1828146 (Refugee)

Case [2024] AATA 3296

1828146 (Refugee) [2024] AATA 3296 (30 April 2024)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

REPRESENTATIVE:  Mr Tony Tran

CASE NUMBERS:  1828146 & 1903676

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Iran

MEMBER:Jason Pennell

DATE:30 April 2024

PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne

DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 30 April 2024 at 3.10pm

CATCHWORDS

REFUGEE – Protection Visa – Iran – religion – Faili Kurd – Kurdish ethnicity – practising Christian – conversion to Christianity – witnessing the Green Movement protests – a returned failed asylum seeker – applicant will continue to express his faith freely – there is a real chance that the applicant will suffer serious harm – satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION

Migration Act 1958, ss 5, 46, 65, 424, 499

Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

  1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 1 August 2018 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

  2. The applicant, who claims to be stateless, applied for the visa on 3 November 2015. The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that the applicant is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as outlined in s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) and is not a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations and who holds a Protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant (s 36(2)(b) and s 36(2)(c) of the Act).

  3. The applicant lodged an application for review of the delegate’s decision to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) on 18 February 2019 and provided the Tribunal with a copy of the delegate’s primary decision record dated 1 August 2018.

  1. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal in person on 1 November 2023 to give evidence and present arguments and the Tribunal is satisfied that he was given a fair opportunity to give evidence and present arguments.

  2. The Tribunal also received oral evidence from Reverend [A] and Reverend [B].

  3. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of interpreters in the Kurdish, Persian and English languages.

  4. The applicant was represented in relation to the review.

CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA

  1. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). An applicant for the visa…

Continue reading 1828146 (Refugee)

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
1828146 (Refugee) [2024] AATA 3296
Case
[2024] AATA 3296
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) considered the case of an applicant seeking a protection visa, who claimed to fear persecution in Iran due to his conversion from Islam to Christianity. The applicant, identified as a Faili Kurd, asserted that his conversion made him an apostate and that he would face serious harm if returned to Iran.

The central legal issue before the Tribunal was whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of religion, as defined by the Migration Act 1958. This required an assessment of both the subjective fear of the applicant and the objective reality of a real chance of persecution, considering the motivation of persecutors and the nature of any applicable laws. The Tribunal also examined whether the applicant's ethnicity as a Faili Kurd or his past involvement in the Green Movement protests presented a real chance of serious harm.

The Tribunal applied the principles established in cases such as *Chan v MIEA* and *MIEA v Guo*, which define a well-founded fear as one with both subjective and objective elements, requiring more than mere plausibility and a real, substantial basis. While the Tribunal found no real chance of harm based on the applicant's Faili Kurd ethnicity or his past involvement in the Green Movement protests, it accepted his evidence of conversion to Christianity. Citing country information indicating that apostasy is illegal in Iran and that converts face arrest, detention, and potential prosecution, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant's expressed intention to freely practice and proselytise his faith upon return to Iran would expose him to a real chance of serious harm. The Tribunal found that the Iranian Penal Code's provisions regarding proselytising by religious minorities, which carry the death penalty, were not proportional to the objective of maintaining an Islamic state and were therefore discriminatory.

