1811643 (Refugee)

[2021] AATA 3198

1811643 (Refugee) [2021] AATA 3198 (23 June 2021)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER:  1811643

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Ethiopia

MEMBER:Peter Haag

DATE:23 June 2021

PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne

DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa.

Statement made on 23 June 2021 at 9:48pm

CATCHWORDS

REFUGEE – Protection visa – Ethiopia – race – Oromo ethnicity – association with Oromo Liberation Front (‘OLF’) – economic refugee – relocated in pursuit of better economic opportunities and advancement – inconsistent evidence –credibility concerns – decision under review affirmed

LEGISLATION

Migration Act 1958, ss 5AAA, 5J, 36, 65, 499

Migration Regulations 1994

CASES
MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 201 FCR 505

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 23 March 2018 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).

2. The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of Ethiopia, applied for the visa on 30 January 2017. The delegate refused to grant the visa as they were not satisfied that the applicant was a refugee, or that there existed a real risk of the applicant suffering harm upon her return to Ethiopia.

   CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA

3. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

4. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.

5. A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a) of the Act. In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).

6. Under s 5J(1) of the Act, a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a  person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-5LA of the Act, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

7. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

   Mandatory considerations

8. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs (the Department), and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

   CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

9. The following issues arise for determination by the Tribunal in relation to the present review application:

   (a)whether the applicant meets the refugee criterion; and

   (b)whether the applicant alternatively meets the complementary protection criterion.

10. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.

11. The applicant claims, and the Tribunal accepts, that she is a national and citizen of Ethiopia. She was born on [date] in Jimma, in Oromia State, Ethiopia. A copy of her passport, which she provided to the Department, corroborated this claim. There is no evidence to suggest the applicant’s passport is a bogus document.

12. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant would be recognised in Ethiopia as a national and citizen of that country. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds Ethiopia is the applicant’s receiving country for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

13. There is no evidence to suggest that the applicant has a right to enter and reside in a country other than Ethiopia, and accordingly the Tribunal finds that the applicant is not excluded from protection under the laws of Australia by s 36(3) of the Act.

14. The Tribunal convened a hearing to consider the merits of the review application on 11 May 2021. The applicant participated in the hearing before the Tribunal in person and she was assisted by an interpreter in the Amharic and English languages. The applicant’s representative was present throughout the hearing and aided the applicant.

    Applicant’s Background and Visa History

15. The applicant stated that she belongs to the Oromo ethnic group, is Protestant in terms of faith, and is able to speak, read and write Amharic. She is able to speak Oromo. According to the applicant’s statement dated 27 April 2021, she has a good understanding of the English language, and for that reason her statement was prepared in the English language.

16. The applicant first arrived in Australia on [date] August 2016 at [age] years of age.

17. The applicant arrived on a Class FA 600 Visitor visa, which was set to expire [in] August 2017.

18. On 30 January 2017, the applicant applied for a protection visa (PV). The application was lodged approximately five and a half months after the applicant first arrived in Australia.

    Protection claims

19. In seeking protection, the applicant claims:

    ·Between leaving Ethiopia and arriving in Australia, the applicant resided and worked in [City 1 in Country 1] for about two years;

    ·the applicant was afraid of being rearrested and imprisoned in Ethiopia, and she did not feel safe in Ethiopia because she knew that her political views and involvement with the Oromo Liberation Front (‘OLF’) put her in danger;

    ·fearing arrest and imprisonment in Ethiopia, one of the applicant’s aunties who lived in [City 1] told the applicant that she could live with her and obtain employment in [City 1]; the applicant felt safe when she was in [City 1];

    ·If she returns to Ethiopia, she will be detained and tortured due to her Oromo ethnicity and her association with the OLF, an organisation classified by the government of the day as a terrorist organisation;

    ·The OLF was banned by the Ethiopian government, and members of the OLF were persecuted by government agencies;

    ·She has been detained and abused by agents of the Ethiopian government on the basis of a suspicion she may be able to provide information concerning her uncle, a suspected OLF supporter, and the OLF;

    ·While detained, she was interrogated, beaten, sexually assaulted and tortured, and on many occasions two male prison officers attempted to rape her;

    ·She was not brought before a court, has no formal criminal record, and her fingerprints were not recorded;

    ·She did not provide the officials who interrogated her with any information about the OLF because she had no information to give them;

    ·The torture was so intense that if she knew anything about the OLF she would have given that information to her interrogators;

    ·While detained, she met [Mr A], an active OLF supporter and subsequently became an active OLF supporter herself;

    ·Her primary role within the OLF was collecting donations from [Mr A]’s established donors and soliciting funds from people she identified as Oromos;

    ·The applicant fears that mere suspicion of being involved with the OLF, in circumstances where she was not ‘actually fighting’[1] for their cause, means she is at risk of harm;

    [1] Applicant’s statement dated 27 April 2021

    ·She did not seek help within Ethiopia for the reason she was detained by government agents, and tortured by them;

    ·A person suspected of being a member or supporter of the OLF will not be protected by government agents or authorities now or in the foreseeable future;  

    ·She fears she is on a ‘wanted list’ and that police officers or other government agents will arrest her at the airport; 

    ·The authorities conduct background checks on all asylum seekers returning from Australia, meaning the authorities would learn of the applicant’s prior arrest and imprisonment thereby rendering her vulnerable to persecution;

    ·Relocation within Ethiopia to avoid the risk of harm is impossible because past and future supporters the OLF experience harm and persecution for that reason throughout Ethiopia;

    ·Relocation within Ethiopian to avoid the risk of harm is impossible because she is a woman, and women experience harm and persecution throughout Ethiopia because they are women;

    ·She came to Australia on a tourist visa for the purposes of assisting her sister-in-law with her two children and to holiday in Australia; 

    ·After arriving in Australia, she contacted a member of the OLF who informed her that, [Mr A], the leader of the secret cell of OLF activists, which included the applicant, was arrested;

    ·The applicant fears that [Mr A], or other members of her cell, identified her to the authorities as an OLF activist;

    ·After arriving in Australia she was informed by her aunty that police had visited her house a number of times inquiring about her whereabouts;

    ·Officials visited her aunt multiple times and demanded to know the applicant’s location;

    ·The government now knows of her opposition to them, and her political views will attract adverse attention from the authorities;

    ·The applicant is a born-again Christian, and faces persecution in Ethiopia on the basis of her Christian faith;

    ·The applicant faces persecution in Ethiopia on the basis of her Oromo ethnicity;

    ·The applicant faces persecution in Ethiopia on the basis that she is a woman.

    COUNTRY INFORMATION

20. The DFAT published a report on Ethiopia on 12 August 2020. That report provides the following information relevant to the applicant’s review:

    RECENT HISTORY
    Ethiopia, formerly Abyssinia, is a multi-ethnic federal republic in East Africa. Ethiopia is Africa’s oldest independent country — with the exception of a five-year Italian occupation (1936-41), it was never colonised. In 1974, a Communist military junta known as the Derg (‘Committee’) overthrew the long-serving Emperor, Haile Selassie, and abolished Ethiopia’s monarchy, the House of Solomon, which dated to antiquity.

    The Derg pursued policies of nationalisation and collectivisation, and Ethiopia descended into civil war between junta and rebel forces. Between 1976 and 1978, the Derg killed thousands of its opponents (the campaign of ‘Red Terror’). Rebel forces from the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a multi-ethnic alliance led by the Tigrayan people, ousted the Derg in 1991, ending Ethiopia’s civil war. The Derg’s leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, was granted asylum in Zimbabwe. The EPRDF and its successor, the Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP), have ruled Ethiopia since. In 1993, Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia and established its own state, rendering Ethiopia landlocked. A border dispute between the two countries triggered a two-year war (1998-2000), in which 100,000 people were killed (see Security Situation). Ethiopia is one of the most drought-prone countries in the world. Drought-induced famines in 1973-74 and 1984-85 resulted in more than 1 million deaths. Its capital city, Addis Ababa, is a major diplomatic hub, as seat of the African Union and the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

    Ethiopia held its first multi-party elections in May 1995. The EPRDF won this and all other subsequent elections, bringing stability and economic growth but restricting political dissent and media and civic freedoms for most of its time in power. The EPRDF was disbanded in December 2019  Ethnic Tigrayans, a minority, wielded outsized influence during most of the EPRDF’s rule, fostering resentment among the considerably larger Amhara and, in particular, Oromo ethnic groups. Meles Zenawi, a Tigrayan who led the removal of the Derg, served as prime minister from 1995 until his death in 2012. Zenawi was succeeded by his deputy, Hailemariam Desalegn, an ethnic Wolayta — Ethiopia’s first peaceful transition of power in modern times.

