1924287 (Refugee) - [2023] AATA 3284

1924287 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 3284 (30 June 2023)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
REPRESENTATIVE:  Mr Athanasios (Arthur) Seremetis (LPN: 5513166 MARN:1912945)
CASE NUMBER:  1924287
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Lebanon
MEMBER:Mark Bishop
DATE:30 June 2023
PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 30 June 2023 at 1:27pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Lebanon – informant with local Municipality – informed security forces of location of drugs – applicant’s details leaked to crime families – applicant of adverse interest to crime families – crime families have means to locate and harm applicant irrespective of where he resides in Lebanon – authorities unable to provide adequate protection – decision under review remitted
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 36, 65, 424A, 499
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 14 August 2019 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicant who claims to be a citizen of Lebanon applied for the visa on 24 January 2018. The delegate refused to grant the visa.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 28 February 2023 and 1 June 2023 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic (Lebanese) and English languages. The Tribunal gave special consideration[i][1] to a psychologist report and the process of the hearing.
The applicant provided a copy of the decision record to the Tribunal. The decision record sets out the applicant was granted a Tourist Visa (FA-600) on 25 October 2017, arrived in Australia [in] November 2017 and applied for a Permanent Protection Visa (XA 866) on 24 January 2018. The Tribunal notes the significant time gaps between these critical events.
The applicant was represented in relation to the review.
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Request for Adjournment
On 10 March 2022 and 16 March 2022 the applicant wrote[2] to the Tribunal in the following terms:
·We request for the scheduled hearing for 23 March 2022 be postponed. We have made an FOI application with the Tribunal, requesting for the Departmental File and interview recording. The Applicant also indicates that he is currently in the process of sourcing additional supporting information from overseas in relation to his claims and has expressed his views that it is unlikely he will be able to receive these prior to the 16th of March 2022- the submission deadline.
·We wish to have all available information in order to complete comprehensive submissions for the convenience of the Tribunal
[2] Doc ID numbers 9525245 and 9542559
On 16 March 2022 the Tribunal wrote[3] to the applicant and agreed to the request as set out in paragraph 12 above.
[3] Doc ID number 9543308
On 7 December 2022 the Tribunal wrote[4] to the applicant and initiated ECAR Pre-constitution Outreach in seeking any additional evidence that is relevant to the application be provided to the Tribunal as soon as possible as it was likely the review application would be scheduled for hearing. In response the applicant advised[5] there were not any dates in the next 3 months that he would not be able to attend a scheduled hearing and he did not want to provide any additional documents.
[4] Doc ID number 10523945
[5] Doc ID number 10526051
On 19 December 2022 the Tribunal wrote[6] to the applicant and advised the review application was scheduled for hearing on 28 February 2023
[6] Doc ID number 10566025
On 22 Feb 2023 the applicant wrote[7] to the Tribunal and again requested an adjournment in the following terms:
·The Applicant’s authorised representative is currently overseas and will be delayed in making submissions prior to the hearing. We understand that only in certain circumstances should this be cogent reason on which an adjournment should be made. In the circumstances an assessment of a Protection Visa, and the applicant’s eligibility under the criterion are complex.
·An FOI was made by our office requesting the Applicant’s Protection Visa Departmental File along with a copy of the audio recording of the interview that took place. We did receive the documents on 22 October 2022; however, an assurance was made that we would receive the audio file by post which was never received by our office. The audio is crucial to the establishment of the Applicant’s credibility in the matter, and without it we are not in a position to effectively put forward submissions for the Applicant in this respect.
·The Applicant is attempting to source documents capable of establishing certain facts in his matter, specifically pertaining to his involvement as an informant. This has been considerably difficult seeing as his contact (which was previously provided to the Department to give evidence) has since passed away.
·On the basis of the above reasons, we kindly request the Tribunal exercise its discretion to provide the applicant with a postponement.
[7] Doc ID number 10768520
On 23 February 2023 the Tribunal wrote[8] to the applicant and advised the further request for an adjournment was refused. At the same time the Tribunal wrote[9] to the Department and requested provision of the audio file from the Protection Visa interview as a matter of urgency prior to the scheduled hearing of 28 February 2023. Arising out of the refusal to grant a further adjournment the applicant wrote[10] to the Tribunal seeking administrative release of the PV interview audio. The applicant did not advance any reasons as to why the Tribunal should grant administrative release as requested. On 24 February 2023 the Department uploaded[11] the PV interview audio. On 24 February 2023 the Tribunal released[12] the Departmental Audio interview to the applicant.
[8] Doc ID number 10773266
[9] Doc ID number 10773171
[10] Doc ID number 10774207
[11] Doc ID number 10776734
[12] Doc Id number 10777092
The Tribunal notes it did not have access to this audio tape until 24 February 2023.
Post provision of the PV audio interview tape on 24 February 2023 the Tribunal reviewed the tape. The Tribunal notes the applicant’s then representative (Latifa Al Haouli from Latifa & Associates) was present at the interview as was an Arabic interpreter. The Tribunal provides the following summary:
Family Composition (7:38)
·The applicant advised his wife and children are still in Lebanon and they live in [Location 1]. His parents and [siblings] also live in [Location 1]. One other sibling lives in Tripoli and is a lawyer. He also has 3 brothers who live in Australia.
·They have property, land, shops and support themselves. They are considered to be well off in Lebanon.
·The applicant considers himself to be still married but has problems.
Employment in Lebanon (11:30)
·His business involved [deleted]
·He worked for [Location 1] municipality as supervisor to monitor every unlawful action in the area i.e. buildings without licence, things that might affect the environment. He used to write reports regarding these unlawful actions and raise it with the municipality and the mayor.
Protection Claims (15:36)
·In response to Departmental questions the applicant asserted that based on certain information that he provided to security forces they were able to confiscate quite a large amount of drugs. Turned out that the government forces had to destroy these drugs. Turned out there was some type of big international network (like a mob) who were located in an area…..in east Lebanon.
·With this confiscation, they were able to arrest a few people but not the heads of these mobs. The conclusion of this case made the heads of these mobs suspecting the applicant. He received a notice when he was in [Location 1] that his life was at risk so he had to leave.
·He went to live in a village called [Location 2] but the risk continued and he was living in fear so he lodged an application to come here. Back there it is a small country, it is a small village where everyone knows the other. Some of our neighbours, some of our village had connections and worked with these mobs.
·He believes his life is in danger. These people are ruthless and they don’t care so anyone they believe who may have done something wrong to them, they won’t care at all. They don’t fear the security forces or the state or anything. Immediately for them, they will kill this person. That’s why I believe once I am in Lebanon, I am always subjected to be killed. Adding to that, my children’s life is at risk too.
·He provided detail of his work with the [Location 1] municipality working between 8am and 3pm. After 3pm he could do private work. He was a construction site supervisor. He monitored potential illegalities or things that might impact the security of the village.
·Post school he did a years’ [study], sat some exams, passed the exams and was appointed to the post. He started work in the municipality in 2006 and ceased prior to coming to Australia in October 2017.
Role in the Drug Raid (33:28)
·The applicant as part of a teamwork in [Location 1] municipality and in 2016 there were number of attacks on travellers in the mountains of north Lebanon and his team was asked to investigate these attacks and report back to the authorities. He and others went into ‘closed lands’, remained a week and reported back on detail to various security forces such that the army did a raid, confiscated 17 tonnes of marijuana and destroyed same.
·He had participated in previous raids to the extent of gathering information relating to other terrorists and ISIS. Neighbours and relatives informed on him to these gangs. He claimed to have a municipality role, a security role and an intelligence role with local authorities. It started in 1997 when he did his compulsory military service. This role was more of an honorary job. It was symbolic. He received some minor consideration.
Post raid (1:05:30)
·After this final raid he lived in a village called [Location 2] about 20km from his usual place of residence. His house in [Location 1] was ransacked around March or April of 2016. After this he received warnings to watch out. His house was not ransacked. He did not receive any direct threats. He claims it was clear the gangs were suspicious of him. The army told him it would be better if he stayed away from his home village and keep a low profile.
·He claims he could not get state protection because he was merely an ‘information collector’.
·After the big raid he continued to work at the [Location 1] municipality. His role changed to that of a ‘mediator’ from that of a ‘information collector’.
·He remained in [Location 1] or [Location 2] from March 2017 until November 2017. He lived in [Location 2] but spread the word he lived in [Location 1]. He was fearful for his life and that of his children. He lived unhindered in [Location 2] from March 2016 until November 2017. He continued to be fearful and his marital relationship deteriorated.
·A man by the name of [Mr A] is the head of these gangs. He is close to another man (unnamed) and they know his current whereabouts. He continues to be worried for his life. He takes precautions. His dissembles information or provides disinformation as to his location in social media posts.
·His family is wealthy. He came to Australia where his brothers live. It was the only option. He did not know anyone in other countries. Australia is a huge country.
·He speaks with his family in [Location 1] every day. There have only been verbal messages to his family in [Location 1] since he left. They don’t want his family, only him. His wife and children live in safety. Because of tribal laws in his home area the cartels do not target family members.
·The information provided by the applicant did not provide any reference to his role in the raid. He advised his role was that of informant only. There is no safe spot for him in Lebanon.
First Hearing
At the commencement of initial hearing[13] on 28 February 2023 the Tribunal advised the applicant it had concerns. Those concerns were about the facts, matters and circumstances that arose in a prior Application for a Tourist Visa in Case number 1620023. The Tribunal advised the applicant it was impressed there was a profound and deep inconsistency between the matters relied upon then and the matters relied upon to date in the current review application. The Tribunal referred particularly to submissions and decision in the earlier case and all submissions received to date by the Tribunal and Department in the current review application. The Tribunal advised it appeared there was a profound inconsistency in the facts, matters and circumstances of both cases. The Tribunal advised it intended to write formally and outline those facts, matters and circumstances and give the applicant an opportunity to respond in writing. The Tribunal then adjourned the proceedings to a date to be fixed.
[13] See audio file of proceedings Document ID number 10795204
On 7 March 2023 the Tribunal forwarded[14] correspondence as outlined to the applicant, attached a copy of written submissions provided by the applicant in Case number1620023 and a copy of the decision record in Case number1620023. The Tribunal advised the applicant as follows:
·    The Tribunal is of the view you provided contradictory submissions in your current review Application for a Protection Visa from those that were provided in your prior application for a Visitor (class FA) Visitor (Sponsored Family) (subclass 600) visa.
·    In the prior application you addressed your intention to resume employment with your employer in Lebanon, the significance of multiple visits to Australia of close family members in previous years, your visit being for a limited period to spend quality time with three siblings, immediate family obligations in Lebanon, wider familial obligations in Lebanon and the fact you had a significant asset base in Lebanon.
