1819468 (Refugee)

1819468 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 732 (6 February 2023)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER:  1819468
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Sri Lanka
MEMBER:Andrew McLean Williams
DATE:6 February 2023
PLACE OF DECISION:  Brisbane
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the Applicants protection visas.

Statement made on 06 February 2023 at 2:50pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Sri Lanka – political opinion – Freedom Party – volunteer campaign worker – United National Party – assessment of evidence – fear of an individual wielding local level influence and power – internal relocation – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H, 5J, 36, 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
CASES
DAT17 v MIBP [2018] FCCA 3750
Guo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1996) 64 FCR 151
MZYXS v MIAC [2013] FMCA 13
SZSMQ v MIBP [2013] FCCA 1768
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made on 28 June 2018 by a Delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs, pursuant to s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’), thereby refusing to grant the Applicants protection visas.
The Applicants - who are each citizens of Sri Lanka - applied for the visas on 6 November 2015.
The Delegate refused to grant the visas on the basis of the Delegate having concluded that the first-named Applicant was not a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations, pursuant to either of s.36(2)(a), or s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. In consequence, the other applicants did not qualify as ‘members of the same family unit’ as a person who holds a protection visa in the same category; such that they too were not owed protection, pursuant to either of s.36(2)(b), or s.36(2)(c) of the Act.
The primary Applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 8 September 2022. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Sinhalese and English languages.
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (‘the Regulations’).
An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), s.36(2)(aa), s.36(2)(b), or s.36(2)(c). That is, he or she must be either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds; or must be a member of the same family unit as such a person, and that other family member holds a protection visa of the same class as that now sought by the family member.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the Applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations, because the person qualifies as a ‘refugee’.
A person qualifies as a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, they are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s.5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they may qualify as a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, they are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s.5H(1)(b).
Under s.5J(1), a person has a “well-founded fear of persecution” if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are then set out in ss.5J(2)-(6), and in ss.5K-LA, which are now extracted, in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of their being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer ‘significant harm’: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).
The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm are then set out in ss.36(2A), and in 36(2B), which are also extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, as made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and the country information assessment for Sri Lanka, as prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, at least to the extent that these are relevant to the matter here under consideration.
Consideration of claims and evidence
At the outset, the Tribunal records that it is satisfied that the Applicants are citizens of Sri Lanka, and that Sri Lanka is the ‘receiving country’ for purposes of the Act. The Tribunal also finds that the Applicants have no right to enter and reside in any other country, other than Sri Lanka.
The issue in this case is whether the primary Applicant is owed protection obligations under either of s.36(2)(a) or s.36(2)(aa) of the Act, and whether the other named visa applicants - as family members of the first-named Applicant - are therefore owed protection obligations because of s.36(2)(b) or s.36(2)(c) of the Act.
In reasons for decision dated 28 June 2018 a Delegate of the Minister summarised the Applicant’s claims for protection as follows:
·The Applicant has been a member of the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (‘Freedom Party’), since his completing high school;
·The Applicant worked closely within the Freedom Party with a former friend, who has since changed his allegiances and joined the Sri Lankan United National Party (‘the UNP’);
·The Applicant’s friend has since been elected as a UNP local council representative and is pursuing the Applicant.
In the reasons for decision refusing the Applicant’s claims for protection, the Delegate noted that the Applicant had participated in a protection visa interview on 23 February 2018 and had provided a narrative account during that interview that was essentially consistent with his prior written claims, yet the Delegate also noted a distinct lack of other evidence in support of the Applicant’s claims. The Delegate found that the Applicant’s fear of harm was not well-founded, and the Delegate could not be satisfied that the Applicant had a real chance of being subjected to persecution if returned to Sri Lanka. In part, the Delegate said:
I find it difficult to accept that in the short periods he’s travelled back to his country of origin, he has fallen afoul of an old colleague on political grounds. I note there is nothing contained in this application that demonstrates the applicant has a relationship with Sri Lankan MPs past or present, is politically active himself, or that he is being pursued in Sri Lanka on a political basis. On this basis I do not accept that the applicant is being pursued by Sri Lankan MPs past or present.
Similarly, the Delegate also found on the basis of the available evidence, that he or she could not be satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia and returned to Sri Lanka there would be a real risk that the Applicant will suffer significant harm, as defined for purposes of s.36(2)(aa) by s.36(2A) and s.5(1) of the Act.
This Application for review was filed in the Tribunal on 28 June 2018.
No additional evidence in support of the Applicant’s claims for protection was provided until as recently as 6 September 2022.
On 26 August 2022 the Tribunal advised the Applicant of a hearing for the application for review, scheduled for 8 September 2022.
