1830581 (Refugee)

1830581 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 4519 (24 October 2023)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
REPRESENTATIVE: Mr Emil Kalouch (MARN: 0637601)
CASE NUMBER: 1830581

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Egypt
MEMBER:James Silva
DATE:24 October 2023
PLACE OF DECISION: Sydney
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

Statement made on 24 October 2023 at 2:59pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Egypt – religion – Coptic Christian – daughter’s forced conversion – forced marriage – charges of insulting Islam – assisting a fugitive – conviction in absentia – court documents – fear of killing – return visits to Egypt – state protection – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5(1), 5H, 5J – 5LA, 36, 65, 424AA, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2; r 1.05
CASES
MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505
Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

The applicant is a man in his [age range] who claims to be a citizen of Egypt.
The applicant most recently arrived in Australia [in] October 2017, as the holder of a [visitor] visa. On 15 December 2017, he applied for a protection (class XA) visa. On 25 September 2018, a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs made a decision to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), essentially on credibility grounds.
This is an application for review of that decision.
For the following reasons, the Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration. The most recent DFAT country information report on Egypt is dated 17 June 2019. While this is now over four years old, the Tribunal notes that most of the information is broadly consistent with country information from other sources, which the Tribunal drew on at hearing.
PROTECTION CLAIMS
The applicant is a Coptic Christian man. The circumstances of his claims are linked with those of his daughter, [Daughter A], who has a separate protection visa application. She claims to have experienced persistent harassment in Egypt, and that a Muslim man (her manager at work) fraudulently purported to convert her to Islam and marry her. She claims that, after she left Egypt, he had her wrongfully convicted of insulting Islam.
The applicant was in Australia at the time of these events. He claims that, after learning of [Daughter A’s] conviction, he returned to Egypt urgently to sort things out. The Muslim man and some accomplices confronted the applicant and threatened to kill him. After reporting the threats to the police, the applicant discovered that there were now felony charges against him, on the basis of having helped [Daughter A] (a fugitive) flee Egypt. On the advice of his lawyer, he skipped the first court session and then fled Egypt. On [a day in] October 2017, after his return to Australia, the court convicted him in absentia and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment.
He claims to fear that, if he returns to Egypt, he will be arrested on arrival and imprisoned, and/or that the Muslim man and his associated will carry out their threat to kill him. The applicant made broad claims about discrimination against Coptic Christians in Egypt, including that the Egyptian authorities fail to protect them.
The issue in this case is whether the applicant meets the refugee criterion, and if not, whether he is entitled to complementary protection.
CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Background
The applicant is [an age] year old man, who identifies as an Egyptian Coptic Christian.
The applicant gave one residential address in Egypt, [in District 1], Cairo. He lived there until his departure from Egypt. At hearing, he agreed with general country information that [District 1] is a cosmopolitan, mostly Christian neighbourhood in Cairo. He said that the family has lived in the rented apartment from some 20 years before he was born. It is currently unoccupied. He continues to pay a nominal rent to retain his tenancy.
The applicant attended primary, middle and secondary schools in [District 1], [between specified years]. He worked as [an occupation 1] with the government-owned [named agency], which he described as [operation type], from [specified year] until his retirement in [year]. He gave his monthly pension (as of December 2017) as 3,389 Egyptian Pounds (EGP), equivalent to 172 $A at current exchange rates.
The applicant is widowed. His wife, who died in [year], was [an occupation 1] in the same company. He has [three children]. The oldest, [Daughter B], is [age] years old and lives in Sydney. The youngest [Daughter C] is [age] years old, married with children and living in Cairo. [Daughter A] is [age] years old and is in Australia, with an ongoing protection visa application. Her claims overlap somewhat with those of the applicant. She has a separate review application before the same Tribunal member.
The applicant holds an Egyptian passport issued [in] 2015, which was valid for seven years. He has frequently visited Australia since 2009. As set out in the delegate’s decision record, his trips were as follows:
§ 2009 ([between specified dates]): two months
§ 2013 ([between specified dates]): two months
§ 2014 ([between specified dates]): 3 weeks
§ 2015 ([between specified dates]): three months
§ 2017 ([between specified dates]): ten weeks
The applicant indicated on his application form other travel, to [specified countries], for holidays, in the period 2012 to 2013.
The applicant arrived in Australia [in] October 2017, and applied for protection on 15 December 2017.
The applicant told the Tribunal that he continues to receive his Egyptian pension, and lives in a small unit provided by the [named church agency] in Sydney, who also provide some financial assistance. He said that he frequently attends the church. He did not give further insight into his activities in Australia. In response to questions, he said that [Daughter B] is preoccupied with her family, and that [Daughter A], who is also in Australia, works and meets her own expenses. He indicated his concerns about [Daughter A’s] emotional and physical wellbeing.
Evidence
The evidence before the Tribunal includes the following relevant material:
To the Department
§ Protection visa application lodged on 15 December 2017. Attached to this was a five page statement (English translation of an Arabic text) setting out the applicant’s protection claims.
§ Identity documents: (a) transcript of birth registration; and (b) Passport issued in Cairo [in] 2015, valid for seven years.
§ Supporting documents (copies of purported Arabic language originals, with English translations, unless otherwise stated:
-   Prosecutor’s submission (‘[agency named]’), undated.
-   Applicant’s power of attorney to lawyer [Lawyer A], dated [in] September 2017.
-   Copy of court decision (in Arabic, with English translation) from [Court 1], dated [in] October 2017, in relation to the applicant.
-   [Lawyer A’s] statement, 4 November 2017.
§ Medical report dated 11 June 2018, from [Person A], [Health Service 1].
§ The protection visa interview (‘Department interview’) held on 18 September 2018, a copy of which is on the department file and which the Tribunal has listened to.
§ The protection visa assessment (‘delegate’s decision record’) of 25 September 2018.
§ The Department file includes documents associated with other matters, such as the applicant’s unsuccessful application for [Agency 1] financial assistance. These are not relevant to the decision under review.
To the Tribunal
§ The review application received on 18 October 2018 has attached to it a copy of the delegate’s decision record.
§ A submission dated 10 August 2023 summarises the applicant’s claims and evidence.
§ Letter of support from [a named priest], of [a named church], dated 10 August 2023, referring to ‘some sort of persecution in Egypt’.
§ The Tribunal received several medical reports, set out in detail below.
The applicant appeared before the current Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments, at hearings held on 18 and 31 August 2023. The hearings were conducted with the assistance of an accredited interpreter in the Arabic and English languages. The applicant did not present any witnesses.
