1814496 (Refugee)

[2023] AATA 4096

1814496 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 4096 (28 August 2023)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

REPRESENTATIVE:  Mr Ali Alkafaji (MARN: 1386318)

CASE NUMBER:  1814496

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Iraq

MEMBER:Melissa McAdam

DATE:28 August 2023

PLACE OF DECISION:  Sydney

DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 28 August 2023 at 11:50am

CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Iraq – particular social group – single women – women living alone – elderly women – religion – moderate Shia – imputed political opinion – Western values – anti-fundamentalist – family link to assassination – threats of harm to applicant’s son and his family – prevalence of gender-based violence – cognitive decline – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H, 5J, 5K, 5L, 5LA, 36, 65, 499
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 18 April 2018 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

2. The applicant who claims to be a citizen of Iraq, applied for the visa on 12 November 2015.

3. The applicant was represented in relation to the review.

   CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA

4. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

5. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.

6. A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).

7. Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a  person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

8. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

   Mandatory considerations

9. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

   Protection visa application

10. The following is a summary of the claims and information the applicant provided in her Protection visa application:

    a.She was born in [year] in Najaf, Iraq.  She submitted a copy of her Iraqi passport.  She lived in Najaf until 1972, then in Baghdad until 2006 and then in Diwaniyah with her [son, Mr A], until her departure from Iraq in August 2015.

    b.She is widowed. Her husband died in 1994.

    c.She is of Muslim religion.

    d.Her [specified children], [sisters, and brothers] are living in Iraq.  She also has a married son in Australia.

    e.She worked as a [Occupation 1] in Iraq. 

    f.She departed Iraq [in] August 2015 and arrived in Australia [in] August 2015 on a Visitor visa.

    g.She previously visited Australia in 2014. She has also travelled to [Country 1], [and other countries].

    h.Two months prior to her departure from Iraq her son [Mr A] fled the country due to threats on his life. He and his family are now living in [Country 2] where they are registered with the UNHCR. [Mr A]'s forced departure from Iraq was very distressing to the applicant and her health deteriorated as a result.

    i.Due to the threat she could no longer stay at the house she shared with [Mr A].  She stayed with her sister-in-law for a brief period of time, and then stayed at a friend's house. As her health condition worsened she travelled to [Country 1] for treatment.

    j.When she returned from [Country 1] her Visitor visa to Australia was granted and she travelled here immediately.

    k.Since the applicant left Iraq the situation there has continued to deteriorate. It has become very dangerous because of the invasion by the Islamic State (IS) and the re-arming of the Shia militia to fight them. There are now daily confrontations between the Shia militia groups and armed Sunni groups, such that the country now resembles a battleground.

    l.The applicant fears that she will be abducted and physically harmed. She fears that she might be killed. These are all things that have happened to other people like her in Iraq and to anyone who is perceived to have views that are contrary to those of the religious and political factions that control all aspects of public life.

    m.The applicant’s son would be viewed by both Sunni and Shia militant groups as a traitor and collaborator with Western forces in Iraq and the applicant fears for her safety due to her perceived support of his work.

    n.The applicant is at risk of attack and abduction from the militia affiliated to religious and political groups, as well as from criminal gangs who would kidnap and torture people and demand money for their safe return.

    o.The applicant won't be able to express any of her views about politics, including the rights of women. Nor will she be able to act freely as a woman.

    p.The applicant is at risk as she is a [Occupation 1]. Fundamentalists believe that [Occupation 1]s like her will corrupt [others by promoting] Western values.

    q.Apart from political views that will be attributed to the applicant because she spent time with her son in Australia, she is also at high risk of being kidnapped for ransom by people who will think her son is rich because he lives in Australia and just want money from him.

    r.The applicant and her family have been threatened many times by extremist groups. They had to leave Baghdad in 2006 as they were threatened by an extremist group due to her son's employment with the US Company [Company 1]. The threat came in the form of a letter which was found by her son in their garage. In the letter the extremists threatened to kill all of the family members if her son [Mr A] did not leave the house. The next day they left their home in Baghdad and went to live in Diwaniyah.

    s.On [date] 2015 the applicant’s son's wife's [relative, Mr B], who was also the applicant’s husband's cousin, was assassinated in [Location 1]. [Mr B] was an influential [Occupation 2] who spoke out against oppression and extremism. The applicant’s son [Mr A] was one of a number of unarmed guards who provided security for [Mr B] as his moderate views were fiercely opposed by the extremists and militia groups.

    t.On 5 June 2015 as [Mr A] and the applicant were leaving for work they found an envelope in their garage with a threat letter and a bullet in it. [Mr A] and his family went to stay with other family members in Hila for 5 days, while the applicant spent this time in Diwaniyah staying with friends and relatives and not going outside.

    u.On 10 June 2015 [Mr A] returned to Diwaniyah and reported the threat to the police. Reporting the threat to the police did not assist the family as on 19 June 2015 [Mr A] found another threat letter promising to waste the blood of [Mr A] and his family. This threat was from the Al-Aqeeda Corps Shia militia group.  The applicant and her family   believe they were responsible for the assassination of [Mr B]. The letter accused [Mr A] of spreading thoughts that weaken the Shia path and strengthen Wahhabi’ism, and threatened to spill the blood of [Mr A] and his family. This prompted [Mr A] to again flee Diwaniyah. The applicant also had to leave their house and seek refuge with friends and relatives in Diwaniyah. [Mr A] then fled Iraq with his family. He is now living in [Country 2] where he registered as a refugee with the UNHCR on [date] 2015.

    v.[Mr A] reported the threats to the police but all they could do was write a report. They did not offer any effective protection against the threats. The Iraqi State has for many years now been spiralling into sectarian chaos with a totally ineffective government. The sectarian divide has increased even further with the invasion by the IS. They are busy dealing with almost daily suicide attacks and bombings and don't see assisting people like the applicant and her family who are being threatened by militant groups as one of their priorities.

    w.The applicant and her family moved to Najaf where they hoped they would be safer. This was not the case as they were threatened there too because the Shia militias are spread throughout Iraq and are the dominant force from the middle of Iraq all the way down to Basra. They are armed and visible on the streets of all Shia cities and towns. They have supporters who provide them with information on people suspected of not supporting their cause. The applicant could not move to a Sunni majority area as she is Shiite and will be targeted by Sunni extremist groups there too.

    x.The overall security situation in Iraq was bad then and it is rapidly deteriorating now. Security forces are on high alert as they try to prevent the IS and associated groups from staging attacks. The IS and its supporters have control of much of northern Iraq and it has a presence close to the western edge of Baghdad. It also has many supporters throughout the country who provide information to it and carry out attacks on its behalf. The authorities are unable to prevent terrorist threats in the form of car bomb attacks, targeted killings/kidnappings and sectarian reprisal attacks occurring on an almost daily basis.

    y.There is no possibility of protection for the applicant in any part of Iraq. Wherever she goes in Iraq she would be at risk of attack because of her Shia religion, her gender, her moderate views on religion and politics and political views imputed to her because of her work as a [Occupation 1] and the work undertaken by her son [Mr A].

    z.The applicant will be harmed because of her religion, gender, and imputed political opinion as a result of her son's employment with a US company in Iraq and support for moderate [Occupation 2] [Mr B].

    aa.The applicant is a practicing Shia Muslim but she totally rejects the principles of the fundamentalists. She believes Iraq should establish a democracy with equal rights for all citizens, regardless of religion, race or gender. She particularly opposes restrictions on women, especially those related to education, working, choosing who they marry and having the independence to express themselves.

    bb.The applicant opposes the extremists who want women to remain uneducated and marry young.

    cc.There is ongoing violence in Iraq. The IS has many fundamentalist Sunni supporters throughout the country who are willing to prosecute its extreme agenda. The authorities do not have the power to control the country. Shia militias have been recruited to help the authorities push back against the threat from the IS, but they have their own agenda and will seek revenge against those who oppose them. They have even been responsible for attacking ordinary citizens they believe do not support their causes. How can authorities who cannot protect their own buildings or people at well-guarded places such as police stations protect just one person like the applicant.

    dd.The IS has made significant inroads in nearby cities to Baghdad and Najaf and the Shia militias have taken control of Baghdad, and even Basra. Both groups have many fundamentalist supporters throughout the country who are willing to prosecute their extreme agenda. The authorities do not have the power to control the country as they are corrupted and infiltrated by political and religious groups. Shia militias have been recruited to help the authorities push back against the threat from the IS, but they are part of the problem, not the solution. The government can barely even protect itself, let alone ordinary citizens. The primary motive of all of the political groups is to look after themselves. They are all corrupt and they cannot protect themselves, let alone ordinary citizens.

    ee.Iraqi society is tribal based. The applicant can't just relocate to another area with no family support and expect to be safe. Wherever she went she would be viewed with suspicion, which would see her more open to further personal attacks. Wherever she goes in Iraq she would be at risk of attack from both Sunni and Shia fundamentalists because of her association and perceived support for her son's work, her work as a [Occupation 1], her religion, her views about the rights of women and her support for a secular Western-style democracy in Iraq.

11. The applicant provided copies of the following materials with her visa application:

    -    Her Iraqi passport issued in Baghdad.

    -    Her son [Mr A] and his family’s UNHCR [Country 2] Asylum Seeker Certificates.

    -    Her son [Mr A]’s employee ID Card for the Red International Zone.  The employer is recorded as [Company 1].

    -    The applicant’s ID Card issued by the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration, listing the applicant’s date of displacement from Baghdad as [date] March 2006.

    -    A medical letter dated 12 February 2018 stating that the applicant suffers from [medical conditions].

