1818213 (Refugee)

[2022] AATA 2021

1818213 (Refugee) [2022] AATA 2021 (21 April 2022)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER:  1818213

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Uganda

MEMBER:Peter Vlahos

DATE:21 April 2022

PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne

DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

This Statement was made on 21^st April 2022 at 3.15PM

CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Uganda – particular social group – journalist resisting the Museveni regime – interviewed opposition politician – Anti-Age limit Bill – detention without due process – raped by male prisoners – subject to intimidation and threats – country information – political unrest – increasing lawlessness – freedom of expression & assembly – media freedom – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H, 5J, 36, 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2

CASES
Applicant S v MIMA (2004) 217 CLR 387
Chan v MIEA (1989) 169 379
MIEA v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
Morato v MILGEA (1992) 39 FCR 401

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 12 June 2018 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

2. The applicant who claims to be a citizen of Uganda, applied for the visa on 24 April 2018. The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that the application for Protection visa did not satisfy sub-section 36(2) of the Act.

3. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 30 March 2022 to give evidence and present arguments.

4. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Other and English languages.

5. The applicant was represented in relation to the review. The representative attended the Tribunal hearing.

   CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA

6. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

7. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.

8. A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).

9. Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a  person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

10. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

    Mandatory considerations

11. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

    CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

12. The issue in this case is whether Australia has protection obligations in respect of the applicant. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.

    Applicant’s identity and country of origin

13. Based on a copy of the applicant’s passport, which was provided to the Department of Home Affairs (the ‘Department’) and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant is a national of the Republic of Uganda and has had her claims assessed against that country in relation to section 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

14. Therefore, on the basis of the abovementioned evidence before the Tribunal, the Tribunal further accepts the applicant’s identity as claimed.

    Department’s file

15. The Tribunal has before it the Department’s file relating to the applicant. The Tribunal also has had regard to the material referred to in the delegate’s decision. The applicant has provided a copy of the departmental decision of record to the Tribunal with the review of decision application.

    Background – the applicant’s migration/visa history

16. [In] April 2018, the applicant arrived in Australia on a [temporary] visa. On 24 April 2018 the applicant applied for a Protection (Class XA, subclass 866) visa and was provided by the associated bridging visa.

    EVIDENCE AT THE HEARING

17. The applicant was born in Kampala, Uganda on [date], and is aged [age] years-of-age, and is married. The applicant finished her education in Uganda and also studied and successfully completed a Certificate and Diploma in Journalism (completed in [year]). She later was employed as a news presenter and interview journalist for a local [media outlet], [Employer 1]. The applicant has family currently living in Uganda, which consist of her elderly mother and [number of] sisters and ‘two dependents’ as the applicant described them (a son and daughter of varying ages). The applicant said that the children live at a different location for their security, and this was because their father (her husband) is under constant surveillance by the Ugandan authorities. The applicant is in contact with her family, when she can so contact them.

    The applicant’s claims for Protection visa

18. The Tribunal noted that in her original application for Protection, which was submitted to the Department and the subject of this review, the applicant made the following claims:[1]

    [1] see Department of Home Affairs File no. [number]

    • The applicant worked as a [Occupation 1] and political journalist. She [worked] for

    [Employer 1], which was known for being ‘anti-government’. She [interviewed] different political leaders, ‘mostly opposition politicians’ to ‘get their opinions’ on the

    ongoing situation in Uganda.

    • The applicant claims that [in] 2017 she was detained by [police] after she [interviewed opposition politician Mr A] of [Political Party 1], and

    ‘spear-headed the anti-age limit Bill’.

    • The applicant claims she was held for three days and charged with ‘inciting violence in public on [media]’.
    • The applicant claims she beaten and held in a cell with men, which is illegal. She was raped by male prisoners, denied access to bathrooms, beaten, and not allowed to communicate with her family.
    • The applicant sought help with the Uganda Journalist Union Association, and they gave her free aid and

    she was released on bail but was put on 24 surveillance and told to report to the police station

    weekly.

    • The applicant moved to another district and stayed with her sister-in-law, but the police followed her

    and she continued to get death threats.

    • The applicant claims her rights were violated as a journalist, and as a woman. She fears if she returns to Uganda she will be detained because she did not adhere to bail conditions, as she could not afford to travel back every week. She fears she will be harassed, jailed, or killed by the authorities.

19. The applicant attended a Protection visa (PV) interview on 17 May 2018. The interview was conducted with the help of a Luganda interpreter. The applicant provided further documentary evidence in support of her claims for protection, including a student identity card, employment identity cards, medical and police documents which the Tribunal was provided with by the applicant.[2]

    [2] see AAT File

20. The applicant said that after she completed her studies, she was employed by a local [media organisation], [Employer 1]. The applicant told the Tribunal she was able to gain work as a journalist because she was identified to have ability to deal with news and reporting.

21. The applicant said that her journalistic responsibilities at [Employer 1] involved the preparation and selection of news-worthy items for public consumption and what she described [as Occupation 1].

22. The Tribunal was asked – what occurred in her journalistic work which caused her the problems she claims to have encountered forcing her to leave Uganda and to seek protection in Australia? The applicant said that it ‘around [month] 2017’ when she was [interviewing] a member of the Ugandan Parliament aligned to the Opposition concerning the Age-Limit Bill which if passed by the Parliament ‘would make the President of Uganda, President for life.’ The applicant went on to say, the Opposition and in particular [Mr A] of [Political Party 1] was very vocal and considered the proposed Bill a ‘direct assault on the Constitution of Uganda.’ This opposition to the Bill, the applicant told the Tribunal were [disseminated by Employer 1].

23. The applicant said that the interview with [Mr A] instead of continuing as a fact-finding discussion – informing [the public] about the ‘dangers’ to Ugandan democracy if the Bill passed into law, deteriorated into [public criticism] of the current Ugandan President. The Opposition spokesman, according to the applicant ‘went overboard.’

24. [Later], while walking out of the building where [Employer 1] operated, there was a sudden scuffle and unknown men (later, identified as Ugandan state security personnel) seized the applicant and took her away and into detention.

25. The applicant recalled that she found herself as a detainee in the ‘[named] Police Station’. On the first day of detention, the applicant recalled, ‘nothing happened’. The applicant said that she was placed in a cell (mixed) with other detainees.

26. The applicant was asked – how long after being placed in prison did, she get interrogated by the authorities? The applicant’s response was “…I do not remember…” When the interrogation commence (the applicant could not remember when) she recalled that it was intimidatory and enormous pressure was being placed on her to make admission which were not true.

27. The Tribunal asked the applicant – what type of intimidation did she encounter from her interrogators? The applicant said that she was told “…if you do not stop this (journalism) you have children that will be taken care of …” and “…no one will find you…” The applicant explained that these ‘intimidations’ were made to stop the applicant from again raising in [public] the issue of the President’s bid to remain in office for life.

28. In particular, the applicant said that what concerned her was the fact that threats were made against her family members and children. In particular, according to the applicant the words “…you are nothing [referring to the applicant] …” and that the applicant was “…just like a insect…” was indication to the applicant, that if she continued with investigative and informative journalism she would face more than just threats. The applicant recalled that she spent three days in detention.

29. The Tribunal asked the applicant – how did the applicant’s release come about? The applicant said that she asked her captors (the local police) to speak to her husband. The applicant told the Tribunal that she spoke to her husband but could not remember the details of that conversation, but the applicant did recall that she told him that she could not remain in detention ‘for more than 48 hours’. What happened next, according to the applicant, her husband met the journalists ‘union’ representatives and told them about the applicant’s dilemma with the authorities and requested the union’s intervention in the matter. The applicant said that the Journalists’ union representatives went to [Employer 1] were told of the applicant’s forced abduction and then attended the local police station and they engaged with the authorities and succeeded in having the applicant released.

30. The applicant said that her ‘release from prison’ was secured by the Journalists’ Union with the payment of a ‘bond’ and with the attached condition that the applicant ‘report to the authorities’ on her whereabout ‘each week.’

31. The applicant said that when she returned to her home, she found it ‘up-side down’ and decided that it would not be safe to live there, and she lived with her ‘sister-in-law’ while her husband and children lived at other undisclosed locations.

32. The applicant said that thereafter she decided with her family and colleagues that it was not safe for her to remain in Uganda. As a result of this fear, the applicant decided to leave Uganda. She told the Tribunal that her ‘escape’ was made possible by bribery of various officials which enabled her to evade the authorities and to secure a legal passport and visa.

    Incident – ‘rape while in jail’

33. The applicant was asked about her claim concerning ‘rape’ while in detention. The applicant became very emotional (resisting tears) she recalled that on the day she was detained by the authorities in [the named] Prison, her detention was in a ‘mixed cell’ not one occupied only by females. The applicant was asked to explain further by the Tribunal. The applicant said that the detention cell had various people, some habitual criminals, and others detained for various other reasons. Though the details of the ‘rape’ were difficult for the applicant to describe (which the Tribunal understands), it would seem from the immediate break-down of the applicant for several minutes during the hearing, that the claimed ‘rape’ was perpetrated by a number of individuals, not one alone but the applicant was not forthcoming with these details because she collapsed into tears.

34. Referring to the incident of rape, the applicant told the Tribunal the following:

    Applicant:       “There is no justice in Uganda…”

    Applicant: “I told them [the authorities in charge of the jail] and they told me that if I said what happened to me to anyone else, they will deal with me…”

35. The applicant was asked by the Tribunal was the rape perpetrated by inmates, detainees or by members of the police? The applicant did not provide an answer but continued to cry.

    Since coming to Australia in 2018 – what has the applicant been doing?

36. The applicant told the Tribunal that she has been working as a ‘[Occupation 1]’ while in Australia and has undertaken studies which she has completed a Diploma in [Discipline 1] and is currently working as [Occupation 2].

37. The applicant also told the Tribunal that she has taken up an active role within Victoria’s Ugandan ethnic community and has participated in public demonstrations against the Ugandan government and acted in her capacity a journalist championing the political platform of the Ugandan opposition.

38. The applicant and her represented requested from the Tribunal the opportunity to provide further submissions on the issues discussed with the Tribunal and the Tribunal acceded to the request. The Tribunal decided that further written materials and supportive evidence be provided within two weeks of the hearing date.

    COUNTRY INFORMATION – UGANDA – POLITICAL UNREST – FREEDOM OF OPINION – THE RULE OF LAW

39. The Tribunal referenced the following relevant country information concerning Uganda, from the 2017 International Crisis Group – Africa Report, no. 256 – 21 November 2017.[3]

    [3] >

    Uganda suffers from inefficient patronage politics and a downward spiral of declining governance, poor economic performance, and local insecurity. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, in power since 1986, appears unwilling to step down; supporters and detractors alike expect him to rule until he dies or engineers a handover to a close ally or family member. He will be 77 by the next election in 2021 and is poised to amend the constitution’s 75-year age limit, despite objections from the opposition, civil society and some in his own party. The president undoubtedly retains support, particularly in rural areas, not all of which is patronage-based. He is credited with bringing stability after the 1980s civil wars and eventually defeating the Lord’s Resistance Army rebellion, though his autocratic drift and systemic corruption risks wrecking this legacy. With political and institutional reform, there still is time to avoid such an outcome.