·    In your current Application for a Protection Visa, you have not addressed these issues in your written submissions notwithstanding the fact matters (as set out above) relevant to your Application for a Protection Visa were well known to you at the time of lodgement of your Application a Visitor (class FA) Visitor (Sponsored Family) (subclass 600) visa.
·    The Tribunal is of the view the submissions in the Application a Visitor (class FA) Visitor (Sponsored Family) (subclass 600) visa undermine to a significant extent the claims for protection in the Application for a Protection Visa.
·    The Tribunal provided particulars as relevant.
[14] Document ID numbers 10790148, 10817582 and 10796038.
The Tribunal invited the applicant to give comments or respond to the information in writing by 21 March 2023. On 20 March 2023 the applicant wrote[15] to the Tribunal requesting an extension of time of 7 days to provide comments or response. The Tribunal granted same. On 29 March 2023 the applicant provided[16] a written s424A response to the Tribunal. The Tribunal provides a summary of this response hereunder at paragraphs 23 and thereafter having regard to the following:
·Visitor Visa application form
·Migration regulations and policy
·Case law and legal commentary
·424A Submissions from Representative
[15] Document ID number 10868020
[16] Document ID number 10904336
Visitor Visa application form
In his Form 1418 :Application for a Visitor Visa – Sponsored Family Stream” the applicant provided[17] the following as his reason for visiting Australia: “visit my three brothers and their families”
[17] See [file number], Folio 27
Migration regulations and policy
Regulations in place on the date of lodging the 600 Visitor Visa (7 October 2016) state:
600.21 Common Criteria
600.211
The applicant genuinely intends to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa is granted, having regard to:
(a) whether the applicant has complied substantially with the conditions to which the last substantive visa, or any subsequent bridging visa, held by the applicant was subject; and
(b) whether the applicant intends to comply with the conditions to which the Subclass 600 visa would be subject; and
(c) any other relevant matter.
…
600.23 – Criteria for Sponsored Family stream
Note: These criteria are only for applicants seeking to satisfy the primary criteria for a Subclass 600 visa in the Sponsored Family stream.
600.231
The applicant intends to visit Australia:
(a) to visit an Australian citizen, or Australian permanent resident, who is a parent, spouse, de facto partner, child, brother or sister of the applicant; or
(b) for any other purpose that is not related to business or medical treatment.
…
600.23 – Criteria for Sponsored Family stream
Note: These criteria are only for applicants seeking to satisfy the primary criteria for a Subclass 600 visa in the Sponsored Family stream.
600.231
The applicant intends to visit Australia:
(a) to visit an Australian citizen, or Australian permanent resident, who is a parent, spouse, de facto partner, child, brother or sister of the applicant; or
(b) for any other purpose that is not related to business or medical treatment.
Migration Policy in effect on 7 October 2016 includes consideration of the “purpose and period of stay” as part of the “for any other purpose” assessment under 600.211. It required the delegate to consider:
Purpose and period of stay
Whether the purpose and proposed duration of the applicant’s visit and their proposed activities in Australia are reasonable and consistent (for example, is the period of stay consistent with “tourism”).
Note: the current regulations which are in place are the same as those which appear above
Case law and commentary
Applicants for a visa in the Tourist stream and in the Sponsored Family stream must meet the requirement that they intend to visit Australia (or to remain in Australia, if in the Tourist stream) for prescribed purposes[18] While an applicant may have more than one purpose in seeking to visit or remain in Australia (e.g. to visit a relative and to engage in sightseeing), the applicant is only required to have one of the prescribed purposes in order to obtain the visa[19]. The criteria do not require the purpose to be specified in the visa application, and the applicant’s purpose for visiting or remaining in Australia is ultimately a question of fact to be addressed at the time of decision.
The Tribunal turned its mind to whether an omission (in not listing every potential purpose for the visitor visa) could be regarded as providing incorrect information. The applicant’s non-disclosure could be relevant in the context of the GTE requirement for the visitor visa, but given that visitor visa process has been finalised and now that the Tribunal is looking at this in the context of the PV application, it is difficult to make a finding of fact on the RA’s intentions at a certain point in time and the focus is now on the objective risk of harm as the PV assessment is forward looking.
[18] See cls. 600.21 and 600.231 as set out above.
[19] Sandoval v MIMA (2001) 194 ALR 71 at [40], in the context of considering the equivalent provision for a Subclass 676 visa. See also obiter comments in Khanam v MIAC (2009) 111 ALD 421 at [30], point 3, in relation to the equivalent provision for the Subclass 679 visa, that the language does not appear to require anything more than a statement of purpose by the visa applicant.
424A Submissions from Representative
The Tribunal accepts with the Representative’s submissions at Paragraph 19 of the 424A response in that only a singular purpose is required and the line of questioning by the former Tribunal did not specifically ask about whether the applicant suffered harm or if he feared harm. Had these points been discussed and the applicant not disclosed what had happened, then the Tribunal would currently be facing a different situation. That being said, if assessing the information “through the lens of a Protection Visa setting” as submitted by the Representative, the failure to mention the raid and subsequent events could lend credence to the argument that the applicant held a subjective fear (see final dot point of Paragraph 36 and related commentary on page 8) and did not feel it was safe to reveal what was happening. This is well summed up by the Representative at paragraph 43:
“….credibility in a Protection Sense is nuanced, and an assessment of the credibility of an applicant seeking protection calls for care, fairness and a reasonable approach to avoid irrationality or legal unreasonableness.”[20]
[20] AFD16 v MIBP [2020] FCA 964 at [74], quoting from AVQ15 v MIBP (2018) 266 FCR 83 at [24].

Having set out the detail in paragraphs 20 to 23 above the Tribunal determines as follows:
·    The written submissions and supporting documents providing in the applicant’s Protection Visa Application are reliable in the sense that speak in a general sense to the applicant’s specific fears of harm, and not the overall security situation or political unrest in Lebanon.
·    The reliability of the applicant as a witness must be tested by the Tribunal prior to making an ultimate finding in relation his claims.
·    The conflicting information does not in a strict sense completely contradict the applicant’s claims for protection.
·    The probative value the Applicant’s documents have in support of his claims are incapable of being contested by the contents of his visitor visa application. Accordingly the omission of detail in his Application for a Visitor Visa – Sponsored Family Stream” later revealed in his Application for a Protection Visa is not fatal to full and proper consideration of the latter application.
·    On this basis, the Tribunal determines the review application be resumed in hearing in order to discuss relevant claims in further detail.
In light of the fact that the factual situation and background to the current review application are nuanced and complex and sometimes lacking clarity the Tribunal has prepared the following chronology of events:
Pre-Migration History
·1996-1997: Applicant completed military service[21]. The Tribunal has cross checked the PV application form[22] and also the Visitor Visa application form[23], but it appears that his military service was not declared.
[21] Legal Submissions at paragraph 52, AAT Tribunal File 1924287 at Doc ID 10785232.
[22] Protection Visa Department File [Number], TRIM [Reference], pp17-18 “Character Declarations”.
[23] Visitor Visa Department File [Number], folio 26 “Character Declarations”.
·[Date] January 2007[24] : Applicant commenced employment with the Municipality of [Location 1][25]. Remained employed up until travel to Australia (entry [November] 2017).
[24] Employer Reference from Municipality of [Location 1] dated 27 August 2016, AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10785232).
[25] There are different variations of spelling for the Municipality across Department and Tribunal records (for example: Visitor Visa Department File [Number] as “Municipality of [Location 1 variation]” and also “[Location 1 variation] Municipality” in Legal Submissions on AAT Tribunal File 1924287 at Doc ID 10785232).
·[Date] January 2014: Licence to Carry a Weapon – Special Capacity[26] issued. Valid until [June] 2014 (which was not valid at the time of the raid in October 2016) and was issued by [named official].
[26] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10785232.
Visitor Visa Application
·7 October 2016: Applicant lodged Visitor Visa (Sponsored Family Stream), Subclass 600, sponsored by [Brother A] (Brother).[27]
[27] ICSE Departmental Records, File [Number].
·19 October 2016: raid (between Dania and Hermel as reported on the Facebook post) occurred.[28]
[28] Facebook Article dated 20 October 2016, references events which occurred “yesterday” (that is, 19 October 2016), AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10785232.
·4 November 2016: Visitor Visa (Sponsored Family Stream), Subclass 600 refused
·28 November 2016: Review commenced with AAT - Review Applicant [Brother A] (Sponsor)[29]
[29] AAT Tribunal File 1620023.
·27 March 2017: Visitor Visa AAT Case 1620023 outcome - remit with direction (Oral Decision with Oral Reasons)[30]
[30] AAT Tribunal File 1620023 Oral Decision (Outcome of Review), Doc ID 3355212.
·23 June 2017: Visitor Visa AAT Case 1620023 Written reduction of oral statement of reasons[31]
[31] AAT Tribunal File 1620023, Doc ID 3525142.
·[Date] September 2017: “Facilitate Passage Card” issued by the General Directorate of the Lebanese State Security[32]. Valid until [date] December 2017 and issued [the] General Director of State Security.
·12 October 2017: Delegate request bond payment $15,000 for the remitted Visitor Visa application.[33]
·25 October 2017: Bond/security paid.[34]
·25 October 2017: Visitor Visa (Sponsored Family Stream), Subclass 600 granted[35]. Permitted period of stay 3 months. First entry required by 25 January 2018. Conditions attached:
o8101 no work
o8201 max 3 months study
o8503 no further stay
·[November] 2017: Applicant arrived in Australia on Subclass 600 (Visa validity [February] 2018).[36]
[32] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10785232.
[33] File [Number].
[34] ICSE Departmental Records, [file number].
[35] Department File BCC2016/3398278, Trim [Reference].
[36] Movement Records, Tribunal File Doc ID 10534439.
Protection Visa Application
·24 January 2018: Applicant lodged XA Protection Visa, Subclass 866 visa.[37]
[37] Department File [number].
·6 February 2018: Department issue Acknowledgement letter for PV application, together with request for biometrics and certified copy of passport biodata page.[38]
[38] Department File [number], Trim [References]
·6 February 2018: Bridging Visa A Subclass 010 granted in association with PV application. Nil conditions attached.[39]
[39] ICSE Departmental Records.
·14 March 2018: Bond/security (collected pre-grant of 600 visa) forfeited.[40]
[40] ICSE Departmental Records.
·23 April 2019: New Representative appointed (Latifa Al-Haouli).[41]
[41] Department File [number], TRIM [Reference].