At 11.15pm on 6 September 2022, the Applicant provided the Tribunal with further documents, by way of an e-mail, with attachments (‘the new materials’). These materials and the Tribunal’s assessment of them will be traversed by the Tribunal, further below.
The Applicant’s Claims at the hearing:
During the giving of his oral evidence, and as now buttressed by the new materials, the Applicant explained the nature of his claims as follows:
·The Applicant claims to have been a supporter of the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (‘Freedom Party’) since shortly after his finishing high school.
·Even after arriving in Australia in 2009 – in order to accompany his wife who had come to Australia on a student visa to study [Discipline 1] - the Applicant would return to Sri Lanka periodically to assist the Freedom Party with election campaigning. The Applicant would also seek to help the Freedom Party between election campaigns via his intermittently doing things such as sending items of computer equipment from Australia to Sri Lanka.
·Towards the end of 2014 the Applicant made another short trip back to Sri Lanka to assist the Freedom Party during an election campaign.
·Whilst in Sri Lanka in 2014, the Applicant claims to have had an initial ‘difference of opinion’ with a former friend and Freedom Party colleague, named as one [Mr A]. The Applicant had met [Mr A] when they had each joined the Freedom Party as young men at around the same time.
·Over time, and even before their difference of opinion arose in 2014, the Applicant says that he had come to realise that his support for the Freedom Party was different from the motivations shown by [Mr A]. Whereas the Applicant says he was interested in public policy and the democratic process, he came to perceive that [Mr A] was primarily self-interested, and motivated only by the potential to use the political process to advance his own interests.
·Even whilst living in Australia, the Applicant claims to have been aware that [Mr A] was engaged in local corruption and racketeering, with this awareness commencing from about 2011-2012, largely on the basis of things that had been told to the Applicant by friends and associates who were still living in Sri Lanka.
·In 2014 and in Sri Lanka, the Applicant claims to have personally observed [Mr A] dealing illicit drugs over the telephone: with this being observed whilst they were eating lunch together at a hotel one day. On the same day the Applicant also claims to have observed [Mr A] speaking with police officers (again by means of the telephone), and instructing the police not to patrol in specified areas, in order that “his guys” could supply drugs in those areas, uninterrupted.
·The Applicant says that shortly after observing this behaviour, he and [Mr A] had their first disagreement. During their disagreement, [Mr A] announced to the Applicant that he was going to swap political parties and join the UNP in lieu of the Freedom Party, and he encouraged the Applicant to do the same thing. The Applicant says that he refused to change parties. Their argument intensified, and the Applicant says that [Mr A] warned the Applicant he would shortly “give the Applicant a good lesson” in the realities of Sri Lankan politics. At this juncture the two men departed company. Shortly afterwards, the Applicant returned to his wife and children in Australia.
·In early August 2015, the Applicant again returned to Sri Lanka to assist the Freedom Party in another election campaign.
·Approximately one week prior to election day, the Applicant says that he was working with other Freedom Party campaign workers and in the process of putting up election posters when another altercation took place between himself and [Mr A], who had happened to be erecting election posters for the UNP at the same location. The Applicant says that [Mr A] accused the Applicant of posting Freedom Party election posters over the top of existing UNP posters. The Applicant says that he responded by accusing [Mr A] of having previously done the same thing. The Applicant says that a heated argument ensued, in which they almost came to blows, before each of them were separated, by other people.
·[In] August 2015, the Applicant says that he was at a hotel restaurant in Sri Lanka having a meal with other friends when [Mr A] appeared at the same venue. The Applicant says that [Mr A] was very drunk, and in company with the UNP candidate that he was supporting. [Mr A] commenced to scorn and ridicule the Applicant. Another argument ensued, and the Applicant says that he accused [Mr A] of engaging in illicit activities, including prostitution and supplying drugs, all under a veil of politics. A scuffle ensued, and in the process the UNP politician was inadvertently slapped in the face. The Applicant says that others who were around the Applicant at the time quickly dragged him away, and they immediately commenced to leave the venue. As the Applicant and other Freedom Party campaign workers were descending a staircase towards the street, the Applicant says that [Mr A] appeared behind them, this time brandishing a pistol and threatening to kill the Applicant (‘the restaurant altercation’).
·The Applicant says that in the aftermath of the restaurant altercation he went to the police to make an official complaint. The Applicant says that the police were not interested, and did not bother to officially record the complaint.
·The UNP went on to win the August 2015 election, thus beating the Freedom Party. A few days afterwards the Applicant left Sri Lanka and returned to Australia. In the intervening period between the restaurant altercation and the Applicant’s departure for Australia, the Applicant claims to be aware that [Mr A] came looking for him, and that threats by telephone continued, even after he had returned to Australia.
