1904001 (Refugee)

[2022] AATA 4890

1904001 (Refugee) [2022] AATA 4890 (13 October 2022)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

REPRESENTATIVE:  Mr Virajith Hewaarachchi

CASE NUMBER:  1904001

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Ethiopia

MEMBER:Nicole Burns

DATE:13 October 2022

PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne

DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 13 October 2022 at 11:12am

CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Ethiopia – race – Oromo ethnicity – imputed or actual political opinion – anti-government/pro-OLF/pro-OLA – Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) – Patriotic Ginbot 7 (PG7) – father’s involvement with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) – monitored, threatened, and detained for seven months – country information – political, social and security developments in Ethiopia – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H, 5J, 5LA, 36, 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 12 February 2019 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

2. The applicant applied for the visa on 28 June 2016.  He holds an Ethiopian passport and states he is a national of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Ethiopia). The delegate did not indicate any issues with his claimed nationality or identity. Accordingly, the Tribunal accepts he is a national of Ethiopia and that Ethiopia is his receiving country for the purpose of assessing his protection claims.

3. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal via video link on 25 November 2021 and 17 December 2021, where he gave evidence and presented arguments about the issues in his case. The Tribunal also took evidence from his sister, [Ms A] from Ethiopia (over the telephone). The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Amharic and English languages.

4. The applicant’s representative in relation to the review was present at the Tribunal hearings.  

   Criteria for a protection visa

5. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

6. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a Protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.

7. A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).

8. Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a  person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

9. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

   Mandatory considerations

10. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.  DFAT’s most recent country information report on Ethiopia was published on 12 August 2020.

    CONSIDERATION OF Claims and evidence

    Background, claims and evidence

11. The applicant is a [age]-year-old man originally from Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. He came to Australia from Ethiopia [in] March 2014 holding a provisional partner visa, based on his marriage to an Australian woman. Subsequently his marriage broke down[1] and the applicant’s permanent partner visa application was refused on 4 May 2016. 

    [1] In the Protection visa application form it states that he married [in] January 2013 and was divorced [in] March 2015.

12. The applicant set out his claims initially in the Protection visa application form and in a statutory declaration dated 9 November 2016. He claimed to fear persecution in Ethiopia for several reasons including due to his Oromo ethnicity; imputed and actual political opinion based on his previous activity supporting an opposition party in Ethiopia (the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)), and supporting  Patriotic Ginbot 7 (PG7), and expressing his (anti-government) political opinion via social media in Australia; and based on his membership of a particular social group of his father’s family. He claims his father was tortured then killed by the authorities when he was six years old because of his father’s involvement with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)[2] and support of Oromo rights. His older siblings faced problems afterwards from the authorities: they were monitored, threatened, and mistreated; the applicant claims. 

    [2] Referred to as ‘ONEG’ in the Protection visa application form. 

13. Additionally, the applicant claims to have been detained for seven months from late 2009 due to his political activities in Ethiopia, and to have been tortured and mistreated during that time. On release he ceased political activities, only becoming active again whilst in Australia. Before he left Ethiopia and after being released from detention, plainclothes members from the authorities would check on him. He told the delegate at interview[3] that he stopped posting comments critical of the government online in 2016, worried about the safety of his siblings who remain in Ethiopia.  

    [3] On 22 March 2018.

14. The applicant addressed some concerns and clarified some matters raised at his interview with the delegate in a statutory declaration dated 4 April 2018, which he provided to the Department. Specifically, the applicant clarified why he was released from detention in 2010 and how he was able to leave Ethiopia on a passport issued in his own name in 2014 with no issues. He explains he was released because the authorities did not have concrete evidence that he was an official member of an opposition party, and he had ceased political activity. Therefore he was not prevented from leaving the country by the authorities. 

15. Material the applicant provided in support of the visa application included:

    ·A receipt of payment to PG7, dated 28 May 2016;

    ·A copy of a letter dated [in] February 2018 signed by [Mr B], PG7, Movement for Unity and Democracy;

    ·Several photographs of the applicant at diaspora events in Australia;

    ·A copy of a letter from the Ethiopian Community Association in Victoria (ECAV) dated [in] March 2017, signed by their secretary;

    • A copy of a letter from [Church 1] of Melbourne, dated 15 July 2017; and

    ·A copy of an untranslated [social media] screenshot purportedly showing the applicant had shared a quote from Berhanu Nega, one of the founding members of PG7, [in] November 2016.

16. The representative provided to the Department a written submission dated 5 April 2018 which included an overview of the applicant’s Protection claims, grounds for protection, and country information relevant to those grounds. The representative also addressed recent political developments in Ethiopia in their submission. 

17. The Departmental file contains an email from the representative on 6 August 2018 – after the applicant’s interview with the delegate – who argues that it is too soon to tell if reforms initiated by the then new Prime Minister (Abiy) will bring genuine lasting reforms to Ethiopia. 

18. The delegate was not satisfied the applicant was at risk of harm based on his father’s profile, nor did they accept that his older siblings were monitored by the authorities after his father’s death as claimed. The delegate indicated that even if they accepted the applicant was detained for seven months in 2009/2010, they did not accept he had any adverse political profile of interest to the authorities when he left Ethiopia in March 2014. The delegate accepted the applicant was a general, low-level member of PG7 based on his evidence about his activities in Australia. However, because he had not posted critical material online since 2016, given the positive reforms in Ethiopia after Prime Minister Abiy came to power in April 2018, and as there were no indications that any of his family members in Ethiopia had experienced any associated problems, they found he did not face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm in his country on that basis. His Protection visa was refused on 12 February 2019.

