1821684 (Refugee)

[2022] AATA 609

1821684 (Refugee) [2022] AATA 609 (19 January 2022)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER:  1821684

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Ethiopia

MEMBER:Brendan Darcy

DATE:19 January 2022

PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne

DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 19 January 2022 at 9:01am

CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Ethiopia – religion – Sunni Muslim – government-enforced Al-Ahbash campaigns – race – mixed Oromo and Gurage ethnicity – imputed political opinion – organiser of the protests organised by the Islamic Council – imputed supporter of Oromo Liberation Front or Oromia separatism – deteriorating security situation – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5H, 5J, 36, 65
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2

CASES
MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 18 July 2018 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).

2. The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Ethiopia), applied for the visa on 20 May 2016. The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that the applicant’s claims for protection lacked credibility.

   CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA

3. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b) or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

4. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.

5. A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s.5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s.5H(1)(b).

6. Under s.5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss.5J(2)–(6) and ss.5K–5LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

7. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (the complementary protection criterion). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss.36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

   Mandatory considerations

8. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

   CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

9. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.

   Background and migration history

10. In his application to the Department, dated 20 May 2016, the applicant stated he was born on [date] in Adama, Oromia region, Ethiopia. He claims he is a citizen of Ethiopia by birth. A certified copy of the applicant’s Ethiopian passport is attached to the applicant’s Departmental file ([number]). The applicant stated his ethnicity is Gurage and his religion is Islam, and that he speaks Amharic. He indicated he was employed as [an Occupation 1] in a [business] in Adama from [specified year] until April 2007, and then worked as a manager at [a] store he owned from April 2007 until departure for Australia.

11. In his application, the applicant indicated he was married to an Ethiopian citizen in October 2013 in Adama, after beginning a relationship in 2010, and that this marriage continues, with his wife currently residing in Ethiopia. The applicant declared a daughter, born in [year], also residing in Ethiopia. The applicant indicated he has a sister, born in [year], currently residing in Australia, who he is in contact with. He also declared [other] family members still residing in Adama, Ethiopia. He also declared a [sibling] residing in and who is a citizen of [Country 1], and [another sibling] residing in and who is a citizen of [Country 2]. The applicant stated he maintains contact with them both.

12. The applicant stated that his only travel outside of Ethiopia before arriving in Australia in the last 30 years was to [Country 3], for three days in September 2015 for business purposes.

13. On 16 September 2015, the applicant applied for a [Visitor] visa, which was refused on 15 October 2015. The sponsor of the refused visa validly applied to have this decision reviewed by the Tribunal on 27 October 2015; the Tribunal remitted the application on 11 January 2016 for reconsideration. The applicant was then granted the Visitor visa on 1 February 2016. The applicant first arrived in Australia as the holder of a [Visitor] visa [in] February 2016.

14. On 3 May 2016, the applicant lodged a Protection (Subclass 866) application that was deemed invalid. The applicant validly applied for the same visa on 20 May 2016, and was granted a bridging visa in connection with the application.

    Claims for protection

15. The applicant’s written claims for protection are contained in his responses to the protection visa application (Form 866), lodged with the Department on 20 May 2016, and in a written statement, lodged 16 March 2018, with corrections to the statement lodged 20 March 2018. The applicant states he left Ethiopia as he is seeking protection from the state due to protesting the government’s interference in the Muslim community’s affairs, after he was arrested, tortured and detained for his involvement in the movement in June 2014.

16. The applicant’s written claims at the Department level can be summarised as follows:

    ·     The applicant was born in [year] in Adama, a city 100km from Addis Ababa. He is of Gurage ethnicity and has [number of] siblings; one of [whom] has passed away. He is married and has a daughter born in [year]. His whole family are committed Muslims.

    ·     After his father passed away in [year], he worked in his father’s [business] from [that same year] to April 2007, when he started his own [business], which he ran until he left Ethiopia.

    ·     In December 2011, Ethiopian Muslims began to protest the government’s interference in religious affairs, after it tried to impose the Al-Ahbash sect, which has otherwise peacefully coexisted in Ethiopia since the 1990s, on the traditionally Sunni community, when it moved to dismiss the administration of the Awoliya religious school in Addis Ababa.

    ·     The school is run by the independent Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (‘Islamic Council’). The authorities dictated the results of the Council’s elections in November 2012, favouring the ‘Al-Habash’ [sic] sect, which the applicant stated the government is sponsoring and providing financial and logistical support.

    ·     The community elected senior Islamic representatives by petition to negotiate with the government, but an agreement could not be reached, and the Islamic Council remained appointed, so protests for religious freedom continued.

    ·     The applicant and his wife attended protests every Friday and with close friends set up a committee to help organise the protests. The applicant was one of [the] committee members, who worked in secret and circulated information to organise protests, which cautioned attendees to be peaceful.

    ·     As the movement grew, security forces started to intimidate people outside of the mosque they attended each Friday. The forces then started detaining suspected ringleaders, so the committee collected money to send to family members of those detained. The committee changed its meeting spots and started to recruit volunteers. The applicant recruited [a number of] volunteers.

    ·     In mid-June 2014, the applicant answered a knock at the door to his home in the morning and was confronted by four plain-clothed security forces officers, who entered the house and ordered him to lie on the floor. They kicked him and beat him with their gun butts while he was on the floor. His wife was crying and asked what the applicant did, to which one officer replied “Ask your Muslim friends”.

    ·     The applicant was handcuffed while on the floor and the forces searched his house, seizing [products] and [amount] Ethiopian birr, which was from the takings of his [shop]. After the search, the applicant was led out handcuffed and taken to [an identified] police station.

    ·     Upon arrival, he was searched, had his details taken and was locked in a cell. He was taken out at night and interrogated by two officers. This happened numerous times, always with two male interrogators but different men each time. The interrogators demanded information about his contacts, first saying they knew he was working with the ringleaders of the protests.

    ·     The applicant told the interrogators he was not involved in any anti-government activity and that Muslims are just demanding the government not interfere in religious affairs. The two men demanded the contact details of the applicant’s father-in-law. Whenever he did not answer demands, the applicant was beaten and kicked repeatedly, frequently on his feet with a belt. He could hardly walk and would beg them to stop.

