1824036 (Refugee)

[2021] AATA 5178

1824036 (Refugee) [2021] AATA 5178 (28 November 2021)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER:  1824036

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Ethiopia

MEMBER:Peter Haag

DATE:28 November 2021

PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne

DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 28 November 2021 at 2:28pm

CATCHWORDS           
REFUGEE – protection visa – Ethiopia – race – Amhara – political opinion – anti-government activism – father died after imprisonment – applicant’s work for non-government organisation – threats to applicant and family – detention, interrogation and abuse – credible witness – improved conditions under new government – recent full-scale armed ethnic conflict and volatile conditions – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5AAA, 36(2)(a), 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 8 August 2018 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

2. The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of Ethiopia, applied for the visa on 2 February 2017. The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that they were not satisfied that the applicant is a refugee or of the existence of a real risk of the applicant suffering significant harm if returned to Ethiopia.

   CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA

3. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

4. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.

5. A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).

6. Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

7. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

   Mandatory considerations

8. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

   CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

9. The following issues arise for determination by the Tribunal in relation to the present review application:

   (a) whether the applicant meets the refugee criterion; and

   (b) whether the applicant alternatively meets the complementary protection criterion.

10. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be remitted.

11. The applicant claims, and the Tribunal accepts, that he is a national of Ethiopia. He was born on [date] in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. A copy of his passport, which he provided to the Department, corroborated this claim. There is no evidence to suggest the applicant’s passport is a bogus document.

12. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant would be recognised in Ethiopia as a national of Ethiopia, and that the applicant is a national of Ethiopia. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds Ethiopia is the applicant’s receiving country for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

13. There is no evidence to suggest that the applicant has a right to enter and reside in a country other than Ethiopia, and accordingly, the Tribunal finds the applicant is not excluded from protection under the laws of Australia by s 36(3) of the Act.

14. The Tribunal convened a hearing to consider the merits of the review application on 22 November 2021. The applicant gave evidence, and he relied on the evidence of one witness, his mother, [Ms A].  The applicant was represented by his legal representative who provided written submissions to the Tribunal before the review and made oral submissions during the review.

    Applicant’s background and visa history

15. The applicant states he belongs to the Amhara ethnic group, is Christian in terms of religion, and is able to speak, read and write Amharic and English. He has never married or been in a de facto relationship.  

16. The applicant arrived in Australia [in] January 2017 as the holder of a [Visitor] visa.

17. He applied for a protection visa on 2 February 2017, approximately one month after arriving in Australia.

    Protection claims

18. In seeking protection, the applicant claims:

    • He is of the Amhara ethnicity;

    ·The past Federal government was hostile towards Amhara people;

    ·The present Federal government is hostile towards Amhara people;

    ·The present Federal government will persecute him;

    • The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) being the past Federal government, came to power in 1991, when the applicant was [age] years old;
    • His parents were fearful of the EPRDF and he heard them speak about the government killing Amhara people;
    • His father would talk to him about human rights violations perpetrated by the government;
    • His father was [an Occupation 1] for [Organisation 1], [which provided Service 1 within] Ethiopia on behalf of other organisations, including [a foreign organisation];
    • [Service 1] was controlled by politicians, and [Organisation 1] was owned by the government. His father was opposed to this;
    • In 1993, his father lost his job. The applicant believes it was partly related to his opposition to the [operation of Service 1]. His father was asked by authorities to celebrate Ginbot 20;
    • His father took up work as [an Occupation 2], though he earned less money than he did as [an Occupation 1]. His family suffered financial difficulty;
    • His father joined the [Occupation 2] union. The union encouraged him to join the EPRDF and to celebrate Ginbot 20. He refused;
    • His father continued to voice his political opinion to the union, and argued that the union should not celebrate Ginbot 20. These actions brought him to the attention of the authorities;
    • [In] May 1999, his father disappeared. He and his family searched for him, though could not find any information about him. The police told them they knew nothing of their father;
    • [in] December 2000, his mother received a telephone call informing her that her husband, the applicant’s father, was in [prison] and that she could collect him;
    • The applicant went with his mother to the prison. They were met by two police officers in an ambulance, who told them that his father was in the ambulance and that they were taking him to hospital;
    • His father was taken to [hospital]. He was covered in scars and could not talk. He passed away [in] December;
    • The applicant hates the government for what happened to his father, and since his disappearance and death his opposition to the government has grown;
    • He attended a [college] to study [Subject 1]. After graduating, he refused to apply for any job related to the government. He found employment [at a Subject 1] company;
    • In the 2005 election, the applicant voted for the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), an opposition political party. He was vocal in his support of the CUD, though he did not attend protests;
    • In 2009, he found employment as [an Occupation 3] at [Employer 1];
    • In the course of his work, he met the ambassador and president of [Organisation 2]. He became friends with the ambassador, and they would discuss politics;
    • He undertook short contract work as a [Occupation 3] consultant for the ambassador and for others he met through his work at [Employer 1];
    • In 2014, the ambassador approached him to meet with him and the president of [Organisation 2] to discuss an employment opportunity. They met three times over several months, and in September 2014 they offered him a position;
    • In October 2014, he began working for [Organisation 2] as the [Manager 1] for [Organisation 2]. He was responsible for developing relationships between the government, [Occupation 4s] and other organisations;
    • His work involved advocating for [Occupation 4s] before the government, and arranging meetings between government representatives and [Occupation 4s];
    • His work brought him into direct conflict with government officials and ministers. The government officials would pressure him to support certain [Occupation 4s], and to assist in procuring funding from [Organisation 2] for [Occupation 4s] aligned with the governing party;
    • He had significant contact with government officials, including ministers. He spoke with the State Ministers responsible for the [Occupation 4] sector about corruption, and that [Occupation 4] development was seriously restricted by corruption and government policies;
    • He was perceived by the authorities to be against the government and stirring up trouble in the [Occupation 4] sector;
    • He encouraged influential [Occupation 4s] to form a union;
    • Government officials decided the applicant was agitating the [Occupation 4s];
    • The applicant and his family began to receive threats, telling him that he would be killed if he did not stop causing trouble for the government;
    • The police did not help him. He suspected the people making the threats were Tigrayans;
    • He raised his concerns with [Organisation 2], to be told he needed to cooperate with the government;
    • In 2016, there was significant unrest in Ethiopia. He was regularly questioned by government authorities and asked if he had connections to the Oromo Liberation Front or to Ginbot 7;
    • In November 2016, he was arrested. He was held in prison for 10 days, and was beaten and interrogated. He was accused of opposing the government and inciting disaffection among the [Occupation 4s];
    • Other people in detention were tortured and killed. He was given very little food and keep in the dark in a very small room;
    • Upon release, he was forced to sign an undertaking that he would not support an opposition political group, and told that if he was found to be involved in anti-government activities, the government would take measures against him;
    • He planned to leave Ethiopia permanently, though he did not tell anyone at [Organisation 2] that he would not return to Ethiopia;
    • At the airport, he was taken aside and searched. He told the officers that he would return to Ethiopia after a short time;
    • He left his computer and documents at home;
    • He arrived in Australia [in] January 2017. When he arrived, he called his sisters in Ethiopia who told him that one of the influential [Occupation 4s] he encouraged to form a [Occupation 4] union had been arrested, and soldiers had come to their house looking for the applicant;
    • The soldiers took the applicant’s computer and documents, and have visited his house numerous times since then. He fears for his sisters’ safety;
    • The [Occupation 4] is currently in prison, and another [Occupation 4] he worked with and encouraged to form a [Occupation 4] union had been shot and killed by soldiers;
    • In Ethiopia, he financially supported his mother and sisters after his mother was forced by government officials to close her restaurant due to her providing food to anti-government influencers;
    • His mother faced discrimination from the regional administrators as a result of the applicant’s conduct and the political conduct of her husband;
    • His sisters were interrogated by soldiers and are required to inform the government of the applicant’s whereabouts. His mother must report to officials once she returns from Australia;
    • He is no longer able to contact his two sisters in Ethiopia and he fears for their safety;
    • He fears that, if he returns, he will be tortured and killed;
    • He cannot seek protection from the authorities, because the risk he faces is from those same authorities;
    • He cannot relocate within Ethiopia as the authorities will find him wherever he goes.

    COUNTRY INFORMATION

19. DFAT published a report on Ethiopia on 12 August 2020. That report provides the following information relevant to the applicant’s review:

    RECENT HISTORY

    Ethiopia, formerly Abyssinia, is a multi-ethnic federal republic in East Africa. Ethiopia is Africa’s oldest independent country — with the exception of a five-year Italian occupation (1936-41), it was never colonised. In 1974, a Communist military junta known as the Derg (‘Committee’) overthrew the long-serving Emperor, Haile Selassie, and abolished Ethiopia’s monarchy, the House of Solomon, which dated to antiquity.

    The Derg pursued policies of nationalisation and collectivisation, and Ethiopia descended into civil war between junta and rebel forces. Between 1976 and 1978, the Derg killed thousands of its opponents (the campaign of ‘Red Terror’). Rebel forces from the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a multi-ethnic alliance led by the Tigrayan people, ousted the Derg in 1991, ending Ethiopia’s civil war. The Derg’s leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, was granted asylum in Zimbabwe. The EPRDF and its successor, the Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP), have ruled Ethiopia since. In 1993, Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia and established its own state, rendering Ethiopia landlocked. A border dispute between the two countries triggered a two-year war (1998-2000), in which 100,000 people were killed (see Security Situation). Ethiopia is one of the most drought-prone countries in the world. Drought-induced famines in 1973-74 and 1984-85 resulted in more than 1 million deaths. Its capital city, Addis Ababa, is a major diplomatic hub, as seat of the African Union and the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

    Ethiopia held its first multi-party elections in May 1995. The EPRDF won this and all other subsequent elections, bringing stability and economic growth but restricting political dissent and media and civic freedoms for most of its time in power. The EPRDF was disbanded in December 2019  Ethnic Tigrayans, a minority, wielded outsized influence during most of the EPRDF’s rule, fostering resentment among the considerably larger Amhara and, in particular, Oromo ethnic groups. Meles Zenawi, a Tigrayan who led the removal of the Derg, served as prime minister from 1995 until his death in 2012. Zenawi was succeeded by his deputy, Hailemariam Desalegn, an ethnic Wolayta — Ethiopia’s first peaceful transition of power in modern times.

