1811883 (Refugee)

1811883 (Refugee) [2021] AATA 3043 (29 June 2021)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:  Migration & Refugee Division
CASE NUMBER:  1811883
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:              Ethiopia
MEMBER:Peter Haag
DATE:29 June 2021
PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa.

Statement made on 29 June 2021 at 4:30pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Ethiopia – political opinion – opposition to the government – race – Harar – physical violence – fear of detention – fear of killing – public employment – confiscation of land and bank account – evidence of land ownership – new reformist government – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5(1), 5AAA, 5H, 5J – 5LA, 36, 65
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2
CASES
MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 201 FCR 505
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Application for review – refusal of protection visa

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (‘the Minister’) on 23 March 2018 to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (‘the Act’).
The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of Ethiopia, applied for the visa on 20 November 2015. The delegate refused to grant the visa as they were not satisfied that the applicant is a refugee, or that there exists a real risk of the applicant suffering harm upon his return to Ethiopia.
Criteria for a protection visa
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994. An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b) or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a) of the Act. In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1) of the Act, a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)–(6) and ss 5K–5LA of the Act, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs (‘the Department’), and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (‘DFAT’) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
The following issues arise for determination by the Tribunal in relation to the present review application:
(a)whether the applicant meets the refugee criterion;
(b)whether the applicant alternatively meets the complementary protection criterion.
For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.
The applicant provided to the Tribunal a copy of the record of the decision of the delegate made on 23 March 2018. The Tribunal has read that decision.
The applicant claims and the Tribunal accepts the applicant is a citizen of Ethiopia. The applicant was born on [date], in Harar, the capital city of Harari State, Ethiopia. These facts are well established by the documentation the applicant provided to the Department, including his passport. There is no evidence before the Tribunal that indicates the applicant’s passport is a bogus document. The Tribunal is satisfied the applicant is a national of Ethiopia, and Ethiopia is the applicant’s ‘receiving country’ for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
The evidence does not demonstrate the applicant has a right to enter and reside in a country other than Ethiopia; accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied the applicant is not excluded from protection under the laws of Australia by s 36(3) of the Act.
The Tribunal convened a hearing to consider the merits of the review application on 7 April 2021. The applicant participated at the hearing before the Tribunal in person and was assisted by an interpreter in the English and Amharic languages, who also participated in person. The applicant was also assisted at the hearing by his representative.
Applicant’s background
The applicant married an Australian citizen in Australia while residing in Australia. He is helping to care for the child born to his wife during her preceding relationship. The applicant and his wife are the biological parents of a child who was born in Australia. The applicant belongs to the Harari ethnic group, is Muslim in terms of faith, and can speak, read, and write English, Harari, Oromo and Amharic.
The applicant first arrived in Australia [in] February 2015 at [age] years of age.
The applicant arrived on a [Student] visa, and, for the first time after arriving in Australia, he departed Australia [in] July 2015. He then returned to Australia [in] August 2015 on the same [Student] visa, which was cancelled on 28 September 2016.
On 12 October 2016, the applicant lodged an application with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for a review of the Department’s decision to cancel his Student visa. The Tribunal affirmed the decision to cancel the visa on 16 October 2018.
On 20 November 2016, approximately two months after the Student visa was cancelled, the applicant applied for a Protection visa. The application was lodged approximately one year and eight months after the applicant first arrived in Australia as a student.
Protection Claims
In seeking protection, the applicant claims:
·He will be persecuted, imprisoned, or killed without a fair trial if he returns to Ethiopia;
·In Ethiopia, he worked as a Harari state government official in [specified duties];
·His political beliefs did not align with those required of him by the government;
·During an election campaign in 2010, he advocated against the incumbent political party;
·During this campaign, he was beaten by police and his right arm was broken;
·He was targeted by police as he was instigating and mobilising people to vote against the government;
·His employer became aware of his political views, he was subsequently denied promotions and salary increases, and ultimately lost his job;
·He then worked for a Non-Governmental Organisation (‘NGO’), which did not restrict his political views or opinion;
·In 2015, he came to Australia to study, and had intended to return to Ethiopia after the completion of his [Course 1] and work on his farm improving the standard of agriculture in Ethiopia;
·Whilst in Australia circumstances in Ethiopia changed for the worse;
·Government officials appropriated his farm, house and land, and all the money in his bank account;
·The government fears that he preparing to return of Ethiopia and that he will coordinate the population against the government;
·The Ethiopian government does not believe he is a genuine student in Australia, and he is seen as a risk to their governance;
·He cannot not seek help, as the authorities would imprison him if they caught him. The authorities will not protect him from harm;
·The incumbent political party rules over the entirety of Ethiopia, and nowhere in the country is safe for the applicant;
·If he is imprisoned, he will die in prison;
·The government will prevent his success in [work], and will prevent him working with NGOs;
·He suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder from his experiences in Ethiopia.
·It is in his nature to speak out;
·His brother was killed by the previous regime;
·Several months after he lost his government job, he was jailed after campaigning against the government;
·He was beaten in jail and spent four months healing at home.
COUNTRY INFORMATION
DFAT published a report on Ethiopia on 12 August 2020. That report provides the following information relevant to the applicant’s review:
RECENT HISTORY
Ethiopia, formerly Abyssinia, is a multi-ethnic federal republic in East Africa. Ethiopia is Africa’s oldest independent country — except for a five-year Italian occupation (1936-41), it was never colonised. In 1974, a Communist military junta known as the Derg (‘Committee’) overthrew the long-serving Emperor, Haile Selassie, and abolished Ethiopia’s monarchy, the House of Solomon, which dated to antiquity.
The Derg pursued policies of nationalisation and collectivisation, and Ethiopia descended into civil war between junta and rebel forces. Between 1976 and 1978, the Derg killed thousands of its opponents (the campaign of ‘Red Terror’). Rebel forces from the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a multi-ethnic alliance led by the Tigrayan people, ousted the Derg in 1991, ending Ethiopia’s civil war. The Derg’s leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, was granted asylum in Zimbabwe. The EPRDF and its successor, the Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP), have ruled Ethiopia since. In 1993, Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia and established its own state, rendering Ethiopia landlocked. A border dispute between the two countries triggered a two-year war (1998-2000), in which 100,000 people were killed (see Security Situation). Ethiopia is one of the most drought-prone countries in the world. Drought-induced famines in 1973-74 and 1984-85 resulted in more than 1 million deaths. Its capital city, Addis Ababa, is a major diplomatic hub, as seat of the African Union and the UN Economic Commission for Africa.
Ethiopia held its first multi-party elections in May 1995. The EPRDF won this and all other subsequent elections, bringing stability and economic growth but restricting political dissent and media and civic freedoms for most of its time in power. The EPRDF was disbanded in December 2019 Ethnic Tigrayans, a minority, wielded outsized influence during most of the EPRDF’s rule, fostering resentment among the considerably larger Amhara and, in particular, Oromo ethnic groups. Meles Zenawi, a Tigrayan who led the removal of the Derg, served as prime minister from 1995 until his death in 2012. Zenawi was succeeded by his deputy, Hailemariam Desalegn, an ethnic Wolayta — Ethiopia’s first peaceful transition of power in modern times.
Large-scale anti-government protests beginning in 2014, centred in Oromia and, later, Amhara states, prompted the declaration of a State of Emergency, under which over 20,000 people were arrested and 1,000 killed (see 2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency). Protesters demanded greater political rights, leading to the resignation, in February 2018, of Prime Minister Desalegn. His successor and current prime minister, Abiy Ahmed (appointed in April 2018), embarked on an ambitious reform agenda, and the human rights situation has improved significantly under his watch. Among other reforms, Abiy has lifted restrictions on freedom of expression, released political prisoners, removed terrorist designations of previously exiled opposition groups, expanded the space for civil society, and initiated reform of legislation used previously to arrest and prosecute government critics. In parallel, Abiy has pursued high-profile diplomatic initiatives across East Africa. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for his peacebuilding efforts with Eritrea, culminating in the signing of an agreement to formally end their war. Abiy is Ethiopia’s first prime minister from the Oromo ethnic group.
After an initial period where violence subsided significantly, ethno-nationalism, inter-ethnic clashes and associated displacement again increased, though not nearly to the levels witnessed preceding Abiy’s election. Abiy’s reform agenda has met some resistance, and his government was the subject of a purported coup attempt in June 2019. Abiy had committed to holding free and fair elections in 2020, although these have been postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak in the country. Abiy declared a five-month State of Emergency on 8 April 2020 in response to the outbreak. The State of Emergency, while valid only until September 2020, limits some human rights, particularly those around association and movement. While these reflect the types of restrictions in place internationally, there is scope for abuse. However, the response has generally been accepted as necessary by opposition parties who see it as proportionate to the threat posed by COVID-19.
DEMOGRAPHY