    ·     He believes he was being treated like this because they believed he was Oromo and were convinced his father was a member of the OLF [Oromo Liberation Front]. When he rejected this and could not provide details of the OLF, the interrogators decided he was an OLF member and threatened to execute him.

    ·     The applicant is distressed recalling his treatment in detention, where he was confined to a small crowded cell of around three square metres. The conditions in the cell were squalid and inhumane, and detainees were not fed adequately.

    ·     Alongside the beatings, the applicant was also subjected to psychological torture during his confinement, called a terrorist and threatened with death. The applicant suffered tremendous anxiety, had regular migraines and breathlessness, all of which were ignored by officials. He experienced severe trauma from his treatment.

    ·     Four weeks later, the applicant was taken with eight others to a detention centre in [a named] town around 100km from Adama. He found others there who were detained on the same allegations of instigating protests.

    ·     After three and a half months in detention, the applicant was released in late August 2014 with the help of his father-in-law, a businessman with connections who had already been receiving information about the applicant’s treatment in detention. On release, he was forced to sign a document stating he would not demonstrate against the government.

    ·     His wife could not recognise him due to the beating and bruising and his back was badly hurt; despite treatment, his back still hurts occasionally. The applicant believes the authorities are suspicious of businesspeople like himself with a large network of friends.

    ·     The authorities had closed his shop and his wife was pregnant at the time, putting his family in financial hardship. He returned to the fundraising committee, which met in secure places like the mosque. The committee continued raising funds and his father-in-law assisted him to obtain a passport and restart his business.

    ·     The applicant stated because he was not convicted of a crime, there were no police records, which assisted him to obtain a passport. He also believes that, although he was detained, because the security forces did not extract any useful information from him that he was ‘put out of the category of a person of continuing interest to the authorities’. He also believes the government does not refuse passports to political opponents and they are probably happy if they leave the country.

    ·     After organising his passport, the applicant travelled to on business from [date] to [date] September 2015. The committee continued mobilising the Muslim community and circulating leaflets among them demanding the release of elected leaders to head up negotiations. The government continues to use accusations of terrorism to clamp down on protests.

    ·     After the applicant was granted a visa to visit his sister and her family in Australia, he arrived [in] February 2016. After arriving, he contacted his wife and the committee [office bearer], [Mr A], by phone.

    ·     In early May 2016, he called [Mr A]’s phone but it was ‘dead’. He then called [another office bearer], [Mr B], who told him [Mr A] had been arrested and was now in hiding. In mid-May 2016, his wife informed him that the security forces were coming now and then asking about his whereabouts, which is when he realised his life was at risk.

    ·     When [Mr A] was arrested many documents were seized, and so the applicant believes the government most likely has records of his financial support now. He also believes it likely [Mr A] was tortured and the applicant’s name may have been extracted through this.

    ·     The applicant is not safe anywhere in Ethiopia as the government knows he is an opponent, and his views will attract the authorities’ attention. He would be regarded with suspicion anywhere new; it is easy and common for newcomers to be targeted by people.

    ·     The applicant believes he will be at risk of persecution and torture due to his religious activism, previous imprisonment, and association with other detainees such as [Mr A].

17. The applicant was interviewed by a delegate of the Department on 11 July 2018. A copy of the interview audio is contained in the Department file associated with this application.

18. On 18 July 2018, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a protection visa.

    Evidence provided to the Tribunal

19. On 26 July 2018, the applicant validly applied to have the delegate’s refusal decision reviewed by the Tribunal, submitting a copy of the notification letter and the delegate’s decision record alongside this application for review.

20. The applicant was represented in relation to this review application by a migration agent from [a NGO].

21. On 1 October 2020, the applicant submitted letters of support from [a named leader of Community Organisation 1], and [a named leader of Community Organisation 2]. In the same submissions, the applicant also provided a receipt for [a specified] donation from [Charity 1] and a letter from a general practitioner in Australia, [Dr C], that notes the applicant recently had a CT scan that showed back complications, which the letter notes the applicant attributed to a beating at the hands of local security in Ethiopia.

22. During a Covid-19 lockdown in the State of Victoria, the applicant was first invited to a hearing on 27 October 2020 to be conducted on an internet-enabled audio-visual platform. However, the applicant insisted on having an in-person hearing. After carefully considering the request, the Tribunal postponed the hearing until a suitable opportunity for an in-person hearing arose.

23. On 22 January 2021, the applicant appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and to present arguments as to the reasons he was owed Australia’s protection obligations. However, this hearing was adjourned due to a legitimate objection regarding the interpreting.

24. On 26 May 2021, a resumed hearing was conducted at the Tribunal’s Melbourne offices. The Tribunal received assistance from an interpreter in the English and Amharic languages throughout the hearing. At the hearing, friends of the applicant, [Mr D] and [Mr E], provided oral evidence as sworn witnesses.

25. At the end of the hearing, the Tribunal indicated that it would delay its decision-making duties until after the federal elections in Ethiopia, after which it would write to the applicant to invite comment on any more recent developments following that event, insofar as those developments may be relevant to the applicant’s claims that he is owed Australia’s protection obligations.

26. On 4 October 2021, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant to invite comment about a number of developments in the applicant’s home country as outlined in a recent DFAT country information report, and to do so by 18 October 2021. The date of the COISS researched paper is 12 August 2021. It is entitled Ethiopia: 20210720123909 – 2021 Election – Protests – Opposition Parties – Tigray – Oromo – Amhara – Harari. A copy of the report was attached to the letter. The applicant’s representative requested an extension to respond to the invitation to comment which was granted until 1 November 2021.

27. On 3 November 2021, the Tribunal received an 11-page legal submission in response to the abovementioned country information.

28. The post-hearing submission included a statutory declaration dated 30 October 2021 signed by the applicant. The applicant’s statutory declaration elaborated a number of late claims advanced by the applicant, including that he has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because his wife and daughter are of Tigrayan ethnicity, that he will be imputed as a supporter of Oromo separatism and that he supports Oromo separatism. The applicant also claimed that with the assistance of his father-in-law he was able to obtain a travel document and clearance to exit Ethiopia without any problems.