The Tribunal drew on a wide range of country information. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, it took into account the latest Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country information assessment[1] of June 2019, as well as a range of more recent materials.
[1] DFAT, Country Information Report – Egypt, 17 June 2019
The Tribunal put to the applicant at the first hearing, under s.424AA of the Act, potentially adverse information from a letter he wrote on 7 November 2017, to the effect that he planned to return to Egypt in mid-November 2017. The Tribunal agreed to his request for additional time to provide comments/response, in writing by 25 August 2023. The applicant submitted a statement from his [Daughter B], dated 1 September 2023, addressing the circumstances in which the applicant signed that letter.
The Tribunal wrote to the applicant on 28 August 2023 under s.424A, inviting his comments/response to potentially adverse material, at an interview held immediately before the second hearing. The letter gave particulars of information from the evidence in his daughter’s case (irregularities in the purported court documents that she had presented, the alleged court proceedings and the daughter’s conduct around this period), It explained the relevance of these, as they cast doubt on the applicant’s claims surrounding his return to Egypt, death threats and a criminal conviction. The applicant addressed these at interview and at hearing.
The applicant is represented by his migration agent, Mr Emil Kalouch, who attended both hearings.
Country of reference
The applicant claims to be a national of Egypt. He entered Australia on an Egyptian passport, is familiar with that country and has family members in Australia who originate from there. There is nothing to suggest that he has any other nationality. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant is a national of Egypt. This is therefore the country of reference for the purpose of assessing his protection claims.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE, AND FINDINGS
Assessment of claims
When assessing claims the Tribunal must make findings of fact in relation to the claims made, in order to assess whether there is a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm. The Tribunal recognises that the assessment of credibility is inherently difficult, and that special considerations apply in relation to asylum seekers. It has had regard to guidelines on the assessment of credibility issued by the Tribunal, Department and others.[2] In considering the applicant’s overall credibility, the Tribunal has reflected on the words of Beaumont J in Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 in which he stated that ‘in the proof of refugeehood, a liberal attitude on the part of the decision-maker is called for… [but this should not lead to]… an uncritical acceptance of any and all allegations made by supplicants’.
[2] The Tribunal has before it the AAT’s Migration and Refugee Division , Guidelines on the Assessment of Credibility; Department of Home Affairs, Policy – Refugee and humanitarian – Refugee Law Guidelines, section 15.4, as re-issued 1 July 2017 (Refugee Law Guidelines); and the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection, re-issued February 2019 at [203]-[204] (UNHCR Handbook). Of particular relevance in this case, given the applicant’s mental health issues, is the MRD Divisions, Guidelines on Vulnerable Persons.
The Tribunal found much of the applicant’s evidence to be vague and repetitive. It was often difficult to elicit direct, specific information, as he tended to make broad statements about what the family had gone through, his fears for the future and his particular concerns for his [Daughter A]. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s uncertain migration status and his concerns for his [Daughter A’s] emotional state may preoccupy him. At the same time, despite his own education and professional background, and his claim to have hired a lawyer in Egypt, he appeared to have little insight or to have made enquiries about aspects of his own criminal case, and other key aspects of his case.
Relevantly, it was following his retirement in [year] that the applicant visited his [Daughter B] in Australia on four occasions, for periods of between about three weeks and three months. Significantly, he only sought protection in Australia following his last return, in 2017. While his main reason for seeking protection in 2017 relates to alleged incidents involving his [Daughter A] earlier that year, he also raised broad claims concerning the treatment of Coptic Christians in Egypt.
At hearing, the applicant noted that on his previous visits to Australia, he had complied with visa conditions and returned to Egypt. In so doing, he suggested that he had only sought protection now because of his experiences during his last visit to Egypt (the threats and prosecution), and the cumulative impact on him of other events (namely, [Daughter A’s] problems and the persistent discrimination Coptic Christians face in Egypt). He also alluded to his health issues, implying that he might be less resilient if he returns to Egypt and/or that there might be humanitarian reasons for him to be granted residency in Australia. In the Tribunal’s view, these considerations are of minimal probative value in assessing the veracity of the applicant’s protection claims, i.e., specific incidents that allegedly occurred on his return visit there.
On 7 November 2017, the applicant signed a ‘to whom it may concern’ letter stating: ‘I will be flying back to Egypt in the middle of November 2017’. The applicant wrote this letter in support of his [Daughter A’s] application for [Agency 1] assistance, evidently for the purpose of demonstrating that he would not be able to provide her with money. As the Tribunal explained to the applicant under the procedure in s.424AA, this is difficult to reconcile with his claims – as set out in his protection visa application lodged a month later – that he already knew (as of [a day in] October 2017) that he had been convicted in an Egyptian court and sentenced to five years imprisonment plus a sizeable fine.
§ The applicant initially did not appear to be aware of this letter.
§ In later comments, he explained that his [Daughter B] had arranged the letter, after speaking to a Department officer about what was required to support [Daughter A’s] [Agency 1] application.
§ A letter dated 1 September 2023 from [Daughter B] indicates that the Department officer dealing with [Daughter A’s] [Agency 1] application had asked about the father’s presence in Australia (i.e. his capacity to assist [Daughter A] financially). The immediate question was when the applicant’s visa was due to expire. According to the applicant and [Daughter B’s] letter, she advised the officer that he intended to apply for a protection visa. [Daughter B’s] letter states that the Department officer actually prepared the text of the letter; [Daughter B] simply printed it out and had the applicant sign it. [Daughter B’s] letter gave an approximation of the DHA officer’s name, but did not include copies of any correspondence with the Department relating to [Daughter A’s] [Agency 1] application.
§ In sum, the applicant and [Daughter B] contend that a Department officer dealing with [Daughter A’s] [Agency 1] application prepared the letter that the applicant signed. That officer had been made aware of the applicant’s intention to seek protection, but did not consider it relevant when assessing the applicant’s capacity to support [Daughter A] financially. They have not substantiated these claims.
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant has limited English, and that he may have signed the letter without checking the details. It also accepts that it was prepared in the context of a different application involving [Daughter A] (the applicant), [Daughter B] (assisting [Daughter A]) and a Department officer. The Tribunal considers the letter to be of limited probative value in determining the applicant’s intentions on 7 November 2017. Nonetheless, it suggests either: (a) that the applicant genuinely planned to return to Egypt late that date; and/or (b) that he and family members are prepared to make inaccurate statements according to what is expedient at a given point in time.
Health issues