The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) estimates Ethiopia’s population at 110 million, with an average annual growth rate of 2.5 per cent in the period 2010-2019. Among African countries, only Nigeria is more populous. Ethiopia’s population is concentrated in the north and centre of the country (the ‘Ethiopian highlands’). Ethiopia has a young population — around 70 per cent is under the age of 30 (including nearly 40 per cent under 14). Only 4 per cent of Ethiopians are aged 65 or older. The median age is 18. Approximately 80 per cent of the population lives in rural areas.
Ethiopia is ethnically and linguistically diverse, comprising more than 80 different ethnic groups and 100 languages. According to the most recent national census (2007), 10 ethnic groups have a population of 1 million people or more. The Oromo constitute the single largest, at 34.5 per cent of the population, followed by the Amhara (26.9 per cent), Somali (6.2 per cent), Tigrayan (6.1 per cent), Sidama (4 per cent) and Gurage (2.5 per cent) peoples. More recent figures are unavailable — a new census has been postponed repeatedly, most recently in 2019 (owing to large-scale internal displacement). Amharic is the official national language, although the government flagged in March 2020 its intention to grant similar status to the Oromiffa, Afar, Somali and Tigrinya languages. These languages already enjoy official status in the regional states in which they predominate. English is widely taught and spoken.
Oromia is the most populous of Ethiopia’s states, with around 37 per cent of the total population, followed by Amhara (23.3 per cent) and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP – 20.4 per cent). Somali and Tigray states, respectively, account for 6 per cent and 5.8 per cent of Ethiopia’s population. Addis Ababa is Ethiopia’s largest city, with a population of around 4.5 million. As Ethiopia’s administrative and commercial capital, Addis Ababa attracts migrants from across the country and has a multi-ethnic character. Inter-ethnic marriage is common in Addis Ababa and urban centres. It is less common in rural areas.
POLITICAL SYSTEM
Ethiopia’s current constitution was adopted in December 1994 and came into force in August 1995. It established a federal system of regional states delineated according to settlement patterns, language and identity (i.e. ethnicity). This method of delineation essentially makes Ethiopia an ‘ethnic federation’, whereby the largest ethnic groups administer their own states and operate with considerable autonomy from the federal government.
Ethiopia had nine states at the time of publication: (1) Afar; (2) Amhara; (3) Benishangul-Gumuz; (4) Gambela; (5) Harari; (6) Oromia; (7) Somali; (8) SNNP; and (9) Tigray. A 10th state, for the Sidama people, is in the process of being established, following the successful passage of a referendum on regional statehood in November 2019 (see Security Situation). States have their own legislative assemblies (kilili); its members are popularly elected. Under the constitution, states have the authority to, inter alia, enact and implement state laws; formulate economic, social and development policies; administer land and other natural resources in accordance with federal laws; levy and collect taxes and administer a state budget; and establish and administer a state police force. For administrative purposes, states are divided into districts (woredas) and neighbourhoods (kebeles). A kebele is the smallest unit of local government in Ethiopia. Representatives of woredas and kebeles are popularly elected. The federal government administers Addis Ababa (in addition to being the federal capital, Addis Ababa is the capital of surrounding Oromia State), Dira Dawa and Harar.
Ethiopia has a bicameral federal parliament, consisting of the House of Peoples’ Representatives (lower chamber, 547 seats) and the House of the Federation (upper chamber, 153 seats). Members of the House of Peoples’ Representatives are elected by popular vote to five-year terms. State assemblies elect members of the House of the Federation, also to five-year terms. The constitution mandates that each recognised ‘Nation, Nationality, and People’ of Ethiopia be represented by one member in the House of the Federation, and one additional member for every million people of its population.
The President is the head of state and is elected jointly by both chambers of parliament to a six-year term (for a maximum of two terms). The incumbent, H.E. Mrs Sahle Work-Zewde, was elected in October 2018. The role of president is largely ceremonial. Most power is vested in the prime minister, who serves as the head of government and commander-in-chief of the national armed forces. The prime minister is chosen by the party with most seats in parliament. It is a constitutional requirement to hold national and state elections every five years.
Political parties have existed in Ethiopia since the overthrow of the Derg in 1991, although the ability of parties not belonging to, or affiliated with, the EPRDF to operate freely was circumscribed. The EPRDF and affiliated parties controlled all tiers of government from 1991 to December 2019, when the EPRDF dissolved and reorganised as the Ethiopian Prosperity Party. The EPRDF was a coalition of four parties representing Ethiopia’s most powerful ethnic communities: (1) the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which founded the EPRDF and led the ouster of the Derg; (2) the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), formerly the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation, or OPDO; (3) the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), formerly the Amhara National Democratic Movement, or ANDM; and (4) the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM). The EPRDF had an estimated 8 million members.
The EPRDF was overwhelmingly voted into power in 1995, Ethiopia’s first democratic election. It was re-elected in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015, although international observers alleged voter irregularities in these elections. Opposition parties made significant gains at the 2005 election, winning 174 of 547 seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives (the EPRDF took 327 seats) on a record voter turnout of 90 per cent. Opposition parties, led by the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD, also known as Qinjit), disputed the result and launched large-scale protests in Addis Ababa. These turned violent — clashes with government forces left nearly 200 protesters dead. Around 4,000 people were arrested, including opposition leaders. In response, the EPRDF restricted the space for political opposition. In July 2007, 30 opposition leaders were handed life sentences for their participation in the 2005 protests but were immediately pardoned. In 2009, parliament adopted the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (the ATP), under which large numbers of political opponents, journalists and activists were arrested, effectively hobbling political opposition to the EPRDF (see also Political Opinion (Actual or imputed)). The EPRDF and affiliated parties won 546 of 547 seats in the 2010 national election, and all 547 seats in the 2015 election. The EPRDF and affiliated parties won 1,966 of 1,987 seats in the 2015 regional elections, thus retaining control of all states. National and regional elections were scheduled for 29 August 2020 but have been postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak.
Ethiopia has witnessed significant changes in the political operating environment since April 2018. Restrictions on political opposition have eased significantly since April 2018, and political parties are able to operate more freely, particularly in Addis Ababa. To date, over 130 political parties have declared their intention to contest the forthcoming national election. Most are organised along ethnic lines.
In June 2018, federal parliament removed Ginbot 7 (Amharic for ‘May 15’, the date of the disputed 2005 election), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) from its list of terrorist organisations. The parties, which maintained armed wings and were committed to the overthrow of the EPRDF through militant means from their bases in Eritrea, were designated as terrorist organisations in June 2011. Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF have since returned from exile and now participate in the political process. Other major opposition movements include the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (also known as Medrek) and Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (known as Ezema). Medrek is a coalition of four parties: the Ethiopian Socialist Democratic Party (ESDP), the Arena for Sovereignty and Democracy, the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). Ezema was formed in May 2019 through the merger of several opposition parties, including Ginbot 7, the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), the Semayawi Party (known as the Blue Party) and Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ, also known as Andinet, the successor party of the CUD/Qinjit). Some political parties promote openly nationalist platforms. Ezema is one of the few political parties that is not ethnic based.
The Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP), formed in December 2019, merged into a single national party three of the four parties that previously formed the EPRDF (the ODP, ADP and SEPDM). The EPP also includes the former Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), the Benishangul-Gumuz People’s Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF), the Ethiopian Somali People’s Democratic Party (ESPDP), the Gambela People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM) and the Harari National League (HNL). The ANDP, BGPDUF, ESPDP, GPDM and HNL previously governed Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, Gambela and Harari states, respectively. They were affiliated to – but not formally part of – the EPRDF. Prime Minister Abiy justified the formation of the Ethiopian Prosperity Party on national unity grounds, claiming it would buttress efforts to move away from ethnic-based identity politics and toward ‘pan-Ethiopianism’. The TPLF, which traditionally dominated decision-making within the EPRDF but felt marginalised under Abiy, opposed the merger and refused to join the EPP. The TPLF is seeking new alliances ahead of the next elections. These elections were planned for August 2020 but have now been indefinitely postponed due to COVID-19.
Parliament adopted a new electoral law in August 2019. Among other things, the law bars serving public servants from contesting elections and increases the threshold for the formation of political parties. Under the new law, 10,000 signatures are required to form a national political party (up from 1,500), and 4,000 signatures for a regional party (up from 750). The law also establishes a framework for resolving electoral disputes countrywide. In March 2019, 107 political parties signed a code of conduct with the federal government to work towards free and fair elections in 2020. The Abiy Government has sought to strengthen the independence of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). In November 2018, it appointed Birtukan Mideksa – a high-profile dissident who previously led the UDJ and was imprisoned for her role in the 2005 protests – as NEBE Chair. On 31 March 2020, NEBE announced it could not hold general elections as scheduled on 29 August 2020 due to the COVID-19 outbreak. Constitutionally, elections must be held by the end of the Ethiopian Calendar year on 6 September 2020. Having declared this no longer possible, the Government is consulting opposition parties, and assessing its constitutional options.