Consequently, the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under section 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958. The decision under review was remitted for reconsideration with a direction that the applicant satisfies the criteria for a protection visa.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The UNHCR Handbook provides an overview of the scope of ‘religion’[50] as:71The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Human Rights Covenant proclaim the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which right include the freedom of a person to change his religion and his freedom to manifest it in public or private, in teaching, practice, worship and observance.72Persecution for “reasons of religion” may assume various forms, e.g. prohibition of membership of a religious community, of worship in private or in public, of religious instruction, or serious measures of discrimination imposed on persons because they practise their religion or belong to a particular religious community.73Mere membership of a religious community will normally not be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status. There may, however, be special circumstances where mere membership can be a sufficient ground.[50] UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status at [71]–[73], <>The question of whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his religion can arise in a variety of factual circumstances and may include the application of generally applicable religious-based laws, departing from orthodox religious beliefs or transgressing social mores, conversion, apostasy and mixed marriage.[51] It will often depend on the motivation of the persecutor or, in circumstances where any fear is caused by the operation of generally applicable laws, whether there is a persecutory intent or nature to those laws or to the way they are applied.[52] It requires an assessment of all the relevant circumstances, including, where relevant, the ‘central tenets’ of the religion, how an applicant is likely to manifest his or her religious beliefs and the likelihood of that manifestation attracting a persecutory reaction from the authorities.[53] [51] To be an apostate does not require conversion from one faith to a different faith but does require abandonment or rejection of the first faith: WZAOO v MIAC (2012) 134 ALD 332 at [12], citing W161/01A v MIMA [2002] FCA 285.[52] See VCAD v MIMIA [2004] FCA 1005 (Kenny J, 4 August 2004) at [35] where Kenny J held that where an applicant has avoided military service for religious reasons there may be a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of religion if a law, neutral on its face, has an indirect discriminatory effect or indirectly inflicts disproportionate injury, for reasons of religion. [53] Pei Lan He v MIMA [2001] FCA 446 (Ryan J, 23 April 2001).In this case, the applicant claims that the essential and significant reason he will be subjected to persecution if he is returned to Iran is because he has converted to the Christian faith. As an apostate, the applicant claims there is a real chance he will be seriously harmed if he is returned to Iran. Based on the applicant’s evidence, the Tribunal accepts that his claim falls within the scope of s 5J(1)(a) of the Act. The applicant’s well-founded fear Section 5J of the Act states that for the purposes of application under the Act, a person has a well-founded fear of persecution ‘if the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ and there is a real chance that they will be persecuted for one or more of these reasons in the event they are returned to their receiving country. In Chan v MIEA[54] the Court held that, when considering ‘well-founded fear’ for the purposes of the Convention, it involves both a subjective and objective element. That is, the definition will be satisfied if an applicant can show genuine fear founded upon a ‘real chance’ of persecution based on a Convention reason. Justice Dawson noted that the phrase ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted…’ contains both a subjective and an objective requirement. That is, there must be a state of mind (fear of being persecuted) and a basis (well-founded) for that fear.[55] [54] (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 396.[55] (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 396. See also MIEA v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 263 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.The subjective element of ‘well-founded fear’ concerns the state of mind of the applicant. That is, whether an applicant has a genuine fear is a question of fact. However, to hold a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ on an objective basis, the applicant’s claim must be more than merely plausible or credible. In Chan v MIEA, Dawson J stated:[56] “Well-founded” must mean something more than plausible, for an applicant may have a plausible belief which may be demonstrated, upon facts unknown to him or her, to have no foundation.[56] Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 CLR 379 per Dawson J at 397.In MIEA v Guo, the Court stated that:[57]Conjecture or surmise has no part to play in determining whether a fear is well‑founded. A fear is “well-founded” when there is a real substantial basis for it. As Chan shows, a substantial basis for a fear may exist even though there is far less than a 50 per cent chance that the object of the fear will eventuate. But no fear can be well-founded for the purpose of the Convention unless the evidence indicates a real ground for believing that the applicant for refugee status is at risk of persecution. A fear of persecution is not well-founded if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation.[57] MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 572; cf MIEA v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 293The applicant claims that, if he is returned to Iran, there is a real chance he will suffer serious harm from authorities because of his religion, having converted from Islam to Christianity. For the reasons detailed below, the Tribunal has accepted that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution if he is returned to Iran because of his religion. Applicant as a Faili KurdThe applicant claims that as a Faili Kurd there is a real chance that he will be seriously harmed if he is returned to Iran. By the 2015 Statutory Declaration the applicant claims that he was not a citizen of Iran. Then country information reports[58] that Faili Kurds originate from the Zagros Mountain range that straddles the Iran–Iraq border. Most Faili Kurds are Shi’a Muslims and have lived in modern-day Iran for centuries. As a result, many are citizens of Iran while others have family on both sides of the border. Many had land and documents seized in the 1960s by the then Ba’athist government in Iraq, which considered the Faili Kurds Iranian, and refugees from that time still live in Iran.[59] Faili Kurds registered as refugees, are entitled to government services and other rights under the Amayesh system. In contrast, undocumented Faili Kurds are not legally entitled to work, access government services or obtain birth, death and marriage certificates.