19. On review the applicant provided to the Tribunal a written statement dated 15 May 2021,[4] in which he expands upon his claims, details problems faced by his sister in Ethiopia – who had allegedly spoken out against the treatment of Oromos in Ethiopia more recently - and described the current political environment since Abiy came to power. He alleges that there are human rights violations by the present government ‘every day’ and an environment where there is no freedom to express opposition to the government. He states that the current government jails political opponents and creates conflict between the largest ethnic groups to stay in power. Further, he states that if he was not afraid, he would want to speak about what happened to his father (and seek justice) and speak about what is happening to Oromos if he returns to Ethiopia. 

    [4] Received by the Tribunal on 17 October 2021 and given a date of 15 October 2021 in an attached email from the representative, which appears to be incorrect.

20. The representative provided a comprehensive written submission[5] to the Tribunal setting out the applicant’s background, protection claims and country information where relevant to support the contention that his fears of persecution on return to Ethiopia are well founded due to:

    a.The applicant’s Oromo ethnicity; and/or

    b.His actual and/or imputed political opinion of being anti-current Ethiopian government; and/or

    c.His imputed political opinion being pro Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and/or pro OLF; and/or

    d.Belonging to a particular social group of persons: people who are perceived as proponents of human rights; and/or people who are perceived as people with radical views.

    [5] Undated; received on 17 October 2021.

21. It is also submitted that direct and indirect threats amount to serious harm by supporters of the current government, people who are not Oromo, and/or gangs targeting people returning from Western countries for reasons not covered by s 5J(1)(a), but where the authorities may discriminatorily withhold protection because of the above reasons.

22. At the Tribunal hearing the applicant gave oral evidence about his background, experiences and circumstances in Ethiopia and Australia, and reasons for fearing persecution upon return to his home country now, summarised as follows.

23. He said before he came to Australia in March 2014 he was living in Addis Ababa with his sister ([Ms A]) and his son – [Child C], who is now [age] years old – who he and his sister had adopted when he was around 10 months old (after he was abandoned in the countryside). He worked as a [Occupation 1] and his sister owned cattle.  Presently the applicant said he works as a [Occupation 2] in Australia and sends regular financial remittances to his sister. He has two brothers - [Mr D] and [Mr E] - who live and work in Addis Ababa and have their own families. His other brother, [Mr F], died when he was a teenager, and who had mental health problems.

24. The applicant said his father, who was a founding member of the OLF, was killed when the applicant was [age] possibly by the authorities. The applicant continued living in their family home with his older siblings after his father’s death, which is where he was living with his sister and son up until he came to Australia (his mother died when he was around [age] years of age). When asked if anything happened to his siblings after his father’s death, the applicant said ‘no’ because they were scared to be involved in politics and just went about their normal business. He said they were closely monitored however, noting the existence of spies in the community who would meet them for coffee and ask questions to find out if they were involved in politics and about their opinions on certain matters. His siblings were never physically harmed but were warned through such spies to stop being involved in the ‘movement’. When it was pointed out the applicant had said his siblings were not politically active in Ethiopia, the applicant then said he received threats from people visiting his home when he was involved in the movement (described further below).   

25. The applicant also stated that some land his father owned was confiscated by the authorities around two years after he died. 

26. The applicant gave evidence about his involvement with opposition groups in Ethiopia. He said when he was around 16, he started to ask more questions about why his father was killed and became involved with an opposition group called the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD).[6] For example, by distributing flyers, participating in anti-government demonstrations, and trying to garner support for them. The authorities were monitoring his involvement and movements (along with others), and in Ethiopian calendar (EC) 2003 (Gregorian calendar (GC) 2009), the applicant said he was detained in a remote location outside Addis Ababa ([specified location], Western Ethiopia) where he was threatened with death if he did not stop his support to the CUD. He was detained for seven months then let go without being charged because the authorities had no evidence (that he was involved with opposition parties). He said at that time the government was undertaking mass arrests of suspected opposition supporters. 

    [6] Also known as ‘Kinijit’ or ‘Qinijit’.

27. Whilst detained, the applicant said the prison conditions were poor, with limited food.  He was interrogated sometimes at night about his involvement with the CUD, the groups’ hierarchy and so on. The authorities knew about his father and threatened he would have the same fate if he did not stop his involvement with the CUD. He said he was tortured. Upon release, the applicant was forced to sign a paper and warned that if the authorities subsequently discovered he was involved in any movement they would take serious action against him. He then returned home, to his sister and son, and returned to work. 

28. The applicant said he was monitored after his release, up until he left Ethiopia in 2014. Groups of unknown people would come to his house to check on him. His sister told him this continued, even after he left, the last time around four or five years prior (to the hearing).  During that visit his sister told the visitors the applicant had gone to Australia. 

29. The applicant explained that he knew his former wife in Ethiopia, and they had been partners before she left Ethiopia with her family around five years before he left the country. She returned to Ethiopia (from Australia) in early 2013 to marry him.

30. The applicant said he was able to leave Ethiopia in March 2014 on his own passport without any problems because he had not been involved with any movements after his release from detention in 2010. 

31. The applicant was asked about his ongoing concerns on return to Ethiopia, given he was able to leave the country with no problems in 2014, the fact the government has changed since he left (in April 2018), and due to significant improvements in relation to treatment of opposition supporters (among other things) since. He said he might be interrogated again on return to Ethiopia because of his political activities in Australia. He added that he might also seek justice for his father, which would lead to persecution. When asked what he means by that, the applicant said the reason he joined the CUD initially was because he had started asking questions about why his father was killed and why there was no justice. If he returns to Ethiopia, he might request an investigation into his father’s death to bring those responsible to justice, and fight for all people’s equal rights. If so, given the current situation in Ethiopia, this may expose him to serious harm. 