40. The decline in governance has ripple effects across the system. It stymies attempts to improve core services – particularly infrastructure and agriculture – that are strained by the demands of a rapidly growing population. Urgent infrastructure projects and the long-anticipated start of oil production have suffered delays, further depressing international investment. New government initiatives, nominally aimed at stimulating the economy, typically take the form of handouts, particularly to under-employed youth, designed to secure political support. The likewise politically[1]motivated creation of new administrative districts has not improved local services, but instead increased the size of the public sector, straining an already overwhelmed public purse. New districts also contribute to communal tensions, particularly when delimitation reallocates control over natural resources and land.

41. The security sector, particularly the police, is emblematic of these problems. Police officers carry out functions that are nominally intended to preserve public order yet in reality function as the president’s first line of defence against rivals. They spend much of their time disrupting opposition activities. Allegations of criminal activity within the police undermines its legitimacy; officers are reportedly involved in protection rackets, organised crime and turf wars. Violent crime, including murder, is on the rise as police ability to carry out regular duties declines. The rise of informal security groups, most notably the Crime Preventers (a non-uniformed youth militia that mobilised pro-government votes and intimidated its rivals during the 2016 election), has blurred lines, further eroded accountability, politicised policing and weakened the influence of better trained and disciplined career officers.

1. As crime has risen, particularly in urban areas, local governance has deteriorated. The local council system remains the bedrock of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), but the government has not held village or parish council elections since 2002, due partly to their cost but also reportedly to fears of the outcome. Local administration has withered and become increasingly dysfunctional.

2. Disputes over land, administrative districts and the government’s recognition of “traditional” authorities – another form of patronage – likewise prompt communal and ethnic violence, problems Ugandans doubt the state can resolve. Clashes are on the rise between the authorities and locals forcibly removed from newly demarcated wildlife reserves or who feel that ancestral lands are being grabbed by rapacious businessmen. The forthcoming land reform bill – a constitutional amendment that would ease government purchase of private land for infrastructure projects – provokes fears of more land-grabbing.

3. The lack of opportunities for youth plus tensions surrounding the presidential age-limit amendment and controversial land reform bills are fuelling the rise of new political actors – notably the musician turned-populist MP Bobi Wine – and increasing the risk of popular demonstrations that could provoke a violent crackdown.

4. Uganda is in urgent need of political and administrative reform to prevent a slide toward an increasingly dysfunctional, corrupt and insecure system. In order to mitigate longer-term dangers of civil strife, donors should be more sensitive to the political impact of their assistance by avoiding projects that contribute to ruling party patronage. For its part, President Museveni’s government should:

   ·Hold a credible National Dialogue: This should be done by revisiting plans to which the ruling party itself had agreed after the February 2016 election. Such a dialogue should be broad-based and focus on popular consultations with Ugandan citizens to discuss issues associated with the presidential succession and reduce fears that it might end in violence.

   ·Take steps to professionalise the police and improve its leadership: To stop the decline in police operational capacity and address criminality within police ranks, the government should re-institute a merit-based system of promotions in the senior command and investigate and prosecute alleged crimes by members of the force. It also should end or reduce use of informal, non-uniformed groups, particularly the Crime Preventers.

   ·Improve local governance: Hold local council elections to re-legitimise grass-roots administration while imposing a moratorium on the creation of new administrative districts.

   ·Consult widely on land reform: Complete consultations with the population at the local level (in local languages) in association with civil society to understand main concerns before embarking on any land ownership reform. Reforms should give local leaders – including elders and elected council leaders – a say in matters such as land allocation. The government should shelve the upcoming constitutional amendment on government land acquisition and instead prioritise reforms and anti-corruption measures within the lands ministry.

   Uganda’s slow slide into crisis

   Museveni for Life?

5. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni has led Uganda since 1986 and seems determined to remain in power. Over time, his rule slowly has shifted from broad-based and constitutional to patronage-based and personal, with his family at the centre. The president controls key institutions, including the army and police, that guarantee his political survival. His ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party dominates all levels of the state. Established opposition forces, whose populist messaging often appears to resonate during election campaigns, lack the organisation, money and political space to win at the ballot box.1 Despite some dissent around the 2016 election, Museveni also has neutered internal NRM opposition and remains entrenched as party head. The longer-term significance of emerging political leaders and new forms of protest remains uncertain as does the potential mobilisation of discontented youth. However, taken together these factors arguably now pose the biggest current challenge to President Museveni.

6. A. Survival at the Ballot Box Although the president largely has been untroubled by opposition parties – including the main opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) – there are signs he is losing some popularity. In the February 2016 presidential vote, he triumphed comfortably despite two apparently strong challengers: former ruling party heavy[1]weight Amama Mbabazi and perennial opposition leader Kizza Besigye (representing the FDC). Still, Museveni’s official margin of victory over Besigye, while comfortable (60.6 to 35.6 per cent), was roughly 8 per cent lower than in 2011. The presidential bid of Mbabazi – a former prime minister and NRM secretary general who ran as an independent – reflected discord within the ruling party, particularly around the issue of who will succeed Museveni.[4] Without an inspiring message, Museveni relied largely on patronage and alleged vote buying, massively out-spending his opponents.[5] The security services, particularly the police, suppressed opposition activities.[6] The FDC rejected the results, claiming Besigye had won 51 per cent, and launched a “Defiance Campaign” which failed to gain much popular support. Besigye himself was imprisoned – he has already served time in jail several times before – on a treason charge, which served to keep him and his followers off the streets.[7] To ease post-election tensions, the government, in consultation with a coalition of civil society groups, agreed to a National Dialogue that would develop a roadmap for political transition and encourage public debate about the country’s future. A civil society working group proposed a four-track process, including a constitutional review process and direct talks between Museveni and Besigye. But as the defiance campaign floundered and the opposition continued to insist on an audit of election results, the government’s interest in such a dialogue waned.7 Still, a [8]credible dialogue would be a worthwhile concession ahead of potentially difficult 2021 elections and boost Museveni’s flagging international legitimacy.[9]

   [4] Mbabazi was sacked in September 2014. He first tried to challenge Museveni for the NRM candidacy, which caused a temporary party rift. Mbabazi then formed the Go Forward! movement, which only contested the presidency. He also claimed that if victorious he would re-join the NRM as its leader. Crisis Group interview, Amama Mbabazi, Kampala, August 2015. The former NRM insider was unable to appeal to party supporters or opposition voters and won less than 2 per cent of the votes. Crisis Group Commentary, “Museveni’s Post-election Politics: Keeping a Lid on Uganda’s Opposition”, 8 August 2016.

   [5] One report suggested the NRM was responsible for more than 90 per cent of total campaign spending. “Extended study on campaign financing of presidential and members of parliament races”, Alliance for Campaign Finance Monitoring, July 2016. “Delays in the delivery of voting materials, reports of pre-checked ballots and vote buying, ongoing blockage of social media sites, and excessive use of force by the police, collectively undermine the integrity of the electoral process”. “On the Results of Uganda’s Presidential Elections”, press statement, U.S. State Department, 20 February 2016. See also, “Uganda General Elections”, Report of the Commonwealth Observer Mission, 18 February 2016. The NRM won 293 out of 375 seats in the National Assembly.

   [6] Both Mbabazi and Besigye were briefly detained for meeting supporters before campaigning officially started and many of their rallies were banned or broken up by security forces. “Ugandan police detain hopefuls for 2016 presidential vote”, Reuters, 9 July 2016; “Police block Besigye, fire teargas and live bullets to disperse supporters”, Daily Monitor, 6 January 2016. The police recruited thousands of young people as “Crime Preventers” – an unpaid militia-style force – that bolstered the president’s rallies and intimidated opposition supporters “Uganda: Suspend ‘Crime Preventers’: Massive Unregulated Force Threatens Election Security”, Human Rights Watch, 12 January 2016; Crisis Group Commentary, “Game on Between Uganda’s Former Liberation War Allies”, 7 October 2015.

   [7] Besigye staged a parallel presidential swearing-in ceremony, a video of which was circulated on social media. The government charged him with treason. He faces multiple prosecutions from this and other arrests. “Ugandan opposition leader charged with treason”, Reuters, 14 May 2016. On 19 October 2017, police charged Besigye with attempted murder (later dropped), assault, inciting violence and unlawful assembly for organising a rally, which turned violent, to protest moves to allow President Museveni to run again. Demonstrators threw stones at police. Officers fired bullets and tear gas reportedly killing two protestors. “Ugandan opposition leader held on murder charge after protests”, Reuters, 20 October 2017. The opposition also criticises the inconclusive investigation of “Naguru-gate’”, so-named for the Kampala neighbourhood where government supporters allegedly tallied electronically submitted ballots illegally. Crisis Group interviews, Ugandan journalist, Kampala, 30 March 2017; security official, Kampala, 27 March 2016; opposition activist, Kampala, 5 July 2017.

   [8] The four tracks are a strategic dialogue between Museveni and Besigye, an inter-party dialogue between government and opposition, a constitutional review process and citizen consultations. The dialogue is spearheaded by six civil society organisations, most prominently the Citizens Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU). Crisis Group interviews, civil society representatives, diplomats, opposition politician, Kampala, May 2017; former MP, Kampala, 20 February 2017. 7 Crisis Group interviews, civil society representatives, diplomats, Kampala, May 2017.

   [9] Crisis Group interviews, civil society representatives, diplomats, Kampala, May 2017.

7. B. The Age-limit Bill Museveni still enjoys personal goodwill for having led the country out of the civil wars that wracked Uganda during the 1970s and 1980s. He is widely expected to be the NRM’s candidate in 2021 and many believe he intends to rule until he dies. But to do so the president, now 73, must remove or negotiate his way around a constitutional provision barring presidential candidates older than 75. Museveni has remained largely silent on lifting the age restriction, though his supporters have started the amendment process in parliament. Despite opposition protests and donor disapproval, the effort is expected to succeed given the ruling party’s dominance and the legislature’s tendency to rubberstamp presidential priorities. In early October 2017, an NRM parliamentarian introduced a bill to remove the age limit, prompting wide protests, particularly by students, and a police crackdown.[10] Supporters abandoned a motion that would have allowed a parliament member to take a leave of absence to prepare the bill – the first step toward its adoption – after a brawl broke out between opposition and pro-government parliamentarians, aided by members of the Special Forces Command who had entered the parliament building. The bill eventually passed its first reading on 3 October. About two weeks later, police fired live bullets to disperse a crowd in the western town of Rukungiri, reportedly killing two protestors.