    Large-scale anti-government protests beginning in 2014, centred in Oromia and, later, Amhara states, prompted the declaration of a State of Emergency, under which over 20,000 people were arrested and 1,000 killed (see 2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency). Protesters demanded greater political rights, leading to the resignation, in February 2018, of Prime Minister Desalegn. His successor and current prime minister, Abiy Ahmed (appointed in April 2018), embarked on an ambitious reform agenda, and the human rights situation has improved significantly under his watch. Among other reforms, Abiy has lifted restrictions on freedom of expression, released political prisoners, removed terrorist designations of previously-exiled opposition groups, expanded the space for civil society, and initiated reform of legislation used previously to arrest and prosecute government critics. In parallel, Abiy has pursued high-profile diplomatic initiatives across East Africa. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for his peacebuilding efforts with Eritrea, culminating in the signing of an agreement to formally end their war. Abiy is Ethiopia’s first prime minister from the Oromo ethnic group.

    After an initial period where violence subsided significantly, ethno-nationalism, inter-ethnic clashes and associated displacement again increased, though not nearly to the levels witnessed preceding Abiy’s election. Abiy’s reform agenda has met some resistance, and his government was the subject of a purported coup attempt in June 2019. Abiy had committed to holding free and fair elections in 2020, although these have been postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak in the country. Abiy declared a five-month State of Emergency on 8 April 2020 in response to the outbreak. The State of Emergency, while valid only until September 2020, limits some human rights, particularly those around association and movement. While these reflect the types of restrictions in place internationally, there is scope for abuse. However, the response has generally been accepted as necessary by opposition parties who see it as proportionate to the threat posed by COVID-19.

    DEMOGRAPHY
    The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) estimates Ethiopia’s population at 110 million, with an average annual growth rate of 2.5 per cent in the period 2010-2019. Among African countries, only Nigeria is more populous. Ethiopia’s population is concentrated in the north and centre of the country (the ‘Ethiopian highlands’). Ethiopia has a young population — around 70 per cent is under the age of 30 (including nearly 40 per cent under 14). Only 4 per cent of Ethiopians are aged 65 or older. The median age is 18. Approximately 80 per cent of the population lives in rural areas.

    Ethiopia is ethnically and linguistically diverse, comprising more than 80 different ethnic groups and 100 languages. According to the most recent national census (2007), 10 ethnic groups have a population of 1 million people or more. The Oromo constitute the single largest, at 34.5 per cent of the population, followed by the Amhara (26.9 per cent), Somali (6.2 per cent), Tigrayan (6.1 per cent), Sidama (4 per cent) and Gurage (2.5 per cent) peoples. More recent figures are unavailable — a new census has been postponed repeatedly, most recently in 2019 (owing to large-scale internal displacement). Amharic is the official national language, although the government flagged in March 2020 its intention to grant similar status to the Oromiffa, Afar, Somali and Tigrinya languages. These languages already enjoy official status in the regional states in which they predominate. English is widely taught and spoken.

    Oromia is the most populous of Ethiopia’s states, with around 37 per cent of the total population, followed by Amhara (23.3 per cent) and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP – 20.4 per cent). Somali and Tigray states, respectively, account for 6 per cent and 5.8 per cent of Ethiopia’s population. Addis Ababa is Ethiopia’s largest city, with a population of around 4.5 million. As Ethiopia’s administrative and commercial capital, Addis Ababa attracts migrants from across the country and has a multi-ethnic character. Inter-ethnic marriage is common in Addis Ababa and urban centres. It is less common in rural areas.

    POLITICAL SYSTEM
    Ethiopia’s current constitution was adopted in December 1994 and came into force in August 1995. It established a federal system of regional states delineated according to settlement patterns, language and identity (i.e. ethnicity). This method of delineation essentially makes Ethiopia an ‘ethnic federation’, whereby the largest ethnic groups administer their own states and operate with considerable autonomy from the federal government.

    Ethiopia had nine states at the time of publication: (1) Afar; (2) Amhara; (3) Benishangul-Gumuz; (4) Gambela; (5) Harari; (6) Oromia; (7) Somali; (8) SNNP; and (9) Tigray. A 10th state, for the Sidama people, is in the process of being established, following the successful passage of a referendum on regional statehood in November 2019 (see Security Situation). States have their own legislative assemblies (kilili); its members are popularly elected. Under the constitution, states have the authority to, inter alia, enact and implement state laws; formulate economic, social and development policies; administer land and other natural resources in accordance with federal laws; levy and collect taxes and administer a state budget; and establish and administer a state police force. For administrative purposes, states are divided into districts (woredas) and neighbourhoods (kebeles). A kebele is the smallest unit of local government in Ethiopia. Representatives of woredas and kebeles are popularly elected. The federal government administers Addis Ababa (in addition to being the federal capital, Addis Ababa is the capital of surrounding Oromia State), Dira Dawa and Harar.

    Ethiopia has a bicameral federal parliament, consisting of the House of Peoples’ Representatives (lower chamber, 547 seats) and the House of the Federation (upper chamber, 153 seats). Members of the House of Peoples’ Representatives are elected by popular vote to five-year terms. State assemblies elect members of the House of the Federation, also to five-year terms. The constitution mandates that each recognised ‘Nation, Nationality, and People’ of Ethiopia be represented by one member in the House of the Federation, and one additional member for every million people of its population.

    The President is the head of state, and is elected jointly by both chambers of parliament to a six-year term (for a maximum of two terms). The incumbent, H.E. Mrs Sahle Work-Zewde, was elected in October 2018. The role of president is largely ceremonial. Most power is vested in the prime minister, who serves as the head of government and commander-in-chief of the national armed forces. The prime minister is chosen by the party with most seats in parliament. It is a constitutional requirement to hold national and state elections every five years.

    Political parties have existed in Ethiopia since the overthrow of the Derg in 1991, although the ability of parties not belonging to, or affiliated with, the EPRDF to operate freely was circumscribed. The EPRDF and affiliated parties controlled all tiers of government from 1991 to December 2019, when the EPRDF dissolved and reorganised as the Ethiopian Prosperity Party. The EPRDF was a coalition of four parties representing Ethiopia’s most powerful ethnic communities: (1) the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which founded the EPRDF and led the ouster of the Derg; (2) the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), formerly the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation, or OPDO; (3) the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), formerly the Amhara National Democratic Movement, or ANDM; and (4) the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM). The EPRDF had an estimated 8 million members.

    The EPRDF was overwhelmingly voted into power in 1995, Ethiopia’s first democratic election. It was re-elected in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015, although international observers alleged voter irregularities in these elections. Opposition parties made significant gains at the 2005 election, winning 174 of 547 seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives (the EPRDF took 327 seats) on a record voter turnout of 90 per cent. Opposition parties, led by the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD, also known as Qinjit), disputed the result and launched large-scale protests in Addis Ababa. These turned violent — clashes with government forces left nearly 200 protesters dead. Around 4,000 people were arrested, including opposition leaders. In response, the EPRDF restricted the space for political opposition. In July 2007, 30 opposition leaders were handed life sentences for their participation in the 2005 protests, but were immediately pardoned. In 2009, parliament adopted the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (the ATP), under which large numbers of political opponents, journalists and activists were arrested, effectively hobbling political opposition to the EPRDF (see also Political Opinion (Actual or imputed)). The EPRDF and affiliated parties won 546 of 547 seats in the 2010 national election, and all 547 seats in the 2015 election. The EPRDF and affiliated parties won 1,966 of 1,987 seats in the 2015 regional elections, thus retaining control of all states. National and regional elections were scheduled for 29 August 2020, but have been postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak.

    Ethiopia has witnessed significant changes in the political operating environment since April 2018. Restrictions on political opposition have eased significantly since April 2018, and political parties are able to operate more freely, particularly in Addis Ababa. To date, over 130 political parties have declared their intention to contest the forthcoming national election. Most are organised along ethnic lines.

    In June 2018, federal parliament removed Ginbot 7 (Amharic for ‘May 15’, the date of the disputed 2005 election), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) from its list of terrorist organisations. The parties, which maintained armed wings and were committed to the overthrow of the EPRDF through militant means from their bases in Eritrea, were designated as terrorist organisations in June 2011. Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF have since returned from exile and now participate in the political process. Other major opposition movements include the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (also known as Medrek) and Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (known as Ezema). Medrek is a coalition of four parties: the Ethiopian Socialist Democratic Party (ESDP), the Arena for Sovereignty and Democracy, the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). Ezema was formed in May 2019 through the merger of several opposition parties, including Ginbot 7, the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), the Semayawi Party (known as the Blue Party) and Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ, also known as Andinet, the successor party of the CUD/Qinjit). Some political parties promote openly nationalist platforms. Ezema is one of the few political parties that is not ethnic based.

    The Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP), formed in December 2019, merged into a single national party three of the four parties that previously formed the EPRDF (the ODP, ADP and SEPDM). The EPP also includes the former Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), the Benishangul-Gumuz People’s Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF), the Ethiopian Somali People’s Democratic Party (ESPDP), the Gambela People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM) and the Harari National League (HNL). The ANDP, BGPDUF, ESPDP, GPDM and HNL previously governed Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, Gambela and Harari states, respectively. They were affiliated to – but not formally part of – the EPRDF. Prime Minister Abiy justified the formation of the Ethiopian Prosperity Party on national unity grounds, claiming it would buttress efforts to move away from ethnic-based identity politics and toward ‘pan-Ethiopianism’. The TPLF, which traditionally dominated decision-making within the EPRDF but felt marginalised under Abiy, opposed the merger and refused to join the EPP. The TPLF is seeking new alliances ahead of the next elections. These elections were planned for August 2020 but have now been indefinitely postponed due to COVID-19.

