JA: Maybe I didn’t understand what you said. What I said was that he was identified and arrested in 2013. And he was killed in 2017.
D: Why would the army wait that long to kill him? If they identified him and arrested him in 2013, why wait four years?
JA: The reason that they didn’t kill him earlier was because they were trying to get information from him to identify other members of the Taliban. Those members of the Taliban who disappeared.
D: Why did you think that you were at greater risk as a result of the killing of this commander?
JA: Because I was the one who identified and showed that commander to the army. And he was a big commander of the Taliban and the Taliban had attacked me once before. So this time I was thinking for revenge they were going to attack me.
D: How did they know it was you that provided the information?
JA: Because I was in close contact with the military and news that I was the one who pointed out and showed the commander to the military spread throughout the area, village area. So the Taliban knew that I was the one who did it.
Discussion re. why the applicant wasn’t attacked sooner than 2013 1:26:55 to 1:29:08
D: One of the things I’m having difficulty understanding was that you said that you were part of the VDC and the ANP since 2009 but you were first attacked in 2013. Why weren’t you attacked prior to that given that you say that you were very active in your opposition to the Taliban?
JA: As I mentioned earlier from 2009 to 2012 the military was firmly in control of the area, they had a lot of check posts everywhere and every 5km a part. They were searching for people so it was difficult for the Taliban to do anything, even in civilian clothes. But later on in 2013 when there weren’t many check posts, then the Taliban started to become active.
Discussion re. how family could remain safely in Swat 1:29:08 to 1:31:14
D: Another issue that I wanted to raise with you based on what you’re saying is how were your family able to continue living in the Swat region given that you say the Taliban were after you since 2013 as Country Information indicates that the Taliban targeted member of the family of their targets.
JA: The Taliban wouldn’t harm other members of the family but they would pressure them, harass them to try and get information about the person who was against them. They would target the person who was specifically against them not other members of the family.
Discussion if applicant was returned to Pakistan 1:31:14 to 1:34:10
D: If you were to return to Pakistan, what would your daily routine be?
JA: If I go back to Pakistan I won’t be able to do anything because I would be scared that I would be identified and harmed by the Taliban.
D: Why would they still be interested in you?
JA: Because I was involved in the, when I identified the main commander of the Taliban who was killed. And yesterday, they killed someone from other village named [unclear].
D: And who were these people?
JA: The Taliban. The Taliban took responsibility.
D: And who were these people who got killed?
JA: [unclear] village, a member of the VDC but was not so active, not as active as I was. If they killed him, someone who was not that active, they are going to do the same, I was more active than that person. If I go back, they will kill me.
Discussion re. relocation 1:34:10 to 1:35:31
D: Do you fear anyone else upon return?
JA: Not from anybody else but the Taliban. The Taliban are everywhere. I won’t feel safe in any city.
D: So there’s nowhere else you would be able to relocate, is that what you’re saying?
JA: After 2013 I relocated to other places but it wasn’t safe, so if I go back it will be the same thing.
Discussion re. risk of harm due to ANP membership 1:35:31 to 1:43:54
D: So you also mentioned in your written application that because of your membership of the ANP you also fear being harmed on return. Country Information indicates that ANP members are the subject of few attacks at the moment due to the improving security situation in Pakistan and in Swat. Would you like to comment on that?
JA: Incidents do take place, people are killed for example, yesterday this person who was killed. Another body of another person was found in an area called Shaidiri (?). These incidents that took place to people who are low profile but these low profile cases don’t get reported by the media. In 2018, brother of member of provincial party Bashir, his brother was targeted and killed. His name was Bilaur. So that was a high profile case. About six seven months ago, a police inspector by the name of [unclear] was kidnapped and later on killed by the Taliban.
D: How do you see all these cases relating to you?
JA: It has a relationship to my case because these people who are high profile, if they were not safe, they were not protected, how can I be safe and protected?
JA: I gave the examples of some high profile people who were killed. I meant by that they were very high profile people and they had protection, I mean they had security but despite that they were targeted and killed. They could not be protected. So someone like me who is not high profile cannot be safe because I am an easy target. And low profile people have been, a number of them have been targeted and killed, I can name some of these people. Riaz, this person was from any area called Kanju. Farhad Rashid, Rahmut Ali, [names]. These were recently targeted. If you want, I can, I will try to get the news articles and pass it on to the lawyer who can then pass it on to you.
JA: Just another point. As I’m just an ordinary person and low profile there won’t be any security provided or protection. I won’t have security. I am not educated that much to find work in other cities, it would be difficult, and life is also expensive in those other places.