   [10] The government mobilised police during parliamentary discussion of the bill, entitled “The Constitutional (Amendment) Bill, 2017”. Both the Democratic Party’s Erias Lukwago and FDC’s Kizza Besigye were placed under preventative house arrest due to government fears their presence on the streets would draw out protestors. In addition, several NGOs opposed to lifting the age-limit, notably the Uganda chapter of Action Aid, faced government attacks and threats of closure.

8. Prior to the bill’s introduction, the government promised to establish a constitutional review commission to address, among other things, electoral reforms on such issues as district boundaries.[11] Many saw this as an attempt by Museveni to compensate for the controversial age-limit cancellation by instituting more popular reforms, such as restoring presidential term limits, which had been removed in 2005.[12] Thus far, however, the government has neither established the commission nor tabled a comprehensive constitutional reform bill. Instead, separate bills have been advanced on land reform and the age limit that include electoral reform measures falling far short of opposition expectations.

   [11] “Baby Steps Towards Electoral Reform in Uganda”, Freedom House, 15 June 2016.

   [12] Crisis Group interviews, civil society representatives, Kampala, May 2017.

9. C. Managing Interests and Expectations Although lifting the presidential age-limit is unlikely to present a major political challenge, Museveni still will need to manoeuvre skilfully, not only to fend off opposition in the courts or on the streets, but also to keep his own party in line. The NRM is a force bound not by ideology or policy but essentially by ambition and patronage. With five terms in office, the dominance of Bush War veterans in the government, party and army is ending.[13] Instead, more youthful cadres are vying for power; those defending the president and party with greatest zeal have risen furthest.[14] At the same time, these younger politicians – who have yet to consolidate power – seem to recognise the current political order is in its twilight, spurring intense competition among them.[15] Among other swathes of society, expectations regarding a potential succession also run high. Many Ugandans, particularly from marginalised regions, project their hopes to redress historic injustices and overcome underdevelopment onto a post-Museveni era. As yet, however, there has been no broad conversation about what a transition might look like. The combination of marginalised groups’ expectations, potential intra-elite jockeying for spoils and the absence of a clear succession roadmap, means that the incumbent’s unexpected death potentially could prompt violence.[16]

   [13] Bush War veterans fought with Museveni against President Milton Obote in the 1980s. A few loyalists still play institutional roles, including the security minister, Lieutenant General (ret.) Henry Tumukunde; inspector general of police, Kale Kayihura; and justice and constitutional affairs minister, Kahinda Otafiire

   [14] This includes State Minister for Investment Evelyn Anite, who spearheaded a February 2014 proposal that Museveni should be unchallenged as party candidate in the 2016 elections and is a key mobiliser for the age-limit removal; and Information and ICT Minister Frank Tumwebaze, who has been instrumental in developing the government’s social media presence.

   [15] Crisis Group interviews, independent MP, civil society representative, Kampala, February 2017; journalist, Kampala, 30 March 2017; security officer, Kampala, June 2017.

   [16] Crisis Group interviews, civil society representatives, Kampala, 2 March 2017; youth activists, Kampala, 5 June 2017.

10. Fuelling these concerns is the lack of an obvious successor. The president has not groomed an heir – at least not openly. Nor does his family, which likely will seek to control succession politics, appear to be united.[17] Many see Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, and wife, Janet, as the most likely contenders.[18] Museveni was rumoured to be grooming Muhoozi when, in 2008, he put him in charge of the newly created Special Forces Unit – a powerful subdivision within the army that has now grown into a third service (alongside land and air forces).[19] This did not sit well with many older military officers, whose opposition triggered a reshuffle that moved a number of veterans, including long-time chief of Defence Forces, General Karonda Nyakairima, into civilian positions or administrative posts. In January 2017, Museveni moved his son from head of the special forces to senior presidential advisor, which allows the president to better protect, prepare and control him.[20]

    Muhoozi has consistently denied eying the presidency. His mother, Janet Museveni – a former parliament member and current cabinet minister – apparently has not ruled the presidency out. She has crafted a powerful network of allies and a reputation as a savvy political operator.[21] Yet neither the first lady nor her son enjoys much popular appeal or establishment support.[22] The public appears to have little confidence that Museveni’s departure will be followed by a constitutional transfer of power. Many expect that groups left out of power will confront the government.[23] In response, the military might step in, most likely in support of the NRM establishment.[24] How the police and army rank-and-file would react to a contested transition is unclear.[25]Although the president and ruling party enjoy a firm grip over the police top command, lower ranks suffer poor pay and living conditions, which has fuelled divisions and encouraged corruption.

    [17] Crisis Group interviews, security official, Kampala, 15 June 2017; journalist, Kampala, 30 March 2017.

    [18] The president’s younger brother Salim Saleh – a retired general and presidential advisor with various sensitive and strategic portfolios – was another possible successor. But, plagued by poor health, he has since retreated from the public scene.

    [19] Now known as Special Forces Command.

    [20] Chief of Defence Forces General Katumba Wamala was retired and replaced by General David Muhoozi from Museveni’s native Ankole region. “Ugandan president reshuffles top military officers drops army chief”, East African, 10 January 2017.

    [21] “I am not eyeing the presidency–Muhoozi”, Daily Monitor, 26 May 2016. “Janet Museveni responds to critics, hints at future plans”, NTV Uganda, 3 April 2017. Crisis Group interview, Ugandan journalist, 30 March 2015.

    [22] In 2012, a meeting of veteran generals reportedly opposed Janet Museveni succeeding her husband. “Museveni backs first lady for the presidency”, East African, 26 May 2012.

    [23] Crisis Group interviews, youth activists, Kampala, 5 June 2017; civil society members, Kampala, March 2017; religious leaders, journalists, civil society representatives, Kitgum, Arua, Gulu and Adjumani, April 2017.

    [24] Top ranks are filled with loyalists, overwhelmingly from western Uganda. Few Bush War veterans remain. Crisis Group interviews, foreign diplomat, Kampala, 8 May 2017; security official, Kampala, 27 March 2016; FDC activist, Kampala, 5 July 2017.

    [25] Issues of pay and housing, as well as a huge retirement backlog, contribute to grievances in the military. Crisis Group interviews, military officers, Kampala, May and December 2016.

11. D. An Opposition in Disarray That few Ugandans believe political change will take place via the ballot box, a popular uprising or a credible National Dialogue is unsurprising, given the state of the political opposition, suffering from funding shortages, infighting and regime co-option.[26] Recent attempts to form an opposition coalition, as occurred prior to the 2016 election, have run aground over disagreements regarding who should lead it.

    [26] The FDC’s network of vote mobilisers, P10 (Power 10), still exists, but has no effective structure. It has been hurt by arrests and illegal detentions. Crisis Group interviews, FDC members, Kampala, April and July 2017; civil society executive, Kampala, February 2017.

12. The FDC is the official parliamentary opposition, but it is divided between rival leaders – Besigye, its flag-bearer, who enjoys widespread support among opposition activists, and the party’s president, Mugisha Muntu, whose profile is more technocratic. Their personal competition has a political dimension: while Muntu wants to focus on building grassroots party institutions, Besigye, having lost faith in elections, favours popular resistance. The party has been weakened by a lack of grassroots structures, financial resources, divisions over strategy and regular police repression.[27] Faith in the democratic system remains strong overall. A 2015 survey showed that 50 per cent of Ugandans were “fairly satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the way democracy works in their country.[28] However, citing a widely shared view that constituencies are rewarded or punished according to election returns, Ugandans interviewed by Crisis Group claimed that their fellow citizens often choose “not to waste my vote” on the opposition, hoping to at least reap the benefits of government [29]patronage.[30] Some interpret the rise of independent (but overwhelmingly NRM[1]aligned) candidates, who won 66 of 375 parliamentary seats in the 2016 election, as a rejection of the politics of both NRM and FDC.[31]

    [27] In the 2016 parliamentary elections, the FDC won 28 of more than 400 seats. Five candidates, including Muntu, but excluding Besigye, are vying for the party presidency in November 2017. 31 The survey also found that 84 per cent of Ugandans believe that a good citizen should always vote. “Afrobarometer Round 6 Uganda”, Afrobarometer, 2015.

    [28] Crisis Group interviews, voter, Gulu, 5 July 2014; elder, Arua, 20 April 2017.

    [29] Crisis Group interviews, mayor, central Uganda, 22 March 2017; religious leader, Moyo, April 2017.

    [30] Dr Stella Nyanzi, who exuberantly criticised the president and his wife for broken campaign promises, was harassed by security forces, arrested and charged in court. “Uganda: Detention of Feminist Academic for Criticising President a Travesty”, Amnesty International, 10 April 2017.

    [31] “MP Bobi Wine: Victory of the oppressed”, Daily Monitor, 3 July 2017

1. E. Youth Frustration Younger voters who tend to be most affected by economic decline are growing more active and gaining political significance. Many express themselves freely on social media, particularly regarding the age-limit bill, despite crackdowns on government critics and shrinking political space.[32] This evolution helped bring about the landslide election of Bobi Wine, a reggae star and vocal Museveni critic who calls for the president’s retirement and ran as an independent in the June 2017 Kyadondo East parliamentary by-election in the Kampala outskirts. His candidacy resonated with young and low[1]income slum dwellers who voted in large numbers. Ugandans widely read his victory – which he achieved with little infrastructure and no party affiliation – as an expression of voter frustration with party politics amid tensions surrounding passage of the age[1]limit bill.[33] Wine’s ability to mobilise hitherto neglected social groups should not be underestimated, though whether he can sustain his popularity remains unclear.

   [32] Dr Stella Nyanzi, who exuberantly criticised the president and his wife for broken campaign promises, was harassed by security forces, arrested and charged in court. “Uganda: Detention of Feminist Academic for Criticising President a Travesty”, Amnesty International, 10 April 2017. 

   [33] “MP Bobi Wine: Victory of the oppressed”, Daily Monitor, 3 July 2017

   Failures of the Patronage State

2. Ugandans appear more concerned about poverty, unemployment and food shortages than the uncertain political transition.[34] A dysfunctional political system, focused more on keeping the president in office than on fixing the economy or providing public services, has contributed to underdevelopment and mounting insecurity. But the recipe that has worked to date – sporadic reforms while the president concentrates on sustaining patronage networks – might prove insufficient to maintain popular support at a time of growing economic hardship.

   [34] Crisis Group interviews, farmers, local elders, Ugandan journalists, religious leaders, civil society representatives, youth activists, security officials, various locations, February-July 2017.