DFAT assesses there has been a shift toward political plurality since April 2018. DFAT assesses there is a level of political commitment at the federal level to open the space for opposition political parties and to stage free and fair multi-party elections when possible. Opposition parties were actively preparing for the August 2020 elections before they were postponed but the pressure put on the system by the COVID-19 pandemic, along with the drought and locust plague, will test Abiy’s commitment to Ethiopia’s new principles, and opposition parties’ commitment to collaboration.
HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
Article 10 of the constitution stipulates human rights and freedoms are inviolable and inalienable, and all human and democratic rights of Ethiopia’s citizens (and peoples) shall be respected. The constitution recognises the right to freedom of thought, expression, assembly, association, conscience and religion.
Ethiopia is a State Party to seven of the nine core international human rights treaties: the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (and its optional protocols on the involvement of children in armed conflict and the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography); and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Ethiopia is not a signatory to the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Article 9 of the constitution stipulates that all international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land.
Chapter Three of the constitution sets out a series of fundamental rights and freedoms, including: the right to life, security of person and liberty; a prohibition against inhuman treatment; freedom of religion, belief and opinion; the right of assembly, demonstration and petition; freedom of association; and freedom of movement. In practice, application of these provisions has been uneven, particularly before April 2018, when laws such as the ATP were widely used to detain government critics (see Political Opinion (Actual or imputed) and Media). The human rights situation has improved significantly since April 2018, and parliament adopted a revised ATP on 2 January 2020. The new legislation is significantly more human rights-compliant than the 2009 proclamation but has still drawn criticism from groups, including Amnesty International (see Political Opinion (Actual or Imputed)).
Ethiopia participated in the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process in 2009, 2014 and 2019. Of the 327 recommendations it received as part of its most recent UPR (May 2019), Ethiopia accepted 270. It has committed to reviewing visit requests from UN special procedure mandate holders. The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression visited Ethiopia in December 2019 — the first visit by a special procedure mandate holder since 2006. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights visited Ethiopia in May 2017 and April 2018.
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was established in 2000 with a mandate to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the constitution. This includes advising the federal government on the compliance of national laws with international human rights standards; delivering training to the military, police, prison officials and public servants; and monitoring federal and regional prisons, including through unannounced visits. The EHRC has the power to investigate allegations of human rights violations that are not currently before the courts, including by summoning parties and analysing evidence, and to make recommendations to relevant state institutions. The EHRC has branches in every regional state. It also operates legal aid centres in collaboration with universities and civil society. The EHRC receives government funding and is accountable to parliament, which appoints its commissioners. Traditionally, the EHRC has lacked capacity and independence and rarely investigated alleged human rights violations by government forces. A local source told DFAT that the EHRC had not lived up to its mandate.
The Global Alliance for National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) assesses the EHRC as being partially compliant with the Paris Principles, the international standard for national human rights institutions (the EHRC was last assessed in 2013). In making its assessment, the GANHRI noted that the EHRC had not provided any advice to the government on laws that impact on human rights, including the ATP and the Charities and Societies Proclamation (2009) (see Human Rights Organisations).
The EHRC has a complaints mechanism, and receives about 1,000 complaints annually. These range from domestic violence, workplace discrimination and labour disputes to enforced disappearances, ill treatment in detention and mass killings. DFAT understands the EHRC plans to publish its findings from all future investigations. Budgetary constraints are an ongoing challenge, and hamper its ability to attract and retain qualified staff, and, in turn, to monitor and investigate complaints of human rights violations.
The current federal government has undertaken to reform and strengthen the capacity and independence of the EHRC. It is reviewing the law establishing the EHRC, with a view to strengthening its mandate. The review is ongoing. A new Chief Commissioner, Daniel Bekele, was appointed in July 2019. Bekele is a high-profile human rights activist who was jailed for his work with the NGO Action Aid Ethiopia and, following his release, went into exile, where he held senior positions at Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
SECURITY SITUATION
The security situation has deteriorated in parts of the country since 2018. Inter-ethnic clashes – invariably over land and other resources – have increased significantly, particularly in the West Guji Zone of Oromia State and along the Oromia-Somali, Oromia-Benishangul-Gumuz, and Amhara-Tigray state borders.
Inter-ethnic clashes have caused death, the destruction of property and large-scale internal displacement — Ethiopia recorded the most conflict-related internal displacement in the world in 2018 (see Internally- Displaced People). Ethnic militias have proliferated in the states, and weapons are readily available. Addis Ababa has largely been immune from this instability to date. Inter-ethnic clashes along the border between Oromia and Somali states have displaced more than 1 million people since 2017. Clashes have subsided, but continue to flare up sporadically. In August 2018, the
federal government deployed forces to quell riots in Jijiga, the capital of Somali State, and surrounding areas. The riots were triggered by the arrest of the state president, and involved the targeting of non-Somalis and Christians (see Religion). At least 30 people died and 140,000 were displaced. Youths loyal to the former state president, belonging to a group called the Heego, were behind the riots. The security situation in Somali State has improved significantly since (see Somalis). In February 2019, federal parliament adopted a proclamation establishing a national reconciliation commission to promote dialogue and encourage resolution of inter-ethnic disputes.
The return from exile of previously banned groups and individuals has catalysed unrest in Oromia State. In September 2018, the return of the OLF provoked intra-Oromo clashes and the targeting of homes and businesses belonging to non-Oromos. At least 70 people were killed and 15,000 displaced. The OLF has yet to disarm completely, and some OLF factions engage in armed clashes with government forces, particularly in western areas of Oromia State. Armed OLF factions have reportedly engaged in criminal activities, including extorting businesses and conducting bank robberies in western Oromia. In October 2019, at least 86 people died during riots triggered by claims – made via Facebook – that the federal government was endangering the personal security of Jawar Mohammed, a prominent Oromo activist and founder of the Oromo Media Network (OMN). Jawar, an advocate for greater rights for the Oromo people who was previously allied to Prime Minister Abiy (but who is now a prominent critic), helped organise from his US base the 2014-18 protests that precipitated the resignation of the previous government. Jawar returned to Ethiopia in August 2018.
Jawar was rearrested on 30 June 2020 during renewed unrest, chiefly in Oromia State but also in the capital Addis Ababa. The unrest followed the 29 June murder of popular Oromo singer and activist Hachalu Hundessa, a former political prisoner who rose to become one of the country’s biggest music stars and a voice for the Oromo ethnic group. International media reported that more than 230 people, including almost a dozen members of the security forces, were killed in the unrest, and an internet blackout was imposed. Nearly 5,000 people were arrested on various charges, including several prominent Oromo leaders and journalists, among them Jawar. The Attorney-General announced that the premises of three media outlets (including Jawar’s Oromia Media Network) had been searched on suspicion of ‘incitement to racial or religious hatred’. The Prime Minister’s Office stated in a press release on 10 July 2020 that, ‘contrary to erroneous reporting’, calm had returned to Addis Ababa and affected areas of Oromia State.
In June 2019, the chief of staff of the National Defence Force (head of the military), General Seare Mekonnen, and the president of Amhara State, Ambachew Mekonnen, were assassinated in concurrent events in Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar (Amhara State). Both were allied to Prime Minister Abiy, who characterised the assassinations as a failed coup attempt. The alleged ringleader, Brigadier General Asaminew Tsige, the chief of security in Amhara State, was killed by government forces. Tsige, who had advocated for greater regional autonomy, had been pardoned and released from prison in 2018 (he was serving a life sentence for his alleged involvement in a failed 2009 coup attempt by Ginbot 7). Federal government forces were deployed to Amhara State and Addis Ababa, and a weeklong internet blackout was imposed nationally, in the wake of the alleged coup. Abiy was earlier the subject of a grenade attack at a progovernment rally in Addis Ababa. The authorities described the June 2018 incident as a failed assassination attempt, and five people were charged with terrorism offences. The attack killed two people and injured more than 100.
SNNP experienced major civil unrest in July 2019, after the federal government delayed a referendum on whether the Sidama people – the largest ethnic group in SNNP and the fifth largest in Ethiopia overall – should secede from SNNP and create their own regional state. Clashes between Sidama protesters and government forces ensued, and ethnic minorities were targeted, leaving over 50 people dead. A State of Emergency was put in place in SNNP (though never publicly declared) and the military and federal police were deployed to restore order. The situation in SNNP has since stabilised. A referendum was held in November 2019, where the Sidama voted overwhelmingly in favour of regional statehood (the process of establishing a separate state for the Sidama was ongoing at the time of publication). SNNP is the most diverse of Ethiopia’s states, comprising over 45 ethnic groups. At least 10 other ethnic groups, including the Wolayta, have since flagged their intention to pursue their own regional states, a right guaranteed by the constitution (see Race/Nationality).