Representative Submissions
On 21 September 2023, the applicant’s representative provided the Tribunal with their pre-hearing submissions in support of the review application. These submissions included:
·Legal Submission dated 21 September 2023
·Statutory Declaration by the applicant dated 21 September 2023
·Psychologist Report by [Mr A] dated 20 September 2023
·Letter by [Mr B], Joint Secretary of the ANP dated 12 September 2023
·Letter by [Mr C], General Secretary of the ANP dated 11 September 2023
·Latter of [Mr D], Chairman of the VDC dated 10 September 2023
Support Letters
The letter by [Mr B], Joint Secretary of the ANP, advises that the applicant is an active worker of the ANP and plays a prominent role for the “prosperity and promotions of Awami National Party”[36]. It states that the applicant was the [office bearer] of the National Youth organisation for union council [specified], and that the applicant was on a hitlist for terrorists and that several threats were delivered to him, including people visiting to his home and asking about him[37].
[36] Letter by [Mr B] dated 12 September 2023, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
[37] Letter by [Mr B] dated 12 September 2023, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
The letter by [Mr C], General Secretary of the ANP, affirms that the applicant is an active worker of the ANP, and that the applicant was on a hit list of the terrorists, and that several threats were delivered to him. It is also stated that terrorists are still underground and making target killings[38].
[38] Letter by [Mr C] dated 11 September 2023, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
Finally, the letter by [Mr D], Chairman of the VDC, state that the applicant was a member of the VDC and performed duties for the VDC including night patrols, providing information to the Pakistan military, showing Taliban houses to the Pakistan military, including a famous Taliban commander’s house leading to his arrest and the destruction of his home, conducting peace meetings and conferences in the village where people would get together and tell him their problems, and facilitating communication with the army and the civilians, as the army came from Punjab province and did not understand the local language[39]. The letter also confirmed that the applicant was on the hit list of the Taliban and that several threats were delivered to him, and that he was also attacked once by the Taliban but that he was saved[40].
[39] Letter by [Mr D] dated 10 September 2023, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
[40] Letter by [Mr D] dated 10 September 2023, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
Psychologist Letter

In the letter dated 20 September 2023, the applicant’s psychologist [Mr A] stated that the applicant first sought an appointment with him in November 2022, however [Mr A]’s first available appointment was not until 31 August 2023 when they had their initial consultation. He states that prior to their initial consultation, [Mr A] requested that the applicant obtain a referral and mental health care plan which was issued by his GP on 28 August 2023 for management and treatment of mixed anxiety, depression, and associated symptoms. [Mr A] states that he has had four one- hour long sessions with the applicant on 31 August 2023, 1 September 2023, 16 September 2023 and 19 September 2023 in both face-to-face and telehealth platforms. He states that the next scheduled session is 3 October 2023[41].
[41] Psychologist Report by [Mr A] dated 20 September 2023 p.2, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
[Mr A] reports that he has administered a psychometric test called the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS) in which the applicant has consistently showed “severe” in the depression scale, and “extremely severe” in the anxiety and stress scales, where severity ranges in order from normal, mild, moderate, severe, and extremely severe. Results from a Mental Health Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) psychometric test showed a “high-risk” of suffering from PTSD, where severity ranges in order from low risk, mild risk, moderate risk, high risk, and very high risk[42]. [Mr A] states that the applicant’s psychosocial history, assessment, clinical presentation and mental status examination is consistent with a diagnosis of PTSD comorbid with Major Depressive Disorder, with anxious distress, severe as outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed, DSM-5), for which he is being treated pharmacologically with the psychotropic medication Apo-Mirtazapine[43].
[42] Psychologist Report by [Mr A] dated 20 September 2023 p.2, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
[43] Psychologist Report by [Mr A] dated 20 September 2023 p.2, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
The report goes on to state that the applicant experienced trauma in the context of civil unrest in his home country, including his friend who was killed by the Taliban, and fleeing as his life was endangered, and that the applicant experiences common PTSD symptoms including but not limited to regular nightmares, flashbacks, dissociation, intrusive memories, prolonged psychological distress and marked physiological reactions in response to internal and external cues[44]. He also experiences depressed mood for most of the day, marked diminished interest and pleasure in normal activities, recurrent insomnia, fatigue and loss of energy, diminished ability to concentrate and suicidal ideation as a result of his Major Depressive Disorder, and anxious responses including elevated heart rate and perspiration in the absence of physical exertion. [Mr A] reports that these symptoms and illnesses are consistent with his psychosocial history[45].
[44] Psychologist Report by [Mr A] dated 20 September 2023 p.3, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
[45] Psychologist Report by [Mr A] dated 20 September 2023 p.3, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
[Mr A] writes that the applicant’s psychological condition detrimentally affects his daily functioning as he experiences severe memory, mood, sleep and appetite disturbances, affecting his ability to work. [Mr A] states that the uncertainty surrounding his visa application coupled with its associated repercussions such as isolation, the inability to see his parents and siblings for about five years and other daily stress and struggles of life appear to be the maintaining and perpetuating factors of his psychological illnesses, and that a resolution in his immigration case will significantly improve his mental health and assist in the prevention of exacerbation and perpetuation of his psychological illnesses[46].
