1927124 (Refugee) - [2024] ARTA 653

1927124 (Refugee) [2024] ARTA 653 (7 November 2024)
DECISION AND
REASONS FOR DECISION
Respondent:Minister for Home Affairs
Tribunal Number: 1927124

Tribunal:General Member S Manera
Place:Sydney
Date: 7 November 2024
Decision:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Statement made on 07 November 2024 at 9:32am

CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Lebanon – particular social group – abused women – separated women – family violence allegations – physical assault – de facto relationship in Australia – employment – obtaining a divorce in Lebanon – economic and security crisis in Lebanon – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and transitional Provisions No1) Act 2024
Migration Act 1958, ss 5(1), 5H, 5J – 5LA, 36, 65, 351, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2
CASES
Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379
DZADC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2012] FMCA 778
MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505
MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
MIMA v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong [1997] HCA 22
Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347
SZSTZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 93
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
STATEMENT OF REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

On 14 October 2024, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) became the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). Under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (the Transitional Act), applications for review to the AAT that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are taken to be an application for review to the Tribunal. The Transitional Act gives the Tribunal the authority to continue and finalise any aspect of the review not already completed by the AAT. This decision and statement of reasons is made by the Tribunal.
This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 20 September 2019 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicant, who is [an age]-year-old woman and citizen of Lebanon, applied for the visa on 28 August 2017.
In a statutory declaration provided in support of her protection visa application, the applicant claimed as follows:
·She met her husband, [Husband A], in December 2014. They married [in] November 2015 in the Maronite church;
·[Husband A] lost his job after the couple returned from their honeymoon;
·[Husband A’s] behaviour changed, and he began abusing the applicant emotionally and psychologically. He assaulted her physically on 4 occasions. He would humiliate and intimidate the applicant and swear at her and her family. The first occasion of physical assault took place in approximately April 2016. The second assault took place in approximately September 2016. The third assault took place in approximately February 2017. The fourth assault took place in approximately June 2017. On occasions she stayed with her sister after the assaults until [Husband A] apologised and she returned to the family home;
·She told [Husband A] that she wanted to travel to Australia to visit her mother and brothers. She arrived in Australia [in] August 2017;
·She cannot return to Lebanon because she will face the following:
oShe cannot get a divorce from the Catholic Church as divorce is not permitted except under special circumstances. She will not be able to remarry;
oShe would be seen as a failure amongst the community. She would be subject to rumours whenever she goes out or talks to another man;
o[Husband A] can stop her from leaving Lebanon;
o[Husband A] can force her to go back to the matrimonial home. If she remains with him then she will continue to be abused by him. The authorities will not be able to protect her.
The applicant attended an interview with an officer of the Department on 19 August 2019. During her interview, she reiterated her claims that she would not be able to remarry in Lebanon. She fears that [Husband A] will force her to return to the matrimonial home and she will face further abuse from him.
The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that the applicant is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as outlined in s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) and is not a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations and who holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant (s 36(2)(b) and s 36(2)(c) of the Act).
The applicant made an application for review on 20 September 2019. The Tribunal finds that the applicant has made a valid application for review. The applicant provided a copy of the delegate’s decision to the Tribunal.