·23 April 2019: Representative emails Department to advise that the applicant received a home visit from departmental officers but he was not there. Requesting confirmation as to whether the applicant is required to meet departmental officers.[42]
[42] Department File [number], TRIM [Reference]
·12 June 2019: Applicant invited to attend Protection Visa interview.[43]
[43] Department File [number], TRIM [Reference].
·1 July 2019: Applicant’s Representative provides the following[44] to the Department:
[44] Department File [number], TRIM [Reference].
oStatement of Claims, unsigned, undated
oLebanese “Facilitate Passage ID card” original + translation
oFacebook article (Tripoli24, October 20, 2016)
oPhoto of marijuana seized by Lebanese Army
oForm 956 signed 1 July 2019
·2 July 2019: Protection Visa Interview held at 9am, Department Melbourne Office.[45]
[45] Department File [number], TRIM [Reference].
·15 July 2019: Representative provides post-interview submissions to the Department (includes copy of original + translation of “Licence to Carry a Weapon – Special Capacity”).[46]
[46] Department File [number], TRIM [Reference].
·18 July 2019: Representative emails Department to advise that “ [Officer A] of the Intelligence Unit involved in the operation disrupting the [Mr A] Drug Cartel, is offering his support to the applicant”.[47]
[47] Department File [number], TRIM [Reference].
·This email includes the [Officer A]’s contact telephone number and invites the delegate to contact [Officer A] to “verify and provide clarifications”.
·14 August 2019: XA Protection Visa, Subclass 866 visa refused.[48]
[48] Department File[number], TRIM [Reference](Notification Letter) and [file number] (Decision Record).
·30 August 2019: Review commenced with AAT.[49]
[49] AAT Tribunal File 1924287.
·[August] 2020: [Officer A] passed away (this is the applicant’s contact with the Lebanese security forced during his role as informant).[50]
[50] Legal Submissions at paragraph 33, AAT Tribunal File 1924287 at Doc ID 10785232.
·4 March 2022: Invitation to attend hearing [20 March 2022 before Member P Dunn].[51]
[51] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 9504197.
·9 March 2022: Response to Hearing Invitation [attending].[52]
[52] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 9523856
·10 March 2022: Request for Hearing Postponement (due to FOI request with Department).[53]
[53] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 9525245
·16 March 2022: Hearing Postponed.[54]
[54] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 9543308
·9 December 2022: Notification of case reconstitution to new member.[55]
[55] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 9543308
·19 December 2022: Invitation to Attend (Rescheduled) Hearing on 28 February 2023 before SM M Bishop.[56]
[56] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10566025
·19 December 2022: Response to Hearing Invitation [attending].[57]
[57] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10567557
·22 February 2022: Request for Hearing Postponement (due to Representative overseas, need time to collect more information + waiting on Department FOI release of PV interview audio).[58]
[58] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10768520
·23 February 2023: Postponement request denied.[59]
[59] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10773266
·23 February 2023: Incoming request from Representative for Tribunal to administratively release Department PV Interview Audio.[60]
[60] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10774207
·24 February 2023: Tribunal release of Department PV Interview Audio.[61]
[61] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10777218
·27 February 2023: Pre-Hearing Submissions received.[62]
[62] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10785232
·28 February 2023: Incoming advice that different lawyer from the Representative’s office will be appearing before the Tribunal (Mr Seremetis).[63]
[63] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10789519
·28 February 2023: MR5 for Mr Seremetis received at the Counter pre-hearing.[64]
[64] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10789772
·28 February 2023: Hearing Adjourned.
·28 February 2023: Representative submitted FOI request for access to the Tribunal’s file relating to the Visitor Visa application.[65]
·7 March 2023: Invitation to comment pursuant to s424A sent with attachments (reply due 21.3.23).[66]
·20 March 2023: Incoming request for Extension of Time for s424A invitation.[67]
·20 March 2023: Extension of Time granted (now due 28.3.23).[68]
·28 March 2023: Incoming response to s424A Invitation received in time.[69]
·29 March 2023: Invitation to Attend Resumption of Adjourned Hearing.[70]
·30 May 2023: Receipt of Psychological report[71] and letter from Republic of Lebanon.[72]
·1 June 2023: Second Hearing[73]
·22 June 2023: Extension of time given plus Request for Additional Information[74]
·30 June 2023: Post-hearing submissions plus attachment s provided[75]
[65] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10790343
[66] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10817837
[67] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10867946
[68] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10868020
[69] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10900559
[70] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 10906839
[71] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 11117617
[72] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 11112157
[73] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID 11131951
[74] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID numbers 11126858, 11198625, 11201662, 11208372, 11208376 and 11225808
[75] AAT Tribunal File 1924287, Doc ID numbers 11225808 and 11229591
In his Application for a Protection Visa[76] dated 24 January 2018 the applicant declared as follows:
[76] [File number]. See also Statement of Claims and attachments [file number], Post interview submission [file number]
·He began working for the municipality council in 2006.
·He was a supervisor of the area charged with reporting immoral conduct and illegal operations.
·He was involved in an operation that resulted in law enforcement seizing 17 tons of marijuana and weapons.
·He supplied crucial information to law enforcement as the land where illegal activities occurred is close to his family’s land.
·He received threats of harm for providing information to law enforcement.
·The ringleader of the drug operation is still wanted by authorities however his men are still running the drug operations in the applicant’s village.
·He relocated to the neighbouring village [Location 2] fearing he would be killed.
·The authorities are unable to protect the applicant and will only attend after an incident has occurred.
·His family is wealthy in Lebanon, they own several acres of land and [shops] they receive rent from.
The Statement of Claim[77] outlined the following as summarised by the Tribunal:
·He was born in [year] in [Location 1], Lebanon and has [siblings].
·He started working at the council in 2006 and was a supervisor “…to report wrong conduct and illegal operations…”
·In the last operation “we” were working on the police raided a marijuana farm and seized 17 tons of marijuana and weapons. He stated, “We are the ones who supplied this information as this land is close to my family’s land.”
·After this he received threats. The police have not arrested [Mr A].
·I am worried for my life I will be killed for being an informant. After the threats I moved to [Location 2] as there are many army check points in that area until I escaped to Australia.
·The police are unable to protect me or provide 24-hour care or security and will only attend after an incident has occurred.
·My family is very wealthy in Lebanon we own several acres of land in addition we own [shops] that we receive rent from . Our family is known to own [deleted] amount of land in our village. I am not an economic refugee I have only come to Australia to save my life.
[77] [File number]
The newspaper article dated 20 October 2018 referred to by the applicant in paragraph 13 above referred to measures taken by the Lebanese army concerning road closures relating to armed robberies, calls by local persons for further military action and arrests of known offenders following the seizure of “a quantity of weapons and drugs”
The applicant made a post interview written submission[78] to the Department summarised by the Tribunal as follows:
·Country Information that indicted a lack of formality in dealing with government officials, no official agreement between the applicant and the Lebanese government, widespread corruption and the minimal or lack of benefit received by the applicant for his cooperation with the government (special gun licence, discount for petrol and travel through checkouts without being checked).
·Despite cooperation with the government, he was forced to remain in hiding. it is unlikely that the applicant would receive adequate protection from the state.
·Relocation concerns, fear of harm from a drug cartel, it is plausible that the threats can manifest into other instances of harm which would follow the applicant through Lebanon, limitations on state protection set out in Country Information inclusive of family or community connections in the intended area of relocation and the financial situation.
[78] [File number]
The delegate made the following findings[79]:
·At PV interview “…I found some elements of the applicant’s response regarding his role as a government informant, his active role in a drug raid and his subsequent targeting by a criminal drug family, along with his decision to eventually depart Lebanon, to be lacking in credibility…”[80]
·“…I do not accept the applicant held a significant profile that would warrant the level of attention he claims from [Mr A’s] family and associated drug cartel. I do not accept the applicant was threatened with harm and went into hiding after providing information to the authorities that culminated in the seizure of large amount of drugs and weapons. I am not satisfied the applicant was recounting factual evidence relevant to his personal experience. The applicant appeared hesitant and was vague in his responses to questions posed to him at the interview…”[81]
Employee of [Location 1]Municipality
·The Tribunal has examined all relevant information on the Departmental file and is satisfied the applicant was employed as a labourer at the [Location 1]Council from 2008 until 2014.
[79] See decision record
[80] Ibid page 2
[81] Ibid page 2 and 3
Issues that forced the Applicant to leave Lebanon
·I consider the applicant has fabricated his claim he was employed as an informant for law enforcement and he is a person of interest in Lebanon from drug cartels who continue to target the applicant and his family some three years later.
·I reject the applicant’s claims his family have been threatened in the past and he is subsequently the focal point of potential harm from members of a criminal syndicate. I consider if the applicant was being directly/indirectly threatened by members of this criminal syndicate in Lebanon, his family would have faced severe consequences in the last three years, yet this is not the case.
·I expect the applicant would have procured supporting evidence to sufficiently corroborate such claims of being a government informant/operative since 1997.
·The delegate gave reasons for rejecting a claim of support from an officer said to be involved in an operation disrupting the [Mr A] Drug Cartel as the applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish his claims. The delegate made the point it was not his job to contact a person in another country to verify applicant claims. That was the task of the applicant and or his representative.
·The applicant failed to provide a copy of a an “informant card” referred to in the post interview submissions. The applicant instead provided a copy of a special gun licence that did not in any way confirm the applicant worked as an informant for law enforcement and is a person of interest because of his involvement in a drug raid.
·The delegate made a finding “…the lack of verifiable specific detail and evidence in his PV application further casts doubt over the credibility of his claims…”
·The delegate noted the applicant’s evidence to the effect the applicant’s family remained safe in the village of [Location 1]long after the alleged drug raid and rejected the applicant’s claim that “…his wife and children remained in the same locality unharmed after some three years when he explained that gangs have a strict code of conduct whereby, they only target the individual in question and not their families…”
·The delegate made a finding that “…he applicant’s actions in leaving his wife and children in [Location 1]in Lebanon to travel to Australia where they are allegedly being threatened by a dangerous drug cartel over a two-year period indicates to me that neither he, nor his family, had/have a well- founded fear of persecution in Lebanon….”
·The delegate noted the applicant constantly and openly posted his whereabouts on visible Facebook posts and rejected his explanations of disassembling false information as to location.
·In response to the applicants claims as to serious and extensive family wealth the delegate made a finding that “…given the applicant’s claim regarding the significance of the disruption his information caused to the drug syndicate, I find the applicant’s families numerous business interests in the village would have been compromised or extorted by [Mr A’s] family and associated drug cartels as retaliation.