[46] Psychologist Report by [Mr A] dated 20 September 2023 p.3, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
Finally, [Mr A] writes that ongoing clinical intervention is important to reduce the chance of intensifying of symptoms and to prevent development of further comorbid psychological illnesses such as schizophrenia and to monitor for risk of self-harm and suicidality, and that the applicant has agreed to fortnightly to monthly treatment sessions[47]. He states[48] that should the applicant return to Pakistan, the likelihood of his recovery will be significantly reduced as the recommended treatment is unavailable in Pakistan and returning would significantly increase his risk of developing further illnesses and comorbidities, self-harm and suicidality[49].
[47] Psychologist Report by [Mr A] dated 20 September 2023 p.3, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
[48] The Tribunal notes no supporting evidence was put forward to support this proposition and that in past Pakistani cases the AAT published evidence of extensive psychological and psychiatric services available in Mingora City and the wider KP Province of Pakistan.
[49] Psychologist Report by [Mr A] dated 20 September 2023 p.4, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
Applicant Statutory Declaration
On 21 September 2023 the applicant provided a lengthy statutory declaration to the Tribunal. The content of this statutory declaration was largely consistent with the detail set out above in respect of his Application for a Protection Visa and subsequent departmental interview. The statutory declaration addressed the following:
·Early schooling, ANP membership, membership of ANP national youth organisation, leaving Swat in 2009, creation of VDC’s at behest of Pakistani armed forces, role of VDC’s, targeted killing from 2011 by Taliban of members of ANP and VDC’s[50].
[50] Statutory Declaration by the applicant dated 21 September 2023, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643 pages 1 and 2.
Applicant role in VDC
·Applicant role in VDC and provision of detailed information re local Taliban members, supporters and activists to Pakistani army.
2013 Attack
·Taliban phone threats in 2013, physical Taliban attacks and death of friend at the hands of local Taliban, lack of investigation of this incident and applicant belief this attack directly related to his VDC activity[51].
[51] Statutory Declaration by the applicant dated 21 September 2023, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643 pages 3 and 4.
Relocation to Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar
·Relocation to Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar post the incident in 2013, hiding in Karachi for about 9 months, relocation to Lahore for about 18 months, inter political party clashes and violence, Taliban identification of applicant in Lahore, subsequent relocation to Peshawar for about 18 months with eventual work [in] this city[52].
[52] Statutory Declaration by the applicant dated 21 September 2023, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643 page 5
Ethnic discrimination during relocations
Return to Swat
·Return to Swat in 2017 as he had heard problems had lessened. Discovery of death of local Taliban commander and general awareness that the applicant was responsible for his death.
Relocation and state protection
Mental health
ANP Letters
Legal Submissions
The applicant’s representative also provided submissions dated 21 September 2023[54]. In those submissions, the representative provided a background to the applicant’s situation and referred to the applicant’s claims for protection, being:
·In relation to the delegate’s adverse finding regarding the length of time between the Taliban commander’s arrest and death, it was submitted that it was plausible that a prisoner of war, such as a Taliban commander, would have been held for four years by the army for any number of reasons, including the extraction of information as suggested by the applicant. It was not the applicant’s duty to establish such a general proposition. The delegate, having invited the applicant to speculate as to that matter, then rejected the applicant’s plausible suggestion as there was no evidence before the delegate to support it[55].
·The delegate was also concerned that the intelligence provided by the applicant as part of the VDC would not be valuable given the likelihood other locals knew about the commander. The representative submitted that the Tribunal can accept the applicant’s explanation for this, as the delegate appeared to accept, that the applicant provided the information from his privileged position as a VDC member and representative from the village to the army[56].
·The delegate was also concerned with the level of detail provided by the applicant at first instance. The representative acknowledged that details now provided by the applicant were left out of his original application and referred to the applicant’s statutory declaration at [15] and [17] where he provides significant further details including names of the commanders and other members and key details about them[57].
·The delegate described the applicant as an ordinary ANP member with a low profile. The representative submitted that “low-level” may be accurate in the literal sense of his role within the ANP, but that the applicant’s profile as any army informer and pro-ANP and anti-Taliban actor is high, particularly in view of the death of Ur Rehman. In this regard, his ANP involvement is highly relevant but not the foremost aspect of his profile[58].
·The delegate accepted that the applicant was a VDC members but considered his involvement to be “low-level”. The representative submitted that but for the rejection of the applicant’s informant claim, his profile as a VDC member cannot be described as “low-level”, as his informant activities plainly raised his profile by making him a target for Taliban attacks, especially in 2013 following Ur Rehman’s arrest and 2017 following his death[59].