·The Applicant also says that people associated with [Mr A] came to his parent’s home in [Town 1] looking for him, even after he had returned to Australia. As a precaution, the Applicant says that he and his other brothers - who also live overseas – then made arrangements for the Applicant’s parents to be re-located from [Town 1], to instead live with other relatives, in safety in [Town 2].
·The Applicant’s younger brother is an [Occupation 1], working in [Country 1]. In October-November 2021 (at a time when the Applicant was back in Australia), the Applicant’s brother returned to Sri Lanka to visit his wife’s parents in [Town 2], as well as their own parents, who by that stage were also living in [Town 2].
·The Applicant’s father, who was elderly and in poor health, persuaded the Applicant’s brother to take him back to visit their former family home in [Town 1], in order that the Applicant’s father might view the house and garden that he had established. [In] November 2021, the Applicant’s brother drove their father to [Town 1], planning to arrive under cover of darkness before returning to [Town 2] early the next morning, in an effort to avoid local villagers becoming aware of their presence in [Town 1].
·The Applicant claims that somebody in [Town 1] must have seen his younger brother, and to have mistaken him for the Applicant; and that word got back to [Mr A] that the Applicant had returned.
·The Applicant says that after his brother and Father had been at the house in [Town 1] for only about one hour, masked men armed with weapons arrived and confronted his brother and father; only to realise that it was the Applicant’s younger brother, and not the Applicant. Threats were made to the Applicant’s brother and Father demanding that the Applicant return to Sri Lanka. The Applicant’s father was pushed to the ground. A scuffle ensued, and a pistol was brandished and pointed at the Applicant’s brother, and threats were made that all members of the family would be killed, in the event the Applicant did not return to Sri Lanka. The Applicant’s brother was then dragged outside, and given a beating.
·Video footage – as provided by the Applicant to the Tribunal for the first time by means of an attachment to an e-mail sent at 11.25pm AEST on 6 November 2022 - ostensibly taken from a security camera on the outside of the house in [Town 1] has now been submitted to the Tribunal. This reveals a group of four masked men (one of whom is possibly armed with a pistol) arriving at 20.58.24 and a fifth man with a stick-like object arriving at the camera location at 20.58.58 and proceeding past the camera, into what is presumed to be the house. A few moments later (at 20.59.02) the masked men are seen dragging another male person with an orange and white umbrella into view of the camera, pushing him to the ground, and standing over him for a few further moments, and hitting him. Three of the masked men are now brandishing stick-like objects and one of them is seen to point a pistol at the head of the man on the ground. At 20.59.35, the masked men flee back into the distant darkness. Shortly after the masked men had departed, a young woman is seen to come out (at 20.59.56), and to assist the man on the ground back to his feet, before escorting the male back to the place from whence the woman had emerged. The man being assisted has a torn shirt. As the man assisted by the woman returns towards (what is presumed to be the interior of the house), one of the masked men also rushes out from the darkness (at 21.00.02), and proceeds straight past them, and attacks the camera, with a stick-like object. The video footage then abruptly ends, at 21.00.07. In total, these events transpired over about 90 seconds.
The Applicant now claims that the man seen on the ground in this video footage was his younger brother; who the Applicant claims was attacked when the assailants realised that the Applicant had not returned to Sri Lanka. The Applicant says that this event caused his father to have a heart attack. The Applicant says that his father was rushed to hospital, yet his father then died [in] November 2021, as the result of a second heart attack.
In relation to the events just described, the Applicant claims that he fears harm from [Mr A], who has since been elected as a provincial council member representing the UNP, such that the Applicant is now unwilling to return to Sri Lanka because of his fear of [Mr A]; or that pursuant to s.36(2)(aa) of the Act, the Applicant is now at a real risk of suffering significant harm at the hands of [Mr A], or his associates.
In relation to [Mr A], the Applicant contends:
·He is fearful of the corrupt power of [Mr A], which the Applicant claims has further increased, over time;
·He could not live safely anywhere in Sri Lanka as Sri Lanka is a small country, and [Mr A]’s ‘tentacles reach everywhere’;
·A friend ([Mr B]) was murdered in February 2021 by a man known as “[Mr C]”, who is claimed to work as an underling for [Mr A]. [Mr C] was arrested, however [Mr A] was then instrumental in obtaining early release from prison for [Mr C], after only about one year.

In addition to the video footage, as described by the Tribunal above, the Applicant submitted the following further documentary evidence, by means of a separate e-mail, sent to the Tribunal at 11.15pm AEST on 6 September 2022:
·A series of photographs, claimed during the Tribunal hearing on 8 September 2022 to have been obtained by the Applicant taking [social media] screenshots (assembled more recently by the Applicant whilst in Australia), purportedly showing [Mr A] campaigning for the UNP.