    Departmental Interview, 5 February 2018

12. The following is a summary of the information provided by the applicant in her Department interview:

    a.After arriving in Australia the applicant’s son told her that someone followed him in Iraq. It was the person who killed [Mr B].

    b.The applicant and her family went from Baghdad to Diwaniya in 2006 and received cards from the Ministry to show they were displaced.

    c.The applicant cannot return to Iraq because they will kill her.  Armed groups will kill her, the militias.  They will target her because she lived with her son who was killed. Her husband’s cousin was a religious person, a very good person, and in 2012 people came to kill him.  He was shot in his stomach but he survived.  This happened in [location]. His name is [Mr B]. His brothers decided that if he should go outside the province to [Location 1] he needed to have a bodyguard.  The applicant’s son agreed to accompany or escort [Mr B].  Her son would accompany [Mr B] when he went outside [Location 1] to deliver his [lectures].

    d.The delegate told the applicant it was important they speak about the claims in her Protection visa application. The applicant responded she was trying to tell him additional information as to why she fears harm but she will answer the delegate’s questions.

    e.[Mr B] was killed at [Location 1].  After his funeral there was a summons for her son to appear before the court to give information about [Mr B] and whether he had any enemies. [Mr B] was killed inside [Location 1] so the applicant’s son was not with him at the time. Her son went to the court and gave information about [Mr B]. This all happened in the month of [specified]. Her son mentioned a threat to [Mr B] from a person called [Mr C] who made telephone threats. [Mr B]’s son-in-law wanted a reference from [Mr B] to enter a religious circle. [Mr B] did not give a good reference to [Mr C] which made him angry. After this there was a letter to arrest [Mr C].

    f.On 25 May they followed the applicant’s son and fired on him on his motorbike but they did not hit him.  He then received a phone call that next time he and his family will be killed. 

    g.On June 5 at 7:30 am the applicant and her son were going to work and there was a letter he found in the garage with a bullet for him.  It is very easy to kill a person in Iraq.

    h.The delegate put to the applicant that the information in her application was different from what she had stated in the interview.  The applicant responded that her son had not previously told her these things.  He called her after she arrived in Australia and told her this new information. He only told the applicant this after she arrived in Australia as he did not want to worry her in Iraq due to her health.

    i.The delegate put to the applicant that there would be more shooting, not a threatening letter, after the first attempt. The applicant responded because they did not want her son to go further with the court, they wanted to make him weaker and leave.

    j.[Mr C] belongs to a religious militia group.

    k.After the threat the applicant’s son went to live with his in-laws and the applicant went to live with her brother’s wife.  Her son’s father-in-law told her son to go to the government to open a court case but he didn’t.

    l.[Mr A] was [an Occupation 3] in Iraq.  The delegate put to the applicant that in her application she wrote that her son acted as an unarmed bodyguard for his wife’s [relative, Mr B], [an Occupation 2].  The delegate asked how he could be a bodyguard without being armed.  The applicant responded that her son was not a security guard he was just looking after [Mr B]’s well-being and would inform his relatives what the situation was, whether or not he had an armed escort or not and so could go out at a particular time.  It would happen just once or month a less, not on a regular basis, just when [Mr B] had to go outside [Location 1].  Her son would occasionally travel with him outside [Location 1] with the police security.  Her son was the messenger between [Mr B] and his family. When an attempt was made to kill [Mr B] the first time he had no one with him so the family decided he needed to have a relative with him when he went outside [Location 1]and the applicant’s son agreed to this role.

    m.The applicant has been to Australia twice before. She last applied for a visa to Australia because her blood pressure went high and she went to [Country 1] to settle her blood pressure. It settled a bit in [Country 1]. She was there for seven days.  Her son in Australia applied for a visa for the applicant while she was in [Country 1].  She was in fear about being killed in Iraq, she could not sleep.

    n.The delegate put to the applicant that she applied for the Visitor visa on 15 June; on 23 June the department requested a medical examination which was provided; the Visitor visa was granted on 23 July; the applicant then left Iraq for [Country 1] in August and then returned to Iraq; and on 23 August she came to Australia from Iraq. Therefore she didn’t leave Iraq immediately the Visitor visa was granted. The applicant responded that she wanted to settle her blood pressure so she had no issues on the plane. She went to [Country 1] by plane. The medication she received in [Country 1] worked.  She did not know she received the visa until she returned to Iraq from [Country 1].  The delegate put to her that if her son in Australia knew of her situation in Iraq why did he not tell her when her visa was granted. The applicant responded that she did not want to risk her life on the plane with her high blood pressure. If her blood pressure was not high she would have come to Australia straight away.

    o.The delegate put to the applicant that her other son, daughters and siblings are in Iraq.  The applicant responded that she cannot live with them because they live with their families.  Even if she stays with her daughters she will be targeted wherever she goes. She is worried about her daughters and son there.

    p.She does not know if any of her children have any issues in Iraq. She will need to inform the police if she moves to another region and the militias will find out.

    q.Her daughters, other son and siblings have not been attacked until now.  But they are all scared in a way. Her son [Mr A] lived with her so she has information about him so that is why she would be targeted.

    r.The delegate asked what information she had about [Mr A] and she responded the threat was from [Mr C] and she may be asked to make a statement too about him.  The delegate asked what information the applicant has which would make her a target. The applicant responded that they are one family and they are all targeted. [Mr C] made a threat.  [Mr A] has left the country.  It is so easy to kill someone in Iraq, you just call the police to come and collect the body.

    Post-Interview Submission

1. On 19 February 2018 the applicant’s representative provided written submissions in response to concerns raised by the delegate during the interview.

   Delegate’s Decision

2. The Delegate accepted that the applicant is a [age] year old Shia female who most recently lived in the southern location of Diwaniyah, Iraq prior to travelling to Australia; the applicant is a former [Occupation 1]; the applicant’s son worked for the company, [Company 1]; she and he were forced to relocate in 2006; and that the applicant has a son living in Australia.

3. The Delegate did not accept that the applicant’s son provided security of any type to a [Occupation 2] in Iraq; that the applicant’s son provided evidence to the police in relation to an assassination; or that the applicant genuinely fears harm for reasons relating to her son and an assassinated [Occupation 2].

4. The Delegate was not satisfied that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution in Iraq, or that she was owed complementary protection.

   Information to the Tribunal

   Pre-Hearing Submission

5. On 20 July 2023 the applicant’s representative submitted a medical letter dated 17 July 2023 outlining that the applicant suffers from “mild cognitive impairment” as well as past presentations of [various medical conditions].

6. On 16 August 2023 the applicant’s representative submitted the following further materials to the Tribunal:

   -     The Representative’s written submission.

   -     A transcript of the protection claims interview between the applicant and the delegate.

   -     Another copy of the 17 July 2023 medical letter.

   -     A copy of a statement by the applicant’s son [Mr A] regarding his protection claims.

   -     A copy of the applicant’s son [Mr A]’s UNHCR [Country 2] Registration Card issued in 2020.

   -     A copy of the applicant’s son [Mr A]’s UNHCR [Country 2] Registration Card issued in 2022.

   -     A copy of UNHCR [Country 2] recognition letter that the applicant’s son [Mr A] is recognised as a refugee.

   -     A 2019 article about the ‘expanding militia army’ in Iraq.

   -     [2015] news articles about the assassination of a [Occupation 2] in [Location 1], [Mr B],

   -     An Internet article about the militia group Saraya Ansar al-Aqeeda.

   -     A 2007 [article] which includes a reference to being a guard of a [Occupation 2] in [Location 1].

   -     A 2018 list of Shia Armed Groups in Iraq.

7. In the representative’s submission he outlines the following:

   Attached is a transcript of the applicant’s PV interview, the reason why this transcript is included in this submission is because the decision to refuse the applicant’s claims was based on what the applicant stated during her PV interview , so the existence of this transcript will help in understanding what the applicant stated during that interview, this transcript was not prepared by a NAATI accredited translator, but rather by applicant’s daughter in law.

   The applicant’s case revolve around the assassination of [Mr B].

   The details of the assassination of [Mr B] is attached to this submission , as you can see the [applicant] stated that [Mr B] is her husband’s [cousin] and for that reason her son was chosen to take care and sometimes accompany [Mr B] in his travels outside of [Location 1].

   The applicant stated clearly that her son was tasked with taking care of [Mr B], and to accompany him in his travel , the delegate suggested that it was implausible that the applicant’s son was unarmed as it is inconsistent with the applicant’s son’s duty as a guard , it is the applicant’s submission that the delegate misunderstood her claim as her son’s duty was a moral duty due to the fact that they related to each other and the fact that her son is a trust worthy person, [guards] and companions doesn’t have an official duty , they are not on the government payment rolls , they usually chosen [due] to the “trust “ issue , these guards are given some money from the donations that is gathered (see attached report about [other similar] guards) .

   The applicant’s son’s close relationship and companionship to [Mr B] is like minefield , because it is very well know in Iraq’s history that the rival between [Shiites] led to a blood shed in that country , for example , the resignation of [Ayatollah Kadhim al-Haeri] from his religious office led to a violence in that country in 2022 , the following is quoted from, an article by Reutres

   “Last week's violence began after Ayatollah Kadhim al-Haeri, a top ranking Iraqi-born Shi'ite cleric who has lived in Iran for decades, announced he was retiring from public life and shutting down his office due to advanced age. Such a move is practically unknown in the 1,300-year history of Shi'ite Islam, where top clerics are typically revered until death.

   Haeri had been anointed as Sadr's movement's spiritual advisor by Sadr's father, himself a revered cleric who was assassinated by Saddam's regime in 1999. In announcing his own resignation, Haeri denounced Sadr for causing rifts among Shi'ites, and called on his own followers to seek future guidance on religious matters from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei - the cleric who also happens to rule the Iranian state.

   Sadr made clear in public that he blamed outsiders - implicitly Tehran – for Haeri's intervention: "I don't believe he did this of his own volition," Sadr tweeted.

   A senior Baghdad-based member of Sadr's movement said Sadr was furious. "Haeri was Sadr's spiritual guide. Sadr saw it as a betrayal that aimed to rob him of his religious legitimacy as a Shi'ite leader, at a time when he's fighting Iran backed groups for power."