·The representative urged the Tribunal to resist the delegate’s compartmentalised reasoning and consider the applicant’s claims in context. It was submitted that the applicant’s profile is significant in Swat due to his various anti-Taliban activities, including his membership and support of the ANP, his leadership role in the National Youth Organisation, and his role in the VDC as an army informant[60].
Country Information Pakistan
[54] Representative Submission dated 21 September 2023, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
[55] Representative Submission dated 21 September 2023 p.8, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
[56] Representative Submission dated 21 September 2023 p.8, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
[57] Representative Submission dated 21 September 2023 p.8, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
[58] Representative Submission dated 21 September 2023 p.9, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
[59] Representative Submission dated 21 September 2023 p.9, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
[60] Representative Submission dated 21 September 2023 p.10, Tribunal File 2005555, Doc ID: 11548643
Country Information ANP
The recent Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Country Information Report Pakistan sets out the following concerning the ANP in Pakistan:
·The Awami National Party (ANP) is a secular Pashtun nationalist political party. It was formed in 1986 and enjoys strong support in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Between 2008 and 2013, the ANP governed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and was a junior partner in the federal coalition government. Since 2018, ANP members have participated in large-scale demonstrations led by the PTM against human rights abuses against Pashtuns in the tribal regions of Pakistan[61].
·The ANP is anti-Taliban, and TTP militants have attacked ANP members due to its secular ideology, support for the military and work to improve the Pakistan- Afghanistan bilateral relationship. In July 2018, a suicide bomb attack at an election rally in Peshawar wounded 69 and killed at least 20, including prominent ANP politician Haroon Bilour. In June 2019, the Peshawar city district president of ANP, Sartaj Khan, was gunned down in Gulbahar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The ANP was also the target of TTP attacks ahead of the May 2013 elections. While security operations have weakened the TTP in recent years, they retain the capacity and intent to target ANP members and leadership (see Armed Groups)[62].
·DFAT assesses ANP members face a moderate risk of terrorist violence based on the ANP’s opposition to the TTP. The risk may be higher for ANP leaders. ANP leaders may also be at risk of official harassment due to their association with the PTM protest movement[63].
[61] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Country Information Report Pakistan dated 25
[62] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Country Information Report Pakistan dated 25
[63]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Country Information Report Pakistan dated 25
January 2022 Paragraph 3.75
A recent report from the UK Government provided the following relevant detail[64].
·In general, low-level members and activists of opposition political parties, or their family members, are unlikely to be of interest to the authorities and/or non-state actors and subject to treatment that is sufficiently serious, by its nature or repetition, to amount to persecution.
·Some senior party members may – depending on the party, their location, the person’s profile, views expressed and previous activities, and difficulties with the state, particularly in relation to corruption charges – be subject to treatment, including harassment, arrest, arbitrary detention and criminal charges by the security forces, which amounts to persecution.
·…g) Threats from non-state actors
oParagraph 3.1.17 In general, the risk to political leaders, supporters and activists by non-state actors is unlikely to be sufficiently serious, by its nature or repetition, to amount to persecution.
oParagraph 3.1.18 The level of risk will depend on the particular profile of the person, the party they support and the area it operates in, their activities, the nature of the threat and how far it would extend. Decision makers must consider each case on its facts with the onus on the person to show that they would be at real risk of serious harm or persecution on account of their actual or perceived political opinion.
[64] 'Country policy and information note: political parties and affiliation, Pakistan, May 2023', Government of United Kingdom, 25 April 2023
Applicant relation/connection to ANP
In his various submissions to the Department and the Tribunal the applicant outlined his historical links to the ANP as follows:
·The applicant described his role with ANP as a member. He joined the National Youth Organisation of the party in 2008 and was the [office bearer] of the union council in 2009[65].
·The applicant described his role as [office bearer] as: ‘organising sports activities’ where he would ‘educate the youth that what the Taliban was doing was not right[66]’
·He describes his family as supporters of the ANP but not members[67].
[65] PV Interview at 45:50
[66] PV Interview at 47:42
[67] PV Interview at 58:55
Country Information VDC’s or Peace Committees
Country Information[68] re VDC’s in Pakistan reveals the following detail:
·Paragraph 3.83 In some conflict-affected areas, including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, local communities or the Pakistani government have empowered local councils called ‘peace committees’ (aman jirga) to help oppose militant groups such as the TTP. According to a 2017 working paper by the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, members of these committees ‘are appointed by the military or police in order to deal with security issues and to bring peace in an area, with the government giving them authority for out of-court arbitration’. Villages may also form peace committees of their own accord. Despite their name, peace committees take many guises, ranging from ‘keeping an eye on’ terrorist activities to actual engagement against terrorist groups as armed tribal militias.
·Paragraph 3.84 Multiple sources told DFAT that members of peace committees and their families were targeted for violence by militant groups (especially the TTP). Peace committees have themselves sometimes been accused of violence or human rights abuses (see Judiciary, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment).