29. No further submissions were received.

    Country information: Ethiopia

30. The following is from the most recent DFAT country information report on Ethiopia issued on August 2020:

    Recent history

    2.2 Ethiopia held its first multi-party elections in May 1995. The EPRDF won this and all other subsequent elections, bringing stability and economic growth but restricting political dissent and media and civic freedoms for most of its time in power. The EPRDF was disbanded in December 2019 (see Political System). Ethnic Tigrayans, a minority, wielded outsized influence during most of the EPRDF’s rule, fostering resentment among the considerably larger Amhara and, in particular, Oromo ethnic groups. Meles Zenawi, a Tigrayan who led the removal of the Derg (communist junta that led Ethiopia between 1974 and 1991), served as prime minister from 1995 until his death in 2012.

    2.3 Zenawi was succeeded by his deputy, Hailemariam Desalegn, an ethnic Wolayta — Ethiopia’s first peaceful transition of power in modern times. Large-scale anti-government protests beginning in 2014, centred in Oromia and, later, Amhara states, prompted the declaration of a State of Emergency, under which over 20,000 people were arrested and 1,000 killed (see 2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency). Protesters demanded greater political rights, leading to the resignation, in February 2018, of Prime Minister Desalegn. His successor and current prime minister, Abiy Ahmed (appointed in April 2018), embarked on an ambitious reform agenda, and the human rights situation has improved significantly under his watch. Among other reforms, Abiy has lifted restrictions on freedom of expression, released political prisoners, removed terrorist designations of previously-exiled opposition groups, expanded the space for civil society, and initiated reform of legislation used previously to arrest and prosecute government critics. In parallel, Abiy has pursued high-profile diplomatic initiatives across East Africa. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for his peacebuilding efforts with Eritrea, culminating in the signing of an agreement to formally end their war. Abiy is Ethiopia’s first prime minister from the Oromo ethnic group.

    2.4 After an initial period where violence subsided significantly, ethno-nationalism, inter-ethnic clashes and associated displacement again increased, though not nearly to the levels witnessed preceding Abiy’s election. Abiy’s reform agenda has met some resistance, and his government was the subject of a purported coup attempt in June 2019.

    2.5 Abiy had committed to holding free and fair elections in 2020, although these have been postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak in the country. Abiy declared a five-month State of Emergency on 8 April 2020 in response to the outbreak. The State of Emergency, while valid only until September 2020, limits some human rights, particularly those around association and movement. While these reflect the types of restrictions in place internationally, there is scope for abuse. However, the response has generally been accepted as necessary by opposition parties who see it as proportionate to the threat posed by COVID-19.

1. The same DFAT country information report for Ethiopia, states the following about the ethnic composition of Ethiopia:

   2.7 Ethiopia is ethnically and linguistically diverse, comprising more than 80 different ethnic groups and 100 languages. According to the most recent national census (2007), 10 ethnic groups have a population of 1 million people or more. The Oromo constitute the single largest, at 34.5 per cent of the population, followed by the Amhara (26.9 per cent), Somali (6.2 per cent), Tigrayan (6.1 per cent), Sidama (4 per cent) and Gurage (2.5 per cent) peoples. More recent figures are unavailable — a new census has been postponed repeatedly, most recently in 2019 (owing to large-scale internal displacement). Amharic is the official national language, although the government flagged in March 2020 its intention to grant similar status to the Oromiffa, Afar, Somali and Tigrinya languages. These languages already enjoy official status in the regional states in which they predominate. English is widely taught and spoken.

   […]

   Oromos

   3.5 The Oromo people are the single largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, at nearly 35 per cent of the population. They live mostly in Oromia State, which surrounds the federally-administered Addis Ababa. According to the 2007 national census (the most recent), there are significant Oromo communities in Addis Ababa (534,000), Amhara State (450,000) and SNNP State (236,000). While recent data is hard to come by, roughly similar numbers of Oromos practise Islam and Christianity (both Orthodox and Protestant). Oromos speak Oromiffa (also known as Afaan Oromo), which is the language of administration and schooling in Oromia State. By virtue of its location surrounding Addis Ababa, Oromia State is one of the more developed parts of the country.

   3.6 Ethnic Oromos’ level of political and economic influence has traditionally been incommensurate to their size. Oromos argue they have long been subservient to smaller ethnic groups — a major source of historical frustration. While Oromos were represented in federal government and held positions of influence during the EPRDF’s rule, ethnic Tigrayans predominated politically and economically. Likewise, ethnic Amharas dominated during the periods of military and monarchic rule. The displacement of Oromos from traditional land on which Addis Ababa is built is another historical grievance for the Oromo community. Oromos were the most vocal of Ethiopia’s ethnic communities during anti-government protests from 2014 to 2018, and bore the brunt of associated arrests and detentions.

   3.7 Oromo influence at the federal level has expanded significantly since the April 2018 election of Abiy as prime minister — the first time in Ethiopia’s modern history an Oromo has led the country. The Oromo were the single largest ethnic group in the federal cabinet (the Council of Ministers) at the time of publication, and were represented in the senior ranks of the public service and the military. Oromo political prisoners, including those arrested for their involvement in the 2014-18 protests, have been released. The OLF, an opposition party dedicated to Oromo self-determination, was delisted as a terrorist organisation in June 2018 and returned from exile in Eritrea in September 2018. The OLF signed a peace agreement with the federal government in August 2018 and agreed to disarm. It now operates as a registered political party and plans to contest forthcoming national and regional elections. Despite these gains, historical grievances remain. The resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn, his subsequent replacement by Abiy and Ethiopia’s democratic opening has triggered a resurgence of Oromo nationalism. Ethnic Oromos have been involved in many of the inter-ethnic clashes and associated displacement that has occurred since 2018, both as instigators and victims (Oromos have been targeted in Benishangul-Gumuz and Somali states). The killing of prominent Oromo singer and activist, Hachalu Hundessa, in June 2020 – who had been increasingly outspoken on the economic and political marginalisation of the Oromo people – sparked renewed Oromo protests.