In a statement provided to the Tribunal dated 17 September 2024, the applicant claimed as follows:
·she is now in a de facto relationship and has registered her relationship with the New South Wales government;
·if she returns to Lebanon [Husband A] would not make life easy, pleasant or manageable. In her community it is extremely uncommon for a woman to simply abandon her husband;
·[Husband A] would still hold very strong hostility towards her. He would have suffered psychologically and mentally because of her actions. The community would remember him as a man who was left by his wife;
·[Husband A] is yet to remarry. The applicant believes this may be in part due to a desire to keep her under his control if she returned to Lebanon;
·the applicant has no intention to convert to any other Christian denomination and refuses to do so;
·the applicant asks the Tribunal to consider what option she would have to be free of financial punishment and have freedom to have her relationship with her new partner recognised in Lebanon and have the freedom to travel freely in and out of her country;
·the applicant was made aware from a friend that roughly 12 to 18 months ago [Husband A] began dating a woman, but the relationship ended when the parents of the woman compelled their daughter to end her relationship with [Husband A] because he refused to obtain a divorce from the applicant;
·the applicant’s circumstances do not fall within the requirements for an annulment of her marriage;
·it is illogical and unreasonable for the applicant to be required to convert to Islam or any other religion in order to obtain a divorce and regain her rights and privileges in Lebanon;
·Lebanese husbands have the right to ban their wives from travelling overseas and can register their wives’ names at specified international travel points;
·Lebanon’s economy has collapsed and she may be restricted from gaining employment abroad or being able to return to Australia to be with her new partner;
·being forced to depart and apply for a partner visa offshore would fall within the terms of persecution;
·[Husband A] was willing to compromise a relationship simply due to the fact that he did not want to lose his power over the applicant. As such, it is reasonable and fair to assume he has registered her name with the authorities, resulting in her detention upon re-entry to Lebanon or preventing her from departing Lebanon;
·the applicant and her family have had no contact with [Husband A] in any form since shortly after her arrival in Australia. They have blocked him on all social media and communication channels;
·the absence of [Husband A’s] deliberate efforts to make threats or target the applicant and his desire to maintain their marriage in an effort to restrict her freedoms and rights can co-exist;
·once [Husband A] learns that the applicant is in a committed and exclusive relationship with a new partner, he will have more reasons to harass or harm her;
·considering [Husband A] has not divorced the applicant in the last 7 years, it should stand that he has no intention to do so for the foreseeable future;
·the applicant’s Maronite church would not marry her and her new partner because she is still legally married to [Husband A];
·[Husband A] would not forgive the applicant as she misled him regarding her travel intentions, cut off contact with him, and ended their life together;
·the authorities cannot protect the applicant, and she cannot relocate anywhere in Lebanon;
·furthermore, the current security situation in Lebanon is dire. The recent attacks on all areas of the country, the economic collapse, and the general insecurity heighten the risk of harm to the applicant.
On 19 September 2024 the applicant provided the following additional documents:
·DFAT Country Information Report on Lebanon (the DFAT Report);
·An article from Peace Women titled A Legal Guide to Being a Lebanese Woman dated 3 December 2010;
·Human Rights Watch report titled Unequal and Unprotected: Women’s Rights Under Lebanese Personal Status Laws dated January 2015.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 26 September 2024 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic (Lebanese) and English languages.
The applicant was represented in relation to the review. Her representative attended the hearing.
On 4 October 2024 the applicant, via her representative, provided the Tribunal with a post-hearing submission dated 3 October 2024. In this submission, the applicant brought to the Tribunal’s attention the seriousness of the deteriorating security situation in Lebanon, considering the recent war and conflict. The representative submitted that the applicant falls into the particular social group of “women in Lebanon” and is therefore at a greater risk of harm from the war and significantly more vulnerable than the remainder of the residents in the country.
The representative also submitted that the applicant’s membership of the particular social groups ‘victim of domestic violence’, ‘failed asylum seeker returning to Lebanon’, ‘woman who is unable to depart Lebanon due to travel bans’ and ‘woman returning to country during war after prolonged absence’, in the context of the current war in Lebanon, places her at a greater risk of harm and renders her more vulnerable than the general population of Lebanon.
Furthermore, on 4 October 2024, the applicant provided a black and white copy of a document called Family Extract of the Civil Status Card dated [in] September 2024, with a certified English translation.
On 8 October 2024 the applicant’s representative provided a further post-hearing submission to the Tribunal. The post-hearing submissions refer to the applicant’s mother (who the representative acknowledges also has an application for review before the Tribunal), but states that the submissions are also relevant to the applicant. The submissions provide a timeline and analysis of the current war in Lebanon, and the impact on Lebanese residents.
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b) or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
The criterion in s 5J(1)(a) contains a subjective requirement, that an applicant must in fact hold a fear of being persecuted, while s 5J(1)(b) imposes an objective standard, that there be a real chance the person would be persecuted. A ‘real chance’ is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50%: Chan Yee Kin v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379.
If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in s 5J(1)(a) (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion), that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution: s 5J(4)(a). Further, the persecution must involve serious harm to the person and systematic and discriminatory conduct: ss 5J(4)(b), (c).
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
There are certain circumstances in which there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm in a country. These arise where it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; where the applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm; or where the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the applicant personally: s 36(2B) of the Act.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The issue in this case is whether the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as outlined in s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.