    Parliament adopted a new electoral law in August 2019. Among other things, the law bars serving public servants from contesting elections and increases the threshold for the formation of political parties. Under the new law, 10,000 signatures are required to form a national political party (up from 1,500), and 4,000 signatures for a regional party (up from 750). The law also establishes a framework for resolving electoral disputes countrywide. In March 2019, 107 political parties signed a code of conduct with the federal government to work towards free and fair elections in 2020. The Abiy Government has sought to strengthen the independence of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). In November 2018, it appointed Birtukan Mideksa – a high-profile dissident who previously led the UDJ and was imprisoned for her role in the 2005 protests – as NEBE Chair. On 31 March 2020, NEBE announced it could not hold general elections as scheduled on 29 August 2020 due to the COVID-19 outbreak. Constitutionally, elections must be held by the end of the Ethiopian Calendar year on 6 September 2020. Having declared this no longer possible, the Government is consulting opposition parties, and assessing its constitutional options.

    DFAT assesses there has been a shift toward political plurality since April 2018. DFAT assesses there is a level of political commitment at the federal level to open the space for opposition political parties and to stage free and fair multi-party elections when possible. Opposition parties were actively preparing for the August 2020 elections before they were postponed but the pressure put on the system by the COVID-19 pandemic, along with the drought and locust plague, will test Abiy’s commitment to Ethiopia’s new principles, and opposition parties’ commitment to collaboration.

    HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
    Article 10 of the constitution stipulates human rights and freedoms are inviolable and inalienable, and all human and democratic rights of Ethiopia’s citizens (and peoples) shall be respected. The constitution recognises the right to freedom of thought, expression, assembly, association, conscience and religion.

    Ethiopia is a State Party to seven of the nine core international human rights treaties: the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (and its optional protocols on the involvement of children in armed conflict and the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography); and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Ethiopia is not a signatory to the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Article 9 of the constitution stipulates that all international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land.

    Chapter Three of the constitution sets out a series of fundamental rights and freedoms, including: the right to life, security of person and liberty; a prohibition against inhuman treatment; freedom of religion, belief and opinion; the right of assembly, demonstration and petition; freedom of association; and freedom of movement. In practice, application of these provisions has been uneven, particularly before April 2018, when laws such as the ATP were widely used to detain government critics (see Political Opinion (Actual or imputed) and Media). The human rights situation has improved significantly since April 2018, and parliament adopted a revised ATP on 2 January 2020. The new legislation is significantly more human rights-compliant than the 2009 proclamation but has still drawn criticism from groups, including Amnesty International (see Political Opinion (Actual or Imputed)).

    Ethiopia participated in the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process in 2009, 2014 and 2019. Of the 327 recommendations it received as part of its most recent UPR (May 2019), Ethiopia accepted 270. It has committed to reviewing visit requests from UN special procedure mandate holders. The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression visited Ethiopia in December 2019 — the first visit by a special procedure mandate holder since 2006. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights visited Ethiopia in May 2017 and April 2018.

    Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
    The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was established in 2000 with a mandate to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the constitution. This includes advising the federal government on the compliance of national laws with international human rights standards; delivering training to the military, police, prison officials and public servants; and monitoring federal and regional prisons, including through unannounced visits. The EHRC has the power to investigate allegations of human rights violations that are not currently before the courts, including by summoning parties and analysing evidence, and to make recommendations to relevant state institutions. The EHRC has branches in every regional state. It also operates legal aid centres in collaboration with universities and civil society. The EHRC receives government funding and is accountable to parliament, which appoints its commissioners. Traditionally, the EHRC has lacked capacity and independence and rarely investigated alleged human rights violations by government forces. A local source told DFAT that the EHRC had not lived up to its mandate.

    The Global Alliance for National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) assesses the EHRC as being partially compliant with the Paris Principles, the international standard for national human rights institutions (the EHRC was last assessed in 2013). In making its assessment, the GANHRI noted that the EHRC had not provided any advice to the government on laws that impact on human rights, including the ATP and the Charities and Societies Proclamation (2009) (see Human Rights Organisations).

    The EHRC has a complaints mechanism, and receives about 1,000 complaints annually. These range from domestic violence, workplace discrimination and labour disputes to enforced disappearances, ill treatment in detention and mass killings. DFAT understands the EHRC plans to publish its findings from all future investigations. Budgetary constraints are an ongoing challenge, and hamper its ability to attract and retain qualified staff, and, in turn, to monitor and investigate complaints of human rights violations.

    The current federal government has undertaken to reform and strengthen the capacity and independence of the EHRC. It is reviewing the law establishing the EHRC, with a view to strengthening its mandate. The review is ongoing. A new Chief Commissioner, Daniel Bekele, was appointed in July 2019. Bekele is a high-profile human rights activist who was jailed for his work with the NGO Action Aid Ethiopia and, following his release, went into exile, where he held senior positions at Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

    SECURITY SITUATION
    The security situation has deteriorated in parts of the country since 2018. Inter-ethnic clashes – invariably over land and other resources – have increased significantly, particularly in the West Guji Zone of Oromia State and along the Oromia-Somali, Oromia-Benishangul-Gumuz, and Amhara-Tigray state borders.

    Inter-ethnic clashes have caused death, the destruction of property and large-scale internal displacement — Ethiopia recorded the most conflict-related internal displacement in the world in 2018 (see Internally- Displaced People). Ethnic militias have proliferated in the states, and weapons are readily available. Addis Ababa has largely been immune from this instability to date. Inter-ethnic clashes along the border between Oromia and Somali states have displaced more than 1 million people since 2017. Clashes have subsided, but continue to flare up sporadically. In August 2018, the
    federal government deployed forces to quell riots in Jijiga, the capital of Somali State, and surrounding areas. The riots were triggered by the arrest of the state president, and involved the targeting of non-Somalis and Christians (see Religion). At least 30 people died and 140,000 were displaced. Youths loyal to the former state president, belonging to a group called the Heego, were behind the riots. The security situation in Somali State has improved significantly since (see Somalis). In February 2019, federal parliament adopted a proclamation establishing a national reconciliation commission to promote dialogue and encourage resolution of inter-ethnic disputes.

    The return from exile of previously-banned groups and individuals has catalysed unrest in Oromia State. In September 2018, the return of the OLF provoked intra-Oromo clashes and the targeting of homes and businesses belonging to non-Oromos. At least 70 people were killed and 15,000 displaced. The OLF has yet to disarm completely, and some OLF factions engage in armed clashes with government forces, particularly in western areas of Oromia State. Armed OLF factions have reportedly engaged in criminal activities, including extorting businesses and conducting bank robberies in western Oromia. In October 2019, at least 86 people died during riots triggered by claims – made via Facebook – that the federal government was endangering the personal security of Jawar Mohammed, a prominent Oromo activist and founder of the Oromo Media Network (OMN). Jawar, an advocate for greater rights for the Oromo people who was previously allied to Prime Minister Abiy (but who is now a prominent critic), helped organise from his US base the 2014-18 protests that precipitated the resignation of the previous government. Jawar returned to Ethiopia in August 2018.

    Jawar was rearrested on 30 June 2020 during renewed unrest, chiefly in Oromia State but also in the capital Addis Ababa. The unrest followed the 29 June murder of popular Oromo singer and activist Hachalu Hundessa, a former political prisoner who rose to become one of the country’s biggest music stars and a voice for the Oromo ethnic group. International media reported that more than 230 people, including almost a dozen members of the security forces, were killed in the unrest, and an internet blackout was imposed. Nearly 5,000 people were arrested on various charges, including several prominent Oromo leaders and journalists, among them Jawar. The Attorney-General announced that the premises of three media outlets (including Jawar’s Oromia Media Network) had been searched on suspicion of ‘incitement to racial or religious hatred’. The Prime Minister’s Office stated in a press release on 10 July 2020 that, ‘contrary to erroneous reporting’, calm had returned to Addis Ababa and affected areas of Oromia State.

    In June 2019, the chief of staff of the National Defence Force (head of the military), General Seare Mekonnen, and the president of Amhara State, Ambachew Mekonnen, were assassinated in concurrent events in Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar (Amhara State). Both were allied to Prime Minister Abiy, who characterised the assassinations as a failed coup attempt. The alleged ringleader, Brigadier General Asaminew Tsige, the chief of security in Amhara State, was killed by government forces. Tsige, who had advocated for greater regional autonomy, had been pardoned and released from prison in 2018 (he was serving a life sentence for his alleged involvement in a failed 2009 coup attempt by Ginbot 7). Federal government forces were deployed to Amhara State and Addis Ababa, and a weeklong internet blackout was imposed nationally, in the wake of the alleged coup. Abiy was earlier the subject of a grenade attack at a progovernment rally in Addis Ababa. The authorities described the June 2018 incident as a failed assassination attempt, and five people were charged with terrorism offences. The attack killed two people and injured more than 100.