   3.8 While there was widespread violence against, and detention of, protesters across Oromia State between 2014 and 2018, DFAT assesses this was not ethnically motivated, but reflected the then-federal government’s sensitivity to political opposition. The situation for government critics, including ethnic Oromos, has improved significantly since April 2018. DFAT assesses that individuals who are part of, or have links to, armed OLF factions engaged in criminal activities and clashes with government forces are likely to be of interest to the authorities, and face a moderate risk of arrest and detention. The risk of arrest and detention faced by OLF members who participate peacefully in the political process is low. DFAT assesses, overall, Oromos face a low risk of official discrimination based on their ethnicity, including with respect to employment in the public sector. DFAT assesses that, excluding in Addis Ababa, Oromos face a moderate risk of violence in areas or states where they constitute a minority.

   Amharas

   3.9 The Amhara people are the second-largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, at 26.9 per cent of the population. While they reside predominantly in Amhara State, ethnic Amharas are present throughout Ethiopia, with significant populations in Oromia and SNNP states (2 million and 420,000, respectively). Nearly 1.3 million Amharas were residing in Addis Ababa at the time of the 2007 census, making them the single-largest ethnic group in the capital. Most Amharas are Orthodox Christian. Their language, Amharic, is the official national language. The Amhara governed Ethiopia for the longest period before the EPRDF came to power in 1991, including during military rule and the era of the monarchy. Like the Oromo, the Amhara felt marginalised by the Tigray under the EPRDF, and protests in Amhara State helped catalyse the resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn in February 2018. Similarly to the Oromo, Amhara nationalism has increased with Ethiopia’s democratic opening and lifting of restrictions on freedom of expression.

   3.10 The Amhara are represented politically at the federal level, including in the current federal government and the senior ranks of the public service and the military (until recently Amharic was the sole working language of the federal bureaucracy). Roughly a quarter of lower house members in Federal Parliament are elected from Amhara State. The current federal president is an ethnic Amhara, and the Amhara were second only to the Oromo in their representation in the Council of Ministers at the time of publication. Political parties representing Amhara interests are active. DFAT assesses the arrest of Amharas during the 2014-18 anti-government protests was not ethnically motivated, but reflected the then-federal government’s sensitivity to political opposition. DFAT assesses Amharas face a low risk of official discrimination based on their ethnicity, including with respect to employment in the public sector. The Amhara have been the subject of ethnic-based attacks in states where they do not constitute a majority, particularly in Benishangul-Gumuz. DFAT assesses that, like most other groups, Amharas face a moderate risk of violence in areas or states where they are a minority

   Non-disclosure notices

2. There are no non-disclosure notices or certificates attached to either the Departmental or Tribunal files in relation to this matter.

   ASSESSMENT OF CLAIMS AND FINDINGS

   Country of reference

3. Considering the copy of the applicant’s Ethiopian passport provided to the Department, the Tribunal finds the applicant to be a citizen of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and that Ethiopia is the applicant’s country of origin, as claimed. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that Ethiopia is the applicant’s country of nationality for the purposes of s.36(2)(a) as well as for the purposes of being the ‘receiving country’ under the Act’s complementary protection provisions.

4. There is no suggestion that the applicant has a claim to enter and reside, either temporarily or permanently, in a third country pursuant to s.36(3) of the Act.

   Accepted personal circumstances

5. With no evidence to the contrary, the Tribunal accepts the following claimed personal circumstances based on his written, oral and documentary evidence to be credible:

   ·     The applicant was born in Adama (also known as Nazret) in Oromia State, in [year] as claimed;

   ·     The applicant’s father and mother have passed away. The ethnicity of the applicant’s father was Gurage and his mother’s ethnicity was Oromo;

   ·     The applicant can speak, read and write in Amharic and he can speak and read in Oromo while he can only speak Gurage;

   ·     The applicant is a practising Sunni Muslim;

   ·     In 2013, the applicant married an Ethiopian woman of Tigrayan background with whom he had a daughter born in [year];

   ·     The applicant’s highest level of learning is the equivalent to [grade] in the Australian education system;

   ·     Prior to his departure from Ethiopia in 2015, the applicant lived in Adama where he was raised and where he owned a business;

   ·     The applicant travelled to [Country 3] in September 2015 and returned without being questioned either on departure or arrival; and

   ·     At the time of the hearing, the applicant’s wife and daughter were living in [a named town] in Oromia (with a relative) since he departed for Australia. Since his arrival in Australia, the applicant has remained married to his wife without being separated or divorced.

   Religious claims

6. It is the applicant’s dispositive claim for protection that he has a well-founded fear of persecution due to his opposition of the Ethiopian authorities to impose the Al-Ahbash sect onto the Sunni Muslim administration of the Awoliya school, should he return to Ethiopia into the foreseeable future.

7. From January 2012 to August 2013, the city of Addis Ababa was swarmed with protests by Muslim demonstrators because of the alleged government-enforced Al-Ahbash campaigns that Muslims viewed as an interference in religious affairs by the regime.[1]

   [1] Østebø, T. (2014). Salafism, State-Politics, and the Question of “Extremism” in Ethiopia. Comparative Islamic Studies, 8(1-2), 165–184. >

   These protests were triggered by the authorities’ attempt to curb the perceived impact of ‘extremist’ Salafi Islam on Ethiopian Muslims. In doing so, the government cooperated with a Muslim Lebanese organisation or school of Islamic teaching known as ‘Al-Ahbash’. In 2011, the government moved for Al-Ahbash to take over the leadership of the country’s leading theological college.

8. Roughly 98 per cent of Ethiopian Muslims are Sunni and it is the largest religion in Ethiopia after Orthodox Christianity. Ethiopia’s association with Islam stretches back to Mohammed, The Prophet (the founder of Islam) in the seventh century in the Christian era. When Mohammed saw the persecution to which his followers were subjected in Mecca (in modern Saudi Arabia), he told them to find safe haven in northern Ethiopia, Abyssinia. The walled city of Harar in eastern Ethiopia, according to UNESCO, is regarded as the fourth holy city of Islam.

