1820054 (Refugee)

[2023] AATA 411

1820054 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 411 (10 January 2023)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER:  1820054

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Sierra Leone

MEMBER:David McCulloch

DATE:10 January 2023

PLACE OF DECISION:  Sydney

DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

Statement made on 10 January 2023 at 11:21am

CATCHWORDS

REFUFEE – protection visa – Sierra Leone – political opinion – All People's Congress (APC) activist – political violence – physical assault – attack on home – fear of killing – returnee from the West – decision under review affirmed

LEGISLATION

Migration Act 1958, ss 5(1), 5H, 5J – 5LA, 36, 65, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2

CASES

Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 191
Luu & Anor v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39
MIEA v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559
Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155
Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437
Yao-Jing Li v MIMA (1997) 74 FCR 275       

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 5 July 2018 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

2. The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of Sierra Leone, applied for the visa on 9 May 2018. The delegate refused to grant the visa.

3. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 12 December 2022 at 9.30am to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Krio and English languages. The applicant was represented by a migration agent who attended hearing.

   Criteria for a protection visa

4. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

5. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.

6. A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).

7. Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

8. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

   Mandatory considerations

9. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

   CONSIDERATION OF Claims and evidence

10. The issue in this case is the credibility of the applicant and whether, on accepted claims, the criteria for protection are fulfilled. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.

11. The applicant arrived in Australia [in] March 2018 on a Temporary Activity visa (Aus Govt Endrst Evnt (GG 408)) to attend the 2018 Commonwealth Games. The applicant applied for a protection visa on 9 May 2018. She visited [Country 1] for [a few] days in June 2017. She transited in [specified places] before arriving in Australia.

12. The following information is apparent from the application for protection forms. The applicant was born on [date] in Freetown, Western Area, Sierra Leone. The applicant is a Christian. She speaks, reads and writes English, and speaks Krio. The applicant is married. Her parents are deceased and she has one [sibling] in Sierra Leone. The applicant lived at three addresses in Sierra Leone. The applicant attended high school until [year]. She studied [a range of subjects]. The applicant worked for a private company in [product] sales from January 2000 until December 2007. She worked for Freetown City Council as [an occupation 1] from April 2009 until the time of application.

13. In her application form and in an undated and unsigned statement, the applicant claimed that during her stay in Australia as part of the 2018 Commonwealth Games, she received a series of phone calls that her party, the All People’s Congress (APC), had lost the election. She campaigned against the winning party. She claimed that in March 2018, supporters and senior officials of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) attacked her house in [Town 1], beat her and her [sibling], and attempted to rape her. She stated that she and her [sibling] were molested, persecuted and treated with hostility because of their campaign against the current president. On [a specified day in] April 2018, SLPP supporters, senior officials and the police force went to her home again, brutally beating her husband, raped [a relative], vandalised her house and her car, took valuable property and burned part of her house. Her husband called her once and the applicant has never heard from him and ‘the children’ since. The applicant is afraid to go back to Sierra Leone because the SLPP supporters and officials are killing APC members and they are in full control of all weapons and ammunitions. SLPP people are using unregistered weapons. She claimed that ‘they’ are waiting for her arrival back in Sierra Leone because of how much she spoke out against them. She stated that she cannot relocate because of the danger in all parts of the country.

14. The applicant also provided a signed statement dated 25 May 2018 setting out her claims for protection as follows (not corrected for spelling or grammar, headings and footings omitted, emphasis removed):

    1.     The following is a summary of my claims for protection. It is not an exhaustive statement of what has happened to me in the past or the reasons why I cannot return to my country of origin. I will provide further information in relation to my claims during any interview with the Department of Immigration.

    2.     I left Sierra Leone [in] March 2018 to attend the Commonwealth Games and arrived in Australia [in] March 2018.

    3.     I fear that if I was forced to return to Sierra Leone, I would be seriously harmed because of my political opinion. I am afraid that I will be attacked and killed by SLPP officials, their supporters and campaigners, vigilantes, and the kamajors, who are members of the Mende group in Sierra Leone.

    My background and history

    4.     I was born in Freetown on [date].

    5.     I lived in Freetown until I was married in 2010. I then relocated to [District 1] in the Northern Province of Sierra Leone but I had to travel to Freetown each week to work was [an occupation 1]. I then moved in 2016 to [Town 1] in the Southern Province of Sierra Leone when my husband was transferred there.

    6.     I am married to [Husband A] (born [date]). I have [specified] children, whose names are:

    ·     [Names and dates of birth deleted].

    Political involvement with the All People’s Congress Party

    7.     I have supported the All People’s Congress Party (APC) since I was born and throughout my life. My father was a Member of Parliament representing the APC for [number] years until he died in [year]. Shortly before my father’s death, my family home was attacked by the SLPP because they knew we were heavily involved with the APC and that the APC supported and provided benefits to my family. I believe that the shock of this attack led to my father’s passing.

    8.     My mother continued to support the APC for most of her life until she died in [year], for example as the chairlady of the [named Women’s branch] and as a polling agent at the election polling stations.

    9.     I have fully participated in rallies and house-to-house campaigns for the APC since 2007 when the APC came into power after the SLPP had rules since 1996. It was not safe for me to campaign openly for the APC before that when the SLPP was in power because that would make me a target. Between [specified years] I had been involved in APC school and university clubs.

    10.  I have been a youth leader in Freetown since 2007 because I wanted to support the APC and see them return to power, which they did. I have continued to hold a youth leadership position when I relocated to [District 1] and [Town 1]. I am currently a member of the [Town 1] [Women’s branch], which is involved in the organisation of campaign activities.

    11.  During the recent election campaign, my responsibility was to reach out to people to tell them the good things about APC and APC’s plans for the future in development and education because a majority of the population in [Town 1] support the SLPP.

    12.  I organised meetings and spoke openly and actively against the SLPP and their leader Julius Maade Bio. I warned people what would happen if they elected Julius Maade Bio based on his history of abuse, his disrespect of women and human rights and his previous role as a junta leader. I also told people that Julius Maade Bio used to be involved with the kamajors and that the kamajors would influence his presidency if he were elected.

    13.  I was able to convince many people to support the APC. Because of how publically and strongly we campaigned to reach out to the public, I had a significant public profile within [Town 1] and many people knew that I was associated in this way with the APC. Although I had begun to campaign for the APC in 2007, my role and public profile was greatest in this 2018 election campaign. I have photographs recording my participation in this 2018 campaign.

    Problems in Sierra Leone

    The 2018 elections

    14.  On 7 March 2018, Sierra Leone held a general election to vote for a new president as well as parliamentarians and district representatives. The two key parties in the election were the APC, which had been in power since 2007, and the Sierra Leone’s People’s Party (SLPP). These two parties are the main parties that contest each election in Sierra Leone and they take turns in power, each ruling for ten or more years at a time.

    15.  Neither the APC nor the SLPP received enough votes at the general election on 7 March 2018 and a run-off election was scheduled for 31 March 2018. The SLPP was successful at this run-off election and Julius Maade Bio was previously a junta leader and he does not respect human rights and would not be controlled by any armed forces, which is why I campaigned against him so strongly.

    Political violence

    16.  Political clashes and election-related violence has been reported by multiple sources in the lead-up to the 2018 general election and the subsequent run-off election. Riots and clashes between party supporters broke out in January 2018 and have been a recurring problem since then. The violence has occurred across the country in cities such as Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Kono, Koquima, and Makeni.

    17.  The types of violence reported by the media have included:

    a)Riots, pelting stones, and beatings between party supporters;

    b)Intimidation against candidates and activists;

    c)Attacking, soiling, and vandalising the homes of candidates, their families and their supporters

    d)Burning vehicles and public buildings; and

    e)Tribalism and hate speech.

    My fears if I am returned to Sierra Leone

    18.  Since the SLPP has come into power, violence against APC supporters has continued. Most recently, Yvonne Aki-Sawyerr, the APC candidate who was elected as the Mayor of Freetown was attacked by SLPP supporters who had gathered outside their party headquarters near the Mayor’s office.

    19.  I have already been attacked in my house by a group of SLPP officials, vigilantes and kamajors on [a day in] March 2018. I knew they were all associated with the SLPP because they were wearing green, SLPP T-shirts and the native cloth usually worn by the kamajors. This group entered my home, injured my husband in the head, and beat my [named child]. They also attempted to rape me. I ran for my life into the next room to hide from them and banged [myself] on the door. I still cannot [lie down] without experiencing pain.

    20.  I was lucky that the APC was still in power and the police were marching outside and heard my screams and they rushed in to my house. Even at that time the police could not control the SLPP officials, vigilantes and kamajors. They did not leave until they were satisfied because they believe they own and control [Town 1]. They believe they own and control the south, the east, and even Freetown.

    21.  The next time the SLPP attacked my home was on [a day in] April 2019 when Julius Maade Bio was announced as the winner of the election. I was not there at the time but my husband [called me] at approximately 10pm (local time) to tell me of the attack. The SLPP group rushed into our living room. They beat my [named child] and raped my [specified] daughter in her sleep. The SLPP did not know that I had left Sierra Leone for Australia and threatened my husband to produce me and that they would kill him if he did not produce me. My husband fled from them and called me. He told me that he did not know what happened to our children. He told me that as he was fleeing, the SLPP threw a homemade bottle bomb after him which set our kitchen on fire. My neighbour was able to extinguish the fire.

    22.  Since then I have not been able to communicate with my husband or any of my children. I have asked my neighbour to look out for my children but there has been nothing. I do not know where my husband and where my children are right now but I know that the SLPP are still looking for my entire family. My friend told me on WhatsApp that the SLPP went into my home in [Town 1] almost every day since [that day in] April 2018 to look for us. They have also vandalised my property and my car.

    23.  The SLPP also went to my family home in Freetown where my cousin lives with their family. The SLPP pretended to my cousin that they had information about me because they believe that I am not back in Sierra Leone since I used to stay in that home with my cousin when I travelled from [Town 1] to work in Freetown.

    24.  The SLPP entered my cousin’s home and vandalised it, demanding that my cousin tell them where I am. My cousin called me last Sunday 20 May to tell me that the SLPP threatened to burn down that house if she did not produce me within 2 weeks.

    25.  Most recently, I received a WhatsApp message from my neighbour [in] May 2018. My neighbour advised me that the SLPP went to my house in [Town 1] again because they still believe I am back in Sierra Leone and hiding from them. My neighbour saw the SLPP banging on my house and trying to force themselves into my house. The SLPP are still actively looking for me, my husband, and my children. This has caused me considerable distress and confusion and I have made a pain in my head from this since I heard about this.

    26.  I could not relocate to any other part of Sierra Leone because the SLPP are now in control of the entire country. The SLPP believe they can do anything they want now in [Town 1] and in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone is not safe for anyone who supports the APC – there is not town, municipality, or village where I would be safe. No one wears red in SLPP territory anymore because that colour is associated with the APC. The SLPP, who wear green, will stop and attack or kill you if you try to pass through their base in red.

    27.  I am afraid that there is no protection for me if I return because the authorities could not do anything even before the SLPP came into power. Now that they in power, they are not afraid of anyone. The SLPP do not fear the police, the armed forces, or anyone else. If they can attack the mayor, they are not afraid of anyone. They even attacked the daughter of the former APC President after the election on 14 April 2018. That is why so many APC officials have fled the country and run for their lives. That is why I am afraid that I will be killed if I return to Sierra Leone.

15. The applicant provided the following material to the Department:

    ·National Delegates Conference – Observer card dated from 14 – 15 October 2017.

    ·All Peoples Congress (APC) membership card – district: [District 1].

    ·Press release from Special Assistant to Former President Koroma, Sheriff Mahmud Ismail of the Office of Former President Dr Ernest Bai Koroma dated 18 April 2018, titled, ‘False allegations against former president Koroma and the military by the spokesman of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party.’

    ·The applicant’s visa grant notice for a GG-408 Temporary Activity visa – granted on 19 January 2018.

    ·Letter of reference from [named position] of the National Olympic Committee of Sierra Leone dated [March] 2018.

    ·Photograph with description ‘My House (Kitchen)’ dated [a day in] April 2018.

    ·Undated photograph with description ‘This is me’.

    ·Multiple other undated photographs with no descriptions.

    ·All Peoples Congress (APC) membership card – district [Town 1].