·The delegate made a finding the applicant’s claims that “…he was held with the level of suspicion by [Mr A’s] family and associated drug cartel fanciful…”
·The delegate made a finding the applicant’s claims of threats and harassment as being vague and general and inconsistent with known dates, his relocation only a few kilometres indicated he remained in the same locality where he said he feared the drug cartel would be able to get him, his continuing work in the northern governance of the nearby village of [Location 2] were all difficult to reconcile with claims of fear of retribution from the drug cartels and his delay in leaving Lebanon after being granted a visa to come to Australia all raised issues of concern.
·The delegate summarised his reasons for failing to give any weight to what appeared to be bales of marijuana and a Facebook article. There was no connection between the relevant evidence and the applicant. The delegate was not satisfied “… the documents tendered by the applicant is probative evidence that corroborates the applicant’s claim he is, or was, a person of interest to a drug cartel in Lebanon…”

The delegate made the following finding[82]: “…I do not accept the applicant would be of any interest to criminal elements for the reasons claimed. Based on the information before me, I am of the view the applicant has fabricated his claims he was an informant for law enforcement agencies in [Location 1]Municipality since 1997. I refute the applicant’s assertions he played a crucial role in the seizure of drugs and weapons and thus, he has been directly/indirectly threatened by a criminal cartel in Lebanon since 2016. I consider the applicant has created these claims solely for the purpose of strengthening his claims for protection and as a last resort to remaining in Australia.”
[82] Decision record Doc ID number 6187740Page 5
On the afternoon prior to the scheduled hearing the applicant provided lengthy written submissions to the Tribunal plus supporting documentation. The Tribunal provides the following summary of those legal submissions:
·The Applicant lodged an application for a XA-866 Protection Visa on the 24 January 2018 on the basis that he feared persecution at the hands of a Criminal Syndicate, due to his role as an informant leading to the seizure of a large quantity of drugs and weapons.
·The Applicant fears that upon repatriation to Lebanon he will suffer serious harm in the form of killings, arbitrary detention, intimidation, physical assault and abduction and kidnapping.
·The applicant claims as follows:
oHe was an informant for the [Location 1]Municipality;
oHe was key in uncovering and tipping off the authorities of large volume of Marijuana;
oThe authorities arrested members of the claimed ‘[Mr A] Family’.
oThe ‘[Mr A] Family’ is a criminal family with criminal networks
oThe Applicant’s identity as an informant was leaked to the ‘[Mr A] Family’
oThe Applicant received threats from perceived members and/or connections of the ‘[Mr A] Family’
oHe fears that he will suffer harm if he were to be returned to Lebanon on this basis.
oThe threat that he will be harmed on return remains real.
oHe is unable to relocate due to the pervasiveness of the Criminal Syndicate;
oHe is unable to seek protection from the authorities due to the power of this syndicate, corruption, and infiltration into the state of such criminal syndicates.
·The applicant is critical[83] of many aspects of the delegate’s decision.
[83] Doc Id number paragraphs 10 to 59
·The applicant referred to Country Information with respect to the following:
oOperation of Criminal Clans and Drug Trade within the Beka’a Valley and neighbouring regions
oClashes between Security Forces and those clans, and overall effectiveness of the authorities on those clans.
oThe link between these clans and Hezbollah and its relevance; and
oThe clans’ tribal culture, and the custom of revenge.
·The applicant provided a summary of the above country information.
·The applicant submitted the following factual findings are plausible:
oThere was an operation where drugs were seized;
oThe operation took place between [Location 1];
oThe apprehended belonged to a known Crime Family;
oThere was coordination between the Lebanese Army and the Municipality to which the Applicant was involved in;
oNot all apprehended were arrested;
oThere are connections and coordination between state authorities and criminal syndicates.
oThe Applicant was employed in the Municipality of [Location 1].
oThe Applicant did have connections with [Officer A] The Applicant was an informant for [Officer A]
oThe Applicant’s evidence of perks such as a special weapons licence, and a freedom of passage licence are indicative of work as an informant.
oThe Applicant’s involvement in the raid - the Applicant’s primary residence is close to the Municipality in which the article stated the Lebanese Army and Municipalities coordinated together- approximately a [time] drive. Not all members of the criminal syndicate were apprehended. The Applicant’s identity was leaked to the Criminal Syndicate
oThe Applicant would have an adverse profile with the Criminal Syndicate as informant. The Criminal Syndicate is capable of identifying his whereabouts. The Criminal Syndicate is capable of harming the Applicant. The Applicant will continue to face harm, irrespective of passage of time due to Tribal customs of revenge.
In addition to the legal submissions summarised in paragraph 32 above the applicant provided a number of documents to the Tribunal as follows:
Facilitate Passage Card[84]
[84] Doc Id number 10785347
·This document had a life of 3 months only from September 2017 until December 2017, was in the name of the applicant, was issued under the authority of the General Directorate of the Lebanese State Security [and] was translated on 27 June 2019.
·The applicant noted in his submission that this card did “…not provide an essential information note such as the licence to carry weapons…and it is unlikely the applicant could or would have been issued this card from the General Directorate of the Lebanese State Security, if he did not have the relevant position as an informant, or/and connection to [Officer A]…”[85]
[85] Doc ID number 10785345 paragraphs 47 to 49
- In a post hearing submission to the Tribunal the applicant advised “…the fact that the Applicant is provided with the ability to travel through Military checkpoints unchecked forms a strong indication that he held the relevant position as an informant with the Lebanese security forces…”[86]
- The Tribunal is of the view a person working in a responsible position in an authority of the state and engaged as an informant or in some form of information gathering, surveillance or reporting on illegal activities would be able to provide a form of official authority that outlined and authorised such activity whether that be a contemporaneous letter, letter obtained after the dates or dates of the work or reference to check the authenticity of the letter at places of inspection such as check posts etc.
- The Tribunal is of the view explanation as to the existence of the Facilitate Passage Card is reasonable in the circumstances of the review application. The Tribunal gives it weight.
Special Licence Weapon[87]
[87] Doc ID number 10785350
·This document had a life of 6 months only from January 2014 until June 2014, was in the name of the applicant, was issued under the authority of the Ministry of National Defence with a signature under stamp [and] was translated on 12 July 2019.
·The applicant submitted this Special Licence Weapon indicated that he was an informant.[88] The applicant referred to an instrument[89] that regulates weapons and ammunitions and persons authorised to receive licences to carry certain weapons in Lebanon. The applicant asserts he received this licence through a military privilege not for other reasons such as game hunting or personal reasons. The Tribunal is of the view the issue of a weapon identified as a Special Licence Weapon and legally held for a limited period would ordinarily be accompanied by a form of official endorsement of purpose or reason. The Tribunal does accept the argument put by the applicant that this licence is a form of indicia the applicant was an informant at relevant times.
[88] Doc ID number 10785345 Paragraph 39
[89]Doc ID number 10785345 footnote 6
·Whilst this document appears to depict the applicant’s personal identifiers this document does indicate the applicant may have worked as an informant for an agency of the Lebanese government and was or is a person of interest arising from any role prior to or after the particular raid. The Tribunal gives it weight.
Municipality Letter[90]
[90] Doc ID number 10785353
·This document pursuant to an application made 22 August 2016 was a statement of employment from the Head of [Location 1] Municipality was dated [July] 2019 and outlined an employment commencement date of [date] January 2007 with a holiday entitlement of 3 months at date of issue with a signature under stamp of [the] Head of [Location 1] Municipality and translated on 12 July 2019.
·The applicant submitted that “…based on the contents of that letter alone, it is not entirely clear that he worked as an informant…”[91] concluding the applicant was an informant on the basis of lack of availability of public records and prevalence of corruption meaning documentary evidence listing the applicant’s name would not be available. The Tribunal notes this submission is a circular argument and essentially asserts a conclusion based on the lack of availability of evidence.
·The Tribunal is of the view a person working in a responsible position in an authority of the state and engaged in some form of information gathering, surveillance or reporting on illegal activities would be able to provide a form of official authority that outlined and authorised such activity whether that be a contemporaneous letter or letter obtained after the dates or dates of the work.
·In a post hearing submission the applicant advised “…the content of the letter attest to the Applicants participation with the Lebanese security forces against groups involved in drug cultivators and traffickers… the attestation is signed and stamped by the Mayor of [Location 1], the Head of [Location 1] Municipality and the Mayor of [Location 3]. All signees, held their respective positions at the time the Applicant was resident in Lebanon and was involved as an informant…”[92]
·The Tribunal is of the view the Municipality Letter is indicative the applicant was employed in [Location 1] Municipality at the relevant time and with the knowledge of senior local officials and engaged in informant activities of the type submitted to the Tribunal
Facebook Article[93]
·This document said to be a Facebook extract dated 20 October 2016, apparently printed 27 February 2023 under the heading “The army blocks the road of Dhania against the Hermel gunmen” outlined detail of armed robbery operations, measures taken by the Lebanese army in cutting roads inclusive of raids, confiscation of weapons and drugs, details of local cooperation, detail of locale where offenders were said to have fled and a comment from the deputy mayor.
·This document is a generalised description of a form of army/police action and the confiscation of illegal contraband. There is no reference to applicant involvement at any stage of the action. There is no exact reference to the specific location of the raid. The article is general and lacks specifics. The Tribunal is unable to draw any linkage or connection from or about the applicant to the article. The Tribunal is unable to see any connection between this article and the applicant. The article does not depict the applicant’s name nor does it make any reference to the applicant’s role as an informant in the operation to seize drugs and weapons.
·The Tribunal gives it no weight.
[91] Doc ID number 10785345 paragraph 37
[92] Doc ID number 11225808 paragraph 8
[93] Document ID number 10785361
Photo of seized cannabis[94]
[94] Document ID number 10785366
·This photo showed what appeared to be clippings of some sort wrapped in white bags stacked (or dumped) in a pile approximately 10 wide and 6 high outside a small building behind what appeared to be an olive tree. No persons were in the photo. The Tribunal was unable to locate a date on the photo. In the top right had corner there appeared to be some sort of emblem.
·The Tribunal examined this photo with care. In post hearing written submissions the applicant advised as follows:
oArticles provided[95] post the hearing “…contain the same information, which confirm the Applicant’s narration of events of the Military raid he was involved in…”
oThe first article is an outline of the events that transpired and is posted on the Lebanese army’s webpage. The date of the article is the 16 October 2016. The fact that the raid was published on the Lebanese army’s webpage confirms and adds veracity to the Applicant’s statements that the event occurred.
oThe fact that the Applicant was not mentioned in the article, does not in itself remove the possibility, or probability that he was involved as an informant, as it is unlikely the Military would advertise its sources of information publicly.
oIn addition to the articles the applicant provided[96] a number of photos that at a minimum verified the applicant’s oral evidence as to the facts of the raid, contraband seized in the raid and his likely advisory role as an informant prior to the raid in October 2016
·The Tribunal is satisfied that the Lebanese military did conduct the raids against drug traffickers and the applicant’s statements in relation to the raids and his involvement are true.