    SNNP experienced major civil unrest in July 2019, after the federal government delayed a referendum on whether the Sidama people – the largest ethnic group in SNNP and the fifth-largest in Ethiopia overall – should secede from SNNP and create their own regional state. Clashes between Sidama protesters and government forces ensued, and ethnic minorities were targeted, leaving over 50 people dead. A State of Emergency was put in place in SNNP (though never publicly declared) and the military and federal police were deployed to restore order. The situation in SNNP has since stabilised. A referendum was held in November 2019, where the Sidama voted overwhelmingly in favour of regional statehood (the process of establishing a separate state for the Sidama was ongoing at the time of publication). SNNP is the most diverse of Ethiopia’s states, comprising over 45 ethnic groups. At least 10 other ethnic groups, including the Wolayta, have since flagged their intention to pursue their own regional states, a right guaranteed by the constitution (see Race/Nationality).

    Border areas with neighbouring countries are extremely unstable. Non-state armed groups, including bandits, operate along Ethiopia’s borders with Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. Inter-tribal clashes, including across national borders, and skirmishes between non-state armed groups and government forces are common in these areas (in April 2016, members of the Murle people in South Sudan attacked a number of villages in Gambela State, killing 200 people). The risk of violent robbery and kidnapping in border areas is high. The terrorist group Al-Shabaab, based in Somalia, reportedly maintains a presence in areas close to the Ethiopian border.

    DFAT assesses that, outside of national and state border areas, the government controls the security situation, and Ethiopia tends to be safer than most of its neighbours. DFAT assesses Addis Ababa to be particularly stable, and it continues to attract migrants from other parts of the country in search of economic opportunities. Nevertheless, the rule of law has deteriorated in some regional states and several non-state armed groups have emerged to advance the interests of their ethnic group. The situation along regional state borders can be particularly unstable. DFAT assesses that, with Ethiopia’s democratic opening presenting opportunities for the expression of previously-suppressed historical grievances and ethnic-based clashes increasing across the country, people who constitute ethnic minorities in regional states face a growing risk of physical violence. This risk is more pronounced during times of civil unrest.

    RACE/NATIONALITY

    Article 25 of the constitution stipulates all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection regardless of race, nationality, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status. Article 46 of the constitution provides the basis for Ethiopia’s states to be delimited ‘on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned’. In effect, this involves the creation of states that are broadly consistent with the geographic locations of major ethnic groups. Traditionally, ethnically-motivated societal violence has been rare, although ethnic-based clashes have increased since 2018 (see Security Situation), fuelled largely by competition for resources and enabled, in part, by the lifting of restrictions on freedom of expression and an associated rise in hate speech and misinformation (see Media). With the exception of the ethnic Anuak people of Gambela State, most ethnic groups in Ethiopia are indistinguishable by their physical appearance, partly as a result of inter-marriage.

    Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic society, and ethnic groups enjoy extensive rights. Under the Ethiopian Constitution every ‘nation, nationality and people’ (a reference to all ethnic groupings which constitute Ethiopia) has the right to speak their language and promote their culture. Every nation, nationality and people also has the constitutional right to self-determination, including the right to regional statehood within Ethiopia’s federal system — a right recently asserted by the Sidama (see Security Situation). Several conditions must be met for regional statehood, including: approval by a two-thirds majority of the members of the relevant state legislature; and a majority vote in a referendum organised by the federal government (the referendum must be organised within one-year of the request for regional statehood being received).

    All major ethnic groups are represented in the federal government and bureaucracy, and political parties represent the interests of Ethiopia’s various ethnic groups. DFAT assesses official discrimination – including systematic state-sanctioned discrimination, denial of public services and higher detention rates – based on race and/or ethnicity is rare. This assessment is consistent with the constitutional prohibitions on discrimination, and reflects the need for governments to maintain their legitimacy through inclusiveness, given Ethiopia’s ethnic diversity. Different ethnic groups have a history of co-existence in Addis Ababa, and discrimination on ethnic grounds is not common there. One source described ethnicity as a ‘non-factor’ in Addis Ababa — most people consider themselves from Addis Ababa as opposed to a particular ethnic group. Violence based on ethnicity is not common in Addis Ababa, but is a growing concern in regional states. Interethnic relations have deteriorated since 2018, and DFAT assesses the situation for ethnic minorities at the regional state-level is increasingly challenging, and they face a growing risk of violence at the hands of the majority community.

    Societal discrimination based on ethnicity can occur, but is predominantly in the form of positive discrimination in favour of a particular ethnic group rather than active discrimination against people of a different race or ethnicity. Official policies can limit opportunities for some groups; for example, the use of Oromiffa as the language of instruction in schools in Oromia State can limit opportunities for ethnic Oromos in the public sector if they do not also speak Amharic and English. Similarly, ethnic groups that constitute a minority within regional states are at a disadvantage from a linguistic perspective, insofar as their languages do not enjoy official status in those states.

    Oromos
    The Oromo people are the single largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, at nearly 35 per cent of the population. They live mostly in Oromia State, which surrounds the federally-administered Addis Ababa. According to the 2007 national census (the most recent), there are significant Oromo communities in Addis Ababa (534,000), Amhara State (450,000) and SNNP State (236,000). While recent data is hard to come by, roughly similar numbers of Oromos practise Islam and Christianity (both Orthodox and Protestant). Oromos speak Oromiffa (also known as Afaan Oromo), which is the language of administration and schooling in Oromia State. By virtue of its location surrounding Addis Ababa, Oromia State is one of the more developed parts of the country.

    Ethnic Oromos’ level of political and economic influence has traditionally been incommensurate to their size. Oromos argue they have long been subservient to smaller ethnic groups — a major source of historical frustration. While Oromos were represented in federal government and held positions of influence during the EPRDF’s rule, ethnic Tigrayans predominated politically and economically. Likewise, ethnic Amharas dominated during the periods of military and monarchic rule. The displacement of Oromos from traditional land on which Addis Ababa is built is another historical grievance for the Oromo community. Oromos were the most vocal of Ethiopia’s ethnic communities during anti-government protests from 2014 to 2018, and bore the brunt of associated arrests and detentions (see 2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency).

    Oromo influence at the federal level has expanded significantly since the April 2018 election of Abiy as prime minister — the first time in Ethiopia’s modern history an Oromo has led the country. The Oromo were the single largest ethnic group in the federal cabinet (the Council of Ministers) at the time of publication, and were represented in the senior ranks of the public service and the military. Oromo political prisoners, including those arrested for their involvement in the 2014-18 protests, have been released. The OLF, an opposition party dedicated to Oromo self-determination, was delisted as a terrorist organisation in June 2018 and returned from exile in Eritrea in September 2018. The OLF signed a peace agreement with the federal government in August 2018 and agreed to disarm. It now operates as a registered political party and plans to contest forthcoming national and regional elections. Despite these gains, historical grievances remain. The resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn, his subsequent replacement by Abiy and Ethiopia’s democratic opening has triggered a resurgence of Oromo nationalism. Ethnic Oromos have been involved in many of the inter-ethnic clashes and associated displacement that has occurred since 2018, both as instigators and victims (Oromos have been targeted in Benishangul-Gumuz and Somali states). The killing of prominent Oromo singer and activist, Hachalu Hundessa, in June 2020 – who had been increasingly outspoken on the economic and political marginalisation of the Oromo people – sparked renewed Oromo protests (see Security Situation).

    While there was widespread violence against, and detention of, protesters across Oromia State between 2014 and 2018, DFAT assesses this was not ethnically motivated, but reflected the then-federal government’s sensitivity to political opposition. The situation for government critics, including ethnic Oromos, has improved significantly since April 2018. DFAT assesses that individuals who are part of, or have links to, armed OLF factions engaged in criminal activities and clashes with government forces are likely to be of interest to the authorities, and face a moderate risk of arrest and detention. The risk of arrest and detention faced by OLF members who participate peacefully in the political process is low. DFAT assesses, overall, Oromos face a low risk of official discrimination based on their ethnicity, including with respect to employment in the public sector. DFAT assesses that, excluding in Addis Ababa, Oromos face a moderate risk of violence in areas or states where they constitute a minority.

    POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED)
    The constitution enshrines extensive protections in relation to political opinion. Article 25 provides for equality under the law, without discrimination on the grounds of political or other opinion; Article 29 provides for freedom of expression; Article 30 provides for freedom of assembly, peaceful demonstration and petition; Article 31 provides for freedom of association; and Article 38 provides for the right to vote, be elected and be a member of a political organisation regardless of colour, race, nation, nationality, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion. Organisations formed in violation of appropriate laws and/or with the intent to subvert the constitutional order are prohibited. Organisers of large public gatherings must notify the authorities 48 hours in advance and obtain a permit.