   Sadrist officials in Najaf said the move meant Sadr would have to choose between obeying his spiritual guide Haeri and following Khamenei, or rejecting him and potentially upsetting older figures in his movement who were close to Sadr's father.

   Instead, Sadr announced his own withdrawal from politics altogether, a move that spurred his followers onto the street.

   The Iranian government and Sadr's office did not immediately respond to request for comment for this story. Haeri's office could not immediately be reached.

   Specialists in Shi'ite Islam say Haeri's move to shut his own office and direct his followers to back the Iranian leader would certainly have appeared suspicious in an Iraqi context, where suggestions of Iranian meddling are explosive.

   "There's strong reason to believe this was influenced by Iranian pressure – but let's not forget that Haeri has also had disagreements with Sadr in the past," said Marsin Alshammary, a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School. "He directs followers to Khamenei when there's no (religious) need to do so. And it seems unlikely a person in his position would shut down his offices which are probably quite lucrative," she said.”

   it is the applicant’s submission that the delegate misunderstood the applicant’s claims, as the applicant’s son’s role as a guard is not “equivalent “ to the official duty of a “Guard” , the applicant stated that her son was carer for [Mr B] and travel companion, hence, the argument about the applicant’s son being “unarmed” reflects this misunderstanding, the argument about police protection of [Mr B] also reflects the fact that the delegate did not consider the relevant country information as the Iraqi police is hugely infiltrated by Shia Militia groups , some of them are opposed to [Mr B]’s religious or political views, the following article by Los Angeles times reflects this conclusion:

   “Killings Linked to Shiite Squads in Iraqi Police Force Shiite Muslim militia members have infiltrated Iraq’s police force and are carrying out sectarian killings under the color of law, according to documents and scores of interviews.

   The abuses raise the specter of organized retaliation to attacks by Sunni-led insurgents that have killed thousands of Shiites, who endured decades of subjugation under Saddam Hussein.

   And they undermine the U.S. effort to stabilize the nation, and train and equip Iraq’s security forces -- the Bush administration’s key prerequisites for the eventual withdrawal of American troops.

   In recent months, hundreds of bodies have been discovered in rivers, garbage dumps, sewage treatment facilities and alongside roads and in desert ravines.

   Many of them are thought to be victims of Sunni insurgents, who are known to target Shiite civilians and Iraqi security forces, and even Sunni Arabs believed to be collaborating with U.S. forces or the Iraqi government. But increasingly, the Shiite militias operating within the national police force are also suspected of committing atrocities.

   It is essential to point to the fact that the delegate’s refusal of the applicant’s claims emanated from the fact that the delegate did not believe that the applicant’s son was a guard to [Mr B] , this conclusion was based on the wrong interpretation of what the applicant said and the relevant country information as stated above, because a fair reading of what the applicant stated suggest that her son was a carer, companion, and relative of [Mr B], it was a mistake to deal with the applicant’s son’s profile as a guard in its official meaning, that is why I attached a full report about [other relevant examples].

   It follows, that the applicant’s son’s “ closeness” to [Mr B] was an issue for those who opposed [Mr B], as the applicant stated that her son is the [cousin] of [Mr B], as we saw from the country information quoted above, last year , violence erupted because of Mr Haeri’s resignation, the article shows that the risk is not reduced by the laps of time

   In relation to who killed [Mr B] , the attached article suggest that no one claimed their responsibility for the killings, which is normal in that country because of the many militias that exists in that country.

   The main issue is when the applicant’s son attended the court in relation to the assassination of [Mr B], the applicant stated that they received a threatening letter ,the applicant and her son [Mr A] lived in the same place , the person who is suspected of the assassination is [Mr C] who was arrested based on the applicant’s son testimony, [Mr C] belongs to a militia group , hence the militia group will target the applicant’s son and the applicant , [Mr C] threatened the [Mr B] before by sending him messages and by calling him , that is why these threats were known to the applicant and the applicant’s son .

   It is observed that the applicant’s son [Mr A] is registered refugee with the UNHCR in [Country 2] , attached is the applicant’s son’s UNHCR card, the applicant’s son’s statement refer to the same incident and to [Mr C] who belongs to a militias called “AL-Aqeeda formations or (Saraya Ansar AL-Aqeeda), the word “formation” is translated to “ Saraya “ , this militias is part of the PMF or the PMU (People’s mobilisation forces ) , it belongs to the Islamic supreme Council and its militias (Badr Brigade) , it is headed by a cleric (Jalal Eldin al-Saghir ) who belongs to the Islamic Supreme council, the PMF is an umbrella for Shia militias in iraq.

   The current DFAT report explains that the PMF is very active in Diwaniya (the applicant’s home town) , the 2023 report at 3.90 states the following

   3.90 Sources told DFAT that following the crackdown on the Tishreen movement, most protesters desisted from political activities, went underground or fled to the KRI, where they reportedly felt safer. Others joined political parties. Sources told DFAT that protesters who were no longer politically active were unlikely to face violence or harassment. Those who remain active are often harassed by armed groups, including through veiled threats, bullets in the mail or written threats known as ‘night letters’. Some are targeted for violence. In September 2022, PMF forces detained and allegedly tortured four prominent Tishreen activists in Diwaniyah whom they accused of being part of a ‘Ba’athist plot’ (see also Persons accused of links to the Ba’ath Party). Two of the activists died shortly after being released.

   3.98 Journalists are often arrested or attacked while covering protests. There were widespread reports of violence and threats towards media covering the protests that began in October 2019. The Baghdad offices of six television stations were ransacked, allegedly by PMF elements, after the news outlets ignored a government directive to cease broadcasting footage of the protests. At least 10 journalists were injured during the August 2022 protests by  supporters of Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and a rocket was fired at the headquarters of Diljah TV. DFAT is aware of an incident where journalists were deliberately targeted by armed men, presumed to be PMF fighters, who smashed their camera and assaulted them. In August 2022, journalists were among dozens of people arrested by KRI security forces ahead of planned protests in Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, and Duhok (see also Protesters and demonstrators).

   Iraq has one of the highest numbers of missing persons of any country in the world. According to the International Commission on Missing Persons, anywhere from 250,000 to 1 million people are missing from decades of conflict and human rights abuses. Victims include protesters and demonstrators, civil society activists, military and political leaders, lawyers and judges, people with perceived affiliations to Da’esh, Yazidis and LGBTI people. Perpetrators have included Iraqi authorities, Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), Al Qaeda and Da’esh. Popular Mobilisation Forces are thought to be behind the disappearance of thousands of mostly Sunni men and boys from 2014-17, as well as hundreds of protesters during civil unrest in 2018-20.

   Thousands of people are still missing in territories formerly held by Da’esh, with most thought to have been murdered

   It is well evidenced that there is effective state protection in iraq, the same DFAT report mentioned above states that the Ministery of interior is controlled by the PMF

   5.2 The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are administratively organised within the Ministries of Interior and Defence, the PMF, and the Counterterrorism Service. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for domestic law enforcement and maintenance of order. It oversees the Federal Police, Provincial Police, Facilities Protection Service, Civil Defence and Department of Border Enforcement. Energy Police, under the Ministry of Oil, are responsible for providing infrastructure protection. Conventional military forces under the Ministry of Defence are responsible for the defence of the country but also carry out counterterrorism and internal security operations in conjunction with the Ministry of Interior. The Counterterrorism Service reports directly to the Prime Minister and oversees the Counterterrorism Command, an organisation that includes three brigades of special operations forces. The National Security Service (NSS) intelligence agency also reports directly to the Prime Minister. The ISF is a congested and contested space with security forces competing for power and relevance, leading to a cross over and blurring of roles and responsibilities and creating the conditions for corruption and instability.

   The specific sections of the DFAT report that covers the PMF activities in Iraq are the following:

   5.5 The Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) are a state-sponsored umbrella military organisation composed of approximately 50 militia groups operating nationwide. The PMF was formally established in June 2014 by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In the same month, Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah issued a fatwa (religious ruling) calling on men to join the Iraqi Security Forces to defend the country from Da’esh. Many chose to enlist with existing militias under the PMF rather than the regular Iraqi army. Their forces played an important role in the eventual military victory. Most PMF units are Shi’a Arab and operate across Iraq. Sunni Arab, Yazidi, Christian and other minority PMF units also exist, generally operating within or near their home regions. Some militias have political wings and parliamentary representation. Many PMF elements reportedly answer directly to the Iranian government, in particular to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The CIA World Factbook estimates the number of PMF fighters at 100,000-160,000.

   5.6 Human rights organisations and in-country sources report that some PMF groups engage in killing, kidnapping and extortion throughout the country, particularly in ethnically and religiously mixed governorates. Human rights observers blame elements of the PMF for much of the violence committed against those demonstrating against the government in the Tishreen protests, as well as for attacks on activists throughout the country. For instance, in May 2021, PMF gunmen allegedly shot and killed prominent activist and protest leader Ehab al-Wazni near his home in Karbala. PMFs exercise considerable political influence and are entrenched in many of Iraq’s formal and illegal economic sectors, including construction, services, protection rackets and the smuggling of oil, drugs and other contraband. In-country sources report those who fall afoul of a local PMF group have little chance of official justice or compensation.

   The applicant fears that she will be targeted in Iraq as she is member of [Mr A] ‘s family , the threat letter was clear that the militia group was going to spill the blood of [Mr A] and his family .

   In relation to the omissions in the statement of claims, the applicant is an old women who suffer from mild cognitive impairment, attached is medical letter in this regard. It is not abnormal in her situation to forget to mention things,

   The delegate did not accept that such a violent militia will send threat letters , while in fact DFAR report suggest that method is followed by the militias , for example DFAT at 3.90 states the following

   : Sources told DFAT that following the crackdown on the Tishreen movement, most protesters desisted from political activities, went underground or fled to the KRI, where they reportedly felt safer. Others joined political parties. Sources told DFAT that protesters who were no longer politically active were unlikely to face violence or harassment. Those who remain active are often harassed by armed groups, including through veiled threats, bullets in the mail or written threats known as ‘night letters’. Some are targeted for violence. In September 2022, PMF forces detained and allegedly tortured four prominent Tishreen activists in Diwaniyah whom they accused of being part of a ‘Ba’athist plot’ (see also Persons accused of links to the Ba’ath Party). Two of the activists died shortly after being released.