3. A. Economy in Decline Annual economic growth, which ranged between 6 and 10 per cent during the boom years of 2000-2011, declined to an estimated 4.6 per cent in 2017.[35] It is likely to remain relatively low (though higher than most Western economies) due to declining global demand for commodities (which make up the bulk of Uganda’s exports), a lack of bureaucratic support and instability in South Sudan, formerly a major Ugandan export market. Economic growth now barely keeps up with population growth, estimated at 3 per cent per year.[36]The financial sector has experienced a particularly severe decline. This was illustrated by the 2016 fall of Crane Bank, owned by Sudhir Ruparelia, an Indian-born tycoon, due to huge non-performing loans granted to Ugandan business elites.39

   [35] “Global Economic Prospects: Databank”, World Bank ( “It is estimated that currently the economy needs to absorb, on yearly basis about 392,000 new entrants into the labour market”. “Uganda Population Dynamics”, Population Matters Issue Brief, United Nations Population Fund, March 2017.

4. The young suffer disproportionately from un- or under-employment. In major towns and cities, many can only find transient work in the informal economy, as boda boda (moped taxi) drivers, guards, hawkers or other forms of casual labour.[37] Likewise, many young people lack access to land or social services.[38] with the rising cost of living, frustrated youth are easy prey for criminal gangs and ripe for political mobilisation.

   [37] 9 “BoU cites under capitalisation for Crane Bank takeover”, East African, 23 October 2016.

   [38] There are more than 50,000 boda boda drivers in Kampala. Crisis Group interviews, boda boda association representatives, Kampala, March-June 2017.

5. The majority of Ugandans – some 84 per cent live in rural areas and 69 per cent are subsistence farmers – struggle to survive in a stagnating agricultural sector. Unpredictable weather patterns, environmental degradation, farm fragmentation (as land is passed down to multiple heirs) and insufficient government support, exacerbate their plight.[39] After a long dry spell – part of a broader regional drought – more than 1.5 million Ugandans needed food assistance in February 2017.[40]

   [39] “Census 2014 Final Results”, op. cit.; “President names ten challenges to agriculture in Uganda”, press release, State House Uganda, 21 June 2016.

   [40] “1.5 million Ugandans in need of food aid, says government”, NTV ( 14 February 2017. The dry spell continued into early 2017, and food costs increased by a third between May 2016 and May 2017. “Cost of feeding family up 30 per cent”, Daily Monitor, 22 May 2017. A better second season harvest improved food security. “Uganda: Food Security Outlook”, FEWS NET, October 2017.

6. B. Public Sector Crisis The public sector, undermined by decades of nepotism and corruption, is unable to meet rising demand for more and better service delivery. Acknowledging the problem in July 2016, in the wake of his election, the president committed his new term to “Hakuna mchezo!” (“No play”), vowing to stamp out corruption and putting forward a twenty-point plan for national development. The plan, which aims to turn Uganda into a middle-income country by 2020, listed twenty different areas in which progress would be made, including fighting corruption, increasing foreign investment and improving the operations of key productive sectors.[41] But piecemeal anti-corruption reforms largely have scapegoated junior players in a wider system of graft. Although measures such as the digitalisation of revenue and immigration services can help root out petty corruption, they do not address more sophisticated schemes by department and agency-wide networks.[42]

   [41] “1.5 million Ugandans in need of food aid, says government”, NTV ( 14 February 2017. The dry spell continued into early 2017, and food costs increased by a third between May 2016 and May 2017. “Cost of feeding family up 30 per cent”, Daily Monitor, 22 May 2017. A better second season harvest improved food security. “Uganda: Food Security Outlook”, FEWS NET, October 2017.

   [42] “Term for work, no jokes – Museveni”, New Vision, 1 August 2016; “Museveni unveils new ‘old’ 20-point agenda”, Daily Monitor, 6 July 2016.

7. Health and education are among the public services that have suffered most, with poor quality and chronic absence of doctors and teachers.46 Opposition critics have attacked the government on this score, notably during the last election campaign, when Besigye’s visits to dilapidated health facilities and makeshift police posts received extensive media coverage. Many of Museveni’s popular 2016 campaign promises – including the delivery of eighteen million hoes to all households, 2 million Ugandan shillings ($550) for every village’s malwa group (women’s groups brewing local beer) and free sanitary pads for school-aged girls – remain unfulfilled.[43]

   [43] “NRM 2016-2021 Manifesto: Taking Uganda to Modernity through Job Creation, Inclusive Development”, National Resistance Movement, 18 November 2015.

8. Agricultural development also has suffered. Budget allocations do not match the rhetorical emphasis on that sector and key programs have failed to deliver results.[44] Operation Wealth Creation, an army-led agricultural development scheme, which aimed to improve farm productivity, has not lived up to expectations.[45]

   [44] “Get rid of poverty through modern agriculture – President Museveni”, press release, State House Uganda, 21 March 2017. In fiscal year 2017/2018, the government allocated 3.5 per cent of its budget to agriculture – in spite of NRM’s commitment to 7 per cent. Instead of modern mechanised farming, in April 2017 the president advocated inefficient drip bottle irrigation. “Museveni soldiers on with drip irrigation campaign”, The Independent, 23 April 2017.

   [45] “Agriculture is central to the employment prospects and well-being of most Ugandans: 70 per cent of employed Ugandans work in agriculture and the sector contributes 26 per cent to gross domestic product. However, the sector is underperforming compared with the rest of Uganda’s economy and its growth has not kept up with the population growth”. Alexandra Löwe and Sanyu Phiona, “Creating opportunities for young people in Northern Uganda’s agricultural sector”, Overseas Development Institute, July 2017.

9. In Kampala, an opposition stronghold where Besigye captured 65 per cent of the 2016 vote, the government struggles to enact necessary economic reforms and regulations opposed by key constituencies. The Kampala Capital City Authority, controlled by the NRM – which wrested power away from the Lord Mayor Erias Lukwago, who was elected on the ticket of a smaller opposition party, the Democratic Party – has aggressively enforced regulations and reforms to planning and revenue collection. Yet these measures often collide with the interests of influential grassroots constituencies – matatu (mini-bus taxi) operators, boda boda drivers and street vendors – and those of powerful businessmen and property owners. Many who work in the city’s markets and streets resent paying more taxes when they receive few services in return.[46]

   [46] When opposition politicians, including Lord Mayor Lukwago, tried to visit Park Yard market in Nakivubo shortly after the Kampala Capital City Authority evicted many traders, they were greeted by angry former tenants and denied access by the anti-riot police. Crisis Group interviews, civil society representatives, Kampala, March 2017.

10. In August 2017, the president ordered a series of measures to boost the economy and public services. He scrapped taxes and fees levied on informal businesses and promised to abolish dozens of agencies that duplicate the work of ministries.[47]These are steps in the right direction, but it remains to be seen if these initiatives will be sustained and are enough to produce tangible results.

    [47] “Museveni orders review of government agencies”, The East African, 24 August 2017.

11. C. Securing Political Support Unwilling or unable to reform the public sector or address broad economic needs, the government has sought to co-opt supporters through patronage. This generally has occurred in two ways: first, via creation of new administrative districts and traditional kingdoms, which then receive constitutionally mandated government resources; second, through politically motivated handouts from development programs.

    INCREASING LAWLESSNESS

12. The ruling party’s restoration of security after a series of brutal civil wars remains the historical anchor of its legitimacy. President Museveni often refers to “oturu” (sleeping peacefully) under the NRM and contrasts his rule with the violence and political instability that preceded it. Still, crime and insecurity are on the rise and, in the president’s own words, “a spike of lawlessness” grips the country.[48] This is due in part to politicisation of the police, now more focused on disrupting opposition activity than fighting crime, and in part to the breakdown of local order as traditional institutions cannot cope with complex societal problems.

    [48] President Yoweri Museveni, State of the Nation Address, 6 June 2017

13. A. The Politicised Police Force With patronage resources stretched thin, the government increasingly relies on coercion. A largely militarised and politicised police force commanded by Inspector General Kale Kayihura, a Museveni loyalist who has held the position since 2005, plays a central role in addressing dissent.[49]

    [49] Kayihura is close to the first family. He joined the National Resistance Army as a junior officer in 1982 and rose through the ranks to become a lieutenant general and chief political commissar before being appointed inspector general of police in 2005. He was appointed to another three-year term in May 2017.

14. Over the past decade, the size, budget and mandate of the police force have all expanded.[50] The 2013 Public Order Management Act (POMA) gives the force broad powers and grants its chief wide discretion to ban public gatherings.[51] In addition to repressing protests and breaking up opposition rallies, the police have arrested, and the government has prosecuted, critics over social media posts, sometimes on national security grounds.[52]

    [50] After NRM came to power in 1986, the police were trimmed to 3,000 officers and had mainly constabulary functions. It has grown since the mid-2000s. “How Kayihura became Museveni’s point man”, The Observer, 5 May 2017.

    [51] The 2015 NGO Act tightly controls and restricts local and foreign NGO activity. Public Order Management Act, 2013 and NGO Act, 2015.

    [52] In June 2015, for example, Robert Shaka was arrested and charged with promoting sectarianism under the Penal Code Act and with misusing computers under the Computer Misuse Act over suspicions that he created the Facebook avatar and government critic, Tom Voltaire Okwalinga. He denied the charges and was released on bail. “Uganda: Freedom of the Press 2016”, Freedom House, 2016. In April 2017, the police sought to bar journalists from covering investigations into the murder of Assistant Inspector General of Police Felix Kaweesi claiming they had obtained confidential documents without clearance from government. “Uganda: Court halts media coverage of Kaweesi murder investigations”, The Observer, 21 April 2017. After clashes between security forces and supporters of the traditional king in Kasese in November 2016, police detained a Kenya Television Network (KTN) journalist for one night and charged her with “abetting terrorism” after she shared footage of the Rwenzori palace burning on social media. “Ugandan journalist Joy Doreen Biira charged with ‘abetting terrorism’”, Committee to Protect Journalists, 30 November 2016.