    In practice, political freedoms were significantly curtailed before April 2018. Members of opposition groups, human rights activists, and independent commentators such as journalists and bloggers who opposed the government’s policies were regularly harassed and detained. The ATP was used extensively to restrict political freedoms and arrest and prosecute government critics, particularly individuals with suspected affiliations to proscribed groups Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF. Against this background, many opposition leaders and dissidents left Ethiopia. Individuals who were not members of the EPRDF reportedly faced discrimination in public sector employment, including impediments to career progression. Antigovernment protests were often dispersed through force, and participants arrested.

    Freedom of political expression has expanded since 2018. More than 10,000 political prisoners have been released since 2018 (a process initiated by the Desalegn Government), including senior opposition leaders Andargachew Tsege of Ginbot 7 and Merera Gudina and Bekele Gerba of the OFC. In June 2018, parliament lifted its terrorist designations of Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF. These groups subsequently renounced armed struggle and returned to Ethiopia, where they operate as registered political parties. In July 2018, federal parliament amnestied thousands of individuals charged with treason and other crimes against the state. This has enabled high-profile opposition figures, including Berhanu Nega of Ginbot 7, to return from exile and resume their political activities. According to the federal government, over 13,000 people have been released under the amnesty law. Political opposition parties now operate with greater freedom, although some report intimidation and obstacles to holding rallies due to a lack of protection in regional states. In January and February 2020, over 100 OLF supporters were reportedly arrested across Oromia State, while some members of the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) – an opposition party formed in 2018 that espouses Amhara nationalism – were detained in connection to the alleged coup attempt in June 2019 (see Security Situation). DFAT is unable to verify if these arrests were politically motivated. A local source involved in politics told DFAT they were able to express their political views freely without fear of arrest and prosecution. Anti-government protests are common — in January 2020, largescale anti-government protests took place in Amhara State in relation to the abduction of 27 ethnic Amhara university students in Oromia State. Protesters accused Prime Minister Abiy of not doing enough to secure the students’ release.

    In June 2018, the government established an Advisory Council for Legal and Justice Affairs comprising independent legal professionals to review and recommend reforms to laws that had been used to restrict political, civic and press freedoms (namely, the ATP, the Charities and Societies Proclamation, and the Freedom of Information and Mass Media Proclamation). The Advisory Council has a three-year mandate. The Charities and Societies Proclamation was repealed and replaced by the Organization of Civil Society Proclamation in February 2019 (see Human Rights Organisations). The new law is in operation, and has been well received by civil society organisations. A revision of the ATP was adopted on 2 January 2020. It is a significant improvement on the previous ATP but has still drawn criticism from civil society groups, including Amnesty International, who fear it could still be used against those critical of government. Replacement legislation for the Freedom of Information and Mass Media Proclamation was before federal parliament at the time of publication. While these laws remain in force, they have been used only sporadically since April 2018.

    Human rights organisations have particularly welcomed the government’s commitment to review and revise the ATP, which was widely considered to fall short of international human rights standards. The old ATP contained a broad definition of ‘terrorist acts’, and was used extensively to arrest and prosecute critics of government policy before April 2018. Under the ATP, detainees could be held without charge for 28-day periods up to a maximum period of four months. In practice, many were held for considerably longer. Bail was not available for persons charged with terrorism offences. Those charged under the ATP can face up to 20 years’ imprisonment.

    Under the new ATP, a person must incite terrorist acts to be prosecuted (rather than simply ‘encouraging terrorism’) and workers’ rights to strike have been strengthened (illegal strikes that affected public services used to be classed as terrorist acts). However, Amnesty International believes opportunities to abuse power still remain. For example, the proclamation criminalises ‘intimidation to commit a terrorist act’.

    According to the federal government, about 300 people were arrested in connection to the alleged coup attempt in June 2018 (see Security Situation). DFAT understands a significantly higher number of people were arrested, including activists, journalists, government officials and members of the NaMA. The majority of arrests occurred in Amhara State; over 40 were detained in Addis Ababa. Most were subsequently released, including 22 in October 2019. A total of 58 people (45 in Amhara State and 13 in Addis Ababa) were charged under the ATP. In February 2020, the federal government said it had dropped charges ‘for the national good’ against some individuals – including NaMA members – suspected of involvement in the alleged attempt, as part of a broader pardon of high-profile detainees.

    Local sources told DFAT that, traditionally, being a member of the EPRDF increased one’s chances of gaining employment in the public sector and earning subsequent promotions, including in the judiciary, police, and public schools and universities. DFAT heard anecdotally that, while the practice of ruling party members being advantaged in public sector employment and promotions persisted, it was not as pronounced under the current federal government.

    DFAT assesses tolerance for political dissent has increased considerably since April 2018. Opposition political parties are able to organise and operate significantly more freely, particularly in Addis Ababa, and their members face a low risk of harassment, arrest and detention by virtue of their political affiliations and views. DFAT assesses Ethiopians can openly criticise the ruling party.

    2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency
    Ethiopia witnessed large-scale anti-government protests from 2014 to 2018 in Oromia and Amhara states (which, collectively, account for 60 per cent of Ethiopia’s population). The protests began in Oromia State (Ethiopia’s most populous) in April 2014, triggered by the federal government’s plan to expand the municipal boundaries of Addis Ababa into Oromia State, which it abuts. The federal government justified the Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan on the grounds it was necessary to cater for the rapid growth of the capital; critics claimed the encroachment would displace Oromo farmers and result in land seizures. The protests were put down through force, but re-emerged in November 2015. The government scrapped the Master Plan in January 2016; however, protests intensified across Oromia State and evolved into calls for greater political rights and the release of ethnic Oromo political prisoners. The Qeerroo, an Oromo youth movement, was at the forefront of these protests. Parallel protests emerged in neighbouring Amhara State in July 2016 (Ethiopia’s second-most populous state), triggered by historical Amhara grievances over the loss of traditional Amhara land stemming from the demarcation of the border between Amhara and
    Tigray states. Like in Oromia State, the protests in Amhara State morphed into calls for broader reform. The protests in Oromia and Amhara states saw violent confrontations between government forces and protesters, including the use of live bullets.

    The federal government declared a countrywide State of Emergency in October 2016 after protesters torched farms and businesses (a State of Emergency is constitutionally permissible in the event of a breakdown in law and order that threatens the constitutional order and is beyond the capacity of regular law enforcement agencies to control. It must be approved by a two-thirds majority in the House of Peoples’ Representatives within 15 days of being declared). The State of Emergency gave authorities broad powers to detain people and search private property without court orders, limit travel and the right to association and protest, and impose curfews and media restrictions (including on social media). The practical effect of the State of Emergency was to formalise and expand practices that were largely already in place. The State of Emergency was lifted in August 2017, but reinstated in February 2018, following the resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn. The State of Emergency was subsequently lifted in June 2018, two months ahead of
    schedule.

    DFAT understands the authorities arrested and detained around 26,000 people under the State of Emergency. This number includes journalists, bloggers, opposition party members and large numbers of people who were thought to have participated in anti-government protests, including children. Arrests and detentions were not limited to protest organisers or high-profile opponents of the government. Large numbers of detainees were subjected to a ‘rehabilitation and re-education’ program, mostly low profile participants who were released following their completion of the program (see Arbitrary Arrest and Detention). Some of those arrested under the State of Emergency claim to have been tortured (see Torture). The majority of those arrested and imprisoned for their participation in the protests have since been released. Over 1,000 civilians are estimated to have died during the course of the protests. Anti-government protests can and do occur.

    DFAT assesses that, since April 2018, participants in peaceful protests face a low risk of arrest and detention. DFAT further assesses that participants in peaceful protests, including organisers, are likely to be of little ongoing interest to the authorities.

    CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
    PUNISHMENT
    Article 18 of the constitution affords Ethiopians the right to protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 424 of the Criminal Code prohibits treatment of prisoners or suspects ‘in an improper or brutal manner, or in a manner which is incompatible with human dignity’. Such acts are punishable with up to 10 years’ imprisonment.

    In practice, prisoners have reported incidents of physical punishment. There are credible reports of individuals detained in connection to the 2014-18 protests and/or for suspected affiliations to previously outlawed opposition groups being mistreated, including being subjected to beatings, overcrowding, extreme heat, lack of water and solitary confinement. The current federal government has committed to addressing such abuses as part of its wide-reaching reform agenda (see Detention and Prison).

    Arbitrary Arrest and Detention
    The constitution stipulates that no person may be subject to arbitrary arrest and detained without charge or conviction. Under the Criminal Code, ‘unlawful arrest or detention’ is punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment. In practice, before April 2018 critics of the federal government were regularly detained on arbitrary grounds and often held for extended periods without charge. Under the State of Emergency, effective from October 2016-August 2017 and then from February-June 2018, authorities were allowed to arrest and detain individuals without a court warrant and hold detainees for longer than proscribed under normal regulations. According to the US Department of State, security forces went door-to-door after some protests, and arrested and arbitrarily detained opposition party members and supporters, whom they accused of inciting violence.