   The applicant’s fear is not far fetched or fanciful, the above explanations comes in light of the relevant country information which states that women in iraq doesn’t have a protection , for example DFAT report at 3.112 states the following :

   3.112 Gender-based violence is common in Iraq, and domestic violence is pervasive. According to the UN Population Fund, 46 per cent of married Iraqi women have been exposed to at least one form of spousal violence. The incidence of domestic violence reportedly increased during COVID-19 lockdowns. The legal framework for dealing with gender-based violence is inadequate. Attempts to pass federal anti-domestic violence legislation remain stalled due to opposition by religious leaders and conservative politicians. Although Article 29 (4) of the constitution specifically prohibits all forms of violence and abuse in the family, Article 41 of the Criminal Code stipulates that men may discipline their wives and children ‘within certain limits prescribed by law or by custom’. Federal laws do not criminalise spousal rape.

   3.120 DFAT assesses that the majority of Iraqi women, regardless of ethnicity or socio-economic status, face a high risk of official discrimination and a high risk of societal discrimination. Iraqi women and girls face a high risk of gender-based violence, including sexual assault and domestic violence, while Iraqi girls face a high risk of being forced into early or involuntary marriage. Iraqi women working to advocate for women’s rights face a high risk of violence, including targeted killings (see Civil Society).

   3.111 Violence and insecurity often constrain Iraqi women to traditional family roles and limit their access to employment and education. Illiteracy is twice as common among women as men. Only 14 per cent of women are working or actively seeking work compared to 73 per cent of men (see Economic Overview). Women are guaranteed 25 per cent of seats in parliament but are rarely appointed to influential roles and rarely participate in the leadership of their parties. As of 2022, there were three women ministers in the 21- person cabinet. About one in 10 Iraqi households is female-headed, including by widows, divorcees and women caring for sick or disabled spouses. These women are highly vulnerable to poverty, food insecurity, displacement, eviction and sexual harassment and abuse. Single mothers and women who live alone face stigma.

   3.132 Women with disabilities face particular stigma, and sometimes abuse, with their disability widely perceived as them ‘bringing shame on their family’. Many are not permitted to leave the house or to be seen by outsiders. Women with intellectual disabilities or mental health issues are at extremely high risk of gender-based violence or sexual abuse. The families of women with physical disabilities reportedly refuse to allow them to be seen by male technicians at factories producing prosthetics, thus preventing them from accessing equipment that would enable them more freedom of movement.

   in relation to the general security situation in iraq, DFAT report states the following :

   2.24 Security incidents occur often and without warning, including rocket attacks, mortar attacks, attacks with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), grenade attacks, small arms fire and assassinations. Targets have included security forces, government offices, diplomatic missions, US-led coalition forces, Iraqi and Turkish military facilities, checkpoints, police stations, recruiting centres, airports and public transport centres, places of worship and religious gatherings, markets, non-government organisations, schools and universities, and civilian infrastructure. Violent crime is common, including kidnapping, murder and robbery.

   Other serious crime includes drug and people trafficking, prostitution and illegal organ harvesting. Organised criminal gangs, militias and armed tribal groups are significant threats.

   the applicant’s claims revolve around a risk to her and her family members due to reasons she provided in her statement of claims, the current country information suggests that the applicant will be at risk of harm due to the fact the targeting of her son and the targeting of [an Occupation 2] in Iraq means that she herself can be targeted due to the fact that the PMF is very powerful militias, because the applicant’s son caused the imprisonment of one of its members , because of the threats that she and her son received , in circumstances where the agents of persecution are able to implement its threats , and in circumstances where all of these issues are supported by the relevant country information.

1. The applicant’s son [Mr A]’s written statement contains the following:

   Q - Have you suffered from pain in your country of origin?

   Yes, my family and I were threatened several times by extremist groups, so we were forced to change our place of residence multiple times as I worked for the American company [Company 1] as an [Occupation 4], and during this period the Terrorist groups pursued anyone who works with the American forces or an American company or the army or the police and security. And because I was working with an American company, we were threatened by terrorist groups, and on 20/03/2006, I found a threatening message in the garage of the house by armed extremist groups saying leave your house You and your family's blood will be shed.

   On the second day, 21/03/2006, we left the house and went to Al-Duwaniyah State. I continued to work as a [Occupation 3]. On 9/11/2012, at around 2:00 p.m., [Mr B] was exposed to an assassination [attempt] while he was going to perform a [lecture] ([He] is my father’s cousin and wife’s father’s cousin).

   As a result of this incident, the relatives [gathered] (Brothers of [Mr B]). [Deleted]. They agreed that I would go with [Mr B] when he leaves [Location 1] to go to other States to deliver [lectures]. My duty was unarmed, only to check [Mr B]’s guards by taking their names, dividing duties among them, and following them up.

   And on [date]/2015 at 12:35pm in the afternoon, and when [Mr B] left [location] and heading to his house in the same area, he was assassinated before entering his home by armed terrorist groups.

   On [date]/2015, I was summoned as a witness by a criminal [court], in order to inquire from me whether [Mr B] has people who have enmity towards him or not. I explained the details of the hostility between [Mr B] and [Mr C], who is the ex-husband of [Mr B]’s daughter. [Mr C] was a student of [a seminary]. He was expelled from it because he did not receive a reference from [Mr B]. On the contrary, [Mr B] declared that [Mr C] is a sinner, that is, in other words, he said that this person is not fit to be a man of faith and does not possess morals, values and principles.

   After this, and because of this problem, [Mr B]'s daughter got divorced, and she took her son with her, since he was young. As a result of this, hostility intensified from [Mr C] towards [Mr B]. And when I was going out with [Mr B] outside [Location 1], I noticed sometimes [Mr B] received threatening messages from [Mr C], and sometimes the threats happen via phone calls between [Mr C] and [Mr B]. And every time this happened, I asked [Mr B], why don’t you put forth a complaint to the law so that he can take his punishment and stop harming you. [Mr B] answered me that this person is my daughter's ex-husband and he has a son who is my grandson so I don't want my grandson or daughter to despise me for doing so as [Mr C] could be imprisoned as a result of my complaint.

   [Mr B] continued to answer me by stating that [Mr C] is a coward and incapable to kill me. He acts like this to worry and scare me only. Furthermore, [Mr C] after being expelled from the [seminary], he joined militias called Al-Aqeeda formations (Shiaa Terrorsit Groups) and became a prominent leader.

   On [date]/2015 when I went out to work, I was subjected to murder attempt because of that I suffered several injuries to my body, and on the same day, at evening, [Mr C] threatened me by phone and clearly said that this time you ([Mr A]) got away but next time you and your family will not escape. After this, I stayed in my house and did not leave it.

   On 05/06/2015, when my mother and I went out to work at around 7.30am, I found an envelope with bullets inside. In the envelope, there was a piece of paper with a verse written on it “In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Those who wronged will know which way they will turn back and what the outcome will be for the righteous, God the Great is true”.

   After this incident, I left the house for five days and went to the State of Hilla, to the house of my [uncle]. On 10/06/2015, I returned to my home in Diwaniyah and appointed a lawyer to raise a lawsuit. And on 15/06/2015, the lawyer filed a lawsuit, but it did not benefit me in any way. During this period, we did not leave the house. Then, on 19/06/2015, I found a threatening letter in the garage of the house from Shiaa Terrorist Groups called (Al-Aqeeda formations) which declared that my blood and my family’s blood will be shed. They accused us of promoting ideas that weaken the Shiaa school of thought and strengthening Sunni Terrorist ideas.

   As a result, I left the house and went to [Hilla] after that, on 23/06/2015 I traveled from Iraq to [Country 3] and arrived in [Country 3] on 24/06/2015. I left [Country 3] on 09/07/2015 and arrived on the same date in [Country 2] and registered At the United Nations on 13/07/2015. From that date I lived at [location] (the mountain) [Country 2].

   Tribunal Hearing, 23 August 2023

2. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 23 August 2023 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic (Standard) and English languages.  The following is a summary of the information provided by the applicant at the hearing:

   a.The applicant was born in Najaf.  She worked as a [Occupation 1] in Najaf, Baghdad, and Diwaniya. She worked until 2015 when the problems started with her son.

   b.She is not working in Australia. If she gets a visa she would like to [work] in her area and do some volunteer work.

   c.She lives on her own in Sydney.  Her [son] is living in Melbourne with his wife and children.  The applicant’s daughter-in-law has a problem with the applicant and does not want her here. That is why the applicant is no longer living with them and now resides by herself in Sydney.

   d.The applicant has a sister-in-law who has two daughters and they live in Sydney.  They call the applicant by phone and take her to special events such as Eids, weddings and engagements.

   e.She has a lot of friends in Australia and people take her to weekly religious gatherings.

   f.Her daughters, sisters and son are in Iraq in Diwanya and Najaf. Her sisters and daughters live with their husbands’ families. Her son moves around for work and is now in Ramadi. He works as an [occupation].  He is not having any problems in Iraq.  The applicant’s daughters and sisters are not having any problems in Iraq.

   g.Her son [Mr A] is still in [Country 2].

   h.She used to travel by herself to Melbourne to see her son but from about two years ago she started to get forgetful so that she became scared to travel there.  There have been changes in her mind and body.

   i.The health system is good here and people are valued. It is different in Iraq and it would be difficult for her there.

   j.She is able to live independently in Australia. She would not be able to do so in Iraq. It is not safe for a woman to live alone there and it is not religiously or culturally acceptable.  If she tried to live alone people would see her as vulnerable and attack and rob her. In Australia no one questions her if she chooses to live alone.