    Large-scale anti-government protests beginning in 2014, centred in Oromia and, later, Amhara states, prompted the declaration of a State of Emergency, under which over 20,000 people were arrested and 1,000 killed (see 2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency). Protesters demanded greater political rights, leading to the resignation, in February 2018, of Prime Minister Desalegn. His successor and current prime minister, Abiy Ahmed (appointed in April 2018), embarked on an ambitious reform agenda, and the human rights situation has improved significantly under his watch. Among other reforms, Abiy has lifted restrictions on freedom of expression, released political prisoners, removed terrorist designations of previously-exiled opposition groups, expanded the space for civil society, and initiated reform of legislation used previously to arrest and prosecute government critics. In parallel, Abiy has pursued high-profile diplomatic initiatives across East Africa. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for his peacebuilding efforts with Eritrea, culminating in the signing of an agreement to formally end their war. Abiy is Ethiopia’s first prime minister from the Oromo ethnic group.

    After an initial period where violence subsided significantly, ethno-nationalism, inter-ethnic clashes and associated displacement again increased, though not nearly to the levels witnessed preceding Abiy’s election. Abiy’s reform agenda has met some resistance, and his government was the subject of a purported coup attempt in June 2019. Abiy had committed to holding free and fair elections in 2020, although these have been postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak in the country. Abiy declared a five-month State of Emergency on 8 April 2020 in response to the outbreak. The State of Emergency, while valid only until September 2020, limits some human rights, particularly those around association and movement. While these reflect the types of restrictions in place internationally, there is scope for abuse. However, the response has generally been accepted as necessary by opposition parties who see it as proportionate to the threat posed by COVID-19.

    DEMOGRAPHY

    The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) estimates Ethiopia’s population at 110 million, with an average annual growth rate of 2.5 per cent in the period 2010-2019. Among African countries, only Nigeria is more populous. Ethiopia’s population is concentrated in the north and centre of the country (the ‘Ethiopian highlands’). Ethiopia has a young population — around 70 per cent is under the age of 30 (including nearly 40 per cent under 14). Only 4 per cent of Ethiopians are aged 65 or older. The median age is 18. Approximately 80 per cent of the population lives in rural areas.

    Ethiopia is ethnically and linguistically diverse, comprising more than 80 different ethnic groups and 100 languages. According to the most recent national census (2007), 10 ethnic groups have a population of 1 million people or more. The Oromo constitute the single largest, at 34.5 per cent of the population, followed by the Amhara (26.9 per cent), Somali (6.2 per cent), Tigrayan (6.1 per cent), Sidama (4 per cent) and Gurage (2.5 per cent) peoples. More recent figures are unavailable — a new census has been postponed repeatedly, most recently in 2019 (owing to large-scale internal displacement). Amharic is the official national language, although the government flagged in March 2020 its intention to grant similar status to the Oromiffa, Afar, Somali and Tigrinya languages. These languages already enjoy official status in the regional states in which they predominate. English is widely taught and spoken.

    Oromia is the most populous of Ethiopia’s states, with around 37 per cent of the total population, followed by Amhara (23.3 per cent) and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP – 20.4 per cent). Somali and Tigray states, respectively, account for 6 per cent and 5.8 per cent of Ethiopia’s population. Addis Ababa is Ethiopia’s largest city, with a population of around 4.5 million. As Ethiopia’s administrative and commercial capital, Addis Ababa attracts migrants from across the country and has a multi-ethnic character. Inter-ethnic marriage is common in Addis Ababa and urban centres. It is less common in rural areas.

    POLITICAL SYSTEM

    Ethiopia’s current constitution was adopted in December 1994 and came into force in August 1995. It established a federal system of regional states delineated according to settlement patterns, language and identity (i.e. ethnicity). This method of delineation essentially makes Ethiopia an ‘ethnic federation’, whereby the largest ethnic groups administer their own states and operate with considerable autonomy from the federal government.

    Ethiopia had nine states at the time of publication: (1) Afar; (2) Amhara; (3) Benishangul-Gumuz; (4) Gambela; (5) Harari; (6) Oromia; (7) Somali; (8) SNNP; and (9) Tigray. A 10th state, for the Sidama people, is in the process of being established, following the successful passage of a referendum on regional statehood in November 2019 (see Security Situation). States have their own legislative assemblies (kilili); its members are popularly elected. Under the constitution, states have the authority to, inter alia, enact and implement state laws; formulate economic, social and development policies; administer land and other natural resources in accordance with federal laws; levy and collect taxes and administer a state budget; and establish and administer a state police force. For administrative purposes, states are divided into districts (woredas) and neighbourhoods (kebeles). A kebele is the smallest unit of local government in Ethiopia. Representatives of woredas and kebeles are popularly elected. The federal government administers Addis Ababa (in addition to being the federal capital, Addis Ababa is the capital of surrounding Oromia State), Dira Dawa and Harar.

    Ethiopia has a bicameral federal parliament, consisting of the House of Peoples’ Representatives (lower chamber, 547 seats) and the House of the Federation (upper chamber, 153 seats). Members of the House of Peoples’ Representatives are elected by popular vote to five-year terms. State assemblies elect members of the House of the Federation, also to five-year terms. The constitution mandates that each recognised ‘Nation, Nationality, and People’ of Ethiopia be represented by one member in the House of the Federation, and one additional member for every million people of its population.

    The President is the head of state, and is elected jointly by both chambers of parliament to a six-year term (for a maximum of two terms). The incumbent, H.E. Mrs Sahle Work-Zewde, was elected in October 2018. The role of president is largely ceremonial. Most power is vested in the prime minister, who serves as the head of government and commander-in-chief of the national armed forces. The prime minister is chosen by the party with most seats in parliament. It is a constitutional requirement to hold national and state elections every five years.

    Political parties have existed in Ethiopia since the overthrow of the Derg in 1991, although the ability of parties not belonging to, or affiliated with, the EPRDF to operate freely was circumscribed. The EPRDF and affiliated parties controlled all tiers of government from 1991 to December 2019, when the EPRDF dissolved and reorganised as the Ethiopian Prosperity Party. The EPRDF was a coalition of four parties representing Ethiopia’s most powerful ethnic communities: (1) the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which founded the EPRDF and led the ouster of the Derg; (2) the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), formerly the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation, or OPDO; (3) the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), formerly the Amhara National Democratic Movement, or ANDM; and (4) the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM). The EPRDF had an estimated 8 million members.

    The EPRDF was overwhelmingly voted into power in 1995, Ethiopia’s first democratic election. It was re-elected in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015, although international observers alleged voter irregularities in these elections. Opposition parties made significant gains at the 2005 election, winning 174 of 547 seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives (the EPRDF took 327 seats) on a record voter turnout of 90 per cent. Opposition parties, led by the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD, also known as Qinjit), disputed the result and launched large-scale protests in Addis Ababa. These turned violent — clashes with government forces left nearly 200 protesters dead. Around 4,000 people were arrested, including opposition leaders. In response, the EPRDF restricted the space for political opposition. In July 2007, 30 opposition leaders were handed life sentences for their participation in the 2005 protests, but were immediately pardoned. In 2009, parliament adopted the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (the ATP), under which large numbers of political opponents, journalists and activists were arrested, effectively hobbling political opposition to the EPRDF (see also Political Opinion (Actual or imputed)). The EPRDF and affiliated parties won 546 of 547 seats in the 2010 national election, and all 547 seats in the 2015 election. The EPRDF and affiliated parties won 1,966 of 1,987 seats in the 2015 regional elections, thus retaining control of all states. National and regional elections were scheduled for 29 August 2020, but have been postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak.

    Ethiopia has witnessed significant changes in the political operating environment since April 2018. Restrictions on political opposition have eased significantly since April 2018, and political parties are able to operate more freely, particularly in Addis Ababa. To date, over 130 political parties have declared their intention to contest the forthcoming national election. Most are organised along ethnic lines.

    In June 2018, federal parliament removed Ginbot 7 (Amharic for ‘May 15’, the date of the disputed 2005 election), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) from its list of terrorist organisations. The parties, which maintained armed wings and were committed to the overthrow of the EPRDF through militant means from their bases in Eritrea, were designated as terrorist organisations in June 2011. Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF have since returned from exile and now participate in the political process. Other major opposition movements include the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (also known as Medrek) and Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (known as Ezema). Medrek is a coalition of four parties: the Ethiopian Socialist Democratic Party (ESDP), the Arena for Sovereignty and Democracy, the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). Ezema was formed in May 2019 through the merger of several opposition parties, including Ginbot 7, the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), the Semayawi Party (known as the Blue Party) and Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ, also known as Andinet, the successor party of the CUD/Qinjit). Some political parties promote openly nationalist platforms. Ezema is one of the few political parties that is not ethnic based.

    The Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP), formed in December 2019, merged into a single national party three of the four parties that previously formed the EPRDF (the ODP, ADP and SEPDM). The EPP also includes the former Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), the Benishangul-Gumuz People’s Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF), the Ethiopian Somali People’s Democratic Party (ESPDP), the Gambela People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM) and the Harari National League (HNL). The ANDP, BGPDUF, ESPDP, GPDM and HNL previously governed Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, Gambela and Harari states, respectively. They were affiliated to – but not formally part of – the EPRDF. Prime Minister Abiy justified the formation of the Ethiopian Prosperity Party on national unity grounds, claiming it would buttress efforts to move away from ethnic-based identity politics and toward ‘pan-Ethiopianism’. The TPLF, which traditionally dominated decision-making within the EPRDF but felt marginalised under Abiy, opposed the merger and refused to join the EPP. The TPLF is seeking new alliances ahead of the next elections. These elections were planned for August 2020 but have now been indefinitely postponed due to COVID-19.

    Parliament adopted a new electoral law in August 2019. Among other things, the law bars serving public servants from contesting elections and increases the threshold for the formation of political parties. Under the new law, 10,000 signatures are required to form a national political party (up from 1,500), and 4,000 signatures for a regional party (up from 750). The law also establishes a framework for resolving electoral disputes countrywide. In March 2019, 107 political parties signed a code of conduct with the federal government to work towards free and fair elections in 2020. The Abiy Government has sought to strengthen the independence of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). In November 2018, it appointed Birtukan Mideksa – a high-profile dissident who previously led the UDJ and was imprisoned for her role in the 2005 protests – as NEBE Chair. On 31 March 2020, NEBE announced it could not hold general elections as scheduled on 29 August 2020 due to the COVID-19 outbreak. Constitutionally, elections must be held by the end of the Ethiopian Calendar year on 6 September 2020. Having declared this no longer possible, the Government is consulting opposition parties, and assessing its constitutional options.