    ·A document that appears to be a social media post, posted by Joseph Fitzgerald Kamara condemning an act committed upon an APC member.

    Independent information

16. The Tribunal notes the following from a report of the Country of Origin Information Services (COISS) of the Department of Home Affairs dated 24 August 2018 in response to the following question asked[1]:

    [1] 'Sierra Leone: CI180817143425932 – All People’s Congress (APC) – Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP)', Country of Origin Information Services Section (COISS), 24 August 2018, CR837DFFB286

    Please provide a general update on the situation in Sierra Leone for APC members and supporters and high profile APC politicians.

    COISS has written several research reports on the treatment of All People’s Congress’ (APC) members since general elections were held in March 2018:

    ·‘Sierra Leone: CI180517160118089 – Political violence – All People’s Congress’, Home Affairs COISS, 24 May 2018, CR837DFFB157

    ·‘Sierra Leone: CI180426115444842 – 1997 coup d’état – Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) – Politically motivated violence – ECOWAS residency and work rights’, Home Affairs COISS, 2 May 2018, CR837DFFB131

    ·‘Sierra Leone: CI180413122032231– Elections – Post-election update’, Home Affairs COISS, 17 April 2018, CR837DFFB118

    This response will focus on the situation since the last of these research requests was written on 24 May 2018.

    Background information about the political situation in Sierra Leone

    The APC party is currently Sierra Leone’s main opposition party. Prior to general elections held in March 2018, the APC had held office since 2007. General elections were held on 7 March 2018, however, as neither the APC nor SLPP presidential candidate won enough seats to form government, a second round of voting was held on 31 March 2018. The SLPP’s Julius Maada Bio won; however, the APC maintains a majority in the parliament.[2]

    [2] ‘Sierra Leone: Are Brawls in Parliament a Sign of Things to Come?’, African Arguments, 26 April 2018, CXBB8A1DA34094

    Observers generally reported a low level of election-related violence. Please see Research Response CI180413122032231 for more information.[3]

    [3] This response is available on CISNET under the reference CR837DFFB118.

    Current situation for APC members and supporters in Sierra Leone

    Limited information is available regarding the treatment of APC members and supporters since the March 2018 elections. The few reports on this topic come from the APC itself. Information on the treatment of high profile APC politicians is provided below.

    On 11 August 2018, local newspaper The Sierra Leone Telegraph reported that ‘APC party grandees say that supporters of the SLPP are violently attacking and intimidating their supporters’.[4] According to the article:

    [4] ‘SLPP officials refute APC allegations of political killing’, The Sierra Leone Telegraph, 11 August 2018, CXBB8A1DA34065

    They are also accusing the ruling SLPP of unfairly sacking their members from public office. But it is the APC allegation of SLPP supporters killing their supporters that has sparked the latest row.[5]

    [5] ‘SLPP officials refute APC allegations of political killing’, The Sierra Leone Telegraph, 11 August 2018, CXBB8A1DA34065

    The SLPP dismissed the allegations as ‘spurious and wide’ and a ‘calculated attempted’ to ‘bring the name of our party into disrepute and cause disaffection among the citizens of the Republic of Sierra Leone.’[6]

    [6] ‘SLPP officials refute APC allegations of political killing’, The Sierra Leone Telegraph, 11 August 2018, CXBB8A1DA34065

    In a statement commenting on the SLPP’s first 100 days in office, published on 26 July 2018, the Secretary-General of the APC party, Osman Foday Yansaneh, provided the following overview of the treatment of APC supporters and officials since the election:

    These uncertainties have been compounded by a spate of marked instances of Human Rights abuses especially aimed at APC public officials and our party-faithful. For example, there was an earlier cowardly attack on the new Mayor of Freetown, Her Worship Yvonne Aki Sawyer by SLPP hoodlums on her way to the office.

    This was followed by recent brazen attack on her in front of her office while other SLPP outlaws, tore down a perimeter fence that was being erected by city workers for the safety of the Mayor and councillors from frequent harassment and physical violence.

    Then, there was the heinous murder of the APC Tonkolili District Youth Leader, Issa Kamara (AKA Adel), Lumley Zonal Chairman, Abu Bakarr Kamara and the ensuing harassment of APC Ministers together with the violent attacks on APC supporters across the nation.

    There were also forceful displacement of Women and Children of APC families from homes of their birth to distant districts while the SLPP lawlessness extended to the looting and burning of shops and homes belonging to APC adherents.

    Other attacks on APC offices, unwarranted detentions and travel bans on political opponents among other instances of Human Right abuses have become a commonplace.

    Most shocking is that the government grounded the Cross-party Committee report, a Committee the APC leadership asked H.E. President Maada Bio for because of the unbearable post-election violence, which was thoroughly investigated by all political parties in Parliament, the SLP, the military, the Sierra Leone Human Rights Commission, the Inter-Religious Council and local stakeholders nationwide.

    For the most part, women and children, the most vulnerable members of our society, have been the most affected. For Example:

    The Cross-party Committee discovered despicable human rights violations on especially women. One notable example was the gang rape of one Sata Lamin, an APC supporter, by several men in Kailahun.[7]

    [7] ‘Opposition APC attacks president Bio’s first one hundred days in office’, The Sierra Leone Telegraph, 26 July 2018, CXBB8A1DA34066

    In June 2018, the former leader of the APC, Samura Mathew Wilson Kamara, noted the ‘supporters of the APC were harassed and humiliated after the pronouncement of the Presidential results.[8]

    [8] ‘*Under Bio’s New Direction, Sierra Leone Becoming Divided, Says Samura Kamara*’, Cocorioko, 28 June 2018, CXBB8A1DA34067

    Current situation for high profile APC politicians in Sierra Leone

    COISS located two incidents of violence involving high profile APC politicians in Freetown since the March 2018 elections.

    On 25 May 2018, Awoko reported that the newly elected APC major of Freetown, Yvonne Aki-Sawyer, was ‘verbally and physically assaulted outside her Freetown City Council office.’[9] According to the article, police had made no arrests and investigations continued; COISS could not find an update.[10] The APC claimed that the attack was perpetrated by ‘irate and rowdy supporters’ of the SLPP. In a press release, the SLPP ‘disassociated itself from the attack and called on police to investigate the matter and bring to book those responsible for the act’.[11] According to the Sierra Leone Telegraph:

    [9] ‘Strong reactions to attack on Mayor’, Awoko Newspaper, 25 May 2018, CXBB8A1DA31028

    [10] Sources consulted include CISNET, UNHCR Refworld, The European Country of Origin Information Network (ECOI), US Department of State, NGO and human rights organisations, local news sources and major international newspapers

    [11] ‘Strong reactions to attack on Mayor’, Awoko Newspaper, 25 May 2018, CXBB8A1DA31028

    Fingers have been pointed in all sorts of directions and press releases have been issued by both the APC and SLPP.

    SLPP haters have been quick to accuse the party especially as their office was close by. Others have accused some disaffected traders.

    The poisoned atmosphere has been smothered considerably by Mayor Aki Sawyerr herself being very conciliatory and not pointing fingers and the SLPP top brass doing a good job of reaching out.

    The picture of SLPP’s Secretary General Umaru Napoleon Koroma and Political Affairs Minister, Foday Yumkella meeting the Mayor looked reassuring. The SLPP also issued a press release.[12]

    [12] ‘Yvonne Aki Sawyerr – a Mayor in a mare’s nest’, Sierra Leone Telegraph, 31 May 2018, CXBB8A1DA34119

    On 6 June 2018, Cocorioko[13] reported that the APC’s Zonal Chairman in Freetown, Abu Bakarr Kamara, was killed after he was ‘attacked and killed by thugs supporting the ruling Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP).’[14] According to the article, ‘this was revealed by family members of the victim and other witnesses to the incident who spoke to this newspaper.’[15] The report quotes the victim’s brother as stating that Abu Bakarr Kamara was ‘the main’ APC ‘chairman’ in the Sherrif Drive Zonal ward area.[16] On 8 June 2018, The Awareness Times newspaper also reported the death of Abu Bakarr Kamara, stating:

    [13] For background information about Cocorioko, please see <

    [14] ‘APC waiting on SLPP Government to respond to complaint about killing of its Zonal Chairman’, Cocorioko, 06 June 2018, CIS7B839411453

    [15] ‘APC waiting on SLPP Government to respond to complaint about killing of its Zonal Chairman’, Cocorioko, 06 June 2018, CIS7B839411453

    [16] ‘APC waiting on SLPP Government to respond to complaint about killing of its Zonal Chairman’, Cocorioko, 06 June 2018, CIS7B839411453

    One such topical one concerns the late Mr. Abu-Bakarr Kamara, an APC Zonal Chairman in Lumley, Freetown who has lost his life and once again, his murder is allegedly at the hands of seven SLPP supporters.

    In this latest extra-judicial killing which occured on Saturday May 26th 2018, there have emerged very serious allegations from Mr. Cornelius Deveaux, the National Publicity Secretary of the now-opposition APC that highly placed officials of the now-ruling SLPP-led Government within State House, Ministry of Internal Affairs which supervises the Police, the Sierra Leone Police itself, Ministry of Youth Affairs, an elected SLPP official and staff of a local radio station FM98.1, are engaged in a massive cover-up to mask the fact that there was political bad blood behind the murder of Mr. Abu-Bakarr Kamara, an APC Zonal Chairman for Lumley in Western Area. This newspaper is however holding on to the full allegations until we complete getting the side of all concerned. If we are unable to reach all the required sides by close of business today, we will go ahead and publish our findings as gathered so far.

    Meanwhile, the late Abubakarr Kamara was laid to rest last week Friday June 1st 2018, amidst weeping and wailing of thousands of APC members and other sympathizers. Mr. Franklyn Kamanda, a brother of then killed APC Chairman and the wife of the deceased APC Chairman have extended thanks to the APC for the solidarity and support shown to the family. They however urge the Government and the Police to not only speed up the investigations into the murder but to also provide security protection for the family at the residence. They say they fear for their lives. The wife, who is herself also an APC Chairlady, is with a young toddler she had with the murdered APC chairman.[17]

    In an undated article, the Standard Times Press Newspaper provided further background information about Abu Bakarr Kamara:

    One of the victims that have suffered a lot from SLPP thuggery is Abu Bakarr Kamara, Organizing Secretary for the now opposition All People’s Congress Party (APC). He has not only suffered from being an APC Party Executive Member, but also an Activist on Social Media, who is been accused of sharing defamatory materials against some senior SLPP Officials.

    Kamara’s family are now facing the brunt after their house at New Site in Bo District was burned down by SLPP thugs were that were armed with offensive weapons as they went in search of the Social Media Activist.

    It can be recalled on 10th January 2018, thugs armed with sticks and knives attacked Kamara and beats him up severely. He has been declared wanted by the leader of the thugs called Arata, who is notorious for attacking those considered as APC supporters in the south.

    Abu Bakarr Kamara is reportedly in hiding with a broken leg caused by the SLPP thug, Arata since 10th January 2018. Kamara who reported that he is not safe in Sierra Leone has been persistently attacked with his APC Chairlady who is also missing since they were last attacked on 4th April 2018 when the SLPP won the elections. He left for his hiding place…

    The National Publicity Secretary of the APC party, Mr. Cornelius Deveaux confirmed that the APC party has “received the report of the death of Abu Bakarr Kamara who was allegedly killed by supporters of the ruling SLPP government” and that “the APC is waiting for the post-mortem report”. He added that after the post-mortem report, the APC party will make its position and decisions known to the public. He, therefore, called on all APC supporters to remain calm and law-abiding. He added that the latest incidents have caused some party supporters to also flee the country to join those that had previously fled after the Presidential elections.[18]

    [17] ‘SLPP Murderer Gets 40 Years Sentence in Kenema for Killing an APC Supporter!’, Awareness Times Newspaper, 4 June 2018, CXBB8A1DA34068

    [18] ‘Widespread political violence and intimidation: Thugs hunt for APC Organizing Secretary’, Standard Times Press Newspaper, August 2018, CXBB8A1DA34069

1. The Tribunal notes the further research undertaken by COISS dated 19 November 2021:[19]

   [19] 'Sierra Leone: 20211008163242 - Political Situation - Political Parties - Violence - Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) - All People’s Congress (APC) - Activists - Journalists - Poro Society - Recruitment - Athletes Overstaying Abroad - Tribal Affiliations', Country of Origin Information Services Section (COISS), 19 November 2021, 20211123103128

   Please provide a snapshot of the current political situation in Sierra Leone.