9. In more recent times, the Salafi movement began to spread in the 1990s due to the political transition in 1991 and the arrival of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF promised a change within Ethiopia’s religious groups through decentralising the structure of ethnic federalism to enable Salafis to raise their activities. During this period, a new generation of Salafis emerged. Salafi teachings became widespread due to organisations in Ethiopia including, World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY), the Islamic Da’wa and Knowledge Organisation, and the Awoliya College. Besides those organisations, the Salafi movement was led by Oromo scholars who were developing the Salafi ideology in Ethiopia. The youth became involved in the movement and began to call people to align with the obligatory practices of Islam with strict Salafi teachings.

10. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant participated in these protests, as claimed. It accepts that the applicant as well as his wife attended protests every Friday and that he played a role in committees to organise protests by circulating fliers and that he recruited as many as [number] volunteers as claimed.

11. While there is no independent reporting of the authorities’ widespread arrest and beatings of Muslim Ethiopians, including an imam, involved in these protests, the Tribunal accepts there is some reportage to indicate the plausibility of the applicant’s claim that he and his wife were arrested in 2014 during a morning raid.[2]

    [2] ‘Ethiopia’s Muslims protest against being “treated like terrorists”’, The Observers, France24 online, 25 July 20212,>

    With no serious credibility concerns about the applicant lacking reliability or truthfulness, the Tribunal accepts the account that his residence had been raided, which led to him being physically harmed by members of Ethiopia’s security forces. It further accepts the authorities also searched his residence and confiscated money and other belongings and that he was taken to a police station where he was further searched, interrogated and beaten, before being released. It accepts that the applicant had been perceived in the past as having a leadership role in organising such protests, as the primary motivation for targeting the applicant. It accepts, despite the applicant being unable to provide any documentary evidence, that he was required to provide surety or bail to remain compliant with the government’s insistence he desist with his anti-government activities and that the applicant complied with this. This caused deep distress to the applicant and his family, leading to a decision to seek asylum in Australia.

12. (The Tribunal detected a thread of evidence that the authorities also targeted the applicant for corrupt purposes, as a businessperson (like so many other Gurage Ethiopians) because he provided the members of the police an opportunity to confiscate his savings and belongings in a criminal manner.)

13. Even in accepting the thrust of the applicant’s uncorroborated claims, the Tribunal does not accept the applicant was a person of ongoing interest to the authorities. He was not arrested a further time and he was permitted to obtain a travel document to leave for an Arab country and to return. Since 2013, there are no further reports of the government seeking to impose the ‘Al-Ahbash’ movement on Ethiopian Muslims who opposed such interference from the state or objected to the insinuation that ordinary Muslims were ‘extremists’.

14. According to the most recent DFAT report, while there has been a recent uptick, attacks on places of worship are rare overall. The two largest religious groups, Orthodox Christians and Muslims, generally respect each other’s right to practise their faith, despite some low-level mutual mistrust. Local sources told DFAT that inter-faith marriage in Addis Ababa is common. DFAT has observed people of different faiths openly attending their respective religious services without facing discrimination or harassment. In many parts of the country, particularly Oromia State and major cities such as Addis Ababa where there are large numbers of Orthodox Christians and Muslims, mosques and Orthodox churches are located within close proximity of one another, with no evidence of hostility or tension. There are an estimated 40,000 mosques in the country. Major Islamic festivals are observed as public holidays and DFAT observed men and women in Islamic dress walking the streets freely in Addis Ababa. DFAT assesses there is a low risk of official and societal discrimination or violence on the basis of religion, including in the case of religions with small followings. DFAT assesses that people can practise their religious beliefs freely and openly.

15. It is the Tribunal’s assessment that the authorities who are pre-occupied with ethnic conflicts, have ceased pursuing the curbing of religious freedom or addressing perceived Islamic extremism by governmental interference into Muslim institutions and communities, as occurred in 2012–13. The authorities who promote pan-Ethiopianism do not wish to disrupt the relative calm that exists between religious communities in Ethiopia, while it is dealing with a number of ethnic conflicts which threaten widespread civil war.

16. It is in this context, that the Tribunal finds the applicant to have embellished his claims that after arriving to Australia in February 2016 that he heard that one of the committee members had been arrested, interrogated and is now in hiding and that this prompted the applicant to relocate his wife and child to another location within Ethiopia. The Tribunal does not accept these specific embellishments to be credible.

17. Taking all this information into account, the Tribunal accepts that there is a risk the applicant, either on arrival or in the community, will come to the attention of the authorities as an organiser and local leader of Muslim Ethiopians in the past.

18. However, with lack of ongoing interest by the authorities seeking to impose the ‘Al-Ahbash’ school of teaching on existing Muslim institutions or communities, the Tribunal finds that the chances of him being seriously harmed for this to be remote and insubstantial. Accordingly, on the evidence before it, the Tribunal finds there is only a remote chance and not a real chance of the applicant, either on arrival or in the community, coming to the attention of the authorities because of his religion and his role in 2011–2012 protests against the government imposing the ‘Al-Ahbash’ school on Ethiopian Muslims or for any related reasons, should the applicant return to his country of nationality, now or into the reasonably foreseeable future.

19. In MIAC v SZQRB, the Full Federal Court held that the ‘real risk’ test imposes the same standard as the ‘real chance’ test applicable to the assessment of ‘well-founded fear’ in the Refugee Convention/s.5H definition. As the Tribunal has made a finding that the applicant faces a remote chance but not a real chance of serious harm based on his religion or based on any role or association with an Islamic movement which is held with suspicion by the Ethiopian authorities, it follows that the Tribunal does not have substantial reasons for believing that the applicant, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to his country of reference, will face a real risk of significant harm for the same reasons.

20. In this regard, the applicant does not satisfy either s.36(2)(a) or s.36(2)(aa).

    Ethnicity and imputed separatism claims

21. The Tribunal turned its considerations to whether the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm based on his ethnicity by paying particular attention to country information regarding the deterioration of the security situation triggered by a recent upsurge of ethnic conflict within Ethiopia.

22. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant is of mixed Oromo and Gurage ethnicity and that societally and officially his ethnicity is considered Oromo despite his father being a Gurage. This is based on the applicant’s capacity to speak and read Oromo and that he has always resided in Oromia. Nonetheless Amharic is the only Ethiopian language which the applicant speaks, reads and writes; he does not communicate fluently in Guragie or Guragiegna (the collective words for the Gurage language and its dialects). (Based on the 2007 census, in Adama, Amharic was spoken as a first language by 59.25% of people, 26.25% spoke Oromo and 6.28% spoke Guragiegna.)[3] DFAT assesses the ethnic Gurage face a low risk of official or societal discrimination, including in parts of the country where they are a minority. Noting the applicant does not advance the claim to face persecution based on being Gurage – as well as the country informaton, the Tribunal finds that the applicant does not face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm based on his Gurage ethnicity, should he return to Ethiopia.

    [3] Central Statistical Agency. 2010. Population and Housing Census 2007 Report, National. [ONLINE] Available at: type="1">

23. The applicant is of mixed ethnic origin. On the one hand, his earlier claims describe his ethnicity as Gurage; while, in his later claims the applicant has emphasised that the Oromo aspect of that mixed heritage. There is no country information to support that there is state-sanctioned violence that targets such persons of mixed ethnicity. Neither is there supportive information that non-state actors target such specific persons of mixed origin. In this regard, the Tribunal finds the applicant does not face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm for the essential and significant reasons that the applicant is an ethnically mixed Oromo-Gurage Ethiopian, if he returns to his country of nationality. \

24. The applicant belatedly claimed that he has a well-founded fear because he married a Tigrayan or part Tigrayan and that his daughter is part Tigrayan. As discussed in the hearing, the armed conflict and other violence towards Tigrayans appears confined to north-western Ethiopia. The applicant’s wife and daughter have been living in Oromia without being harmed based on her race. Should the applicant who is not ethnically Tigrayan return to Ethiopia, the Tribunal does not accept the applicant, or his dependent wife and child, faces a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm based on these claims on religion.

25. However, the Tribunal accepts the applicant will be imputed with or assumed to have Oromo ethnicity, both societally and officially. This is based primarily on his mixed heritage based primarily on his being from Oromia (or Oromia Regional State). The Tribunal also notes the applicant’s wife and daughter continue to live in Oromia, albeit not currently in the applicant’s home city of Adama (which has been the capital city of Oromia since 2000).

26. During the hearing, the applicant claimed that while he was detained as an organiser of the protests organised by the Islamic Council, he was interrogated about any connections he had with the separatist movement of the Oromo Liberation Front. He elaborated that many businesspeople are assumed to be pro-OLF because many have assisted them in the past. As noted above, the applicant signed an undertaking not to protest and provided surety to comply. The applicant claimed that he was monitored on a continuous basis and that the situation was intimidating, which affected him psychologically and his ability to concentrate on his business. The applicant also claimed that he faced a real chance of being targeted because his father-in-law had supported the OLF and had been detained and tortured for his support for Oromo separatism.

27. In the applicant’s statutory declaration dated 30 October 2021, he stated that:

    7. I believe that if I was to be returned to Ethiopia in the future then there is a real chance that I could be targeted by the Ethiopian authorities on the basis that I was a supporter or member of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and/or Oromo Liberation Army (ORA). As previously discussed with the Tribunal, I believe that the authorities may suspect that I am a member and/or supporter of the OLF because of my past involvement in protests, my actual and imputed anti-Government beliefs, my father-in-law’s ties to the OLF and my Oromo ethnicity. Whilst I am not a member of the OLF I do support many of their policies and/or beliefs. I believe that OLF stans for the freedom and rights of the Oromo people in Ethiopia. However, because they are often critical of the government the Ethiopian authorities consider them to be terrorists. I believe the Ethiopian government often label people who oppose and/or criticise them as terrorists. Several leaders of the OLF are being incarcerated by the present government.

    8. I am not a member of OLF but I believe their ideologies. I believe that OLF are fighting for the freedom of all Oromo people who are imprisoned by the government because of their political belief and that all people of all religious beliefs shall be treated equally.

28. By the applicant’s own admission, he is not and has never been a member of the OLF or any Oromia organisation in the past. He has never claimed to have participated in any pro-Oromo protests. Had the applicant genuinely been a supporter of OLF or Oromia separatism, he would have joined such a movement in the past, alongside his involvement in anti-government protests which were motivated by religion and not ethnicity. The Tribunal does not accept this late claim advanced by the applicant about his political opinion in favour of ethnic separatism and Oromia independence. The Tribunal finds it to be a late embellishment to augment his otherwise weak claims for protection based on his accepted religious affiliation and activities in the past. The Tribunal does not accept the applicant will face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm based on such actual memberships, should he return to Ethiopia, either on arrival or in the community in his home area.

29. Nonetheless, the Tribunal has considered the applicant’s claims that he faces a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm based on being imputed with such a political opinion arising from his ethnicity.

30. On the balance of probability, the Tribunal accepts the applicant’s father-in-law to have supported the OLF. The Tribunal is commensurately open to whether this and other accepted circumstances, cumulatively considered, will amount to the applicant having a well-founded fear of persecution based on an imputed political opinion in favour of an Oromo separatist organisation.

31. The Tribunal has considered the following country information to reach the following decision.

32. (Notwithstanding the country information contained in the August 2020 DFAT report, the Tribunal has been mindful not to be totally persuaded by the information within it. The information is relatively out of date due to significant recent developments.)

33. As the most recent DFAT report mentioned, Ethiopia has witnessed significant changes in the political operating environment since April 2018. Restrictions on political opposition have eased significantly since April 2018, and political parties are able to operate more freely, particularly in Addis Ababa. For instance, in June 2018, federal parliament removed Ginbot7 (Amharic for ‘May 15’, the date of the disputed 2005 election) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) from its list of terrorist organisations. The parties, which maintained armed wings and were committed to the overthrow of the EPRDF through militant means from their bases in Eritrea, were designated as terrorist organisations in June 2011. Ethiopia and Eritrea however signed a formal treaty ending the state of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in September 2018. The land border was reopened in September 2018 but was subsequently closed in April 2019 due to Eritrean concerns over the impact of Ethiopian imports on the local economy.