    DFAT assesses there has been a shift toward political plurality since April 2018. DFAT assesses there is a level of political commitment at the federal level to open the space for opposition political parties and to stage free and fair multi-party elections when possible. Opposition parties were actively preparing for the August 2020 elections before they were postponed but the pressure put on the system by the COVID-19 pandemic, along with the drought and locust plague, will test Abiy’s commitment to Ethiopia’s new principles, and opposition parties’ commitment to collaboration.

    HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK

    Article 10 of the constitution stipulates human rights and freedoms are inviolable and inalienable, and all human and democratic rights of Ethiopia’s citizens (and peoples) shall be respected. The constitution recognises the right to freedom of thought, expression, assembly, association, conscience and religion.

    Ethiopia is a State Party to seven of the nine core international human rights treaties: the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (and its optional protocols on the involvement of children in armed conflict and the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography); and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Ethiopia is not a signatory to the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Article 9 of the constitution stipulates that all international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land.

    Chapter Three of the constitution sets out a series of fundamental rights and freedoms, including: the right to life, security of person and liberty; a prohibition against inhuman treatment; freedom of religion, belief and opinion; the right of assembly, demonstration and petition; freedom of association; and freedom of movement. In practice, application of these provisions has been uneven, particularly before April 2018, when laws such as the ATP were widely used to detain government critics (see Political Opinion (Actual or imputed) and Media). The human rights situation has improved significantly since April 2018, and parliament adopted a revised ATP on 2 January 2020. The new legislation is significantly more human rights-compliant than the 2009 proclamation but has still drawn criticism from groups, including Amnesty International (see Political Opinion (Actual or Imputed)).

    Ethiopia participated in the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process in 2009, 2014 and 2019. Of the 327 recommendations it received as part of its most recent UPR (May 2019), Ethiopia accepted 270. It has committed to reviewing visit requests from UN special procedure mandate holders. The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression visited Ethiopia in December 2019 — the first visit by a special procedure mandate holder since 2006. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights visited Ethiopia in May 2017 and April 2018.

    Ethiopian Human Rights Commission

    The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was established in 2000 with a mandate to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the constitution. This includes advising the federal government on the compliance of national laws with international human rights standards; delivering training to the military, police, prison officials and public servants; and monitoring federal and regional prisons, including through unannounced visits. The EHRC has the power to investigate allegations of human rights violations that are not currently before the courts, including by summoning parties and analysing evidence, and to make recommendations to relevant state institutions. The EHRC has branches in every regional state. It also operates legal aid centres in collaboration with universities and civil society. The EHRC receives government funding and is accountable to parliament, which appoints its commissioners. Traditionally, the EHRC has lacked capacity and independence and rarely investigated alleged human rights violations by government forces. A local source told DFAT that the EHRC had not lived up to its mandate.

    The Global Alliance for National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) assesses the EHRC as being partially compliant with the Paris Principles, the international standard for national human rights institutions (the EHRC was last assessed in 2013). In making its assessment, the GANHRI noted that the EHRC had not provided any advice to the government on laws that impact on human rights, including the ATP and the Charities and Societies Proclamation (2009) (see Human Rights Organisations).

    The EHRC has a complaints mechanism, and receives about 1,000 complaints annually. These range from domestic violence, workplace discrimination and labour disputes to enforced disappearances, ill treatment in detention and mass killings. DFAT understands the EHRC plans to publish its findings from all future investigations. Budgetary constraints are an ongoing challenge, and hamper its ability to attract and retain qualified staff, and, in turn, to monitor and investigate complaints of human rights violations.

    The current federal government has undertaken to reform and strengthen the capacity and independence of the EHRC. It is reviewing the law establishing the EHRC, with a view to strengthening its mandate. The review is ongoing. A new Chief Commissioner, Daniel Bekele, was appointed in July 2019. Bekele is a high-profile human rights activist who was jailed for his work with the NGO Action Aid Ethiopia and, following his release, went into exile, where he held senior positions at Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

    SECURITY SITUATION

    The security situation has deteriorated in parts of the country since 2018. Inter-ethnic clashes – invariably over land and other resources – have increased significantly, particularly in the West Guji Zone of Oromia State and along the Oromia-Somali, Oromia-Benishangul-Gumuz, and Amhara-Tigray state borders.

    Inter-ethnic clashes have caused death, the destruction of property and large-scale internal displacement — Ethiopia recorded the most conflict-related internal displacement in the world in 2018 (see Internally- Displaced People). Ethnic militias have proliferated in the states, and weapons are readily available. Addis Ababa has largely been immune from this instability to date. Inter-ethnic clashes along the border between Oromia and Somali states have displaced more than 1 million people since 2017. Clashes have subsided, but continue to flare up sporadically. In August 2018, the
    federal government deployed forces to quell riots in Jijiga, the capital of Somali State, and surrounding areas. The riots were triggered by the arrest of the state president, and involved the targeting of non-Somalis and Christians (see Religion). At least 30 people died and 140,000 were displaced. Youths loyal to the former state president, belonging to a group called the Heego, were behind the riots. The security situation in Somali State has improved significantly since (see Somalis). In February 2019, federal parliament adopted a proclamation establishing a national reconciliation commission to promote dialogue and encourage resolution of inter-ethnic disputes.

    The return from exile of previously-banned groups and individuals has catalysed unrest in Oromia State. In September 2018, the return of the OLF provoked intra-Oromo clashes and the targeting of homes and businesses belonging to non-Oromos. At least 70 people were killed and 15,000 displaced. The OLF has yet to disarm completely, and some OLF factions engage in armed clashes with government forces, particularly in western areas of Oromia State. Armed OLF factions have reportedly engaged in criminal activities, including extorting businesses and conducting bank robberies in western Oromia. In October 2019, at least 86 people died during riots triggered by claims – made via Facebook – that the federal government was endangering the personal security of Jawar Mohammed, a prominent Oromo activist and founder of the Oromo Media Network (OMN). Jawar, an advocate for greater rights for the Oromo people who was previously allied to Prime Minister Abiy (but who is now a prominent critic), helped organise from his US base the 2014-18 protests that precipitated the resignation of the previous government. Jawar returned to Ethiopia in August 2018.

    Jawar was rearrested on 30 June 2020 during renewed unrest, chiefly in Oromia State but also in the capital Addis Ababa. The unrest followed the 29 June murder of popular Oromo singer and activist Hachalu Hundessa, a former political prisoner who rose to become one of the country’s biggest music stars and a voice for the Oromo ethnic group. International media reported that more than 230 people, including almost a dozen members of the security forces, were killed in the unrest, and an internet blackout was imposed. Nearly 5,000 people were arrested on various charges, including several prominent Oromo leaders and journalists, among them Jawar. The Attorney-General announced that the premises of three media outlets (including Jawar’s Oromia Media Network) had been searched on suspicion of ‘incitement to racial or religious hatred’. The Prime Minister’s Office stated in a press release on 10 July 2020 that, ‘contrary to erroneous reporting’, calm had returned to Addis Ababa and affected areas of Oromia State.

    In June 2019, the chief of staff of the National Defence Force (head of the military), General Seare Mekonnen, and the president of Amhara State, Ambachew Mekonnen, were assassinated in concurrent events in Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar (Amhara State). Both were allied to Prime Minister Abiy, who characterised the assassinations as a failed coup attempt. The alleged ringleader, Brigadier General Asaminew Tsige, the chief of security in Amhara State, was killed by government forces. Tsige, who had advocated for greater regional autonomy, had been pardoned and released from prison in 2018 (he was serving a life sentence for his alleged involvement in a failed 2009 coup attempt by Ginbot 7). Federal government forces were deployed to Amhara State and Addis Ababa, and a weeklong internet blackout was imposed nationally, in the wake of the alleged coup. Abiy was earlier the subject of a grenade attack at a progovernment rally in Addis Ababa. The authorities described the June 2018 incident as a failed assassination attempt, and five people were charged with terrorism offences. The attack killed two people and injured more than 100.

    SNNP experienced major civil unrest in July 2019, after the federal government delayed a referendum on whether the Sidama people – the largest ethnic group in SNNP and the fifth-largest in Ethiopia overall – should secede from SNNP and create their own regional state. Clashes between Sidama protesters and government forces ensued, and ethnic minorities were targeted, leaving over 50 people dead. A State of Emergency was put in place in SNNP (though never publicly declared) and the military and federal police were deployed to restore order. The situation in SNNP has since stabilised. A referendum was held in November 2019, where the Sidama voted overwhelmingly in favour of regional statehood (the process of establishing a separate state for the Sidama was ongoing at the time of publication). SNNP is the most diverse of Ethiopia’s states, comprising over 45 ethnic groups. At least 10 other ethnic groups, including the Wolayta, have since flagged their intention to pursue their own regional states, a right guaranteed by the constitution (see Race/Nationality).

    Border areas with neighbouring countries are extremely unstable. Non-state armed groups, including bandits, operate along Ethiopia’s borders with Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. Inter-tribal clashes, including across national borders, and skirmishes between non-state armed groups and government forces are common in these areas (in April 2016, members of the Murle people in South Sudan attacked a number of villages in Gambela State, killing 200 people). The risk of violent robbery and kidnapping in border areas is high. The terrorist group Al-Shabaab, based in Somalia, reportedly maintains a presence in areas close to the Ethiopian border.

    DFAT assesses that, outside of national and state border areas, the government controls the security situation, and Ethiopia tends to be safer than most of its neighbours. DFAT assesses Addis Ababa to be particularly stable, and it continues to attract migrants from other parts of the country in search of economic opportunities. Nevertheless, the rule of law has deteriorated in some regional states and several non-state armed groups have emerged to advance the interests of their ethnic group. The situation along regional state borders can be particularly unstable. DFAT assesses that, with Ethiopia’s democratic opening presenting opportunities for the expression of previously-suppressed historical grievances and ethnic-based clashes increasing across the country, people who constitute ethnic minorities in regional states face a growing risk of physical violence. This risk is more pronounced during times of civil unrest.