Border areas with neighbouring countries are extremely unstable. Non-state armed groups, including bandits, operate along Ethiopia’s borders with Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. Inter-tribal clashes, including across national borders, and skirmishes between non-state armed groups and government forces are common in these areas (in April 2016, members of the Murle people in South Sudan attacked a number of villages in Gambela State, killing 200 people). The risk of violent robbery and kidnapping in border areas is high. The terrorist group Al-Shabaab, based in Somalia, reportedly maintains a presence in areas close to the Ethiopian border.
DFAT assesses that, outside of national and state border areas, the government controls the security situation, and Ethiopia tends to be safer than most of its neighbours. DFAT assesses Addis Ababa to be particularly stable, and it continues to attract migrants from other parts of the country in search of economic opportunities. Nevertheless, the rule of law has deteriorated in some regional states and several non-state armed groups have emerged to advance the interests of their ethnic group. The situation along regional state borders can be particularly unstable. DFAT assesses that, with Ethiopia’s democratic opening presenting opportunities for the expression of previously suppressed historical grievances and ethnic-based clashes increasing across the country, people who constitute ethnic minorities in regional states face a growing risk of physical violence. This risk is more pronounced during times of civil unrest.
POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED)
The constitution enshrines extensive protections in relation to political opinion. Article 25 provides for equality under the law, without discrimination on the grounds of political or other opinion; Article 29 provides for freedom of expression; Article 30 provides for freedom of assembly, peaceful demonstration and petition; Article 31 provides for freedom of association; and Article 38 provides for the right to vote, be elected and be a member of a political organisation regardless of colour, race, nation, nationality, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion. Organisations formed in violation of appropriate laws and/or with the intent to subvert the constitutional order are prohibited. Organisers of large public gatherings must notify the authorities 48 hours in advance and obtain a permit.
In practice, political freedoms were significantly curtailed before April 2018. Members of opposition groups, human rights activists, and independent commentators such as journalists and bloggers who opposed the government’s policies were regularly harassed and detained. The ATP was used extensively to restrict political freedoms and arrest and prosecute government critics, particularly individuals with suspected affiliations to proscribed groups Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF. Against this background, many opposition leaders and dissidents left Ethiopia. Individuals who were not members of the EPRDF reportedly faced discrimination in public sector employment, including impediments to career progression. Antigovernment protests were often dispersed through force, and participants arrested.
Freedom of political expression has expanded since 2018. More than 10,000 political prisoners have been released since 2018 (a process initiated by the Desalegn Government), including senior opposition leaders Andargachew Tsege of Ginbot 7 and Merera Gudina and Bekele Gerba of the OFC. In June 2018, parliament lifted its terrorist designations of Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF. These groups subsequently renounced armed struggle and returned to Ethiopia, where they operate as registered political parties. In July 2018, federal parliament amnestied thousands of individuals charged with treason and other crimes against the state. This has enabled high-profile opposition figures, including Berhanu Nega of Ginbot 7, to return from exile and resume their political activities. According to the federal government, over 13,000 people have been released under the amnesty law. Political opposition parties now operate with greater freedom, although some report intimidation and obstacles to holding rallies due to a lack of protection in regional states. In January and February 2020, over 100 OLF supporters were reportedly arrested across Oromia State, while some members of the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) – an opposition party formed in 2018 that espouses Amhara nationalism – were detained in connection to the alleged coup attempt in June 2019 (see Security Situation). DFAT is unable to verify if these arrests were politically motivated. A local source involved in politics told DFAT they were able to express their political views freely without fear of arrest and prosecution. Anti-government protests are common — in January 2020, largescale anti-government protests took place in Amhara State in relation to the abduction of 27 ethnic Amhara university students in Oromia State. Protesters accused Prime Minister Abiy of not doing enough to secure the students’ release.
In June 2018, the government established an Advisory Council for Legal and Justice Affairs comprising independent legal professionals to review and recommend reforms to laws that had been used to restrict political, civic and press freedoms (namely, the ATP, the Charities and Societies Proclamation, and the Freedom of Information and Mass Media Proclamation). The Advisory Council has a three-year mandate. The Charities and Societies Proclamation was repealed and replaced by the Organization of Civil Society Proclamation in February 2019 (see Human Rights Organisations). The new law is in operation, and has been well received by civil society organisations. A revision of the ATP was adopted on 2 January 2020. It is a significant improvement on the previous ATP but has still drawn criticism from civil society groups, including Amnesty International, who fear it could still be used against those critical of government. Replacement legislation for the Freedom of Information and Mass Media Proclamation was before federal parliament at the time of publication. While these laws remain in force, they have been used only sporadically since April 2018.
Human rights organisations have particularly welcomed the government’s commitment to review and revise the ATP, which was widely considered to fall short of international human rights standards. The old ATP contained a broad definition of ‘terrorist acts’, and was used extensively to arrest and prosecute critics of government policy before April 2018. Under the ATP, detainees could be held without charge for 28-day periods up to a maximum period of four months. In practice, many were held for considerably longer. Bail was not available for persons charged with terrorism offences. Those charged under the ATP can face up to 20 years’ imprisonment.
Under the new ATP, a person must incite terrorist acts to be prosecuted (rather than simply ‘encouraging terrorism’) and workers’ rights to strike have been strengthened (illegal strikes that affected public services used to be classed as terrorist acts). However, Amnesty International believes opportunities to abuse power still remain. For example, the proclamation criminalises ‘intimidation to commit a terrorist act’.
According to the federal government, about 300 people were arrested in connection to the alleged coup attempt in June 2018 (see Security Situation). DFAT understands a significantly higher number of people were arrested, including activists, journalists, government officials and members of the NaMA. The majority of arrests occurred in Amhara State; over 40 were detained in Addis Ababa. Most were subsequently released, including 22 in October 2019. A total of 58 people (45 in Amhara State and 13 in Addis Ababa) were charged under the ATP. In February 2020, the federal government said it had dropped charges ‘for the national good’ against some individuals – including NaMA members – suspected of involvement in the alleged attempt, as part of a broader pardon of high-profile detainees.
Local sources told DFAT that, traditionally, being a member of the EPRDF increased one’s chances of gaining employment in the public sector and earning subsequent promotions, including in the judiciary, police, and public schools and universities. DFAT heard anecdotally that, while the practice of ruling party members being advantaged in public sector employment and promotions persisted, it was not as pronounced under the current federal government.
DFAT assesses tolerance for political dissent has increased considerably since April 2018. Opposition political parties are able to organise and operate significantly more freely, particularly in Addis Ababa, and their members face a low risk of harassment, arrest and detention by virtue of their political affiliations and views. DFAT assesses Ethiopians can openly criticise the ruling party.
2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency
Ethiopia witnessed large-scale anti-government protests from 2014 to 2018 in Oromia and Amhara states (which, collectively, account for 60 per cent of Ethiopia’s population). The protests began in Oromia State (Ethiopia’s most populous) in April 2014, triggered by the federal government’s plan to expand the municipal boundaries of Addis Ababa into Oromia State, which it abuts. The federal government justified the Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan on the grounds it was necessary to cater for the rapid growth of the capital; critics claimed the encroachment would displace Oromo farmers and result in land seizures. The protests were put down through force, but re-emerged in November 2015. The government scrapped the Master Plan in January 2016; however, protests intensified across Oromia State and evolved into calls for greater political rights and the release of ethnic Oromo political prisoners. The Qeerroo, an Oromo youth movement, was at the forefront of these protests. Parallel protests emerged in neighbouring Amhara State in July 2016 (Ethiopia’s second-most populous state), triggered by historical Amhara grievances over the loss of traditional Amhara land stemming from the demarcation of the border between Amhara and
Tigray states. Like in Oromia State, the protests in Amhara State morphed into calls for broader reform. The protests in Oromia and Amhara states saw violent confrontations between government forces and protesters, including the use of live bullets.
The federal government declared a countrywide State of Emergency in October 2016 after protesters torched farms and businesses (a State of Emergency is constitutionally permissible in the event of a breakdown in law and order that threatens the constitutional order and is beyond the capacity of regular law enforcement agencies to control. It must be approved by a two-thirds majority in the House of Peoples’ Representatives within 15 days of being declared). The State of Emergency gave authorities broad powers to detain people and search private property without court orders, limit travel and the right to association and protest, and impose curfews and media restrictions (including on social media). The practical effect of the State of Emergency was to formalise and expand practices that were largely already in place. The State of Emergency was lifted in August 2017, but reinstated in February 2018, following the resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn. The State of Emergency was subsequently lifted in June 2018, two months ahead of
schedule.