Credibility
In assessing the credibility of the applicant’s claims, the Tribunal accepts that the benefit of the doubt should be given to applicants who are generally credible but unable to substantiate all of their claims. The Tribunal is also aware that if it makes an adverse finding in relation to a material claim made by an applicant, but is unable to make that finding with confidence, it must proceed to assess the claim on the basis that it might possibly be true.[1] However, the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any or all of the allegations made by an applicant. Furthermore, the Tribunal is not required to have rebutting evidence available to it before it can find that a particular factual assertion by an applicant is not made out.[2] The mere fact that a person claims a fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is for the reason claimed or that it is well founded. It remains for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that all of the statutory elements are made out.
[1] MIMA v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220.
[2] Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348.
The Tribunal finds the applicant’s evidence given during the hearing was generally credible. She was forthcoming in her oral evidence which, the Tribunal notes, was generally consistent with her written evidence.
Family violence claim
During the hearing the applicant stated that she is still legally married to [Husband A]. Considering she has consistently claimed this, and considering the Family Extract of the Civil Status Card provided to the Tribunal on 4 October 2024, the Tribunal accepts the applicant is still married under Lebanese law to [Husband A]. The applicant stated that she has been in a de facto relationship with her new partner for over 4 years and they registered this relationship in September 2022. They currently live together. The applicant has recently lodged a Partner visa application in Australia. The Tribunal accepts the applicant is in an exclusive relationship with her new partner.
Considering the Tribunal’s findings on the applicant’s credibility, the Tribunal accepts the applicant was the victim of family violence perpetrated by [Husband A]. The Tribunal accepts that the problems in their relationship started shortly after [Husband A] lost his job. The Tribunal accepts the applicant was subject to physical and verbal abuse. The Tribunal accepts the applicant was physically assaulted on 4 occasions in Lebanon. The Tribunal notes from the applicant’s statutory declaration and her oral evidence given during her protection visa interview that the physical assaults took place during arguments with [Husband A].
During the hearing the applicant claimed that [Husband A] has the power to put her name on a watchlist at any Lebanese airport. If he does this, she will be prevented from departing Lebanon. She may be detained by the authorities upon arrival at Beirut International Airport.
The Tribunal asked the applicant what she thought [Husband A] would do to her. The applicant responded that she did not know if [Husband A] would harm her again, however he may do anything. He may stalk her, or start further arguments with her. He may seek to control her. He may put her name on a watchlist. She said the motivation for his conduct is that she left him. In doing so, she has wounded his pride and dignity. She acknowledged that she has not been threatened or harmed by [Husband A] in approximately the past 7 years.

The Act requires a decision maker to consider what may take place in the future, rather than what occurred in the past.[3] In Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong[4], the High Court noted that while the future is not predictable, the ‘degree of probability that an event will occur is often… assessable’. The assessment could be based on:
·past events and analysis of the conditions in which those events occurred;
·the likelihood of the introduction of new events that may decrease the likelihood of the past event occurring again; and
·an estimation of what events will give rise to the likelihood or not of an event recurring (this can be achieved through country information analysis).[5]
[3] DZADC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2012] FMCA 778, at [16] and SZSTZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 93.
[4] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong [1997] HCA 22.
[5] The Refugee Law Guidelines at 3.12.2.
In MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559, the Court stated that conjecture or surmise has no part to play in determining whether a fear is well-founded: ‘A fear is well-founded when there is a real substantial basis for it. A fear of persecution is not well-founded if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation’. The fact that an individual’s claims of persecution may be plausible or credible is not enough to establish a real chance of persecution. In Chan v MIEA, Dawson J stated:
“Well-founded” must mean something more than plausible, for an applicant may have a plausible belief which may be demonstrated, upon facts unknown to him or her, to have no foundation.[6]
[6] Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 397.
For the following reasons, the Tribunal does not accept the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm from [Husband A].
Firstly, the Tribunal has considered the passage of time since the applicant last suffered harm from [Husband A]. On her evidence, he last physically assaulted her in approximately June 2017. However, the Tribunal accepts that the verbal and psychological abuse towards the applicant would have continued up until the time the applicant left Lebanon. Furthermore, the Tribunal accepts the applicant’s oral evidence, given during her protection visa interview, that in the 2 or 3 months after her arrival in Australia, the applicant’s brother had arguments with [Husband A], and the applicant was present on speakerphone during these arguments. The Tribunal accepts that at the time [Husband A] would have been extremely angry and would have abused the applicant and her family members over the telephone. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant and her family members blocked [Husband A] on all communication platforms.