    RACE/NATIONALITY

    Article 25 of the constitution stipulates all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection regardless of race, nationality, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status. Article 46 of the constitution provides the basis for Ethiopia’s states to be delimited ‘on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned’. In effect, this involves the creation of states that are broadly consistent with the geographic locations of major ethnic groups. Traditionally, ethnically-motivated societal violence has been rare, although ethnic-based clashes have increased since 2018 (see Security Situation), fuelled largely by competition for resources and enabled, in part, by the lifting of restrictions on freedom of expression and an associated rise in hate speech and misinformation (see Media). With the exception of the ethnic Anuak people of Gambela State, most ethnic groups in Ethiopia are indistinguishable by their physical appearance, partly as a result of inter-marriage.

    Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic society, and ethnic groups enjoy extensive rights. Under the Ethiopian Constitution every ‘nation, nationality and people’ (a reference to all ethnic groupings which constitute Ethiopia) has the right to speak their language and promote their culture. Every nation, nationality and people also has the constitutional right to self-determination, including the right to regional statehood within Ethiopia’s federal system — a right recently asserted by the Sidama (see Security Situation). Several conditions must be met for regional statehood, including: approval by a two-thirds majority of the members of the relevant state legislature; and a majority vote in a referendum organised by the federal government (the referendum must be organised within one-year of the request for regional statehood being received).

    All major ethnic groups are represented in the federal government and bureaucracy, and political parties represent the interests of Ethiopia’s various ethnic groups. DFAT assesses official discrimination – including systematic state-sanctioned discrimination, denial of public services and higher detention rates – based on race and/or ethnicity is rare. This assessment is consistent with the constitutional prohibitions on discrimination, and reflects the need for governments to maintain their legitimacy through inclusiveness, given Ethiopia’s ethnic diversity. Different ethnic groups have a history of co-existence in Addis Ababa, and discrimination on ethnic grounds is not common there. One source described ethnicity as a ‘non-factor’ in Addis Ababa — most people consider themselves from Addis Ababa as opposed to a particular ethnic group. Violence based on ethnicity is not common in Addis Ababa, but is a growing concern in regional states. Interethnic relations have deteriorated since 2018, and DFAT assesses the situation for ethnic minorities at the regional state-level is increasingly challenging, and they face a growing risk of violence at the hands of the majority community.

    Societal discrimination based on ethnicity can occur, but is predominantly in the form of positive discrimination in favour of a particular ethnic group rather than active discrimination against people of a different race or ethnicity. Official policies can limit opportunities for some groups; for example, the use of Oromiffa as the language of instruction in schools in Oromia State can limit opportunities for ethnic Oromos in the public sector if they do not also speak Amharic and English. Similarly, ethnic groups that constitute a minority within regional states are at a disadvantage from a linguistic perspective, insofar as their languages do not enjoy official status in those states.

    Amharas

    The Amhara people are the second-largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, at 26.9 per cent of the population. While they reside predominantly in Amhara State, ethnic Amharas are present throughout Ethiopia, with significant populations in Oromia and SNNP states (2 million and 420,000, respectively). Nearly 1.3 million Amharas were residing in Addis Ababa at the time of the 2007 census, making them the single-largest ethnic group in the capital. Most Amharas are Orthodox Christian. Their language, Amharic, is the official national language. The Amhara governed Ethiopia for the longest period before the EPRDF came to power in 1991, including during military rule and the era of the monarchy. Like the Oromo, the Amhara felt marginalised by the Tigray under the EPRDF, and protests in Amhara State helped catalyse the resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn in February 2018. Similarly to the Oromo, Amhara nationalism has increased with Ethiopia’s democratic opening and lifting of restrictions on freedom of expression.

    The Amhara are represented politically at the federal level, including in the current federal government and the senior ranks of the public service and the military (until recently Amharic was the sole working language of the federal bureaucracy). Roughly a quarter of lower house members in Federal Parliament are elected from Amhara State. The current federal president is an ethnic Amhara, and the Amhara were second only to the Oromo in their representation in the Council of Ministers at the time of publication. Political parties representing Amhara interests are active. DFAT assesses the arrest of Amharas during the 2014-18 anti-government protests was not ethnically motivated, but reflected the then-federal government’s sensitivity to political opposition. DFAT assesses Amharas face a low risk of official discrimination based on their ethnicity, including with respect to employment in the public sector. The Amhara have been the subject of ethnic-based attacks in states where they do not constitute a majority, particularly in Benishangul-Gumuz. DFAT assesses that, like most other groups, Amharas face a moderate risk of violence in areas or states where they are a minority.

    POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED)

    The constitution enshrines extensive protections in relation to political opinion. Article 25 provides for equality under the law, without discrimination on the grounds of political or other opinion; Article 29 provides for freedom of expression; Article 30 provides for freedom of assembly, peaceful demonstration and petition; Article 31 provides for freedom of association; and Article 38 provides for the right to vote, be elected and be a member of a political organisation regardless of colour, race, nation, nationality, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion. Organisations formed in violation of appropriate laws and/or with the intent to subvert the constitutional order are prohibited. Organisers of large public gatherings must notify the authorities 48 hours in advance and obtain a permit.

    In practice, political freedoms were significantly curtailed before April 2018. Members of opposition groups, human rights activists, and independent commentators such as journalists and bloggers who opposed the government’s policies were regularly harassed and detained. The ATP was used extensively to restrict political freedoms and arrest and prosecute government critics, particularly individuals with suspected affiliations to proscribed groups Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF. Against this background, many opposition leaders and dissidents left Ethiopia. Individuals who were not members of the EPRDF reportedly faced discrimination in public sector employment, including impediments to career progression. Antigovernment protests were often dispersed through force, and participants arrested.

    Freedom of political expression has expanded since 2018. More than 10,000 political prisoners have been released since 2018 (a process initiated by the Desalegn Government), including senior opposition leaders Andargachew Tsege of Ginbot 7 and Merera Gudina and Bekele Gerba of the OFC. In June 2018, parliament lifted its terrorist designations of Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF. These groups subsequently renounced armed struggle and returned to Ethiopia, where they operate as registered political parties. In July 2018, federal parliament amnestied thousands of individuals charged with treason and other crimes against the state. This has enabled high-profile opposition figures, including Berhanu Nega of Ginbot 7, to return from exile and resume their political activities. According to the federal government, over 13,000 people have been released under the amnesty law. Political opposition parties now operate with greater freedom, although some report intimidation and obstacles to holding rallies due to a lack of protection in regional states. In January and February 2020, over 100 OLF supporters were reportedly arrested across Oromia State, while some members of the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) – an opposition party formed in 2018 that espouses Amhara nationalism – were detained in connection to the alleged coup attempt in June 2019 (see Security Situation). DFAT is unable to verify if these arrests were politically motivated. A local source involved in politics told DFAT they were able to express their political views freely without fear of arrest and prosecution. Anti-government protests are common — in January 2020, largescale anti-government protests took place in Amhara State in relation to the abduction of 27 ethnic Amhara university students in Oromia State. Protesters accused Prime Minister Abiy of not doing enough to secure the students’ release.

    In June 2018, the government established an Advisory Council for Legal and Justice Affairs comprising independent legal professionals to review and recommend reforms to laws that had been used to restrict political, civic and press freedoms (namely, the ATP, the Charities and Societies Proclamation, and the Freedom of Information and Mass Media Proclamation). The Advisory Council has a three-year mandate. The Charities and Societies Proclamation was repealed and replaced by the Organization of Civil Society Proclamation in February 2019 (see Human Rights Organisations). The new law is in operation, and has been well received by civil society organisations. A revision of the ATP was adopted on 2 January 2020. It is a significant improvement on the previous ATP but has still drawn criticism from civil society groups, including Amnesty International, who fear it could still be used against those critical of government. Replacement legislation for the Freedom of Information and Mass Media Proclamation was before federal parliament at the time of publication. While these laws remain in force, they have been used only sporadically since April 2018.

    Human rights organisations have particularly welcomed the government’s commitment to review and revise the ATP, which was widely considered to fall short of international human rights standards. The old ATP contained a broad definition of ‘terrorist acts’, and was used extensively to arrest and prosecute critics of government policy before April 2018. Under the ATP, detainees could be held without charge for 28-day periods up to a maximum period of four months. In practice, many were held for considerably longer. Bail was not available for persons charged with terrorism offences. Those charged under the ATP can face up to 20 years’ imprisonment.

    Under the new ATP, a person must incite terrorist acts to be prosecuted (rather than simply ‘encouraging terrorism’) and workers’ rights to strike have been strengthened (illegal strikes that affected public services used to be classed as terrorist acts). However, Amnesty International believes opportunities to abuse power still remain. For example, the proclamation criminalises ‘intimidation to commit a terrorist act’.

    According to the federal government, about 300 people were arrested in connection to the alleged coup attempt in June 2018 (see Security Situation). DFAT understands a significantly higher number of people were arrested, including activists, journalists, government officials and members of the NaMA. The majority of arrests occurred in Amhara State; over 40 were detained in Addis Ababa. Most were subsequently released, including 22 in October 2019. A total of 58 people (45 in Amhara State and 13 in Addis Ababa) were charged under the ATP. In February 2020, the federal government said it had dropped charges ‘for the national good’ against some individuals – including NaMA members – suspected of involvement in the alleged attempt, as part of a broader pardon of high-profile detainees.

    Local sources told DFAT that, traditionally, being a member of the EPRDF increased one’s chances of gaining employment in the public sector and earning subsequent promotions, including in the judiciary, police, and public schools and universities. DFAT heard anecdotally that, while the practice of ruling party members being advantaged in public sector employment and promotions persisted, it was not as pronounced under the current federal government.

    DFAT assesses tolerance for political dissent has increased considerably since April 2018. Opposition political parties are able to organise and operate significantly more freely, particularly in Addis Ababa, and their members face a low risk of harassment, arrest and detention by virtue of their political affiliations and views. DFAT assesses Ethiopians can openly criticise the ruling party.

    2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency

    Ethiopia witnessed large-scale anti-government protests from 2014 to 2018 in Oromia and Amhara states (which, collectively, account for 60 per cent of Ethiopia’s population). The protests began in Oromia State (Ethiopia’s most populous) in April 2014, triggered by the federal government’s plan to expand the municipal boundaries of Addis Ababa into Oromia State, which it abuts. The federal government justified the Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan on the grounds it was necessary to cater for the rapid growth of the capital; critics claimed the encroachment would displace Oromo farmers and result in land seizures. The protests were put down through force, but re-emerged in November 2015. The government scrapped the Master Plan in January 2016; however, protests intensified across Oromia State and evolved into calls for greater political rights and the release of ethnic Oromo political prisoners. The Qeerroo, an Oromo youth movement, was at the forefront of these protests. Parallel protests emerged in neighbouring Amhara State in July 2016 (Ethiopia’s second-most populous state), triggered by historical Amhara grievances over the loss of traditional Amhara land stemming from the demarcation of the border between Amhara and
    Tigray states. Like in Oromia State, the protests in Amhara State morphed into calls for broader reform. The protests in Oromia and Amhara states saw violent confrontations between government forces and protesters, including the use of live bullets.