[95] Document ID number 11225808 paragraph 10
[96] Document ID number 11225808 paragraphs 11 to 18
The material set out in paragraph 33 above is persuasive. The explanations provided by the applicant in his pre-hearing submissions, oral evidence to the Tribunal and post hearing submissions and supporting attachments is largely consistent. Mostly the assertions and arguments put by the applicant are supported by documentation. The Tribunal is not sceptical as to any linkage between the documents and any alleged role of the applicant as an informant at any time. The Tribunal is persuaded the applicant worked and was retained by agencies of the Lebanese government post his military service in 1996 and 1997 as an informant. The Tribunal is persuaded the applicant played a role in the raid. The Tribunal gives weight to the material set out in paragraph 33 above.
The discussion in paragraph 33 above and the lengthy submissions provided by the applicant in addition to the detailed consideration of same as outlined in paragraphs 26 to 33 above plus the many references to criminal syndicates[97], criminal networks and drug trade in the Beka’a Valley[98], state operations against criminal clans[99], linkages between Hezbollah and the criminal clans[100], tribal culture and clanship[101], as part of country information all lead the applicant to assert it is possible the findings as set out in paragraph 91 of the written submission to the Tribunal are plausible[102].
[97] Document ID number 10785345 paragraph 54 and following
[98] Document ID number 10785345 paragraph 61 and following
[99] Document ID number 10785345 paragraph 67 and following
[100] Document ID number 10785345 paragraph 74 and following
[101] Document ID number 10785345 paragraph 83 and following
[102] Document ID number 10785345 paragraph 91
The Tribunal does not dispute that there is criminal activity in Lebanon, that drug cartels may be active, that drug cartels might use violence to achieve their ends, that lawlessness exists in several parts of Lebanon and that forms of patronage are present in a society in many respects still feudal and hierarchical. The totality of the evidence and supporting explanations does lead the Tribunal to conclude the outcomes set out in paragraph 91 of the written submission are plausible. Concerns of the Tribunal as to the absence of hard, direct evidence that necessarily linked the applicant to the actions he asserted caused him to flee his home country were largely attended to in the post hearing written submissions and supporting attachments provided by the applicant and addressed in this decision record. The Tribunal now turns to consider Country Information for Lebanon in more detail (inclusive of the post hearing CI submissions provided to the Tribunal on 30 June 2023) as well as the evidence of the applicant given to the Tribunal on 1 June 2023.
Lebanon Country Information (CI)
The Tribunal now turns to an examination[103] of relevant CI
[103] In addition see paragraph 32 above.
Organised crime within the Beka[104] Valley
[104] Often spelt Beka, Beqa, Bekaa or Beka’a
- The Tribunal conducted extensive searches across various country information resources as well as general internet search (i.e. Google) and was unable to find any information on a [Mr A] clan or family in Lebanon.
·“The operation of criminal clans and drug trafficking in the Beka Valley and elsewhere in Lebanon has been well documented. A number of clans, some tied to extensive criminal networks, reside in the Beka valley.
·Since mid-2020, gunmen from rival Shiite clans in the Beka Valley have clashed with one another, vying for control over production and smuggling of illicit crops such as cannabis, or pursuing vengeance for earlier wrongs, with both conflict drivers often intertwined. Violence occasionally spills over into Beirut’s southern suburbs, where extensions of these families live. The two Shiite parties, Hezbollah and Amal, which control these areas, mostly avoid getting involved in these conflicts, as they could implicate some of their popular base. Instead, they cooperate with the security forces’ efforts to prevent escalation, while retaining overall security control. The Shiite parties’ overbearing presence constrains the army’s ability to deal with the criminal groups, some of which are equipped with rocket-propelled grenade launchers, short-range missiles and heavy machine guns, and can often outgun the soldiers.[105]”
[105] Crisis Group Middle East Report N.228, Managing Lebanon’s Compounding Crises, 28 October 2021, page 13
- “Several criminally oriented families, clans, and gangs continue to operate in Lebanon. Police enforcement action against these families is difficult due to the geographically isolated areas in which many of the syndicates operate, and the limited police presence and resources in areas outside of Beirut and its surrounding governorates.[106]”
·According to reputable and well-established sources global organised crime[107] has a presence in Lebanon. In particular
[107] Global Organised Crime Index 2021 Report on Lebanon
oIn Lebanon, large and violent families or clans with a leadership cadre, known as ‘Woujah’, are capable of mobilizing armed militias and kidnapping for ransom.
oClans lack indefinable membership, but control territory that the state cannot enter.
oLebanese criminal networks are active in most markets, mainly in Beirut, the Beka Valley and the border regions.
oWhile Beka Valley cannabis farms are run by armed families, Hezbollah is also involved in smuggling, and its authority is recognized.
Drug influence/trade within Beka Valley and neighbouring regions
·The applicant claims that he was an informant for the [Location 1]municipality and was key in uncovering and tipping off the authorities in an operation that resulted in law enforcement seizing 17 tons of marijuana and weapons.
·As part of submissions[108] to the Tribunal , the applicant included a Facebook article dated 20 October 2016 and an undated photograph of a large quantity of cannabis in bails, with what appears to be the crest of the Lebanese Army in the top-right hand corner. The Facebook article appears to be a post on the Tripoli 24 and references “aggressive gunmen, especially since most of them are known by names”, however it does not specifically mention any members of a specific crime family or clan.
[108] Tribunal Case 1924284, Document ID 10785232
·The Tribunal conducted various searches to find corroborative material of any news reports or articles regarding the alleged raid and were unable to locate any articles.[109]
[109] The Tribunal conducted various searches to find corroborative material of any news reports or articles regarding the alleged raid and were unable to locate any articles. The Tribunal was unable to locate the Facebook article dated 20 October 2016 on the Tripoli 24 Facebook webpage which is noted as a “news & media website”, with all posts listed in Arabic. In addition to seeking to verify the Facebook article on the Tripoli 24 Facebook webpage, the Tribunal also conducted various online searches to find corroborative material of any news reports or articles regarding the alleged raid in October 2016 and were unable to locate any articles. Searches were conducted on Google and the Tribunal was unable to find any news articles which specifically reference this raid which occurred in or about October 2016.
·Lebanon is one of the biggest producers of cannabis in the world.
·Production occurs primarily within the Beka Valley, where there are thousands of outstanding arrest warrants and, in 2020, Lebanon reported a record seizure of 25 tonnes of hashish.
·While Beka Valley cannabis farms are run by armed families, Hezbollah is also involved in smuggling, and its authority is recognized. Lebanese drug-trafficking groups in Latin America, North America and Europe have been linked to Hezbollah, with loyalists arrested for facilitating drug and human trafficking[110].
[110] Global Organised Crime Index 2021 Report on Lebanon
·In June 2022 Al-Mashareq reported as follows:
o‘The Lebanese army has been conducting large-scale raids on drug-trafficking cells in the vicinity of Baalbek in the eastern Beka Valley since June 3, when it targeted the home of a notorious drug baron.
o"The war on drugs has not ended and is ongoing," Lebanese Army Chief Gen. Joseph Aoun said Friday (June 10), amid the ongoing raids.
oThe crackdown on drug trafficking stems from the military's "sense of responsibility towards our people and our nation", he said during a visit to the Beka Valley, where he congratulated soldiers on their progress in this area.
o…
oDrug dealers "are protected by Hezbollah, which controls the northern Beka (Baalbek-Hermel) and the southern suburb", said political activist Hussein Ataya said.”[111]
[111]'Lebanese army pursues Baalbek drug barons in ongoing raids', Al-Mashareq, 13 June 2022
Lack of state authority
·It is widely reported that Lebanon suffers from endemic corruption.[112]
[112] DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon 19 March 2019 at [2.14-215]; Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report Lebanon, Freedom House; 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Lebanon, US Department of State.
·“Decades of malpractice, misuse of public funds, and widespread institutional corruption have led to the collapse of the banking sector and, subsequently, Lebanon’s whole economy.[113]”
[113] Conflict Analysis Lebanon National Level, Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR), 14 January 2022
·“The security forces are the most pressing concern. Soldiers and police officers are now receiving far too little pay to provide for themselves, let alone their families. Moon-lighting and desertion are set to become more widespread, while rising social tensions leave the security forces and in particular the army perilously overburdened.[114]”
·“Hezbollah is positioned to wield particular influence as the state declines due to its exceptional financial, military and organisational capacity, including the ability to maintain autonomous external resource streams.[115]”
·“The LAF and other security agencies will remain under high pressure as they handle increasingly complex and accumulating challenges. These include containing intra- and intercommunal clashes throughout Lebanon, confronting jihadists, particularly in the north, enforcing order at prisons and reining in smugglers, drug lords and heavily armed clans in the Beka Valley. Even if security forces succeed in meeting these challenges, they do not have sufficient capacity to deal with sustained wide-spread social unrest absent a coherent policy approach to the areas where it occurs. Security officials are increasingly worried about maintaining security and institutional integrity under such conditions.[116]”
·“the hollowing out of the state’s security apparatuses has triggered a rise in the phenomena of community policing; in areas like Tripoli and Akkar, children as young as 15 are seen carrying weapons on the basis that they are protecting the community.[117]”
Custom of revenge / clans’ tribunal culture
·Strong family and clan ties, in all sects, are prevalent and shape conflict dynamics[118].
·Clans and tribes are reported to be key actors in Lebanon’s Akkar Governorate, particularly in the areas of Karha and Wadi Khaled, and play a major role in the social and political life of the villages. A history of revenge and vendettas has also influenced the local social fabric, and it has been reported that armed conflict has been common in the histories of these clans and that inter-clan tensions have been fragile. However, clans in Akkar Governorate also play a significant role in mediating conflicts and resolving disputes[119].
·“Personal disputes and feuds over drug smuggling are also driving clan-related violence. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) states that competition over increasingly scarce patronage resources is likely behind mounting tensions between rival sectarian political parties and that clan-related violent events increased almost fourfold in 2020, a continuing trend into 2021.[120]”
·During January 2020 and April 2021, at least 25 people were reported killed in clan-related violence across the country[121].