[60] However, it’s reported that Faili Kurds who are citizens of Iran enjoy the same rights as other Iranians.[61][58] DFAT Report at p.17.[59] Ibid.[60] Ibid.[61] Ibid.In this case the applicant claimed[62] that he is a stateless Faili Kurd. He stated that he had been granted a Green Card, that had expired, and had not obtained any further formal documentation in Iran. However, his evidence to the Tribunal was that he was an Iranian citizen and had departed Iran on his own passport. The applicant provided the Tribunal with copies of his mother’s and father’s passports and National Identification booklets as evidence of his status as an Iranian citizen. Based on the evidence provided by the applicant the Tribunal has found that he is a citizen of Iran. [62] The 2015 Statutory Declaration, Department File No. [deleted], Doc ID 6057857.Therefore, based on the available country information, the Tribunal finds that there is no real chance the applicant will be seriously harmed if he is returned to Iran by reason of him being a Faili Kurd. Applicant’s detention The applicant claims that there is a real chance he will be seriously harmed if he is returned to Iran by reason of him witnessing the Green Movement protests and being detained by members of Basij. The applicant claims that on 16 June 2009 while witnessing the Green Movement protests his wife was attacked by members of the Basij. Upon going to his wife’s assistance, the applicant was beaten by the Basij members. The applicant was placed in a van but escaped. The applicant’s evidence was that he suffered two broken teeth and a broken nose for which he received treatment by an orthopaedic surgeon and a dentist who were friends of his family.[63] [63] Op Cit para 128.The applicant claims that early in the morning on 6 July 2009, three members of Sepah came to his house and detained him.[64] The applicant believes that he was identified and located by his student ID card which was taken from him at the protest. He was taken to a military building [where] he was held for 7 hours during which he was interrogated about his attendance at the protest. He claims that he was then taken to [a prison] where he was strip-searched, photographed and fingerprinted. He was held overnight with 300 other prisoners then taken to [another prison] where he was held for 4 months. [64] Op Cit paras 129–131.The country information reports[65] that protests are relatively common in Iran and can be violent. It’s reported[66] that until 2022, protests were largely driven by economic issues. However, in recent years’ protests, while economic factors remain an issue, there has been more of an anti-government and anti-regime theme. It’s reported that protests can be met with lethal force.[67] The country information reports[68] that the Iranian authorities reacted strongly to the Green Movement. The protests were about the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President. The movement was violently suppressed by authorities. It’s reported[69] that some high-profile participants went into exile and continued to promote anti-regime political views, but the movement did not last beyond 2010.[70] [65] DFAT Report at p.24.[66] Ibid.[67] Ibid.[68] DFAT Report at p.26.[69] Ibid.[70] Ibid.Therefore, based on the applicant’s detailed evidence and available country information the Tribunal accepts and finds that the applicant was detained while watching the Green Movement protests as claimed and was detained and interrogated in prison as claimed. The applicant’s evidence was he was released from prison on security provided by his mother-in-law and ordered to report to BAFIA on a regular basis. The applicant’s evidence was that he reported to BAFIA for a period of 2 years. The applicant’s evidence was from about September 2011 to February 2012 he refused several requests to admit to working with foreigners on video. On [date] March 2012 the applicant was detained and beaten by the authorities. It was not clear to the Tribunal why the applicant was beaten by the authorities merely because he had refused to make admissions as requested. As a result of his injuries, the applicant was taken to [a] Hospital [where] he was treated for injuries to his arm and thoracic spine. The applicant did not provide any evidence of his treatment for his injuries at [the] Hospital as claimed. Nevertheless, the applicant received treatment for his injuries in Darwin and provided the Tribunal with x-rays and photographs of the treatment of his injuries from [a] hospital. The Tribunal is unable to determine if the applicant was injured by the Iranian authorities as claimed or by some other means prior to his arrival in Darwin. Nevertheless, the Tribunal is prepared to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt and accepts his evidence that he was injured by the Iranian authorities as claimed. The applicant claims that he will be seriously harmed if he is returned to Iran because he departed the country in breach of his reporting obligations to BAFIA. However, the country information[71] reports that the authorities pay little attention to failed asylum seekers on their return to Iran. The authorities generally accept that many will seek to live and work overseas for economic reasons. It’s reported[72] that unless a person was the subject of adverse official attention prior to departing Iran (e.g. for their political activism), returnees are unlikely to attract attention from the authorities, and face a low risk of monitoring, mistreatment or other forms of official discrimination. People returning on a laissez-passer are questioned by the Immigration Police at Imam Khomeini International Airport in Tehran about the circumstances of their departure and why they are travelling on a laissez-passer. Arrest and mistreatment are not common during this process.[73] [71] DFAT Report at p.40. [72] Ibid.[73] Ibid.In this case the applicant’s evidence was that he was subject to adverse attention by the authorities prior to his departure from Iran. However, the applicant’s evidence was that upon his release in February 2012 he was not provided any further dates that he was required to report to BAFIA and as such his obligation to continue to report had ceased. In addition, the applicant departed the country on his own passport without being detained or coming to the attention of the authorities. Finally, the country information reports that people who participated in the Green Movement protests are no longer of any interest to the authorities in Iran. Therefore, based on the applicant’s own evidence and the available country information the Tribunal finds that there is no real chance he will be seriously harmed if he is returned to Iran by reason of his involvement in the Green Movement as claimed. Applicant as a ChristianThe applicant claims that as a person who has converted from Islam to Christianity, there is a real chance he will be seriously harmed if he is returned to Iran. The applicant’s evidence was that while he grew up as a Shi’a Muslim, his family did not observe the Muslim faith by regularly attending the Mosque and that his wife came from a secular family. As such he claimed that in Iran, he had no religion. The applicant’s evidence was that after he arrived in Australia, he was introduced to Christianity in Darwin by his sponsor [Ms E]. He initially attended church for fellowship but through his contact with the church learned more about Christianity and was baptised [in] September 2013 at [Church 1] in Darwin. Based on the applicant’s evidence and the supporting documents, including the applicant’s Certificate of Baptism and a letter from [Church 1] confirming his baptism,[74] the Tribunal accepts and finds that the applicant was baptised in Darwin as claimed.