DFAT understands the authorities arrested and detained around 26,000 people under the State of Emergency. This number includes journalists, bloggers, opposition party members and large numbers of people who were thought to have participated in anti-government protests, including children. Arrests and detentions were not limited to protest organisers or high-profile opponents of the government. Large numbers of detainees were subjected to a ‘rehabilitation and re-education’ program, mostly low-profile participants who were released following their completion of the program (see Arbitrary Arrest and Detention). Some of those arrested under the State of Emergency claim to have been tortured (see Torture). The majority of those arrested and imprisoned for their participation in the protests have since been released. Over 1,000 civilians are estimated to have died during the course of the protests. Anti-government protests can and do occur.
DFAT assesses that, since April 2018, participants in peaceful protests face a low risk of arrest and detention. DFAT further assesses that participants in peaceful protests, including organisers, are likely to be of little ongoing interest to the authorities.
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
Article 18 of the constitution affords Ethiopians the right to protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 424 of the Criminal Code prohibits treatment of prisoners or suspects ‘in an improper or brutal manner, or in a manner which is incompatible with human dignity’. Such acts are punishable with up to 10 years’ imprisonment.
In practice, prisoners have reported incidents of physical punishment. There are credible reports of individuals detained in connection to the 2014-18 protests and/or for suspected affiliations to previously outlawed opposition groups being mistreated, including being subjected to beatings, overcrowding, extreme heat, lack of water and solitary confinement. The current federal government has committed to addressing such abuses as part of its wide-reaching reform agenda (see Detention and Prison).
Arbitrary Arrest and Detention
The constitution stipulates that no person may be subject to arbitrary arrest and detained without charge or conviction. Under the Criminal Code, ‘unlawful arrest or detention’ is punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment. In practice, before April 2018 critics of the federal government were regularly detained on arbitrary grounds and often held for extended periods without charge. Under the State of Emergency, effective from October 2016-August 2017 and then from February-June 2018, authorities were allowed to arrest and detain individuals without a court warrant and hold detainees for longer than proscribed under normal regulations. According to the US Department of State, security forces went door-to-door after some protests, and arrested and arbitrarily detained opposition party members and supporters, whom they accused of inciting violence.
There are fewer reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions since the change in federal government in April 2018 and the lifting of the State of Emergency. Some members of the OLF and the NaMA claim to have been the subject of arbitrary arrest and detention (in connection to the failed June 2019 coup attempt in the case of the NaMA) (see Political Opinion (Actual or Imputed)).
In September 2018, security forces detained 3,000 people in Oromia State and Addis Ababa in response to rising criminality. Those arrested included individuals found gambling and – despite not constituting criminal offences– smoking shisha (a tobacco mix smoked in a water pipe) and consuming khat. Most were subsequently released.
Successive governments have detained people – primarily youth – for ‘rehabilitation and re-education’ purposes in military-run camps. This includes people involved in the 2014-18 protests. About 1,200 people – detained in connection to the September 2018 unrest in Oromia State that accompanied the return from exile of the OLF – were sent for rehabilitation at a military facility. Most have since completed their rehabilitation and been released. Rehabilitation occurs outside of the judicial process — those undergoing rehabilitation are not charged and prosecuted. Amnesty International reports that rehabilitation processes continued throughout 2019. DFAT understands rehabilitation can last between one and several months, and includes education and physical exercise components. DFAT understands that rehabilitation does not involve torture or other forms of ill-treatment. Those undergoing rehabilitation are released without charge on completion of their program. The authorities claim rehabilitation boosts the employment prospects of those who undergo it and supports national unity.
STATE PROTECTION
Ethiopia has an extensive security and intelligence apparatus, a legacy of its previous political systems. The state exercises control over most of the country, and it has largely been effective in maintaining law and order and protecting the population from major crimes, including terrorism. The security and intelligence apparatus was used in the past to monitor and suppress dissent, and had a history of using force to quell instances of unrest, including large-scale anti-government protests.
Prime Minister Abiy has sought to impose greater discipline and accountability on the security forces, including by punishing past wrongdoings, as part of broader efforts to strengthen the professionalism and civilian oversight of the security forces (local sources claim this has had a deterrent effect on government forces). According to the national report it submitted ahead of its most recent UPR (May 2019), the federal government is developing legislation on police use of force and accountability, and plans to establish an independent mechanism to which complaints of ill-treatment by security and law enforcement authorities can be submitted, but this is not yet legislated. Regional state governments are making parallel efforts to reform law enforcement at the
state level. A proliferation of ethnic-based militias since 2018 has challenged state authority and eroded the rule of law in some parts of the country, particularly in western Oromia State.
Government forces have shown greater restraint toward protesters since April 2018. Local sources told DFAT that non-state actors now posed a greater threat to safety than did government forces. In a report presented to federal parliament in January 2020, the EHRC claimed that human rights violations committed by government forces had declined, with most violations now perpetrated by non-state actors.
DFAT assesses that, overall, federal and regional security forces are largely effective at maintaining law and order and in providing protection from threats by non-state actors, particularly in major urban centres. However, DFAT assesses that the emergence of armed, invariably ethnic-based non-state actors has increasingly challenged the state’s monopoly on the use of force and its concomitant ability to provide protection in remote areas and along borders separating Ethiopia’s regional states.
Intelligence Services
Ethiopia has a highly capable domestic intelligence system. The NISS is an autonomous federal government office, in theory accountable to the Minister for Peace, but in practice directly accountable to the prime minister. While reliable data on the size of the NISS is not available, it is broadly considered to have a strong capacity to monitor the activities of persons of interest in Ethiopia, and high priority areas along its borders. A civilian monitoring and reporting system support the intelligence network, whereby individuals report on the activities of others in their community or household. The current federal government is working to strengthen the NISS’ independence from political interference. Abiy replaced the NISS’ senior leadership in June 2018, and over 30 senior NISS officials, including its former deputy head, have been arrested for allegedly overseeing human rights violations of prisoners and suspects, including abduction and torture (NISS’ former head has also been charged, but evaded arrest to date). Under proposed legislation currently before parliament, the NISS will be renamed the National Information Centre.
The federal government operates a separate cyber-intelligence and security organisation, the Information Network Security Agency (INSA). INSA’s role includes investigating threats to national security, combatting cyber-crime and preventing cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure.
The Ethiopian intelligence agencies are highly capable. DFAT assesses that individuals considered a threat to national security are unlikely to escape their attention within Ethiopia. Security and intelligence services operate across Ethiopia. DFAT assesses that an individual who is of interest to the authorities is unlikely to be able to avoid attracting official attention by relocating within Ethiopia.
TREATMENT OF RETURNEES
Article 32 of the constitution stipulates that Ethiopian nationals have the right to return to the country. Ethiopia has a large diaspora. About 5 million Ethiopians live outside of the country, with large concentrations in the US and the Middle East. Members of the diaspora return to Ethiopia regularly and contribute to the economy, including through remittances. Prime Minister Abiy has encouraged former dissidents to return from abroad and participate in his reform agenda. Many have done so, including members of opposition movements previously designated as terrorist organisations (see Political System).
DFAT understands there have been instances of individuals who were seeking asylum abroad discontinuing their protection claims and returning to Ethiopia. Some returnees are now active in politics and civil society. Former political prisoners have returned from exile to head the EHRC and the NEBE.
The authorities have typically welcomed voluntary returnees to Ethiopia, including, since April 2018, government critics and opponents. DFAT assesses that returnees, including failed asylum seekers and/or government critics and opponents, face a low risk of monitoring, harassment, detention and official discrimination. While the authorities have significant intelligence-gathering capabilities and are likely to be aware of major anti-government protest activity undertaken in other countries and online, DFAT assesses that people who openly criticise the ruling party while they are outside of Ethiopia face a low risk of official harm on their return to Ethiopia.
DFAT assesses that, under the current federal government, failed asylum seekers face a low risk of harm on their return to Ethiopia, including where they sought asylum on political grounds.
Exit and Entry Procedures
Ethiopians travelling internationally by air are subject to security and identification checks at the airport, and immigration stations at airports have photograph and fingerprinting facilities. Ethiopian passports are machine-readable and have a range of security features (see Documentation). Biometric security measures linked to national databases apply at formal entry and exit points across the country. The NISS has primary responsibility for intelligence and border security processes.
An exit visa is not required to depart Ethiopia, and Article 32 of the constitution stipulates that Ethiopian nationals have the right to leave the country at any time. In practice, there have been some instances of individuals being prevented from exiting the country. From 2013 to 2018, Ethiopia prohibited its citizens from travelling to the Gulf region in search of work. The travel ban was imposed to prevent the exploitation and abuse of unskilled and female domestic workers. It was lifted after Ethiopia signed bilateral agreements with several Gulf countries to protect the rights of Ethiopian workers. A Certificate of Good Conduct (‘police clearance certificate’) is required when a person seeks to emigrate from Ethiopia (see Police Clearance Certificates).
Section 5AAA of the Migration Act 1958