   In March 2018, the opposition Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) candidate, Julius Maada Bio, won the presidential election in a second-round run-off. In the 2018 parliamentary election, the All People's Congress (APC) retained its majority in parliament. Following a High Court decision in May 2019 to remove ten APC members of parliament for allegedly violating electoral laws during the election campaign, and replace them with nine SLPP members, with the tenth to be chosen through a by-election, the SLPP became the largest party in parliament. In March 2021, following a by-election, the SLPP held 59 seats in parliament and the APC 58 seats. In June 2021, it was reported that the SLPP may have lost its majority in parliament after the National Electoral Commission declared an SLPP Member of Parliament the newly elected Paramount Chief of Sambaia Chiefdom.  

   The US Department of State (USDOS) report on human rights practices in Sierra Leone for 2020 states that ‘Sierra Leone is a constitutional republic with a directly elected president and a unicameral legislature’.[20] The report continues:

   [20] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Sierra Leone', US Department of State, 30 March 2021, Executive Summary, p.1, 20210409135837

   In March 2018 the opposition Sierra Leone People’s Party [SLPP] candidate, Julius Maada Bio, won the presidential elections. In January 2018 parliamentary elections, the All People’s Congress [APC] won a plurality of the seats. After the December 12 election re-run and by-elections, the Sierra Leone People’s Party and the All People’s Congress each held 58 seats. Observers found these elections to be largely free and fair.[21]

   [21] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Sierra Leone', US Department of State, 30 March 2021, Executive Summary, p.1, Section 3, pp.12-13, 20210409135837

   According to a 2021 Freedom House report:

   In the March 2018 presidential election, Julius Maada Bio of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) defeated Samura Kamara of the incumbent All People’s Congress (APC) and succeeded term-limited predecessor Ernest Bai Koroma. Bio won nearly 52 percent of the vote in the second round. Allegations of violence and voter intimidation marred the campaign period. Nevertheless, international observers determined that the election was credible, praising the National Election Commission (NEC) for effectively fulfilling its duties despite budget constraints, logistical challenges, and pressure from the government, which disbursed election funds late and occasionally threatened to withhold resources.[22]

   [22] 'Freedom in the World 2021 - Sierra Leone', Freedom House, 2021, A1, pp.2-3, 20211001084356

   The 2021 Freedom House report also indicates that ‘[d]uring the 2018 parliamentary elections, the APC retained its majority, winning 68 seats, while the SLPP increased its share to 49 seats. The Coalition for Change won 8 seats, the National Grand Coalition (NGC) took 4, and independents captured the remaining 3. Despite some procedural errors, international observers considered the parliamentary elections credible’.[23]

   [23] 'Freedom in the World 2021 - Sierra Leone', Freedom House, 2021, A2, p.3, 20211001084356

   The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) 2020 country report on Sierra Leone refers to general elections being ‘held in Sierra Leone in March 2018 to elect the president, parliament and local councils’.[24] Julius Maada Bio of the SLPP won the presidency following a second round of voting, while the APC ‘took the majority of seats in the parliament’.[25] The report indicates that ‘[t]he election was deemed “free and fair” by international observers, and violence between supporters of the two parties remained on a low level. The transition of power was overall smooth and formally strengthened democratic procedures’.[26] The report also indicates, however, that in mobilising the electorate, ‘both parties resorted to exploiting existing ethno-regional divides within the country… As in the past, political mass support was generated by accentuating ethnicity rather than presenting competing political visions and programs. This resulted in the deepening of societal antagonisms and contravened the peace consolidation processes’.[27] The APC was ‘deeply rooted in the northern regions and in the Temne and Limba ethnic groups’, while ‘the SLPP remains more or less a Mende party based in the southeastern parts of the country’.[28]

   [24] 'BTI 2020 Country Report Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 29 April 2020, p.3, 20200430165835

   [25] 'BTI 2020 Country Report Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 29 April 2020, p.3, 20200430165835

   [26] 'BTI 2020 Country Report Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 29 April 2020, p.3, 20200430165835

   [27] 'BTI 2020 Country Report Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 29 April 2020, p.3, 20200430165835

   [28] 'BTI 2020 Country Report Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 29 April 2020, p.12, 20200430165835

   The 2021 Freedom House report notes that ‘[i]n March 2019, APC members of Parliament (MPs) staged a walkout over the SLPP’s efforts to remove several APC lawmakers. That May, the High Court ruled in favor of an SLPP petition alleging APC electoral fraud in 2018, resulting in the removal of 10 MPs and a [sic] securing a parliamentary majority for the SLPP’. The APC had ‘filed a petition for the Supreme Court to hear the case in October 2020’.[29] The Economist Intelligence Unit also reported that ‘[f]ollowing a High Court decision in May 2019 to remove ten APC members of parliament (for allegedly violating electoral law during the election campaign) and replace them with nine SLPP members (with the tenth to be chosen through a by-election), the SLPP is now the largest party in parliament’.[30]

   [29] 'Freedom in the World 2021 - Sierra Leone', Freedom House, 2021, A2, p.3, 20211001084356

   [30] ‘Sierra Leone - Political structure’, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1 March 2021, 20211116173721

   A November 2019 statistical factsheet in relation to the members of Sierra Leone’s fifth parliament indicates that at that time, the SLPP held 59 seats in parliament and the APC 57 seats, with one seat in Constituency 110 vacant and subject to a by-election.[31]

   [31] ‘Statistical Factsheet of Members of the Fifth Parliament of the Second Republic of Sierra Leone’, Parliament of Sierra Leone, 25 November 2019, p.2, 20211117124722

   The USDOS report on human rights practices in Sierra Leone for 2020 states that ‘[s]everal parliamentary and local re-run and by-elections’ were held on 12 December 2020,[32] following which ‘the Sierra Leone People’s Party and the All People’s Congress each held 58 seats’ in parliament.[33]

   [32] Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Sierra Leone', US Department of State, 30 March 2021, Executive Summary, p.1, Section 3, p.13, 20210409135837

   [33] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Sierra Leone', US Department of State, 30 March 2021, Executive Summary, p.1, 20210409135837

   A March 2021 press release by the Parliament of Sierra Leone indicates that after the swearing in of Zainab Kama Brima, who had recently won a by-election in Constituency 010 in Kailahun District following the death of the Hon. Samuel Gafter, the ‘current standings of political parties in Parliament’ were ‘SLPP 59; APC 58; C4C 08; NGC 04; Independent MPs 03; and 14 Paramount Chief Members of Parliament; totaling 146’.[34]

   [34] ‘New Member of Parliament Takes Oath of Office’, Parliament of Sierra Leone, 4 March 2021, 20211117114923

   In June 2021, The Sierra Leone Telegraph reported, with reference to Dr Sylvia Olayinka Blyden, that the SLPP had lost its majority in parliament after ‘the National Electoral Commission declared that SLPP’s Hon. Member of Parliament representing Tonkolili Constituency 056, is now the newly elected Paramount Chief of Sambaia Chiefdom’. The article indicates that Section 74(1)(a) of Sierra Leone’s Constitution ‘says only one Paramount Chief Member of Parliament (PCMP) per district. Tonkolili already has Hon. Bai Kurr as PCMP’. Also, under Section 77(1)(f) of the Constitution, when ‘an Ordinary Member of Parliament becomes a Paramount Chief, his seat as an MP is to be immediately vacated’.[35]

   [35] ‘SLPP no longer has a majority in Sierra Leone’s parliament’, Thomas, A R, The Sierra Leone Telegraph, 4 June 2021, 20211117134429

   The USDOS report on human rights practices in Sierra Leone for 2020 indicates that Sylvia Blyden is a ‘former minister of social welfare, gender and children’s affairs and a journalist and opposition All People’s Congress (APC) party member’’.[36]

   [36] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Sierra Leone', US Department of State, 30 March 2021, Section 1(d), p.7, 20210409135837

   What is the current level of political violence, harassment, intimidation, etc., between political parties in Sierra Leone?

   As mentioned in the answer to Question 1 above, the BTI 2020 country report on Sierra Leone indicates that the 2018 election in Sierra Leone ‘was deemed “free and fair” by international observers, and violence between supporters of the two parties [the SLPP and the APC] remained on a low level. The transition of power was overall smooth and formally strengthened democratic procedures’.[37] The report also indicates, however, that in mobilising the electorate, ‘both parties resorted to exploiting existing ethno-regional divides within the country… As in the past, political mass support was generated by accentuating ethnicity rather than presenting competing political visions and programs. This resulted in the deepening of societal antagonisms and contravened the peace consolidation processes’.[38] The APC was ‘deeply rooted in the northern regions and in the Temne and Limba ethnic groups’, while ‘the SLPP remains more or less a Mende party based in the southeastern parts of the country’.[39]

   [37] 'BTI 2020 Country Report Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 29 April 2020, p.3, 20200430165835

   [38] 'BTI 2020 Country Report Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 29 April 2020, p.3, 20200430165835

   [39] 'BTI 2020 Country Report Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 29 April 2020, p.12, 20200430165835

   The BTI report further states that ‘[o]rganized violence remained at a fairly low level during the review period [from 1 February 2017 to 31 January 2019], but the potential for mass violence remains high’. Antagonism between the APC and the SLPP had ‘led to violent clashes in the run-up to the general elections in March 2018. This was not unexpected. Despite an agreement to prevent violence between supporters of each party, signed by both parties in 2009, their radicalized youth organizations are prone to the use of violence’.[40]

   [40] 'BTI 2020 Country Report Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 29 April 2020, p.25, 20200430165835

   An April 2018 article in The Economist refers to ‘[t]ensions based on ethnic, political and regional divisions’ simmering throughout the 2018 election campaign. When the result was announced, ‘[s]upporters of Mr Bio’s Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) attacked followers of the APC, which previously held the presidency. Much of the violence’ had ‘taken place in the SLPP’s southern strongholds. But more than 100 people’ had ‘also fled Kono, a volatile swing state in the east’.[41]

   [41] ‘A little hope in Sierra Leone - Sierra Leone’s new president has made big promises’, The Economist, 14 April 2018, 20211116182555

   The 2021 Freedom House report also states that [a]llegations of violence and voter intimidation marred the campaign period’ of the March 2018 presidential election. The report notes that ‘[n]evertheless, international observers determined that the election was credible, praising the National Election Commission (NEC) for effectively fulfilling its duties despite budget constraints, logistical challenges, and pressure from the government, which disbursed election funds late and occasionally threatened to withhold resources’.[42]

   [42] 'Freedom in the World 2021 - Sierra Leone', Freedom House, 2021, A1, pp.2-3, 20211001084356

   The Amnesty International 2020/21 report notes that ‘[t]he political tensions between the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party and the All People's Congress (APC), the main opposition party, persisted’.[43]

   [43] 'Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of the World's Human Rights', Amnesty International, 6 April 2021, p.316, 20210407093348

   A December 2020 report on political violence in Sierra Leone produced by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) in partnership with Clingendael - the Netherlands Institute of International Relations and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding-Sierra Leone (WANEP-SL), indicates that there were ‘early signs… that political violence in the country is on the rise’. The report notes that ‘there is limited evidence to make substantial claims about an increase or decrease of political violence and its drivers. Presently, debates in the country about political violence are often based on perceptions and anecdotes which cannot be taken at face value’.[44] It is stated in the report that ‘[c]ombined data from ACLED, WANEP-SL, and SL-LED [Sierra Leone - Local Event Dataset] show that political violence in Sierra Leone is increasing. Since 2014-2015, a slow increase in political violence has been recorded. Violence peaked around the 2018 elections and has remained at high levels since’. Most political violence in the country was ‘driven by political competition’. Local politics had ‘become increasingly subservient to national politics’. There were ‘various examples of how very local communal conflicts are becoming entangled with the tensions at the center between the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and All People’s Congress (APC), as well as between factions within both parties’.[45] The report notes that in the period after the March 2018 elections in Sierra Leone:

   [44] ‘When Emerging Democracies Breed Violence: Sierra Leone 20 Years After the Civil War’, de Bruijne, K, Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), December 2020, p.5, 20211119081124