32. The applicant said he is following the current situation in Ethiopia closely and noted that even though Prime Minister Abiy is Oromo, he does not treat Oromos well and does not respect their rights: as such the applicant would feel compelled to fight for those rights.

33. The applicant told the Tribunal about his political activities in Australia. Specifically, in around April 2016 he said he joined Ginbot 7 –an Ethiopian opposition political organisation, active in diaspora communities. He used to attend monthly meetings (held in various Ethiopian community halls in different Melbourne suburbs), paid a monthly fee, and participated in demonstrations and fundraising events. He also helped organise events when Ginbot 7 leaders visited Australia, and protests when Ethiopian government officials visited: for example, Seyoum Mesfin, who was an Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government minister (and later killed).

34. The applicant said he stopped social media posts critical of the Ethiopian government sometime in 2016 because the government in Ethiopia could see his posts and his siblings (in Ethiopia) were scared. When asked how he knew the government could see his posts, the applicant said his brothers in Ethiopia could see what he was posting, so he thinks the government also knew. Although he decided to stop posting online, he continued his Ginbot 7 related activities in Australia, increasing his involvement up until he ceased altogether not long after Abiy came to power in 2018, and Ginbot 7 was split into two groups: one with the current government. He said that when the current government announced they would give Ginbot 7 (and other previously proscribed groups) a seat in government, the applicant (and some others) started to doubt their sincerity and felt betrayed by them. 

1. The applicant said he opposes the new government in Ethiopia because they believe in weapons, and he feels betrayed by Ginbot 7. He said many people think that much has changed and improved since Abiy came to power, but he contends there is no change.  Whilst there may have been some opening up of democratic space initially, it has closed again.

2. The applicant spoke of recent searches of people’s homes for weapons in Addis Ababa. When asked if the searches were linked to the conflict in Tigray (that has advanced to other parts of the country), the applicant said it is not related to anything, noting some people whose houses have been searched have been living in Addis Ababa for 20 years or more. If he returns to Ethiopia the applicant said he is worried the authorities might come to know about his background opposing the government. He reiterated that he might also seek justice for his father, and if so, he might suffer harm. 

3. The applicant told the Tribunal that although presently he has withdrawn his personal involvement with Ginbot 7, he plans to be politically active in the future, preferably to support the Oromo community to have their own party, noting Oromos (including his father) have suffered because of their ethnicity. When asked what party specifically, the applicant said there are different pro-Oromo organisations who oppose the government, and he plans to take his time to look into which ones are really against the government. He noted that on reflection he did not think about it much when he joined Ginbot 7, who have since betrayed him. When asked why he joined them then, the applicant said because there are many different ethnicities in Ethiopia, he believed in Ethiopian nationalism, and Ginbot 7’s main purpose was to overthrow the then government and establish a new government.

4. He was asked if he still believes in Ethiopian nationalism, with different ethnic groups being represented: in reply the applicant said he believes in peace and whilst he is Oromo, he does not want his ethnicity to clash with his feelings of being Ethiopian. However, he said he will ‘fight to the end’ for his people to have their own government, and independence if his identity as Oromo is not accepted. He reiterated that he currently wants to research various groups before deciding who to support. He wants to find an organisation that sets Oromos free, and really fights for Oromos. Although Prime Minister Abiy is Oromo, he does not serve his community: Oromo people’s lands are confiscated and they are not free to make decisions, the applicant said.   

5. When asked if he experienced specific problems due to his Oromo ethnicity in Ethiopia, the applicant said his father was killed because he was Oromo, and he has suffered a lot because he is Oromo, including psychologically (he did not elaborate). 

6. Another reason why the applicant does not like Prime Minister Abiy is because his sister has suffered under his rule. He told the Tribunal in 2019 she gave an interview about what had happened to their family – including their father being assassinated, his subsequent land confiscated, and the general persecution their family had experienced – on [a media outlet]. Afterwards she was refused services at the local kebele[7] including a permit she needed to renovate the building where she kept her animals, and to store food for her livestock. Each time she visited the kebele to try and access services she was refused and called ‘crazy’. The applicant said the authorities also went to her home and threatened her.  She was then unable to subsist, as some of her cattle became sick and died, after being exposed to the wind and rain, and she was forced to sell her remaining cattle. The government also demolished her house, and she has stopped working; now she is financially dependent on the applicant. 

   [7] An administrative ward or level of local government.

7. At hearing [Ms A] told the Tribunal that the government demolished her house (which was the family home) five years ago, claiming it was illegal: she is not sure why. She was upset and wanted to seek justice, but community members and the local authorities called her crazy (the applicant clarified that his sister’s house was demolished before she was interviewed on television in 2019, noting that even beforehand she was often denied services). 

8. Additionally, [Ms A] said her father, who was a founding member of the OLF, was killed in front of their door. When the applicant grew up, he started asking questions about their father’s death with peers, friends, and others. He also supported opposition groups (who were agitating for Oromo rights) and was subsequently imprisoned for seven months at one point. During that time, he was tortured, his sister said. He also used to get beaten up by the authorities in plainclothes when he went out sometimes: she said the applicant suffered a lot. After he left Ethiopia, the authorities continued to ask about him, visit their home, and enquire with neighbours, sometimes in plainclothes, sometimes in police uniform. [Ms A] said they do not ask about him anymore.