15. Paramilitary units, including the Flying Squad and the recently disbanded Special Investigations Unit, have been accused of abuses by international and domestic human rights organisations.[53]In May 2017, for example, the media published pictures of alleged torture victims held at the Nalufenya police station (described by the government as a “counter-terrorism detention centre”) in Jinja, a town approximately 80km east of Kampala.[54] Opposition and civil society organisations have accused the police of arbitrarily arresting and detaining opposition activists.[55] There are structural problems as well. The police hierarchy increasingly operates through informal networks that bypass the official chain of command.[56] The force also relies on poorly-trained auxiliaries and volunteers:[57] the plain-clothed “Kiboko Squads” (stick wielding men) who reportedly beat citizens at public gatherings; members of the motorbike taxis association, “Boda Boda 2010”, who reportedly spy on behalf of the government; and the Crime Preventers, volunteers supervised by local station chiefs and reportedly re-introduced during the 2016 elections to mobilise support and intimidate the opposition.[58] Police officers and other critics accuse the Crime Preventers of carrying out arbitrary arrests and extortion, saying they are undermining local government forces.[59] Factionalism within the police is another concern. Powerful officers appointed by the inspector general, Crime Preventers and disgruntled career policemen compete for influence and resources. Many career officers criticise the way the system functions, pointing to surging local crime and botched investigations of even high-profile murders. Rival units publicly blame each other.[60] Poor pay and living conditions, corruption and politicisation have allowed criminals to infiltrate the force, a problem President Museveni has acknowledged and which the leadership has taken some steps to address.[61]

    [53] U.S. State Department, “Uganda”, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Report, 3 March 2017; “Uganda: Torture, Extortion, Killings by Police Unit”, Human Rights Watch, 23 March 2011.

    [54] “Nalufenya: Where innocents are tortured to confess”, The Independent, 29 May 2017; “Kaweesi suspects reveal torture, death at Nalufenya”, Daily Monitor, 26 May 2017.

    [55] For example, in June 2017 FDC reported four youth members missing who days later were confirmed to be held at Nalufenya. “Four FDC youth go missing”, Daily Monitor, 26 June 2017. “Security forces often arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, including opposition leaders, politicians, activists, demonstrators, and journalists”. “Uganda”, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Report, U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 3 March 2017.

    [56] Crisis Group interviews, Ugandan security officer, Kampala, December 2014; senior police officer, Kampala, May 2017.

    [57] Rebecca Tapscott, “Where the Wild Things Are Not: Crime Preventers and the 2016 Ugandan Elections”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 10, no. 4, 1 February 2017; “Uganda 2017 Crime & Safety Report”, op. cit.

    [58] Most Crime Preventers reportedly help the police in exchange for occasional cash handouts, a sense of empowerment and (albeit rarely implemented) the prospect of future rewards, such as money or jobs. Some also received loans from saving cooperatives (SACCOs) and Youth Livelihood Fund loans, as well as Operation Wealth Creation handouts. Rebecca Tapscott, “Preventing Crime and Protecting the Regime: Crime Preventers, Local Livelihoods and the 2016 Ugandan Elections”, Justice and Security Research Programme, London School of Economics, April 2016. Inspector General of Police General Kale Kayihura has alternately lauded and criticised Crime Preventers. “Emulate Crime Preventers, Kayihura tells Police”, Sunday Vision, 23 October 2016; “Kayihura condemns laxity in crime preventers”, Sunday Vision, 27 June 2017. Many other officers also criticise the preventers. Crisis Group interviews, security officer, Kampala, December 2014; senior police officer and security expert, Kampala, 25 April 2017.

    [59] The Crime Preventers’ mandate is often unclear even to members, the officers supposedly in charge of them, and the communities in which they operate. There is no policy framework guiding Crime Preventers or community policing more broadly. Crisis Group interviews, police officers, Local Council chairmen, residents, Kampala, January-June 2017.

    [60] Crisis Group interviews, senior police officer, Kampala, 24 April 2017; military officer, Kampala, 15 June 2017; security expert, Kampala, 20 February 2017.

    [61] “Police has been infiltrated by criminals – Museveni”, Uganda Radio Network, 20 March 2017; “100 police officers under probe for abetting crime”, Daily Monitor, 27 June 2016. In Kampala, corrupt police officers are linked to youth gangs. “Kayihura cleans up police, 5 officers detained over Nansana criminal gangs” Insider (theinsider.ug), 10 August 2017; “Kayihura Deploys, Transfers 150 Police Officers Since Kaweesi Murder”, The Observer (Kampala), 28 April 2017.

16. B. Rising Crime The combination of corrupt, politicised police plus rising unemployment and deteriorating local governance, has contributed to mounting crime.[62] In Kampala, youth gangs at times allegedly connive with police officials.[63] Between May and August 2017 at least twenty women were raped and murdered on the outskirts of Kampala and Entebbe, sparking public panic.[64] In Teso and Kitgum districts, police implicated local officials in a spate of armed robberies and murder in late 2016; within the greater Masaka region, bands of thugs raided villages at night during the first half of 2017. Scores were arrested.[65] In recent years, armed groups have attacked police stations, stealing guns, freeing detainees, and leaving several police officers dead. In Sebei, Kapchorwa district, a purported rebel group attacked a string of police stations during the 2016 electoral campaign until its alleged ringleader was arrested.94 Locals generally dismiss the notion that this was a rebellion, pointing instead to land-related conflicts between communities and the Uganda Wildlife Authority rangers in Mount Elgon National Park. There also has been a rise in high-profile assassinations. The best-known victim was the powerful Assistant Inspector General of Police, Felix Kaweesi, killed in March 2017.[66] Two years earlier, Senior State Prosecutor Joan Kagezi, who had been working on the case of the 2010 Kampala terrorist bombing, was murdered in the same professional manner by assailants on motorbikes.[67] A dozen Muslim clerics have also been killed by apparent hitmen over the past three years.[68] Motives remain unclear, although police have levelled unsubstantiated accusations against the Allied Democratic Forces – a nominally Islamist rebel group of Ugandan origin that has operated in eastern Congo since 2007.[69]

    [62] “During 2016, Uganda experienced a general increase in petty and violent crime, threats of political violence, and a decrease in the general threat from regional and worldwide terrorism”. “Uganda 2017 Crime & Safety Report”, U.S. Department of State Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), 5 May 2017.

    [63] “Our gang meetings are facilitated, guarded by police – suspect tells Kayihura”, Daily Monitor, 24 April 2017.

    [64] “Entebbe murders: Body of 23rd woman found in banana garden”, Daily Monitor, 20 September 2017.

    [65] “Flying Squad arrests 100 in Kitgum over murder, robbery”, Daily Monitor, 24 October 2016; “100 arrested over Masaka attacks”, Daily Monitor, 15 May 2017.

    [66] Crisis Group interviews, local government official, Sironko, 15 March 2017; government official and local politician, Kapchorwa, 14 March 2017; security official, Mbale, 15 March 2017.

    [67] The Somali Islamist terrorism group Al-Shabaab Kampala carried out two terrorist bombings in Kampala. It said they were a response to the Ugandan military intervention in Somalia as part of the hybrid African Union (AU)/UN peacekeeping mission

    [68] “Uganda: Living in fear”, Al Jazeera, 22 February 2016.

    [69] Their leader, Jamil Mukulu, has been awaiting trial in Uganda after his 2014 arrest and extradition from Tanzania. In November 2016, Sheikh Major Mohammed Kiggundu, a former Allied Democratic Forces commander was murdered in Kampala. “Police link Maj. Kiggundu’s assassination to ADF rebels”, Daily Monitor, 26 November 2016. Crisis Group interviews, Muslim elder, Arua, April 2017; imam, Kampala, September 2015. For background, see Crisis Group Briefing N°93, Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion, 19 December 2012.

1. C. Erosion of Local Order The local council system, comprising village and parish councils set up by the NRM during the Bush War, has withered and lost legitimacy.[70] Set up to allow communities to govern themselves and manage their own security while serving as the national party’s local backbone, the system originally included local courts, defence units overseen by a defence secretary and representatives of special interest groups. In many places today, however, only the chairman and in some instances a defence secretary remain, with the former wielding predominant power. Elections for local councillors have not been held since 2002. Critics blame the postponements on the NRM’s fears that a vote could uproot its entrenched grassroots structure plus the cost of carrying out elections in 58,000 villages and parishes countrywide. Local councillor positions, last elected in 2001, often are transferred to sons or political allies.[71] According to a roadmap for local elections released by the election commission in late August, new council elections were supposed to take place in November 2017, but they were temporarily postponed in early November following a legal challenge.[72] If and when the vote proceeds, voters will not cast secret ballots but line up behind their preferred candidates – a practice officially portrayed as cost-saving measure, but widely interpreted as a way to deter opposition to ruling party favourites.[73]

   [70] Local councils were formerly known as resistance councils. Chairmen receive no government funds, other than political mobilisation handouts, but levy stamp duties to certify land transactions, marriages, letters of good conduct, and other legal documents. Crisis Group interviews, local council chairmen, Kampala, March 2017.

   [71]Crisis Group interviews, residents, local council chairmen, Kampala, January-June 2017; NGO workers, Moroto, April 2017.

   [72]In October 2015, parliament approved the local government amendment act that called for elections by lining up behind candidates. “Programme for Conduct of Village (LCI) and Parish (LC II) Elections 2017”, Electoral Commission of Uganda, 24 August 2017. Crisis Group interviews, civil society representatives, Kampala, March 2017.

   [73] The court ruled that holding the elections would disenfranchise students who would not be able to vote in their villages during exams. “Court blocks LC elections”, Daily Monitor, 13 November 2017.

   Conclusion

2. Major violence is unlikely for now, but Uganda nonetheless faces the gradual fraying of order, security and governance. Discontent is growing, particularly among youth, against what many Ugandans see as perpetual rule by President Museveni and his NRM government. The president cannot continue to rely on patronage and coercion by loyal security services instead of initiating the reforms necessary to reverse the decline of the economy, public services and security. This deterioration affects the lives of ordinary Ugandans and fuels grievances both among communities and between communities and the state.

3. Thus far, Museveni largely has managed opposition to his rule without significant violence. Yet should opposition grow, both he and the security services, particularly the police, could well resort to more aggressive repression against protestors, their leaders and supporters in civil society and the media. This would make Uganda less governable, driving away donor support and foreign investment.

4. Without reform at the top, the system will become ever more expensive and difficult to manage, increasing the likelihood of a political explosion that would be impossible to contain using current methods. President Museveni holds the keys to potential – and necessary – reform. He oversaw the country’s historic recovery after years of civil war. It is in the president’s own interest to halt Uganda’s slide, work with his opponents and give its decaying institutions a chance to recover. Failure to do these things risks spoiling the president’s legacy and leading his country toward a more dangerous future.

5. Human Rights Watch in its report[74] on the situation in Uganda had the following to report:

   [74]

6. Uganda’s constitutional court upheld Parliament’s 2017 constitutional amendment to remove age limits for presidential candidates, paving the way for President Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1986, to run in all future elections. Allegations of widespread repression and intimidation of parliamentarians during debates marred the amendment process.

7. Violations of rights to freedoms of association, expression, and assembly persisted, as security forces beat and at times, tortured and arbitrarily detained protesters, journalists and opposition members. Thirty-three people, including six parliamentarians, arrested during by-election campaigns in Arua, north-western Uganda, faced treason charges and alleged torture by security forces. Police and soldiers beat and detained journalists reporting in Arua and at ensuing protests.