   [45] ‘When Emerging Democracies Breed Violence: Sierra Leone 20 Years After the Civil War’, de Bruijne, K, Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), December 2020, p.7, 20211119081124

   Rather than a decline in violence — as is common during a post-election period — political violence in Sierra Leone accelerated. Since September 2018, political violence increased to about 10 events per month, with occasional peaks of nearly 30 events (an average of one incident every day of the month). All three forms of competitive violence have increased: direct clashes between political parties, internal party violence, and violence targeting civilians by or directed against political parties have all significantly risen…

   This report finds that the rising levels of violence are a result of increasing political competition in Sierra Leone, first in the form of electoral violence and then in the form of competitive party violence outside of elections. This violence is intimately tied to attempts to rebuild Sierra Leone after the war. Political competition has been institutionalized through the building of political parties and re-introducing competition at the local level.[46]

   [46] ‘When Emerging Democracies Breed Violence: Sierra Leone 20 Years After the Civil War’, de Bruijne, K, Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), December 2020, p.19, 20211119081124

   The reasons for the increase in political competition were firstly, ‘that the APC and SLPP are increasingly at loggerheads and are willing to use violence against one another’.[47] Secondly, ‘local actors have increasingly become a target for national politicians and political parties in post-war Sierra Leone’, with the main result being ‘that the country’s political party cleavage between the SLPP and APC is reproduced at nearly every local level’. A third reason for the rise in political violence is ‘there are more and more internal factional party fights, and these fights are accompanied by violence’.[48] According to the report:

   [47] ‘When Emerging Democracies Breed Violence: Sierra Leone 20 Years After the Civil War’, de Bruijne, K, Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), December 2020, p.20, 20211119081124

   [48] ‘When Emerging Democracies Breed Violence: Sierra Leone 20 Years After the Civil War’, de Bruijne, K, Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), December 2020, p.21, 20211119081124

   In summary, political violence is driven by a number of different factors and perpetrated by a host of actors in Sierra Leone. However, the recent increase in violence has clearly identifiable characteristics and causes. Violence is rising because of increasing political competition for formal state and party offices and to ensure local allegiance to institutionalized parties.[49]

   The USDOS report on human rights practices in Sierra Leone for 2020 indicates that the non-governmental organisation (NGO), the Center for Accountability and Rule of Law, reported there were clashes in Freetown between supporters of the APC and SLPP in January 2020. In an incident on 27 January 2020, ‘27 persons were reportedly wounded. Police arrested 19 persons after the clash; all were later released on bail’.[50]

   An article in The Sierra Leone Telegraph dated 14 January 2020 refers to ‘at least one person – an APC supporter’ being seriously injured ​in violence that occurred ‘outside the opposition All People’s Congress (APC) party office’. It was ‘not clear what started the violence, but from various video clips published on social media, large crowds of APC supporters could be seen shouting about being attacked by supporters of the ruling SLPP party, who they said were throwing stones at the APC supporters’. APC supporters claimed ‘the minister of internal affairs – Lahai Lawrence Leema, who is responsible for the country’s police force, was seen driving past the APC party office at the time of the attack on their supporters’. There were ‘some eye witness reports’ that the attack on the APC supporters started when a funeral cortege of a senior SLPP supporter drove past the APC party office. There had been similar violence a few months previously ‘at the APC party office when police stormed the office in an attempt to arrest supporters who they said were throwing stones at the police and SLPP supporters’.[51]

   A July 2020 US Overseas Security Advisory Council crime and safety report on Sierra Leone states that ‘[p]olitical violence is sporadic and normally increases during election periods’. The report also states that ‘[p]olitical demonstrations and rallies are generally peaceful, but sporadic clashes do occur, often instigated by individuals within the crowds. Participants at political rallies are easily incited and may use weapons of opportunity, including sticks and rocks. Strong rivalries exist in Sierra Leone; participants at large demonstrations can become aggressive toward one another and the police. The police deploy crowd-control techniques, including the firing of warning shots and use of tear gas’.[52]

   An October 2019 article from African Arguments indicates that in the 18 months since the general election, Sierra Leone had held by-elections that had ‘been marred by political violence and accusations of malpractice’. The article refers to the comments of Marcella Samba-Sesay from the Campaign for Good Governance, who said that by-elections in Sierra Leone had ‘become battlegrounds for “a [wider] fight between the APC and SLPP that permeates every space in society, including state institutions”’.[53]

   A June 2019 Radio France Internationale (RFI) article indicates that the decision by Sierra Leone's High Court to cancel the election of 10 opposition MPs for alleged breaches of the electoral law during the March 2018 legislative polls, which resulted in the ruling SLPP regaining ‘a one-seat majority in the chamber (58 against 57 for the APC the opposition)’, had prompted ‘the disqualified MPs to barricade themselves in their offices, while their supporters clashed with police in the capital Freetown’.[54] It was reported that ‘more than one hundred people including former ministers and a sitting MP’ were ‘detained in connection with the violence’. They ‘had been released on bail and 38 of them charged’. The article also indicates that some observers saw the High Court ‘ruling delivered outside the court’s mandate, as the latest evidence of continued manipulation of the judiciary by President Julius Maada Bio’s government’.[55] Sierra Leone’s ‘influential Cocorioco newspaper’ had also criticised ‘a scheme by President Bio’s government to “deliberately and systematically eliminate natives of some Sierra Leone tribes, from key positions in the civil service and government institutions”’. The publication cited ‘the recent sacking of members of the Human Rights Commission and their replacement with people from Bio’s Mende tribe as an example of the so-called “jobnocide” taking place’.[56]

   An April 2019 article from African Arguments indicates that a year after the 2018 election in Sierra Leone, the political scene was ‘fraught with tensions’. There was ‘a Commission of Inquiry set up to investigate corruption between September 2007 and April 2018 – i.e. the latest period of APC rule’. An April 2018 ‘transition report named various former APC officials accused of corruption, which was followed up with several high-level arrests, including of former ministers, an ambassador and bank director. At the same time, the Anti-Corruption Commission engaged in unprecedented levels of activity, inviting individuals such as former president Ernest Bai Koromo to give testimony’. The APC had ‘refused to appear before the Commission of Inquiry until “certain conditions are met” relating to the body’s mandate’.[57] Sierra Leone’s change of government had ‘led to several APC officials – from low- to high-level bureaucrats across various ministries, departments and agencies – being sacked or moved’. As well, ‘the heads of sometimes very local organisations and unions – such as those representing drivers, petty traders and money exchangers’, had ‘also been replaced or pressured, demonstrating the SLPP’s formidable grassroots structure and determination’.[58]

   The article indicates that Sierra Leone was ‘also witnessing a rise in small-scale violence. Data from ACLED, supplemented by information from local organisations’, suggested that political violence had ‘risen since 2013-2014, possibly as politicians began employing gangs. This accelerated, however, in the build-up to the March 2018 elections’ and had ‘not reduced since’. These clashes were ‘not limited to one political group’ and had ‘occurred across the country’.[59] This low-level violence typically arose ‘around contentious local issues such as the leadership of markets or student union elections’. It did ‘not challenge the state’ and was ‘not organised around armed groups’. It was ‘driven by different groups such as formal party security (often trained ex-combatants), informal party “Task Forces” (violent youth groups) or secret societies’. Some of this violence was ‘also increasingly conducted by gangs who are often hired by politicians to start riots, “organise crowds” or intimidate opponents’.[60] According to the article, Sierra Leone’s politics and ongoing low-level violence posed ‘serious concerns, but for the moment, both seem relatively contained’. Politically, the APC seemed ‘too divided to mount a sustained challenge to the SLPP’. In relation to the violence, it also seemed ‘unlikely that political tension will translate into significantly increased instability’. President Maada Bio and his faction, known as paopa, had ‘tight control over the security realm with party intelligence networks in many places. There are claims of ethno-regional rifts within the military and police, but Bio’s decision to keep the APC-appointed head of the army and police (controlling subordinates who generally oppose the SLPP) suggests he can walk this tightrope’.[61]

   An earlier September 2018 Agence France-Presse article indicates that a violent altercation between supporters of the ruling SLPP and the opposition APC during a local by-election in Sierra Leone had left a teenager dead and prompted polling station staff to immediately suspend the ballot. It was not clear what had sparked the confrontation, but an APC spokesman expressed anger over the cancellation of the ballot.[62]

   [49] ‘When Emerging Democracies Breed Violence: Sierra Leone 20 Years After the Civil War’, de Bruijne, K, Armed Conflict Location ＆ Event Data Project (ACLED), December 2020, p.21, 20211119081124

   [50] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Sierra Leone', US Department of State, 30 March 2021, Section 3, p.13, 20210409135837

   [51] 'Another senseless bloody violence erupts at APC party office in Freetown', The Sierra Leone Telegraph, 14 January 2020, 20200130101219

   [52] 'Sierra Leone 2020 Crime & Safety Report', Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), 4 July 2020, 20210924101412

   [53] ‘Sierra Leone: How the SLPP took power. And then took some more.’, Enria, L & Hitchen, J, African Arguments, 28 October 2019, 20211118133107

   [54] 'Focus on Africa: Sierra Leone court annuls election of opposition MPs', Niba, W, rfi, 5 June 2019, 20190607170024; See also: 'Strife hampers Bio's reforms', Africa Confidential, 21 September 2020, 20200925095415; ‘Sierra Leone: How the SLPP took power. And then took some more.’, Enria, L & Hitchen, J, African Arguments, 28 October 2019, 20211118133107; '“We condemn SLPP unconstitutionality and brutality” – says opposition APC', The Sierra Leone Telegraph, 3 June 2019, 20200508171628

   [55] 'Focus on Africa: Sierra Leone court annuls election of opposition MPs', Niba, W, rfi, 5 June 2019, 20190607170024

   [56] 'Focus on Africa: Sierra Leone court annuls election of opposition MPs', Niba, W, rfi, 5 June 2019, 20190607170024

   [57] ‘Sierra Leone: The new government’s tense struggle for control a year on’, De Bruijne, K, African Arguments, 18 April 2019, 20211116075802

   [58] ‘Sierra Leone: The new government’s tense struggle for control a year on’, De Bruijne, K, African Arguments, 18 April 2019, 20211116075802

   [59] ‘Sierra Leone: The new government’s tense struggle for control a year on’, De Bruijne, K, African Arguments, 18 April 2019, 20211116075802

   [60] ‘Sierra Leone: The new government’s tense struggle for control a year on’, De Bruijne, K, African Arguments, 18 April 2019, 20211116075802

   [61] ‘Sierra Leone: The new government’s tense struggle for control a year on’, De Bruijne, K, African Arguments, 18 April 2019, 20211116075802

   [62] ‘Teen killed as violence hits S.Leone by-election’, Agence France-Presse, 30 September 2018, 20211112174354; See also: ‘Sierra Leone: How the SLPP took power. And then took some more.’, Enria, L & Hitchen, J, African Arguments, 28 October 2019, 20211118133107

1. For the purpose of this and another application, the Tribunal made a request of COISS to update the last extracted report in terms of political violence in Sierra Leone. The Tribunal’s question, and response provided on 14 October 2022, is extracted below:

   Please update the COISS report of 19 November 2021 in relation to the current level of political violence, harassment and intimidation, etc., between political parties in Sierra Leone, particularly in relation to adverse treatment of APC members. It is noted that the November 2021 report refers to increasing political violence since the 2018 elections in the potential for mass violence.