However, the Tribunal notes, and put to the applicant during the hearing, that since their last phone call 2 or 3 months after her arrival in Australia, there does not appear to have been any form of communication, threats, or harassment of any kind from [Husband A]. Now approximately 7 years have passed. The Tribunal considers the complete absence of any attempt to communicate with the applicant, let alone make threats of harm to her, since shortly after her arrival in Australia, is indicative that he is no longer interested in pursuing or harming her. Considering the Tribunal accepts that [Husband A] perpetrated verbal abuse, intimidation and humiliation towards the applicant during their relationship, and considering the Tribunal accepts that [Husband A] would have been very angry upon learning that his wife had left him, the Tribunal draws the conclusion that the absence of threats from [Husband A] indicate that he does not have an intention to harm the applicant if she were to return to Lebanon now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. While the applicant says that she and her family members blocked all forms of communication with [Husband A], the Tribunal also notes that the applicant’s sister lived in [Town 1], which is approximately only 30 km from where the applicant last knew her husband to be living before they ceased contact. On the evidence, [Husband A] has made no attempt to enquire after the applicant with her sister. The Tribunal finds that if [Husband A] intended to intimidate, harass, or harm the applicant, as he has done in the past, there would be some evidence of his intention.
The applicant has claimed [Husband A] may seek to control her in Lebanon, for example by preventing her from departing the country. Considering the seriousness of this allegation, and the seriousness of the consequences to the applicant should [Husband A] take this action, the Tribunal finds it reasonable for there to have been some threats made in this regard, or some conduct or communication by [Husband A], to indicate there is a real chance that he will seek to control her if she were to return to Lebanon. The Tribunal also considers the applicant’s evidence in relation to this claim has been exaggerated. In her statement dated 17 September 2024, the applicant said that [Husband A] had dated a woman in Lebanon after the applicant left him, but the relationship ended when her parents compelled her to end it because [Husband A] refused to divorce the applicant. The applicant went on to state that [Husband A] was willing to compromise his relationship with his girlfriend because he did not want to lose power over her and, as a result, it is reasonable to assume he has registered her name with the authorities at points of entry and exit into Lebanon. However, when pressed during the hearing, the applicant admitted that she did not, in fact, know whether [Husband A] had separated from his girlfriend. She did not know whether [Husband A’s] girlfriend’s parents had intervened to end the relationship. This was her speculation only. As such, the Tribunal finds there is no persuasive evidence to support the applicant’s claim that [Husband A] was willing to compromise a relationship simply to maintain his power over the applicant. The Tribunal does not accept that this gossip, which could be described as flaky at best, is persuasive evidence that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm from [Husband A].
The applicant claimed that [Husband A’s] decision not to divorce her is, in itself, action by [Husband A] to control her, as he would know that she cannot remarry while they are still married under Lebanese law. However, the Tribunal also notes from her oral evidence that the applicant has not taken any steps since she arrived in Australia to try to obtain a divorce from [Husband A]. She does not know whether [Husband A] would agree to a divorce if she requested one. The Tribunal put to the applicant that there may be many reasons why [Husband A] has not applied for divorce, and it seemed to be an assumption that just because [Husband A] had not divorced her, this meant there was a real chance he would seek to control her if she returned to Lebanon. The Tribunal also put to the applicant that it seemed to be speculation that [Husband A] would be so humiliated and aggrieved that he would take steps to control or seriously harm her upon return to Lebanon. The applicant stated that the law in Lebanon allowed him to control her. She said that maybe he would try to control her, and maybe he wouldn’t. The Tribunal finds that the applicant’s fear as to [Husband A’s] future behaviour is speculative only.
The Tribunal has considered the country information provided by the applicant and has also undertaken its own research. It notes that country information from DFAT indicates that women face a moderate risk of family and sexual violence, and this risk increases for members of vulnerable communities including those in rural areas, conservative religious groups, and in Syrian refugee communities.[7] The Tribunal also notes that gender discrimination remains rife in Lebanon, particularly in relation to divorce, citizenship, inheritance, property and child custody.[8] The Gender Working Group Gender Statistical Profile for Lebanon dated June 2023 confirms high percentages of women suffering domestic violence.[9] The Arab Centre Washington DC report called ‘The harrowing state of women’s rights in Lebanon’ states “There are four issues that affect Lebanese women: the existence of a religious personal code, a gendered nationality law, domestic violence, and child marriage”.[10] Women are not adequately protected from domestic violence under Lebanese law.[11] Husbands can put their wives’ names at relevant international travel points and thus prevent them from travelling without permission.[12]
[7] 'DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon' (DFAT Report), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 26 June 2023 at 3.62.