    There are fewer reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions since the change in federal government in April 2018 and the lifting of the State of Emergency. Some members of the OLF and the NaMA claim to have been the subject of arbitrary arrest and detention (in connection to the failed June 2019 coup attempt in the case of the NaMA) (see Political Opinion (Actual or Imputed)).

    In September 2018, security forces detained 3,000 people in Oromia State and Addis Ababa in response to rising criminality. Those arrested included individuals found gambling and – despite not constituting criminal offences– smoking shisha (a tobacco mix smoked in a water pipe) and consuming khat. Most were subsequently released.

    Successive governments have detained people – primarily youth – for ‘rehabilitation and re-education’ purposes in military-run camps. This includes people involved in the 2014-18 protests. About 1,200 people – detained in connection to the September 2018 unrest in Oromia State that accompanied the return from exile of the OLF – were sent for rehabilitation at a military facility. Most have since completed their rehabilitation and been released. Rehabilitation occurs outside of the judicial process — those undergoing rehabilitation are not charged and prosecuted. Amnesty International reports that rehabilitation processes continued throughout 2019. DFAT understands rehabilitation can last between one and several months, and includes education and physical exercise components. DFAT understands that rehabilitation does not involve torture or other forms of ill-treatment. Those undergoing rehabilitation are released without charge on completion of their program. The authorities claim rehabilitation boosts the employment prospects of those who undergo it and supports national unity.

    STATE PROTECTION
    Ethiopia has an extensive security and intelligence apparatus, a legacy of its previous political systems. The state exercises control over most of the country, and it has largely been effective in maintaining law and order and protecting the population from major crimes, including terrorism. The security and intelligence apparatus was used in the past to monitor and suppress dissent, and had a history of using force to quell instances of unrest, including large-scale anti-government protests.

    Prime Minister Abiy has sought to impose greater discipline and accountability on the security forces, including by punishing past wrongdoings, as part of broader efforts to strengthen the professionalism and civilian oversight of the security forces (local sources claim this has had a deterrent effect on government forces). According to the national report it submitted ahead of its most recent UPR (May 2019), the federal government is developing legislation on police use of force and accountability, and plans to establish an independent mechanism to which complaints of ill-treatment by security and law enforcement authorities can be submitted, but this is not yet legislated. Regional state governments are making parallel efforts to reform law enforcement at the
    state level. A proliferation of ethnic-based militias since 2018 has challenged state authority and eroded the rule of law in some parts of the country, particularly in western Oromia State.

    Government forces have shown greater restraint toward protesters since April 2018. Local sources told DFAT that non-state actors now posed a greater threat to safety than did government forces. In a report presented to federal parliament in January 2020, the EHRC claimed that human rights violations committed by government forces had declined, with most violations now perpetrated by non-state actors.

    DFAT assesses that, overall, federal and regional security forces are largely effective at maintaining law and order and in providing protection from threats by non-state actors, particularly in major urban centres. However, DFAT assesses that the emergence of armed, invariably ethnic-based non-state actors has increasingly challenged the state’s monopoly on the use of force and its concomitant ability to provide protection in remote areas and along borders separating Ethiopia’s regional states.

    Intelligence Services
    Ethiopia has a highly capable domestic intelligence system. The NISS is an autonomous federal government office, in theory accountable to the Minister for Peace, but in practice directly accountable to the prime minister. While reliable data on the size of the NISS is not available, it is broadly considered to have a strong capacity to monitor the activities of persons of interest in Ethiopia, and high priority areas along its borders. A civilian monitoring and reporting system supports the intelligence network, whereby individuals report on the activities of others in their community or household. The current federal government is working to strengthen the NISS’ independence from political interference. Abiy replaced the NISS’ senior leadership in June 2018, and over 30 senior NISS officials, including its former deputy head, have been arrested for allegedly overseeing human rights violations of prisoners and suspects, including abduction and torture (NISS’ former head has also been charged, but evaded arrest to date). Under proposed legislation currently before parliament, the NISS will be renamed the National Information Center.

    The federal government operates a separate cyber-intelligence and security organisation, the Information Network Security Agency (INSA). INSA’s role includes investigating threats to national security, combatting cyber-crime and preventing cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure.

    The Ethiopian intelligence agencies are highly capable. DFAT assesses that individuals considered a threat to national security are unlikely to escape their attention within Ethiopia. Security and intelligence services operate across Ethiopia. DFAT assesses that an individual who is of interest to the authorities is unlikely to be able to avoid attracting official attention by relocating within Ethiopia.

    TREATMENT OF RETURNEES
    Article 32 of the constitution stipulates that Ethiopian nationals have the right to return to the country. Ethiopia has a large diaspora. About 5 million Ethiopians live outside of the country, with large concentrations in the US and the Middle East. Members of the diaspora return to Ethiopia regularly and contribute to the economy, including through remittances. Prime Minister Abiy has encouraged former dissidents to return from abroad and participate in his reform agenda. Many have done so, including members of opposition movements previously designated as terrorist organisations (see Political System).

    DFAT understands there have been instances of individuals who were seeking asylum abroad discontinuing their protection claims and returning to Ethiopia. Some returnees are now active in politics and civil society. Former political prisoners have returned from exile to head the EHRC and the NEBE.

    The authorities have typically welcomed voluntary returnees to Ethiopia, including, since April 2018, government critics and opponents. DFAT assesses that returnees, including failed asylum seekers and/or government critics and opponents, face a low risk of monitoring, harassment, detention and official discrimination. While the authorities have significant intelligence-gathering capabilities and are likely to be aware of major anti-government protest activity undertaken in other countries and online, DFAT assesses that people who openly criticise the ruling party while they are outside of Ethiopia face a low risk of official harm on their return to Ethiopia.

    DFAT assesses that, under the current federal government, failed asylum seekers face a low risk of harm on their return to Ethiopia, including where they sought asylum on political grounds.

    Exit and Entry Procedures
    Ethiopians travelling internationally by air are subject to security and identification checks at the airport, and immigration stations at airports have photograph and fingerprinting facilities. Ethiopian passports are machine-readable and have a range of security features (see Documentation). Biometric security measures linked to national databases apply at formal entry and exit points across the country. The NISS has primary responsibility for intelligence and border security processes.

    An exit visa is not required to depart Ethiopia, and Article 32 of the constitution stipulates that Ethiopian nationals have the right to leave the country at any time. In practice, there have been some instances of individuals being prevented from exiting the country. From 2013 to 2018, Ethiopia prohibited its citizens from travelling to the Gulf region in search of work. The travel ban was imposed to prevent the exploitation and abuse of unskilled and female domestic workers. It was lifted after Ethiopia signed bilateral agreements with several Gulf countries to protect the rights of Ethiopian workers. A Certificate of Good Conduct (‘police clearance certificate’) is required when a person seeks to emigrate from Ethiopia (see Police Clearance Certificates).

    Section 5AAA of the Migration Act1958

1. Pursuant to s 5AAA of the Act, it is for a review applicant to specify all particulars of a claim to be persons in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and to provide sufficient evidence to establish the claim. The Tribunal does not have any responsibility or obligation to specify, or assist the applicant in specifying, any particulars of their claims. Nor does the Tribunal have any responsibility or obligation to establish or assist in establishing the claim.

   Refugee considerations

2. Material to assessing any risk of harm the applicant would face if she is removed to Ethiopia now, or in the reasonably foreseeable future, is whether the Tribunal is satisfied the applicant was an OLF activist. If that be the case, whether by past and future association with the OLF, the applicant faces a real chance of being persecuted for reasons of political opinion if she is removed to Ethiopia now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

3. The applicant was born on [date] and now is [age] years of age.

4. The applicant was born in Jimma, in Oromia state in Ethiopia. The applicant submitted to the Tribunal a written statement dated 27 April 2021.

5. According to the statement her parents reside in Jimma.

6. The applicant successfully completed her secondary school education in 2004 in a high school located in Jimma. According to the statement (S1) she provided to the Department as part of the PV application, after she completed high school she was unable to attend university because her academic score did not meet the level required for acceptance into university. In this review the applicant gave a materially different explanation for not attending university.

7. In this review the applicant placed reliance on her written statement dated 27 April 2021 (S2) which was filed prior to the review hearing. In S2 the applicant claimed she was unable to attend university in Ethiopia due to her ethnicity, namely Oromo.  There is a material difference between not attending university due to failing to meet the academic standard required for admission and being excluded from admission on the grounds of race. The different reasons advanced by the applicant for not attending university raises concerns in the Tribunal about the applicant’s veracity and accuracy.

8. The applicant’s recent claim that she was excluded from university for reasons of race was clearly intended to strengthen her case for the grant of a PV. The discrepancy in the applicant’s reasons for not attending university has caused the Tribunal to be concerned that the applicant is disposed to making inaccurate statements of fact for the purpose of strengthening her prospects of achieving a successful outcome in this review. This discrepancy raises doubt about the veracity and reliability of the applicant as a witness.

9. According to the evidence, due to the applicant being unable to find employment in Jimma, her home city in Oromia State, she relocated to Addis Ababa in January 2005 to live with her aunty and uncle, and work in the small shop her uncle owned.