8. Despite various government commitments to hold security forces accountable for their conduct, many investigations into military and police abuses of civilians failed to progress, including into the November 2016 killing of more than 100 civilians in Kasese, western Uganda, and the killings of protestors in September 2009 and April 2011.

   Freedom of Expression & Assembly

9. In July, the government implemented a social media tax requiring user of WhatsApp, Twitter, and Facebook, among other sites, to pay a daily fee of 200 Ugandan Shillings (US$0.05). At a protest march against the tax in Kampala on July 11, police fired live bullets and tear gas to disperse the demonstration which the police deemed “illegal.” Protestors argued the tax violated Ugandans rights to free expression and information. 

10. In June, security officials in Kitgum, northern Ugandan, banned a song by musician Bosmic Otim that was critical of government officials for being “misleading” and “inciting violence.” The song criticized four parliamentarians for allegedly being sycophants of government and unresponsive to citizens’ problems in northern Uganda. 

11. On June 5, police arrested six people as they attempted to petition police leadership at Naguru Police Headquarters in Kampala as part of a protest over numerous kidnappings and unresolved murders of women and children. Anti-terrorism and anti-riot police were deployed to block the activists from accessing the premises. 

    Media Freedom and Attacks on Journalists

12. On February 14, 2019, five unidentified men wearing military uniforms seized Charles Etukuri, an investigative journalist with New Vision outside the newspaper’s Kampala offices days after he published an article linking Internal Security Organisation agents to the death of a Finnish businessman. Etukuri said his abductors demanded he reveal his sources. He was released after six days following a court ruling. 

13. On August 13, security personnel arrested journalists Herbert Zziwa and Ronald Muwanga as they covered the Arua by-election and the military’s fatal shooting of Yasin Kawuma, parliamentarian Robert Kyagulanyi’s (aka Bobi Wine) driver. Security forces tied and beat Zziwa and Muwanga before holding them overnight in Gulu, charging them with malicious damage to property and incitement of violence. They were later released on bond. 

14. On August 20, soldiers beat and detained journalists covering protests, including photojournalist James Akena, confiscating, and damaging his equipment. In September, police detained at least eight journalists and confiscated their equipment as they sought to report on Kyagulanyi’s return from the United States for medical treatment following his alleged torture by soldiers. Despite the military’s stated commitment to investigate soldiers for beating journalists, no one had been held accountable at time of writing. 

15. On April 29, the Uganda Communications Commission ordered internet service providers to shut down all unauthorized news sites following a directive requiring online data communication service providers, including publishers, news platforms, radio and television operators to obtain authorization. 

    Lack of accountability for torture and extra-judicial killings

16. In March, John Martin Okoth Ochola was appointed Inspector General of Police. His predecessor, Kale Kayihura, was arrested three months later, brought before a military court and charged with failing to protect war materials, failing to supervise police officers and abetting the kidnap and forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees. He has been released on bail, but charges remain pending. No charges have been brought against him for commanding units involved in torture or extrajudicial killings, despite credible allegations of such crimes during his leadership. 

17. In April, Okoth Ochola ordered that the Nalufenya detention facility in Jinja, Eastern Uganda be redesignated from a special force operation base to a standard police station. This was significant because Nalufenya had been notorious as a place of torture and long-term detention without trial. In May, Okoth Ochola disbanded the police Flying Squad Unit, established in 2013 to counter armed robberies, but which has been implicated in multiple serious allegations of extortion and torture. 

18. On August 13, Ugandan police and military arrested and beat six opposition members of parliament, including Francis Zaake and Kyagulanyi, and 28 other people in advance of the August 15 by-elections in Arua. Prosecutors charged all 34 with treason for allegedly throwing stones at a presidential convoy on August 13. The media reported that men in military uniform took Zaake, who was unconscious, to a hospital in Kampala and abandoned him. Kyagulanyi alleged Special Forces Command soldiers tortured him while was detained for 10 days by the military. He was also charged before a military court for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, but the charges were later dropped. Authorities promised to investigate Kyagulanyi’s allegations of torture. 

19. Police and military shot and killed at least six people in Kampala, Mityana, Katwe and Gomba, during protests against security forces’ abusive conduct in the period around the Arua by-election. 

    Freedom of Association

20. In recent years, offices of over two dozen non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been robbed, and some of their security guards killed, but police failed to credibly investigate the attacks. The targeted groups worked on “sensitive issues” including human rights, land and resource governance and corruption. 

21. On February 8, unknown assailants broke into the offices of Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum, which provides legal services to marginalized groups such as LGBTI people and disabled its security system. Two guards were severely injured. On August 6, unidentified people broke into Isis-WICCE, a women’s rights organization, and stole computer processors, hard drives, and cash. In September, Twerwaneho Listeners Club, a human rights organization in Fort Portal, in western Uganda, reported three forced entries into its offices in a single month. 

    Prosecutions for Serious crimes
    
    

22. In April, International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutors in The Hague, completed their case against alleged former Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) commander Dominic Ongwen, charged with 70 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Ongwen’s defence began its case in September. Two ICC warrants remain outstanding for the arrest of Joseph Kony, long-time LRA leader and Vincent Otti, who is presumed dead. The LRA remains active in central Africa, but there have been fewer media reports of killings and abductions. 

23. On August 30, the International Crimes Division (ICD) of Uganda’s High Court confirmed charges against alleged former LRA commander Thomas Kwoyelo – in custody since his capture in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2009.The trial began in September but was quickly adjourned until November, when Kwoyelo pled not guilty to all 93 counts against him. 

24. Pre-trial sessions in the case against Jamil Mukulu, alleged leader of the rebel Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), captured in Tanzania in April 2015, started at the ICD. Mukulu and 34 others are charged with terrorism, multiple murders, aggravated robbery and crimes against humanity over several years.

    Forced Evictions

25. Years of security forces’ forced evictions in Apaa, Northern Uganda gained attention in June when 200 residents travelled 100 kilometres to seek refuge at the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Gulu after soldiers allegedly torched homes, beating and killing a resident. Following a month of negotiations between OHCHR, the community and government, residents elected to return home, but reported that forced evictions have continued. 

26. According to Freedom House – Uganda: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report, 2020[75] reported the situation in Uganda as follows:

    [75]

27. Between March and May, police arrested and assaulted at least 10 journalists while enforcing COVID-19-related restrictions, taking advantage of the pandemic to further curtail freedom of the press. In April, police arrested Rogers Asiimwe of Freedom Radio, raided his office, and questioned him about his discussion of the coronavirus, its origins, and the Ugandan government’s lockdown measures.

28. In October, a combined military and police force raided the campaign headquarters of the singer and parliamentarian Robert Kyagulanyi—better known as Bobi Wine—ostensibly to recover red berets the campaign had stashed, a part of military uniform. Wine’s campaign uses the berets as a symbol of resistance, which the government claims is illegal. While opposition parties’ rallies were violently dispersed by security forces and participants were arrested throughout the year, the NRM was able to hold campaign events without interference.

29. Following the November 2020 arrest of Bobi Wine at a political rally, security forces violently dispersed protests organized by Wine’s party, killing 54 people. Multiple videos shared on social media during protests show the military and plainclothes gunmen firing high-calibre rifles in populated urban centers. The government failed to hold any of the attackers responsible for killing unarmed civilians.

100.   The formation of political parties is protected by law, and multiple parties exist and compete in practice. However, the activities of opposition groups are hindered by restrictive party registration requirements and candidate eligibility rules, a lack of access to state media coverage, and violence or harassment by state authorities and paramilitary groups. Police used tear gas and live ammunition to break up FDC rallies in the towns of Lira and Kasese in April 2019 and used similar tactics throughout 2019.

101.   When FDC leaders tried to organize the party’s national conference in November, heavily armed police and military officers cordoned off the venue and forcibly dispersed party supporters. Besigye and a number of other FDC members were arrested and temporarily detained. In June 2020, the Ugandan government prohibited all political gatherings, ostensibly to curtail the spread of COVID-19. Candidates were forced to campaign using radio, TV, leaflets, and social media; media the ruling party has substantial influence over. The government’s enforcement of the ban disproportionately targeted opposition party activities, particularly of Bobi Wine’s People Power group.

102.   In October, a combined military and police force raided Wine’s campaign headquarters, claiming the raid was intended to recover red berets, a part of military uniform, that Wine’s campaign use as a symbol of resistance; the government claims they are illegal. While opposition parties’ rallies were violently dispersed by security forces and participants were arrested throughout the year, the NRM was able to hold campaign events without interference.

103.   Following the November 2020 arrest of Bobi Wine at a political rally, security forces violently dispersed protests organized by Wine’s party, killing 54 people. Multiple videos shared on social media during protests show the military and plainclothes gunmen firing high-caliber rifles in populated urban centers. The government failed to hold any of the attackers responsible for killing unarmed civilians.

104.   The ruling party dominates all levels of government. There are several dozen opposition lawmakers in Parliament, as well as numerous independents, though some of the latter support the NRM. Presidential and parliamentary election campaigns are characterized by violence, intimidation, and harassment toward opposition parties. Leaders of opposition parties and political movements are sometimes arrested on trumped-up criminal charges.

105.   There were multiple arrests of FDC leaders during 2019, and Bobi Wine was arrested in November 2020 and harassed throughout the year. At the end of 2020, Wine and more than 30 others were still awaiting trial on treason charges arising from a 2018 incident in the Arua district; police alleged that Wine and his supporters obstructed President Museveni’s motorcade and threw stones at the vehicles. Charges of annoying, alarming, or ridiculing the president were added to the case in August 2019.

The Military and its loyalties

106.   The military is closely aligned with Museveni and the NRM and holds 10 seats in Parliament. The government and ruling party also reportedly use public resources and patronage networks to build political support among religious leaders and other influential figures.

The Function of Government

107.   Power is concentrated in the hands of the NRM leadership, the security forces, and especially the president, who retains office through deeply flawed electoral processes. Lawmakers have little practical ability to influence legislation in which the government has a particular interest, though there is more consultation on ordinary policy matters. The executive has secured passage of key legislation through inducement, harassment, and intimidation of the legislative branch. For example, several opposition lawmakers were assaulted and forcibly removed from Parliament by plainclothes military officers during the reading of the 2017 constitutional amendment bill that removed the presidential age limit.

The problem of corruption

108.   Corruption is a serious problem. There are laws and institutions designed to combat official malfeasance, including the Anti-Corruption Act of 2009 and the Inspectorate of Government, and instances of alleged graft have led to investigations and intense media attention. However, the system has not been effective at addressing corruption in a sustained manner, and top government officials are rarely prosecuted in practice.