   Question 2 of a COISS Q&A report dated 19 November 2021 provides information on the level of political violence, harassment and intimidation, etc., between political parties in Sierra Leone at that time.[63] The Q&A report refers to a Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) 2020 country report on Sierra Leone which states that ‘[o]rganized violence remained at a fairly low level during the review period [from 1 February 2017 to 31 January 2019], but the potential for mass violence remains high’. Antagonism between the All People’s Congress (APC) and the SLPP had ‘led to violent clashes in the run-up to the general elections in March 2018. This was not unexpected. Despite an agreement to prevent violence between supporters of each party, signed by both parties in 2009, their radicalized youth organizations are prone to the use of violence’.[64]

   [63] 'Sierra Leone: 20211008163242 - Political Situation - Political Parties - Violence - Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) - All People’s Congress (APC) - Activists - Journalists - Poro Society - Recruitment - Athletes Overstaying Abroad - Tribal Affiliations - Mende Tribe - Temne Tribe', Country of Origin Information Services Section (COISS), 19 November 2021, 20211123103128

   [64] 'BTI 2020 Country Report Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 29 April 2020, p.25, 20200430165835

   Question 5 of a more recent COISS Q&A report dated 18 March 2022 looks at whether APC supporters faced ill-treatment from SLPP supporters during 2021 and 2022.[65] The Q&A report refers to a 2022 Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index country report on Sierra Leone, which covers the period from 1 February 2019 to 31 January 2021. The 2022 BTI report repeats the wording of the previous report, stating that ‘[o]rganized violence has remained on a fairly low level during the review period, but the potential for mass violence remains high’.[66] The report also comments that ‘[i]n an ongoing process, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) enquires into corruption under the rule of the All People’s Congress (APC) rule spanning from 2007 to 2018’, while ‘[t]he APC questions the constitutional legality of the process’. As a result, political antagonisms had ‘been perpetuated, contravening collaborative reconciliation and confidence-building processes’.[67] The report states that ‘[i]n mobilizing electorates, both parties have resorted to exploit the existing ethnoregional divide within the country’. In December 2020, a by-election won by the APC in Constituency 110, Freetown Peninsula, ‘was overshadowed by violence and allegations of fraud’.[68] The report notes that ‘since [President Julius Maada] Bio took power after the March 2018 general elections, the police seem to enforce SLPP objectives and have been accused of having a pro-SLPP bias’. There had been ‘[h]eavy-handed crackdowns on opposition supporters, arrests of former APC government officials’ and enforcement of ‘a travel ban on persons under investigation by the COI [Commission of Inquiry]’, which ‘all suggest that the SLPP has consolidated its control over the SLP [Sierra Leone Police]’.[69] The report also states that ‘[a] main obstacle to reform is increasing antagonism between the SLPP and the APC, preventing a collaborative policy approach. The main political actors appear not to be guided by lessons from past experiences to collaborate for the common good of the country’.[70]

   [65] 'Sierra Leone 20220225175206 – Media credibility [redacted]', Country of Origin Information Services Section (COISS), 18 March 2022, 20220318153626

   [66] 'BTI 2022 Country Report - Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 23 February 2022, p.28, 20220301124010

   [67] 'BTI 2022 Country Report - Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 23 February 2022, p.3, 20220301124010

   [68] 'BTI 2022 Country Report - Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 23 February 2022, p.9, 20220301124010

   [69] 'BTI 2022 Country Report - Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 23 February 2022, p.35, 20220301124010

   [70] 'BTI 2022 Country Report - Sierra Leone', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 23 February 2022, p.31, 20220301124010

   The US Department of State (USDOS) report on human rights practices in Sierra Leone for 2021 states that ‘[p]olitical parties were able to register and operate in the country’, and that ‘[u]nlike the previous year, there were no reports of political violence among competing parties’.[71] The report notes that in July 2021, ‘police arrested opposition All People’s Congress politician and member of parliament Emmanuel Saidu Conteh and three others, after customs officials detected firearms and ammunition impounded in a vehicle recently imported by them’. They were charged ‘with conspiracy to commit a felony and illegal importation and unlawful possession of arms and ammunition’. After being denied bail in July 2021, the four suspects were granted bail and released in August 2021.[72] The report also notes that ‘[t]here were no reports of political prisoners or detainees’.[73]

   [71] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Sierra Leone', US Department of State, 12 April 2022, Section 3, pp.12-13, 20220413152400

   [72] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Sierra Leone', US Department of State, 12 April 2022, Section 1(d), pp.6-7, 20220413152400

   [73] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Sierra Leone', US Department of State, 12 April 2022, Section 1(e), p.9, 20220413152400

   A 2022 Freedom House report states that ‘[a]lthough people have the right to organize in different political parties, opposition parties and leaders have faced intimidation and harassment from APC and SLPP governments’. In December 2021, the ‘Unity Party chairwoman Femi Claudius-Cole was detained over comments she made regarding the midterm census, though she was released after several days. APC politician Diana Konomanyi was also detained, though she was more quickly released without charge’.[74] The report also states that ‘[t]he electoral laws and framework are generally deemed to be fair’, but also notes that in November 2021, ‘the APC criticized the NEC [National Election Commission]’s handling of a local contest held in Koinadugu the month before; it alleged that NEC staff engaged in fraud that benefited the SLPP’.[75]

   [74] 'Freedom in the World 2022 - Sierra Leone', Freedom House, 2022, B1, p.4, 20220608091321

   [75] 'Freedom in the World 2022 - Sierra Leone', Freedom House, 2022, A3, p.3, 20220608091321

   In May 2022, The Sierra Leone Telegraph reported that in the previous week, ‘the Speaker of Parliament had to adjourn a session for nearly half an hour in a bid to separate feuding SLPP and APC MPs [Members of Parliament]. Reports say that the two sides almost went into physical blows’. The article states that ‘since the transfer of power from the APC to the ruling SLPP in April 2018, there has been a wave of protests, walkouts, boycotts and low-level violence between the two main political parties both inside and outside Parliament’. Sierra Leone’s political scene was ‘fraught with tensions’. At the core of much political tension was ‘the Commission of Inquiry set up to investigate corruption between September 2007 and April 2018 under the APC government’, with an April 2018 transition report naming various former APC government ministers and public officials accused of corruption. This was followed by several high-level arrests. The article further states that ‘Sierra Leone’s fraught politics and ongoing low-level violence pose serious concerns, though for the moment it is relatively being contained’.[76]

   [76] ‘Continued SLPP, APC tensions could threaten 2023 elections – Op ed’, Abdul Rashid Thomas, The Sierra Leone Telegraph, 31 May 2022, 20221013082909

   In June 2022, Politico SL reported that violence had ‘reportedly flared up between supporters of the APC and SLPP at Constituency 056 in Tonkolili district where the country’s two main political parties are vying for the vacant parliamentary seat after the substantive SLPP parliamentarian Musa Jalloh quit, becoming a Paramount Chief’. Officials of both the APC and SLPP had ‘traded accusations at each other for starting the violence that left several people injured and at least one house burned’.[77] The Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone and the Political Parties Registration Commission had issued a joint press release dated 12th June 2022 instituting a ban on street political rallies. The press release ‘said the decision was a result of the violence that “occurred during the APC rally on Tuesday 7th June 2022 in Sambaia Bendugu which culminated in personal attacks and the destruction of private properties in the said locality”’.[78] On 14 June 2022, the Concord Times reported that the United Nation’s Resident Coordinator, Babatunde Ahonsi, had called for an investigation into the violence between the SLPP and the APC in Tonkolili district.[79]

   [77] ‘SLPP district chairman reacts to political rally ban’, Abu, A, Politico SL, 26 June 2022, 20221010183219

   [78] ‘SLPP district chairman reacts to political rally ban’, Abu, A, Politico SL, 26 June 2022, 20221010183219

   [79] ‘Tonkolili bye-election violence: UN Rep, PPRC and ECSL call for investigation’, Koroma, A, Concord Times, 14 June 2022, 20221012152833; See also: ‘Police speaks on Tonkolili election violence’, Koroma, A, Concord Times, 16 June 2022, 20221012160127

   On 10 August 2022, anti-government protesters in Sierra Leone clashed with police in the capital, Freetown. Aljazeera reported that six police officers were killed in the violence. The protests were reportedly over the rising cost of living, with demonstrators calling for the departure of President Bio. According to Aljazeera, ‘[l]ong-standing frustration with the government in some quarters has been exacerbated by rising prices for basic goods in the West African country, where more than half of its population of around eight million live below the poverty line, according to the World Bank’.[80]

   An article dated 11 August 2022 in The Sierra Leone Telegraph indicates that ‘Sierra Leone’s main opposition political party – the APC, last night issued a statement condemning yesterday’s violent protests which saw the killing of civilians and security officers’. The main opposition APC was ‘being accused by supporters of the government and ruling SLPP party of orchestrating the nationwide protests’. The article also states that ‘[s]ince President Bio’s election to office in 2018, there has been a continuous rise in political tension and violence in the country, which many say is made worse by a highly politicised and unprofessional police force’.[81]

   According to a Politico SL article dated 15 August 2022, in an address to the nation, President Julius Maada Bio had ‘described the violent protests of Wednesday, August 10 as a well-planned and financed insurrection that was executed with shocking brutality’. Bio ‘made reference to the sabre-rattling by some politicians of making the country ungovernable, and of people on social media who identified themselves as APC Warriors, PPP and others that he said were determined to seize power even if it meant hundreds of people dying in the process’. President Bio ‘condemned the use of small children in the protests in some areas and vowed to crack down on those he called “violent insurrectionists”’.  He ‘dismissed the notion of it being a peaceful protest or that it related to the soaring prices of goods and services due to the global economic meltdown, and that it was intent on overthrowing the government as witnessed in the killing of Police Officers, and the destruction of property belonging or associated with the government’. The protests had ‘left some six police officers and 21 civilians dead’.[82]

   On 17 August 2022, the leader of the main opposition APC in parliament, Chernor Maju Bah, called for an independent committee to quickly investigate the August protests and their aftermath. He also asked that the number of those detained be made public, and that they be granted access to their families and legal representation, and speedy and fair access to a court of law. Bah also ‘claimed that some citizens of their party, who were arrested before the protest on the 10th of August 2022,’ were ‘still in detention’.[83]

   Also on 17 August 2022, BBC News reported that police had killed an APC member suspected of being one of the people behind the protests. The article states that ‘[a]ccording to the police, Hassan Dumbuya - popularly known as Evangelist Samson and a member of the All People’s Congress - was killed when officers exchanged gunfire with a neighbourhood group in the capital Freetown’. The clash ‘happened when officers were in the hideout of alleged suspects behind last week’s violent protests’. Other were reported to have disputed the police version of events. The article indicates that President Julius Maada Bio had ‘said that the protests were an attempt to overthrow his government and that the perpetrators will face justice’. There were twenty-one civilians and five police officers ‘killed during the violent protests over the rising cost of basic goods. Rights groups have called for an independent investigation into the protests’. The article also states that the killing of Dumbaya, who was ‘[a] prominent critic of Sierra Leone's government’, raised ‘serious concerns about extrajudicial killings and accusations of targeting opposition figures’.[84] The APC subsequently called for an independent investigation into Hassan Dumbuya’s death.[85]

   In another article dated 19 August 2022, BBC News reported that President Bio had said that the nature of the previous week's protests against his government had ‘caught the police force by surprise’. Bio said they ‘knew they (protesters) wanted to come out, but we did not have an identifiable group or person leading them’. He ‘again blamed the opposition for trying to topple his government, an accusation the opposition All People's Congress party has denied’. Bio ‘said a forensic and independent investigation was being conducted to unravel the truth’. The protests had ‘resulted in 25 deaths including five police officers’.[86] 

   On 23 August 2022, the President of the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists, Ahmed Sahid Nasralla, was reported to have said ‘all must share collective responsibility for the August 10 violence that occurred in parts of the country’. Nasralla ‘told President Bio that the government, the opposition, the security sector, civil society, the media, the clergy, and Sierra Leoneans in the diaspora should all take responsibility for the events of that day’.[87]

   On 25 August 2022, The East African reported that the Sierra Leone government had appointed a 15-person committee to investigate the August 2022 protests.[88]

   A Politico SL article dated 4 September 2022 indicates that an internal document obtained by Politico showed ‘that 31 people were killed during the violent antigovernment protests on 10 August in parts of Freetown and the north’, with 25 of them civilians and six policemen. They were ‘believed to be the highest police and civilian protest-related casualties in a single day in peacetime Sierra Leone’.[89] Another Politico SL article of the same date states that ‘[r]epresentatives of Political Parties and the Independent Commission for Peace and National Cohesion (ICPNC) are to tour all the districts of Sierra Leone to help diffuse the political tension, which they all agreed is prevalent in the country’. The article also indicates that the Chairman of the APC’s Interim Transitional Committee, Alfred Peter Conteh, had said there were signals in July 2022 that elements within his party were involved in planning the protests which took place in August 2022, and that ‘they completely dissociate themselves from those people’.[90] An earlier article dated 17 August 2022 in the Concorde Times, which also refers to comments by Alfred Peter Conteh, indicates that several APC officials had strongly defended the party, distancing it from what had occurred and condemning the violence.[91] 