[8] DFAT Report at 3.53; A Legal Guide to Being a Lebanese Woman, PeaceWomen (3 December 2010)
[9] ‘Gender Statistical Profile Lebanon’ June 2023, Gender Working Group, pp 4 – 6 <
[10] Rola El-Husseini, ‘The Harrowing State of Women’s Rights in Lebanon’, Arab Centre Washington DC (1 May 2023) <The Harrowing State of Women’s Rights in Lebanon (arabcenterdc.org)>
[11] Unequal and Unprotected Women’s Rights Under Lebanese Personal Status Laws, Human Rights Watch (2015) p 102.
[12] DFAT Report at 5.21; A Legal Guide to Being a Lebanese Woman, PeaceWomen (3 December 2010) <>
The Tribunal has considered the absence of persuasive evidence that [Husband A] has any intention to harm, harass or even contact the applicant at all in Lebanon. Despite significant deficiencies in the State’s ability to prevent or protect women from domestic violence, considering the specific circumstances of the applicant’s case, and the speculative nature of the applicant’s evidence, the Tribunal does not find the applicant would face a real chance of serious harm from [Husband A] if she returned to Lebanon now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Tribunal does not accept [Husband A] has put the applicant on an international travel watchlist. While there are discriminatory laws of which [Husband A] has the ability to take advantage of under Lebanese law, there is no persuasive evidence that [Husband A] would take advantage of his position as a Lebanese male such that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm from him.
For the above reasons the Tribunal does not accept the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm from [Husband A]. The Tribunal finds the chance of harm is speculative only.
Separated woman
The Tribunal has considered whether the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm from the Christian community or the wider community in Lebanon as a result of being a woman who has left her husband. While this claim was raised in the statutory declaration provided at time of lodging her protection visa application, the Tribunal notes the applicant did not raise a claim of social ostracism or discrimination due to her status as a separated woman or woman who has left their husband. Rather, during the hearing she stated that her fears related to harm from [Husband A].
Country information indicates that separation and divorce in Lebanese society is no longer considered a stigma and, as at information published in 2022, 34% of marriages in Lebanon end in divorce.[13] Maronite women can and do leave their husbands, although some may wait until children are older to do so.[14]
[13] Rise in breakups and divorce in Lebanon mirrors socio-economic changes across the Arab world, Arab News (10 September 2022) <
[14] Interview: Women Unequal Under Lebanon’s Law, Human Rights Watch (19 January 2015) <
Considering the country information, and the fact that the applicant did not raise this claim during the hearing, despite being specifically asked why she feared returning to Lebanon, the Tribunal finds there is no persuasive evidence the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm for reason of being a separated woman who has left her husband. As such, the Tribunal finds the applicant does not face a real chance of serious harm for this reason.
The applicant has also claimed that she is unable to divorce in Lebanon, either due to [Husband A’s] refusal to divorce her, or because the law does not permit divorce for Maronite Christians. As stated above, there is no persuasive evidence that [Husband A] refuses to divorce the applicant. The applicant has never tried to find out if he would agree to a divorce. In any case, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant’s inability to get divorced constitutes serious harm. Section 5J(4)(b) of the Act requires the Tribunal to consider whether the persecution involves serious harm. Section 5J(5) defines ‘serious harm’ for the purposes of s 5J(4)(b). It sets out a non-exhaustive list of types and levels of harm that will meet the serious harm threshold. For the purposes of s 5J(4), s 5J(5) provides that the following are instances of serious harm: (a) a threat to the person’s life or liberty; (b) significant physical harassment of the person; (c) significant physical ill-treatment of the person; (d) significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist; (e) denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist; (f) denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s personal circumstances. It notes she is currently in a de facto relationship, and she has registered this relationship with the NSW authorities. It also notes that divorce is no longer considered a stigma in Lebanon. On the applicant’s oral evidence, her family have been supportive of her decision to leave [Husband A]. The applicant fled to her sister’s house after incidents of abuse from [Husband A]. While the Tribunal accepts that under Lebanese law the applicant may be unable to get divorced, the Tribunal is not satisfied that in the applicant’s circumstances this constitutes serious harm.