   k.She can’t live in Iraq because she and her son received threats from a man [Mr C].  He can send his group and kill whoever he wants.  He is from Najaf but he would send his group to threaten her son and her in Diwaniya.  [Mr C] killed [Mr B], the applicant’s husband’s paternal cousin. Her son was a witness against him. She does not know if [Mr C] was arrested or what happened to him.

   l.Her son [Mr A] left Iraq with his wife and children. His wife did not want to leave because she had a job in Iraq but her son said it was too risky for them to stay.

   m.The Tribunal asked why [Mr C] and his group would have any interest in the applicant and she replied because she lived with her son.

   n.She did not leave Iraq with her son because of her high blood pressure. She went to [Country 1] for several days to get her blood pressure down. She could not get on a plane with high blood pressure.

   o.After her son left Iraq the applicant stayed with her sister-in-law in Diwaniya and then with a friend in Najaf. She was scared there because of [Mr C]’s contacts.

   p.Nothing happened to her in Iraq because she did not have a stable and known address.

   q.She cannot live with her son in Iraq because he lives and works in Ramadi.  He has a job there. The applicant can’t live there as it is a Sunni area.

   r.The applicant cannot live with her daughters and sisters in Iraq because they live with their husbands’ families and there is no room for the applicant.  They live in very hard circumstances so it will be hard for them to take the applicant in.

   s.The Tribunal put to the applicant that the incident with [Mr C] happened over eight years ago. The applicant responded that [Mr C] can do anything, he has a big powerful party.  The Tribunal asked why he would do anything against the applicant and she responded because he was arrested and sentenced and he would want his revenge.  For sure he was charged and sentenced but she does not know if his sentence came into effect as he and his party are very powerful.

   t.The Tribunal put to the applicant that [Mr C] obtained revenge by forcing [Mr A] and his family out of Iraq.  The applicant responded that [Mr A] received a threat against himself and his family.  The Tribunal put to the applicant that she didn’t act against [Mr C] in Iraq and would not be considered a threat to him. The applicant responded that there was a threat against [Mr A] and his family.  The Tribunal put to the applicant that perhaps the threat was against [Mr A], his wife and children, and not necessarily the applicant or other extended family members. The applicant responded that [Mr A]’s sisters live in the countryside not the city so were not at risk form the threat.

   u.The applicant is at risk because of her Shia religion because [Mr C] is very powerful and can blow up her house. Also the Sunni will harm her in Iraq as this has happened before in Baghdad. They would not harm her in Diwaniya. The only person she fears in Diwaniya is [Mr C] and his political party. They are a big group who would take care of things for him. They can easily harm her because she is a woman and weak.

   v.She is critical of her government because it is corrupt and full of thieves who take the money outside the country.  The government is not in charge and it is run by mafia like political parties. She would be in danger if she voices her criticisms in Iraq.

   w.In Iraq women do not have any rights.  If a woman is alone she will have no source of income and the government will not take care of her.

   x.The applicant’s representative submitted that the applicant had been diagnosed with mild cognitive impairment. He submitted that her cognitive state was likely to continue to deteriorate.  As someone with a mental disability in Iraq she will bring shame to her family and be kept at home.  The representative also referred to DFAT’s information about a high level of violence and prejudice against women in Iraq.  The representative was of the opinion that the applicant had a diminished level of functioning and provided the example that he was unable to successfully explain and convey the Tribunal’s address or time of the hearing to the applicant.  He was therefore required to travel to her home in an outer suburb to personally escort her to the Tribunal, and he will need to escort her home after the hearing too.

   y.The representative submitted that the Tribunal should consider the possibility that [Mr C] is in prison as a reason why he has not harmed the family in Iraq, and that when he is released from prison there will be a threat to the applicant.  The broad level of feelings and volatility in relation to the Shia groups is evidenced by the response to [Haeri’s] recent statement prompting widespread violence and bloodshed, with unexpected people tending to get caught up in the disputes. The applicant’s family’s closeness to [Mr B] puts her at a higher risk.

   z.The representative submitted that the applicant cannot live with her son in Ramadi because it is a Sunni majority area which was recently controlled by the IS.  Sunni Terrorist groups are still present in Ramadi. He further submitted that the civil registration requirements mean that the applicant would need to get official permission to move to and register a home in another place of Iraq.

   Country Information

3. DFAT’s most recent Country Information Report on Iraq, published in January 2023, contains the following:

   Iraq’s economy contracted sharply in 2020 due to COVID-19 and falling global oil prices. It recovered in 2021 to achieve modest growth of 2.8 per cent. Soaring oil prices in 2022 drove oil revenue to its highest level in 50 years. Although classified as an upper middle-income country by the World Bank, Iraq’s social indicators, including on health, education and poverty, are poor. There is significant inequality, and 19 per cent of the population lives below the national poverty line of approximately AUD 110 per month.
   Unemployment is high, and labour force participation is among the lowest in the world. Women and young people are particularly likely to be unemployed; women make up just 13 per cent of the labour force, and more than a fifth of working-age young people do not have a job and are not engaged in education or training. The public sector is the largest employer but demand for public service employment outstrips supply of jobs. The World Bank’s Spring 2022 Iraq Economic Monitor assesses Iraq will continue to struggle to attract foreign investment due to its volatile security environment, high levels of corruption, and administrative inefficiencies.
   Climate change is having a significant impact on economic activity and quality of life in large parts of Iraq. Low rainfall – the second lowest amount in 40 years – has caused widespread food and water security issues. Production of strategic crops such as wheat and barley dropped 70 and 90 per cent respectively in 2021. Other impacts include very high and increasing temperatures, frequent sand and dust storms, and flooding. The IOM assesses that climate change is a significant and increasing driver of migration both within and out of Iraq. According to IOM estimates, 20,000 people were internally displaced due to water scarcity in Iraq in 2021. With 18 per cent of the labour force employed in the agricultural sector there is little or no capacity in the private sector to absorb labour if farmers migrate due to climate change.

   Health

   The overall quality and availability of healthcare in Iraq is low. There is a nationwide shortage of doctors and nurses, a situation made worse by prolonged conflict and a long-term brain-drain of medical professionals. The Ministry of Health (MoH) is the primary health care provider. Chronic underinvestment and corruption have undermined its capacity to deliver quality healthcare. Waiting lists are long and hospitals often lack essential supplies such as cancer drugs. Iraqis who can afford to use private hospitals and clinics prefer them but, because private health insurance is unavailable, this can be expensive. The quality and availability of healthcare is slightly better in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).
   Violence against medical personnel is a serious problem. A 2021 survey found 87 per cent of doctors in Iraq had experienced violence in the previous six months. There are reports of doctors and nurses being targeted for revenge attacks by the families and tribes of patients who die, even if the patient was near death on arrival at the hospital. There are also reports of tribes extorting ‘tribal penalties’ from doctors for real or fabricated malpractice, which can reach as much as AUD 140,000-290,000. Many doctors have left the country or turned to other professions as a result.

   Mental health

   Mental illnesses such as depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder are common in Iraq and frequently linked to experiences of conflict and displacement. Mental health services are inadequate. There are two dedicated psychiatric hospitals in the country, Al-Rashad Psychiatric Hospital and Ibn Rushd Hospital, both located in Baghdad. There are psychiatric wards in some general hospitals, as well as some out-patient clinics, often run by international non-government organisations (NGOs) such as Medicins sans Frontieres. The absence of community-based mental health care means that often the only care available is family-based or in psychiatric institutions, which have been linked to inhumane treatment and degrading conditions. There is significant societal stigma against people with mental illness. People with mental illness are often perceived as dangerous and unable to work, and some Iraqis blame mental illness on personal weakness or divine retribution. These attitudes result in under-reporting of mental illness and under-utilisation of the services that are available.
   …

   Corruption

   Corruption in Iraq is widespread.  Transparency International ranked Iraq 157 out of 180 countries in its 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, scoring it 23 out of 100 (where 100 signifies very clean and 0 highly corrupt). An opinion poll carried out across Iraq in 2019 found that corruption was the major source of concern for ordinary Iraqis: 82 per cent were concerned or very concerned about corruption at the highest levels of government, and 83 per cent perceived corruption to be getting worse. Popular anger at high-level corruption has been a driving force behind mass demonstrations across Iraq since 2018).
   Bribes are often required to obtain basic services, such as connecting utilities, accessing public health services and obtaining official documents. Bribery, money laundering, nepotism and embezzlement occur at all levels of government and across all ministries. Iraq’s Parliamentary Transparency Commission reported in 2018 that corruption was responsible for the disappearance of at least USD320 billion from the state treasury since 2003, mostly because of corrupt or phantom contracts. Other sectors affected by corruption include the judiciary, police and state security services, customs, electricity generation and the natural resources sector, particularly the oil industry. Criminal networks, reportedly involving oil ministry staff and high-ranking political and religious figures, smuggle oil to the black market, generating huge profits.
   Despite anti-corruption laws and the implementation of an anti-corruption commission, efforts to curb corruption in Iraq have had limited success. Anti-corruption officials, police, lawyers and judges have faced threats, intimidation and abuse, as have civil society activists and the media. Armed militias are involved in corruption and provide protection for corrupt officials. Although still high, corruption levels in the KRI are reportedly lower than elsewhere in Iraq.