    The federal government declared a countrywide State of Emergency in October 2016 after protesters torched farms and businesses (a State of Emergency is constitutionally permissible in the event of a breakdown in law and order that threatens the constitutional order and is beyond the capacity of regular law enforcement agencies to control. It must be approved by a two-thirds majority in the House of Peoples’ Representatives within 15 days of being declared). The State of Emergency gave authorities broad powers to detain people and search private property without court orders, limit travel and the right to association and protest, and impose curfews and media restrictions (including on social media). The practical effect of the State of Emergency was to formalise and expand practices that were largely already in place. The State of Emergency was lifted in August 2017, but reinstated in February 2018, following the resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn. The State of Emergency was subsequently lifted in June 2018, two months ahead of
    schedule.

    DFAT understands the authorities arrested and detained around 26,000 people under the State of Emergency. This number includes journalists, bloggers, opposition party members and large numbers of people who were thought to have participated in anti-government protests, including children. Arrests and detentions were not limited to protest organisers or high-profile opponents of the government. Large numbers of detainees were subjected to a ‘rehabilitation and re-education’ program, mostly low profile participants who were released following their completion of the program (see Arbitrary Arrest and Detention). Some of those arrested under the State of Emergency claim to have been tortured (see Torture). The majority of those arrested and imprisoned for their participation in the protests have since been released. Over 1,000 civilians are estimated to have died during the course of the protests. Anti-government protests can and do occur.

    DFAT assesses that, since April 2018, participants in peaceful protests face a low risk of arrest and detention. DFAT further assesses that participants in peaceful protests, including organisers, are likely to be of little ongoing interest to the authorities.

    CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR

    PUNISHMENT
    Article 18 of the constitution affords Ethiopians the right to protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 424 of the Criminal Code prohibits treatment of prisoners or suspects ‘in an improper or brutal manner, or in a manner which is incompatible with human dignity’. Such acts are punishable with up to 10 years’ imprisonment.

    In practice, prisoners have reported incidents of physical punishment. There are credible reports of individuals detained in connection to the 2014-18 protests and/or for suspected affiliations to previously outlawed opposition groups being mistreated, including being subjected to beatings, overcrowding, extreme heat, lack of water and solitary confinement. The current federal government has committed to addressing such abuses as part of its wide-reaching reform agenda (see Detention and Prison).

    Arbitrary Arrest and Detention

    The constitution stipulates that no person may be subject to arbitrary arrest and detained without charge or conviction. Under the Criminal Code, ‘unlawful arrest or detention’ is punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment. In practice, before April 2018 critics of the federal government were regularly detained on arbitrary grounds and often held for extended periods without charge. Under the State of Emergency, effective from October 2016-August 2017 and then from February-June 2018, authorities were allowed to arrest and detain individuals without a court warrant and hold detainees for longer than proscribed under normal regulations. According to the US Department of State, security forces went door-to-door after some protests, and arrested and arbitrarily detained opposition party members and supporters, whom they accused of inciting violence.

    There are fewer reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions since the change in federal government in April 2018 and the lifting of the State of Emergency. Some members of the OLF and the NaMA claim to have been the subject of arbitrary arrest and detention (in connection to the failed June 2019 coup attempt in the case of the NaMA) (see Political Opinion (Actual or Imputed)).

    In September 2018, security forces detained 3,000 people in Oromia State and Addis Ababa in response to rising criminality. Those arrested included individuals found gambling and – despite not constituting criminal offences– smoking shisha (a tobacco mix smoked in a water pipe) and consuming khat. Most were subsequently released.

    Successive governments have detained people – primarily youth – for ‘rehabilitation and re-education’ purposes in military-run camps. This includes people involved in the 2014-18 protests. About 1,200 people – detained in connection to the September 2018 unrest in Oromia State that accompanied the return from exile of the OLF – were sent for rehabilitation at a military facility. Most have since completed their rehabilitation and been released. Rehabilitation occurs outside of the judicial process — those undergoing rehabilitation are not charged and prosecuted. Amnesty International reports that rehabilitation processes continued throughout 2019. DFAT understands rehabilitation can last between one and several months, and includes education and physical exercise components. DFAT understands that rehabilitation does not involve torture or other forms of ill-treatment. Those undergoing rehabilitation are released without charge on completion of their program. The authorities claim rehabilitation boosts the employment prospects of those who undergo it and supports national unity.

    STATE PROTECTION

    Ethiopia has an extensive security and intelligence apparatus, a legacy of its previous political systems. The state exercises control over most of the country, and it has largely been effective in maintaining law and order and protecting the population from major crimes, including terrorism. The security and intelligence apparatus was used in the past to monitor and suppress dissent, and had a history of using force to quell instances of unrest, including large-scale anti-government protests.

    Prime Minister Abiy has sought to impose greater discipline and accountability on the security forces, including by punishing past wrongdoings, as part of broader efforts to strengthen the professionalism and civilian oversight of the security forces (local sources claim this has had a deterrent effect on government forces). According to the national report it submitted ahead of its most recent UPR (May 2019), the federal government is developing legislation on police use of force and accountability, and plans to establish an independent mechanism to which complaints of ill-treatment by security and law enforcement authorities can be submitted, but this is not yet legislated. Regional state governments are making parallel efforts to reform law enforcement at the
    state level. A proliferation of ethnic-based militias since 2018 has challenged state authority and eroded the rule of law in some parts of the country, particularly in western Oromia State.

    Government forces have shown greater restraint toward protesters since April 2018. Local sources told DFAT that non-state actors now posed a greater threat to safety than did government forces. In a report presented to federal parliament in January 2020, the EHRC claimed that human rights violations committed by government forces had declined, with most violations now perpetrated by non-state actors.

    DFAT assesses that, overall, federal and regional security forces are largely effective at maintaining law and order and in providing protection from threats by non-state actors, particularly in major urban centres. However, DFAT assesses that the emergence of armed, invariably ethnic-based non-state actors has increasingly challenged the state’s monopoly on the use of force and its concomitant ability to provide protection in remote areas and along borders separating Ethiopia’s regional states.

    Intelligence Services

    Ethiopia has a highly capable domestic intelligence system. The NISS is an autonomous federal government office, in theory accountable to the Minister for Peace, but in practice directly accountable to the prime minister. While reliable data on the size of the NISS is not available, it is broadly considered to have a strong capacity to monitor the activities of persons of interest in Ethiopia, and high priority areas along its borders. A civilian monitoring and reporting system supports the intelligence network, whereby individuals report on the activities of others in their community or household. The current federal government is working to strengthen the NISS’ independence from political interference. Abiy replaced the NISS’ senior leadership in June 2018, and over 30 senior NISS officials, including its former deputy head, have been arrested for allegedly overseeing human rights violations of prisoners and suspects, including abduction and torture (NISS’ former head has also been charged, but evaded arrest to date). Under proposed legislation currently before parliament, the NISS will be renamed the National Information Center.

    The federal government operates a separate cyber-intelligence and security organisation, the Information Network Security Agency (INSA). INSA’s role includes investigating threats to national security, combatting cyber-crime and preventing cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure.

    The Ethiopian intelligence agencies are highly capable. DFAT assesses that individuals considered a threat to national security are unlikely to escape their attention within Ethiopia. Security and intelligence services operate across Ethiopia. DFAT assesses that an individual who is of interest to the authorities is unlikely to be able to avoid attracting official attention by relocating within Ethiopia.

    TREATMENT OF RETURNEES

    Article 32 of the constitution stipulates that Ethiopian nationals have the right to return to the country. Ethiopia has a large diaspora. About 5 million Ethiopians live outside of the country, with large concentrations in the US and the Middle East. Members of the diaspora return to Ethiopia regularly and contribute to the economy, including through remittances. Prime Minister Abiy has encouraged former dissidents to return from abroad and participate in his reform agenda. Many have done so, including members of opposition movements previously designated as terrorist organisations (see Political System).

    DFAT understands there have been instances of individuals who were seeking asylum abroad discontinuing their protection claims and returning to Ethiopia. Some returnees are now active in politics and civil society. Former political prisoners have returned from exile to head the EHRC and the NEBE.

    The authorities have typically welcomed voluntary returnees to Ethiopia, including, since April 2018, government critics and opponents. DFAT assesses that returnees, including failed asylum seekers and/or government critics and opponents, face a low risk of monitoring, harassment, detention and official discrimination. While the authorities have significant intelligence-gathering capabilities and are likely to be aware of major anti-government protest activity undertaken in other countries and online, DFAT assesses that people who openly criticise the ruling party while they are outside of Ethiopia face a low risk of official harm on their return to Ethiopia.

    DFAT assesses that, under the current federal government, failed asylum seekers face a low risk of harm on their return to Ethiopia, including where they sought asylum on political grounds.

    Exit and Entry Procedures

    Ethiopians travelling internationally by air are subject to security and identification checks at the airport, and immigration stations at airports have photograph and fingerprinting facilities. Ethiopian passports are machine-readable and have a range of security features (see Documentation). Biometric security measures linked to national databases apply at formal entry and exit points across the country. The NISS has primary responsibility for intelligence and border security processes.

    An exit visa is not required to depart Ethiopia, and Article 32 of the constitution stipulates that Ethiopian nationals have the right to leave the country at any time. In practice, there have been some instances of individuals being prevented from exiting the country. From 2013 to 2018, Ethiopia prohibited its citizens from travelling to the Gulf region in search of work. The travel ban was imposed to prevent the exploitation and abuse of unskilled and female domestic workers. It was lifted after Ethiopia signed bilateral agreements with several Gulf countries to protect the rights of Ethiopian workers. A Certificate of Good Conduct (‘police clearance certificate’) is required when a person seeks to emigrate from Ethiopia (see Police Clearance Certificates).