9. In his oral submission to the Tribunal, the representative noted the situation in Ethiopia has deteriorated since DFAT issued its report in August 2020, showing a clear movement towards a climate of fear that had existed in Ethiopia for decades. The trajectory is important to consider, he argues, as a clear indicator of where the government and country is headed. For example, recent allegations of the OLF and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) working together in opposition, and the resultant government crackdown. Also, with respect to the OLF and Oromos in general boycotting the most recent election in Ethiopia. 

10. The representative added that a low risk of detention, or harassment, or discrimination – as DFAT assesses for Oromos or for people who engage in peaceful protests (for example) – is not inconsistent with a real risk of serious harm, particularly considering the deterioration in the situation and increase in risk overall since the DFAT report. He submitted that when looking to the future, the types of activity the applicant would engage in, even if not for his past profile, will place him at a real risk of harm given the trajectory the country is on. 

11. The Tribunal notes prior to the hearing the representative provided a link purportedly of the video recording of [Ms A]’s interview on [a media outlet] and asked if at hearing the interpreter could interpret her account. The Tribunal advised in response that information provided by applicants in support of their case should be in English or properly transcribed using a properly accredited translator, and that the applicant would need to decide for the video to be translated and/or transcribed. In an email provided in response, the representative advised that they had requested a translated transcript of the video; but asked that in the event this is unable to be provided before the hearing, whether the video could be played, and an interpreter translate the contents of the final five minutes. In an email in response, the Tribunal reiterated that it is up to the applicant to provide a translation of the transcript.  The Tribunal notes no transcript of the interview has been received.  Nonetheless, for reasons discussed further below, the Tribunal is willing to accept the applicant’s sister was interviewed in around 2019 on [a media outlet]. 

12. The representative provided a post hearing written submission[8] to the Tribunal about the volatile and unstable situation in Ethiopia. He argues that in such a context the applicant’s already heightened risk of harm if returned to Ethiopia will increase further. Reference is made to country information from a variety of sources indicating a violent (and downward) trajectory of Ethiopia’s descent into civil war, with the representative noting the following points in particular:

    • The worsening civil war between the Ethiopian government and rebel forces, which has exposed the Abiy administration’s deep-seated resentment and intolerance of political opposition in all its forms. The Ethiopian authorities’ treatment of rebel forces portends its likely treatment of political dissidents in the immediate future;
    • The applicant’s history of active political engagement, noting that it is almost inevitable the applicant will find himself imputed with (or involved) active political opposition to the Abiy administration which, considering the increasingly intolerant stance towards political dissent of same, increases his already heightened risk of harm even further;
    • The applicant’s Oromo ethnicity: in addition to the increased risk of harm at the hands of the authorities (as well as from the rebel forces), the applicant faces the probability of harm based on his Oromo ethnicity, as the conflict between government and Tigrayan forces widens the rift, and spurs and enables violence between ethnic groups.

    [8] Undated, received on 12 January 2022.

    Findings with respect to the applicant’s past experiences and profile

13. The Tribunal has considered the evidence before it, including the applicant (and his sister’s) oral evidence at hearing and the various submissions and supporting documents provided, in assessing his claims related to his past experiences in Ethiopia, since he has left there, and in Australia, considered separately as follows.

    The applicant’s father

14. The applicant claims his father – a founding member of the OLF (and of Oromo ethnicity) – was killed presumably by the authorities when he was [age] years old (and before that his father was purportedly closely monitored by the authorities, threatened, and tortured). The applicant claims his (older) siblings were monitored by the authorities, often via community spies, and warned not to be politically active, thereafter. 

15. The applicant fears being harmed by the authorities upon return, imputed with being pro-OLF or pro OLA due to his father (and his own Oromo ethnicity and political activities in support of opposition groups), particularly if he attempts to seek justice for his father’s death, as he now claims he will do. In his statement to the Tribunal the applicant states that if so, he fears he will be harassed, followed, monitored, and have false charges made against him, noting in Ethiopia individuals are unable to speak about what is (and has) happened to Oromos, or freely express political opinions against the government. He refers to the way his sister was treated after she was interviewed by independent media about the oppression of Oromos (and her family in particular) in 2019. 

16. The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s father was of Oromo ethnicity and was killed when the applicant was around [age]: that is around 1994/95, in Addis Ababa where the family lived. It accepts the applicant’s mother had died earlier (when the applicant was around [age]) and he was raised by his older siblings after his father’s death. The applicant has consistently claimed his father died when he was this age, and in these circumstances, which was confirmed by his sister’s oral evidence to the Tribunal. 

17. The Tribunal also accepts the authorities may have confiscated his father’s land and around two years after his death. His oral evidence was vague about this; however, this is likely due to his young age at the time. Country information indicates historical land seizures by the Ethiopian authorities, in particular the EPRDF, including around Addis Ababa.[9] 

    [9] Hunde Dhugassa, ‘Land Grabbing and its dire consequences in Ethiopia’, farmlandgrab.org,11 January 2014.