   Security Situation

   Security incidents occur often and without warning, including rocket attacks, mortar attacks, attacks with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), grenade attacks, small arms fire and assassinations. Targets have included security forces, government offices, diplomatic missions, US-led coalition forces, Iraqi and Turkish military facilities, checkpoints, police stations, recruiting centres, airports and public transport centres, places of worship and religious gatherings, markets, non-government organisations, schools and universities, and civilian infrastructure. Violent crime is common, including kidnapping, murder and robbery. Other serious crime includes drug and people trafficking, prostitution and illegal organ harvesting. Organised criminal gangs, militias and armed tribal groups are significant threats.
   …
   Despite the territorial defeat of Da’esh in December 2017, Da’esh continues to launch attacks on security forces and civilians in Iraq, including suicide bombings and IED attacks. The group operates from safe havens in the Western Desert and along the disputed territories between federal Iraq and the KRI, supported by Da’esh fighters based in Syria. In 2021, Da’esh carried out more than 1,000 attacks in Iraq, killing or injuring over 2,000 people. These included a suicide bombing in Teyeran Square that killed 32 people in January 2021 and an IED attack in Madinat al-Sadr that killed 35 people in July 2021. Both attacks targeted Shi’a populations. According to the US Department of State, Da’esh also attacked electricity and water infrastructure, and abducted and killed civilians and security personnel, throughout 2021.
   …
   Large-scale, prolonged violent protests began in major cities in October 2019 and continued until mid-2021. These protests came to be known as the ‘Tishreen’ (October) protests, and participants as ‘Tishreenis’. Security forces, allegedly with the support of Iranian-aligned militias, used tear gas, water cannons and live ammunition against protesters, resulting in hundreds of deaths. In July 2022, in a separate period of unrest following the October 2021 elections, supporters of influential cleric Muqtada al-Sadr breached the International Zone in Baghdad (the partially-secured centre of the international and government presence in the city) and staged a sit-in at the Iraqi parliament that lasted several days. They were protesting the nomination by al-Sadr’s opponents of Mohammad al-Sudani as prime minister and attempting to inhibit government formation. In August 2022, al-Sadr’s supporters moved their protest to the Supreme Judicial Council, before forcing their way into the Presidential and Government Palaces. The protesters later clashed violently with groups believed to include Iranian-aligned militias, exchanging small arms and rocket fire continuously for 20 hours. At least 20 people were killed and more than 300 injured in this violence.
   Iraq is one of the world’s most landmine-affected countries. There are reportedly more than 2,000 hazardous mine areas nationwide from numerous conflicts. Border areas are particularly affected, and areas previously controlled by Da’esh have also been heavily mined, including with booby-traps. Explosive hazards pose risks at farms, schools, hospitals, water treatment facilities, power plants, bridges and other infrastructure, and have prevented the safe return of displaced people.
   …

   Religion

   An estimated 97 per cent of the population is Muslim. Shi’a Muslims make up 55 to 60 per cent of the overall population, while Sunni Muslims constitute about 40 per cent.
   …

   Political Opinion (Actual or imputed)

   Following the US-led military action in 2003, Iraq experienced a sharp deterioration in its security situation, along with a rapid increase in the number of political parties and armed groups operating within the country. The current political situation is highly complex, with multiple actors vying for power, territory, resources, and control of legal and illegal markets. As a result, individuals expressing contrary political views can find themselves at odds with a diverse range of groups, including central and regional governments, state security forces (including state-sponsored militia), fringe militia groups, tribal groups, conservative religious elements and Islamic militant groups. What constitutes safe political expression in one part of Iraq is sometimes dangerous in another. The degree of risk faced by an individual on the basis of their political opinion (real or perceived) therefore varies depending on their prominence, persistence and location, the group or groups they oppose, and the degree to which they enjoy the protection of other powerful groups.

   …

   Protesters and demonstrators

   Article 38 (3) of the Constitution of Iraq guarantees the right to peaceful demonstration, to be regulated by law. Regulations require protest organisers to request permission seven days in advance of a demonstration and to submit detailed information regarding the applicants, the reason for the protest and the participants. The regulations prohibit all ‘slogans, signs, printed materials or drawings’ involving sectarianism, racism or segregation of citizens. The regulations also prohibit anything that would violate the constitution or law; encourage violence, hatred or killing; or prove insulting to Islam or other religions. Human rights observers report that authorities generally issue permits in accordance with the regulations.
   A wave of nationwide protests known as the Tishreen protests commenced at the beginning of October 2019. Participants were subjected to regular violence by various parts of the security forces, including masked men who were widely assumed to be from Iraq’s many militias. Some protesters also committed violent acts. According to the Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights, 591 protesters were killed and 54 reported missing between October 2019 and May 2021.
   Many protesters were threatened, beaten, and arbitrarily detained by intelligence services during and after the protests. Security forces abducted dozens of protesters in the period between early October and December 2019 in several governorates, including in the cities of Baghdad, Amarah and Karbala, releasing most within days or weeks. Some were assassinated or disappeared. Others targeted by security forces included lawyers representing the protesters, medics treating injured protesters, people feeding protesters and journalists covering the protests.
   In 2021, former Prime Minister Kadhimi ordered an official investigation into the deaths and injuries of protesters and security forces related to the Tishreen protests. The investigation found excessive force by security forces had killed 149 protesters and eight members of security forces, with over 70 per cent of the deaths caused by shots to the head or chest. Many were killed or injured by teargas cannisters intentionally fired at their heads. The investigation has yet to hold anyone accountable.
   Sources told DFAT that following the crackdown on the Tishreen movement, most protesters desisted from political activities, went underground or fled to the KRI, where they reportedly felt safer. Others joined political parties. Sources told DFAT that protesters who were no longer politically active were unlikely to face violence or harassment. Those who remain active are often harassed by armed groups, including through veiled threats, bullets in the mail or written threats known as ‘night letters’. Some are targeted for violence. In September 2022, PMF forces detained and allegedly tortured four prominent Tishreen activists in Diwaniyah whom they accused of being part of a ‘Ba’athist plot’. Two of the activists died shortly after being released.
   In July and August 2022, supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr conducted large-scale protests in Baghdad’s Green Zone. Most violence reportedly involved clashes between al-Sadr’s supporters and Iran-backed militia fighters. Iraqi Security Forces cordoned off the area, but were reportedly instructed to avoid escalating the violence. Many observers contrasted the state’s heavy-handed response to the Tishreen protests with their relatively light touch approach to the Sadrist protests in 2022.
   …
   DFAT assesses that, while previous involvement in protests is not in itself likely to place individuals at risk of harassment or violence, protesters and demonstrators who are perceived as acting against the interests of the state (including the KRG) or armed groups (including state-sponsored militias) face a high risk of harassment and violence. State protection is often inadequate.
   …

   Women

   For much of the 20th century, women in Iraq made significant progress towards equality, achieving relatively high rates of tertiary education and employment in the professions and civil service. Many of these advances were reversed in the latter part of Saddam’s rule. Since the 2003 US-led military action, armed conflict and resurgent tribal and religious influences have led to a serious deterioration in the situation of women in Iraq. While individual circumstances vary, women across the spectrum of Iraqi society are affected by issues such as high rates of domestic and gender-based violence, low rates of economic participation, unfair laws, abusive cultural practices, exclusion from decision-making and inadequate state protection.
   Article 14 of the constitution guarantees equality before the law without discrimination based on gender. Nevertheless, a variety of laws discriminate against women, including in criminal, family, religious, labour and inheritance matters. In some cases, a woman’s testimony in a court of law is worth half that of a man. Female heirs inherit less, and male heirs are required to provide them financial support. While women can initiate divorce proceedings, they are not entitled to alimony, and women seeking a divorce are sometimes required to return their dowry.  Fathers are automatically awarded guardianship of their children in divorce cases, although a divorced mother may be granted custody of her children until age 10 (extendable by a court until age 15), at which time the child may choose with which parent to live. Women are required by law to have the consent of a male guardian to acquire a passport. Women enjoy relatively more legal rights in the KRI than in other parts of Iraq.
   Violence and insecurity often constrain Iraqi women to traditional family roles and limit their access to employment and education. Illiteracy is twice as common among women as men. Only 14 per cent of women are working or actively seeking work compared to 73 per cent of men. Women are guaranteed 25 per cent of seats in parliament but are rarely appointed to influential roles and rarely participate in the leadership of their parties. As of 2022, there were three women ministers in the 21-person cabinet. About one in 10 Iraqi households is female-headed, including by widows, divorcees and women caring for sick or disabled spouses. These women are highly vulnerable to poverty, food insecurity, displacement, eviction and sexual harassment and abuse. Single mothers and women who live alone face stigma.

   Violence against women

   Gender-based violence is common in Iraq, and domestic violence is pervasive. According to the UN Population Fund, 46 per cent of married Iraqi women have been exposed to at least one form of spousal violence. The incidence of domestic violence reportedly increased during COVID-19 lockdowns. The legal framework for dealing with gender-based violence is inadequate. Attempts to pass federal anti-domestic violence legislation remain stalled due to opposition by religious leaders and conservative politicians. Although Article 29 (4) of the constitution specifically prohibits all forms of violence and abuse in the family, Article 41 of the Criminal Code stipulates that men may discipline their wives and children ‘within certain limits prescribed by law or by custom’. Federal laws do not criminalise spousal rape.
   …
   Outside the KRI, ‘Women’s Protection Centres’ operate in Diwaniyah, Kirkuk and Anbar. A centre in Baghdad provides shelter for homeless women but not victims of GBV. Space is reportedly limited and service delivery poor. Communities reportedly often view shelters as brothels and ask the government to close them or they occasionally attack them. Protection workers assisting women to seek shelter from abusers have been charged with kidnapping the women who sought their help. Shelters are subject to unexpected closure by authorities. Some victims, without alternatives, reportedly become homeless. Women leaving shelters are often targeted by sex traffickers.
   State protection against rape and sexual violence is inadequate. There is a lack of female police officers and police trained in dealing with gender-based violence and rape. The legal framework and societal norms contribute to impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence. Article 398 of the Criminal Code requires authorities to drop a rape case if the perpetrator marries the victim (the rape prosecution will resume if the husband divorces the victim within the first three years of marriage). Article 394 of the Criminal Code prohibits sexual relations outside marriage, and victims often do not report rape due to fear of being charged under this law, as well as stigma and fear of being killed by family members. Abortion is illegal, including in cases of rape, although the morning-after pill can legally be prescribed for rape victims.
   …
   DFAT assesses that the majority of Iraqi women, regardless of ethnicity or socio-economic status, face a high risk of official discrimination and a high risk of societal discrimination. Iraqi women and girls face a high risk of gender-based violence, including sexual assault and domestic violence, while Iraqi girls face a high risk of being forced into early or involuntary marriage. Iraqi women working to advocate for women’s rights face a high risk of violence, including targeted killing.
   . …