[74] Certificate of Baptism and letter from [Church 1] dated 30 September 2013, Department File No. [no.], Doc ID 6057857.The applicant’s evidence was that he has become an active member of the Iranian Church. He attends the Church regularly, attends and participates in church meetings and seminars and is a member of the Church Council. Reverend [A] and Reverend [B] both gave evidence in support of the applicant and confirmed his involvement in the Church and his commitment to the Christian faith. Based on the applicant’s evidence and the evidence of Reverend [A] and Reverend [B] the Tribunal accepts that the applicant is a committed Christian and involved in the Iranian Church as claimed. The country information reports that it is estimated that 99.6 percent of Iranians are Muslim.[75] Christians, Zoroastrians and Jews may practise their faith, unless they are converts from Islam.[76] Apostasy is illegal in Iran.[77] While not specifically a crime, it is a crime under Sharia law, which is enforceable by the constitution.[78] A person can be found guilty of a crime of apostasy based on the testimony of two male witnesses, the knowledge of a judge or a confession.[79] The death penalty may be imposed but this rarely occurs.[80] [75] DFAT Report at p.18.[76] Ibid.[77] Ibid.[78] Ibid.[79] Ibid.[80] Ibid. It’s reported[81] that Iranians who are not members of the recognised churches generally practise in underground ‘house churches’ that are usually Evangelical Protestant. While the number of adherents to the house churches is unknown, because they are secret and illegal, it’s estimated that 0.52 percent of the population is Evangelical Christian.[82] It’s reported that the number of underground Christians is growing. Christians may travel to Türkiye to be baptised and then return to continue to practise their faith in secret. [81] DFAT Report at p.20.[82] Ibid.It’s reported that the authorities regularly carry out raids against the underground churches, having interpreted the growth in such churches as a threat to national security.[83] As a result, congregations regularly change houses to avoid detection. The authorities generally conduct raids on house churches because of tip-offs from Muslim neighbours and tend to focus on those house churches that actively proselytise or seek out new members.[84] It’s also reported[85] that the authorities will send people posing as converts for the purpose of infiltrating a particular house church. [83] DFAT Report at p.21.[84] Ibid.[85] Ibid.100.While it is not a common punishment, the death penalty for apostasy is a possible outcome for Christians meeting in house churches.[86] Long prison sentences are also possible. In 2021 amendments to the Islamic Penal Code meant that those found guilty of ‘deviant psychological manipulation’ or ‘propaganda contrary to Islam’ are now liable to be found to be a member of a sect punishable by either a fine, prison, flogging or the death penalty.[87] It’s reported that in August 2021, three Christians in the city of Karaj were sentenced to a total of 9 years in prison under the new amendments.[88] [86] Ibid.[87] Ibid.[88] Ibid.101.The DFAT Report[89] states that Muslim converts to Christianity risk arrest and detention if their conversion is revealed. Christians found to be proselytising face a high risk of arrest and prosecution and imprisonment. In addition, DFAT assesses[90] that Christian converts face a high risk of social discrimination if their conversion becomes known in the wider community. This may involve being ostracised from a person’s family and discrimination at work.[91] DFAT assesses that those Christians who convert while outside the country of Iran and who intend to continue to practise their Christian religion would face a high level of discrimination and could be subjected to the death penalty.[92] [89] Ibid.[90] Ibid.[91] Ibid.[92] Ibid.102.In this case, the applicant has converted to Christianity in Australia. He became involved with the Church in Darwin upon his arrival into Australia and has continued his faith as a Christian through the Iranian Church in Melbourne. He is an active member of the Church including as a member of the Church Council. His evidence was that if he is returned to Iran, he would continue attending the house church and would freely express his faith at every opportunity for the purposes of proselytising the Christian religion to others. As referred to above both Reverend [A] and Reverend [B] confirmed his involvement in the Iranian Church and his commitment to the Christian faith. Their evidence was that the applicant has embraced the evangelical expression of his faith, and that he would continue to practise as a Christian if he was returned to Iran. Reverend [B] gave evidence that her sister had experienced harm as a Christian in Iran. Having experienced the nature and practice of the house churches in Iran she expressed concern that the applicant would experience serious harm from the authorities if he was returned to Iran because of his expression of faith. 103.Based on the applicant’s evidence and the evidence provided by Reverend [A] and Reverend [B], the Tribunal accepts that the applicant will continue to express his faith freely in the event he is returned to Iran. Laws of general application 104.It’s well established that enforcement of a generally applicable law does not ordinarily constitute persecution for the purposes of the Convention, because enforcement of such a law does not ordinarily constitute discrimination.[93] However, in this case, the Tribunal notes that the law the applicant would be subjected to upon his return to Iran appears to be either discriminatory on its terms or generally expressed with discriminatory intent. As referred to above, the Iranian Penal Code specifies the death sentence for proselytising by religious minority groups.[94] As such, the rejection of Islam and conversion to another religion such as the Baha’i faith is prohibited, with converts facing the risk of arrest, detention and prosecution.[95] [93] Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 258 referring to Yang v Carroll (1994) 852 F Supp 460 at 467; Chen Shi Hai v MIMA (2000) 201 CLR 293 at [20].[94] ‘International Religious Freedom Report for 2020 – Iran’; DFAT Report at p.32; DFAT, Christians in Iran, COISS, dated 27 July 2021 at p.2.[95] DFAT Country Information Report of 14 April 2020 at p.30; ‘Iran: Christian converts and house churches (1) – prevalence and conditions for religious practise’, Landinfo – Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre, 27 November 2017, p.6, < DFAT, Christians in Iran, COISS, dated 27 July 2021 at p.1.105.Whether a law is properly characterised as a law of general application turns on identifying those members of the population to whom it applies.