18. The applicant was somewhat vague about his father’s involvement with the OLF and about alleged problems he experienced before he died: however, this is also likely due to the fact he was young at the time, and his father’s activities took place before or shortly after the applicant was born.  The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s father, as an Oromo, may have been involved with the OLF, which was founded in 1973, and fought alongside other ethnic-based groups against the ruling Derg (military junta) regime in the eighties.[10] 

    [10] UK Home Office, Country policy and information note: Oromos, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Army, Ethiopia, 22 March 2022, at 6.1.1

19. However, the Tribunal is concerned about the applicant’s claims that his father was one of the founding members of the OLF given a search of his father’s name in country information does not indicate as such, and because the applicant failed to mention his father was a founding member of the OLF in his Protection visa application and statutory declaration provided to the Department (nor does this appear in the representative’s written submission dated April 2018 provided in support of that application). Instead, the applicant states that his father was a member of ONEG and used to support Oromo rights but made no mention that he was a founding member of the OLF, which the Tribunal considers is a significant omission. It appears that the first time the applicant mentioned his father was a founding member of OLF was at his interview with the delegate, as indicated in the decision record. 

20. Given these concerns, the Tribunal is of the view the applicant exaggerated his father’s role with the OLF by claiming he was a founding member. It accepts his father was involved with the OLF before his death but does not accept he was a founding member. Furthermore, the Tribunal accepts his father’s death may have been due to his involvement with the OLF and more broadly his support of Oromo rights, and that he may have been monitored, threatened, and tortured prior to his death, even though the applicant’s evidence on these matters was somewhat vague. Country information indicates that the EPRDF – in power from 1988 to early 2018 – largely controlled Ethiopian politics and had little tolerance for opposition or perceived dissent.[11]

    [11] DFAT Country Information Report, Ethiopia, 1 April 2016 at 2.17

21. The applicant claims his siblings were monitored by the authorities after their father’s death. In his statutory declaration provided to the Department described this as ‘non-stop’ wherein their daily lives were closely monitored, and they were threatened and mistreated. At hearing the applicant told the Tribunal they were never physically harmed but were warned through community spies. The Tribunal found his oral evidence in this respect vague and internally inconsistent to some degree. For example, he was unable to articulate who amongst the community warned his siblings, when this occurred, or provide any further details or context. Additionally, when asked why his siblings were warned not to continue with the movement, given his evidence that they were not politically active, the applicant changed his evidence to say that it was him who was warned. However, this may be explained by the fact he was young, and his siblings may have kept details from him. Given the OLF – an opposition group dedicated to Oromo self-determination - was a proscribed organisation up until June 2018 (and returned from exile in Eritrea in September 2018),[12] and country information indicates there were risks Oromos (and others) faced if they actively and openly opposed the EPRDF,[13] the Tribunal accepts the applicant’s claims that his siblings were monitored and perhaps occasionally questioned (which could be considered threatening) by the authorities after their father’s death. However, it considers the applicant may have exaggerated the level of harassment and threat his siblings experienced from the authorities after their father’s death, particularly given they have stayed living there and considering the applicant’s at times vague oral evidence in this regard. 

    [12] DFAT Country Information Report, Ethiopia, 12 August 2020 at 3.7.

    [13] DFAT Country Information Report, Ethiopia, 28 September 2017 at 3.8

22. The Tribunal notes in his statutory declaration provided to the Department the applicant states that one of his brothers – who experienced mental health issues – died when a teenager, and whilst he cannot speculate why, he is sure the ‘terror’ he and his siblings lived with contributed to his brother’s mental state. The applicant did not talk about this brother specifically at hearing. Nonetheless, the Tribunal accepts the applicant’s brother died when he was a teenager, that he experienced mental health issues, and those issues were likely exacerbated by his father’s murder and monitoring of the family members thereafter.   

    Political activities in Ethiopia

23. The applicant claims to fear persecution on return to Ethiopia from the authorities due to his past support to an opposition group there, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD).[14]  He claims he became involved with the CUD when he was around [age] years of age, when he started asking questions about his father. At hearing he said he distributed flyers and participated in peaceful demonstrations. He claims he was detained because of his support to the CUD in Ethiopia for seven months (from late 2009) in Dedesa prison, and that he was tortured and mistreated during that time. After he was released, he ceased political activities in Ethiopia. He claims that plainclothes members of the authorities checked up on him after his release from detention, and via his sister (and brothers if they were visiting his sister’s house) after he left the country; the last check up around four or five years prior to the hearing (that is around 2016). 

    [14] The CUD was known in Ethiopia as Kinijit, as referred to by the applicant in the protection visa application.   

24. At hearing the Tribunal found the applicant’s knowledge of the CUD – which had been the main opposition alliance in Ethiopia – including its purpose and evolution, was fairly limited and general. For instance, he could not remember when they were founded, even though country information indicates it was founded in October 2004,[15] around the time he claimed to have become involved (when he was [age]). He made sweeping statements about the CUD’s purpose to oppose the government, for example on issues about freedom of expression, peaceful demonstrations, and peoples’ rights, but was unable to provide any specific details or context. Additionally, he appeared unaware that the CUD was a coalition made up of four parties (none of which he was unable to identify), instead claiming there was only one party, which is not supported by country information.[16]   

    [15] The Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) was formed in October 2004 and recognized by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) in November 2004. ‘NEBE has not recognized new merger by CUD member parties’ 2005, National Electoral Board of Ethiopia website,

    [16] The member parties to the coalition were the All Ethiopian Unity Party, the Rainbow Ethiopia Movement for Democracy and Social Justice, the Ethiopian Democratic League and United Ethiopian Democratic Party-Medhin, ‘NEBE has not recognized new merger by CUD member parties’ 2005, National Electoral Board of Ethiopia website, 15 October

25. Despite these concerns, the Tribunal notes the applicant has consistently claimed to have been involved with the CUD whilst in Ethiopia; to have been arrested and detained for seven months in around 2009/2010; and to have been monitored by the authorities before and after his arrest, including after he left the country via his siblings who remained there. The Tribunal accepts the applicant may have supported the CUD in the past from around the age of [age] (2004) until after he was released from detention in 2010, and his activities included attending meetings, distributing flyers, and trying to garner support. It does not accept he was overly active or involved given his limited knowledge of the CUD, alongside other concerns with his evidence, as indicated earlier. 