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands published a report on Ethiopia in August 2021. That report provides the following information relevant to the applicant’s review:

   Security situation in Tigray (since November 2020)

   Ongoing conflict

   On the night of 3 to 4 November 2020, the conflict began with the attack by TPLF-affiliated troops on the Northern Command’s federal army bases. In response to the attack, ENDF federal troops supported by various groups including Amhara Special Forces and militias (ADF: Amhara Defence Forces) and Eritrean forces invaded Tigray. Prime Minister Abiy said that the purpose of the military operation by the federal troops and allies was to restore the rule of law in the region and the country, and promised to protect civilians. Over three weeks later, on 28 November 2021, the Ethiopian authorities announced that the Tigrayan capital Mekelle had fallen into federal hands. Prime Minister Abiy prematurely declared victory over the TPLF. The Ethiopian authorities stated that the whole of Tigray was accessible again, although some parts could only be visited with a military escort. An Ethiopian general stated in April 2021 that the federal armed forces had completely defeated the TPLF forces.

   At the time of writing of this report, however, the conflict was not yet over. After the Tigrayan troops had first withdrawn to the countryside and to the inhospitable parts of the country (see below), from where the struggle was continued using guerrilla tactics, an offensive was launched in June in which the capital Mekelle was retaken and large parts of Tigray came back under the control of the TDF/TPLF forces. Abiy is reported to have said in April 2021 that it was hard to defeat an ‘enemy hiding among the people’. The Ethiopian government announced a unilateral ceasefire on the day that Mekelle was captured by Tigrayan forces. According to the federal government, the federal troops had withdrawn partly so that a break could be arranged during which the farmers could work their land again. Tigrayan spokesman Getachew Redda called the unilateral ceasefire a ‘joke’: the TDF/TPLF did not accept the ceasefire and continued the offensive.
   …
   May 2021 saw a further concentration of the fighting: except for a few incidents, most of the armed clashes took place in Central and Eastern Tigray. These were also the areas over which the TDF/TPLF still had control at the end of April 2021, according to the University of Ghent map (see Map 2). Confidential sources noted that the ENDF had little influence outside the major roads and towns of the areas under the control of the interim government established by the federal authorities. The TDF/TPLF controlled the countryside and the inhospitable parts of Central and Eastern Tigray. In Western Tigray, Amhara militias and Amhara Special Forces were in charge. According to many sources, the large numbers of Eritrean troops present, especially in the north, take no notice of anyone and do things their own way. According to a confidential source, the TDF/TPLF troops were far from defeated and were in fact becoming more effective.
   That the TDF/TPLF had not been defeated was apparent from the offensive launched by the Tigrayans in mid-June. Mekelle was captured on 28 June 2021. Apart from Western Tigray and the southern parts of North-Western Tigray, there were armed clashes in all parts of Tigray during this offensive in late June 2021, as can be seen on Map 1, which shows events up to the end of June. In the course of July 2021, the TDF/TPLF took parts of Southern Tigray and armed clashes were also said to be taking place in Western Tigray between the Amhara forces and the TDF/TPLF. The conflict also extended beyond Tigray’s regional borders: the TDF/TPLF invaded parts of Afar and Amhara… At the time of writing of this report, the conflict was still in progress, both in Tigray and beyond, in the Amhara and Afar regions.
   Due to the TDF/TPLF offensive, Abiy Ahmed called on the different regions to join him in the struggle against the TDF/TPLF. The regions of Oromia, SNNPR, Afar, Somali Regional State and Sidama, among others, are said to have responded to the request and sent regional forces to Tigray. The regional presidents of Afar and Amhara called on the inhabitants of their regions to take up arms against the TDF/TPLF. On 10 August 2021, Abiy called on all fit Ethiopian citizens to join the armed forces in order to stop the Tigrayan forces. It is not known to what extent citizens have heeded the appeal by the regional presidents and Prime Minister Abiy. However, a large part of the Ethiopian population seems to back the Ethiopian Prime Minister in his fight against the TDF/TPLF given the many demonstrations in the country, especially in the capital, but also in other regions, showing support for the federal government. A confidential source commented that support for the struggle among the Ethiopian population was not strong and that the demonstrations were largely staged.
   …

   Civilian deaths

   The number of incidents in which the armed parties used violence against civilians also shows a downward trend after the start of the conflict. It should be noted that a disproportionate number of civilian casualties occurred in November compared to other months. These are mainly attributable to the incidents that took place in Mai Kadra (also known as May Cadera or Moya Khadra) and Aksum (also called Axum) in November 2020. Another incident that explains the high number of civilian casualties in November 2020 is the events in Aksum at the end of November, when Eritrean troops reportedly caused a large number of civilian casualties. Although the number of civilian casualties has shown a downward trend since the start of the conflict in November 2020, the food shortages experienced by the population are expected to claim more and more victims. Hunger is reportedly being used by the federal government and allies as a weapon against the Tigrayan population.
   Following the TDF/TPLF offensive, there has been an increase in reporting of civilian casualties. After the withdrawal of federal forces from Tigray at the end of June 2021, the Raya Rayuma Democratic Party81 reported that the TDF/TPLF was involved in the killing of civilians suspected of collaborating with the interim government established by the federal government. In July and August 2021, there are also reports of civilian casualties in Amhara and Afar due to the conflict.
   …

   Amhara Special Forces, militias and Fano (ADF)

   Militias, special security forces and the youth militia Fano from Amhara (collective name: ADF) have been involved in the conflict since it started. The ADF occupy large parts of Western, North-western and Southern Tigray. Dignitaries from the Amhara region have indicated that they will not give up these areas, claiming that areas such as Welkait, the Raya Valley and Humera have traditionally been part of Amhara. A confidential source reported that the presence of Amhara forces in Western Tigray was a thorn in the side of the federal government, but that the Amhara regional government had no intention of removing them from the area. In the areas under the control of the ADF, these forces often operated autonomously and there were few if any ENDF forces present, according to various confidential sources. In Southern Tigray, the ENDF was said to have more of a presence than in Western and North-western Tigray. The ADF was quite well structured, according to a confidential source.
   …

   Forms of violence/targeted methods of violence or methods that claim random victims

   On 4 March 2021, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OCHCR), Michelle Bachelet, stated that deeply disturbing reports continued to reach her office about sexual and gender-related violence, extrajudicial killings and large-scale destruction and looting of public and private property in Tigray. OHCHR named all the warring factions, the ENDF, the TPLF, the EDF and the regional forces and affiliated militias from Amhara, as responsible for the abuses. In addition to these crimes against humanity, Human Rights Watch (HRW) also cited reports at the end of May 2021 of indiscriminate bombings and large-scale massacres, such as in Mai Kadra and Aksum. In Western Tigray, the ADF also expelled ethnic Tigrayans on a large scale from the area; this was described by the US authorities as ‘ethnic cleansing’. IDPs (internally displaced persons) and Eritrean refugees are said to have been forcibly removed by Eritrean and Ethiopian troops from camps where they had sought protection. Hunger was also said to be used as a weapon to weaken the Tigrayan population.
   Both open and confidential sources stated that the EDF were responsible for most of the atrocities. The University of Ghent stated in its report on the situation in Tigray that the perpetrators of documented civilian casualties were Eritrean soldiers in 50% of cases, Ethiopian federal soldiers in 20%, either Ethiopian or Eritrean soldiers in 16% and Amhara militias in 4%. Amnesty International (AI) reported that the Eritrean army, for example, had killed civilians in the town of Aksum in a coordinated and systematic operation at the end of November 2020. HRW and the EHRC (Ethiopian Human Rights Commission) also reported the acts of violence carried out by the Eritrean forces in Aksum. According to the Ghent researchers, the perpetrating group was unknown in 10% of cases. It should be noted that the university’s research focused in particular on the ENDF and allies as perpetrators. Although none of the documented civilian casualties were attributed to the TDF or its allies, members of the TDF may have been among the perpetrators in some of the reported cases, the report said.
   The Eritrean and Ethiopian authorities stated in early April 2021 that the atrocities and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by their forces were grossly exaggerated, while the alleged crimes committed by the TPLF were not being investigated. With regard to alleged atrocities on the part of the TPLF and allied factions, the country of origin information report of February 2021 already mentioned the massacre mainly of Amhara in the village of May Kadra in Western Tigray shortly after the outbreak of the conflict. Militias affiliated with the TPLF and the Tigrayan youth group Samri were named as the main perpetrators. When May Kadra fell into the hands of the ADF, Tigrayans were also said to have been murdered in reprisals by the Amhara side.
   According to The Economist, there were reliable reports of the burning of crops and the killing of livestock by the federal army and its allies. The publication wrote that if these allegations were true, they constituted war crimes. In particular, the Ethiopian and Eritrean military are mentioned as being behind such practices. On 15 June 2021, the then UN humanitarian coordinator Mark Lowcock stated that Eritrean soldiers in Tigray were using ‘famine’ as a weapon. The Eritrean authorities replied that Eritrea was not engaged in starving the Tigrayan population into submission, and that Lowcock had been duped by TPLF propaganda. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed also rejected reports that his government was deliberately starving the people of Tigray. Like the Eritrean authorities, he called this ‘pure propaganda’. By contrast, the Ethiopian authorities argued that the TPLF was responsible for attacks on aid convoys and the theft and looting of food supplies. They did not come up with concrete examples when asked. When the federal government forces withdrew from Mekelle at the time of the TDF/TPLF advance in late June 2021, they raided the offices of UNICEF and WFP in the Tigrayan capital and destroyed UNICEF’s VSAT system.