10. In S2 the applicant described Addis Ababa at that time (April 2021) as one of the largest and safest cities in Ethiopia. The applicant’s description of Addis Ababa is consistent with the DFAT country information report issued in April 2020.

11. The applicant, amongst other things, provided the Tribunal with a copy of the DFAT country information report for the purposes of this review.

12. According to the DFAT report, Addis Ababa is largely immune from the interethnic rivalries and the activities of ethnic-based militias which have proliferated since 2018, challenged the authority of the state and eroded the rule of law in some parts of the country, particularly in western Oromia State, remote areas, and a number of borders separating Ethiopia’s regional states. Nevertheless, different ethnic groups have a history of co-existence in Addis Ababa, and discrimination on ethnic grounds is not common there. DFAT assesses violence based on ethnic grounds is not common in Addis Ababa but it is a growing concern in regional states, with a growing risk of violence at the hands of the majority community in those areas. DFAT assesses that overall, federal and regional security forces are largely effective at maintaining law and order and in providing protection from non-state actors, particularly in major urban centres. Addis Ababa would be an obvious example of a major urban centre contemplated in the DFAT country information.

13. The applicant resided in Addis Ababa from January 2005 to November 2014, at which time she relocated to [City 1]. At hearing it was evident the applicant was permitted to enter and stay in [City 1] because [City 1] granted her a two-year work visa.

14. As the Tribunal understands the evidence, the applicant’s uncle is now deceased, but her aunty continues to live in Addis Ababa. According to the applicant’s evidence she is still in communication with her aunty and there is no evidence that suggests the applicant does not continue to enjoy a good relationship with her.

15. It is evident that before the applicant relocated to [City 1] she was employed in her uncle’s [shop] which was located in a market in suburban Addis Ababa between January 2005 and November 2014.

16. Initially the applicant was employed by her uncle as a customer service person and later employed as shop manager. The applicant’s uncle died in March or April 2014. About that time the applicant became unemployed.

17. The applicant identified the circumstances that informed her decision to relocate to [City 1]. At question 89 in her PV application form, the applicant was asked to state with specificity her detailed reasons for leaving her home country: she replied, ‘I left my home country to start work in [City 1], [Country 1].’ 

18. In S1 filed in support of her PV application, the applicant specified further reasons for her decision to leave Ethiopia. In March 2014, about the time her uncle died, her aunty was informed by the authorities that property owners, including the applicant’s aunty, would be relocated to the outskirts of Addis Ababa to make way for the redevelopment of the area where the property was located. Later evidence established that the area required for redevelopment included the uncle’s shop. At this time the applicant was unemployed and realised just how hard it would be for her obtain employment in Ethiopia. The applicant formed the view that she had no future in Ethiopia. The applicant consulted with her mother and other family members about her circumstances and prospects in Ethiopia. The applicant’s aunty in [City 1] invited the applicant to live and work with her minding children.  

19. The applicant claims she informed the members of the secret cell of OLF supporters, of which she claims she was an active member, of her negative circumstances and prospects in Ethiopia. The Tribunal understands from the evidence that they supported her decision, encouraged her to relocate to [City 1] and to stay in touch with them.

20. To summarise the evidence: the applicant left Ethiopia to work in [City 1] because the shop in which she was employed was acquired to make way for a land development project; she was unemployed. Realising how difficult it is to obtain employment in Ethiopia, and, believing she had no future in Ethiopia, the applicant conferred with her mother and other family members about her circumstances.  The necessary arrangements were made for the applicant to travel to [City 1], to live with her aunty and to engage in paid employment. The applicant relocated to [City 1] in November 2014.

21. While the applicant claimed in January 2017 that she would be persecuted if she returned to Ethiopia rather than relocate to [City 1], her detailed and apparently considered reasons for leaving Ethiopia in 2014, do not state she left because she feared she was at risk of being arrested, detained and tortured due to her active support for the OLF, race, religion or for any s 5J(1)(a) reason.

22. In S1 the applicant explained why she experienced no difficulties obtaining a passport to leave Ethiopia. Central to that explanation is the applicant’s opinion that at the time she obtained the passport and, by implication departed Ethiopia, she was not a person of interest to the security forces, although as a member of the general population she may have been randomly detained for a short time and released as a way of keeping the general population docile. 

23. Furthermore, the applicant’s opinion that she was not a person of interest to the authorities needs to be considered in the broader context of her evidence. The applicant claims she was arrested and detained by government agents in December 2010 and released in early April 2011. According to S1 the applicant was questioned and beaten severely for the purpose of forcing her to give them names and descriptions of anybody she was aware of who had contact with her employer/uncle. Her uncle had been arrested a week earlier because the security forces believed he actively supported the OLF, which, according to the applicant at hearing, had been falsely classified by the government as a terrorist organisation. According to the applicant she did not provide them with any information related to the OLF because she had no information to give them. By inference the authorities eventually accepted that that was the case and released her in April 2011, along with other prisoners. In saying this the Tribunal is not to be taken as being satisfied the applicant was in fact arrested and detained in Ethiopia.

24. On balance, the evidence considered so far weighs towards finding the applicant, at the time she departed for [City 1], did not fear she was a person of interest to the state security forces for her actual or imputed political opinions, or for any support she may have given to the OLF.

25. On balance, the evidence considered so far in this decision, supports a finding that the applicant left Ethiopia in pursuit of a better economic future; not because she believed she was likely to be detained by the authorities and persecuted for her political opinion, or that she was at risk of harm for reasons of race, religion or for any other s 5(1)(a) reason.

26. In S2 the applicant revisited her reasons for leaving Ethiopia and relocating to [City 1]. She described the prevailing considerations she contends compelled her to leave Ethiopia and relocate to [City 1].

27. The applicant contends two competing imperatives influenced her decision to leave Ethiopia. It was important to the applicant that she continue to stand up for and fight for the rights of Oromos.  In tension with this circumstance was her fear of being rearrested and imprisoned. The applicant did not feel safe in Ethiopia. She felt she was endangered by her political views and her active involvement in a secret cell of the OLF. According to S2 the applicant’s fear of arrest and detention prevailed. The applicant knew she could relocate to [City 1] and live there with her aunty and feel safe. 

28. According to the substance of S2, the applicant claims she left Ethiopia for the purposes of removing herself from the real chance she faced of being rearrested and tortured by the security forces for reasons of her belief the government was discriminating against and mistreating Oromos, and abusing their rights. The applicant feared her active involvement in a secret cell of the OLF would be discovered: she would be rearrested, imprisoned, and tortured.  Driven by that fear the applicant chose the safety of [City 1] over remaining in Ethiopia.  

29. The applicant’s account in S2 of the circumstances that compelled her to leave Ethiopia omits to mention the economic circumstances that she faced at that time, summarised at paragraph 38 and 40 of this decision. Those circumstances demonstrate that the applicant left Ethiopia in search of better economic opportunities; that in [City 1] she would find a place to live and employment; and that she left Ethiopia for those reasons, not because she feared, or that she faced a real chance of being harmed in Ethiopia for reasons of her political opinions, ethnicity, religious beliefs, that she is an Oromo woman, or any other s 5J(1)(a) reason.

30. The applicant arrived in [City 1] in November 2014. In May 2016, whilst residing in [City 1], she lodged an application for an Australian Visitor visa. The visa was granted, and she arrived in Australia on [date] August 2016.  

31. Before departing [City 1], the applicant was employed in [a specified] sector. At the [workplace], she was employed as [Occupation 1]. According to S1 the applicant spoke regularly from [City 1] to members of the secret cell of OLF supporters and she made a financial contribution to the cell every month.

32. Is S1 the applicant claims she accepted an invitation from her sister to visit her in Australia. She told her manager she wished to take leave for the purpose of visiting her sister in Australia. Her manager obtained authorisation from the [employer’s] personnel manager for her to go on leave whenever she was ready to travel to Australia.

33. The applicant does not disclose she left [City 1] for any reasons associated with the expiration of her temporary visa and that her employment had ceased for visa reasons. In S1, an undated document apparently lodged with the Department in early 2018, the applicant indicates she simply took leave of absence from her employment to visit her sister in Australia and she obtained an Australian Visitor visa for that purpose.

34. This set of circumstances is consistent with applicant’s view expressed elsewhere in S1 that after she was released from detention in 2014 she was no longer a person of interest to the authorities in Ethiopia. That circumstance continued, according to the description of events in S1, until November 2016, sometime after the applicant had entered Australia.  The applicant does not contend in S1 that she travelled to Australia because she feared she would be persecuted if she returned to Ethiopia at that time.

35. Taking leave from her employment for the purpose of accepting her sister’s invitation to visit her in Australia and, obtaining an Australian Visitor visa for that purpose, is an explanation for leaving [City 1] that is materially different to leaving there because she was no longer permitted to remain for visa reasons and that she had become unemployed. These circumstances are also materially different to leaving [City 1] and travelling to Australia because she believed if she returned to Ethiopia at that time, she would be detained and tortured due to her ethnicity, being a single woman, and due to an association with the OLF.[2]

    [2] Department file, visa application form Q90.