109.   Many government departments deny requests for information under the country’s Access to Information Act. Other laws related to national security and confidentiality also impede open access to information in practice. The Access to Information Act is not uniformly applied. Government agencies seem to release information that only favours the regime. For example, in September 2020, the Electoral Commission made public the academic documents of Bobi Wine while refusing to release those of President Museveni, despite numerous petitions. Wine described the Commission’s decision as intended to raise questions about his eligibility to run for president. Public procurement decisions are generally opaque.

Are there free and independent media?

110.   The media sector features many independent outlets, but their journalists face arrest, harassment, intimidation, and assault in reprisal for their work. Authorities routinely raid and shut down radio stations and other outlets and will take away accreditation from journalists in retribution for their reporting. Throughout 2020, journalists covering the campaign events of Bobi Wine were harassed, assaulted, and detained, on various charges. The Committee to Protect Journalists, a press freedom watchdog, reported that at least seven journalists were harassed and attacked by police and members of the public between November and December while covering campaigns for the 2021 presidential elections. Further, authorities issued new guidelines for foreign journalists, requiring them to reapply for accreditation within a week of the guidelines being announced. At least one foreign news crew was deported. Between March and May, police arrested and assaulted at least 10 journalists while enforcing COVID-19-related restrictions. In April, police arrested Rogers Asiimwe of Freedom Radio, raided his office, and questioned him about his discussion of the coronavirus, its origins, and the lockdown measures instituted by the Ugandan government.

137.   The Tribunal noted the letter dated 13 August 2021 from [an office bearer] of the Uganda Journalists Union[90] [Mr B] which confirmed that the applicant was a journalist ‘formerly working for [Employer 1] as a [political commentator] and [Occupation 1].’ [Mr B] goes on to describe the applicant in the following terms:

[90] see AAT File, Applicant’s written submission and documents-in-support (Appendix)

She [the applicant] is a member of the Uganda Journalists Union (UJU) for the last [number] years and a member of [specified] sub-committee. [the applicant’s work enabled] critical discussions and [allowed the audience] to debate issues and occasionally bash the government ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) Party.

138.   The [Mr B] letter concludes as follows:

But towards the end of 2017, her life became so hard that she expected danger any time. She was advised to look for ways of escaping from Kampala and to hide upcountry, and if possibly get out of the country to save her life.

139.   It is clear from [Mr B]’s letter, the applicant’s future as a journalist working as she would wish is not possible because of her profile in the wider community (in Uganda) as a journalist who has and is resisting the current Museveni regime. This resistance has also been continued while in Australia, where the applicant has attended Ugandan-community organised protests. Therefore, based on the applicant’s own evidence and the documentary evidence provided to the Tribunal at the hearing and in as further submission post-hearing, the applicant is a considered by the Tribunal as a journalist that is resisting the Museveni regime in Uganda.

140.   The country information reports that journalism and in particular, journalists attempting to question the current Museveni government’s efforts to remain in office beyond its constitutionally allowed term have been intimidated, persecuted, forcibly restrained and even permanently silenced. It was noted by the Tribunal[91], Uganda’s media landscape comprises 10 national newspapers, 30 television stations and more than 300 radio stations. All these media houses use English as the official language and more than 50 ethnic languages. They are complemented by various online media outlets which serve more than 47m people. Ownership is split between state and non-state actors. However, despite the increased number of media outlets due to the liberalisation of the industry in 1990 that allowed private sector investment, journalists, media owners and defenders of media freedom are still calling on government to let the media express themselves without censorship.

[91]  The country’s record—on freedom of expression, access to information and the general media environment—is wanting. In the Global Press Freedom Index by Reporters without Borders, Uganda dropped from 117^th in 2018 to remain static at 125^th these past three years. Local and international media rights reports highlight the violations that security officers routinely mete out against journalists with impunity. These include beatings, arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture, forceful confiscation of media equipment and deletion of footage. COVID-19 has made the situation even worse. Also, ‘[m]ost of these attacks tend to be heightened during politically charged periods such as times of contentious political debates and during elections’, when human rights issues take centre stage. UNESCO has indicated that such attacks intimidate and affect journalists’ ability to function freely because ‘every attack distorts reality by creating a climate of fear and self-censorship’.

Colonial legacy of media suppression

142.   Suppression of freedom of expression and citizen participation is far from new in Uganda’s history. In a way, it emanates from the implementation of ‘bad colonial and postcolonial policies [and laws]’ on media operations. Uganda’s unreconstructed postcolonial legal framework not only limits the rights and freedoms of individuals domestically but also falls below internationally accepted human rights standards.

143.   The Penal Code Act (amended 2007) is considered the ‘most lethal weapon against media freedom in Uganda’. Section 41 on sectarianism, section 50 on publication of false news, section 53 on defamation of foreign princes, section 179 on libel and section 180 that defines defamatory matter, among others, are disastrous for freedom of speech. In particular, the sectarianism offence carries a penalty of five years in prison and is often used to arrest and intimidate journalists. For example, when journalists report or discuss nepotism in the media, they are often swiftly charged with ‘promoting sectarianism’. One such case is that of Basajja Mivule, who was arrested for criticising the government over tribalism. Government officials also sometimes invoke the defamation sections against journalists and political opponents to conceal state wrongdoings and protect their reputations.

Notably, the Constitutional Court in Uganda nullified section 40 of the Penal Code Act on sedition, which suggests that maintaining these other sections that contravene constitutional guarantees and international standards is inconsistent and unnecessary.

144.   Another colonial law still operational in Uganda is the Official Secrets Act of 1964, section 2(2) and (3) of which prohibit anyone from revealing protected state secrets, while section 15 spells out the penalty of up to 15 years in prison for doing so. Government officials frequently use the professional oath of secrecy they take under the Public Service Standing Orders in this Act to conceal wrongs, hence undermining the spirit of accountability. If any journalist wants to uncover public wrong, the only option left is to undertake an often costly and risky investigation.

Even when journalists have used legal means to beat these restrictions, their efforts are usually cut short. For instance, in 2010, Chief Magistrate Deo Ssejjemba used the Official Secrets Act to rule thus:

I would like to think that government business is not in its entirety supposed to be in the public domain. There are cases where the keeping of certain class of documents secret is necessary for proper functioning of public service.

145.   This ruling came after two journalists sued the government over non-disclosure of oil deals and failure to grant them access to such information. The court’s decision was a major blow to media freedom and human rights protection.

The Ugandan media continues to suffer both physical and legal attacks, despite numerous provisions for freedom of expression in both national and international law.

146. The Constitution contains repeated guarantees on free speech, specifically for journalists: Article 41 provides the right to seek, receive and impart information in order to facilitate free reporting while Articles 44 and 45 protect media freedom and prohibit derogation from all protected rights. Moreover, Article 29(1)(a) explicitly states: ‘Every person shall have the right to … freedom of speech and expression which shall include freedom of the press and other media.’

147.   Internationally, the African Union’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa and General Comment 34 of the UN Human Rights Committee provide for practical steps on access to information, which is the engine of any democratic society.

148.   Uganda has also ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and is consequently obliged to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the provisions on media freedom and protection of human rights. Responding to Uganda’s initial country report on 4 May 2004, the UN Human Rights Committee in its concluding observations asked the government to:

take urgent and effective measures to prevent arbitrary detention and torture by state agents … and … thoroughly investigate any alleged case of arbitrary detention and torture, prosecute those held responsible and ensure that full reparation is granted, including fair and adequate compensation.

149.   Moreover, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Resolution 169 calls on member states to amend their laws in line with international standards to enable free functioning of the media.

A pivotal judgment seven years ago also provided the continent of Africa with a strong example on freedom of expression. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights ruled in 2014 in what is now considered a landmark case on media freedom in Konaté v Burkina Faso.

150.   When the Burkina Faso government levied harsh criminal charges against journalist Lohé Issa Konaté, a domestic court found him guilty of defaming a state prosecutor with many newspaper articles he published, accusing the prosecutor of corruption. The African Court overruled the conviction stating that public figures must be more open to scrutiny than private individuals in order to properly investigate corruption and promote public debate in a democratic society. The case was unusual in that it was a decision where an African court ruled against the state in favour of a journalist and the ruling was implemented. For example, following the ruling, Burkina Faso amended its criminal defamation laws. While Uganda has constitutional guarantees on freedom of expression and other liberties, the Penal Code Act and the Official Secrets Act impede enjoyment of these fundamental human rights. These need to be repealed to allow enactment of new laws that enable journalists and political opponents to express themselves freely. The political will for this has to come from government leaders, encouraged by strategic advocacy and litigation from civil society organisations.

151. While Uganda has a number of laws that promote and protect media freedoms as well as the right to access information by every citizen. Most notable of these is Article 41(1) of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda which states that every citizen has a right of access to information in the possession of the State or any other organ or agency of the State except where the release of the information is likely to prejudice the security or sovereignty of the State or interfere with the right to the privacy of any other person. Article 29 (a) of the Constitution also provides for freedom of speech and expression which shall include freedom of the press and other media.

152. However, it appears that the same aforementioned laws have been used to criminalize the freedom of expression guaranteed under the Constitution. This is particularly the case with the Press and Journalist Act 2000. This Act was intended to professionalize journalism, creating structures and processes through which one becomes a journalist and practice journalism as a profession. However, this Act has instead been misused by authorities to criminalize the practice of journalism as was seen during this reporting period. This was seen through several cases in which the voice of the media was shut down; with several restrictions being made on who is lawfully considered a journalist.

There were also instances where broadcasting licenses were revoked without the due process of law. Several journalists were arrested and tortured during the review period thus threatening the independence of journalism. Of particular note was the shutdown of all social media platforms in Uganda;[92] an act that was approved by the President of Uganda in response to Facebook’s shutdown of the official NRM accounts.[93] The Act was justified by the President during a presidential address made on January 12, 2021 ahead of the presidential and parliamentary election.[94] Social media platforms like Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter and Viber were forced to shut down; following a letter written by the Executive Director of the Uganda Communications Commission ordering all telecommunications companies to suspend any access to social media and online messaging platforms.[95] This was therefore a curtail to media freedom which is a very crucial element to enable transparency elections to take place. Furthermore, on February 17, 2021, the ULS also noted the case wherein some army officers and police officers attacked journalists who were covering an event in which the former Presidential Candidate Hon. Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu was delivering a petition to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Kololo, Kampala.[96] As a result, over twenty journalists were left in crutches with others nursing wounds for the injuries they sustained in the operation that was allegedly led by Lt. Col. Franklin Namanya.[97]

[92] David Lumu, “Government blocks social media sites,” New Vision, January 13, 2021 at page 3

[93] Available at  accessed on March 12, 2021.

[94] ibid

[95]“UCC orders social media shut down ahead of tense poll,” The Daily Monitor, January 12, 2021. Available at  co.ug/uganda/news/national/ucc-orders-social-media-shutdown-ahead-of-tense-poll-3254532 last accessed on March 15, 2021.