·Paragraph 3.85 DFAT assesses members of peace committees and their families are at moderate risk of violence by militant groups[69].
·News reports indicate at least 200-250 Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)members are in Swat Valley and surrounding areas. The most recent incident occurring in June 2023, where two police constables and a bank security guard were killed in Sabzi Mandi, Swat Valley by TTP[70]. In September 2022, a former peace committee member and two police officers were among eight people killed by a remote controlled bomb[71]. In October 2022 thousands of people rallied in Swat Valley to protest the increase of shootings following the killing of a local school bus driver shot by an unknown person[72]. Protests by residents of the Swat Valley against the resurgence of TTP in their province continued into January 2023[73].
[68] DFAT Country Information Report Pakistan (25 January 2022)
[69] DFAT Country Information Report Pakistan (25 January 2022), p.30
[70] 'Radical Islam Makes its Way from Afghanistan to Pakistan', Salman Rafi Sheikh, Asia Sentinel, 15 August 2022, 'TTP ‘checkpoint’ established in Swat: report', Nation, The (Pakistan), 11 August 2022,; 'Pakistan: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Swat Valley witnessing a resurgence of the TTP', The Print (India), 8 November 2022, and 'Swat between conflict and peace', Usman Torwali, Pakistan Today, 15 August 2022,; 'Challenges For Pakistan As The Taliban Return', Osama Ahmad, Friday Times (Pakistan), 15 August 2022
[71] 'Killings, Abductions Fuel Fear of Taliban Return in North-West Pakistan', ReliefWeb, 13 September 2022, 'Swat blast claims five lives, including peace committee member: police', Sirajuddin, Dawn (Pakistan), 12 September 2022
[72] 'Thousands protest increased violence in Pakistan’s Swat Valley', Abid Hussain, Al Jazeera, 10 October 2022,
[73] 'Pashtuns Rally For Peace In The Face Of A Renew ed Offensive Against The Pakistani Taliban', Abubakar Siddique, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Gandhara, 13 January 2023
Applicant describes his role in VDC

The applicant outlined his role in the VDC in the following terms:
·The applicant describes his role in the VDC as passing on information to the military about the Taliban, such as their names and their houses[74].
·He also described his role as facilitating communication between the local people and the military and conducting night duty to identify people who were unknown who came and visited the area and informing the military[75].
·He states that he provided the army with information about a Taliban commander in his local village in 2010 which lead to his arrest by the army[76].
·The applicant claims he worked for the VDC from 2009 to 2013[77].
[74] PV Interview at 33:26
[75] PV Interview at 34:50
[76] PV Interview at 45:22
[77] PV Interview at 44:49
Country Information TTP
Some recent reports outline increased activity on the part of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as follows:
·     The TTP have continued to target police and military personal in ‘revenge attacks’ across the country since the peace negotiations broke down in November 2022. PIPS[78] estimated that the TTP and its associated groups carried out approximately 179 attacks in 2022, causing an estimated 250 deaths with a majority of them belonging to law enforcement agencies[79].
[78] Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies
[79] 'Pakistan Security Report 2022', Muhammad Amir Rana and Safdar Sial, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, January 2023, p. 11, 20230127084946;
·     The militant group has intensified its operations within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and areas bordering Afghanistan[80]. In the first quarter of 2023 multiple attacks, by the TTP and its closely affiliated groups, on police personnel occurred[81]. On 30 January 2023 the largest attack on police personnel occurred where 101 people were killed and 59 were injured after a suicide bomber self-detonated in a mosque in Peshawar’s Police Lines[82].
·     The TTP have warned ruling political parties, including Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari it will be taking ‘concrete action’ against the Pakistani government for ‘declaring war’ against their organisation[83].
·     In November 2022 the TTP ended its ceasefire talks with the government and issued an order to its members to carry out attacks across the country[84]. On 28 November the TTP announced an end to the ceasefire and called on all members ‘…to carry out attacks…wherever…in the entire country[85].’ Since the announcement several terror attacks have occurred – targeting the Hazara community in Quetta[86], polio workers[87], police officials[88], and female students[89].
Evidence that Taliban activity is now confined to NW KPK
·     The TTP have continued to target police[90] and military personal[91] in ‘revenge attacks’[92] across the country since the peace negotiations broke down in November 2022[93]. PIPS estimated that the TTP and its associated groups carried out approximately 179 attacks in 2022, causing an estimated 250 deaths with a majority of them belonging to law enforcement agencies[94].
·     The militant group has intensified its operations within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and areas bordering Afghanistan[95].
·     Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has emerged as the most affected province.