[114] Crisis Group Middle East Report N.228, Managing Lebanon’s Compounding Crises, 28 October 2021, page ii
[115] Ibid
[116] Ibid, page 12
[117] Conflict Analysis Lebanon National Level, Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR), 14 January 2022
[118] 'Lebanon Conflict Analysis – Central Beka', Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR), 17 February 2022
[119] '"Le Monde de L'Entre Deux": Conflict Analysis Study of the Border Areas of Akkar and Baalbek El-Hermel Governorates', International Centre for Migration Policy Development, August 2021, pp.9, 12, 16-17
[120] 'A New Season of Unrest in Lebanon', ACLED, 12 May 2021
[121] Ibid

The day prior to the hearing the applicant provided[122] two further documents to the Tribunal, a copy of a psychological report and a letter in translation said to be from the Lebanese Republic Ministry of Interior. The Tribunal discusses each in turn.
Letter Lebanese Republic Ministry of Interior
[122] Doc ID numbers11112157 and 11117617
The letter provides the following comment:
·“[Applicant name] born in [Location 1] on [date], place and register No.: [deleted],his mother’s name is [deleted], and he resides in [Location 3].
·He worked for Security agencies in anti-narcotics efforts and drug control pursuing the groups that grow weed and going after drug dealers in the North. And he left the Lebanese territory in 2017 because he received threats from these groups wanted by the Security Agencies and his name is still mentioned among them now.
·Signed as follows:
oMayor of [Location 1]: [Mr C] – No. [deleted]
oHead of [Location 1] Municipality [name deleted]-
oMayor of [Location 3]: [Mr B]”
The Tribunal engaged in a number of searches.
·The Tribunal was unable to locate any specific websites to verify the names listed in paragraph 39 above. It may be that the town does not have its own website. There were no matching profiles in LinkedIn.
·[Location 3] (also appears as [variation]) is a town in the Miniyeh-Danniyeh District in the North Governorate of Lebanon. The Akar Governate is to the north of the North Governate and extends to the Syrian border
·The Tribunal located a Wikipedia page with information about a 2018 election for the North 11[123] electoral district which includes a constituency of three ‘minor districts’ one of which is Miniyeh-Danniyeh. However, none of the names listed in the letter set out in paragraph 39 above appear.
[123] North II
·The Tribunal notes the district of Miniyeh-Danniyeh within the North governate 11 in 2017 was 350,147 persons comprising the following:
oSunni Islam 101,971 or 85.93%.
oShia Islam 312 persons or .26%
oDruze 3 persons or [statistically] 0.00%
oAlawite 74 persons or 0.06%
oChristians[124]
·The Tribunal notes the Lebanon religious demographic[125] as overwhelmingly Sunni Islam with significant enclaves of various Christian faiths in the centre and north of North11. Shiite Islam as a population base barely exists in the North 11 constituency.
·The Tribunal notes further that none of the persons set out in paragraph 39 above appeared in any of the lists[126] for the 2018[127] elections although the article notes [deleted].[128]
Psychological report
[124] Christians comprises Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Syriac Orthodox, Evangelical and other minorities excluding Jews
[125] As per map provided to the applicant in the hearing and discussed in the hearing as part of Country Information Lebanon.
[126]
[127] North II - Wikipedia
[128] [Source deleted]
The Tribunal provides the following summary:
Cover letter
·The cover letter recounts the applicant’s personal history as told by the applicant, interspersed with generalised observations about the impact of trauma on individuals particularly in the context of memory and performance at interviews. [Psychologist A][129] does observe in the cover letter that he clinically assessed the applicant as “highly anxious and depressed” and as having “problems with his memory and attention span functions” leading [Psychologist A] to conclude “I expect he would not make sense at public hearings such as tribunals…” (para 14)
[129] The Tribunal notes in Attachment 1 to the psychological report [Psychologist A] set out his background as a report writer and psychologist in the following terms as relevant:
·    I have an MA Degree (obtained in [year]) in Clinical Developmental Psychology: I have made a study of psychological and developmental processes at the different stages of human life, which includes issues such as growth and crises associated with different developmental stages.
·    I worked as a [Teacher] for 2 years and as a Psychologist for 38 years. I run my own private practice and had extensive experience working with clients from diverse cultural backgrounds.
·    My clinical practice encompasses such areas as trauma counselling, CISD, career counselling and guidance, substance abuse, phobias, family/marital problems, couples counselling, mediation, unemployment problems (assisting the unemployed with barriers to employment), interpersonal conflicts, eating problems, depression, self-esteem, motivation, consultation with management, time and stress management.
Report
·[Psychologist A] assessment appears to be based on interviews during two clinical consultations (para 40 of the report) and included the administration of four psychometric tests for personality, depression – anxiety – stress and short-term memory;
·Based on these tests and the self-reported personal history and symptoms of the applicant, [Psychologist A] diagnosed the applicant’s mental status as being that he has “Major Depressive Disorder, with Melancholic Features, Severe with Recurrent Episodes” and “Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with Generalised Anxiety Features”;
·[Psychologist A] assessed the applicant as having a positive prognosis based on being open to treatment but indicated that prognosis would change to negative if the applicant is refused a Protection visa;
·[Psychologist A] recommends the applicant receives three weekly counselling sessions from an Arab speaking psychologist for “about 12 months” and that an anti-depressant be added to the applicant’s drug therapy to treat his severe anxiety and depressed mood.
Psychologist report re credibility issues and mental health generally
·At paragraph 12 the report states “People who fear persecution and are highly anxious are not always consistent in giving evidence given defects in their cognitive functions caused by a chronic supply of stress hormones.”
·At paragraph 14 the report states “I assessed his mental status and came to the conclusion he is highly anxious and depressed, which he demonstrated during assessment with me as I had to ask him over and over to clarify matters. In fact, I administered a few cognitive tests which indicated to me that he has problems with his memory and attention span functions as he sometimes has problems with paying attention to what is asked of him…I expect that he would not make sense at public hearings such as tribunals given his challenges with severe anxiety and depressed mood caused by threats at the hands of the Drug Syndicate gangs and The [Mr A] Family in Lebanon. Because of his critical stress, he has problems with memory, attention span and concentration.”
·At paragraph 15 the report states “Moreover, because of cognitive deficits, asylum seekers do not always speak freely about traumatic events and tend to suffer from what is known as "hyperamnesia" or could become confused about facts and stressful events.”
- At paragraph 32 of the report, fears of disapproval and performance during his formative years formed the foundation for the applicant’s “challenges with generalised anxiety and depressed mood episodes” which are related to father-abandonment issues and then resurfaced following his divorce. These matters are compounded by his fears of persecution as a result of his role as an informant and the drug raids which took place in October 2016.
·At paragraph 34 of the report, reference is made to a tractor accident (2017) and also a car accident (2019) which caused the applicant to develop headaches and impacted on his memory/attention span. There is no evidence that medical treatment was received and these factors were not raised with the Department or the Tribunal earlier.
Tribunal comment
·[Psychologist A] assessment of the applicant appears to be based on two sessions with the applicant on 22 and 23 May 2023 and the administration of four psychometric tests leading to a diagnosis of major depressive disorder and PTSD. [Psychologist A]’s observed during interview and testing that the applicant “presented with challenges with attention span, concentration and memory” which [Psychologist A] attributes to the applicant’s highly stressed state leading to hyperamnesia. [Psychologist A] formed the view the applicant’s reported symptoms (fear of persecution and confusion, strong guilt, sleeplessness, lethargy and sense of helplessness, low confidence, rushed speech and flat and agitated affect) are “understandable and believable”.
·[Psychologist A] expresses the view that the applicant has trouble paying attention and remembering things when he is stressed and depressed and his circumstances “could be a plausible explanation” for why the applicant did not mention his persecution fears when first interviewed by the Department and why those fears were only mentioned during the second interview.
·“Hence, the problems that he has with his memory and attention span which gives the impression that he was inconsistent in his presentation at different times and why he was observed of being not credible in giving evidence. This is also currently the case.”
Conclusion re report
·The psychologist states that the applicant fears persecution at the hands of the [Mr A] clan / drug cartel should he return to Lebanon.
·The psychologist reports that the applicant presented with secondary symptoms of PTSD and that he developed “mental health problems, which had an adverse effect on his general wellbeing, he is forgetful and has problems in paying attention.”
·The applicant is likely to be highly stressed during the hearing and may present “with challenges with attention span, concentration and memory.” (at paragraph 40).
The Tribunal notes it raised concerns[130] with the applicant at the first scheduled review hearing. Arising out of that hearing the Tribunal wrote to the applicant and sought comment. This process was deliberate on the part of the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not want to surprise or “ambush” the applicant in the review hearing considering the applicant comes from a non-English speaking background. The Tribunal was giving the applicant an opportunity to consider the matter, provide an explanation and respond on an informed and considered basis. The applicant provided a detailed written response inclusive of lengthy commentary covering the following:
· Visitor Visa application form
·Migration regulations and policy
·Case law and legal commentary
·424A Submissions from Representative
[130] See paragraphs 20 to 24 above and in particular (1) dot point 4 of paragraph 24 and (2) the 424A Submissions from Representative proving an explanation as summarised by the Tribunal at paragraph 23 above.
The Tribunal notes the delegate made[131] a series of findings as follows:
·    “However at PV interview I found some elements of the applicant’s response regarding his role as a government informant, his active role in a drug raid and his subsequent targeting by a criminal drug family, along with his decision to eventually depart Lebanon, to be lacking in credibility.”
·    I do not accept the applicant was threatened with harm and went into hiding after providing information to the authorities that culminated in the seizure of large amount of drugs and weapons. I am not satisfied the applicant was recounting factual evidence relevant to his personal experience. The applicant appeared hesitant and was vague in his responses to questions posed to him at the interview. As I will discuss in detail below, I find the applicant has embellished parts of his material claims regarding the ongoing direct/indirect threats from the [Mr A] family and associated drug cartel in an effort to enhance his chances of gaining a Protection visa in Australia.
·    Based on the information before me, I am of the view the applicant has fabricated his claims he was an informant for law enforcement agencies in [Location 1]Municipality since 1997. I refute the applicant’s assertions he played a crucial role in the seizure of drugs and weapons and thus, he has been directly/indirectly threatened by a criminal cartel in Lebanon since 2016. I consider the applicant has created these claims solely for the purpose of strengthening his claims for protection and as a last resort to remaining in Australia.
[131] Decision record pages 2, 3 and 5.
In addition the Tribunal prepared[132] a detailed chronology of events so there would be an exact record of matters because it was clear to the Tribunal from a review of all matters on the Departmental and Tribunal files that there appeared to be uncertainties and inconsistencies in the outline of events that occurred in decades prior to the applicant seeking a Protection Visa in Australia.
[132] See paragraph 25 above.