   Persons with disabilities (PWDs)

   …
   Women with disabilities face particular stigma, and sometimes abuse, with their disability widely perceived as them ‘bringing shame on their family’. Many are not permitted to leave the house or to be seen by outsiders. Women with intellectual disabilities or mental health issues are at extremely high risk of gender-based violence or sexual abuse. The families of women with physical disabilities reportedly refuse to allow them to be seen by male technicians at factories producing prosthetics, thus preventing them from accessing equipment that would enable them more freedom of movement.
   Stigma, distance and access reportedly prevent many PWDs from registering for benefits. Disability advocates allege that the process by which authorities decide which PWDs should receive the limited assistance available is highly politicised. In-country sources report that anyone who suffers a debilitating injury while serving with a PMF is ensured of receiving support, whereas those who received their injuries fighting against Iran in the 1980s Iran-Iraq conflict are at risk of losing their benefits.
   DFAT assesses that PWDs in all parts of Iraq face a moderate risk of official discrimination, particularly in educational settings, and are unlikely to receive sufficient support from government to enable them to participate fully in society. PWDs face a high risk of societal discrimination that may include violence or sexual abuse, particularly women with intellectual disabilities or mental health issues.
   …

   Internal Relocation

   Articles 44 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of Iraq guarantee Iraqis freedom of movement, travel, and residence inside and outside Iraq, and state that no Iraqi may be exiled, displaced, or deprived from returning to the country. In practice, considerable restrictions exist in relation to the freedom of internal movement, particularly in territories disputed between the central government and KRG and in areas formerly controlled by Da’esh.
   People can and do relocate to other parts of Iraq, including to reduce the risk of harassment or violence based on political opinion, religion and so forth. However, the ability to relocate to another region of Iraq such as the KRI or the south will depend on several factors, including wealth, gender, and family, ethnic and tribal connections. It may be difficult for non-Kurds who do not speak Kurdish to relocate to the KRI; similarly, non-Shi’a persons may struggle to establish themselves in the south.
   Law and custom do not generally respect freedom of movement for women. Women require the consent of a male guardian or legal representative to apply for a passport, and for identification documents necessary for accessing public services, food assistance, health care, employment, education and housing. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a single woman to relocate to a new area where she did not have the protection of a male relative.
   Where a person is relocating to avoid violence or the threat of violence at the hands of family, tribe, or community as a result of harmful traditional practices, including on account of preserving family ‘honour’, there is clear evidence that such actors will pursue the person to the proposed area of relocation, including, through tribal, family or other links. The endorsement of such norms and practices by large segments of society and the limitations of the state to provide protection against such abuses all mitigate against successful relocation.

1. According to IOM it is difficult for a single person to rent housing in Iraq ‘because Iraqi society does not accept single people living alone or with non-relative families,’ particularly females. Furthermore, housing designed for a single person is rare in Iraq as most is made to suit families of two or more people.[1]

   [1] IOM, Information on Return and Reintegration in Iraq, December 2015

2. The 2022 EUAA Country Guidance note on Iraq states:

   Living alone as a woman is not generally accepted in Iraq because it is considered inappropriate behaviour. Women living on their own will often encounter negative attitudes from society and are at a particularly high risk of violence. Women in female-headed households, divorced women and widows are in a vulnerable position economically and in terms of exposure to harassment, and have difficulty finding employment, especially if they lack the protection of a male relative and necessary connections to find employment and sustain dependent children.

   Women experience economic discrimination in access to employment, credit and pay equality. It is difficult for a single person to rent housing in Iraq because Iraqi society does not accept single people living alone or with non-relative families, particularly women. Women who have been repudiated by their family and lack a social support network, are considerably worse off.

   Additionally, the position of single women who are self-sufficient because they have a job differs from the position of unemployed and/or uneducated women. The situation for single women may vary depending on their level of education, on whether they live in cities or not, and on their financial independence. Although it is reportedly possible for an educated woman with an income to live in a city on her own, ‘as long as she does not have an honour conflict with her family’, in practice the possibility for single women to live on their own has been reduced due to deteriorating societal restrictions and financial situation in the country.

   Widowed women may be harboured by their own family or by their in-laws. In those circumstances, male relatives will act as their custodian. … 

   For women, there are many societal and family restrictions and any woman living outside a
   

   [2] European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), ‘Country Guidance: Iraq - Common analysis and guidance note', 29 June 2022

   family community is at risk. [2]

3. In a 2018 report the Finnish Immigration Service stated the following:

   In a report published by Minority Rights Group International (MRG) and the Ceasefire Center for Civilian Rights (CCCR) in 2015, it was noted that women in Iraq were threatened from all sides in the conflict: armed groups threatened, raped and killed women; the security and police forces, mostly male, failed to protect women and often committed violence against them too; criminal groups exploited the women’s desperate situation. Women were discriminated against in legislation, and the authorities were unconcerned about violence against women.

   According to CCCR director Mark Lattimer, women are considered inferior to men. Women are expected to travel with a male relative; an honourable woman would not be expected to travel alone or to act independently. Some of the violence during the conflict has been specifically aimed at women due to their conduct being considered politically or morally illicit. For instance, militia have killed women at venues claimed to be brothels or because they wore the wrong kind of clothing. Lattimer estimates that any woman living outside a family community is at risk. On the other hand, in many family communities women face an enemy within.
   …
   In the report by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)(2014), it was noted that most widows were the heads of their families. The report indicated that widows were at risk of becoming victims of violence and abuse, including sexual abuse, because of their insecure financial and social situation. The CEDAW was concerned that only a small portion of all widows in Iraq (about 200,000 out of around 1.5 million) received financial support from the government through the Department of Women’s Welfare. In addition, widows suffered from a lack of capacity building and empowerment.

   It was noted in an article in the New York Times (2011) that, according to the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, some 9% of women in Iraq were widows (about 900,000). The Department of Women’s Welfare estimated that there were around one million widows. The large number of widows is explained by war and internal conflicts, in which men in particular have been killed.  Also citing official figures, the AI Monitor article from 2016 put the number of widows in Iraq at around 850,000. The survey did not cover the provinces of Nineveh and Anbar, which would augment the figure. In addition, it did not cover matters considered sensitive such as the remarrying of widows.
   …
   

   [3] Finnish Immigration Service, ‘Overview of the Status of Women Living Without a Safety Net in Iraq’, 22 May 2018

   Two articles in the New York Times (2009 and 2011) mentioned two caravan sites near Baghdad, where widows and their children lived. The widows and assisting NGOs interviewed for the 2011 article reported that widows did not make attractive brides. It was noted in the article that the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs paid widows minimum assistance of about USD 80 per month. In the 2009 article, it was noted that those distributing social welfare benefits reported widows having been forced into temporary marriages, for a fixed period of anything from one hour to one year, in order to gain financial assistance from the government, a religious leader or a tribal leader. Some widows have ended up as prostitutes or suicide bombers. According to information received from the authorities, only about one in six widows received financial assistance from the government. According to widows and their advocates, to obtain financial assistance widows require political connections or must agree to temporary marriages with those controlling the distribution of state funds. … It was noted in the article that the government assistance was so small and the bureaucracy involved in applying for it so heavy that many widows never registered with the appropriate authorities.[3]

4. A November 2022 UNHCR report states:

   The Housing Card is an official document showing the address where the head of household rents or owns a residence. The General Directorate for Nationality of the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the issuance of the Housing Card. It is used in both Federal Iraq and in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I).

   …

   While Iraqis can temporarily regularize their stay by registering with the local authorities and security actors, only the Housing Card issued in the new location ensures that the individual / family can permanently settle and have access to the full range of rights and basic services in the new location, including:

   - Obtain/renew civil documentation;

   - Exercise the right to vote;

   - Enter formal rent agreements and buy property;

   - Access employment; and

   - Access to basic services such as health, education and food rations through the Public Distribution System (PDS).

   The Housing Card is issued at the household level. Heads of household who already hold a Housing Card in their name from any location in Iraq and who seek to change their place of residency are required to transfer their Housing Card to the new location. Heads of household who do not hold a Housing Card in their name because they are still included in their family’s records must apply for a new Housing Card in the place in which they seek to reside.

   For either process (transfer or issuance of the Housing Card), the head of household needs to meet a range of administrative and documentary requirements Instructions on the Housing Card (2018). In practice, the implementation of these instructions can vary.

   a) Requirements for the transfer of the Housing Card to the new location:

   • Approval from the Housing Information Office in the former place of residency to transfer the individual’s records to the new place of residency and deactivate the Housing Card in the former place of residency. This approval is not granted if there is an ongoing investigation or an arrest warrant against the individual or any family member;

   • An application form signed and stamped by the mukhtar (or local council or mayor) in the new place of residency; and The approval from the concerned security actor/s in the new location, normally the Ministry of Interior Intelligence Department (Federal Iraq) or the Asayish (KR-I), respectively.

   b) Requirements for the first-time issuance of the Housing Card in the new location:

   • Proof of residency or support letter from the mukhtar (or the local council or mayor) in charge of the neighbourhood in which the head of household seeks to reside. In Diyala and the Southern governorates, this proof of residency or support letter needs to be signed by one sponsor and in Baghdad by two sponsors, and certified by the mayor’s office. In Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah Governorate, endorsement of the mayor’s office is also required. In Kirkuk, there is no need for a sponsor, but instead a letter confirming that the head of household is no longer resident in the former place of residency needs to be obtained from the mukhtar or local council and endorsed by the local police in the former place of residency; and

   • Approval from the concerned security actor(s) in the new location, normally the Ministry of Interior Intelligence Department (Federal Iraq) or the Asayish (KR-I), respectively.

   c) Documents required for the transfer/issuance of the Housing Card:

   • Original CSID and nationality certificate or UNID for all family members;

   • Approval letter from the local police department;

   • Original Housing Card or, in case of first-time issuance, copy of the Housing Card in which the individual’s name was included (e.g., father’s Housing Card);

   • Marriage contract in case of first-time issuance;

   • A rental contract or house ownership deed from the new location; and

   • At times, other documents such as the PDS card are also required.