Conflict and war in Lebanon
During the hearing the applicant reiterated her claim that the security situation in Lebanon is dire. She stated that the conflict extends to the whole of Lebanon and that it was impossible to travel to Lebanon at present.
The Tribunal accepts that the security situation in Lebanon has been in constant and rapid decline and that Israel and Lebanon are at war. The Tribunal also notes information on the DFAT website which advises Australians not to travel to Lebanon due to the volatile security situation and the risk of the security situation deteriorating further.[15] The Tribunal notes that rocket and missile fire commenced in southern Lebanon, and has spread to other areas in Lebanon.[16] According to the Lebanese health ministry, the death toll in Lebanon from Israel’s bombing is more than 2,653, with thousands more injured and others missing.[17] The Tribunal also notes from the post-hearing submission dated 8 October 2024 that the applicant’s sister has been displaced from her home because of the war. Considering the significant escalation of hostilities with Israel in recent weeks resulting in the displacement of over 1 million people,[18] and DFAT’s assessment that Israeli military airstrikes in southern Beirut and other locations and Israeli military ground operations in southern Lebanon are likely to continue,[19] the Tribunal accepts there is a real chance the applicant will be a victim of the military action.
[15]
[16] Ibid.
[17] Zena Chamas, ‘Lebanese Australians grieve family members killed in Israeli attacks on Beirut and southern Lebanon’, ABC News (28 October 2024) <
[18] How is Lebanon’s cash-strapped government responding to war?, AlJazeera (17 October 2024) <
[19]
During the hearing the Tribunal put to the applicant that any harm arising from the war with Israel did not appear to be targeted towards her personally, nor did the harm appear to arise for a refugee reason. The applicant agreed that the deteriorating security situation could affect anyone in Lebanon; it was not specific to her.
The Tribunal notes from the country information that certain groups in Lebanon are targeted by Israeli forces. The Tribunal notes that while airstrikes have taken place across many areas in Lebanon, the majority appear to be concentrated in southern Lebanon and Beirut.[20] The Tribunal notes a recent report regarding an apparent Israeli airstrike on a compound housing Lebanese journalists.[21] Furthermore, Israel has carried out airstrikes in the northern city of Tripoli, targeting Hamas members.[22] In terms of how the war and mass displacement has affected women in Lebanon, the Tribunal notes that maintaining decent health and hygiene is challenging for women and girls experiencing menstruation or pregnancy.[23] The applicant has not provided any evidence that she is pregnant.
[20] Israeli attacks on Lebanon in maps and charts: Live tracker, AlJazeera (24 September 2024) < International organisations condemn Israel's fatal strike on journalists, ABC News (26 October 2024) < Israeli air strike on northern Lebanon kills Hamas commander and his family, AlJazeera (5 October 2024) <
[23] Escalating hostilities in Lebanon have gendered impact on women and girls, Women’s, Children’s and Adolescents’ Health (27 September 2024) <
Furthermore, the Tribunal has not located country information indicating that failed asylum seekers attract any particular stigma upon return to Lebanon. According to the latest DFAT Report, it is not a crime for Lebanese citizens to seek asylum abroad.[24] A failed asylum seeker would only come to the attention of authorities if they had an existing stop order against them.[25] As stated above, the Tribunal does not find there is a real chance [Husband A] has had a stop order imposed on the applicant.
[24] DFAT Report at 5.26.
[25] Ibid.
Regarding whether the applicant faces a heightened profile in the context of the war for any reason, the Tribunal has considered the applicant’s personal circumstances. It notes she has a sister in Lebanon, with whom she has previously resided. On her oral evidence, her sister is still in Lebanon. The Tribunal was informed in the post-hearing submission dated 8 October 2024 that the applicant’s sister remains in Lebanon, albeit she has been internally displaced by the war. The Tribunal finds the applicant would not be alone in Lebanon, as she could reside with her sister and her sister’s family. The Tribunal acknowledges that this would be a less than ideal situation considering the family is displaced, however the Tribunal finds the applicant would have the protection of her family in Lebanon. She would not be a woman on her own. Furthermore, she would not be returning to Lebanon to work in a hospital or as a journalist. On the evidence, her status as a failed asylum seeker would not come to the attention of anyone.