   Indiscriminate violence or violence targeting specific groups

   It is clear from open and confidential sources that both indiscriminate and targeted violence has been used by all parties to the conflict. The mere fact that someone could be a potential fighter for the TDF/TPLF could mean a death sentence. Many TPLF leaders have reportedly been deliberately put out of action by the federal army and allies. On the other hand, the TDF/TPLF has specifically killed employees of the interim government established by the federal government in Tigray. Eritrean refugees in Tigray have been caught in the midst of the trouble. On the one hand, Eritrean refugees, many of whom had fled Eritrea for political reasons, have been rounded up by Eritrean forces and sent back to Eritrea. The fate of many refugees is unknown. On the other hand, they have been targeted by the TDF/TPLF, because they have been regarded as jointly responsible for the misdeeds of the Eritrean military in Tigray. Ordinary civilians in Tigray have been victims of indiscriminate violence, such as revenge attacks, random bombings and indiscriminate shooting at, for example, fleeing civilians.
   …

   Risk for women of becoming victims of violence

   There are numerous examples of sexual violence against women and children. On 19 February 2021, the Ethiopian President Sahle-Work Zewde admitted that women were being raped on a large scale in Tigray without specifying who the perpetrators were. The UN envoy for sexual violence in conflict, Pramila Patten, stated on 14 April 2021 that in the mountainous region of Northern and Central Tigray, women and girls were suffering ‘unprecedented sexual violence’.
   Estimates range from hundreds to thousands of women, from young girls to elderly women, who have been victims of some form of sexual violence. Some women said they had been systematically raped by different men over several days. The number of reported cases of sexual violence was the tip of the iceberg, according to a doctor. Because of the shame and stigma associated with rape and the lack of medical treatment, many victims do not come forward.
   Victims of rape or other forms of sexual violence point in particular to Eritrean and Ethiopian soldiers as the perpetrators. Amhara militia members and the special security forces from this region are also said to have committed sexual violence against women of Tigrayan descent in Tigray. Al Jazeera has written about the brutal sterilisation of Tigrayan women by Amhara militia members. One militia member allegedly told his victim that a Tigrayan womb should never bear children. Abiy reportedly said in parliament that anyone who had violated ‘our Tigrayan sisters’ would be held responsible. Due to the poor housing of IDPs (internally displaced persons), including open spaces, broken windows and doors that could not be closed, OCHA wrote of the increased risk of gender-related violence in locations where IDPs had taken refuge.
   On 11 August 2021, an AI report was released about the widespread rape and kidnapping of Tigrayan women and girls by troops fighting for the Ethiopian federal government in Tigray. Sexual violence victims and medical personnel said the ENDF, EDF, Amhara special security forces and Fano militia had engaged in such practices. AI Secretary-General Agnès Callamard stated that rape and sexual violence against women and girls in Tigray had been used as a weapon of war and spoke of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity. From February to April 2021, health facilities in Tigray recorded nearly 1,300 cases of gender-related violence. AI believes that the number of women raped is probably higher, as many survivors have not officially come forward.

   Areas/places in Tigray where violence occurs (widespread or specific locations?)

   As already mentioned in, the conflict area is fluid and dynamic in nature. Violent clashes have actually taken place in all areas of Tigray. After the federal forces and allies entered Tigray, fighting was concentrated mainly in Central, Eastern, and South/South-eastern Tigray: these were the areas where the TPLF/TDF had retreated to the countryside and to inhospitable areas. From May 2021, it was relatively quiet in the areas of Southern and Western Tigray where the ADF was in control. It should be noted here that incidents are always possible, such as in May 2021 when, according to the federal Ethiopian government, more than 300 Tigrayan fighters were killed trying to enter Western Tigray from Sudan.
   In June 2021, the TPLF/TDF launched an offensive in which large parts of Tigray were retaken from the federal army and allies. At the end of July 2021, the conflict crossed regional borders and Tigrayan forces invaded the territory of the Afar and Amhara regions. According to a confidential source, this was done for strategic reasons. The TPLF/TDF hoped, among other things, to establish a buffer zone so that it would be harder for the federal army and allies to invade Tigray a second time. The source also believed that the Tigrayan troops in Amhara and Afar hoped to find supplies and military equipment, as these are in very short supply in Tigray. It is unclear how the conflict is progressing in these regions. Both the TPLF/TDF and the federal government said they had won victories over the other side. According to OCHA, after the TPLF/TDF had taken control of large parts of Tigray, the security situation there remained unpredictable and fast-changing. In the major cities of Mekelle, Adigrat, Adwa, Aksum and Shire, the general situation was calm, without any significant incidents.
   …

   Possibility of settling in another part of the country to escape the violence in Tigray

   To start with, it should be noted that, outside Tigray, Ethiopia has several other regions where the security situation is precarious, such as in Western and Southern Oromia and the regions of Benishangul Gumuz, Somali Regional State and the SNNPR. The security situation has deteriorated across Ethiopia since the outbreak of the Tigray conflict, according to various sources. Many sources agree that because of anti-Tigrayan sentiment, Tigrayans are unlikely to seek refuge outside Tigray. The ethnicity of the IDPs who have fled from Tigray to Amhara and Afar is unclear. A confidential source regarded it as impossible that they should include ethnic Tigrayans, whereas another source believes that the IDP population in Afar and Amhara is of mixed composition. For example, it is thought to include relatives of Northern Command soldiers. These relatives had fled after the military bases of the federal army unit in Tigray were attacked by Tigrayan forces in early November 2020. The Tigrayan diaspora elsewhere in Ethiopia is not large: other than in the capital Addis Ababa, there are no large groups of Tigrayans in other parts of the country, which minimises the possibilities for gaining protection with relatives in these regions.
   …

   Obstacles/limitations/problems that a person may encounter if he/she settles elsewhere in Ethiopia

   When asked, a confidential source stated that the consequences of Covid-19, the economic situation and the security situation in Ethiopia make it difficult for anyone who cannot be taken in by relatives to settle in a different part of the country. In addition, tensions between the various ethnic groups in Ethiopia are a factor when it comes to settling elsewhere in Ethiopia.

   ADDITIONAL COUNTRY INFORMATION

2. In November 2021, independent articles published by Reuters, The Guardian and The New York Times claimed that Tigrayan forces have joined forces with the Oromo Liberation Army and are advancing towards Addis Ababa.[1]

   [1] ‘Ethiopia government says Tigray forces killed 100 youths in key town’, Reuters (2 November 2021)

3. The federal government has declared a state of emergency and has called on citizens to prepare to defend the capital. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed called for loyalists to double efforts to defend the seat of power. “Use any type of weapons to block the destructive [rebel push], to overturn it and bury it,” he said. “Dying for Ethiopia is a duty for all of us.”

4. A spokesperson for the TPLF told Reuters: “We have linked up with the OLF/OLA and if achieving our objectives in Tigray will require that we march to Addis Ababa, we will.”

   SECTION 5AAA OF THE ACT

1. Section 5AAA of the Act makes clear that it is the applicants’ responsibility to specify all particulars of a claim to be persons in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and to provide sufficient evidence to establish the claim. The Tribunal does not have any responsibility or obligation to specify, or assist the applicants in specifying, any particulars of their claims. Nor does the Tribunal have any responsibility or obligation to establish or assist in establishing the claim.

2. The Tribunal has considered the contents of the applicant’s statutory declaration declared in Melbourne on 19 January 2018. The document was lodged with the Department in support of his protection claims.

3. The Tribunal has also considered the contents of the applicant’s second statutory declaration which was declared in Melbourne on 15 November 2021, and submitted to the Tribunal in this review.

4. In the opinion of Tribunal, the essential nature of the applicant’s evidence is that he was at risk of persecution in Ethiopia due to the political regimen that preceded the present government deciding that he is an anti-government activist who was instrumental in organising [Occupation 4] to oppose the federal government, its [Occupation 4] policies, and corruption in public office.

5. The applicant asserts that in 2016 the federal government declared a state of emergency in the face of widespread anti-government protests and calls for fundamental reform.  This assertion is consistent with information in the 2020 DFAT country information report reproduced in this decision.

6. Due to the applicant’s imputed anti-government activism in [Town 1], a town at the centre of [Occupation 4] protests against the federal government, he was arrested when he was driving home from there in November 2016. He was arbitrarily imprisoned and tortured by soldiers. He was accused of being actively opposed to the government, inciting [Occupation 4s] to oppose the government, and of causing unrest and trouble for the Government. The applicant denied the allegations despite being persecuted in prison.

7. The applicant acknowledges he provided [Occupation 4s] with information about: the corrupt practices of government officials; the favouritism given to [Occupation 4s] aligned with the governing party; and the government and its officials being the reason for continuous [poverty] and lack of development. He encouraged [Occupation 4s] to advocate for their rights.[2]

   [2] Department file: applicant’s statutory declaration declared 19 January 2018 [31].

8. The applicant became aware of these [Occupation 4] issues through his employment as the [Manager 1] for [Organisation 2]. He was appointed to the position in October 2014.

9. In that position the applicant was tasked to work with [Occupation 4s] for the purpose of enabling them to expand and improve the productivity of their [industry]. According to the applicant he had the authority to make recommendations to [Organisation 2] as to the financing of [Occupation 4s] and [their industry]. He met resistance from local government officials who required the applicant  to direct funding to the [Occupation 4s] they favoured and who were aligned with the TPLF.

10. The applicant met with government ministers responsible for the [Occupation 4] sector and told them about the corruption he was encountering in the allocation of development grants to [Occupation 4s], and how officials and government policies were contributing to [poverty].

11. The applicant contends that his meetings with two federal government ministers he named in his statutory declarations, combined with the information and encouragement he gave to [Occupation 4s] to advocate for reform, and the [anti-government] protests that coincided with his presence in [Town 1] explain his arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. The applicant described his experiences in prison. His evidence appeared to unfold naturally and without exaggeration.

12. The applicant described in detail how, through his employment in a supervisory position at [Employer 1] in Addis Ababa, he met certain influential individuals.[3] He refers to them by name in his statutory declarations. Those meetings led to him meeting the president of [Organisation 2] and subsequently, the ambassador for [Organisation 2], [named]. In October 2014 the applicant began working for [Organisation 2]. His role included developing relationships with government officials, members of government, and working with [Occupation 4] on the implementation of a programme intended to improve [the Occupation 4 sector] in Ethiopia.

    [3] The applicant names these individuals in his statutory declarations.

13. The applicant provided detailed evidence of his employment history and educational and occupational training that impressed the Tribunal as likely to be accurate. The applicant explained, in his statutory declarations and evidence at hearing, his pathway to gaining employment in [Organisation 2].  The narrative is logical and consistent with the significance of personal contacts and patronage in obtaining advancement in countries where corruption, ethnic loyalties and rivalries, and patronage has a large bearing on personal advancement.

14. The Tribunal found the applicant to be a credible witness. He gave his evidence in a measured way and without evident exaggeration. His evidence about his circumstances at the time he was identified as a significant anti-government activist, responsible for encouraging and organising [Occupation 4s] to protest against government corruption and mismanagement in the [Occupation 4] sector, is consistent with the DFAT country information report about the prevailing circumstances in Ethiopia at that time.