·     The PICC Militancy Database showing a 51 per cent rise in terror attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2023 compared to the same period in 2022[96]. North Waziristan continued to be a major location for incidents for a third year in a row, followed by neighbouring South Waziristan tribal district. Other Kyber Pakhtunkhwa locations which recorded high levels of insurgency included Peshawar, Khyber, Di Khan, Lakki Mawat, Bannu and Bajaur[97].
·     Most terrorist attacks target civilians or security forces, vehicles and outposts. Most attacks happen in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (especially North Waziristan) and Balochistan, although Punjab and Sindh (especially Karachi) are also targeted. There were no attacks in Islamabad, Gilgit-Baltistan or Azad Kashmir in 2020[98].
[80] ‘Police vehicle narrowly escapes bomb blast in Peshawar’s Badaber area', Zahid Imdad, Dawn (Pakistan), 21 January 2023,; Pakistan Security Report 2022', Muhammad Amir Rana and Safdar Sial, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, January 2023, p. 14,
[81] 'Three Islamists, two others killed in storming of Karachi police station', Akhtar Soomro and Ariba Shahid, Reuters, 17 February 2023,; 'Death toll from Peshawar mosque bombing rises to 101 as police say ‘major arrests’ made', Sirajuddin, Dawn (Pakistan), 31 January 2023,
[82] 'Death toll from Peshawar mosque bombing rises to 101 as police say ‘major arrests’ made', Sirajuddin, Dawn (Pakistan), 31 January 2023
[83] ‘Pakistan Taliban threatens top political leadership including PM', Abid Hussain, Al Jazeera, 03 January 2023,
[84] 'Pakistan Taliban ends ceasefire with gov’t, threatens new attacks', Abid Hussain, Al Jazeera, 27 November 2022, 'TTP ends ceasefire with govt, orders its militants to 'carry out attacks in entire country'', Tahir Khan, Dawn (Pakistan), 28 November 2022,
[85] 'TTP ends ceasefire with govt, orders its militants to 'carry out attacks in entire country'', Tahir Khan, Dawn (Pakistan), 28 November 2022, 'Pakistan Taliban ends ceasefire with gov’t, threatens new attacks', Abid Hussain, Al Jazeera, 27 November 2022
[86] 'At Least Nine Reportedly Killed In Taliban Attack On Village In Ethnic Hazara Province', Gandhara (Pakistan), 26 November 2022,
[87] 'Five police personnel protecting polio team injured in DI Khan firing', Ahmed Nawas Mughal, Samaa, 4 January 2023, 'Four Killed, 26 Wounded In Quetta Suicide Attack Claimed By Pakistani Taliban', RFE/RL's Radio Mashaal, Gandhara (Pakistan), 29 November 2022,
[88] 'Four Killed, 26 Wounded In Quetta Suicide Attack Claimed By Pakistani Taliban', RFE/RL's Radio Mashaal, Gandhara (Pakistan), 29 November 2022,
[89] 'One Person Killed In Armed Attack On Pakistan Girls' School', RFE/RL's Radio Mashaal, Gandhara (Pakistan), 04 December 2022
[90] 'Death toll from Peshawar mosque bombing rises to 101 as police say ‘major arrests’ made', Sirajuddin, Dawn (Pakistan), 31 January 2023,; 'Pakistani militants claim killing of two intelligence officials', Saud Mehsud and Mubasher Bukhari, Reuters, 04 January 2023, '3 cops martyred in terrorist attack on Khyber checkpost', Tahir Khan, Dawn (Pakistan), 18 January 2023,; 'Police officer among 3 martyred in late-night attack on police station in Peshawar', Tahir Khan, Dawn (Pakistan), 13 January 2023, 20230131091234; 'Militants Kill Three Security Personnel In Attack On Police Station In Northwestern Pakistan', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Gandhara, 13 January 2023, 'Police vehicle narrowly escapes bomb blast in Peshawar’s Badaber area', Zahid Imdad, Dawn (Pakistan), 21 January 2023, 'Cop martyred in attack on Charsadda police post', Dawn (Pakistan), 21 January 2023, and 'At least 59 martyred, 157 injured in Peshawar Police Line mosque blast', Express Tribune (Pakistan), 29 January 2023
[91] 'Taliban ends ceasefire with Pakistani government, vows ‘revenge attacks’ across the country', Bill Roggio, Long War Journal, The, 21 November 2022, 'Soldier martyred in Bannu IED blast: ISPR', Dawn (Pakistan), 22 January 2023,
[92] 'Implications of TTP Attack on Counter Terrorism Department Compound in Bannu', Ali Zahid, Jamestown Foundation, 19 January 2023,
[93] 'TTP ends ceasefire with govt, orders its militants to 'carry out attacks in entire country'', Tahir Khan, Dawn (Pakistan), 28 November 2022, ''Clouds Of War Are Gathering': Pakistanis Brace For Bloody
[94] 'Pakistan Security Report 2022', Muhammad Amir Rana and Safdar Sial, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, January 2023, p. 11,
[95] Police vehicle narrowly escapes bomb blast in Peshawar’s Badaber area', Zahid Imdad, Dawn (Pakistan), 21 January 2023, Pakistan Security Report 2022', Muhammad Amir Rana and Safdar Sial, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, January 2023,
[96] 'Terrorism in Pakistan Soars 79% in First Half of 2023', Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, 2 July 2023,
[97] 'Pakistan Security Report 2022', Muhammad Amir Rana and Safdar Sial, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, January 2023, p.14,
[98] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Country Information Report Pakistan dated 25
Evidence, Findings, Analysis and Conclusions
The Tribunal finds as follows:
·The applicant grew up in a secular Pashtun family in the village of [Village 1]. He and his family were active in the ANP.