   On 27 September 2022, BBC News also reported that the protests of 10 August 2022 had ‘left 31 people killed including six police officers’. The article also states that ‘[t]he president blamed the protests – which were generally about the high cost of living – on the opposition alleging that they were part of a plot to overthrow him, leading to the dismissal of the top three in the army’. The opposition All People’s Congress ‘vehemently denied the allegations’.[92]

   [80] ‘Sierra Leone imposes curfew amid anti-government protests’, Aljazeera, 10 August 2022, 20221010144753; See also: 'Sierra Leone: Chaos Erupt in Neighboring Sierra Leone As Citizens Violently Protest Against Rising Cost of Living', Koinyeneh, G C, Front Page Africa, 11 August 2022, 20220812162102

   [81] ‘Opposition APC says it unreservedly condemn all forms of violence’, Thomas, A R, The Sierra Leone Telegraph, 11 August 2022, 20221010180005

   [82] ‘Sierra Leone president says August 10 protests were a planned insurrection’, Abu, A, Politico SL, 15 August 2022, 20221010172623

   [83] ‘Opposition calls for update on Sierra Leone protest deaths’, Kargbo, N, Politico SL, 21 August 2022, 20221013105451; See also: ‘August 10th violence protest: Opposition leader speaks on the way forward’, Alhaji Haruna Sani, Concord Times, 19 August 2022, 20221013112806; ‘S.Leone Opposition Demands Probe Over Deadly Protest’, Agence France Presse, 18 August 2022, 20221013182615

   [84] ‘Sierra Leone opposition figure Hassan Dumbuya killed’, Naadi, T, BBC News, 17 August 2022, 20221010163520; See also: ‘Sierra Leone appoints team to investigate deadly protest’, Cham, K, The East African, 25 August 2022, 20221013190248; ‘Opposition calls for update on Sierra Leone protest deaths’, Kargbo, N, Politico SL, 21 August 2022, 20221013105451; ‘S.Leone Opposition Demands Probe Over Deadly Protest’, Agence France Presse, 18 August 2022, 20221013182615

   [85] ‘Sierra Leone: Opposition probes into Hassan Dumbuya's death’, Africa News, 19 August 2022, 20221010170700

   [86] ‘Sierra Leone protests caught police unawares: President’, BBC News, 19 August 2022, 20221010153438

   [87] ‘SLAJ exhorts collective responsibility for August 10’, Abu, A, Politico SL, 23 August 2022, 20221013084421

   [88] ‘Sierra Leone appoints team to investigate deadly protest’, Cham, K, The East African, 25 August 2022, 20221013190248

   [89] ‘Sierra Leone confirms 31 deaths in violent 10 August protests’, Fofana, U, Politico SL, 4 September 2022, 20221012175432

   [90] ‘Peace Commission to defuse tension in Sierra Leone’, Abu, A, Politico SL, 4 September 2022, 20221012181734

   [91] ‘Ponder my thoughts: SL deadly protests: there are two sides to a coin’, Keili, A, Concord Times, 17 August 2022, 20221013165932; See also: ‘“APC Has Nothing to do With August 10 Protest” – Says APC Interim Chairman Alfred Conteh’, Hashim, I, Sierraloaded, 13 August 2022, 20221014091817

   [92] ‘Sierra Leone president has PhD in coups - first lady’, Fofana, U, BBC News, 27 September 2022, 20221012165046

2. Given that there was a degree of volatility in the political environment in Sierra Leone and the deadly attack on 10 August 2022, the Tribunal requested advice from COISS updating its advice so that the Tribunal had before it the most current information. The updated information follows and was provided on 6 December 2022:

   Please update the research response dated 14 October 2022 indicating if there have been any further instances of political violence in Sierra Leone, particularly noting the significant incident that occurred on 10 August 2022 indicating an escalation in political violence.

   It is reported that in November 2022, violence broke out between Members of Parliament from the ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and the opposition All People’s Congress (APC) during a debate in Sierra Leone’s parliament about a proposed change to the electoral system to allow for proportional representation in the 2023 election. In October 2022, twenty-seven civilians killed in the August 2022 violence in Sierra Leone were buried in the capital Freetown following a state-led ceremony, as families disputed police accounts of their deaths. One report refers to the comments of the executive director of the Campaign for Good Governance, who noted that even ahead of the protests, the political environment was very tense, with very clear political tensions between the opposition and the ruling party. There had also been high levels of violent speech on social media, especially reported from people in the diaspora.

   Question 2 of a COISS Q&A report dated 14 October 2022 provides information on the level of political violence, harassment and intimidation, etc., between political parties in Sierra Leone at that time.[93]

   [93] 'Sierra Leone: 20220909101724 - Go-Go Green - Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) - All People’s Congress (APC) - Political Parties - Violence - Salone Today', Country of Origin Information Services Section (COISS), 14 October 2022, 20221017175108

   On 23 November 2022, violence broke out between Members of Parliament (MPs) during a debate in Sierra Leone’s parliament about ‘a proposed change to the electoral system to allow for proportional representation’ in the 2023 election. MPs ‘from the ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and the opposition All People’s Congress (APC) party were seen fighting and throwing chairs’. Lawmakers were also reported to have ‘torn apart equipment and broke a vase’. The fight reportedly ‘erupted around 1100 GMT and had quieted down by afternoon’.[94] One report indicates that ‘[f]ighting broke out when opposition APC members of Parliament refused to debate the changes and called on the Speaker to defer the proceedings to allow sufficient time for MPs to study the new regulation. But the Speaker refused, and violence ensued’.[95] According to local reports, the police had ‘intervened to calm down the riotous scene and expel disruptive MPs from the chamber’.[96] The Clerk of Parliament subsequently reported that the damage caused to the parliament as a result of the violence was 380,000 New Leones.[97] [98] Sierra Leone’s Electoral Commission had ‘advised switching to a proportional representation system for next year’s local and parliamentary elections excluding presidential polls’. The opposition claimed ‘the move would be unconstitutional when the government backs the plan. However, for it to be passed, it requires parliamentary approval’.[99]

   [94] ‘Chaotic scenes as Sierra Leone lawmakers brawl’, Africanews.com, 25 November 2022, 20221205095624

   [95] ‘Sierra Leone Parliament descends into ugly brawl and fist fights as opposition MPs refuse to debate proportional represention laws’, Thomas, A R, The Sierra Leone Telegraph, 27 November 2022, 20221205102421

   [96] ‘Chaotic scenes as Sierra Leone lawmakers brawl’, Africanews.com, 25 November 2022, 20221205095624

   [97] ‘Sierra Leone Parliament descends into ugly brawl and fist fights as opposition MPs refuse to debate proportional represention laws’, Thomas, A R, The Sierra Leone Telegraph, 27 November 2022, 20221205102421; ‘Le 380 million damage done to Sierra Leone’s parliament as violence rocks the House’, Politico SL, 28 November 2022, 20221205103331

   [98] $1.00 AUD equals approximately 12 Sierra Leonean New Leones. $1.00 AUD equals 12,367.4 Sierra Leonean Leones - See: 1 AUD to SLL - Australian Dollars to Sierra Leonean Leones Exchange Rate (xe.com) One Sierra Leonean New Leone equals 1,000 Sierra Leonean Leones - See: Sierra Leone announces the re-denomination of its currency | SwitSalone

   [99] ‘Chaotic scenes as Sierra Leone lawmakers brawl’, Africanews.com, 25 November 2022, 20221205095624

   Another report on the violence in Sierra Leone’s parliament in Newsweek notes that the move to proportional representation was ‘fiercely opposed by opposition politicians’.​ Chernor Maju Bah, aka Chericoco, leader of the APC, had ‘called the proposal a "serious constitutional breach," in an article for the Sierra Leone Telegraph’. Bah had ‘added: "Using the PR system in place of the constituency system would amount to taking away the rights of the people to choose their representatives directly and hand that power over to political parties."​’[100] Proponents of proportional representation have argued that it would be inclusive, and would result in less violence than the First Past the Post System.[101]

   [100] ‘Sierra Leone Parliament Descends Into Wild Brawl, Shocking Video Shows’, Bickerton, J,

   [101] ‘PR is advantageous for women -50/50 Group President’, Koroma, A, Concord Times, 3 November 2022, 20221205181221; ‘Sierra Leone’s All Politico Parties Association endorses new electoral system’, Kamara, C A, Politico SL, 7 November 2022, 20221205183646

   A November 2022 Association for Catholic information in Africa (ACI Africa) article states that Archbishop Edward Tamba Charles, the Archbishop of the Catholic Archdiocese of Freetown, had ‘noted that a majority of parties registered for the country’s forthcoming elections’ had ‘chosen to remain noncommittal to peaceful polls, and that many had refused to sign a document that would otherwise cement their commitment to a peaceful election next year’. The Archbishop, who also serves as the President of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL), ‘noted that the country had been witnessing various acts of violence pitting civilians against the police, and also between opposing parties in parliament. Some of these, he said, had involved physical assault, with legislators hurling objects against each other in parliament’.[102] He said that preliminary investigations into the August 2022 violence ‘had shown that the members of the opposition APC had something to do with the rioters, even though they publicly denied any relationship with them’.​ Apart from Freetown, the riots had taken ‘place mainly in the APC strongholds in the North and the North-west: Makeni, Magburaka, Binkolo, Kamakwie, Lunsar, Port Loko, and Lungi’. The Archbishop ‘said that the IRCSL had “roundly” condemned the 10th August violent riots and called for an investigation that would identify its organizers, planners, and financiers’.[103] The article further states:

   [102] ‘Catholic Archbishop in Sierra Leone Faults Political Parties Apathy on Peace ahead of Poll’, Aineah, A, ACI Africa (Association for Catholic information in Africa), 25 November 2022, 20221202190722

   [103] ‘Catholic Archbishop in Sierra Leone Faults Political Parties Apathy on Peace ahead of Poll’, Aineah, A, ACI Africa (Association for Catholic information in Africa), 25 November 2022, 20221202190722

   The Catholic Archbishop recounted that the political situation in Sierra Leone was relatively calm until the final results of the 2018 presidential elections.

   Since then, he said, and particularly with the change of power from APC to SLPP, “the political temperature went high and has not gone down.”​

   “The election of the Speaker of the House of Parliament was marred by violence. Some members of the opposition APC lost their parliamentary seats as a result of court petitions, all of which were interpreted as a result of the manipulation of the judiciary by the Executive arm of Government,” the President of Sierra Leone’s inter-religious Council said.

   And now, what the IRCSL fears the most is that the June 2023 election may be marred by violence, with politicians being the biggest orchestrators of the violence.[104] 

   [104] ‘Catholic Archbishop in Sierra Leone Faults Political Parties Apathy on Peace ahead of Poll’, Aineah, A, ACI Africa (Association for Catholic information in Africa), 25 November 2022, 20221202190722

   In October 2022, Agence France-Presse reported that ‘[t]wenty-seven civilians killed in August riots in Sierra Leone’ had been buried ‘in the capital Freetown following a state-led ceremony, as families disputed police accounts of their deaths’. Alusine Koroma, the brother ‘of Hassan Dumbuya, a social media influencer and prominent member of the opposition All People's Congress (APC) party’, contested the official account of his brother’s death.[105] It is stated in the article:

   [105] ‘Sierra Leone buries riot dead amid outcry’, Agence France Presse, 17 October 2022, 20221205100333

   On August 10, a protest about the cost of living spiralled into deadly clashes between security forces and young men calling for President Julius Bio to resign.

   Violence erupted in several parts of the West African nation, with the authorities imposing an internet blackout in response.

   In the days following, police said they conducted raids on "hideouts for perpetrators".

   During one of those raids in the city of Makeni, Dumbuya -- alias Evangelist Samson -- was killed in crossfire, a police statement said. His family disputes that, and the APC has called for an independent probe.

   "He was shot from the back in Makeni, according to the autopsy report we received from the coroner", Koroma said through tears on Monday.

   The family has refused the 20,000 Leones ($1,200) the government offered to each family to help with funeral rites.