The applicant appears to have a range of issues relating to both his physical and mental health. The medical documents and Mr Kalouch’s advice indicate that he has [a heart condition] and underwent [specified] surgery in August 2019; [other medical conditions]; and impaired hearing. He had [another condition] in September 2019. The Tribunal was alerted to these issues before the hearing, and was able to accommodate them (for instance, by ensuring that the parties, in particular the interpreter, spoke audibly).
The documents allude to some emotional and mental health concerns, although it appears that the applicant’s engagement with health professionals has been sporadic. These include the following:
§ [Psychiatrist A], consultant psychiatrist, wrote on 3 July 2019 that the applicant had had consultations with a therapist [Therapist A] for several months earlier; and that he had gone to another therapist for a year before that. He noted that the applicant had been taking the anti-depressant Duloxetine for the previous eight months, which the psychiatrist was recommending be increased; and that he takes sleeping pills (Quetiapine).
-   [Psychiatrist A] recounts the background provided by the applicant’s [Daughter B], referring to [Daughter A’s] forced conversion and marriage, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s threats to the applicant’s life.
§ It also states that he moved to different parts of Egypt, including Alexandria, where he witnessed Muslims assassinate a local shopkeeper. [Psychiatrist A] believes that the latter had a profound impact on the applicant, more so than the ‘emotionally destabilising’ effect of death threats against himself personally’.
§ The Tribunal notes that there is no mention of these matters in the applicant’s own oral or written evidence, and no comment or further explanation of them. The Tribunal takes these to be errors in [Psychiatrist A’s] report.
-   [Psychiatrist A] gives no details of diagnostic tests, but notes that the symptoms described are typical for those of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Major Depression. He opines that the applicant may have passed through a ‘mild phase of depression’ following his wife’s death, and that he probably has a family history of psychiatric disorders.
§ [Therapist A][3], writing on 12 October 2022, recounts aspects of the applicant’s protection claims, and states that he is scared of returning to Egypt, for fear of being killed. She states: ‘Based on my clinical experience with this group of people, I also believe that his inability to obtain any protection from the Egyptian authorities against the persecution is well-founded’. She states that in her clinical opinion, the applicant’s psychological condition requires that he have access to further therapeutic support. She concludes: ‘On clinical grounds, I support his application for refugee protection and ask that his case be considered in a favourable light and that it be resolved as soon as possible.’
-   The Tribunal accepts that the applicant presented to [Therapist A] as being worried about his future if he returns to Egypt. It notes that she appears to have accepted his claims as related to her; but it is not satisfied on the limited available information that she critically assessed the veracity of his claims, or that she has the expertise to do so. Although [Therapist A] referred to her ‘clinical experience with this group of people’ and ‘clinical grounds’ for recommending the grant of a protection visa, the Tribunal considers this to be general advocacy rather than a professional opinion based on [Therapist A’s] field of expertise.
§ [Doctor A] wrote on 31 August 2022 that the applicant was anxious about the ‘upcoming court session', and its potential impact on his physical health ‘if subjected to intense pressure’.
[3] Accredited mental health social worker, with a Bachelor of Social Work, Master of Social Work and Doctorate in Public Health.
At hearing, the applicant presented as somewhat withdrawn and worried. In response to the Tribunal’s questions, he said that he was constantly thinking about past events in Egypt, and worried in particular about what would happen to his [Daughter A] if she goes back there. In response to questions, he said that he has been taking anti-depressants for some four to five years, and that he takes sleeping pills. He was not sure if his doctors were satisfied as to the management of these issues.
The Tribunal, noting the applicant’s references to anxiety, depression and forgetfulness, invited him and the representative to alert it to any concerns about the questioning. It observed that, although the applicant initially appeared nervous, he later became more focused and assertive during the course of the exchange.
Relevance to credibility assessment of past claims: The authors of the medical documents refer to the applicant’s protection claims, as related to them. While the authors consider that these accounts may be consistent with the symptoms reported by the applicant, the Tribunal is not satisfied that they critically evaluated whether the statements are true, or that they have expertise (such as access to independent country information) to do so. The Tribunal places minimal weight on them as corroboration of the applicant’s claims relating to events in Egypt.
Conduct of hearing and evaluation of oral evidence: The Tribunal accepts, from its own observations as well as the expert letters, that the applicant appeared detached, anxious and particularly worried about [Daughter A’s] wellbeing. It took this into account in the conduct of the hearing, and in the assessment below of the applicant’s oral evidence. In this context, it notes that the applicant is represented, and that he has presented a range of other material, such as documents relating to his claims.
Future prospects in Egypt: Several of the medical reports advocate for the grant to the applicant of permanent residency in Australia. In addition to his heart problems, they refer to the applicant’s fear of being harmed or killed if he returns to Egypt. Although the applicant did not articulate any clear protection claims based on his future medical needs, the Tribunal takes this into account in the cumulative assessments below.
At hearing, the applicant stated that he lives alone in accommodation provided by the [named church agency]; that he relies on them for financial assistance; and that he appears to have limited social contact beyond this. As noted above, he commented briefly that his [Daughter B] has her own family and is not in a strong financial position; and that his [Daughter A] is socially withdrawn. The limited information before the Tribunal suggests that the family dynamic is complex and opaque. It takes into account, in the assessment below, that the applicant appears to have limited social support in both Australia and Egypt.
Background: The applicant learns of his daughter’s conviction in Egypt
The applicant visited Australia from [a day in] May 2017 (his fourth visit), to help [Daughter B], who was about to give birth. He claims that he originally intended to return to Egypt in due course.
The applicant claims that in late July 2017, he learned about his [Daughter A’s] conviction in Egypt, and the events that led to it. Propelled by paternal instincts, he rushed back to Egypt to try and sort out his daughter’s legal dilemma. The submission of 10 August 2023 sets out the circumstances as follows (with minor editorial corrections):
[In June 2017], his [Daughter A] arrived in Australia.
When she arrived, she confided in her sister [Daughter B] and eventually her father that she was subjected to attacks by a person [Mr D] who had wanted to marry [Daughter A] and had asked her to convert to Islam and marry him. Which she objected to profusely while telling him that she will never do such a thing and will never convert being a devout Christian in addition to the fact that she did not know nor wanted to marry [Mr D],
[Mr D] apparently insisted and threatened her and told her that he will marry her no matter what she says.
[Mr D] proceeded to attack [Daughter A].
A few days later [i.e. after [Daughter A’s] arrival in Australia] [Daughter C] […] told them that she was in possession of some documents showing that [Mr D] and [Daughter A] are married according to Islamic laws and that [Daughter A] had converted to Islam.
[Daughter A] arrived in Australia and told her father and sister what had happened.
Upon hearing this news and fearing for his daughter and not believing with absolute certainty that this could happen, [the applicant] decided to travel to Egypt to clarify matters and to make sure that this was not the case […]’.
The applicant gave some limited information about these events, evidently drawing on what he (allegedly) heard in June and July 2017 (including the documents that [Daughter C] sent), information that the lawyer obtain, and other insights he gained on his return to Egypt.
In sum, [Daughter A] claims that a Muslim work colleague, [Mr D] harassed her, pressing her to convert to Islam and marry him. In the wake of such pressure, she left Egypt for a holiday with her sister in Australia in June 2017 (the applicant had arrived in Australia a month earlier). On 27 July 2017, the applicant’s [Daughter C] called from Egypt to alert [Daughter A] that the police had come to the family home looking for her, following her conviction for the offence of insulting Islam. This prompted the applicant to return to Egypt [in] August 2017.
These events, if accepted, go the circumstances in which the applicant returned to Egypt [in] August 2017, and would therefore lend some support to his key protection claims: (a) that [Mr D] confronted on the street and threatened to kill him; and (b) that he was subsequently convicted for having helped [Daughter A] flee Egyptian justice.
The Tribunal discussed with the applicant what he knew – in the period from early March 2017 until his departure for Australia in [May] 2017 - about [Daughter A’s] problems at work, and any police or court action that she may have been subject to.