·He was a member of the VDC in the village of [Village 1].
·Many of the applicant’s friends were also active to varying degrees in the ANP and the local VDC. One of his friends was killed by the Taliban in a car attack targeted at the applicant.
·The applicant was an active participant in his VDC at varying times whilst resident in his home village.
·The applicant was active in providing assistance to the Pakistani army as part of its fight against the TTP in the KP Province of Pakistan.
·The applicant has received direct threats from the Taliban over a period of many years.
·These threats were directed at the applicant because of his activities in the ANP and leadership role within the VDC. This leadership role involved the applicant over a lengthy period of time putting his own life at risk for the purpose of protecting his village, family and friends. The applicant voluntarily put his own life at risk by identifying Taliban members, supporters, activists, fighters and safehouses to the Pakistani army. The information and assistance he provided directly related in the death of a Taliban commander.
·The Taliban continue to seek revenge for what they regard as the applicant’s role in the death of one of their key fighters.
·On and from December 2022 TTP activities in and around the Swat District have increased by a significant degree to such an extent that it is likely the applicant and would be and are in danger if he should return to any part of KP. The Tribunal is of the view a person with a history that lead to the death of a Taliban leader and combatant at the hands of the Pakistani armed forces would continue to be a person of interest to that organisation at time of decision.
·The applicant suffers from severe PTSD occasioned by his fear of the Taliban and their likely retribution against him if he should return to his home village or anywhere else in KP Province.
·The applicant need to be able to access continuing mental health treatment from a suitably trained professional in the field of psychiatry or psychology as appropriate. Such services are readily available in locales immediately adjacent to the applciant’s home village.
·He will suffer discrimination in other parts of Pakistan, particularly Karachi on account of his Pashtun ethnicity.
·Adequate police protection or state protection is not accessible by the applicant on account of his Pashtun ethnicity, police corruption and likely police interference because of oftentimes loyalty or obligations to wider considerations not directly related to the applicant or his background as an anti-Taliban activist in the KP Province of Pakistan.
Pakistan is a large, diverse country with extremes of living standards in the cities and rural areas alike. It is not difficult to draw specialised or exact conclusions or recommendations from a pattern of behaviour or events over time or in a particular geographic area no matter how large. It is difficult, however, to draw conclusions that have generalised application from localised, sectionalised or specialised events or occurrences.
Hence in this review application simply because there may have been sporadic or isolated examples of terrorist behaviour in particular years in a particular locale or particular province it does not automatically follow those examples are the norm. In fact they may be the opposite or now regarded as an aberration or anachronism because of pushback by local actors who object to the indiscriminate use of violence.
The Tribunal has tested the written submissions against relevant empirical data. Somewhat unusually in an Application for a Protection Visa analysis of the empirical data supports the submissions repeatedly put by the applicant to the Department and Tribunal over time.
There are, of course some mistakes, a minor degree of embellishment or exaggeration and on occasion unsupported conclusions in the various written submissions and attachments of the applicant. The Tribunal considers these details to be relatively insignificant and does not interfere with the central proposition put forward by the applicant.
In this review application there is considerable evidence that it is a localised and particular event in the VDC in the Village of [Village 1] that cause the Tribunal to have concerns the applicant will face the prospect of real harm should he return to his home village, nearby towns or cities in the Northwestern province of KP, the wider Swat valley area of KP or elsewhere in major cities like Karachi.
It appears the applicant should not return to any population centre in his home province of KP because of his past activities of passing information to the Pakistani armed forces that directly resulted in the death of a local Taliban commander and helped to restrict the growth of the Taliban in and around the home village of the applicant.
It appears he cannot relocate elsewhere in Pakistan because of his Pashtun ethnicity. It appears state protection is not a meaningful option to which the applicant can turn as many of the arms of the state in Pakistan are either compromised, politically motivated or captured by groups like the TTP for wider historic geographical and political reasons.
It is clear from the above CI that the TTP has re-organised its internal structures, imposed a significant degree of centralised control over its activists, retains a significant presence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North-West Frontier Province) and post the break-down of peace talks with the Pakistani Government has re-invigorated it’s on the ground activities including the use of violence, extortion, localised attacks and ongoing threats.