1. Additionally, the Tribunal accepts the applicant was detained at Dedesa prison, along with others, and interrogated and mistreated (including being tortured) during a seven-month period in 2009/2010, before being released with no charges. The Tribunal is of the view the applicant was not specifically targeted but fell victim to one of the mass arrests of young men with suspected links to opposition groups by the authorities at that time. His evidence about being monitored and threatened beforehand was weak and the Tribunal considers the applicant may have suspected that was the case but is not satisfied anything concrete occurred. 

2. At hearing, the applicant claimed he had to sign a form upon release from detention and was warned of trouble he would face if he became involved with opposition groups in the future.  The Tribunal found his oral evidence in this respect was vague. Further, he makes no mention of this in his November 2016 statutory declaration provided to the Department, instead stating when he was released, he was told they would bring him back whenever they felt like it. Therefore, the Tribunal does not accept the applicant was made to sign a document when released from prison in 2010 as claimed at hearing. 

3. The applicant claims after his release from prison in Ethiopia he stopped all political activities, although he continued to be monitored by the authorities. At hearing he said unknown people checked up on him after his release from prison by visiting the house he lived at with his sister, before and after he left Ethiopia. The last time this occurred was around four or five years before the hearing (that is around late 2016). In his 2016 statutory declaration he states that plainclothes members of the authorities checked on him in ‘a threatening manner on a random irregular basis once a month or every three months’. He said they asked about his political activities, and he felt he was followed. They continued to ask where he was after he arrived in Australia and his brother told them he had travelled to Australia. In his April 2018 statutory declaration provided to the Department, the applicant stated that his brother in Ethiopia told him the authorities had visited and threatened him and his sister (twice) that they would have problems if the applicant did not stop his political activities and thereafter, he stopped posting material online. 

4. At hearing, the applicant explained that they mostly visited his sister (because he used to live at her home) and sometimes his brothers were visiting that house at the time. As noted, his sister told the Tribunal the authorities had asked after the applicant but not anymore.

5. As the Tribunal accepts the applicant was detained as claimed, under suspicion of being involved with opposition groups in Ethiopia, and his past support (if limited) to the CUD, and given his father was involved with the OLF (and likely murdered because of it), the Tribunal finds it plausible the authorities continued to monitor the applicant to some extent after his release from prison in 2010, even if that tapered off as claimed: with the last time around late 2016, around two years after he had left the country. Country information indicates that opposition groups and individuals seen to oppose the EPRDF government including around this time, were regularly monitored, harassed and detained.[17]

   Political activities in Australia

   [17] DFAT Country Information Report, Ethiopia 1 April 2016

6. The applicant claims to have been politically active in Australia primarily through support to PG7, and by posting material online which could be construed as anti-Ethiopian government.   He has provided a letter confirming his involvement with PG7 from [Mr B], PG7 Melbourne office, who states the applicant actively engages in activities like attending meetings, demonstrations, fund raising events, and has made membership contributions.  Based on this letter, the applicant’s oral evidence, and other evidence such as receipts of financial contributions to PG7 and photographs of the applicant attending various events in Australia, the Tribunal accepts the applicant has actively supported PG7 since around 2016 in Australia, until he ceased sometime after Abiy came to power in 2018 (when elements within Ginbot 7 joined the then new Ethiopian government).  

7. The Tribunal also accepts the applicant may have posted some material online (and/or shared material) which could be considered against the then EPRDF government. However, based on his own evidence he stopped doing so in 2016. 

8. As discussed at hearing, the Tribunal held some concerns about the applicant’s motivation for getting involved with PG7 in Australia, largely because of the timing. That is, he became active from around April 2016, which was just before he applied for a Protection visa (in June 2016), around two years after he had arrived in Australia, and after the breakdown of his marriage and related partner visa pathway. At hearing the applicant said the timing was a coincidence. He reiterated what he had told the Department: that there was a process involved, as he had to gain the trust of other PG7 members before he joined, for them to make sure he was not a spy.

9. In his November 2016 statutory declaration, he explains that he was depressed after his marriage breakdown, noting he had been mistreated by his ex-wife and it was in this context that he became involved with PG7 whose leaders he admired from the original but now fragmented CUD/Kinijit. 

10. Despite these concerns, as the Tribunal has accepted the applicant was politically active against the government in Ethiopia in the past, albeit in a limited way, and was detained for seven months based on his suspected support to opposition groups, and his father was political active promoting Oromo people’s rights and killed as a result when the applicant was young, the Tribunal is willing to accept there may have been several reasons why the applicant wanted to support PG7 in Australia at that time, including to try and generate political change in his home country. The Tribunal is satisfied the applicant engaged in such conduct otherwise than for the sole purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee, and therefore has not disregarded that conduct.

    The applicant’s sister

11. Before the Tribunal, the applicant claims his sister – who has remained in Addis Ababa – was denied government services after she gave an interview to [a media] outlet about their family’s persecution as Oromos in 2019. This resulted in the loss of her livestock, and her livelihood. 