·Screenshots of audio telephone call history between the Applicant and his friend [Mr B] (who it is alleged had left the Freedom Party together with [Mr A] to join the UNP), in which [Mr B] is claimed to have informed the Applicant that [Mr A] was “impossible to work with” as he was “just another corrupted politician”, such that [Mr B] had decided to change allegiances again, and in future to support another candidate, [Mr D], rather than the UNP.
·Photographs, (again obtained as screenshots taken from [social media]), claimed to show [Mr B] campaigning with [Mr D], in lieu of his campaigning with [Mr A] and the UNP.
·Claims by the Applicant that, after [Mr D] won the election, [Mr A] went to [Mr B]’s house and threatened him with a pistol, whilst also mentioning the name of the Applicant.
·Claims by the Applicant that [Mr A] had ordered the killing of [Mr B].
·A picture, claiming to be the deceased body of [Mr B], whom the Applicant claims was killed in a sword attack by a man known as “[Mr C]” on instruction from [Mr A]. The Applicant claims that [Mr C] was later arrested, yet [Mr A] wields sufficient power that [Mr C] was released from gaol after serving just over one year.
·A translated copy of the death certificate for [Mr B] (submitted to the Tribunal by the Applicant separately, under cover of an e-mail on 26 September 2022), indicating his date of death to be [February] 2021, and as being causally attributed to “cuts to the head caused by a heavy sharp weapon”.
·Claims, by the Applicant, that [Mr C] had called his telephone in Australia, in July 2022, warning that he had killed [Mr B], and similarly threatening to kill the Applicant on behalf [Mr A], before the Applicant hung up the phone;
·Screenshots of missed telephone calls in July and August 2022, which the Applicant now alleges are further attempts by [Mr C] to make contact with him, in Australia.
·Pictures, ostensibly showing the Applicant’s father in hospital, and then in a deceased state, in a funeral suit;
·Further pictures - also obtained as screenshots taken from [social media] - now claimed to show [Mr A] in company with various politicians and others in Sri Lanka, apparently engaged in campaigning activities.
Assessment of the Applicant’s Recent Evidence
The Tribunal has considered the evidence provided by the Applicant by means of e-mail attachments sent to the Tribunal Registry on 6 September and 26 September 2022. No attempt has been made by the Applicant to explain why this material was not submitted until the eve of the Tribunal hearing, and nor has the Applicant explained how the video footage - ostensibly obtained from the security camera on the house in [Town 1] - came to be in his possession.
Although the Applicant claims that the person shown as the direct victim of the assault portrayed in the video footage was his brother, who lives in [Country 1], no statement of evidence (or explanation for the absence of a statement of evidence) has been produced by the Applicant from his brother: this despite the Applicant informing the Tribunal that he is able to contact his brother, in [Country 1]. Similarly, no statement of evidence (or explanation for the absence of a statement of evidence), has been provided from the young woman also shown in the footage as rendering assistance to the alleged victim in the portrayed assault. Presumably, this young woman is connected to the Applicant’s brother, and is thus also a person who could be contacted by the Applicant to provide a first-hand account of the events now claimed to have transpired in [Town 1] on 1 November 2021.
After viewing and considering the contents of the security camera footage, the Tribunal is left in a state of considerable residual doubt regarding the authenticity of the claimed footage. The Tribunal is left with an unresolved impression that the events portrayed in the video may be a staged enactment. The nature of the purported attack appears contrived, and the Tribunal is unable to confirm that this footage was even taken in [Town 1], on the date and at the time now alleged in the time stamp on the video. Nor is it apparent why the claimed attack even needed to be taken from inside the home (where it is said to have commenced) to outside, and thus directly into view of the camera. The Tribunal is not satisfied regarding the provenance of the video footage, and in these circumstances is not prepared to attach any weight to it. As the Applicant was not himself present in Sri Lanka on 1 November 2021, the Tribunal is not able to place any weight on his interpretation of the claimed events in [Town 1] on that date.
In relation to the other evidence more recently produced by the Applicant, the Tribunal makes the following observations:
·There is still no evidence that is corroborative of the claimed exchanges between the Applicant and [Mr A] in 2014 and 2015. Given the nature of the restaurant altercation in particular (in which the Applicant says that he was dragged outside by other Freedom Party campaign workers, who were then also present with him when [Mr A] wielded a pistol and threatened the Applicant), one might expect that statements of evidence could have been obtained from other persons whom were also present, in order to corroborate the Applicant’s account. Yet, no statements of evidence (or explanation for their absence) have been provided by the Applicant. In the circumstances the Tribunal is not prepared to accept the Applicant’s account of the events now said to comprise the ‘restaurant altercation’;
·Screenshots taken from the [social media] page maintained by [Mr A] at best do no more than suggest him to be a conventional supporter, of the UNP. These do not reveal any specific enmity between [Mr A] and the Applicant, and nor do these afford evidence of [Mr A] being engaged in illicit activities;
·The Tribunal is prepared to accept that the person named as [Mr B] had been a campaign supporter of [Mr D], and that [Mr B] may have died a violent death [in] February 2021, however none of the evidence submitted by the Applicant is sufficient to link that death to either [Mr A], or the man now described by the Applicant as [Mr B]’s claimed assailant, ‘[Mr C]’, or to events involving the Applicant as long ago as 2015. The Applicant’s claims to that end remain uncorroborated, and are just not able to be assessed by the Tribunal.