§ Documents relating to [Daughter A] indicate that the key events – that is, her alleged conversion to Islam, her marriage to [Mr D] and the police and court proceedings against her – occurred in the period from March to June 2017. Significantly, the applicant and [Daughter A] were both living in the family home until his departure in May 2017. The applicant confirmed that he was unaware of any of these incidents at the time. He said that he only knew that [Daughter A] had been distressed and withdrawn.
§ Asked whether he had concerns about leaving [Daughter A] alone at home when he left for Australia [in] May 2017, he replied that she was ‘not so distressed’ at that time, and she used to stay with relatives sometimes.
§ The Tribunal also asked whether the applicant had (at any time) examined the documents, for instance to find out when [Daughter A] was supposed to have converted to Islam and married [Mr D]. The applicant replied that he did not. The Tribunal signalled its surprise that the applicant returned to Egypt to investigate the circumstances surrounding [Daughter A’s] conviction, without examining the documents to find out what supposedly occurred. He responded briefly that his chief concern was to avoid [Daughter A] being exposed to future harm.
The Tribunal also put to the applicant under s.424A particulars of information about the documents his daughter had submitted in relation to these events and her conduct. Subject to his comments/responses, would be the reason of part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. It invited his comments/responses at interview (prior to a second hearing) and gave him the opportunity to address these at hearing or in any written submission. The relevant part of the Tribunal’s letter reads:
Irregularities in [your daughter’s] court decision:
The decision is from the [Court 1], also referred to as the ‘Misdemeanour [Town 1 Court]’. The Tribunal has found a few references to such a court, in matters under the Emergency Law.[4] These appear to be matters involving activists and journalists accused of political offences, rather than general criminal matters.
The decision refers to ‘Articles of Law of 1978’, of insulting Islam. It does not specify which article. The authorities are known to use Article 98(f) of the Egyptian Criminal (or Penal) Code against various groups, including Christians and converts from Islam.
Documents are possibly fraudulent:
Country information indicates that document fraud is rife in Egypt. For instance, at a United Nations conference in September 2019, the Egyptian Prosecutor General’s Office noted that people smugglers had even arranged forged letters signed and sealed by the Egyptian Minister of Culture, for presentation to European embassies in Cairo, as well as forged bank statements and Masters degree certificates.[5]
You have variously stated that your [Daughter C] sent the court documents to you by email (although you have not forwarded to the Tribunal a copy of the email), and that she gave them to an unnamed person to carry them to Australia for you. As such, there is uncertain, inconsistent evidence about how you came to have these documents.
The court decision relating to [Daughter A] refers to [Mr D’s] allegations that [Daughter A] converted to Islam on [a day in] March 2017 and married him [days later in] March 2017. Your daughter provided copies of these documents. You and your daughter claim that they contain untrue information.
The conversion and marriage certificates are notarised by Egyptian authorities, with wet stamps. If so, this suggests that the Egyptian authorities authenticate documents that are not genuine or untruthful, and/or that you have obtained documents that are not genuine.
Daughter’s conduct
The court decision states that on receipt of the complaint, the police went to your family home to deliver a summons. However, it was not served, ‘as her parents refused to receive it’. [In] March 2017, the prosecution received the report, and sent to the parents’ address a further summons. [Daughter A] did not attend, so the matter was referred to [Court 1 variant]. She did not appear at the first court hearing [in] May 2017. The matter was adjourned to [a day in] June 2017. However, [Daughter A] had departed Egypt several days earlier (arriving in Australia [in] June 2017).
[Daughter A] told the Tribunal that she was not aware of any charges or police pursuit of her prior to leaving Egypt, even though she was living at the apartment up to and after you departed Egypt (around [dates in] May 2017).
[4] [Sources deleted.]
[5]
The Tribunal explained the relevance of this information, namely: (a) that it may not accept the purported court document as genuine; and (b) that it may infer that other documents have been similarly manufactured or contain unreliable information. It also explained that the daughter’s departure from Egypt on or around [a day in] June 2017 – with no apparent knowledge of any charges and without the Egyptian authorities preventing her from leaving – could indicate there were no charges or court case, and also no allegations against his daughter. It noted that [Mr D’s] complaint – regardless of whether they were true or not – would have resulted in a police report; summonses for her to attend the police station and to appear in court; a first court hearing date, before the matter was (allegedly) concluded [in] June 2017.
The applicant provided some comments/responses to this information.
§ He appeared to accept his daughter’s account of her experiences in Egypt, and the documents supporting her claims, at face value.
§ He explained that he and [Daughter A] had originally planned to travel to Australia together, but he brought forward his departure in order to help [Daughter B] with the pregnancy.
§ He said that he cannot comment on the authenticity of the documents relating to [Daughter A’s] conversion, marriage and conviction. He said that acknowledged that some well-connected people can obtain fraudulent documents, with official stamps, but these avenues are not open to Christians.
§ In relation to the source of the documents, he said that [Daughter C] had sent copies by email, and he later carried the originals (presumably copies of the originals).
§ He emphatically stated that [Daughter A] would never consider converting to Islam or marrying [Mr D].
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant is genuinely concerned about [Daughter A’s] welfare and her conduct since arriving in Australia.
Nonetheless, it has significant concerns about the claimed developments in Egypt in the first half of 2017, in particular the claims that [Daughter A] was tricked into converting to Islam and marrying [Mr D], and that [Mr D] initiated criminal proceedings against her that resulted in her conviction on charges of insulting Islam. The Tribunal takes into account the applicant’s claim that he was not a party to any of these developments, or aware of them until late July 2017. However, this does not resolve questions such as how he and [Daughter A] were unaware of [Mr D’s] claim to have married her in March 2017, or of the events set out in the purported court documents ([Mr D’s] initial complaint, the failed police attempt to serve a summons at the family home, the later court summons and the first court hearing), all of which were supposed to have occurred while they were both living in the family home in Egypt. It also remains unclear why the purported court judgement fails to identity any provision of the law, let alone Article 98(f) of the Egyptian Criminal (or Penal) Code, which relates to the offence of insulting Islam. Finally, the provenance of these documents – in particular, whether [Daughter C] sent them by email in late July 2017, as claimed – remains problematic.
Taking all of these concerns together, the Tribunal is not satisfied that [Mr D] tricked [Daughter A] into converting to Islam and marrying him; or that [Daughter A] was subsequently convicted (after her arrival in Australia). It also does not accept at face value that the applicant returned to Egypt in late July 2017 after learning about these developments, with a view to trying to resolve them.[6] (The Tribunal’s findings on these matters are below.)
[6] Separately, the Tribunal accepts as plausible that at a later stage, the applicant learned about [Daughter A’s] protection claims – based on the alleged forced conversion and marriage, and later conviction – and accepted them as a possible explanation for her behaviour during 2017.
Egypt: Applicant’s experiences: August – October 2017
The applicant’s own protection claims start with his return to Egypt [in] August 2017, when he (allegedly) returned to sort out [Daughter A’s] legal problems. For the reasons set out immediately above, the Tribunal does not accept at face value that he returned to Egypt for this reason.
The applicant described several incidents during his stay in Egypt from [August] to [October] 2017. Essentially, these involved: (a) his enquiries about [Daughter A’s] conviction; (b) a confrontation with her tormentor [Mr D]; and (c) a criminal case against the applicant, accusing him of assisting a fugitive ([Daughter A]).
Enquiries about [Daughter A’s] conviction
The applicant claims that a few days after his return to Egypt, he contacted a lawyer to seek assistance in this matter. On 6 August 2017, he went to [Lawyer A] (his [Daughter C’s] friend) and briefed her on what had happened. She undertook to investigate the matter, and the prospects of appealing the court decision against [Daughter A]. The following day, she informed him that [Daughter A] has no appeal rights, as she is a fugitive and outside the country.
The Tribunal noted the applicant’s earlier statements that [Daughter C] had obtained [Daughter A’s] documents (the ones sent to Australia) through a lawyer, and wondered why the applicant had to seek out and brief a different lawyer. He replied that the previous lawyer was on leave at the time, so he approached [Lawyer A] for assistance.
Confrontation with [Mr D]