[96] It can be necessary to look behind a law that is generally expressed, to establish whether the law itself is in truth discriminatory in its intent or whether it has a discriminatory impact on members of a group recognised by the Convention. Laws or policies that target, or only apply to, or impact adversely upon, a particular section of the population cannot be properly described as laws or policies of general application.[97] [96] See Weheliye v MIMA [2001] FCA 1222 at [50].[97] Chen Shi Hai v MIMA (2000) 201 CLR 293 at [19], [20].106.In this case, it is necessary to consider if the law specifying the death sentence for proselytising by religious minority groups is appropriate[98] and adapted for a legitimate object of the state.[99] This involves considering if the means adopted are proportional to achieving the object of securing a predominantly Islamic state.[100] A legitimate object is generally considered to be an object that must be pursued to protect or promote the general welfare of the state and its citizens. Therefore, the enforcement of a generally applicable criminal law, or the enforcement of laws designed to protect the general welfare of the state, would not ordinarily constitute persecution.[101] However, in this case, the threat of a death sentence for proselytising by religious minority groups does not appear to the Tribunal to be proportional to the objective of promoting and maintaining an Islamic state. [98] Applicant S v MIMA (2004) 217 CLR 387.[99] Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225.[100] See Applicant S v MIMA (2004) 217 CLR 387 at [44], [48]; MZQAP v MIMIA [2005] FCAFC 35.[101] Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 258.107.Even in circumstances where the possibility of the law being enforced is remote, the mere existence of such a law that imposes the death penalty for expressing religious views contrary to the regime is, in the Tribunal’s view, discriminatory. That is not to say that the mere existence of a criminal law could never constitute persecution. Living under the shadow of the mere possibility of a death sentence for apostasy in Iran, regardless of how remote that possibility might be, has been considered to constitute persecution.[102] Accordingly, the Tribunal accepts that there is a real chance the applicant will suffer serious harm if he is returned to Iran by reason of his religion as claimed.[102] SGKB v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 44 at [21], endorsed by Kirby J in Applicant NABD of 2002 v MIMIA [2005] HCA 29 at [94].108.Having considered the applicant’s claims singularly and cumulatively, the Tribunal finds that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Iran, there is a real chance that the applicant will suffer serious harm.CONCLUSION109.For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) of the Act.DECISION110.The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Act. Jason PennellSenior MemberATTACHMENT ‘A’Corruption2.16 Corruption is widespread and a major barrier to economic activity. Iran is a State Party to the UN Convention against Corruption, and Article 3 of the Iranian Constitution commits the government to fighting all forms of corruption. While Iran has a range of anti-corruption laws and agencies, ultimately these have little effect in a system structured around transferring large amounts of wealth to Iran’s elite including the Supreme Leader himself. Iran ranked 147th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index. GAN Integrity notes a high risk of corruption in the judiciary, police, public services (acquiring licences, utilities), land administration, tax and customs, public procurement, and the natural resources industry. Corruption takes the form of irregular payments, cronyism, and embezzlement. Officials may expect bribes to conduct routine services.Mental Health2.22 Mental health services are provided as part of the mainstream health services available to all Iranians. However, according to a 2021 study published in the Iranian Journal of Psychiatry, the Iranian Mental Health Survey indicated almost one in four people had one or more psychiatric disorders (23.6 per cent); two-thirds of patients did not benefit from health interventions; and many provided services were inadequate and imposed a high burden on Iranian families. As in many countries, stigma is a significant barrier to seeking treatment. While mental illness has, to date, not been considered a legitimate medical condition, and people living with mental illness have been expected to ‘tough it out’, there are signs that this is changing – at least in the more progressive parts of Iran. Stigma can include difficulties in relationships, prejudicial attitudes including social discrimination, or societal acceptance and approval of such discrimination. Families will typically hide the fact that a member is living with a mental illness and will isolate them socially; families may also physically restrain the individual. Private services are available, especially in Tehran, but are expensive.2.23 A 2023 study published in the BMC Psychiatry Journal exploring the prevalence of violence and its association with mental health among the Iranian population one year after the outbreak of COVID-19 found prevalence of violence had increased. The study reported overall prevalence of domestic and social violence was 11.4 per cent and 5.5 per cent, respectively, and verbal violence was the most common type; with 61.8 per cent and 66.8 per cent for domestic and social violence, respectively. The study found suspected mental disorder, female gender, being younger than 25 years, living together, unemployment, low education, and history of COVID-19 infection presented a significant association with domestic and social violence. (See also Women).POLITICAL SYSTEM2.29 Iran is a theocratic republic, established under the principle of Velayat-e faqih (‘guardianship of the jurist’). Under this principle, an Islamic jurist (the Supreme Leader) makes final policy decisions. While the President is technically the head of state, the Supreme Leader is the highest power in the land, and the commander of its armed forces. The Supreme Leader is responsible for setting overall state policy and has significant influence over foreign policy and national security. The Supreme Leader appoints the head of the judiciary, half the members of the Guardian Council and all members of the Expediency Council (see below). The Supreme Leader can annul any bill passed by parliament and must approve any constitutional changes. The current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, assumed the role in 1989, following the death of the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.2.30 Iran’s political system is a combination of elected and unelected institutions. Elections are held regularly for president, parliament, local councils, and the Assembly of Experts. The Supreme Leader and members of the Guardian Council and the Expediency Council, where most power is concentrated, are not popularly elected.2.31 The Assembly of Experts, comprising 88 clerics, is