Pursuant to s 5AAA of the Act, it is for the review applicant to specify all particulars of a claim to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and to provide sufficient evidence to establish the claim. The Tribunal does not have any responsibility or obligation to specify, or assist the applicant in specifying, any particulars of their claims. Nor does the Tribunal have any responsibility or obligation to establish or assist in establishing the claim.
Refugee Considerations
Before the applicant arrived in Australia he resided in the city of Harar, the capital city of Harari State, Ethiopia. The applicant is ethnic Harari from Ethiopia.
The applicant obtained [previous] qualifications in Harar between [specified years]: [detail deleted].
According to his Protection visa (PV) application, between 2005 and 2014 the applicant worked voluntarily [at a charity] he founded. During a part of this period, between [2005] and [2010], the applicant was employed as an expert by [Agency 1], a government organisation in Harari State. From June 2010 to June 2012 the applicant was employed by [Employer 1], a private company, in the position of manager. The company was in Harar city. Subsequently, between January 2013 and December 2014, the applicant was employed by [Employer 2], a not for profit organisation, in the position of manager. [In] February 2015 the applicant arrived in Australia as the holder of a Student visa. The applicant arrived to undertake a [Course 1] degree at [a named university]. He did not complete the course.
As part of the PV application, the applicant lodged with the Department a number of documents for the purposes of establishing his asset position in Ethiopia before he arrived in Australia [in] February 2015.
The asset position was relevant to the PV application because reports by telephone he received from Ethiopia from his [Sister A], in about April/May 2015, triggered a fear that he would be killed if he returned to Ethiopia. His sister informed him his farm, house and land and the contents of his bank account, and other assets, were taken from him by the authorities and police. The applicant’s sister warned the applicant he would be killed if he returned to Ethiopia. These immediate circumstances prompted the applicant to apply for the PV.
The applicant lodged with the Department a document dated [a day in] July 2014, stating that the applicant held in his own name an account with [Bank 1], Harar. On that date the balance of his account was Birr [amount]. The document purports to be signed by [Officer A], a customer service manager of the bank. This is the only bank record before the Tribunal relating to the applicant’s bank account in Ethiopia. The applicant did not obtain a witness statement from [Officer A] for the purposes of this review and that person was not on the list of witnesses the applicant wanted the Tribunal to contact in this review.
Without explanation, no person from [Bank 1] who may have been able to give evidence in relation to the current status of the applicant’s bank account gave evidence in this review or was on the applicant’s list of witnesses in this review.
The applicant claimed he owned two parcels of real estate in Harari State prior to February 2015. One parcel comprised a residential block of land and dwelling. At hearing, the applicant claimed he satisfied all official requirements associated with owning this land including building to completion a dwelling on the land. In supporting of this claim the applicant provided a document purporting to be a copy of the original ‘Certificate of property ownership’[1] written in the Amharic language. The applicant provided an English language translation of the property ownership document. Relevantly, the applicant speaks, reads, and writes the Amharic and English languages[2]. According to the evidence at hearing the original land ownership document is written in Amharic.
[1] Department file and Tribunal file.
[2] Protection visa applicant form: answer to Q30.
At hearing the applicant acknowledged he was in regular communication with his [Sister A], a witness in his review. According to the applicant’s testimony, his sister sent him documents from Ethiopia for the purpose of supporting his PV application including, as the Tribunal understands the evidence, the ‘Certificate of property ownership’. This evidence indicates that with the assistance of the applicant’s sister in Ethiopia, documentation could be sought out in Ethiopia for the purposes of this review.
The second parcel of land the applicant claims he owned he identified as farmland in a rural area outside Harar city. In support of this claim the applicant relied on a series of photographs of farmland, cattle, crops, timber and the applicant standing beside a number of goats. The applicant retrieved these photographs from what he identified in an email sent on 9 January 2018 to his representative as his ‘back up library’. It is evident from the text of the email that applicant claimed he owned the land depicted in the photographs; he had been working it as a farm and he intended to apply the expertise he gained from [Course 1] degree to improving his farm; an endeavour described by the applicant in the email, and in evidence, as his dream.
In addition to the photographs, the applicant did not provide further evidentiary material, such as official documents in proof of his ownership of the farmland, or other documentation associated with owning and farming livestock and the cultivation of crops.
It is important to consider whether the Tribunal accepts the applicant owned the farm, and the house and land package and the funds at [Bank 1] at the time he arrived in Australia and, whether those assets were seized by the authorities and police. If the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant owned those assets and they were seized by the authorities and police, then his claim for protection under Australian law would be substantially weakened.
The only evidence from [Bank 1] that evidences the applicant’s funds is dated [the day in] July 2014; it is six years out of date. The applicant did not adduce any evidence from the bank, such as oral evidence from a representation of the bank, or documentation that verifies the applicant’s claim that the money he held in the bank is no longer held by the bank and available to him or the reason that may be the case. There is no evidence from the bank that establishes the applicant’s bank is not still open and available to the applicant to access at any time.
There is no evidence that establishes [Bank 1] does not manage the accounts of all of its clients, including the applicant, with integrity and according to law.
There is no evidence from the bank that supports the applicant’s claim, variously expressed, that the government froze his bank account; confiscated the money that was in his bank account; or took the money he had in the bank. There is no evidence that the applicant contacted, or attempted to contact the bank to establish for himself that the funds in his bank account were no longer held by the bank and, if that is the true position, to obtain an explanation as to how that situation came about. Instead, after the applicant’s [Sister A], a witness in this review, told the applicant in a telephone conversation about three for four months after he initially arrived in Australia, that all his assets had been taken by the authorities, he accepted what she told him and, there is no evidence that the applicant made his own inquiries to verify the accuracy of any of the information she gave him about the fate of his assets.
[Sister A] wrote to the applicant on 17 October 2016, about 20 months after she told the applicant his assets had been taken by government officials, confirming her earlier report about the fate of his assets[3]. The applicant had appointed [Sister A] his power of attorney. This arrangement is evidenced by a document translated from the original. The document purports to be a Power of Attorney in which the applicant on [a day in] January 2015, gave his sister unfettered control over all his assets in Ethiopia, including the power to transfer, gift and sell those assets and a power to engage a lawyer and to undertake judicial proceedings to protect his assets.
[3] Department file, folio 70.
It is inherently unlikely that the applicant, now [an age] year old person with the benefit of significant managerial experience in Ethiopia, would not have made his own inquiries with [Bank 1] as to the status of his bank account and if he still had funds on deposit with the bank in April 2015, at the time [Sister A] is said to have told him the money he had in the bank had been frozen or confiscated by the authorities.
The applicant’s [Sister A] gave evidence in this review. She acknowledged the applicant had given her the Power of Attorney over his assets. She confirmed that the applicant’s assets including the money in his bank account had been taken by the authorities. According to her evidence, that occurred when government representatives and police attended at her home and asked about the applicant’s whereabouts, demanded that he return to Ethiopia and, told her that her brother’s assets had been frozen or confiscated. She also indicated she was told his assets had been taken from him. According to [Sister A’s] evidence she was not provided with any documentation in relation to the freezing, confiscation or taking her brother’s assets.
The Tribunal asked [Sister A] if she had engaged a lawyer or taken the matter to court to protect her brothers’ assets. She said she had not done that; she can’t do that because she had a problem with the authorities and she does not want to do anything, she only wants to look after her children. This evidence is materially inconsistent with the applicant’s evidence. According to his evidence [Sister A] hired a lawyer and took the matter to court. This inconsistency is a matter of concern to the Tribunal.
According to [Sister A’s] evidence she had never attended at the bank to check on the status of her brother’s bank account. The Tribunal suggested to [Sister A] that the funds could still be held by the bank and, she may be able to access funds in the account. [Sister A] stated that she can’t access the account. When she was asked why she can’t access the bank account she responded in general terms referring to being asked about the whereabouts of her brother; and, he had previously had a problem, was arrested and injured so she can’t be confident. [Sister A’s] explanation for not attempting to make inquires of the bank as to the status of her brother’s bank account was unconvincing.
It is of concern to the Tribunal that the applicant has not provided evidence more recent than [July] 2014 that establishes he had a bank account with [Bank 1] or any other bank in Ethiopia and the current status of any such account, that is more recent than the bank letter of [July] 2014.
On balance, the foregoing evidence is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant had a bank account with [Bank 1], or that he had money on deposit with that bank, or any other bank in Ethiopia, around April 2015, the time the applicant claims the money he had in the bank was taken from him by the authorities.
In support of the applicant’s claim that he owned a farm in Ethiopia, he places reliance on a set of photographs he initially provided to his representative from his library of photographs. This is the only documentary evidence he relies on to verify his claim that he owned a farm. One of the photographs clearly depicts the applicant. There is no evidence such as a land ownership document or any other records of the applicant owning and farming the land depicted in the photographs. The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s evidence about owning and operating the farm and his future plans in relation to it, and his sister’s evidence in relation to ownership of the farm. The applicant’s sister assumes in evidence he owned a farm, rather than establishing he owned the farm depicted in the photographs.
On balance, the evidence is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant owned a farm that was seized by the authorities.
The applicant relied on a document which on its face purports to be a ‘Certificate of property ownership’ in the name of the applicant to verify his evidence that he owned residential land and a house, and that it was taken from him by the authorities. The Certificate relates to a residential block of land in the City of Harar. The document is a translation of the original document which the applicant relied on in his PV application, and in this review, to verify his ownership of the residential land and house he claims was taken from him by the authorities.
At hearing the Tribunal informed the applicant of its concern that both the original ‘Certificate of property ownership’ and the translated copy of the Certificate was blank in spaces that required signatures. The Tribunal showed the applicant the original document and pointed out to him that the blank signature spaces appeared in both the original document and the translation of the original.
The Tribunal was concerned that the document obliged the applicant to build a house on the land in accordance with the plan and, that the document was not signed by the applicant or the Mayor in the spaces provided. Additionally, the document provided that the applicant’s ownership of the land will only be recognised if the applicant accepts the legal obligation to build a house on the land within one year of the allocation of the land to the applicant; and, that he builds the house on the land within that time. The document is dated [a day in] July 2006.
The applicant responded to the Tribunal’s concerns about the legal obligation expressed in the document and, the lack of relevant signatures on the Certificate, by telling the Tribunal that he signed many papers before he was given this document and he was not sure why it was unsigned. The applicant claimed he fulfilled all the required procedures, he built the house to completion, and he got the Certificate after he completed the house. The applicant did not adduce documentary evidence such as photographs that depicted the residential land and dwelling that is the subject of the Certificate.
The evidence given by the applicant’s [Sister A] assumes but does not establish the applicant’s ownership of land and house. In evidence [Sister A] acknowledged she had not visited the land to observe what may have been the situation there after she claims the authorities and police informed her the applicant’s property had been either frozen, confiscated or taken from the applicant. There is no evidence that establishes [Sister A], at any time, visited the block of land.
The Certificate is unsigned by the applicant in the space provided for him to sign his name and thereby agree to fulfill the legal obligation required of him, namely that he agree in writing to build the house on the land according to the plan within one year of the allocation of the land to him. The Certificate is also unsigned by the Mayor.
The absence of the applicant’s signature in the legal obligation section of the Certificate and, the absence of the Mayor’s signature from the form calls into doubt that the land was ever allocated to the applicant. The applicant’s evidence to the effect that the Certificate was issued to him after he finished building the house is not credible. It is evident on the face of the Certificate, that ownership of the land passing to the applicant was conditional: one condition being that he agree in writing to building the house on the land according to the site plan within one year of the allocation of the land, that being [a day in] July 2006, the date specified on the site plan. Relevantly, there is no evidence of the date on which the applicant claims to have completed the construction of the house or other evidence that verifies that the applicant built the house.
The evidence is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant obtained legal ownership of the land that is the subject of the ‘Certificate of property ownership’ and, that he built a house on the land and, that the authorities and police took dominion and control of the land and house from the applicant.
On balance, the evidence does not establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal, that the applicant owned a farm, or a residential block of land and dwelling in Ethiopia in 2015, or that in about April 2015, he had a bank account at [Bank 1] or another bank in Ethiopia, that contained funds that were taken from him by the authorities.
After paying careful attention to the evidence given by the applicant’s [Sister A], the Tribunal finds her evidence to be unconvincing, and that she is an unreliable witness. The Tribunal gives little weight to her evidence.
On balance, the evidence is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant’s sister informed the applicant in about April 2015 that the assets he claims he owned in Ethiopia had been confiscated by the authorities and police and that she warned him at that time he would be killed if he returned to Ethiopia. The Tribunal is not satisfied that conversation occurred.
The applicant’s sister, in correspondence with the applicant dated 17 October 2016, referred to an earlier telephone conversation with the applicant in relation to the confiscating of his assets and purports to repeat that information. In the letter the applicant’s sister elaborates on the earlier warning that the applicant would be killed and warns the applicant about the dangers of returning to Ethiopia under the then government (the EPRDF). She informs him about the mistreatment of family members and harm inflicted on other people. The Tribunal has found it is not persuaded the applicant owned the assets referred to in the letter of 17 October 2016, and that state agents attended [Sister A’s] home as an incident in taking the applicant’s assets from him. The Tribunal is not satisfied the matters stated by the applicant’s sister, a witness the Tribunal regards as unreliable, would have influenced the applicant’s decision to apply for the PV, because the Tribunal is not persuaded the earlier phone call referenced in the letter occurred, or that the applicant owned the assets [Sister A] claimed in the letter had been taken by the authorities.
The applicant’s explanation at hearing, relevant to his stated intention to return home when he initially entered Australia, is inconsistent with his future plan that he referenced in his PV application.[4] In answer to question 91 the applicant said that in 2015 he chose to further his studies in Australia hoping that he would return (to Ethiopia) to work for a non-government organisation. This explanation is inconsistent with what the applicant described as his dream to return to Ethiopia and apply the skills he learnt in Australia, on his farm and in that way, improve agriculture in Ethiopia. This inconsistency is a matter of concern to the Tribunal that reflects adversely on the reliability of the applicant as a witness.
[4] PV application, Department file, folio 9, in answer to Q 91.
An essential part of the applicant’s reason for changing his mind about returning to Ethiopia and instead, applying for the PV is that the authorities and the police took all his assets from him.
The foregoing rejection of the applicant’s claim that he owned the assets he claims were confiscated, and the Tribunal’s concerns about the reliability of the applicant as a witness, combined with the Tribunal’s view that the applicant’s [Sister A] is an unconvincing witness, means the Tribunal is not satisfied the taking of the applicant’s assets is the reason or part of the reason for his decision to remain in Australia and apply for a PV.