The Tribunal has considered the post-hearing submission dated 3 October 2024 which submits that the applicant falls into the particular social group of ‘women in Lebanon’ and is therefore at a greater risk of harm and significantly more vulnerable than the remainder of the residents in the country. The submission also states that the applicant fits into the particular social groups of ‘victim of domestic violence’, ‘women who are unable to obtain a divorce in Lebanon’, ‘women who are unable to depart Lebanon due to travel bans’ and ‘women returning to country during war after prolonged absence’. While the post-hearing submission makes these assertions, they do not provide any explanation as to why the applicant is at a greater risk of harm because of her membership of these groups. The submissions do not include or reference any country information. The Tribunal finds they are unsubstantiated assertions made by the applicant’s representative.
The Tribunal also notes that while the representative stated in his post-hearing submission dated 3 October 2024 that the applicant was more vulnerable than the general population, no evidence from the applicant (for example a post-hearing written statement) has been provided to the Tribunal to substantiate the representative’s submission.
The Tribunal has also considered the representative’s submission dated 8 October 2024 regarding the deteriorating situation in Lebanon and the human cost of war. The Tribunal does not doubt that the war with Israel has had a profound and multifaced impact on civilians. However, considering the applicant’s personal circumstances, the Tribunal does not accept she has a heightened profile over the general population.
On the country information, and considering the lack of persuasive evidence, the Tribunal does not accept the representative’s submission that the applicant is at a greater risk of harm in conflict between Lebanon and Israel because of her membership of any particular social group. The Tribunal does not find that the generalised violence in Lebanon would impact the applicant differentially due to her sex, religion, nationality, or any other refugee protection reason in s 5J(1)(a) of the Act.
For the above reasons, the Tribunal does not accept the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the 5 refugee protection reasons in s 5J(1)(a) of the Act.
Economic claims
During the hearing the applicant stated that if she returns to Lebanon she may not be able to find work considering she is now [age] years old and there is an economic crisis. She has been in Australia for 7 years and has lost work contacts in Lebanon. She said that it is hard for women to find work. In Australia she has been gainfully employed for many years.
The deteriorating economic and labour market conditions in Lebanon, coupled with rising prices of essential goods and services, such as fuel and food, have made it extremely challenging for individuals to make ends meet. According to a 2021 Gallup poll 85% of Lebanese respondents reported struggling to meet their financial needs, with 62% characterising their financial situation as “very difficult”.[26]
[26] Arab States Employment and Social Outlook – Trends 2024, International Labour Organization (2024) <
The Tribunal put to the applicant that no legal restrictions limit women’s engagement in income-generating activities. The law does not distinguish between women and men in employment, and it provides for equal pay for women and men.[27] The depression of the Lebanese economy impacts everyone in Lebanon. The applicant responded that she would particularly be affected because of her age. According to the 2023 DFAT Report on Lebanon, international media reports estimate that about a third of the labour force is unemployed.[28] According to International Labour Organization (ILO) data, the youth unemployment rate (people aged 15 to 24 years old) was 25% in 2021, compared with 12.5% overall.[29] According to UNICEF, youth unemployment increased to 48% in 2022, almost twice the adult unemployment rate which was at 25.6% in 2022.[30] Many young Lebanese people study abroad but do not return to Lebanon because of more favourable employment prospects, higher wages and superior working conditions available to them in foreign countries.[31] The country information before the Tribunal indicates that, in fact, young people are disproportionately affected by the economic crisis in Lebanon. The Tribunal finds the applicant, who is [age] years old and has many years of work experience in Lebanon and Australia, would not face the same barriers to finding employment as young people in Lebanon.
[27] DFAT Report at 3.54.
[28] DFAT Report at 2.11.
[29] DFAT Report at 2.11.
[30] UNICEF Lebanon (2022) <
[31] Arab States Employment and Social Outlook – Trends 2024, International Labour Organization (2024) < p 52.
Furthermore, the Tribunal has considered whether the applicant faces a real chance of being denied the opportunity to work because of her sex. The Tribunal notes that while women face considerable societal obstacles to gaining employment,[32] these obstacles may arise as a result of men exercising control over female relatives.[33] As stated above, the Tribunal does not find [Husband A] poses a real chance of serious harm to the applicant and, for the same reasons, the Tribunal does not find that [Husband A] would prevent the applicant from finding work.
[32] DFAT Report 3.54.
[33] DFAT Report 3.54.
According to the Global Gender Gap 2024 Insight Report, published in June 2024, gender parity in technical and professional roles is higher than 70% in 7 economies in the Middle East and North Africa, including in Lebanon.[34] As stated above, the applicant has worked in Lebanon in various positions for many years. There is no persuasive evidence before the Tribunal that there is a real chance she would be denied the opportunity to work, or would face economic hardship, for reason of her sex.