   Koroma said they had requested and were denied a family burial.[106]

   [106] ‘Sierra Leone buries riot dead amid outcry’, Agence France Presse, 17 October 2022, 20221205100333

   The Agence France-Presse article further states that Sierra Leone’s Minister of Information and Communications, Mohamed Rahman Swaray, had ‘said the state had "struck a deal" with families in which it would lead the ceremony for national security reasons’. He said that security was ‘"the only reason" the state was involved… attributing the long delay to the need to reach a consensus with the families’. Swaray ‘also cited the need for relatives to identify bodies and be present for "examinations"’, saying ‘"[s]ome of (the violence) happened in various parts of the country; we had to put out public announcements and family members -- some of them were initially scared"… "We had to extend one deadline after another."’ Civilians had been ‘killed in the cities of Makeni, in the Northern Province, and Kamakwie, in the North West Province, as well as in eastern Freetown’, and ‘Swaray said nine bodies had still not been identified’. He also ‘said families had initially feared the dead would be buried in mass graves’, but the Sierra Leone government had said in a statement ‘that each body would be buried in its own grave "following a dignified ceremony", at the instruction of the president’. Six police officers killed in the riots were buried in a state funeral attended by President Bio in August 2022.[107]

   A more recent article in The Irish Times dated 2 December 2022 states that ‘[o]nly four family members for each victim were allowed to be present’ at the funeral ceremony for the 27 civilians killed in August 2022. The ‘[s]ecurity was heavy, with nearby streets blocked by armed soldiers and police’. The article notes that ‘[t]he victims were to be buried en masse that same day. Their families had begged for permission to take away their bodies and carry out their own funerals, but to no avail’. At the cemetery, relatives ‘were held back in the cemetery by armed guards and only allowed to see the graves after the coffins had already been covered with soil’.[108]

   According to the article, ‘[m]ost of the dead were killed on August 10th, in what Sierra Leone’s government has called a coup and attempted insurgency, and civilians say was a protest against the cost of living’. Many participants had ‘said the protest was organised and encouraged by a Sierra Leonean living in Europe, who spreads daily voice messages through WhatsApp’. Participants, however, ‘said that the eventual demonstration was faceless, and that that man had only put words to their already widespread discontent’. Sierra Leone ‘is one of the world’s poorest states. This year, it has experienced a fuel crisis and rocketing inflation, partially caused by the war in Ukraine, though many citizens accuse the government of corruption and financial mismanagement’.[109] The demonstrators had been ‘met by security forces shooting first tear gas, then live ammunition’. On the following day, one man said to The Irish Times ‘they “were really doing good protesting with [posters]” but the situation took a turn when the tear gas was fired. “That made some people go mad and [they] started throwing stones towards the police and it became violent.”’ Reuters news agency had ‘verified a video that showed police firing live ammunition into crowds. The internet was shut down for two hours at noon, and again overnight. A nationwide 3pm curfew was declared, and police and military convoys patrolled to enforce it’.[110]

   Official reports indicate that 27 civilians and six police officers died in the August 2022 violence, although The Irish Times spoke to family members of a man killed during the protests who was not included in the official figures. The families of each of the police officers who died in the violence ‘reportedly received 100 million leones (€5,250) and they were buried on August 24th, in a state funeral attended by President Bio’.[111] Relatives of three of the civilians killed in the violence who spoke to The Irish Times ‘said they were asked to attend a postmortem between three weeks and two months after the deaths. Some said they could not bear it as the bodies were so decomposed’. All had ‘said they received no documents confirming the postmortem’s findings: those were kept by the state’.[112] The article continues:

   More than two months after the deaths, relatives of the identified victims were invited to a meeting with the government. There, they said no admission of responsibility was made. However, each family was offered 20 million leones (€1,054) in cash which they were told could go towards a memorial service. This is a huge amount of money in Sierra Leone, where the GDP per capita last year was €515, so it was hard to reject. Still, one noted: “The money they gave us was so small compared to life. Nothing compares to life.”

   “There was no sign of remorse,” another attendee said. “I thought the postmortem would enable them to trace the bullets and trace it to the police officer. The officer should apologise to the family. [The state is] the one who gave them the ammunition.”[113]

   The reporter also spoke to Marcella Sampa-Sesay, the executive director of the Campaign for Good Governance, who ‘said there was violence was [sic] on both sides, though she saw no evidence that protesters were armed’. She also said that ‘[i]n terms of police brutality, Sierra Leonean police “lack the tact and professionalism to deal with a crowd”… and “accountability of their actions is basically selective in favour of the regime that is in power”’. She said that ‘[e]ven ahead of the protests… “it is very important to note that the political environment was very tense... there has been a massive dwindling of trust. Political tensions between the opposition and the ruling party have been very clear, [both sides] have never agreed on policies and taking positions for national interest.”’ There had ‘also notably been “high levels of violent speech on social media, especially reported from people in the diaspora... the entire WhatsApp ecosystem is polluted with those messages.”’[114] Sampa-Sesay said the Campaign for Good Governance believed in dialogue, but under the current government, there had ‘been “a lack of consultative spaces to build consensus around national issues impacting on governance and the welfare of citizens”. Instead of embarking on “conscious dialogue with certain groups”, she said, the government had labelled the opposition terrorists and it had become a “buzzword... deepening the divide and sharpening the mistrust and hate”’.[115]

   [107] ‘Sierra Leone buries riot dead amid outcry’, Agence France Presse, 17 October 2022, 20221205100333

   [108] ‘Death in Sierra Leone: When protest turned to tragedy, the state offered money but no remorse’, Hayden, S, The Irish Times, 2 December 2022, 20221204123841

   [109] ‘Death in Sierra Leone: When protest turned to tragedy, the state offered money but no remorse’, Hayden, S, The Irish Times, 2 December 2022, 20221204123841

   [110] ‘Death in Sierra Leone: When protest turned to tragedy, the state offered money but no remorse’, Hayden, S, The Irish Times, 2 December 2022, 20221204123841

   [111] ‘Death in Sierra Leone: When protest turned to tragedy, the state offered money but no remorse’, Hayden, S, The Irish Times, 2 December 2022, 20221204123841

   [112] ‘Death in Sierra Leone: When protest turned to tragedy, the state offered money but no remorse’, Hayden, S, The Irish Times, 2 December 2022, 20221204123841

   [113] ‘Death in Sierra Leone: When protest turned to tragedy, the state offered money but no remorse’, Hayden, S, The Irish Times, 2 December 2022, 20221204123841

   [114] ‘Death in Sierra Leone: When protest turned to tragedy, the state offered money but no remorse’, Hayden, S, The Irish Times, 2 December 2022, 20221204123841

   [115] ‘Death in Sierra Leone: When protest turned to tragedy, the state offered money but no remorse’, Hayden, S, The Irish Times, 2 December 2022, 20221204123841

   Hearing, credibility, findings, and assessment

1. The mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is “well-founded” or that it is for the reason claimed. It remains for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that all of the statutory elements are made out: MIEA v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596. Although the concept of onus of proof is not appropriate to administrative inquiries and decision making (Yao-Jing Li v MIMA (1997) 74 FCR 275 at 288), the relevant facts of the individual case will have to be supplied by the applicant himself or herself, in as much detail as is necessary to enable the examiner to establish the relevant facts. A decision-maker is not required to make the applicant’s case for him or her: Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70; Luu & Anor v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 at 45. Nor is the Tribunal required to accept uncritically any and all the allegations made by an applicant: Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437.

2. In considering overall the credibility of the applicant, the Tribunal is cognisant of the words of Beaumont J in Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451, in which he stated that ‘in the proof of refugeehood, a liberal attitude on the part of the decision-maker is called for… [but this should not lead to]… an uncritical acceptance of any and all allegations made by applicants’. The Tribunal notes also the remarks of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 191 where it was said that ‘the fact that an applicant for refugee status may yield to temptation to embroider an account of his or her history is hardly surprising’. The Tribunal has sought to adopt the liberal approach outlined in these cases.

3. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a citizen of Sierra Leone and accordingly her claims will be assessed against Sierra Leone.

4. The Tribunal has numerous concerns, including some significant credibility concerns, with the applicant’s claims.

5. Firstly, the applicant has been inconsistent in terms of the detail of the claimed attack on [the day in] March 2018. In the interview with the delegate the applicant indicated that she was attacked when watching television and individuals rushed inside and harmed her. The applicant indicated that the attack ended because police happened to be marching past the home and came to the rescue.

6. The Tribunal put to the applicant that this was inconsistent with the evidence that had she given in the hearing that she was in in bed trying to get to sleep and talking with her husband about election issues as opposed to claims that she was watching television. In response to this inconsistency, the applicant indicated that there was a television in the bedroom and she was indeed watching television. The applicant’s migration agent submitted that this inconsistency, in the circumstances, should not be fatal in determining credibility.

7. The Tribunal is unpersuaded that if the applicant had been in bed trying to sleep but with the television on when the attack occurred, she would have only indicated in the interview with the delegate that she was watching television when the attack occurred, without this important contextual information. The Tribunal considers that, if true, the applicant would say that she was in bed ready to go to sleep rather than simply indicating she was watching television.

8. The Tribunal also put to the applicant the inconsistency in the evidence that was provided in her written statement that they were saved because police happened to be marching by the home and came in to rescue them. This was inconsistent with what she had indicated in the hearing, which was that a neighbour had called the army and that they had then arrived later to rescue them. In response, the applicant indicated that in Sierra Leone there is a common term for both the police and the army and it could be the case that the police or army heard the commotion from their headquarters, which was not far away from home.

9. The Tribunal is prepared to accept that there may be common terminology between police and army in the local language and does not draw an adverse inference from this inconsistency. However, the Tribunal does draw an adverse inference from the inconsistent evidence as to whether it was a neighbour who called the authorities or the authorities just happened to be marching by the premises when the attack occurred.

10. The Tribunal thinks that the explanation provided by the applicant in the hearing when the inconsistency was put to her is implausible, namely that the headquarters of the authorities were so close that they heard the commotion and came. The Tribunal considers that this is a constructed explanation seeking to explain the inconsistency.

11. The inconsistencies are undermining of the truth of the applicant’s claims to have been attacked together with her family on [the day in] March 2018 and to the applicant’s credibility generally. The credibility concerns are not fatal to the applicant in making adverse credibility findings but are considered cumulatively together with the other credibility concerns identified.

12. Secondly, the applicant has provided photographic evidence of the claimed attack that took place on [the day in] April 2018 of her claimed damaged kitchen; however, the photograph was clearly obtained from other sources not showing her own kitchen. The Tribunal put to the applicant in the hearing that it is noted by the delegate that this photograph is accessible on the internet. The photograph was posted on the internet in an article in the [named media source] dated [in] April 2018, which refers to the damage of the compound of [a named person] being burnt down.

13. In response to this concern put to the applicant in the hearing, she indicated that whenever there is an attack information is posted on the internet and maintained that the photograph which was sent to her by a neighbour did show her kitchen.

14. The Tribunal is not persuaded of this given the presence of the photograph in the context of the media article described. The photograph is given little weight. As indicated to the applicant in the hearing, the fact that the applicant has provided clearly concocted corroborative evidence is undermining of her credibility generally.

15. Thirdly, the applicant has not provided consistent evidence as to the political leadership positions she held. In the interview with the delegate, the applicant indicated that from 2007, in her various locations, she had been the chair of APC women’s groups. This is inconsistent with the applicant’s evidence in the hearing that when she lived in Freetown, she was a member (not chair) of the local APC women’s group. This was also inconsistent with her other evidence in the hearing that when she moved to [Town 2] in around 2014, she was the treasurer to the chair.

16. In response to these inconsistencies put in the hearing, the applicant then shifted her evidence given earlier in the hearing to say that she was in fact chair of APC women’s groups continuously from university in 2007.

17. The Tribunal is not persuaded of this in light of the clear inconsistencies in evidence. For instance, the fact that the applicant specifically indicated that when she was in [Town 2], she was the treasurer to the chair makes it quite clear that she was not indicating that she was the chair. In the hearing the applicant was asked multiple questions as to political positions she had held and did not provide evidence that she had chaired women’s groups prior to her moving to [Town 1] in 2016, changing this evidence only when inconsistent prior evidence was pointed out.