The applicant claimed in his PV application to be highly qualified, learned and influential in Ethiopian society. The applicant claims that he has become a target because the government at the time he submitted his PV application in November 2015 was very oppressive; believed he was not a genuine student; believed he was likely to be gathering support in Australia; and, if he returned to Ethiopia he would pose a risk to the government.
At hearing the applicant acknowledged there had been a change of government since he arrived in Australia, but he claimed the current government is just as oppressive as the previous government. In substance the applicant contends the current government is no different to the previous government. Additionally, the applicant claims he would be harmed and killed by agents of the current government if he is removed to Ethiopia.
The applicant sought to support these claims by contending he was a government employee between May 2006 and April 2010. He described his duties at that time as ‘expert.’[5] His employer was said to be [Agency 1], an [agency of] the Harari State government[6]. The applicant claimed he objected to the official corruption and misallocation of funds he discovered during the course of his employment. He also spoke out against the federal and state governments of the day. According to the applicant the federal government controlled the State and local governments of Harari along with the whole country. Consequently, the applicant was denied promotion, pay rises and all of this culminated in the applicant’s dismissal from his government position.
[5] PV application, Part F – Employment.
[6] PV application; the applicant’s statutory declaration and testimony in this review.
After the applicant was dismissed in 2010, he claims he secured employment with an NGO.[7] According to his statutory declaration declared on 5 April 2021, after he was dismissed from employment with the State government agency, he secured another job working for an NGO commencing in 2010 and ending in 2014. The applicant supported this evidence with a document dated 2 April 2021 on what purports to be the letterhead of [Employer 2], a non-government, not for profit organisation. The document is signed by [Mr A], as [a manager] of the [employer]. [Mr A] was not named on the list of witnesses the applicant required the Tribunal to take evidence from in this review. The document is addressed ‘To whom it may Concern’ and the letter is stated to be a ‘work Experience Letter.’
[7] Applicant’s statutory declaration filed in this review and declared on 5 April 2021.
The document states [the applicant] was employed by [Employer 2] as its leader and General Manager from December 2010 to January 2015. This period of employment includes the two year period the applicant states in his PV application that he was employed as a manager of [Employer 1], a private company. The period of employment stated in the letter provided by the [Employer 2] is materially inconsistent with the employment history the applicant stated in his PV application and his statutory declaration dated 5 April 2021.
At hearing and in post hearing submissions, the applicant has sought to explain the discrepancy in dates he provided in his employment history on the basis that the effect of the effluxion of time adversely affected his memory of events. The difficulty with this explanation is that it does not satisfactorily explain the applicant’s unequivocal statement in his PV application that he was employed by a private company as a manager for two years during the period he was, according his statutory declaration and the letter from the [Employer 2], employed as the leader and [manager] of that [employer]. This discrepancy in the applicant’s employment history is significant and, it leads the Tribunal to doubt the accuracy of the applicant’s employment history.
Furthermore, the applicant has provided no concrete evidence, such as documentation associated with any period of employment with [Agency 1] that verifies he was employed by that entity, and the period of any such employment. That is a matter of concern to the Tribunal and it casts doubt on the reliability of the applicant’s claim that he was employed by that government entity.
Having regard to the material discrepancies in the applicant’s employment history, and that there is no concrete evidence that verifies the applicant was employed by [Agency 1], the evidence is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant was employed by that entity or any other government entity in Ethiopia.
The evidence relevant to the applicant’s employment history is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal, that the applicant spoke out against corruption and the misappropriation of funds to the advantage of the government, and for that reason he was subjected to discrimination and ultimately he was wrongly dismissed from [Agency 1].
The applicant claims that, influenced by his experience of official corruption and his related dismissal from the [Agency], he was motivated to campaign against the government at the 2010 election. The applicant claims that for his efforts he was assaulted and arrested by police and the police broke his arm. In support of this claim the applicant provided X-rays of what he contends verifies his evidence that his arm was broken by police. The X-rays do not identify the date they were taken, or that the applicant is the subject of the X-rays. They are not accompanied by an explanatory medical report. The Tribunal is not able to determine by reference to the X-rays which limb of the human body they depict. After considering the applicant’s evidence, his sister’s evidence relevant to this claim, and the X-rays themselves, the Tribunal is not persuaded to give any weight to the X-rays. Moreover, the evidence is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant engaged in anti-government political activities in Ethiopia; that he was arrested and assaulted by police and, that his arm was broken as a result of being assaulted by police.
The applicant contends that due to his political activities he was followed by police and for reasons of his political opinion the authorities considered him to be a risk to the government of Ethiopia. The evidence considered as a whole is insufficient to satisfy the Tribunal that the then government of Ethiopia treated the applicant as a risk to the government.
The applicant accepted at hearing that the government that was in power when he resided in Ethiopia, the government that he claims regarded him to be a political activist who posed a risk to the government and targeted him for persecution for reason of his actual or imputed political opinion is no longer the government of Ethiopia. According to the DFAT country information report extracted above, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was in power at the time the applicant relocated to Australia, and it was replaced in 2018 by the Ethiopian Prosperity Party, a reformist coalition government led by Prime Minister Abiy who is implementing a significant reform agenda.
The space for political opposition has been expanded and many political parties representing the various ethnic groups and regions have registered to contest the next federal election.
The government has encouraged political exiles to return to Ethiopia and to participate in society and mainstream politics. For example, various organisations such as Ginbot 7 and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) that were classified by the EPRDF government as terrorist organisations have been de-classified as terrorist organisations and, a significant number of their exiled leaders have voluntarily returned to Ethiopia and entered mainstream society and political life. There is no claim by the applicant that he was ever a member of a terrorist political organisation or sympathised with one of them. If former leaders of terrorist organisation have been able to return to Ethiopia and participate in normal political life, including opposition to the government, it seems unlikely the applicant would be targeted by the present reformist government as a threat to state security and social stability and persecuted in Ethiopia for reason of his political opinion.
The applicant sought to neutralise the significance of the replacement of the EPRDF with the current reformist government under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy, by asserting in evidence the current government is no different from the government it replaced. The DFAT country information does not support this evidence and the Tribunal finds the applicant’s evidence to be unpersuasive.
The Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant would be viewed by the present government as presenting a threat to the governance of Ethiopia. And to reiterate, the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant was actively engaged in opposing the government or disclosing corruption in public office when he resided in Ethiopia.
The applicant’s brother who resides in [Country 1] gave evidence in this review. To summarise the material aspects of his evidence: he left Ethiopia in 1988 and there is no evidence that he has ever returned. He contended that the present government is no different from the government that was in power when he left Ethiopia in 1988. The Tribunal finds this evidence to be unpersuasive. It is inconsistent with the DFAT country information which demonstrates the current Prime Minister and government has acted to quell interethnic competition and violence and, significantly expanded the space for political participation and opposition politics.
The witness also said in evidence that it is not safe for the applicant to return to Ethiopia for an additional reason. He said if he returns to Ethiopia he will be harmed by the government. The witnessed based this contention on the applicant having been an employee of the previous government, and that any person who was employed by the previous government, for that reason, would be persecuted by the present government. This evidence is inconsistent with the DFAT country information about the attitude of the present government to welcoming returnees to Ethiopia even though those persons had previously led banned terrorist organisations such as Ginbot 7 and the OLF. Furthermore, the applicant does not claim he would be persecuted in Ethiopia simply because he, and other government employees, were government employees at a time the previous government was in power. The Tribunal attaches no weight to this aspect of the witness’s evidence.
The material aspects of the evidence given by the applicant’s brother, considered individually and in combination with the other evidence, is unpersuasive.
On balance, the evidence is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant, whose evidence amounts to contending his intention was to return to Ethiopia and farm his land and, in that way to improve agriculture in Ethiopia, would in fact engage in political activities or, express his political opinions in a way that would give rise to a real chance he would be subjected to serious harm if he is removed to Ethiopia now or in the foreseeable future. Relevantly, there is no evidence that the applicant would join a political organisation in Ethiopia or that he intends to oppose the government in ways that would not be permitted or tolerated by the authorities in present day Ethiopia.
The applicant belongs to the Harari ethnic group in Ethiopia. According to country information the federal government administers Addis Ababa and Harar. The applicant’s home city of Harar is situated in the small state of Harari. Harari is situated in the north-eastern part of Ethiopia and it is surrounded by Oromia State which is predominately populated by Oromo people. The DFAT country information report provides little specific information about the circumstances that prevail in Harar and Harari State for Harari people.
The DFAT country information indicates that in September 2018 the return of the OLF provoked intra-Oromo clashes and the targeting of homes and businesses belonging to non-Oromos. It is convenient to reiterate here the Tribunal’s finding that the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant owned a farm or the other relevant assets in Ethiopia in 2015 when his sister is said to have first informed him by telephone that government officials and police had taken his assets from him.
DFAT country information also reports that the OLF is yet to disarm completely. It also reports that OLF factions have engaged in armed clashes with government forces particularly in western Ethiopia. DFAT also reports that interethnic clashes along the border with Somali State have displaced more than 1 million people since 2017. Harari State is located near the Somalia border. DFAT country information also points out that armed factions of the OLF have engaged in criminal activities, including extorting businesses and robbing banks in western Oromia. DFAT also reports that the rule of law has deteriorated in some regional states and several non-state armed groups have emerged to advance the interests of their ethnic group.
DFAT country information also reports that with Ethiopia’s democracy opening up under the present government, this is presenting opportunities for the expression of historical grievances and, that ethnic-based violence is increasing across the country and, people who constitute ethnic minorities in regional states face a growing risk of physical violence. The risk is more pronounced during times of civil unrest such as now, during the large-scale armed conflict between government forces and Tigray separatist forces.
The applicant’s representative provided country information that suggests Harari people are becoming a minority in Harari. The Harari people makeup a small minority group in Ethiopia.
Having regard to the applicant’s evidence that he would be at risk of being subjected to harm from other ethnic groups if he resided in Harar or Harari State; that the Harari people are a small minority group surrounded by Oromia, the home State of the OLF; and, the DFAT country information in relation to the activities of armed OLF groups, their objectives and the related risk of interethnic violence faced by ethnic minorities, the Tribunal is satisfied there is a real chance the applicant will be subjected to serious harm for reason of race, if he is removed to Ethiopia now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Tribunal is not satisfied the real chance of serious harm for reasons of the applicant’s race relates to all areas of Ethiopia. The Tribunal will now provide reasons for this finding.
The Tribunal is not satisfied the real chance of serious harm for reasons of the applicant being of Harari ethnicity applies to Addis Ababa, the capital City of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa is the commercial and administrative capital of Ethiopia. It is administered by the federal government. DFAT assesses that official discrimination, including systematic state sanctioned discrimination, denial of public services and higher education based on race and ethnicity is rare. This assessment is consistent with the constitutional prohibitions on discrimination, and reflects the need for government to maintain their legitimacy through inclusiveness, given Ethiopia’s ethnic diversity. This DFAT assessment relates to Addis Ababa.
Furthermore, according to the DFAT country information report, different ethnic groups have a history of co-existence in Addis Ababa, and discrimination on ethnic grounds is not common there. According the DFAT report ethnicity is reported to be a ‘non-factor’ in Addis Ababa; most people identify as being from Addis Ababa as opposed to a particular ethnic group. According to the DFAT report violence based on ethnicity is not common in Addis Ababa.
The evidence and country information before the Tribunal, including the country information provided by the applicant, has not established to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the DFAT country report is insufficiently current and relevant for the Tribunal not to have regard to it for the purpose of assessing whether the applicant currently faces a real chance of being subjected to serious harm in Addis Ababa for the reason of race, if he is removed to Ethiopia now, or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The evidence and country information before the Tribunal, considered as a whole, is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal the existence of a real chance the applicant would be subjected to serious harm in Addis Ababa for reasons of race if he is returned to Ethiopia now, or in the reasonably foreseeable future. Consequently, the Tribunal is not satisfied the real chance of persecution for reasons of race relates to all areas of Ethiopia: s 5J(1)(c) of the Act.
Furthermore, based on the whole of the materially relevant evidence and country information before the Tribunal, the Tribunal is not satisfied of the existence of a real chance the applicant would be subjected to serious harm for reason of his actual or imputed political opinion if he is returned to Ethiopia now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The applicant’s evidence and, the evidence set out in statutory declaration made by [name], the person to whom he is married, and filed by the applicant in this review, makes clear she would not relocate to Ethiopia. The applicant’s wife, the mother of their child, does not support the child relocating from Australia to Ethiopia. The applicant’s evidence on this matter is contradictory. At hearing he said his wife does not want to go to Ethiopia and he would not take his son with him to live in Ethiopia. A few minutes later the applicant contradicted this evidence and said he would take his child to live with him in Ethiopia. On balance, the evidence does not satisfy the Tribunal that the applicant would take his child to reside in Ethiopia, or that his wife, the mother of the child, would consent to him doing so. Accordingly, the Tribunal has given no weight in this decision to the applicant’s evidence that his son would relocate with him to Ethiopia if the applicant is removed to that country now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
In essence, the applicant’s wife in her statutory declaration asserted in various ways, without advancing compelling reasons for her assertions, that the applicant would be harmed if he is required to return to Ethiopia. She was not named in the list of witnesses the applicant required the Tribunal to take evidence from in this review and, she did not give evidence at the hearing. The Tribunal finds the assertions advanced by the applicant’s wife in her statutory declarations about the applicant being seriously harmed if he is returned to Ethiopia, to be unpersuasive. The Tribunal has given her assertions little weight in reaching its findings in this review.
In forming its reasons for decision, the Tribunal has considered the psychological report dated 22 March 2017 prepared by [a named] psychologist. The report has not been updated since that date. The author was not on the list of witnesses the applicant required the Tribunal to take evidence from in this review and he did not give evidence in this review. According to the applicant’s evidence at hearing, the report was written on the basis of one consultation attended by the applicant and his sister. At paragraph 15 of the report the psychologist indicates the report is based on information provided by both the applicant and his sister. That is a matter of concern to the Tribunal. The report was based on one consultation with the applicant and his sister, thereby establishing the report was based on limited contact with the applicant. Copies of the tests the psychologist required the applicant to take as part of his assessment of the applicant were not provided with the report.