elected for eight-year terms by popular vote. It selects the Supreme Leader and has the constitutional power to remove them from office should they be unable to perform their duties. In practice, the Assembly of Experts has never challenged the Supreme Leader’s authority.2.32 The Council of Guardians of the Constitution (‘Guardian Council’) reviews all bills passed by parliament to determine whether they comply with sharia (Islamic law) and the constitution. It vets all candidates for election to the presidency, parliament, and Assembly of Experts, including on the basis of a candidate’s allegiance to Shi’a Islam and to the Islamic Republic. Disqualification of reform-minded candidates, or candidates considered insufficiently loyal to the clerical establishment, is common. The Guardian Council comprises 12 clerics, half of whom are appointed directly by the Supreme Leader for phased six-year terms. The head of the judiciary (appointed by the Supreme Leader) nominates the other six, who are then approved by parliament.2.33 The Council for the Discernment of Expediency (‘Expediency Council’) resolves impasses between parliament and the Guardian Council. It also acts as an advisory body for the Supreme Leader. The Expediency Council comprises the president, the speaker of parliament, the chief of the Supreme Court, the chief-of-staff of the armed forces, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (the body responsible for directing national security policy), four Guardian Council jurisprudents and 38 members appointed to five-year terms by the Supreme Leader.2.34 The Islamic Consultative Assembly (commonly referred to as the Majlis) is Iran’s unicameral parliament. It comprises 290 members elected for four-year terms by popular vote (the most recent parliamentary election took place in February 2020). Deputies represent 208 constituencies. Constituencies with large populations have multiple seats (for example, Tehran, the largest constituency, has 30 seats). Five seats are reserved for deputies from recognised religious minorities, and women serve in the parliament (though in small numbers, currently there are 16 women compared to 268 men). Parliament has the power to initiate bills, but they must be approved by the Guardian Council to become law. Overall, the parliament is not as powerful as unelected committees such as the Guardian Council or the Expediency Council, however, plays an important role as an outlet for public debate and challenges to political power. While all members are vetted, reformist and moderate members do sit in the Parliament but currently comprise less than seven per cent of all members.2.35 The most recent Presidential election in June 2021 was won by conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi. The election was characterised by poor voter turnout amid allegations of rigging – many potential rivals were disqualified by the Guardian Council. Raisi, a former judicial head, is subject to US sanctions for human rights abuses including judicial execution of children, his role in crackdowns on protests, and in a commission that ordered thousands of executions of political opponents in 1988.HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK2.36 The constitution provides for freedom of expression, association, opinion, assembly, and religion, if those rights do not violate certain principles, including Islam. In practice, these rights are not typically upheld by authorities. See Religion, Political Opinion (Actual or Imputed) and Groups of Interest.2.37 Iran does not have a single national human rights institution. A number of official bodies are tasked with promoting human rights. The High Council for Human Rights is the peak body and a commission set up under article 90 of the constitution (the Article 90 Commission) legally empowered to investigate and report on complaints received by the public on any branch of government. In practice, it would be unusual for complaints made to these bodies to lead to a prosecution.2.179 DFAT assesses that the authorities use violence or other pressure tactics to extract confessions from defendants, including those charged with security-related offences.CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT2.180 Article 39 of the constitution prohibits all affronts to the dignity and repute of detained persons. The law allows for Sharia law punishments that include amputation, flogging, blinding and stoning and the Government does not consider these to breach constitutional provisions.2.181 More than 100 offences attract the punishment of flogging, including dress code violations, same-sex sexual activity and alcohol consumption. Flogging has been used in political cases where offences are often vaguely worded, such as ‘propaganda’, ‘defamation’ or ‘rebellion’. Amputations, of the fingers or hands for example, may be applied for property offences such as theft.2.182 Blindings have been used as retribution, for example where an offender has blinded a victim the punishment is to be blinded. DFAT understands blinding is rare; compensation money followed by forgiveness is more common.2.183 Stoning is uncommon but can be applied as a punishment for adultery and same-sex sexual intercourse. The method of execution may be changed to hanging instead of stoning for these offences. DFAT understands some hard-line judges still impose the punishment on offenders but is not aware of recent examples.2.184 In November 2022, international media reported female protesters arrested as part of anti-government protests (see Mahsa Amini protests) were raped while in detention.Arbitrary Arrest and Detention2.185 Article 32 of the constitution stipulates no one may be arrested ‘except by the order and in accordance with the procedure set down by law’. Authorities must communicate the charges to the arrested person in writing without delay and forward a provisional dossier to the competent judicial authorities within 24 hours. Article 36 states that only a competent court may pass and execute a sentence, and it must be in accordance with the law. Article 37 guarantees the presumption of innocence.2.186 Despite these constitutional protections, human rights groups allege that arbitrary arrest is common, particularly against ethnic and religious minorities, activists, journalists and their lawyers and families. The arbitrary nature of arrests makes it difficult to conclude a pattern. For further information please see the relevant section of the report about minorities or political activists.STATE PROTECTIONIslamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)2.187 The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is Iran’s most powerful security and military organisation, responsible for the protection and survival of the Islamic Republic. The IRCG was established as a guardian of the 1979 revolution’s values and played a key role in the early days of the Republic. It is now Iran’s preeminent internal and external security force with an army, navy and air force, which it operates separately from the regular military, and also has cyber and intelligence wings. The IRCG’s associated companies in the banking, communications, construction, shipping and other sectors play a significant role in the economy. There are around 150,000 to 200,000 members of the IRGC across various divisions. 