·Screenshots of call records between the Applicant and [Mr B] do establish some contact between the two of them, however these screenshots do not show the nature any conversation or information passing between them. To accept the substance/basis of any conversation between the Applicant and [Mr B] the Tribunal would first need to be persuaded by the testimonial evidence of the Applicant; yet the Tribunal is not persuaded by the Applicant’s testimonial evidence.
·The Tribunal is not persuaded by the Applicant’s evidence that ‘[Mr C]’ contacted him by telephone and issued threats on behalf [Mr A]. Screenshots of call records of further purported efforts by the man described as [Mr C] to make contact with the Applicant do not afford evidence of the rationale for any attempted telephone contact.
·The Tribunal is prepared to accept that the Applicant’s father died, [in] November 2021.
The Tribunal is aware of the importance of adopting a reasonable approach towards findings of credibility and in particular the note of caution sounded by Foster J in Guo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1996) 64 FCR 151 at [194], wherein his Honour said:
“care must be taken that an over-stringent approach does not result in an unjust exclusion from consideration of the totality of some evidence where a portion of it could be reasonably accepted…”
Similarly, the Tribunal notes that generally, if the Applicant’s account appears credible, then it ought, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt and be accepted. However, in the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Geneva, 1992) at paragraph [204], the UNHCR cautions that:
“….The benefit of doubt should, however, only be given when all available evidence has been obtained and checked and the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility. The applicant’s statements must be coherent and plausible, and must not run counter to generally known facts…”
[emphasis not in the original, yet included here, by the Tribunal].
Evidence that is clearly and logically relevant to an assessment of the key facts in issue – in the form of an account from the Applicant’s own brother (now resident in [Country 1]), and the woman portrayed in the video footage – have not been provided by the Applicant; such that the Tribunal is unable to move beyond its current state of dissatisfaction regarding the provenance of the security camera footage. As well, there remains an absence of sufficiently corroborative evidence by which the Tribunal might be able to attain a state of comfortable satisfaction regarding the plausibility of the Applicant’s claims. The Tribunal is not required to accept the Applicant uncritically, nor even to have rebutting evidence available to it before it can find that any particular assertion by the Applicant has not been made out.[1] The Tribunal accordingly records that it finds that the Applicant’s claims – those as regards threats from [Mr A] and/or the man described as [Mr C] - have not, as a matter of evidence, been established to the Tribunal’s reasonable satisfaction.
[1] Consider: Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437 at [451] per Beaumont J; Selvadurai v MIEA & Anor (1994) 34 ALD 347 at [348], per Heerey J; and Kopalapillai v MIMA (1998) 86 FCR 547.
In light of the foregoing, the Tribunal is unable to achieve a sufficient state of satisfaction to be able to make factual findings regarding the Applicants claims of threats to his personal safety emanating from [Mr A], or those claimed to be acting on his instruction: SZSMQ v MIBP [2013] FCCA 1768 at [58] – [60]; and DAT17 v MIBP [2018] FCCA 3750 at [30] - [31].
Relevant Country Information:
The Applicant is a Sinhalese man, and makes no specific claims of his having a well-found fear of persecution in Sri Lanka on any of the grounds articulated in s.5J(1)(a), s.5J(1)(b) or 5J(1)(c) of the Act. The Applicant makes no claims other than in relation to the threat now claimed to be posed to him by [Mr A], and/or by his associates, acting on instructions received from [Mr A].
From the perspective of the refugee criteria in s.5H and 5J(1), the Applicant’s claims are at least potentially able to be conceived as relating to matters of “political opinion” – at least to the extent that the Applicant’s political opinions, actual or imputed, may be expressed as being divergent from the opinions now also claimed by the Applicant as being held by [Mr A]. For completeness, the Tribunal will therefore analyse the Applicant’s claims from this perspective.