[96] Clare Muhindo, “Eight journalists beaten on orders of military officer at UN Human Rights office,” African Centre for Media Excellence, February 17, 2021. Available at  un-human-rights-office last accessed on March 15, 2021.

[97]  Monitor Reporters, “Unmasking commander behind journalists beating,” Daily Monitor, February 19, 2021. Available at https:// accessed on March 15, 2021

153.   Incidents of torturing journalists have gradually increased over time as is reported in media bulletins, like Ronald Kakooza a Vision Group reporter was roughed up and arrested at the Forum for Democratic Change Party headquarters in Najjanankumbi, Moses Bwayo a freelance journalist was shot in the face with a rubber bullet, Daniel Lutaaya and Thomas Kitimbo were attacked by unknown thugs in Lira while Saif-Ilah Ashraf, a radio one journalists were beaten and pepper sprayed by police13 and all these were covering the campaign trails of opposition politicians. Since then, no accountability has been made and efforts to reduce cases of torturing journalists have become futile. Such threats coupled with a wide range of tactics have stifled critical and independent reporting in the country.

154.   The Ugandan government has also attempted to restrict the free flow of information via the internet. Internet freedom in Uganda declined significantly as the government imposed sweeping digital restrictions during the contested January 2021 general elections. As President Yoweri Museveni faced a serious challenge from opposition candidate Robert Kyagulanyi, better known as Bobi Wine, the government restricted internet connectivity, blocked social media platforms and circumvention tools, and sought to manipulate the online information environment. During the campaign period, security forces physically attacked online journalists covering opposition campaigns and continued to arrest people who criticized Museveni online. Museveni won his sixth term in office after 35 years in power. The polls, which were held amidst COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, were marred by excessive violence towards the opposition and election irregularities. While Uganda holds regular elections, their credibility has deteriorated over time, and the country has been ruled by the same party and president since 1986. The ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) retains power through patronage, the manipulation of state resources, intimidation by security forces, and politicized prosecutions of opposition leaders. Ugandan civil society groups and independent media outlets suffer from legal and extra-legal harassment and state violence.

Key developments, June 1, 2020 to May 31, 2021

155.   In April 2021, the government replaced the over-the-top (OTT) services tax, under which Ugandan internet users had to pay a daily fee to access social media sites, with a 12 percent tax on internet data, sharply raising the cost of internet access. 

156.   The Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) ordered a five-day internet shutdown the day before polls closed in January 2021.

157.   Two days before the polls, the government blocked major social media platforms, as well as roughly a hundred circumvention tools; while most sites were unblocked after a month, Facebook remained inaccessible in Uganda as of August 2021.

158.   In January 2021, Facebook and Twitter removed a network of government-linked social media accounts seeking to shape online opinions in favour of President Museveni and the ruling NRM ahead of the elections.

159.   People who criticized the government and President Museveni on social media faced arrest and criminal charges during the coverage period, while online journalists covering opposition campaigns were attacked by security forces.

160.   New regulations were promulgated in March 2021 to implement the Data Protection and Privacy Act 2019, a key step in ensuring the protection of Ugandans’ data.

161.   Finally, in recent times, the Museveni government in attempt to control the media has called for the compulsory registration of journalists seeking to cover public events. According to an All-Africa news report,[98] (in The Monitor) the Government has renewed its push to have journalists get accredited afresh by the Uganda Media Council as they go about covering public events. The Minister of Information, Communication, Technology and National Guidance, Dr Chris Baryomunsi, said following the recent Constitutional Court ruling, the Uganda Media Council has since asked journalists to get accredited. Dr Baryomunsi said since the call in August to have journalists get registered afresh, only a handful have responded to the government's call. "In exercise of its mandate, the Media Council of Uganda on the 16th of August 2021, issued a notice to all editors, publishers and broadcasters to register their editors and producers within 30 days from the date of notice. It's regrettable that to date, only a few of you have complied." he said. The minister was speaking at a media breakfast meeting in Kampala on Thursday with more than 100 editors and media managers in attendance. However, one of the journalists' lawyers, Mr Francis Gimara, scoffed at government's demands to have journalists accredited afresh as illegal. He said the Media Council is still not yet fully constituted to carry out the same mandate. Similarly, Mr Robert Sempala, the national coordinator of Human Rights Network for Journalists (HRNJ) - Uganda, said the call by Media Council to journalists is illegal. He said the High Court ruling stopping the same process hasn't been set aside. But Dr Baryomunsi assured the journalists that their registration is not being pursued in bad faith but to crack down on quack journalists and ensure the genuine members work in a professional environment.

[98] see,  "The purpose of registration is to among others, comply with the law; facilitate the authentication of the media practitioners; and to create a database for media practitioners with a view to facilitate and enhance professionalism among the media practitioners," he said.

163.   Dr Baryomunsi said, "This exercise is the cornerstone of smooth interaction of the media with government. Among others, we intend to ensure that all registered journalists have the right skills to carry out their work in a professional manner within the parameters of a free and responsible media."

164. The demand to have the journalists get accredited afresh, comes after a July ruling of the Constitutional Court where the court reaffirmed the mandate of the Council. The court quashed the journalists' claims that the stringent State regulations contained in the Press and Journalist Act were curtailing their work. Core to the bid by media defenders was that the Press and Journalist Act is inconsistent with the right to a fair hearing, expression, assembly, and association as enshrined in Articles 28, 29(1) and 40(2) of the Constitution.

165.   They also argued that the Act, in granting the line minister wide powers to intervene in the Media Council and Disciplinary Committee, bodies whose powers supposedly curtail freedom of the press, is unconstitutional. The journalists were also challenging Section 6(a) of the Press and Journalist Act, which required proprietors and editors of media organisations to ensure that what is published is not contrary to public morality. But the same ruing of the court has since been appealed before the Supreme Court and its pending determination. Earlier this year, the High Court in Kampala, quashed with costs, the directives by the Media Council that had required journalists to register to cover the 2021 general election and other State events. Presiding judge, Esta Nambayo declared that the registration of journalists by the Media Council without an operational National Institute of Journalists of Uganda to enrol journalists in accordance with the Press and Journalists Act, was illegal.

The applicant claims that since her arrest following her [discussion with Opposition politician, Mr A] concerning the Life-Term Bill and her forced detention and subsequent treatment by forces in the police and security forces loyal to the present Museveni regime in Uganda, the applicant has little or no chance of returning to Uganda and continuing with her work as a political commentator and [journalist]. Her person is of interest to the authorities following her activities against Museveni with others from her country while here, in Australia. Based on the applicant’s evidence and the evidence provided from the Journalist Association (Uganda) and the various [independent sources] where the [applicant] is described as a ‘[description redacted]’[99] the Tribunal accepts that applicant is a journalist that is resisting the Museveni regime. In addition, having considered the independent country information on Uganda as far as it concerned the treatment the media, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant would have been detained by the pro-Museveni authorities following her [discussion] of Age Limit Bill with [Mr A], of the Ugandan Opposition.

[99] [Source deleted].

166.   The applicant claims that because she fulfilled her responsibilities as a journalist in this period of social and political upheaval in Uganda it is the essential and significant reason that she would suffer serious harm upon her return to Uganda. Indeed, the applicant claims that because of her activities within the Ugandan community in Australia, in her public profile protesting the lapse of democratic rights and freedoms in her homeland, is at greater risk of being detained and charged with an offence under the various enactments that have been legislated by the Museveni regime in its attempt to limit anti-Museveni sentiments and discussion by the media. Based on the country information the Tribunal accepts that there is a real chance that the applicant will be harmed if she is returned to Uganda as a journalist. That it (the Tribunal accepts) that the essential and significant reason that the applicant will be harmed as claimed is because of her membership of a PSG as a journalist resisting the Museveni regime.

167.   The country information makes it clear in the Tribunal’s opinion, having regard to the current regime’s attempts to regulate political opposition within Uganda by legislative means which has at its centre of concern that country’s media – and the violence encouraged and carried out by the authorities against journalist attempting to report the news with balance, it is clear that the state and the authorities attached to it have made it clear that an independent media and in independent-minded journalism is not to be tolerated. The evidence provided by the country information submitted by the applicant but also accessed by the Tribunal records that media independence and thought can prove fatal for those journalists that provide either a platform for criticism of the Museveni regime or participate in any anti-Museveni discussions all in the name of democratic intercourse concern issues of national concern. Therefore, in the circumstances where journalism or journalistic practice is heavily overseen and regulated by the Ugandan state, to the extent that journalists are victims of extra-judicial killings (often caused by elements associated with the Museveni regime), the Tribunal finds that pursuant to s.5J(3)(a)(iii) of the Act the applicant does have a well-founded fear of persecution if she returns to Uganda by reason of her profession as a journalist that has resisted and is resisting the Museveni regime. That is, there is a real chance she will be seriously harmed in the event she is returned to Uganda by reason of her profession as a journalist.

CONCLUSION

168. As a result, the Tribunal finds that because of being removed from Australia to Uganda, there is a real chance that the applicant will suffer serious harm by reason of her being a journalist who has resisted the current regime in power in Uganda. The Tribunal is therefore satisfied that the applicant does satisfy the criterion set out in s. 36(2)(a) of the Act for a Protection visa as the applicant is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Tribunal is satisfied Australia has protection obligations as a refugee.

169.   For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Therefore, the applicant satisfies the criterion for refugee as is provided for in s. 36(2)(a) of the Act.

170.   Therefore, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a refugee as defined in s. 5H (1) of the Act.

171.   For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).

DECISION

172. The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Peter Vlahos
Member

ATTACHMENT  -  Extract from Migration Act 1958

5 (1) Interpretation

…

cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:

(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or

(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;

but does not include an act or omission:

(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

…

degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:

(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

…

torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:

(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or

(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or

(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or

(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or

(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;

but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

…

receiving country,  in relation to a non-citizen, means:

(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or

(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.

…

5H    Meaning of refugee

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:

(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or

(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.

Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.

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5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:

(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and

(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and

(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.

Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.

(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.

Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.

(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:

(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or

(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or

(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:

(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;

(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;

(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;

(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;

(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;

(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):

(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and

(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and

(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:

(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;

(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;

(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;

(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.

(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family

For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:

(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and

(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:

(i)the first person has ever experienced; or

(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.

Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family

For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:

(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and

(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and

(c)     any of the following apply:

(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;

(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;

(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

5LA Effective protection measures

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:

(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:

(i)the relevant State; or

(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.

(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:

(a)     the person can access the protection; and

(b)     the protection is durable; and

(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.

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36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act

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(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

(aa)  a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and

(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and

(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:

(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or

(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or

(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:

(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.

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