34. Meanwhile the ruling parties underwent some notable changes. The Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP), formed in December 2019, merged three of the four parties that previously formed the EPRDF (the ODP, ADP and SEPDM) into a single national party. The EPP also includes the former Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), the Benishangul-Gumuz People’s Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF), the Ethiopian Somali People’s Democratic Party (ESPDP), the Gambela People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM) and the Harari National League (HNL). The ANDP, BGPDUF, ESPDP, GPDM and HNL previously governed Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, Gambela and Harari states, respectively. They were affiliated to – but not formally part of – the EPRDF. Prime Minister Abiy justified the formation of the Ethiopian Prosperity Party on national unity grounds, claiming it would buttress efforts to move away from ethnic-based identity politics and toward ‘pan-Ethiopianism’.

35. The TPLF, which traditionally dominated decision-making within the EPRDF but felt marginalised under Abiy, opposed the merger and refused to join. The Government of Tigray, led by the TPLF, engaged in a number of border disputes, predominantly with the Government of Amhara State. Ethnic Tigrayans have clashed with ethnic Amharans in the Welkait and Raya woredas, with both sides claiming foul play by the other. Conflict has persisted in rural areas, and Tigrayans have also been targets for violence in eastern Amhara State (approximately 37,000 Tigrayans were living in Amhara State at the time of the 2007 census).

36. In June 2019, the chief of staff of the National Defence Force (head of the military), General Se’are Mekonnen, and the president of Amhara State, Ambachew Mekonnen, were assassinated in concurrent events in Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar (Amhara State). Both were allied to Prime Minister Abiy, who characterised the assassinations as a failed coup attempt. Federal government forces were deployed to Amhara State and Addis Ababa, and a week-long internet blackout was imposed nationally, in the wake of the alleged coup. Abiy was earlier the subject of a grenade attack at a pro-government rally in Addis Ababa. The authorities described the June 2018 incident as a failed assassination attempt, and five people were charged with terrorism offences. The attack killed two people and injured more than 100.

37. Human Rights Watch[4] reports that longstanding grievances and polarisation over historical and complex issues concerning land, politics and identity have led to violence among ethnic communities in Ethiopia. In 2019 and 2020 violence on 22 university campuses in Oromo and Amhara regions caused approximately 35,000 students to flee.[5] In January 2020, conflict erupted between the Amhara and Oromo groups over the use of the old national flag and decorations during the Orthodox Christian celebration of Epiphany and caused many casualties and loss of property.[6] In what has been viewed as a broadening of the Tigrayan conflict, on 11 August 2021 the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) leader Kumsa Diriba announced that the group had formed an alliance with the TPLF and that there were plans among opposition groups to establish a ‘grand coalition’ against the government.[7] The coalition with the TPLF has been formed in opposition to the government forces despite the atrocities that were inflicted on Oromo people by the TPLF prior to 2018.[8]

    [4] Human Rights Watch, ‘Ethiopia Events 2020’,    ibid

    [6]    ibid

    [7] Associated Press, "Ethiopia Armed Group Says it Has Alliance with Tigray Forces", Anna, Cara, 12 August 2021, ibid

Africa Confidential[9] reports that there is strong backing in the Amhara region for Prime Minister Abiy’s nationalist rhetoric against the TPLF. It further reports that in Prime Minister Abiy’s inauguration speech, he spoke of his plans to hold an inclusive national dialogue to narrow political differences, but emphasised that none of this would involve ‘…the arrogant and the traitors from the northern part of the country…’, namely the TPLF and Tigray. It further reports that Prime Minister Abiy has consistently resisted all pleas to accept mediation over Tigray. It further reports that Amhara State President Yilikal Kefale called for people to rise up ‘to wipe out this anti-Ethiopia traitorous group from the face of the earth’. Africa Confidential further reports that Addis Ababa launched its latest military offensive on the same day as Prime Minister Abiy’s inauguration after a recruitment drive for the armed forces, calling on Amhara and Oromo militias.

[9] Africa Confidential, ‘Abiy’s war party digs in’ (21 October 2021) >

Ethiopia’s election was held on 21 June 2021 after two delays due to COVID-19 and logistical problems.[10] On 10 July 2021, the National Election Board of Ethiopia announced that the ruling party, the Prosperity Party, won 410 seats out of 436 where elections were held, in the federal parliament.[11] The vote was largely peaceful though the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) reported numerous irregularities such as some regions running out of ballot papers, intimidation of observers and the forgery of documents.[12]

[10] 'Ethiopia announces new date for twice-delayed national elections', Aljazeera, 20 May 2021, 20210810103358

[11] 'Ethiopia: Abiy’s Prosperity Party wins landslide election victory', Aljazeera, 10 July 2021, 20210803112911

[12] 'Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy’s Party Wins National Election', BNN Bloomberg, 10 July 2021, 20210811104926

Opposition parties did participate in the federal election, however two of the most prominent opposition parties (Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and the OLF) withdrew from the election due to the alleged harassment of their candidates and the closing of their offices.[13] This meant that the Prosperity Party ran unopposed in several dozen constituencies.[14] The leader of the OFC described the election as ‘political theatre’ and urged observers not to ‘take the election very seriously.’[15]

[13] 'Ethiopia: Abiy’s Prosperity Party wins landslide election victory', Aljazeera, 10 July 2021, 20210803112911; 'Oromo Liberation Front takes queue after OFC, opted out of Election', Borkena.com, 5 March 2021, 20210803120957; 'Why Ethiopia’s 2021 Elections Matter', United States Institute of Peace, 17 June 2021, 20210805151424

[14] 'Ethiopia: Abiy’s Prosperity Party wins landslide election victory', Aljazeera, 10 July 2021, 20210803112911; 'Why Ethiopia’s 2021 Elections Matter', United States Institute of Peace, 17 June 2021, 20210805151424

[15] 'Voting underway in Ethiopia amid conflict and a raging humanitarian crisis', CNN, 21 June 2021, 20210809111823

The International Crisis Group[16] reports that since June 2021, the Tigray region’s forces have turned the tables on the federal military and its allies. It reports that although their offensive has galvanised resistance, especially in the neighbouring Amhara region, Tigray forces have recently made new gains, increasing the pressure on Addis Ababa. It further reports that continued fighting will further destabilise Ethiopia if Tigray forces seek to reclaim western Tigray from Amhara control and combined with an insurgency in the Oromia region and economic challenges, the situation could trigger a collapse in federal authority. It further reports that an August 2021 alliance between the Tigray forces and anti-government insurgents in the central region of Oromia has ratcheted up the likelihood of all-out civil war. It reports that this is something that the Ethiopian state, already buckling under an economic crisis exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, would struggle to withstand.