The DFAT Country Information report for Sri Lanka (23 December 2021) provides the following – potentially relevant - extracts regarding the political system in Sri Lanka:
2.11 Under Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2020, Sri Lanka is rated 94th out of 180 countries. According to the Global Corruption Barometer, 79 per cent of Sri Lankans think government corruption is a big problem while 16 per cent report having paid a bribe to receive a public service in the last 12 months. Local sources indicate that while much corruption in Sri Lanka is at a senior enough level so as not to affect the lives of ordinary people (such as corruption in relation to government procurement or money laundering), there does exist petty corruption, such as the bribes paid by some parents for their children to attend a good school. Similarly, Transparency Sri Lanka states that, in a country with a large and inefficient public service, often “personal connections mean regulations are bypassed”.
2.12 Police officers are not well paid, and individual officers reportedly engage in petty corruption, such as taking bribes instead of issuing traffic fines, to supplement their income. There are several measures in place for the public to make complaints to the police, including directly to the officer-in-charge at local stations, the public complaints department or via the internet. Official statistics on the uptake of this service are not publicly available.
…/
2.29 Sri Lanka is a democracy with a mixed parliamentary and presidential form of government. The president is directly elected for a five-year term (limited to two terms) and is the Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. President Rajapaksa is also the current Minister of Defence. International and domestic election observers deemed the last parliamentary election, held in 2020, to be mostly credible, although some incidents of voter intimidation were reported.
2.30 In August 2020, the Sri Lanka People's Freedom Alliance (SLPFA), a coalition under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa (which includes his own party, the Sri Lanka People's Front (SLPP)), won a two-thirds majority in the Sri Lankan Parliament led by Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa.
2.31 On 20 October 2020, the Sri Lankan Parliament endorsed the 20th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution. The amendment reversed some measures introduced by the previous government, largely dismantling pro-transparency and accountability reforms in the 19th Amendment, as well as enhanced executive control over the legislature and judiciary. In January 2021, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed her concern that ‘the amendment has fundamentally eroded the independence of key commissions and institutions, including the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL), the Election Commission, the National Police Commission and the judiciary in terms of procedure for the selection, appointment and dismissal of senior judges and other high-ranking officials.’ The amendment also allowed dual citizens to enter Parliament.
2.32 In July 2021, Basil Rajapaksa, a dual-Sri Lankan-US citizen, was sworn in as Sri Lanka’s Minister of Finance, becoming the fourth Rajapaksa brother and fifth member of the first family to enter the Cabinet. The move further consolidated the family’s control over the machinery of government. The family’s return to government has seen greater centralisation of power in the executive branch and the increased militarisation of civilian government (such as the filling of civilian positions with former military officers). Some observers have called these measures ‘democratic backsliding’; the weakening of institutions that provide democratic accountability (see Recent History).
2.33 Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa’s earlier 10-year presidency (2005-2015) was also marked by allegations of democratic backsliding and accusations of corruption and human rights violations, including alleged war crimes against the Tamils, and harassment, arrest and disappearance of government critics. The current government of Gotabaya Rajapaksa has sought to retain popularity within the majority Sinhalese community by highlighting their role in the defeat of the LTTE and by promoting strong state security, particularly following the 2019 Easter Sunday terrorist attacks. Local sources, Tamil and non-Tamil, told DFAT that the human rights improvements achieved under the government of Maithripala Sirisena (2015-2019), including in relation to freedom of expression, are now being reversed. Such sources regard the increasing militarisation of the civilian government, the 20^th Amendment’s centralisation of power in the hands of the executive, and the increasing use of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other means to silence critics, as vindication of their fears. Presidential elections are next scheduled to be held in 2024. In July 2021, President Rajapaksa stated his intention to run for a second term in office.
…/
2.43 In January 2020, President Rajapaksa established the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCOI) into political victimisation to investigate so-called ‘acts of political victimization’ that occurred as part of investigations against people connected to his Government, carried out in the past by the Sri Lankan police or other agencies. Domestic and international human rights observers regard the PCOI as a mechanism to ‘derail investigations’ of President Rajapaksa’s relatives and allies begun by the previous administration in 2015-19.
2.44 The Bar Association of Sri Lanka has said that the PCOI’s report, which has been approved by Cabinet but not publicly released, ‘may undermine the Rule of Law in this country, impair the independence of the Judiciary, and erode the impartial and efficient functioning of the Attorney General’s Department.’ The OHCHR notes that the Government’s PCOI has ‘had the effect of undermining the police and judiciary in several high-profile human rights and corruption-related cases.’ Among the historical cases affected by the PCOI is the 2008-09 enforced disappearance and suspected murder of 11 men and boys by alleged members of naval intelligence. Fourteen former and serving naval officers including Adm. (ret.) Ravindra Wijegunaratne, a former Chief of Defence Staff, were due to stand trial in 2020 before it was postponed. Other historical cases include the 2008 abduction and torture of a journalist, Keith Noyahr; the 2010 disappearance of a journalist, Prageeth Ekneligoda, in which a criminal trial is proceeding; and, the 2012 Welikada Prison massacre, in which security force personnel are currently facing trial. According to Human Rights Watch, a common element in all these cases is that evidence produced in court by the police has implicated President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and/or his family and allies. Among other recommendations, the PCOI recommended withdrawal of around 75 cases pending in Sri Lankan courts (all linked in some way to the Rajapaksa family members or their loyalists), on the basis that the cases constituted political victimisation.