[34] Global Gender Gap 2024 Insight Report World Economic Forum (June 2024) < p 24.
On the country information before the Tribunal, it does not accept the applicant would be disproportionately affected by the economic crisis because of her age or sex. Rather, high levels of unemployment stem from the wider economic crisis which affects most people in Lebanon.[35]
[35] DFAT Report at 2.12.
As such, the Tribunal does not accept the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm, including significant economic hardship, denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, or denial of access to basic services, for the essential and significant reason of any of the 5 refugee protection reasons in s 5J(1)(a) of the Act.
Requirement to apply for a partner visa offshore
The Tribunal has considered the claim in the applicant’s statement dated 17 September 2024 that being forced to depart Australia and apply for a Partner visa from outside Australia would be tantamount to persecution. The Tribunal put to the applicant during the hearing that this did not appear to be persecution arising from the actions of the government, an individual, or anyone else in Lebanon, rather it appeared to be a consequence of Australian immigration laws. The applicant did not have any comment on the legal issue, rather she reiterated that she would apply for a partner visa offshore, but in Lebanon her partner wouldn’t be recognised as her lawful husband. Considering the applicant’s oral evidence that she has already applied for an onshore partner visa on the basis of her de facto relationship with her partner, the Tribunal does not consider their de facto status would prevent her from applying for a partner visa offshore. In any case, the Tribunal does not consider the applicant faces a real chance of persecution if obliged to apply for a Partner visa offshore considering there is no “persecutor” involved, and it is the consequences of Australian law, not Lebanese law, that would require the applicant to apply for a partner visa offshore.
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).
Complementary protection
Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa). Section 36(2)(aa) refers to a ‘real risk’ of an applicant suffering significant harm. In MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505, the ‘real risk’ test was held to impose the same standard as the ‘real chance’ test applicable to the assessment of ‘well-founded fear’ in the Refugee Convention definition and that reasoning appears equally applicable to the refugee criterion in s 5J(1)(b) of the Act. On the basis of the findings above, and for the same reasons as referred to above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant faces a real risk of significant harm from [Husband A] for reason of having left him, nor is the Tribunal satisfied the applicant faces a real risk of significant harm as a separated woman.
In relation to the applicant’s claim that she will be unable to obtain a divorce in Lebanon, the Tribunal is not satisfied this constitutes significant harm as defined in s 36(2A). Considering the applicant’s personal circumstances, namely that she is currently in a de facto relationship, she has the support of her family in Lebanon, and the fact that separation is becoming more and more common in Lebanon, the Tribunal is not satisfied that any level of anxiety the applicant may feel as a woman in a de facto relationship (and not a legal marriage) would reach the necessary level of severity to constitute significant harm.
In relation to the applicant’s claims regarding the economy, security situation and war in Lebanon, for the reasons set out above, the Tribunal considers that the real risk of being affected by the poor economy or war is one faced by the population generally and not by the applicant personally such that s 36(2B)(c) applies and there is taken not to be a real risk she will suffer significant harm in Lebanon for these reasons.
In relation to the applicant’s claim that if she is removed from Australia she will be required to apply for a partner visa offshore, the Tribunal finds this does not constitute significant harm as there is no relevant act or omission, rather, the applicant’s decision to apply for a partner visa offshore would be a consequence of the act of being removed, and a consequence of Australia’s immigration laws.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa).
Member of the same family unit
There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s 36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s 36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy any of the criteria in s 36(2).
Final comment
The Tribunal is sympathetic to the applicant’s situation. It notes she has been living and working in Australia for the past 7 years, and she has been in a relationship with an Australian citizen for approximately 4 years. The Tribunal notes the security situation in Lebanon has rapidly deteriorated, and that the Australian government is recommending Australian citizens to leave Lebanon as soon as possible. The Tribunal has considered referring this matter to the Minister for intervention under s 351 of the Act. However, the Tribunal notes that the Minister has considered that it is inappropriate to consider ministerial intervention requests from persons who may be eligible to apply for a partner visa. Considering the applicant has applied onshore for a partner visa, it is the Tribunal’s firm opinion that, in the circumstances, there are compelling reasons for the grant of an onshore partner visa to the applicant.
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Date of hearing: 26 September 2024
Representative for the Applicant: Mr Simar Hermis (MARN: 1464902)