   If all conditions are met, the Housing Card will be transferred or issued, usually within 10 to 14 days.

   …

   Single men and women who are still included in their father’s Housing Card are generally not able to transfer the Housing Card to the new location nor can they obtain a new Housing Card in their name (except if they own property in the new location).[4]

   [4] UNHCR, 2022, ‘Ability of Iraqis to Legally Access and Settle Durably in Proposed Areas of Internal Relocation’, November.

   CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

5. The applicant submitted her Iraqi passport. On the basis of this document and the applicant’s oral evidence the Tribunal is satisfied she is a citizen of Iraq. The Tribunal assesses the applicant’s claims against Iraq as her country of nationality and receiving country.

6. The applicant claims to fear harm in he home area in Iraq because there was a threat against her son [Mr A] and his family by a man, [Mr C], and his affiliated Shia militia group, in mid-2015.  The applicant also claims she will be vulnerable to harm as an elderly widowed woman in Iraq.

   Credibility

7. The applicant claims her husband was a cousin of an [Occupation 2] in [Location 1], [Mr B].  Because of a past assassination attempt in another province, the applicant’s son [Mr A] was nominated by the family to monitor [Mr B]’s security detail when [Mr B] needed to travel outside of [Location 1] and to liaise with [Mr B]’s family as to whether or not it was safe for [Mr B] to travel.  In [2015] [Mr B] was assassinated inside [Location 1] allegedly by his former son-in-law, [Mr C].  [Mr A] reported to the authorities that [Mr C] had threatened [Mr B] and was a likely suspect in the assassination so that an arrest warrant was issued against [Mr C].  [Mr C] then tried to attack [Mr A] and later he and his militia group delivered threatening messages that they would kill [Mr A] and his family. At the time the applicant was living with her son [Mr A] and his wife and children in Diwaniya.

8. The applicant has been reasonably consistent about these details over the course of her Protection visa application. She has also provided her son’s written statement to the UNHCR in [Country 2] in which he outlines the events in more detail, the core of which are largely consistent with the applicant’s account. Further there is independent evidence about a [Occupation 2], [Mr B], being assassinated in [Location 1] in [2015]. The Tribunal therefore gives the applicant the benefit of the doubt that these events occurred and accepts that they did.

9. The Tribunal also accepts that the applicant is an elderly and widowed woman.

   Fear of Harm in Iraq

10. The Tribunal notes that the applicant’s son [Mr A] has been recognised as a refugee by the UNHCR in [Country 2], based upon the information he provided to them.  The Tribunal accepts the likelihood that at the time he, his wife and children departed Iraq there was a real chance [Mr C] and the Aqeeda Shia militia would seriously harm him.

11. The Tribunal notes that the threatening events occurred in [2015] when the applicant was a member of [Mr A]’s household in Diwaniya.  While [Mr A], his wife and children departed Iraq in late June 2015 the applicant remained in Iraq until late August 2015, after spending about seven days receiving medical treatment for her high blood pressure in [Country 1].

12. For the following reasons the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant herself would be of any interest to [Mr C] or the Aqeeda Shia militia either in [2015] or now.

13. Firstly, the applicant did not personally take any action against [Mr C] or the militia, and she could not be perceived as any threat to [Mr C] or the militia. Secondly, she is an elderly woman and it is highly unlikely that the [Mr C] or the militia would consider her a suitable target, regardless of her relationship to [Mr A]. Thirdly, [Mr C] and the militia were able to successfully drive [Mr A] and his immediate family out of Iraq so would have no subsequent need to threaten or harm the applicant. Fourthly, given there was only one attack upon [Mr A] in [2015] there was no indication that [Mr C] or the militia would act upon their threats to harm his family. Fifthly, eight years have passed since the events and there is no plausible reason why [Mr C] or the militia would have any interest in harming the applicant now.  Sixthly, there is no indication that the [Mr C] or the militia took any action against anyone in [Mr A]’s family or extended family in Iraq.  Seventhly, there is no indication that [Mr C] or the militia continued to threaten the applicant, or anyone else in [Mr A]’s family or extended family, after [Mr A] departed Iraq. Eighthly, there is no mention or indication in [Mr A]’s written statement of any risk of harm to the applicant.

14. In view of the above the Tribunal is not satisfied there is a real chance that [Mr C] or a Shia militia will subject the applicant to serious or significant harm in Iraq, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

15. The applicant will be returning to Iraq as a single, elderly woman.  She no longer has a home or employment in Iraq.  She has two daughters, a son, and several siblings in Iraq. When asked if she could live with any of them on return to Iraq she maintained that she could not as they had their own families, were already living with extended families, and have no room or capacity to support her.

16. Culturally, the applicant’s son in Iraq would usually have the responsibility for his mother’s accommodation and care there.  However he is no longer living in Diwaniya but in a Sunni majority area, Ramadi, which had recently been controlled by the IS.  The applicant does not have the appropriate authorisation, a Housing Card, to live in Ramadi and the available country information suggests it would be difficult for her to obtain a new Housing Card. The Tribunal therefore accepts there would be some danger as well as substantial administrative obstacles for the applicant to try to travel to Ramadi and establish herself there with her son.

17. The Tribunal considers it would be very unreasonable for none of the applicant’s family members in Diwaniya and Najaf to take the applicant in and provide her with support and accommodation there.  However, the Tribunal notes the available country information which indicate this does happen and that the elderly and widows can be considered a burden too great during times of hardship so that they are left to fend for themselves.  Further if the applicant did try to live with one of her daughters and their in-laws or even her siblings it is likely that resentment could build to the level that their hospitality is withdrawn and the applicant forced out, as occurred with her daughter-in-law’s household in Melbourne.

18. The Tribunal therefore accepts there is a real possibility that the applicant would not be able to live with family members in Iraq, or would not be able to live with them in the reasonably foreseeable future.  This means that there is a real chance the applicant will be on her own in Iraq. 

19. The applicant has given evidence that she is able to live on her own in Australia but she would not be able to in Iraq as it is not culturally or religiously acceptable for women in Iraq to do so.  She also stated that she would be vulnerable to attack, robbery and home invasions if she lived alone because she would be identified as a weak woman who could not protect herself.  The available country information, as set out above, supports her statements.  For example, the 2022 EUAA report refers to women living on their own often encountering negative attitudes from society and being at a “particularly high risk of violence”.

20. The Tribunal considers that the applicant’s vulnerability to harm, as a woman living alone in Iraq, is heightened by her cognitive decline and other health issues, as well as by her age, given her ability to successfully navigate confrontation or dangerous situations would likely be markedly decreased.

21. The Tribunal is therefore satisfied that there is a real chance that the applicant will be physically assaulted, threatened, robbed and her home invaded if she returns to Iraq. The Tribunal considers these harms are serious harm. The Tribunal is satisfied that the reason for the harm is the applicant’s membership of the particular social groups, single women in Iraq, women living alone in Iraq, and elderly women in Iraq. The Tribunal considers that the harm is a result of systematic and discriminatory conduct in that it will be done to the applicant selectively and intentionally.  The Tribunal is satisfied that the chance of harm to the applicant as an elderly woman alone, exists in all areas of Iraq and that there is no effective protection available to her.

22. The Tribunal is therefore satisfied the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Iraq as defined by s.5J of the Act.

    Section 36(3)

23. There is no evidence or indication that the applicant has a right to enter and reside in any other country. The Tribunal accordingly finds she has no such right and that she is not excluded from Australia’s protection by s.36(3) of the Act.

    Conclusion

24. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).

    DECISION

25. The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

    Melissa McAdam
    Member

    
    

    ATTACHMENT  -  Extract from Migration Act 1958

    5 (1) Interpretation

    …

    cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:

    (a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or

    (b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;

    but does not include an act or omission:

    (c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

    (d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

    …

    degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:

    (a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

    (b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

    …

    torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:

    (a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or

    (b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or

    (c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or

    (d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or

    (e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;

    but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

    …

    receiving country,  in relation to a non-citizen, means:

    (a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or

    (b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.

    …

    5H    Meaning of refugee

    (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:

    (a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or

    (b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.

    Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.

    …

    5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution

    (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:

    (a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and

    (b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and

    (c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.

    Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.

    (2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.

    Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.

    (3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:

    (a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or

    (b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or

    (c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:

    (i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;

    (ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;

    (iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;

    (iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;

    (v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;

    (vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

    (4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):

    (a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and

    (b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and

    (c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

    (5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:

    (a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;

    (b)     significant physical harassment of the person;

    (c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;

    (d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

    (e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

    (f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.

    (6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

    5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family

    For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:

    (a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and

    (b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:

    (i)the first person has ever experienced; or

    (ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

    where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.

    Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

    5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family

    For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:

    (a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and

    (b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and

    (c)     any of the following apply:

    (i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;

    (ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;

    (iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

    (d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

    5LA Effective protection measures

    (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:

    (a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:

    (i)the relevant State; or

    (ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

    (b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.

    (2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:

    (a)     the person can access the protection; and

    (b)     the protection is durable; and

    (c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.

    …

    36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act

    …

    (2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

    (a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

    (aa)  a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or

    (b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

    (i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and

    (ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

    (c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

    (i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and

    (ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

    (2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:

    (a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

    (b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or

    (c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or

    (d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

    (e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

    (2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:

    (a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

    (b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

    (c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.

    …