The findings of the delegate are just that. They are the findings of the delegate. Those findings are not binding on the Tribunal. The review hearing is not a hearing conducted by a superior court. The review hearing is a de novo application. The review application and review hearing are conducted again “ab initio” or from the beginning.
At all stages of the determination of this review application the Tribunal has been careful to ensure the applicant receives natural justice and all matters are considered afresh as is the nature of a review hearing.
At no time during his interaction with the first Tribunal for the Visitor Visa case or with the Department prior to grant of the Visitor Visa, did the applicant raise his fears of persecution at the hands of the drug cartels and/or the [Mr A] clan due arising out of the raid which took place in October 2016 and his claimed role as an informant for the [Location 1]Municipality.
It appears that the psychologist report submitted to the Tribunal on 29 May 2023 seeks to elaborate further as to psychological reasons which may address the inconsistent information provided by the applicant to the Department and Tribunal across the Visitor Visa and Protection Visa application. The report also addresses the applicant’s mental health and ongoing challenges.
During the PV interview, the applicant’s then representative Latifa Al Haouli was present and did not raise any concerns regarding the applicant’s mental state and/or ability to interact with the delegate and/or respond to questions coherently. The applicant’s discussion of his family composition, employment and protection claims appeared to be spontaneous and his evidence was clear and coherent. No concerns were raised about the interpreter’s ability to understand the applicant or relay information accurately.
In post-interview submissions made to the Department, the representative again did not raise any concerns about the mental health, memory or cognitive ability of the applicant[133]. Instead, the submissions addressed the delegate’s concerns regarding the circumstances surrounding the applicant’s claims for a protection visa.
[133] Department File [number]
The Tribunal gives [Psychologist A’s] report, diagnosis and observations some weight given they were based on his personal observations of the applicant and the administration of relevant psychometric tests. It is not stated in [Psychologist A’s] cover letter or report how these sessions were conducted (in-person or remotely) or their duration.
These limitations aside, [Psychologist A]’s report is an assessment of the mental health of the applicant as at May 2023 and the Tribunal has made appropriate allowances in the conduct of this review and the assessment of the applicant’s evidence for the reduced cognitive functioning of the applicant as observed and diagnosed by [Psychologist A].
In light of the above report as it relates to cognitive functioning the Tribunal determined[134] to offer the applicant the option of a break every 15 minutes.
[134] See paragraph 41 above and following.
On the day prior to the hearing the applicant provided the Tribunal with a copy[135] of a extract from “Alkarama’s Annual Report 2022”. This article outlined events relating to threats made to a Mr Tarek Chindeb a Lebanese lawyer known for his commitment to defend human rights in Lebanon.
[135] Doc ID number 11120048
In evidence the applicant advised the Tribunal as follows:
·Prior to coming to Australia he had separated from his wife and was living separately from her. He is divorced[136] from his wife and could not remember the exact date of formal divorce.
[136] During the discussion of family composition at the Protection Visa Interview held on 2 July 2019, the applicant confirms that he was still married but “having problems”. However, the psychological report provided to the Tribunal on 29 May 2023 states that “after he arrived in Melbourne his wife divorced him based on irreconcilable differences.”
·He has two children [details deleted]. His children live with his parents and rarely see their mother. He sends regular remittances to his children for their support and university education.
·He has [siblings]. His father has passed and his mother is alive.
·He and his family are wealthy and own lands shops and houses in his home village, nearby towns and Tripoli. In addition to his employment in Australia he receives income from assets like his shops.
·In Australia he lives with his brother and depending on the season works on his brother’s farm or has employment as a maintenance man. He earns approximately $1,500 per week net. He has 3 brothers living in Australia all of whom are Australian citizens. His children in Lebanon have not visited him in Australia.
·He completed a high school diploma in Lebanon. He attended school in Tripoli for his high school education.
·He completed one years’ service in the army in the years 1996-1997. Thereafter from 1997 until 2006 he worked in a family [shop].
·His home village is [Location 3]. He outlined the immediate geographical area of his home village as [Location 3 variation 1], [Location 3 variation 2] and [Location 1]. He said these three geographic locales were almost the same community and basically Sunni Islam or Christian.
·He worked in the local council from 2006 until November 2017 when he came to Australia. He worked as a labourer and supervisor and his job involved identifying faulty or non-compliant house and building projects which he reported to the city council. The council depot was immediately adjacent to the offices of the security forces. He worked in addition as an informant. His work normally finished around 3pm.
·Post 3pm he would continue his searches for illegal activities. He said the local area in which he worked was a well-known tourist area and the activities of armed gangs and their involvement in smuggling of drugs and weapons was of concern to the authorities. He made regular reports to the senior officer of the security forces. This person was[137] [Officer A].
[137] [Officer A] and his contact details were provided to the Department on 18 July 2018 post the Protection Visa Interview. See Departmental file [number]. The Tribunal notes the delegate’s observation that “…it is the applicant’s responsibility to specify his claims for protection and provide sufficient evidence to establish his claims. I am not required to contact someone in another country to verify the applicant’s claims. I note the applicant has gone to lengths to obtain a telephone number from an individual he claims is the [Officer A] of the Intelligence Unit involved in the operation of disrupting the [Mr A] Drug Cartel, yet the applicant is unable to acquire any verifiable evidence from this same person to support his claims…”
·Post his career in the army and whilst employed at the council depot he maintained a close relationship with [Officer A]. It was a relationship based upon trust and honesty. He communicated with General or his office and subordinates on a regular basis because his local area had a lot of problems with illegal gang activities. He repeated he communicated with the [Officer A] or his office on a regular basis or when in receipt of critical information. He agreed his own activities directly harmed the finance interests of his own family. He knew his own informant activates would eventually lead to harm.
·He said he was not involved in the raid of October 2016. The raid occurred in an area about 25 minutes from [Location 3]. Locals in his village considered this area to be a hive of illegal activity. People in his village were of the view the gangs needed to be nullified. He provided General and the security forces with critical information as to gang location, road surveillance, illegal checkpoints, gang activities, criminal commercial front organisations and non-government controlled back roads. In essence he said he played the role of a information gatherer because he had access to information not readily available or known to the more formal security forces. The army or government controlled only main roads and not service roads or back roads.
·He said his role was that of informant, supplier of background information and provided detail as to dangers in local geographic areas.
·He did not play any role in the raid itself. He did not participate in the raid itself.
- Gang members gained access to his phone and sent him threats. After he received the threats he relocated to a house in [a] nearby town [approximately] [number] minutes distant from [Location 3] where his father owned a house. He and his 2 children lived on the 3^rd floor of this house as it was safe.
·His brother is a lawyer in Tripoli. He contacted his brother and told him about his case in Australia. His brother said he was happy to assist and on his behalf contacted the head of the [Location 1] municipality. This person and the other two signatories to the letter of [February] 2023 were long standing officials of the local council going back 10 to 15 years and at the time of the raid participated in meetings with [Officer A] and local security forces. [Mr B] had been mayor of [Location 3] for 15 years. [Mr C] had been may or [Location 1] for 15 years.
·He acknowledged the scale of the drug haul was a huge event. He acknowledged it should have received huge publicity because it was a successful outcome of the local security forces. He advised he thought the security forces had not sought publicity and he was at a loss to explain this because the raid and its outcome were known in the local community. He advised he was not aware of other press, radio or tv relating to the raid or its outcome.
·The head of the [Mr A] Family in Lebanon had been sentenced to 25 years in goal “in absentia”. He was still at large. The applicant was still fearful of harm at the hands of this crime gang.
·He said he did not wish to return to Lebanon as he was a well-known man from a well known family. He believed he would be abducted and killed.
·He cited the example of a close family relative, a cousin, who had been living in [Country 1] and returned to Lebanon
·He cited this very recent example of a relative who had returned to Tripoli from [Country 1], worked as an [occupation], returned to Tripoli from [Country 1], was abducted and assaulted in a part of Tripoli close to the security forces by a group affiliated or associated with Hezbollah and was forced to apay a ransom [for] his release. He was of the view that if a kidnapping could involve a [family] member like his [cousin] it would most likely occur to him.

The Tribunal notes the applicant’s evidence covers a range of issues: family background in Lebanon, asset holdings in Lebanon, family in Australia, army service and consequent informant activities over decades, informant activities leading up to the October 2016 raid, post raid re-location to nearby town, details of like case, a statement from local municipal officials, reasons for coming to Australia and fears of persecution if returned to Lebanon.
Every 15 minutes during the hearing the Tribunal offered the applicant the option of a break. On each occasion the applicant refused the break. Well into the examination the applicant volunteered to the Tribunal the hearing was going well and he was comfortable. The Tribunal maintained its practice of offering breaks. The applicant’s evidence was clear, concise and exact. He responded to all questions. He did not seek to avoid giving a response. He did not exhibit any signs of discomfort. In summary the applicant’s discussion of these matters appeared to be spontaneous and his evidence was clear and coherent. No concerns were raised about the interpreter’s ability to understand the applicant or relay information accurately.
At the conclusion of the hearing the Tribunal expressed some concerns as to the evidence. The Tribunal explained its concerns as to the lack of evidence[138] confirming applicant engagement or involvement in the matters set out below. Subsequent to the hearing and as foreshadowed the Tribunal wrote to the applicant in the following terms:
I am writing in relation to the application for review made by you in respect of a decision to refuse to grant a Protection visa.
As discussed during the hearing on 1 June 2023, you are requested to provide the
following information:
·    Written confirmation that attests to your engagement with the General, his office and his subordinates over time and the role that you played as an informant in the lead up to the particular raid that occurred in October 2016;
·    Any copies of press reports, newspaper reports or radio transcripts which reference the raid that occurred in October 2016; and
·    Any copies of press references relating to the particular crime family that was affected by the October 2016 raid and is responsible for threats to you.
Please provide this information, in writing, by 12:00pm on 26 June 2023.
[138] Excluding the letter of [February] 2023 as discussed in this review application at paragraphs 39 and 40 above.
In addition on 26 June 2023 the Tribunal wrote[139] to the applicant in the following terms:
I am writing in relation to the application for review made by you in respect of a decision to refuse to grant a Protection visa.
·The Senior Member notes that today DFAT released a new Country Information Report on Lebanon. The Tribunal provides a link to this report (copy also attached). The Senior Member notes this report replaces and updates the previous DFAT CI Report on Lebanon dated 19 March 2019. The Tribunal notes pre-hearing legal submissions dated 27 February 2023 at paragraphs 59 and following addressed various matters relevant to the applicant’s claim for protection.
·It is important that you are aware of the most recent report, and that you have an opportunity to read the report and comment if you so wish. The Tribunal is required to take account of this DFAT country assessment in its decision, to the extent that it is relevant, pursuant to Ministerial Directive No. 56. The Tribunal attaches a link to this report.