These activities have occurred mainly in the Swat Valley area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province with the clear purpose of taking territorial control of the tribal belt adjacent to Afghanistan.
The applicant was born, raised and lived in born in [Village 1], Swat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, Pakistan. He has lived in what might be described at time of decision as “the eye of the storm”. If not an active combatant in the military sense he most certainly has been an active participant in the wars in Swat against the Taliban. He has provided leadership to his local village through his role in the VDC. He has provided assistance to his village, his local community and those in the Pakistani armed forces charged with the responsibility of eradicating the malign influence of the Taliban.
It is correct to observe that whole of country terrorism related incidents in Pakistan generally declined over time from 2017 with an up kick in 2022/2023 due to the breakdown of Government Taliban peace talks and a consequent call to arms by the Taliban. However as is directly relevant in this review application that call to arms has to date been concentrated in the applicant’s home province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The evidence before the Tribunal as derived from the whole of CI sources is that the TTP is in the process of withdrawing from the whole of Pakistan and intends to concentrate its terrorist activities in the foreseeable future in and around the KP Province. More particularly such relocation will occur to the border areas facing Afghanistan where apparently Taliban fighters can cross into Pakistan with relative impunity if not the ongoing support of the new Taliban government in Afghanistan.
The question thus becomes does the applicant have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of the applicant’s membership or a particular social group and his actual or imputed political opinion and is there is a real chance he would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country.
As is clear from this decision record the applicant has provided to the Department and Tribunal over time a mass of information. Most of that information related to the applicant’sfamily, life, career, ethnicity, family participation and activism within local and regional politics and his trenchant and continuing opposition to the activities of the TTP over a period of years
He has been brave, resourceful and committed to his set of beliefs. He appears to have has faced both outside violent opposition and local opponents who hold him responsible for their own family loss of a local Taliban commander in what can only be described as a continuing horrific war zone in parts of KP Province.
The Tribunal gives strong weight to the various CI sources set out and discussed throughout this decision record.
The Tribunal is of the view that a Pashtun man with a history of activism within a secular ANP, active in his local VDC, targeted as being responsible for the death of a local Taliban commander and known through his own actions in his local VDC to be implacably opposed to the various iterations of the TTP over time is a man living in dangerous times when he is at home and living with his family in their traditional home area of KP Province.
The Tribunal is of the view the applicant faces a real chance of persecution on account of his high profile and continuing association with and support of the ANP, service in the VDC and perceived and actual anti TTP opinion and membership of the particular social groups (known activists against the Taliban, secular residents of Swat Valley and as a returnee from a western country).
He faces these dangers in [Village 1], the Swat District or more likely than not anywhere else in KP Province. The Tribunal is of the view the applicant faces a real chance of persecution in his home village of [Village 1], in his home Swat District and in the wider KP Province.
The Tribunal is of the view the applicant faces a real chance of persecution should he return to his home village of [Village 1], the Swat District the Swat Valley, any part of KP Province or any other part of Pakistan inclusive of Karachi.
Conclusion
The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s claims and is satisfied that, considered singly, and in aggregate, the reasons advanced by the applicant are sufficient to attract a real chance of serious harm amounting to persecution in Pakistan. After considering all the available evidence, the Tribunal is satisfied the applicant cumulatively does faces a real chance of serious harm on return to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
In order to have a well-founded fear of persecution, the real chance of persecution must also relate to all areas of the receiving country, as per section 5J(1)(c) of the Act. The Tribunal is satisfied the applicant does not have the capacity to stay in his home village, the Swat District or the wider KP Province without violent contact from the Taliban. Having assessed the applicant’s claims separately and cumulatively the Tribunal is satisfied that there is a real chance of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in s5J(1)(a) of the Act in the receiving country.
The Tribunal is satisfied the applicant would be subjected to serious harm for reason of his membership of a particular social group as defined these being reasons that meet the provisions of s 5J(1)(a) of the Act if he is removed to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Accordingly, the applicant satisfies the criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
Consequently, the Tribunal is satisfied the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a reason specified in s 5J(1) of the Act and that the applicant meets the definition of refugee as set out is s 5H of the Act.

For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).
DECISION
The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
Mark Bishop
Senior Member
ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…
5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…
36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…

January 2022 Paragraph 3.73

January 2022 Paragraph 3.74

'Military operation in S. Waziristan thwarts major terrorist attack', Sumaira Khan, Samaa, 04 January 2023,

Year As TTP Ends Cease-Fire, Intensifies Attacks', Daud Khattak, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 30 December 2022

January 2022 paragraphs 2.34, 2.35, 2.36 and 2.37

[2023] AATA 4412

27 September 2023

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