…/
2.52 Elections have historically been volatile periods in Sri Lanka; however, independent election monitors found no significant security problems with the running of the 2019 Presidential and 2020 parliamentary elections, even amid COVID-19 restrictions for the 2020 election.
…/
3.38 Sri Lanka has held regular democratic elections since independence. Large-scale violence and vote rigging have never been features of elections, but nor have elections always been described as entirely free and fair. DFAT assesses that political parties are able to operate freely across Sri Lanka and contest elections. There are no constitutional, legal or other restrictions preventing minorities from participating in politics. Sri Lanka has a diverse political landscape, with 70 registered political parties representing ethnic, religious and ideological interests. Political representation in parliament of each ethnicity is broadly proportional to the ethnic make-up of the overall population. The current parliament includes 27 Tamils and 19 Muslims among its 225 members. There is a single Muslim and Tamil respectively in the current cabinet, with another two Tamil state ministers.
…/
5.16 Sri Lankan authorities retain comprehensive countrywide ‘stop’ and ‘watch’ lists of those suspected of involvement in terrorist or serious criminal offences (see Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)). Individuals on either list will not be able to avoid adverse attention from security forces. However, DFAT assesses that individuals seeking to relocate internally to minimise monitoring or harassment by local-level officials for petty issues can safely do so.
[Emphasis not in the original, yet included here, by the Tribunal]
Assessment of the Applicant’s Claims under the Refugee criteria in s.36(2)(a):

On the basis of the aforementioned Country Information, the Tribunal is prepared to accept that the Sri Lankan political system can be oftentimes tumultuous, and that political campaigners and supporters may change party allegiances more frequently than is usually the case in other, more stable democratic systems.
The Tribunal is further prepared to accept that the Sri Lankan political system affords opportunities for local corruption, and that local police officers may be either themselves engaged in corrupt activities; or otherwise be unwilling to enforce existing laws against corrupt activities committed by others, including local representatives. On the basis of paragraph 5.16 of the Sri Lanka Country Information Report, the Tribunal finds that individuals seeking to relocate internally in Sri Lanka so as to minimise monitoring or harassment by local-level officials for petty issues can do so, with safety.
On the basis of the Applicant’s movement records - which do record the fact of his having returned to Sri Lanka in each of 2014 and 2015 for short periods - and in light of his evident knowledge of Sri Lankan political issues and campaigns, the Tribunal is prepared to accept that the Applicant is at least ‘politically interested’, and that the Applicant had worked at the local campaign worker level, and was, in each of 2014 and 2015, a volunteer campaign worker for the Freedom Party in Sri Lanka.
Ultimately however, the Applicant does not make any specific claims of his fearing persecution on the basis of his political opinions, per se. Rather, the Applicant claims that [Mr A] is first and foremost a criminal with a propensity towards violence, who also happens to consort with and support certain politicians; and that [Mr A] has himself since been elected as a local council representative for the UNP: such that he has enhanced his capacity for criminal endeavour, by reason of his more recently acquired political status.
Distilled to an essence, the Applicant’s claim is one that a threat is posed to him by [Mr A] by reason that the Applicant knows about the illicit activities conducted by [Mr A], in circumstances wherein the Applicant had previously threatened to expose these, during the argument at the epicentre of their restaurant altercation. In these circumstances, the Applicant’s claims are tantamount to his saying that he is at risk in Sri Lanka because of [Mr A], and this risk applies irrespective of the nature of the Applicant’s personal political opinions, actual or imputed. This is assessed by the Tribunal as categorically different from a fear of persecution on the specific ‘refugee status’ ground of ‘political opinion’.
The Tribunal concludes therefore that if the Applicant were to return to Sri Lanka he would not face a risk of persecution on the basis of his political beliefs - whether actual or imputed - as any threat to the Applicant as expressed in his claims is categorically different from any of the grounds identified for explicit purposes of refugee protection under s.36(2)(a) by s.5J(1)(a) of the Act.
Furthermore, in order for a fear of persecution to be categorised as ‘well-founded’, there first needs to be a ‘real chance’ that the Applicant would be persecuted for one of more of the reasons specified in s.5J(1)(a) of the Act, and in circumstances where that real chance relates to all areas of Sri Lanka, as the receiving country under examination (s.5J(1)(c) refers).