15. The Tribunal accepts the applicant was employed by [Organisation 2] and that he encouraged and aided [Occupation 4] to protest against widespread corruption in the [Occupation 4] sector of the economy. The Tribunal accepts that it is likely the applicant was arrested and abused shortly before he arrived in Australia [in] January 2017. At that time Ethiopia was experiencing widespread political upheaval, and anti-government protests and violence. Ethiopia was on the cusp of a forced change of government, which led to the dissolution of the EPRDF, being the governing party at that time. DFAT country information indicates that Tigrayans dominated decision making in the EPRDF and that they were strongly represented in the military and bureaucracy. However, the change of government did not take place until 2018, a little time after the applicant arrived in Australia in January 2017.

16. In the circumstances that prevailed in Ethiopia in the leadup to the applicant’s departure, he feared he would be persecuted if he remained there, because the EPRDF government, agents of the state, and officials aligned with the government had identified him as their enemy.

17. The difficulty the Tribunal has in accepting the applicant’s claim for protection is this: the EPRDF, being the political party that controlled the government of Ethiopia before the applicant departed the country, was dissolved in 2019. That happened under the leadership of the new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who was appointed in 2018. He formed the Ethiopian Prosperity Party, which became the new governing party. The party included an element of the EPRDF which agreed to commit to the Abiy reform agenda. That agenda was focused on fostering national unity through the advancement of federalism over ethnocentrism.

18. According to the DFAT report, under Abiy, the economy was opened to the world. Investment and economic advancement in all sectors of the economy was actively encouraged and achieved a significant degree of success.

19. Ethiopians living abroad were encouraged to return and participate equally in society, political engagement and economic activity. Ethiopians living abroad, including former leaders of actively violent groups such as the Ginbot 7, and other groups, were encouraged to return to the country irrespective of their ethnicity and any previous political stance, including imputed politically motivated violence. Many did so: the were able to return to mainstream employment, social and political life without hindrance from the government, state sponsored and non-state actors.

20. According to the DFAT report, Addis Ababa is a stable city and relatively prosperous. This is the place to which the applicant would return if he is returned to Ethiopia. It is his home city, the place where he lived all his life, and where he was educated and successfully employed throughout his working life. He spent time visiting country areas as part of his duties when he was employed in [Organisation 2].

21. If the circumstances in Ethiopia had remained as they were after 2018, and had not shifted so dramatically in November 2020, it is likely the Tribunal would have affirmed the delegate’s decision. However, that is not the case today.

22. On in November 2020, armed conflict erupted in the state of Tigray. Previously, Tigrayans dominated the TPLF and through it, wielded substantial political power and influence over the state apparatus before 2018.

23. The state of Tigray has rejected the authority of the federal government under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy. The federal government has declared the state government of Tigray is illegal, and sought to replace it with a federally imposed interim government. 

24. At present there is a full-scale armed conflict raging between the Tigrayan armed forces and their allies including the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and the Federal government’s armed forces.

25. According to country information available to the Tribunal, it is accepted by DFAT that the present circumstances in Ethiopia are volatile, violent, and changing by the day. Much of the media reporting is unreliable, and reliable information coming out of the country is sketchy.

26. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Tigrayan led forces are making large territorial gains and they are advancing towards Addis Ababa. It has been reported by a number of public sources that have not been rejected by DFAT, and to which the Tribunal gives weight, that a spokesperson for the Tigrayan armed forces has asserted they intend to enter Addis Ababa if that be necessary to achieve their objectives. However, the information available to the Tribunal does not clearly define the ultimate objectives of the Tigrayan military.  

27. At present the federal forces have been unable to halt the Tigrayan military’s advance towards the capital.  Stand still negotiations have so far been ineffectual. According to country information available to the Tribunal, many countries have ordered their nationals to leave the country immediately. Some countries are relocating their embassy staff to neighbouring countries.

28. It is an article of the lessons of history, and the common course of human experience, that during war ethnic loyalty is demanded, and destructive interethnic conflict does occur.

29. According to the DFAT country information, 1.3 million Amhara reside in Addis Ababa. That information was obtained from the 2007 census, making them the single largest ethnic group in the capital.

30. The Amhara felt marginalised by the EPRDF government, which was dominated by ethnic Tigrayans. In the current federal government ethnic Amhara are strongly represented in the parliament, the public service and the military. The current federal president is ethnic Amhara. The Amhara are second only to the Oromo in representation in the Council of Ministers.  According to country information available to the Tribunal, the Amhara support the federal government and oppose the Tigrayan rebels.

31. At the time of the 2007 census about 170,000 Tigrayans lived in Addis Ababa. Given Addis Ababa has attracted people from all over the country seeking to improve their circumstances, it is reasonable to anticipate the number of Tigrayans living in the capital has increased since 2007.

32. The country information indicates the Tigrayans and the OLF have formed a military alliance, and together, with their other allies, are advancing on the capital.

33. The OLF signed a peace agreement with the federal government in August 2018 and agreed to disarm. It became a mainstream political party. According to DFAT country information, irrespective of this agreement and positioning in mainstream politics, armed factions of the OLF have engaged in criminal activities and clashed with government forces. 

34. According to the DFAT country report, approximately 543,000 Oromo were living in Addis Ababa in 2007.

35. According to country information reproduced in this decision and country information available to the Tribunal, all able-bodied residents of Addis Ababa have been called on to take up arms and to prepare to defend the city against the rebellion.  Accepting that the Amhara support the current government, and considering the Amhara felt strongly that they were marginalised by the previous TPLF government that was dominated by ethnic Tigrayans, it is reasonable to expect Amhara in Addis Ababa, in significant numbers, to answer Prime Minister Abiy’s call to the people of the city to take up arms, and stand against the advancing Tigrayans and their allies.  

36. It is reasonable to anticipate a significant likelihood that, in the current circumstances, ethnic groups in Addis Ababa that identify with opposing sides of the rebellion will turn on each other.  

37. At present it seems that politically motivated violence and entrenched ethnic rivalries and disagreements are inseparable drivers of the present armed conflict.

38. Country information in the public domain strongly indicates that atrocities have been committed on all sides of the conflict.

39. It is reasonable to expect that some significant proportion of the Tigrayan and Oromo ethnic groups in Addis Ababa will oppose those who take up arms in readiness to kill the advancing Tigrayans and their Oromo allies. It is likely the Amhara, who support the federal government, will answer Prime Minister Abiy’s call to take up arms and stand against Tigrayans and their allies. In the current circumstances there is a significant present and continuing danger that the rebellion will reach into Addis Ababa.

40. It is reasonable to form the view that there is a real chance of pre-emptive interethnic armed violence erupting in Addis Ababa ahead of the rebels’ advance, as elements within ethnic groups within the city succumb to their ethnic and political allegiances.

41. There can be no absolute certainty about what will occur in Ethiopia and Addis Ababa in coming days, weeks and months, however, when the evidence and country information is considered cumulative it is sufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal the existence of a present and continuing real chance of an outbreak of interethnic armed conflict in Addis Ababa.

    Further analysis and findings

42. On the basis of the current circumstances in Ethiopia, the Tribunal is satisfied of the existence of a real chance that the applicant, who is ethnic Amhara, would be subjected to serious harm for reasons of race and his membership of a particular social group, namely the Amhara ethnic group, if he is removed to Ethiopia now, or in the reasonably foreseeable future.  

43. In considering the question of whether the real chance of persecution applies to all areas of the country, it is relevant to give regard to DFAT country information that is available to the Tribunal. That information and the evidence demonstrates the current situation in Ethiopia is dominated by warfare; interethnic enmities; changing rapidly, and it is unpredictable. Many countries are warning their nationals not to enter Ethiopia and those who are there to leave as soon as possible.

44. Furthermore, Tigrayan forces are: advancing towards the capital; retaking land over which they claim an historical entitlement; by conquest, further expanding the territory they control; and committing atrocities on non-allied ethnic groups. According to country information from reliable sources: the Federal government has blocked all food supplies and goods from entering Tigray, causing a humanitarian crisis; the federal armed forces have proved largely ineffectual and unable to halt the advance of the Tigrayan rebels and their allies; and standstill negotiations have not halted the conflict.  

45. Viewed from this distance, the longevity of the Federal government and its pan-Ethiopian objectives are being seriously threatened by Tigrayans and their allies. Undoubtedly the war is the preoccupying concern of the government, the state security apparatus and armed services throughout the country: in that context the Tribunal is satisfied effective protection measures are not available to the applicant in Ethiopia; the real chance of persecution arises  from the applicant’s race, hence the question of behaviour modification in order to avoid the real chance of persecution does not arise for consideration; and, the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the country.

46. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) of the Act.

    DECISION

47. The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

    Peter Haag
    Member

    
    

    ATTACHMENT  -  Extract from Migration Act 1958

    5 (1) Interpretation

    …

    cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:

    (a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or

    (b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;

    but does not include an act or omission:

    (c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

    (d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

    …

    degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:

    (a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

    (b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

    …

    torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:

    (a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or

    (b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or

    (c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or

    (d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or

    (e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;

    but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

    …

    receiving country,  in relation to a non-citizen, means:

    (a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or

    (b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.

    …

    5H    Meaning of refugee

    (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:

    (a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or

    (b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.

    Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.

    …

    5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution

    (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:

    (a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and

    (b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and

    (c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.

    Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.

    (2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.

    Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.

    (3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:

    (a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or

    (b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or

    (c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:

    (i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;

    (ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;

    (iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;

    (iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;

    (v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;

    (vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

    (4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):

    (a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and

    (b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and

    (c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

    (5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:

    (a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;

    (b)     significant physical harassment of the person;

    (c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;

    (d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

    (e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

    (f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.

    (6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

    5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family

    For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:

    (a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and

    (b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:

    (i)the first person has ever experienced; or

    (ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

    where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.

    Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

    5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family

    For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:

    (a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and

    (b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and

    (c)     any of the following apply:

    (i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;

    (ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;

    (iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

    (d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

    5LA Effective protection measures

    (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:

    (a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:

    (i)the relevant State; or

    (ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

    (b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.

    (2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:

    (a)     the person can access the protection; and

    (b)     the protection is durable; and

    (c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.

    …

    36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act

    …

    (2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

    (a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

    (aa)  a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or

    (b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

    (i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and

    (ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

    (c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

    (i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and

    (ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

    (2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:

    (a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

    (b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or

    (c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or

    (d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

    (e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

    (2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:

    (a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

    (b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

    (c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.

    …

    
    

Declan Walsh and Simon Marks, ‘Ethiopia Declares State of Emergency as Rebels Advance Toward Capital’, The New York Times (11 November 2021) Chulov, ‘Tigrayan forces’ capture of two towns raises fears for Ethiopian capital’, The Guardian (2 November 2021)