12. The Tribunal notes the applicant’s claims relating to his sister’s ill treatment by the local authorities in Ethiopia came about after the delegate made their decision in 2019 in which the delegate noted (and gave weight to (among other things)) the fact nothing had happened to the applicants’ siblings who remained in Ethiopia to determine that the applicant’s fears on return to Ethiopia on political opinion grounds were not well founded. Additionally, the applicant’s claim that his sister’s woes in relation to having her house demolished by the government were a result of her speaking out about Oromos and her family’s situation to the media in 2019, was undermined by her evidence at hearing that her house was demolished five years prior. When this was pointed out, the applicant acknowledged that was the case, but added that this sister had problems with the local authorities such as being denied services, even before she gave the [interview]. The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s sister may have had her house demolished by the authorities in Ethiopia in the past but given this occurred before her interview with an Oromo media outlet, it remains unclear to the Tribunal why that was the case or the particular circumstances.

13. The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s sister was interviewed by [a] media outlet in 2019 during which she may have spoken about her family’s mistreatment in the past and broader concerns that Oromos face. It also accepts she may have had some trouble accessing local government services in Ethiopia in the past, and that her livestock business suffered as a result, both before and after she gave that interview. It accepts she is now financially reliant on the applicant. On the applicant’s own oral evidence, some of these problems occurred before his sister was interviewed however, and it appears speculative that her speaking out at that time was the cause of her subsequent problems. The Tribunal is of the view the applicant may have exaggerated his sister’s problems in this respect, even considering her oral evidence on these matters, which overall the Tribunal found fairly general and imprecise. 

    Well-founded fear of persecution in the future

14. Given these findings about the applicant’s past experiences and profile in Ethiopia, and during his time in Australia, and that of his family members, the Tribunal has considered if he faces a well-founded fear of persecution for a refugee reason on return there due to his past support to opposition groups, his prolonged detention, his father’s political activities, and the applicant’s political activities in Australia, as well as due to his Oromo ethnicity. In doing so it has considered country information about the current security situation and political environment in Ethiopia relevant to the applicant’s specific claims and profile, as follows. 

15. The Tribunal accepts the applicant has experienced problems in the past in Ethiopia as an Oromo with suspected links to opposition groups (specifically the CUD) and possibly OLF due to his father’s past involvement with them. This has included being monitored, threatened, and detained for seven months where he was subject to further questioning, depravation and mistreatment – including torture. It accepts a level of monitoring continued after his release from detention, and after he left the country via his siblings who remained there, the last time in around 2016. It also accepts he has been active in supporting diaspora groups in Australia, including PG7, up until around 2018. Nonetheless the following considerations put into question his claims that he would face serious harm from the authorities on return to Ethiopia as a result.

    a.The applicant was released from detention in 2010 because (according to him) the authorities were not satisfied he was involved in opposition groups; he was not rearrested or otherwise harmed thereafter; and he was able to leave Ethiopia on a passport issued in his own name in March 2014, unhindered. This was during a period of time when the EPRDF were particularly intolerant of opposition supporters, as noted earlier. For these reasons the Tribunal considers the applicant was not of any particular adverse interest to the Ethiopian authorities at the time he left the country in March 2014. 

    b.The authorities do not appear to have an ongoing interest in the applicant or his siblings since the last time they purportedly asked after the applicant via his sister in around 2016. Additionally, on his own evidence the applicant stopped online activities which could be considered critical of the government in 2016.

    c.Significant changes to the political and security environment have occurred in Ethiopia after Prime Minister Abiy took power in April 2018, which heralded a number of reforms and the opening up of political space and the unshackling of opposition.  This included the removal of certain groups, including Ginbot 7 and the OLF, from the government’s list of terrorist organisations and an invitation for its leaders to return to Ethiopia and engage in political discussions.[18]

    d.Other positive changes under Abiy’s leadership in the initial period include: a dramatic shift in the government’s stance towards the political opposition, freedom of speech and the state’s relationship with Eritrea; the release of thousands of political prisoners, including high profile and prominent party members and critics of the government; a decrease in arrests and confrontation with party members and protesters; and a generally increased tolerance for political dissidents.[19]   

    [18] Daniel Mumbere, ‘Ethiopia removes ‘terrorist’ label from OLF, ONLF and Ginbot 7 opposition groups’, africanews.com, 5 July 2018, and Abdur Rahman Alfa Shaban, ‘Ethiopia’s ex-revel group Ginbot 7 returns from Eritrea based’ Africanews.com, 3 September 2018,

    [19] DFAT Country Information Report, Ethiopia, 12 August 2020; UK Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note - Ethiopia: Opposition to the government, Version 4.0, July 2020, at 2.4.8–2.4.9.

16. However, for the reasons that follow, the Tribunal finds the applicant – on a cumulative basis – faces a real chance of serious harm on return to Ethiopia from the authorities for the combined reasons of his imputed or actual political opinion (anti-government/pro-OLF/pro-OLA) and his Oromo ethnicity. In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal has considered the  significant political, social and security developments in Ethiopia since the DFAT report was published in August 2020, explored further below.

17. Presently Ethiopia is in the midst of an increasingly volatile political transition that began in 2018 when Prime Minister Abiy came to power and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) (who had headed up the EPRDF coalition that ruled the country for 30 years) was ousted. Abiy, who is from Oromia (the largest of Ethiopia’s 11 ethnically based regions by area) pledged a new era of national unity, democracy and stability in Ethiopia.