The Tribunal notes that in part, the Applicant claims that it is now unsafe for him to return to Sri Lanka by reason that [Mr A] has been elected as a member of the [named] Provincial Council, and his power and influence is therefore claimed to be extensive. Yet, other than for the Applicant’s assertions to that end, and some [social media] photographs showing [Mr A] as being in the company of some Sri Lankan politicians on some occasions, (to which the Tribunal is not prepared to attach much weight), there is no persuasive evidence before the Tribunal to support the contention of [Mr A] wielding extensive political power. To this end, the Applicant agreed that the [named] Provincial Council was the approximate equivalent of local government in Australia, and dealt with local issues; such that [Mr A], if so elected, would now be a local-level official, only. As such, and given the state of the available evidence in light of the Country Information Report on Sri Lanka, the Tribunal is not prepared to hold that [Mr A] has the capacity to wield more than local level influence and power, within the geographic jurisdiction of the [named] Provincial Council.
When it was put to the Applicant that he could go and safely live in another part of Sri Lanka, (somewhere away from [Town 1]), the Applicant denied that this was possible, asserting that [Mr A] would still find him. It was put to the Applicant that he and his brothers had previously sent their parents to live in [Town 2] - in the east of Sri Lanka - expressly for reasons of ensuring their safety. Despite an acknowledgement of the Applicant’s parents having been relocated from [Town 1] to [Town 2], expressly in order to provide for their safety, the Applicant denied that it would be similarly safe for him in [Town 2], or elsewhere in Sri Lanka. Ultimately the Tribunal is unable to accept the Applicant’s claims to this end by reason that, at paragraph 5.16 of the most recent Sri Lankan Country Information report it is specified that “DFAT assesses that individuals seeking to relocate internally to minimise monitoring or harassment by local-level officials for petty issues can safely do so”. It follows therefore that, even if the evidential basis for the Applicant’s refugee-status claims were accepted (and this evidence is expressly not accepted by the Tribunal), the Applicant could still not be found by the Tribunal as having a “well-founded” fear of persecution, by reason that any putative “real chance” of persecution does not - on the available evidence - relate to all areas in the receiving country of Sri Lanka.
It follows therefore that the Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant’s claims do not give rise to a right to protection on grounds of the Applicant qualifying as a ‘refugee’ under s.36(2)(a) of the Act.
Assessment of Complimentary Protection Claims under s.36(2)(aa)
The next issue before the Tribunal is whether the Applicant may still be entitled to complementary protection by reason that there are substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the Applicant being removed from Australia and returned to Sri Lanka there is still a ‘real risk’ that he will suffer ‘significant harm’.
Pursuant to s.36(2A) of the Act, ‘significant harm’ will occur if:
·The Applicant will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or
·The death penalty will be carried out on the Applicant; or
·The Applicant will be subjected to torture; or
·The Applicant will be subjected to cruel or inhumane treatment or punishment; or
·The Applicant will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
However, pursuant to s.36(2B) of the Act there is taken not to be a ‘real risk’ that the Applicant will suffer ‘significant harm’ if:
·It would be reasonable for the Applicant to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that they will suffer significant harm; or
·The Applicant could obtain (via the appropriate authorities in Sri Lanka) protection, such that there would not be a real risk that the person will suffer significant harm; or
·The real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally, rather than being specific to the Applicant
Previously, the Tribunal has determined that there is insufficient persuasive and reliable evidence for it to be able to conclude that the Applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution applicable to all areas of Sri Lanka as the receiving country. The real-chance test that gives rise to a well-founded fear of persecution in s.5J(1) of the Act is effectively the same as the ‘real risk’ test in s.36(2)(aa) (consider: MIAC v SZQRB (2103) 210 FCR 505 at [246]; [297]; & [342]; see also MZYXS v MIAC [2013] FMCA 13).
For similar reasons as those found in relation to an absence of any basis for a well-founded fear of persecution, the Tribunal is unable to be satisfied that there are now substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the Applicant being returned to Sri Lanka there is a real risk that the Applicant will suffer significant harm. On the evidence it would seem to be reasonable for the Applicant to relocate to another part of Sri Lanka, such as [Town 2] that is not subject to the influence of [Mr A].
DECISION
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that any of the Applicants is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations. Therefore the Applicants do not satisfy the criterion set out in either s.36(2)(a) or 36(2)(aa) for a protection visa. It follows that they are also unable to satisfy the criterion set out in s 36(2)(b) or (c), and cannot be granted the visa.
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the Applicants protection visas.
Andrew McLean Williams
Member

Attachment - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…
5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…
36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…

[2023] AATA 732

6 February 2023

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Immigration

Administrative Law

Legal Concepts

Judicial Review

Statutory Construction

Procedural Fairness

Jurisdiction