The applicant claims that on [a day in] August 2017, a tall, dark man approached him on the street and introduced himself as [Mr D], i.e. the main claiming to be [Daughter A’s] husband. Two other men, with beards and carrying knives, were next to him. [Mr D] asked when [Daughter A] would return to home, in response to which the applicant said that she was in Australia and he did not know when she would return. One of the men threatened to kill the applicant, if [Daughter A] did not return soon. The applicant claims that he genuinely feared for his life at that point.
After the men left, the applicant went to the police to report the incident. He went to the police station in [Town 1], where [Mr D] lived. The applicant was able to provide [Mr D’s] full name, as he had seen the court documents relating to [Daughter A]; he could not identify the other men. The applicant wrote in his original statement of claims that the police filled out a complain form for him.
The submission of 10 August 2023 essentially repeats these claims, although this notes that he ‘attempted to lodge a complaint’.
At hearing, the applicant confirmed that [Mr D] and the other two men confronted him at the front door of his home, as he was going out to get groceries. [Mr D] identified himself as [Daughter A’s] husband and demanded to know where she was. They threatened and ‘assaulted’ him, which he later clarified to mean a ‘verbal attack’. The applicant said that the men’s tone was harsh, and he was speechless. He recalled the exchange ending with the words ‘your lives will end’.
He said that the police made notes of his complaint, but were quite dismissive and mocking. He noted that Christians often had this experience when seek police protection. The applicant said he did not receive a copy of the police report, only a reference number in case of any further encounters with [Mr D].
The applicant remained in Egypt for more than two months after these alleged death threats. In response to questions, he said that he was scared and often stayed with friends. As for whether he had considered returning to Australia earlier, he replied that he had thought of that. However, there were difficulties in securing flights, and he had to wait until a term deposit matured, to fund his return trip to Australia. He emphasised that he was scared and confused at the time, and not thinking rationally.
The Tribunal has significant concerns about this account. First, it is surprising that [Mr D] – despite having allegedly married [Daughter A] in early March 2017 – did not appear at the family home or make himself known to the applicant until August 2017. Second, the applicant did not claim and there is nothing to suggest that [Mr D] followed up his threats in person, despite the applicant continuing to stay in the family home, for at least some of the time. The Tribunal is concerned that this incident did not actually occur, but instead was part of a narrative that led to the alleged criminal proceedings. Finally, while the Tribunal accepts that the applicant may have been looking for flights to Australia and organising funds (including term deposits), it detects no sense of urgency that the applicant was acting in response to credible death threats.
All of these concerns lead the Tribunal to not accept at face value that there was any such encounter with or death threats from [Mr D]; that the applicant did not file any police report; and that he was not living in fear during this period.
Criminal case
The applicant claims that about a month later (around [a day in] September 2017), a notice arrived for him to appear in court in a case against him. It was left with the cleaners on the ground floor of his home. According to his statement of claims, [Mr D] lodged the case against the applicant, accusing him of having helped [Daughter A] flee Egypt and covering up her crimes.
The applicant claims that he again consulted [Lawyer A], who prepared a power of attorney for him. The applicant submitted a copy of a general power of attorney dated [in] September 2017
§ The lawyer stated that she would represent the applicant in court, recommending that he not appear in person.
§ The court hearing date was [in] September 2017. The lawyer appeared on the applicant’s behalf. The charges alleged that he had covered up his daughter’s crime of contempt to Islam. According to the purported court decision, [Mr D] filed the complaint [in] September 2017. The charges against the applicant were (according to the translated text): ‘covering up for a criminal, helping her to escape the country, disrespecting the law and helping a criminal to escape the implementation of the justice ruling’.
§ The court adjourned the matter for [a day in] October 2017, when a verdict would be decided.
§ The lawyer told the applicant that she was powerless, and recommended that he flee Egypt ‘because we are in a fanatic Muslim country’.
The applicant provided a number of documents in relation to these proceedings: (a) his power of attorney for [Lawyer A], dated [in] September 2018; (b) a copy of the prosecutor’s submission to the court (undated, but with reference to the applicant having left Egypt [in] October 2017); (c) decision of the court dated [in] October 2017; and (d) a statement dated 4 November 2011 from his lawyer, [Lawyer A].
The purported court verdict of [October] 2017 convicted the applicant to five years imprisonment with hard labour, and fined him [amount] Egyptian pounds. It appears that [Lawyer A] did not attend the hearing, but contacted the applicant the following day to inform him of the judgement. She then provided [Daughter C] with a copy of the applicant’s file (presumably a reference to documents (b) and (c) listed above).
The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s power of attorney granted to [Lawyer A] on [in] September 2017, and related documents. The timing meshes well with other aspects of this claims, namely that on [a day in] September 2017 he received a court attendance notice for [later in] September 2017. The purported court decision of [October] 2017, in reciting the history of the matter, records that [Lawyer A] attended the hearing [in] September 2017, that the court granted her one hour to examine the applicant’s file and that, she unsuccessfully sought to make arguments in respect of [Daughter A’s] conviction. Broadly speaking, these events are broadly consistent with and support the applicant’s claims about what happened in Egypt during this period.
As the Tribunal signalled at hearing, it has a range of concerns about these claims, and the supporting documents. An initial concern was with the reference to the court as a ‘misdemeanor court’ although, as the Tribunal later observed, this may be a reference to the courts established under the Emergency Law, for which (as noted in the Tribunal’s s.424A letter) it has found several references.
Second, the purported decision convicts the applicant under ‘Article 144 of the Penal Code’ which refers to the offence of assisting a fugitive. The decision reads, in translation: ‘These provisions apply on a husband or wife or father or mother or grandfather or grandmother or children or grandchildren, and their act will be considered crime of concealment or hiding a criminal fugitive from the law’. However, English translations of this law indicate that it does not apply to such persons as parents.[7] Indeed, Article 144 lists categories of close persons precisely because they are exempt from the scope of that article, presumably with a view to respecting the inviolability of the family, or a similar principle. The Tribunal is not satisfied that a court (including an emergency court) would make such a basic error in relation to the scope of this provision. The Tribunal notes the applicant’s comment that he had relied on his lawyer and was not familiar with these legal matters. This does not resolve the Tribunal’s concern about the contents of the purported court decision, and its genuineness.
[7] See, for instance, the International Labour Organisation translation:
The Tribunal put to the applicant country information about the prevalence of document fraud in Egypt, essentially mirroring the language set out in the s.424A letter concerning the documents that [Daughter A] had presented (set out above). He again reiterated that he relied on and accepted as genuine the documents that his [Daughter C] had sent to him. Despite this, he appeared to accept that some of the documents were fraudulent – in that they had been fabricated and/or contained incorrect information – such as the certificates relating to [Daughter A’s] conversion to Islam and her marriage. However, he did not believe that this applied to the court documents or other materials that [Daughter C] and his lawyer had obtained.
The applicant provided a statement from [Lawyer A] dated 4 November 2017, in which she confirms that she appeared for the applicant in court but was unable to ‘defend him as we are in an Islamic country where it is difficult to listen to the voice of Christians’. She goes on to state that the applicant is ‘in big danger if he returns to Egypt’, as he has been sentenced to five years imprisonment. This letter was produced for the purpose of assisting the applicant’s protection visa application. The Tribunal does not consider that an Egyptian lawyer, writing for a domestic audience, would describe the legal system in such sectarian terms. In any event, it is satisfied that the intended audience was the Tribunal (or similar decision-makers). Given the Tribunal’s significant concerns about the applicant’s conduct, the content of the purported court decision and the applicant’s credibility generally, the Tribunal places little weight on this letter as independent corroboration that the applicant has, in fact, been convicted and sentenced to five years imprisonment.
Departure from Egypt
As noted above, the applicant departed Egypt [in] October 2017, without hindrance. Even after taking into account the applicant’s comments about flight availability and financial constraints, the Tribunal does not consider his conduct consistent with that of a person who fears serious or significant harm (such as from a threatening Muslim man, or in association with dubious criminal charges).
Egypt: Experiences as a Coptic Christian
During the primary and review applications, the applicant made numerous references to the treatment of Coptic Christians in Egypt. He alluded to discrimination and suggested that this had a particular impact on those who (as he had claimed) required State protection. Among these references were the following:
§ In his original statement of claims, the applicant noted [Mr D's] Islamic faith, and put the claims about [Daughter A’s] conversion and forced marriage in the context of the Muslim majority’s mistreatment of Coptic Christians, and their impunity. He noted [Lawyer A’s] advice to him – that he should return to Australia and not attend the court hearing – as reflecting her view that Egypt is a ‘fanatic Muslim country’ and that he would not have a fair trial.
§ During the course of the review, the applicant reiterated that his claims related to not only his and [Daughter A’s] experiences, but reflected more generally the situation of Coptic Christians in Egypt.
At hearing, the applicant repeated his claims that Egypt is a Muslim country, and that Coptic Christians face mistreatment. In responding to country information about the situation of Coptic Christians in Egypt, as well as his own circumstances, the applicant highlighted that Muslims in Egypt kidnap Christian girls, and even married women. The Tribunal took him to mean that this is symptomatic of the kind of discrimination and mistreatment that the Coptic Christian community faces.