[16] International Crisis Group, ‘Ethiopia’s Civil War: Cutting a Deal to Stop the Bloodshed’ (26 October 2021) >

The International Crisis Group[17] further reports that the conflict is also escalating in Oromia, Ethiopia’s most populous region, where tensions are running high between the authorities and Oromo nationalists. It reports that Abiy’s government sees the OLA as posing a significant threat, in part because it has the potential to choke trade to and from the capital and is already controlling swathes of rural central and western Oromia, including near Addis Ababa. It reports that in August 2021, the OLA and Tigray forces allied and struck a military cooperation agreement with the stated goal of trying to replace Abiy’s cabinet with a transitional administration.

[17] ibid

The International Crisis Group[18] reports that:

As the violence has escalated, historically rooted tensions between Ethiopia’s two largest communities, the Oromo and Amhara, have continued to flare. In late August 2021, locals and officials said OLA fighters killed more than 100 Amhara civilians in East Wollega Zone. The insurgents said all those killed in fighting were government-affiliated militiamen from Amhara. The turmoil relates to a broader political dispute that involves Oromo nationalists classing Amhara settlers as their main oppressor during an imperial era that ended in 1974. Amhara activists argue that innocent civilians are persecuted by Oromo nationalists and other ethno-nationalists as a result.

If the fault line between Amhara and Oromo widens further, it could set in train other destabilising effects. …these tensions could deepen rifts within the Oromo and Amhara chapters of the country’s ruling Prosperity Party.

The humanitarian and economic crisis related to the conflict could have devastating effects nationwide. Although most suffering is inside Tigray, the war’s spread has created its own emergency in parts of Amhara and Afar…More broadly, further war means that conditions will continue to deteriorate, with Addis [Ababa] unable to impose its authority in several regions that have become restive at the same time. If the Abiy government’s control were to keep dwindling, the end result could even be a disastrous fragmentation of the Horn of Africa’s most populous state, especially given that opposition plans for a transitional administration seem unformed at best and that some other political actors are implacably hostile to the notion of a TPLF-OLA-led interim administration.

[18] ibid

On 30 August 2021, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees[19] reported the deaths of 150 ethnic Amharas allegedly killed by the Oromo Liberation Front in Oromia:

On 26.08.21, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) reported that members of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLA) killed at least 150 ethnic Amhara in Gida Kiremu Woreda (district) in East Welega zone in Oromia regional state. The OLA, a splinter group of the formerly banned opposition Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), denies the allegation saying that it repelled an attack by Amharic militias. Fighting between the OLA and Amharic units has broken out repeatedly in the border region to the regional state of Amhara, especially since the Ethiopian military was withdrawn for the operation in Tigray.

[19] Briefing Notes ', BAMF - Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Germany), 30 August 2021, p.4.

However, despite the optimistic start to Abiy’s leadership, Human Rights Watch[20] reports that the security and human rights situation in Ethiopia has deteriorated amid growing unrest and political tensions. It is reported that the OLF as an opposition party now faces considerable government harassment.[21] In addition, as a result of mistreatment of OLF fighters by the government, the military wing of OLF, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), officially separated from OLF leadership[22] and has continued the armed struggle for self‑determination for the Oromo people in Oromia, creating political insecurity in the region. It is reported that abuses by government security forces, attacks on civilians by armed groups, deadly violence along communal and ethnic lines and a political crisis have all led to human rights abuses.[23]

[20] Human Rights Watch- Ethiopia Events 2020, ETHIOPIAN INSIGHT, ‘GUJI OROMO NEED FREEDOM FROM LIBERATORS’ 3 AUGUST 2020 BY NAGESSA DUBE; Oromo Legacy Leadership Advocacy Association, ‘The Security Situation in Oromia’, by Beresa Abera Jebena

[23] ibid

On 29 June 2020 the popular Oromo singer Hachalu Hundessa was assassinated triggering protests which were met by a heavy-handed security response resulting in large‑scale property destruction and violence by civilians.[24] Hundessa’s songs captured the struggles and frustrations of the Oromo people during the 2014–18 anti-government protest movement.[25] The government’s response, which included cutting internet services across the country, inflamed concerns that the people were being silenced and that human rights abuses and communal violence were not being addressed.[26] It is reported that the attacks heightened the existing social and political tensions, which were further exacerbated by the arrest of members of opposition parties for their alleged connection with the violence. Bekele Gerba (Bekele), deputy leader of the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), and Jawar Mohammed (Jawar), founding director of Oromia Media Network and prominent member of the OFC,[27] were imprisoned on 30 June 2020, charged with terrorism, following a crackdown by the government after Hundessa’s murder.[28] In response, Jawar accused the government of locking up anyone they suspected of being a strong opponent in the next election, claiming that the OFC was more popular than the government.[29] It was reported[30] that the detention of journalists and opposition party members raised concerns that the investigative authorities had not moved on from past practices of arresting first and investigating later.

[24] Human Rights Watch- Ethiopia Events 2020, Human Rights Watch ‘Ethiopia Cracks Down Following Popular Singers Killing’ 1 July 2020 Laetita Bader, Human Rights Watch ‘Ethiopia Cracks Down Following Popular Singers Killing’ 1 July 2020 Laetita Bader, Africsnews.com, 2 January 2020; Borkena Ethiopian News "Why Ethiopian gov't arrested Jawar Mohammed, Bekele Gerba". 6 June 2020 BBC News "Jawar Mohammed: Top Ethiopia opposition figure 'proud' of terror charge". 21 September 2020; Human Rights Watch ‘Ethiopia: Opposition Parties Held without Charge.’ 15 August 2020