18. The inconsistencies are undermining of the applicant’s credibility.

19. Fourthly, the applicant has provided inconsistent evidence of further attacks that took place after the incident on [the day in] March 2022 and before the applicant came to Australia [in] March 2018. In the hearing, the applicant indicated that there were two further incidents, one after she had moved to another location in [Town 1] after the [March] 2018 attack and was stopped when in a car driving back to her home and hit on the shoulder. The applicant indicated that the second attack was when she moved to Freetown and individuals came to her family home there and attacked her and kicked her in the abdomen.

20. The Tribunal noted to the applicant that this is not consistent with evidence in the interview with the delegate that there was only one other attack after [the one in] March 2018, which was when she was travelling from [Town 1] to Freetown. The Tribunal also noted that none of these attacks after [the day in] March 2018 had been referred to in written claims.

21. In response, the applicant indicated that it was the case that there were many attacks but did not readily explain the inconsistency in the number of claimed attacks. She indicated that her written claims were prepared in a rush, which is why they did not contain any information about the attacks.

22. The applicant has provided a detailed written claim to the Department outlining significant details as to her circumstances and harm suffered. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant would not in this statement have included, if true, three physical attacks occurring in the weeks leading up to her leaving Sierra Leone and only refer to the attack on [the day in] March 2018.

23. The inconsistencies and the failure by the applicant to include details of the attacks in her written claims are significantly undermining of her credibility.

24. Fifthly, the applicant did not in the hearing reiterate claims in the interview with the delegate that she also received threatening letters from the SLPP after the attack on [the day in] March 2018.  The Tribunal asked multiple questions of the applicant in different ways as to the harm and difficulties that she faced in Sierra Leone after the attack on [the day in] March 2018.  In none of these responses did the applicant refer to receiving threatening letters.

25. In response, the applicant indicated that this was because she was waiting to be specifically asked about this by the Tribunal.

26. The Tribunal is not persuaded of this in terms of the many open-ended questions asked by the Tribunal as to harm or difficulties faced by her. The Tribunal has credibility concerns given the applicant’s failure in the hearing to indicate that she had received many threatening letters from the SLPP.

27. Sixthly, the Tribunal has significant plausibility concerns that in the circumstances described by the applicant she has had no contact with her husband since [the day in] April 2018 and does not know where he is other than believing that, because of what her husband told her on [that day], he has left the country.

28. In the hearing the applicant indicated that [all] of her children are living in Sierra Leone and she is in contact with them through the mobile phone owned by one of her children. In the hearing, the applicant indicated that she has had no contact with her husband since the phone call of [the day in] April 2018 in which he told her that he was going to flee the country.

29. The Tribunal put to the applicant the implausibility that she would not over this four-year period have had any contact from her husband, noting that her children are contactable by phone in Sierra Leone and it might be thought that her husband would at least contact his children who would provide contact details for him to contact the applicant. The applicant responded that the family fled after the attack on [the day in] April 2018 and that she was not able to contact her children until 2018. She indicated that her husband clearly was not able to bring the children together.

30. The Tribunal does not consider that this addresses the implausibility of what is being claimed in terms of no contact with her husband for four years. The Tribunal acknowledges that the fact that something is implausible does not mean that it did not happen. This is not a credibility concern which on its own determines adverse credibility findings but is considered cumulatively with other matters.

31. Seventhly, the applicant has been inconsistent in terms of details of the last political rally that she was present at and spoke at before the attack on [the day in] March 2018. In both the interview with the delegate and in the hearing the applicant indicated that this rally took place at the end of February 2018 and that she spoke at the rally for several hours, together with other leaders.

32. The Tribunal questioned the applicant as to how long the rally went on for given the length of time that she spoke and given that others were to speak. In response, the applicant indicated that the rally started at about 7:30am and went for the whole day. The applicant indicated that the rally gathered individuals from more distant areas and was very substantial in terms of the number that attended, being many times bigger than rallies that she had previously participated in.  Previous rallies she said had been attended by about 200 people.

33. The Tribunal put to the applicant that this evidence was inconsistent with evidence in the interview with the delegate that the rally [at the end of] February 2018 started in the late afternoon and was attended by about 500 people. The applicant did not meaningfully explain the inconsistency. This creates credibility concerns.

34. Eighthly, no documentary or photographic evidence has been provided, which the Tribunal considers would be reasonably readily available, and has indeed been offered by the applicant to the delegate, establishing her leadership roles as the chairperson of women’s political organisations in Sierra Leone. This would include photographs of the applicant speaking at rallies, and the numerous other documents that would be available such as minutes, meeting agendas, speaking invitations and the like that would establish that the applicant held the political leadership positions claimed.

35. In the hearing it was put that the delegate had noted to the applicant that the photographs the applicant had provided only show her participating in rallies, and asked if there were photographs that would show her speaking at rallies. The applicant undertook to seek to provide such photographs to the delegate but never did. The Tribunal noted this to the applicant in the hearing with the comment that it might think that there would be photographic evidence of her claimed political involvement.

36. The applicant claimed in the hearing that in relation to photographs as well as any other documentary evidence that would establish her political leadership positions, it is not possible to obtain this information now from Sierra Leone because of the chaotic state of the organisations that she was involved in. The applicant indicated that at the time she left Sierra Leone she did not at that point fear for her safety as she believes that the run-off election would be determined in favour of the APC and for that reason she did not bring supporting documents with her.

37. The Tribunal accepts, as indicated below, that there is a not insignificant degree of political tension in Sierra Leone at present. However, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the political situation is so intense in relation to adverse action taken against the APC by the ruling party that all records of the applicant’s political involvement in the applicant’s claimed chair roles in local APC women’s groups in three different areas have been destroyed or are unavailable.

38. The failure by the applicant to provide any corroborative evidence of her claimed political leadership positions is undermining of the truth of her claims. This is not a credibility issue that in itself is determinative of adverse credibility findings, but it is considered cumulatively with other more significant matters.

39. The Tribunal considers these eight credibility concerns cumulatively. Considered together, they are very significantly adverse to key aspects of the applicant’s claims and her credibility generally. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant has been an honest or truthful witness. The Tribunal is not satisfied as to key claims.

40. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant held any leadership roles in the APC including in local women’s groups. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant and/or her family were attacked in the circumstances claimed on [the day in] March 2018 or [the day in] April 2018 or on any occasion before or since as a result of her political involvement. The Tribunal is not satisfied that threatening letters were sent by the SLPP to the applicant on any occasion. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the SLPP subsequently was looking for the applicant at her own home or her cousin’s home as claimed. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant’s cousin has been threatened with harm and harm to property if the applicant is not produced.

41. Given these findings, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant faces a real chance of serious or significant harm as a result of holding leadership positions in the APC, having been previously threatened or attacked and/or been targeted as a person of adverse interest by authorities or those associated with the SLPP.

42. However, the Tribunal is prepared to accept that the applicant has had some involvement as an ordinary member of the APC including in women’s groups in the various locations that she has worked in Sierra Leone. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has attended meetings and rallies as an ordinary member and from her involvement in APC women’s groups.

43. The Tribunal is prepared to accept that the applicant would wish to continue her political involvement in the same manner if she were to return to Sierra Leone.

44. It remains for the Tribunal therefore to consider whether the applicant would face requisite harm as a result of her continuing involvement in the APC in the manner as found by the Tribunal.

45. The Tribunal, in the hearing, discussed the COISS research extracted in this decision outlining the level of political violence in Sierra Leone as between the APC and the SLLP. The Tribunal noted that there are four research requests setting out the situation in the lead up to and aftermath of the 2018 election. There is recent information current as at 6 December 2022 as to the situation.

46. The Tribunal noted that the information indicates some degree of violence leading up to the 2018 election and in the time since. Whereas normally it would be expected that violence would reduce after election periods, this was not the case in Sierra Leone after the 2018 election. Low level organised violence continued in the assessment by one authority (2022 Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index country report on Sierra Leone) but with a potential for mass violence being high. This was the assessment in the period from February 2017 until January 2021. The Tribunal accepts this assessment as at January 2021 as being consistent with the weight of independent information as extracted from the COISS research.

47. Significantly, the research indicates one protest that occurred on 10 August 2022 resulting in a much higher level of political violence than had previously been the case. This occurred when police in Freetown clashed with anti-government protesters demonstrating at the increased cost of living and calling for the departure of the President. Reports indicate the government accused the APC of orchestrating the nationwide protests. Reports indicate that 31 people were killed in the incident, 25 civilians and six policemen. It is reported that this is the highest number of police and civilian protest-related casualties in a single day in peacetime Sierra Leone.

48. In November 2022 there was a brawl in Parliament between MPs from the SLPP and the ACP. There is also recent violent hate speech on social media of the Sierra Leone diaspora.

49. The Tribunal draws from the research extracted that there is not insignificant political tension in Sierra Leone, including one unprecedented incident at a political protest with multiple deaths. The tension is exemplified by recent physical altercations in Parliament. However, notwithstanding the incident on 10 August 2022, the evidence does not establish widespread violence suffered by those with positions in political parties while undertaking their political activities. The Tribunal indicated that it would not be inclined to accept that the independent evidence establishes that an ordinary member of the APC, including one holding mid-level political roles, faces a real chance of serious or significant harm in Sierra Leone as a result of that political involvement.

1. In response, the applicant indicated that political prisoners have been arrested in different locations and some killed, and that there have been mass burials. The applicant indicated that one of her fellow chairs of APC women’s groups has recently been killed. The applicant indicated that the volatility of the situation is exemplified by the fact that the ex-President has to be guarded by the UN to avoid arrest. The applicant indicated that there is a risk of harm to anyone who criticises the President. The applicant indicated that she would have returned to Sierra Leone to continue her political involvement had it not been for the SLPP’s victory at the election run-off.

2. The Tribunal has noted these comments by the applicant but is not persuaded, given the weight of independent evidence, that the applicant, as having a continued involvement as an ordinary member in the APC and women’s groups and not being specifically targeted by authorities would face a real chance of serious and significant harm on return to Sierra Leone as a result of that ongoing level of political involvement.

3. Given these findings, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of serious or significant harm for any of the reasons claimed.

4. In summary, the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a reason set out in s 5J(1) of the Act. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Sierra Leone, there is a real risk of her suffering significant harm.

5. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).

6. Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa).

7. There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s 36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s 36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criteria in s 36(2).

   decision

8. The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

   David McCulloch
   Member

   
   

   Attachment  -  Extract from Migration Act 1958

   5 (1) Interpretation

   …

   cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:

   (a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or

   (b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;

   but does not include an act or omission:

   (c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

   (d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

   …

   degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:

   (a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

   (b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

   …

   torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:

   (a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or

   (b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or

   (c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or

   (d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or

   (e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;

   but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

   …

   receiving country,  in relation to a non-citizen, means:

   (a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or

   (b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.

   …

   5H    Meaning of refugee

   (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:

   (a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or

   (b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.

   Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.

   …

   5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution

   (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:

   (a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and

   (b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and

   (c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.

   Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.

   (2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.

   Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.

   (3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:

   (a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or

   (b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or

   (c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:

   (i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;

   (ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;

   (iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;

   (iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;

   (v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;

   (vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

   (4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):

   (a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and

   (b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and

   (c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

   (5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:

   (a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;

   (b)     significant physical harassment of the person;

   (c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;

   (d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

   (e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

   (f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.

   (6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

   5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family

   For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:

   (a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and

   (b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:

   (i)the first person has ever experienced; or

   (ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

   where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.

   Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

   5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family

   For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:

   (a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and

   (b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and

   (c)     any of the following apply:

   (i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;

   (ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;

   (iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

   (d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

   5LA Effective protection measures

   (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:

   (a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:

   (i)the relevant State; or

   (ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

   (b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.

   (2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:

   (a)     the person can access the protection; and

   (b)     the protection is durable; and

   (c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.

   …

   36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act

   …

   (2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

   (a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

   (aa)  a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or

   (b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

   (i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and

   (ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

   (c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

   (i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and

   (ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

   (2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:

   (a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

   (b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or

   (c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or

   (d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

   (e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

   (2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:

   (a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

   (b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

   (c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.

   …

   
   

Newsweek, 24 November 2022, 20221202193219; See also: ‘Hon. Chernor Maju Bah Says Conditions for PR System Do Not Exist’, Kef, A, The Calabash Newspaper (Sierra Leone), 26 October 2022, 20221205191652