2.188 The IRGC helped to suppress the Green Movement demonstrations in 2009 and, together with other parts of the security apparatus, played a role in responding to the December 2017, January 2018 and November 2019 protests. International media reports and leaked documents point to IRGC involvement in more recent protests and planning to crack down on protests before price rises took effect in 2022, for example. Following the election of President Raisi, the IRGC is playing an ever-increasing role in politics, including many former IRGC officers now holding senior political appointments.Police2.191 The national police force of Iran are described as a ‘disciplinary force’ and may be known by their abbreviation, ‘NAJA’. They are distinct from the now-disbanded morality police, known as the Gasht-e Ershad, who enforced religious rules on hijabs, alcohol and showing affection in public. NAJA is responsible for internal security, although receives support from the IRGC and the Basij in quelling large-scale protests. NAJA have an obvious street presence, particularly in the major cities. NAJA is highly organised, including in responding to crime. The level of violent crime in Iran is low relative to other countries in the region (see Security Situation)Detention and Prison2.198 Prison conditions are widely considered to be poor. In his February 2023 report on the situation of human reports in Iran, UN Special Rapporteur Rehman described conditions in one solitary cell as ‘inhumane’. He noted severe overcrowding, ill-treatment of prisoners including prison guards assaulting prisoners, long periods of solitary confinement that amount to torture and a lack of healthcare (including routine medical care and specialist care during the COVID-19 pandemic).2.199 The US Department of State’s 2021 Human Rights Report called prison conditions ‘harsh and life threatening’ with food shortages, ‘gross overcrowding’, inadequate sanitary conditions and lack of medical care. The report quotes human rights organisations that note a lack of medical care (sometimes as a form of punishment), contaminated food and water, water shortages, rodent and insect infestations, shortage of bedding, ‘intolerable heat’ and poor ventilation.2.200 Political prisoners by law should experience better conditions; for example, they do not have to wear prison uniforms, should not be held in solitary confinement unless a judge deems it necessary, and should have better access to the outside world through communication with friends and family, and access to newspapers, radio and television. In practice, this does not occur. DFAT understands political prisoners are at a greater risk of torture than are other prisoners, and in many cases have not been held separately from other prisoners, meaning that the conditions described above apply equally to political prisoners.TREATMENT OF RETURNEES2.202 The Iranian Government has a longstanding policy of not accepting involuntary returns. Voluntary returns are possible and are sometimes assisted by returning governments or the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In cases where an Iranian diplomatic mission has issued temporary travel documents, authorities will be forewarned of the person’s imminent return. DFAT is not aware of any legislative or social barriers to voluntary returnees finding work or shelter in Iran, nor any specific barriers to prevent voluntary returnees from returning to their home region.2.203 In general, authorities pay little attention to failed asylum seekers on their return to Iran. DFAT understands their actions (including social media posts about sur place activities) are not routinely investigated by authorities. Iranians with a public profile in Australia (or elsewhere) may have activities visible on social media tracked by the Iranian government. (See also Media.) Iranians have left the country in large numbers since the 1979 revolution, and authorities accept many will seek to live and work overseas for economic reasons. Those who return on a laissez-passer are questioned by the Immigration Police at Imam Khomeini International Airport in Tehran about the circumstances of their departure and why they are traveling on a laissez-passer. Questioning usually takes between 30 minutes and one hour, however may take longer if the returnee is considered evasive in their answers and/or immigration authorities suspect a criminal history on the part of the returnee. Arrest and mistreatment are not common during this process.2.204 DFAT assesses that, unless they were the subject of adverse official attention prior to departing Iran (e.g. for their political activism), returnees are unlikely to attract attention from the authorities, and face a low risk of monitoring, mistreatment or other forms of official discrimination. Local sources told DFAT the greater challenges for returnees are finding work and economic considerations, which will differ from person to person depending on the location of return, family support and skills and experience.Exit and Entry Procedures2.205 Millions of Iranians travel into and out of Iran each year without difficulty, including the large Iranian diaspora residing in North America, Europe, the United Arab Emirates and Australia. Iranian nationals must pay an exit tax each time they depart Iran, which increases with each outbound journey. Payments of exit taxes are made at the airport as one is departing Iran. An exit permit for foreign travel is required for Iranians employed in fields considered sensitive (e.g., employees of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation); those studying abroad (whether on government scholarships or privately-funded); and all males aged 18-30 who are yet to complete military service (principally those who have deferred military service to undertake tertiary studies). To obtain an exit permit, citizens must provide proof of their status (e.g., a letter from their university confirming their enrolment) and pay a bond (the bond is retrievable on return). Iranian nationals resident in Iran who require an exit permit must obtain one each time they leave the country (multiple exit permits are not available for Iranian nationals resident in Iran). Exit permits are issued electronically. 