The Tribunal accepts the applicant was assessed as suffering from high anxiety, depression, displayed forgetfulness and that he has suffered trauma in Ethiopia. It is of concern that this assessment was, without explanation by the psychologist, based on information which was provided by both the applicant has his sister rather than the applicant alone.
The Tribunal does not accept that the psychologist’s assessment of the applicant’s psychological state based on information provided by the applicant and his sister about the applicant’s circumstances in Ethiopia, is evidence in these proceedings of the veracity and reliability of the applicant as witness; the reliability of the evidence given by the applicant in this review; or the truth of the matters of fact in the report which comprise the case history the psychologist took from the applicant and his sister.
Accordingly, the Tribunal is of the view the 2017 psychological report has little relevance in this review and, the Tribunal has given it little weight in its reason for decision and findings in this review.
Based on the whole of the evidence, the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons specified in s 5J(1) of the Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant meets the definition of refugee as set out in s 5H of the Act.
Complementary protection
The Tribunal now turns to whether the applicant satisfies the criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. A person will meet that criterion if there are ‘substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm’.
The test for ‘real risk’ is the same as that for the ‘real chance’ test in the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a).[8]
[8] MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505.
Pursuant to s 36(2A), a person will suffer significant harm if:
(a)they will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or
(b)the death penalty will be carried out on them; or
(c)they will be subjected to torture; or
(d)they will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)they will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
The Tribunal will now consider whether the applicant satisfies the criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The applicant will satisfy the criterion if there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Ethiopia, there is a real risk he will suffer significant harm.
In applying the decision in MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 201 FCR 505, [246] [297] [342], the Tribunal accepts the ‘real risk’ test is the same as the ‘real chance’ test in the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. Therefore, for the reasons outlined above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed to Ethiopia, there is a real risk the applicant will suffer significant harm as defined in s 36(2A).
Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant meets the criterion in s 36(2)(aa).
FINDINGS
Having considered the applicant’s claims individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant is a refugee for the purposes of the Act, and therefore the applicant is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugee Convention. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2)(a).
Furthermore, having considered the applicant’s claims individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa).
There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s 36(2) of the Act based on being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criteria in s 36(2).
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visas.
Peter J Haag
Member
110.
ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:   For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…
5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:   For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:   For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
·(i)             alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
·(ii)            conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
·(iii)           alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
·(iv)           conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
·(v)            enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
·(vi)           alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear of persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
·(i)             the first person has ever experienced; or
·(ii)            any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear of persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note:   Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
·(i)             the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
·(ii)            the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
·(iii)           the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
·(i)             the relevant State; or
·(ii)            a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…
36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
·(i)             is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
·(ii)            holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
·(i)             is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
·(ii)            holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…

[2021] AATA 3043

29 June 2021

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Immigration

Administrative Law

Legal Concepts

Judicial Review

Procedural Fairness

Statutory Construction

Jurisdiction

Natural Justice

Appeal