·The Tribunal grants an extension of time until 12 midday Thursday 6 July 2023 to provide further written submissions
[139] Doc ID numbers 11208372 and 11208376
On 30 June 2023 the applicant provided[140] to the Tribunal further lengthy written submissions and relevant supporting documentation as requested. Those submissions and documents addressed the following:
[140] Doc ID numbers 11225808, 11229591, 11229603, 11229614, 11229632, 11229642 and 11229647
·Extracted 11225808: Post Hearing Submissions
·Extracted 11225808: Att 6-Letter from Brig Gen [F]
·Extracted 11225808: Att 7-Military article re raid 16.10.16
·Extracted 11225808: Att 8-Media article re raid 16.10.16
·Extracted 11225808: Att 9-Media article re [Mr D]
·Extracted 11225808: Att 10-Court docs re [Mr E]
Written confirmation that attests to your engagement with the General, his office and his subordinates over time and the role that you played as an informant in the lead up to the particular raid that occurred in October 2016;
·The applicant provided the following detail:
oA letter from Brigadier General [F], the former director of the State Security Directorate in the North, attesting to [the applicant]’s role as an informant during the 2014-2016 period.
oThe Applicant advised that General [F] worked in the same unit as [Officer A] and, took over his position when he passed away.
oOn the basis of this evidence, we indicate the applicant did in fact hold the position as an informant with the Lebanese security forces.
Any copies of press reports, newspaper reports or radio transcripts which reference the raid that occurred in October 2016;
- The applicant provided the following detail:
oCopies of two articles outlining the events that transpired in October 2016. Attached to these documents were hyperlinks to the relevant articles.
oA summary of the content of the articles.
oThe articles outlined largely the same information on the events transpiring on 16 October 2016, and provides additional details. The articles refers to two suspects being arrested by name, which is directly consistent with the applicant’s evidence that some individuals were arrested.
oFrom the provision of these documents, the applicant submitted that the Lebanese military did conduct the raids against drug traffickers, and the Applicant’s statements in relation to the raids and his involvement are true.
Any copies of press references relating to the particular crime family that was affected by the October 2016 raid and is responsible for threats to you
·The applicant could not receive [from Lebanon] any direct press releases listing the ‘[Mr A] family’ as a crime family, nor any press releases relating to the raid being connected to the [Mr A] family.
·The applicant provided the following detail:
oThe IM Lebanon article outlines that Ali Kamel Allaw and Muhamamd Ali Ibrahim Hosher were arrested.
oThe two arrested suspects cannot be linked to the [Mr A] family directly. However, it is our position that it is reasonable that the [Mr A] crime family associates do not need to hold the same name to be associated to the syndicate. Additionally, we indicate given the substantial amount of drugs seized in the raid, that the individuals could not have been acting alone, but rather working as a part of a syndicate.
oThe Applicant has always maintained that the drug family to which he fears harm from is the ‘[Mr A] Family’ and is a marker of his consistency in this respect.
oThe Applicant has attempted to obtain information relating to a [Mr A], to evidence his prominence and profile as a criminal involved in drug activities in Lebanon.
oAn article from [source], dated [March] 2014, indicates that [Mr D] was previously detained in [prison], and escaped due to an agreement with the member of the security forces.
oAlthough the article does not directly refer to [Mr D] as a member of the [Mr A] family, or his involvement in the drug trade, we indicate the article speaks to his criminal profile, and the fact that he has connections within the Lebanese security forces.
oIt is unlikely that [Mr D], could broker a deal with a member of the security forces if he did not have the profile, the Applicant claims him to have.
oThe article is consistent with the Applicant’s evidence at hearing where he indicated that [Mr D] was previously arrested, however escaped the authorities and is currently at large. He also indicated that he had influence with the authorities and that his identity as an informant was leaked to the [Mr A] family. Furthermore, the Applicant was able to receive court documents indicating that [Mr D]’s brother, [Mr E] had previously been investigated due to his criminal activities, particularly drug trafficking.
oOn the information before the Tribunal, we submit that it is reasonable to accept [Mr D] and [Mr E] are related given the patrilineal naming convention in the middle east, ‘[name]’ being both their middle names, and is representative that ‘[name]’ is the father of both – in our view evidences their familial relationship.
oIn our view, the article and court documents evidence the link between the two brothers demonstrating they are both prominent criminals from the same family, have connections within the state security and are involved in the illegal drug trade.
oWhen viewed in conjunction with our previous submissions at [61] – [66], it is reasonable for the Tribunal to make a finding that the ‘[Mr D] family’ is one of the many criminal clans that operate illegal drug trades in the North of Lebanon. The Applicant’s geographical position of residence, and geographical location of where the October 2016 raid took place, is consistent with drug clans operating within those areas.
oAccordingly, it is our submission that despite no press article tying the October 2016 raid to the ‘[Mr A] Family’, it is reasonable to link the raid to affecting a Criminal Drug Syndicate.
Updated DFAT Country Information Report
·The applicant submitted as follows:
oAt [38(II)] of our submissions, we outlined[141] the prevalence of corruption distorting the public procurement process within Lebanon.
oAt [69] of our submissions, we outlined[142] clashes have occurred between Lebanese security forces and Islamic State militants in the north-eastern Beka’a valley region (including the Hermel-Baalbek region and the towns of Arsal, el Qaa and Ras Baalbek).
oAt [79] of our submissions, we indicated[143] that in areas where Hezbollah exercises effective control over, it exceeds the influence and control of that of the Lebanese state.
oAt [80] of our submissions the ability of authorities to provide state protection is dependent on the geographical area as some areas of Lebanon are not under the effective control of the state.
oAt [114] of our submissions, we outlined[144] that despite all Lebanese citizen having the legal capacity to relocate internally, the ease in which an individual can relocate largely depends on their individual circumstances.
oIn this respect, the updated DFAT report does not contest the information we previously relied upon in the old DFAT report, either offering the same information, variances of that information or omitting information completely.
oWhere information was previously contained in the old DFAT report, which is not available in the new DFAT report, we submit that this is not a true indication that it is not relevant to the Applicant’s circumstances.
oThis is because, the majority of the country information for the Applicant’s particular claims were sourced outside of the DFAT report. The old DFAT report only providing a baseline for the contextual circumstances in Lebanon relating to prevalence of crime, gangs and Hezbollah in the Bekaa Valley and surrounding areas.
oWe indicate that all submissions made previously in this respect, are not inconsistent with new DFAT report, rather aim to address gaps in the Country Information not available in the previous DFAT report.
[141] Submissions provided to the Tribunal on 27/02/2023
[142] Ibid
[143] Ibid
[144] Ibid
Analysis and Findings s36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act.
The Tribunal has considered all the above information.
The Tribunal finds as follows:
·The applicant was an informant with the [Location 1] Municipality;
·He was involved in the October 2016 raid, by way of informing the security forces of the location of drugs;
·His details were leaked to crime families;
·On return he will be of adverse interest to those crime families;
·The crime families have relevant motive to target the applicant;
·The crime families have the means to locate and harm the applicant irrespective of where he resides in Lebanon.
·The feared harm is serious/significant harm.
·The authorities are unable to provide adequate protection to the applicant.
The applicant has provided extensive information that was not provided in such detail to the Department. It is not new information that invites consideration of s 423A of the Migration Act. As relevant this information addresses the history of the applicant’s activities as an informant for security and intelligence agencies within the state of Lebanon whilst he was employed in a local municipality in his hometown. The applicant was as he described himself just a labourer and supervisor within the local council. More importantly and unknown for many years he acted as an informant for security and intelligence agencies engaged in the combatting of crime and terrorism. His informant activities were known to local elected officials, appointed local senior officials and, of course, various iterations of command within the intelligence and security services.
The Tribunal has examined closely copies of documents provided by local officials and security services. The Tribunal has engaged in its own researches to verify or confirm, or not as appropriate, the names, offices, family histories, locations of local and security persons, positions held and periods of office of relevant local or appointed players in this review application. The Tribunal has reviewed publicly available and publicly accessible information as to the tribal, community, geographic and demographic features of the relevant area referred to by the applicant.
The applicant has lived in Australia since 2018 after arriving as the holder of a holiday visa. Post arrival in Australia he applied for a Protection Visa essentially on the grounds that his now known role as an informant to the security and intelligence services in Lebanon had resulted in a significant police or army raid that resulted in the confiscation of millions of dollars of drugs, weapons and assorted other illegal materials. The success of this raid had drawn the ongoing and still current enmity of major crime gangs to the applicant and he fled his family, life and position of repute in his hometown to the relative safety of Australia.
The numerous government and NGO reports cited in above under the heading of Country Information confirm the prevalence, authority, often state protection of crime gangs and the toleration if not encouragement of their activities by some layers of responsible authority within the Lebanese government. The Tribunal accepts the evidence of the applicant that his life is under threat by these crime gangs if he should return to Lebanon. The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s service to the security and intelligence agencies of Lebanon as an informant identify him as a person of great interest to those crime gangs who have been harmed by his activities.
Having considered the applicant’s claims individually and cumulatively, the evidence, considered as a whole and in combination with the cited country information and numerous current and topical government and NGO reports, is sufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal the existence of a real chance the applicant would be subjected to serious harm for reasons of his past informant type activities as derived from his long-standing employment in the local council. The Tribunal is satisfied the applicant would be subjected to serious harm for reason of these activities these being reasons that meet the provisions of s 5J(1)(a) of the Act if he is removed to Lebanon now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. Accordingly, the applicant satisfies the criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
Consequently, the Tribunal is satisfied the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a reason specified in s 5J(1) of the Act and that the applicant meets the definition of refugee as set out is s 5H of the Act.
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).
Relocation and State Protection
The Tribunal has also considered the option of relocation for the applicant to another part of Lebanon. The Tribunal is satisfied the government of Lebanon or crime gangs as relevant has agents or officials or informants in all parts of the country and the forced relocation of a man who has been absent from his own country since 2018 would be a matter brought to the attention of corrupt government officials or crime gangs. Similarly, the Tribunal if of the view the government of Lebanon is not able or willing to provide adequate state protection of the type and cost that might be required by a known police informant anywhere in Lebanon.
CONCLUDING PARAGRAPHS
For the reasons given above the Tribunal is satisfied that each of the applicants is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations. Therefore, the applicants satisfy the criterion set out in s 36(2)(a).
DECISION
The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
Mark Bishop
Senior Member
ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
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degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
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torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
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receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
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5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
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5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
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36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
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(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
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[1] See below at paragraphs 41 to 57.