2.206 In some cases, citizens require special permission to obtain a passport (see also Passports). This includes minors under the age of 18, who require the permission of their father/custodian; males who have not completed their military service; and married women, who require their husband’s permission. Beyond their passport and, where it is required, an exit permit, Iranians exiting Iran are not required to present any other documents.2.207 Government authorities can impose travel bans on Iranian citizens. Reasons for a travel ban can include security concerns, financial debts, outstanding taxes and outstanding sentences awaiting enforcement. Citizens with ongoing charges or outstanding court matters and those released on bail or parole are subjected to travel bans. Civil and political activists may also be subjected to travel bans. Husbands of married women and fathers of unmarried women and underage children can request travel bans against their dependents. Intelligence and law enforcement services have the power to impose travel bans without judicial oversight. (See Judiciary) Iranians under travel bans are often unaware of their status until they reach passport control at the airport and are turned back. The presence of security organisations in all Iranian airports, particularly those with border checkpoints, enables authorities to determine whether any Iranian citizen can leave the country by air.2.208 It is not possible to assess or profile travellers who will be successful in a border crossing attempt; chances of success depend on individual circumstances of the traveller and individual sanctions against them by the government, which are not always clear. Sources report the government knows of those who have departed illegally, such as via an unauthorised border crossing, and that such people will face consequences such as the inability to get a passport in the future. Passengers undertaking domestic air travel are usually only required to present their ticket. Passengers may be asked for identification, however DFAT understands this practice is not consistent. Overland border crossing, including via rugged mountain areas, is more achievable for some Iranians than crossing at official crossing points. Such actions can be very dangerous because of the risk of violent crime.2.209 Security procedures at Imam Khomeini International Airport in Tehran are robust. They include computerised cross-checking and multiple layers of physical security and document checking. Immigration officials are considered highly competent. A source told DFAT that it was ‘next to impossible’ to bypass security procedures at Imam Khomeini International Airport. DFAT assesses that the likelihood of an individual exiting Imam Khomeini International Airport with a fraudulent passport is extremely low. DFAT assesses that it is easier to depart Iran on a fraudulent passport at land border crossings, where immigration authorities deal with a greater volume of people and their capacity can be stretched.Passports2.216 Passports demonstrate Iranian citizenship. Applicants are required to provide their original shenasnameh, photocopies of all of the pages of the shenasnameh containing an ID photograph, the original and a copy of their Residence Permit, and three passport photographs taken within the last three months. Applications can be lodged at police stations. As with driver’s licences and other forms of identification, women must have a headscarf covering their hair completely in their passport photographs.ATTACHMENT – Extract from Migration Act 19585 (1) Interpretation…cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:(a) severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or(b) pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;but does not include an act or omission:(c) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or(d) arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.…degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:(a) that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or(b) that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.…torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:(a) for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or(b) for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or(c) for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or(d) for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or(e) for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.…receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:(a) a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or(b) if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.…5H Meaning of refugeeFor the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:(a) in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or(b) in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.Note: For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.…5J Meaning of well-founded fear of persecutionFor the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:(a) the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and(b) there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and(c) the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.Note: For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.Note: For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:(a) conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or(b) conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or(c) without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):(a) that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and(b) the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and(c) the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:(a) a threat to the person’s life or liberty;(b) significant physical harassment of the person;(c) significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;(d) significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;(e) denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;(f) denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.5K Membership of a particular social group consisting of familyFor the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:(a) disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and(b) disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:(i)the first person has ever experienced; or(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.Note: Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.5L Membership of a particular social group other than familyFor the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:(a) a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and(b) the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and(c) any of the following apply:(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and(d) the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.5LA Effective protection measuresFor the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:(a) protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:(i)the relevant State; or(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and(b) the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:(a) the person can access the protection; and(b) the protection is durable; and(c) in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.…Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act…A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:(a) a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or(b) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or(c) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:(a) the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or(b) the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or(c) the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or(d) the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or(e) the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:(a) it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or(b) the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or(c) the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.…

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.