The Tribunal put to the applicant country information about the size of the Coptic Christian population in Egypt (with estimates around the ten million mark), and its diversity. The Tribunal noted that the community tends to be marginalised and face some degree of societal and official discrimination, although this does not usually involve harm amounting to persecution or significant harm. There are reported instances of violence, including mob violence and individual attacks, but these tend to be sporadic and localised. The Tribunal noted that the current Sisi government has adopted a more positive official policies towards the Coptic Christian community, although reports indicate that this has not necessarily filtered down to local officials, where discriminatory attitudes persist. The Tribunal drew on the most recent DFAT report (see relevant excerpts below), and more recent sources, which tended to be consistent with these claims.
In this context, the Tribunal also noted the applicant’s personal and family circumstances (apart from the specific protection claims that he had presented). For instance, he has lived in one residence throughout his life, in a fairly diverse part of Cairo; he had stable work as [an occupation 1] for a government corporation, until [year]; and he receives a government pension. In retirement, he has had holidays in [a specified region] and visiting his daughter in Australia. Although the Tribunal accepts that the applicant may have faced some degree of official and societal discrimination over the years, as a Coptic Christian, it is not satisfied that this has – individually or cumulatively – amounted to persecution or significant harm.
Summary of findings
The Tribunal has considered all of the applicant’s claims and evidence relating to his daughter’s circumstances in Egypt (including her alleged forced conversion to Islam and forced marriage, and her conviction), his return to Egypt and his experiences there. In light of the above concerns, taken together, it does not accept that he returned to Egypt after learning about [Daughter A’s] conviction and with the aim of investigating and trying to resolve her problems.
The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant enquired about the prospects of appealing [Daughter A’s] conviction in early August 2017, only to be told it cannot be reviewed; that [Mr D] and two men threatened and verbally abused him in August 2017; that the applicant feared for his life after that (and sometimes stayed with friends); that he received notice in early September 2017 of a criminal case against him for helping [Daughter A] flee Egypt; that he engaged [Lawyer A] to represent him in these proceedings; or that she attended court in which allegations were made and the matter adjourned until [the day in] October 2017. The Tribunal does not accept that he was convicted of assisting a fugitive on [the day in] October 2017; that he was sentenced to five years imprisonment and a large fine; or that the applicant’s lawyer advised him that his name appears on an ‘arrivals watch list’, for his arrest at all Egyptians airports and ports.
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant is conscious of the Coptic Christian community’s minority status, and that he may have been the subject of some discrimination over the years. However, it is not satisfied that this amounts to persecution or significant harm.
ASSESSMENT: REFUGEE CRITERION
The Tribunal now assesses whether, on the basis of the findings of fact above, the applicant’s future conduct if he returns to Egypt, and relevant country information, he has a well-founded fear of Convention-related persecution, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
At hearing, the Tribunal asked the applicant about his future plans if he were to return to Egypt, noting that he continues to pay the rent on the family home and that his modest Egyptian pension would go further there. The applicant declined to be drawn, stating emphatically that he is at risk in Egypt and will not return there. The Tribunal proceeds on the basis that the applicant will return to the family home, and continue to draw his Egyptian pension.
For the reasons stated above, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant returned to Egypt in August 2017 in response to urgent news about his [Daughter A] (that is, that she had been forcefully converted to Islam and married, and convicted of insulting Islam); or that [Mr D] threatened him; that he was subject to any police or court action for having ‘smuggled’ [Daughter A] out of Egypt; or that he was later convicted and sentenced on such charges.
Based on these findings, the Tribunal concludes that there is no real chance of the Egyptian authorities arresting the applicant on his return to Egypt (because he is on an ‘arrivals watch list’ or for any similar reason); or taking any other enforcement action in relation to the now-dismissed claims relating to his and his daughter’s convictions.
The Tribunal also has not accepted that [Mr D] and his associates threatened and intimidated the applicant, threatening to kill him if [Daughter A] does not return to Egypt, or that the applicant has any fears in relation to this claim. As such, the Tribunal finds that there is no real chance of the applicant being subject to serious harm at the hands of [Mr D] and his associates or, as he suggested in his original statement of claims, Muslims in general. It also finds that there is no real chance that, due to such threats or harm, he will require State protection (and hence, also no real chance that he will be denied it as a Coptic Christian, or for any other reason).
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant, as a Coptic Christian, has experienced some degree of official and societal discrimination in the past. Looking ahead to the reasonably foreseeable future, the Tribunal has considered a large volume of country information about Coptic Christians in Egypt. It considers general attitudes to the community, and the nature, prevalence and seriousness of any discrimination or violence they experience; and applies this to the applicant’s circumstances, to determine whether he has a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the reasons set out in s.5J(1).
As discussed at hearing, the Coptic Christian population is estimated to be about ten million (although estimates vary significantly) lives throughout Egypt. As noted in the DFAT report, while they have been historically marginalised in Egypt, their circumstances are diverse, including their geographic spread (e.g. urban and rural communities), political leanings and socio-economic status. This suggests the need for care in making broad assessments about the community, including in the context of refugee determination.
Ministerial Direction No.84 requires the Tribunal to take the most recent DFT country information report[8] into account, insofar as it is relevant to the decision, it is convenient to set out the sections relating to Christians:
3.31 Christianity was established in Egypt in the first century and is one of the oldest centres of Christianity in the world. Although there are twelve officially recognised Christian denominations in Egypt (four Orthodox, seven Catholic and one Protestant), the vast majority of Christians in Egypt are members of the Coptic Orthodox Church. All those belonging to recognised Christian denominations are identified as Christian on their national ID cards. While Christians reside throughout the country, they are particularly concentrated in Upper Egypt (the southern part of Egypt) and in major cities such as Cairo and Alexandria. Suburbs in Cairo and other cities and some villages are sometimes regarded or described as ‘Christian areas’, but few are exclusively Christian (or Muslim). Egyptian Christians are politically and socio-economically diverse: they hold varied professions; range from the very poor to the very rich; and have attained a range of education levels.
3.32 Christians generally dress similarly to Muslim Egyptians. In urban areas, however, Christian women are more likely than Muslim women to leave their hair uncovered. Christian women living in rural or conservative areas are more likely to cover their hair, but generally do not wear the Islamic hijab. Christians tend to have identifiable names. Some Christians tattoo small crosses on the inside of their wrists or between their thumb and forefinger as a mark of their identity, often following visits to monasteries or holy sites. Not all Christians have these tattoos and it is not a mandatory religious practice.
3.33 There are no legal barriers to prevent Christians from being visible in public life, and a number of Christians have become prominent and influential in Egyptian politics and business. DFAT understands that the percentage of Christians in the Egyptian civil service is broadly representative of the religious breakdown of the population. However, Christians tend to be under-represented in senior civil servant roles, and in the upper ranks of the military and security services. It is very rare for Christians to be appointed as presidents, deans or vice-deans in public universities. While anti-discriminatory laws and legal protections exist, these are not always enforced fairly and Christians may experience some discrimination, particularly in rural areas.
3.34 Most Christians viewed the post-2011 Revolution ascendency of the Muslim Brotherhood with considerable apprehension. They regarded the Morsi government’s removal and the restoration of general law and order as a cause for relief, and strongly supported the ascendency of Sisi to the presidency. Many Christians and representatives of other minority faiths report that while things could always improve, they generally consider themselves better protected under President Sisi than previous Egyptian leaders. Christian religious authorities have consistently expressed appreciation for Sisi’s public messaging which has called upon Egyptians to place national unity above religious differences, and for his personal example: in 2015, Sisi became the first Egyptian head of state to attend Christmas mass at the St. Mark’s Cathedral in Cairo and has attended every year since. Sisi has actively engaged with the Christian community, declaring days of national mourning or calling personally on Pope Tawadros to express his condolences following terrorist attacks against Christians (see Security Situation). Local sources report that Christians generally remain strong supporters of Sisi, although (like other Egyptians) their initial enthusiasm has waned due to the lack of economic improvement and ongoing social difficulties in Egypt.
[Paragraph 3.35 relates to Jehovah’s Witnesses]
3.36 DFAT assesses that Christians face a moderate risk of discrimination that is more likely to be societal than official in nature, and is likely to vary considerably according to geographic location. Christians, particularly in rural areas, may face difficulty in obtaining justice through legal means (see Judiciary). Despite the lack of any official policy of discrimination, Christians remain less likely than Muslims to be able to achieve senior positions in institutions such as the civil service, military and security services, and universities.
[8] DFAT, Country Information Report – Egypt, 17 June 2019