18. Several commentators have noted that whilst at first reforms brought about by Abiy seemed to hold great promise, fractures have grown, particularly among the country’s numerous ethnic groups. War between the federal and Tigray governments broke out in the northern region of Ethiopia in late 2020, as these tensions came to the fore. The government have alleged the TPLF had, among other things, been arming and training opposition groups, including the OLA, the armed faction that split from the OLF in mid-2018.[20] On 24 August this year, war resumed in northern Ethiopia after a nine-month truce.[21] 

    [20] The Economist, ‘Two ethnic revolts rack Ethiopia at the same time’, 25 August 2022, Two ethnic revolts rack Ethiopia at the same time | The Economist

    [21] International Crisis Group, Statement/Africa, ‘Avoiding the Abyss as War Resumes in Northern Ethiopia’, 7 September 2022.

19. At the same time, fighting has erupted elsewhere in Ethiopia: in the west, and south as well as in the north. This includes in the Oromia region which borders (and surrounds) the capital, Addis Ababa. Reports indicate that deepening insurgencies have led to increased violence targeting civilians, most evidently in Oromia. Earlier in 2022, the government launched a new offensive against the OLA (who had signed an alliance with the Tigrayan rebel front a year prior). Federal troops were backed by militias and volunteers – known as the Fano – from neighbouring Amhara region, and by May this year large scale fighting had reached within 100km of Addis Ababa. There are reports of several hundreds of Oromo civilians being killed by government forces or Fano militiamen since January,[22] whilst the United Nations estimates half a million people have fled. In June this year, the OLA carried out a string of retaliatory attacks in towns in western Oromia, and according to a recent article in the Economist, the state human-rights commission reported that security forces had then summarily executed many Oromo residents.[23]   

    [22] The Economist, ibid

    [23] The Economist, ibid

20. The prospect of peace talks with the OLA (who has also been accused of atrocities) and the TPLF, has diminished, as the government labels both groups ‘terrorists’. In the case of the TPLF, the government also accuses it of scheming with al-Shabab, a jihadist group linked to al-Qaeda active in neighbouring Somalia. According to the same recent article in the Economist, ‘faced with growing disorder in its borderlands, the government has arrested more than 4,000 people allegedly linked to rebel groups or jihadists in the past two months’.[24] 

    [24] The Economist, Ibid

21. The OLA (or OLF-Shene or Shene) – whose main objective is to establish independence including through armed struggle – was designated a terrorist organisation by the Ethiopian government on 6 May 2021 (along with the TPLF).[25]

    [25] UK Home Office, Country Policy and information note: Oromos, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Army, Ethiopia, March 2022 (updated 22 March 2022), at 11.6.6

22. According to William Davison, senior Ethiopian analyst at the International Crisis Group (ICG), in a German news group article published before the latest parliamentary election in Ethiopia in mid-2021, part of the OLA’s strategy is to use armed struggle to disrupt elections, which has led to ‘an increasingly ruthless counterinsurgency response from the authorities’.[26] 

    [26] Deutsche Welle (DW), ‘Ethiopia’s Oromia region is volatile ahead of elections’, 17 June 2021

23. Other groups have reported on the Ethiopian government’s counter-insurgency campaigns against armed rebels, or those suspected of supporting them, particularly in Oromia and also in Addis Ababa, throughout 2021. For example, in Human Rights Watch’s 2022 world report, covering events in 2021, it is stated that: ‘In Oromia, reports of arrests, detention, and summary executions of Oromo civilians accused of supporting the armed rebel group, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), continued’. The report also states that: ‘In southern and western Oromia, government counter-insurgency campaigns against armed rebel groups resulted in serious human rights violations and abuses against local communities committed by all sides’.[27]

    [27] Human Rights Watch (HRW), World Report 2022, ‘Ethiopia: Events of 2021’.

24. With respect to the treatment of OLF supporters in the current environment in Ethiopia, the UK Home Office in a March 2022 report referred to findings from the UK Upper Tribunal’s country guidance case on this issue.[28] The Upper Tribunal found, in general, a person with a significant history of membership or support for the OLF, or perceived by the authorities to have a significant history of membership or support, is likely to be at risk of persecution or serious harm.[29]  The guidance specified as follows:

    ·OLF members and supporters and those specifically perceived by the authorities to be such members or supporters will in general be at real risk if they have been previously arrested or detained on suspicion of OLF involvement;

    ·Those who have a significant history, known to the authorities, of OLF membership or support, or are perceived by the authorities to have such significant history will in general be at real risk of persecution by the authorities;

    ·‘Significant’ should not be read as denoting a very high level of involvement or support. Rather, it relates to suspicion being established that a person is perceived by the authorities as possessing an anti-government agenda.

    [28] OLF members and sympathisers (Supporters), AAR (OLF - MB confirmed) Ethiopia CG [2022] UKUT 00001 (IAC), heard 24 February 2021, promulgated 29 December 2021, and referring to MB (OLF and MTA – risk) Ethiopia CG [2007] UKAIT 00030. 

    [29] Cited in UK Home Office, Country Policy and information note: Oromos, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Army, Ethiopia, March 2022 (updated 22 March 2022), at 4.13

25. With respect to the treatment of members or supporters of the OLA, the same UK Home Office report states that the OLF assessment of risk also applies to those perceived to be or actually associated with the OLA.[30]

    [30] UK Home Office, ibid at 2.4.15

(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:

(a)   the person can access the protection; and

(b)   the protection is durable; and

(c)   in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.

…

36   Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act

…

(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

(a)   a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(b)   a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and

(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

(c)   a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and

(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:

(a)   the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

(b)   the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or

(c)   the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or

(d)   the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

(e)   the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:

(a)   it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(b)   the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(c)   the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.

…