The DFAT report also addresses terrorist attacks on Christians and instances of communal violence, as follows:
Terrorist Attacks on Christians
3.21 In December 2016, a suicide bomber targeted a church service at a chapel adjoining St Mark’s Cathedral in Cairo, killing 29 and injuring 49. Following the previously mentioned February 2017 attacks in el Arish, IS claimed responsibility for two major attacks against Palm Sunday church services on 9 April 2017. The first attack occurred at a service in Tanta, killing 27 people and injuring over 70. The second attack occurred at a cathedral in Alexandria. At least 16 people were killed and 66 people were injured in the Alexandria attack: Pope Tawadros was saying mass at the cathedral at the time, but escaped unharmed. In May 2017 in Minya, a gunman opened fire on a bus and killed 29 people who refused to renounce their faith. In November 2018, militants ambushed three buses carrying Christian pilgrims to a remote desert monastery south of Cairo, killing seven and wounding 19. In addition to these attacks, security services have reportedly thwarted a number of attempted attacks.
Communal Violence
3.22 Most Egyptians, especially those living in urban areas, work, live and socialise together with little regard to each other’s religious identity. However, small-scale disputes such as neighbourhood disagreements can on occasion adopt religious overtones and escalate into community-level violence, particularly in poorer and rural areas. Most communal incidents in Egypt take the form of vandalism and destruction of property. The large-scale anti-Christian violence that occurred in 2011 and 2013 notwithstanding (see Security Situation), high-profile incidents in which people are killed or churches attacked are not a frequent occurrence.
3.23 A general breakdown in law and order nationwide occurred in the years following the 2011 Revolution, peaking in the period leading up to and immediately following the July 2013 military intervention, and again in the aftermath of the August 2013 dispersals of pro-Morsi protests in Cairo. On these occasions, Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters attacked Christian targets across the country, including churches, schools, and private property. A November 2014 government report into the anti-Christian violence found that 29 people had died in communal-related killings, 52 churches had been completely razed, another 12 damaged, and numerous Christian-owned properties destroyed. Most, but not all, of the incidents were marked by a slow police response, which may have been in part the result of police and security personnel being otherwise engaged in protecting government institutions. Large-scale anti-Christian violence ended with the declaration of a nationwide state of emergency and curfew in August 2013, combined with a security crackdown on protest activity by Brotherhood supporters. In December 2014, 40 perpetrators found responsible for attacks on churches in Upper Egypt received prison terms ranging from one to 15 years.
3.24 The majority of incidences of communal violence in recent years have taken place in the provinces of Upper Egypt. The province of Minya – which has a sizeable (approximately 40 per cent) and relatively assertive Christian population, high concentration of Islamists, high rate of poverty, and low rate of education – has been particularly notable in this regard. According to the National Council of Human Rights, around ten incidents of communal violence occur each month in Minya. In one particularly high profile incident in May 2016, an elderly Christian woman was stripped and assaulted by a 300-strong mob angered by rumours that her son was in a relationship with a divorced Muslim woman. In July 2016, eight men involved in the incident were released and ordered to pay a fine.
3.25 Egyptian leaders are sensitive to the impact of communal violence. President Sisi has repeatedly denounced attempts to create rifts among Egyptians and called for national unity, most recently in relation to the displacement of Christians from northern Sinai. In December 2018, the government announced it would form a higher committee tasked with developing a general strategy to prevent and confront communal incidents. While acknowledging Sisi’s personal engagement on the issue, Church officials have questioned the commitment of some local officials and law enforcement to upholding the law equally for Christians and Muslims.
3.26 DFAT assesses that while Egyptian authorities are generally committed to preventing communal violence, this commitment may vary between individuals and locations. Occasional violent incidents of communal violence are likely to continue to occur, especially in Upper Egypt and in Minya in particular. Most cases are likely to be the result of small-scale localised disputes that take on a religious dimension.
The report includes other includes other references to Copts, including: (a) Coptic Christians comprise an estimated eight to ten per cent of the Egyptian population[9]; (b) there are 39 Copts among the 596 members of Parliament[10]; (b) in early 2017, seven Coptic Christians were killed in separate attacks in the northern Sinai, prompting over 150 Christian families to flee[11]; (c) Islamic militants have targeted Coptic Christian churches and pilgrims (along with other targets)[12]; and (d) that the construction and restoration of churches is a sensitive issue, with lengthy approval processes despite some recent reforms.[13]
[9] DFAT Country Information Report – Egypt, para 3.2
[10] Ibid, para 2.28
[11] Ibid, para 2.39.
[12] Ibid, para 2.40.
[13] Ibid, paras 3.17-3.19.
The Tribunal is mindful that this report is now over four years old, and that some commentators give a more guarded assessment of the situation for Coptic Christians.
Having regard to the country information and the applicant’s personal and family circumstances, the Tribunal accepts that he may face some degree of discrimination if he returns to Egypt, but it finds there is no real chance of him experiencing discrimination amounting to persecution.
There is also a large volume of information concerning historical and recent violence against Coptic Christians in Egypt. A survey of recent country information indicates that violence against Christians mainly takes the form of: (a) terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists; (b) communal mob attacks, mainly in rural areas; and (c) individual attacks. Disputes over the construction of churches; intimate relationships between Christians and Muslims (especially Christian men and Muslim women); perceived acts of blasphemy against Islam; and (d) personal disagreements can trigger violence, including communal violence.
At hearing, the applicant highlighted reports of the abduction and conversion of Coptic Christian women in Egypt which, according to Coptic Christian and international Christian advocacy groups is organised, systematically planned and increasing in frequency. These groups also claim that the Egyptian security forces are sometimes complicit in these actions, and the State fails to prevent abductions. Other sources suggest that the issue of forced conversions and marriage is much more complex and opaque, and that some voluntary conversions and interfaith relationships are cast as ‘abductions’ to avoid stigma or shame. In any event, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant’s [Daughter A] was subject to any such actions and, as it noted at hearing, this phenomenon is not otherwise directly relevant to the applicant’s circumstances.
The Tribunal finds, on the available material, that the applicant does not face a real chance of serious harm amounting to persecution as a Coptic Christian, even though he may experience some degree of discrimination from time to time.

100. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant has some ongoing health issues, including heart disease, [another condition] and poor hearing; and that he presents as having symptoms associated with PTSD and depression. As noted above, he presented at hearing as somewhat fragile and worried, in relation to [Daughter A’s] welfare but also arguably his own uncertain migration status.
101. Neither the applicant nor the representative presented protection claims based on health issues, including any future medical treatment. There is no specific information as to the prognosis or treatment options for his heart, [the other condition] or hearing problems; and no claims that the applicant will be denied access to any treatment, on a selective and discriminatory basis.
102. The information about the applicant’s mental health is similarly patchy, and based on his occasional consultations with a psychiatrist and counsellor. The applicant stated at hearing that he has been taking anti-depressants for some four to five years. He has not claimed, and there is nothing to suggest, that he would be unable to access these (or an equivalent medication) if he returns to Egypt. [Therapist A] also referred to his need for ‘further therapeutic support’, without details. There is limited evidence as to the applicant’s ongoing professional therapy, or what other family and community support he currently relies on. At hearing, he stated that he relies on [a named church agency], rather than his [children], for accommodation and companionship. The Tribunal notes that the applicant continues to rent the family home in Cairo, and would presumably be able to re-establish contact with neighbours and his [Daughter C] if he were to return to Egypt. On the available material, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant has any medical needs, or social support needs, such that he faces a real chance of them being denied to him as a Coptic Christian, or for any other s.5J(1)(a) reason.
Overall assessment
103. The Tribunal has considered all the applicant’s claims and evidence, including their cumulative effect. It is not satisfied that he faces a real chance of serious harm for reasons arising from events during his return to Egypt in August to October 2017; or from an incidents involving his [Daughter A]; or as a Coptic Christian more generally.
It finds that he does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons enumerated in s.5J(1)(a), in Cairo or anywhere in Egypt, and does not meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a).
ASSESSMENT: COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION
104. The Tribunal, having concluded that the applicant does not satisfy s.36(2)(a) now proceeds whether he meets the complementary protection criterion in s.36(2)(aa). It has regards to the findings of fact above, his future conduct and relevant country information.
105. The Tribunal notes that s.36(2)(aa) refers to a ‘real risk’ of an applicant suffering significant harm. In MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505, the ‘real risk’ test was held to impose the same standard as the ‘real chance’ test applicable to the assessment of ‘well-founded fear’ in the Refugee Convention definition and that reasoning appears equally applicable to the refugee criterion in s 5J(1)(b) of the Act (see Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Caseload Legacy) Bill 2014 (Cth), pp.170-1 at [1169], [1180])].
106. The Tribunal refers to the findings of fact above, and its assessment of the applicant’s future conduct if he returns to Egypt. Having regard to these, as well as country information, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real risk of the Egyptian authorities, Islamist extremists or individuals such as [Mr D] seeking to inflict significant harm on him. As such, it finds that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the applicant will face a real risk of significant harm if he returns to Egypt.
107. The applicant made broad claims relating to Egypt’s Muslim majority, and government favouritism and corruption, in particular as to how it affects the Coptic Christian community. Based on its analysis of country information about the extent of discrimination and violence against the Coptic Christian community, and in particular the Egyptian government’s attitudes and practices (including in providing State protection), the Tribunal concludes that there is no real risk that the applicant will be subject to significant harm as a result of these conditions.
108. The applicant also alluded to a range of personal and family circumstances that may be relevant to his prospects if he returns to Egypt. These include his age, his physical and mental health issues, and his concerns about the welfare of his [Daughter A]. The Tribunal notes also in this context that he appears to rely to a large extent on the [named church agency] in Sydney for financial support and companionship. The Tribunal notes that he retains the family home in Cairo, and has neighbours and [another child] there. It is difficult to anticipate how the applicant’s health, social connections and other circumstances may unfold if he returns to Egypt, including after an absence of some six years. Nonetheless, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds to believe that he faces a real risk of significant harm on his return.
109. In sum, having regard to his circumstances and relevant country information, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant will face a real risk of being arbitrarily deprived of his life, that the death penalty would be carried out on him, that he will be subjected to torture, that he will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or that he will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
110. Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Egypt, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa).
CONCLUSION
111. The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s claims and evidence, individually and cumulatively. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(a).
112. Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa).
113. There is no claim that the applicant satisfies s.36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s.36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. The Tribunal notes in this context that the applicant is not a member of the same family unit as either of his daughters in Australia. Both are over 23 years old, and there are no dependent relationships within the meaning of r.1.05A.
114. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s.36(2).
DECISION
115. The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
James Silva
Member
ATTACHMENT: Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…

cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)    severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)   pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)    that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)   arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…

degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b) that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…

torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)    for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)   for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)    for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)   for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)    for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…

receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a) a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b) if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…

5H   Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)    in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)   in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:    For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…

5J    Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)    the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)   there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)    the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:    For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:    For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)    conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)   conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)    without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;

(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)    that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)   the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)    the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)    a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)   significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)    significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)   significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)    denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)    denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

5K   Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)    disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)   disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note: Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

5L   Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)    a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)   the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)    any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

(d) the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a) protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

(b)   the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)    the person can access the protection; and
(b)   the protection is durable; and
(c)    in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…

36    Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)    a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)   a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

(c) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)    the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)   the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)    the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)   the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)    the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)    it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)   the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)    the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.

[2023] AATA 4519

24 October 2023

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