36. In S2 the applicant revisited her explanation for travelling to Australia rather than returning to Ethiopia. Her explanation is materially different to the explanation she advanced in S1. The applicant explained she was in [City 1] on a temporary visa.  Through her regular communications with [Mr A], the ‘secretary’ of the secret cell of OLF supporters and the person who recruited her to join the cell, she was informed that members of their cell were arrested and imprisoned for supporting the OLF. This news induced in her a fear of returning to Ethiopia. She claims she believed she would be arrested at the airport immediately upon her arrival, detained and reimprisoned. She could no longer stay in [City 1] and needed a solution because she could not return to Ethiopia. Consequently, she decided to accept her sister’s invitation to visit her in Australia and assist her to manage her two children.

37. The differences between the applicant’s explanation for leaving for Australia on prearranged leave from her place of employment; leave taken and travel undertaken in response the her sister’s repeated invitation to visit her in Australia; and, travelling to Australia because she had received information that caused her to fear she faced immediate arrest and imprisonment if she set foot in Ethiopia, are material differences in the view of the Tribunal, and those differences are a matter of concern to the Tribunal.

38. There is an additional material difference found in S1 compared to S2. In S1 the applicant omitted to say she was under pressure to leave [City 1] because her temporary visa had expired, and she was unemployed.

39. The discrepancies in the applicant’s explanations of the circumstances that were affecting her situation at the time she decided to leave [City 1] and travel to Australia are concerning to the Tribunal. These omissions and the differences in the applicant’s account of material circumstances, induce doubt about the veracity and reliability of the applicant as a witness.

40. There is an obvious parallel between the economic circumstances the applicant was facing in [City 1] in May/August 2016 and her sense of her economic circumstances and prospects in Ethiopia in November 2014. These circumstances bore directly upon the applicant in 2014, and in the view of the Tribunal constitute the reason she decided to leave Ethiopia at that time. In 2014 the solution to her concerns was found in her move to [City 1]. In [City 1] she lived with her Aunty and obtained agreeable employment, whereas in Ethiopia, she believed it was hard to find employment; she believed she had no future there; and, that better economic opportunities would be available to her in [City 1].

41. At hearing the applicant gave further evidence about her reasons for relocating to [City 1]. She had been working in her uncle’s shop. He died in 2014 shortly after he was released from prison having been tortured there and detained for about three years. His injuries led to his death several months after his release. About that time in 2014 the uncle’s shop was demolished to make way for the redevelopment of the area. The applicant became unemployed. In that context the applicant was informed by her aunty in [City 1] about employment opportunities in [City 1].

42. It is not evident that the applicant in May/August 2016, when her visa and employment ceased in [City 1], that she assessed, or believed her economic prospects in Ethiopia had improved during the time she spent in [City 1].

43. At hearing the Tribunal informed the applicant, it was concerned she is an economic refugee; that she is not genuinely concerned she would be harmed for reasons of her political beliefs or for any other reason if she returned to Ethiopia.

44. In response to this concern the applicant relied on the Tribunal accepting that she was arrested, tortured, released, and became an active supporter of the OLF collecting funds for the OLF, and generally encouraging Oromo people to support the OLF.  At that time the applicant knew the OLF was a banned terrorist organisation.

45. To further summarise the applicant’s evidence, the applicant felt justified in supporting the OLF because she was tortured in prison. The Government discriminated against Oromo people, denied them basic human rights, murdered them, and disrespected their property rights. In prison she was befriended by [Mr A], the leader of a secret cell of OLF supporters.  They were released from custody together, and the applicant joined a secret cell and mainly collected donations from OLF supporters which she gave to [Mr A].

46. In S1 the applicant referred to being brutally assaulted on one occasion by two prison guards while they were sexually assaulting her and attempting to rape her. In S2 the applicant gave a materially different description of being sexually assaulted in prison. That prison officers tried to rape her many times, but she managed to fight them off. At hearing the applicant gave evidence consistent with S2: she claimed the same two members of the prison staff tried to rape her many times, but she fought them off. The Tribunal suggested it was difficult to accept that two male officers who attempted to rape her on multiple occasions would not have succeeded. The applicant materially varied her evidence to: there was one occasion when they seriously attempted to rape her; on the other occasions they were not serious. The variations in the applicant’s description of the sexual abuse she claims she suffered in detention suggests to the Tribunal that the veracity and accuracy of the applicant as a witness is doubtful.

1. To summarise parts of the evidence: the applicant claimed in S1 and S2 that after contacting [Mr A] and another cell member from Australia she was not longer able to make contact with them. First, she lost contact with [Mr A] and then the other member of her cell. Through these communications she learnt [Mr A] had been arrested and the other member of her cell she was speaking to about [Mr A] not being contactable was in hiding.  Additionally, the applicant claims her aunty contacted her in Australia and informed her she had been by visited police at her home on several occasions looking for the applicant. At hearing the applicant made similar claims. Acceptance of this evidence as reliable depends on accepting the applicant as a truthful and reliable witness, and that she genuinely fears she will be subjected to serious harm for reasons of her political beliefs and past support for the OLF, and that she would actively support the OLF in Ethiopia if she is removed to Ethiopia, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

2. According to the applicant’s evidence a part of being released from detention was that she was forced to sign a document in which she agreed not to engage in anti-government activities and accepted that if she did so, she would be subject to arrest and detention.

3. By implication the applicant contends that she would be at risk of future harm in Ethiopia because she would actively support the OLF if she is returned to Ethiopia and that support would put her in breach of the agreement.  Acceptance of the existence of a real chance of the applicant being subject to harm associated with this agreement depends on accepting that the applicant signed the purported agreement, and that the applicant would support the OLF is she is removed to Ethiopia. The Tribunal will return to the latter aspect of this matter later in its reasons. Nevertheless, for reasons already discussed in this decision, the Tribunal doubts the veracity and reliability of the applicant as a witness; and, the evidence is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant entered into the purported agreement.

4. Furthermore, after giving regard to the foregoing evidence and concerns, considered cumulatively, the Tribunal remains concerned that the applicant relocated to [City 1] in search of better economic opportunities; and, the applicant relocated to Australia for the same reason, being the economic advantages arising from living and working in Australia. It this respect the Tribunal has given regard to, the applicant indicating in S2 that she is employed and, her remark towards the end of her evidence at hearing that she is working.

5. The evidence considered as whole indicates the applicant left Ethiopia for [City 1] and [City 1] for Australia, for the same reason in both instances: she relocated in pursuit of better economic opportunities and advancement.   Having regard to this consideration, on balance, the evidence is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant left Ethiopia for political reasons.

6. The evidence material to deciding whether the applicant supported the OLF is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant at any time supported the OLF; that she was imprisoned in Ethiopia; that she was at any time a member of a secret cell of OLF supporters; or that she would support the OLF if she were removed to Ethiopia, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

7. The applicant said in evidence that she would advocate for the welfare and advancement of Oromos and protest discrimination and violence against Oromos, if she is removed to Ethiopia. This is a political activity the applicant may pursue without necessarily joining the OLF, or actively supporting the OLF. Nevertheless, the applicant’s protection claim, submissions, and particularly her post-hearing submissions, depend in large measure on accepting the applicant would re-engage with the OLF in Ethiopia and support it providing its activities are law-abiding, and peaceful. The Tribunal has already found that it does not accept the applicant would support the OLF if she returned to Ethiopia.

8. At hearing the applicant made clear she never supported politically motivated violence and would not do so in the future.  The applicant would only support peaceful, and lawful, political protest activities and that she would do so if she is removed to Ethiopia. The applicant went on to qualify this evidence. To relevantly summarise her evidence: in Ethiopia there are no peaceful opportunities to engage in political activities because the government gives priority to parties that follow the government’s instructions. The applicant’s evidence is inherently inconsistent. The applicant would only engage in peaceful political activities, but in her mind, there are no peaceful opportunities to engage in political activities in support of the Oromo people, either as part of the OLF or as an individual, or otherwise. In considering this part of the applicant’s evidence, and her evidence as a whole, along with the Tribunal’s concerns about the applicant’s veracity and reliability as a witness, the Tribunal does not accept the applicant would be an advocate for the Oromo people and engage in anti-government political activities for the Oromo people if she were removed to Ethiopia now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

9. The applicant claims she would be harmed in Ethiopia for reasons of her religious belief. The applicant claims her religion when she entered Australia was Protestant Christian. She did not claim in her PV application form or in S1 that she feared she would be persecuted for reasons of religion if she returned to Ethiopia.

10. On 27 April 2021 in S2, the applicant claimed for the first time she fears she will be persecuted in Ethiopia for reasons of religion.  At hearing the applicant said she became a ‘Born Again Christian’ in Australia. The applicant no longer regards herself as strictly Protestant. According to the evidence the applicant is not Orthodox Christian.

11. The applicant has not given evidence that discloses in the event of her return to Ethiopia, that her religious practises in Australia as a born-again Christian, would differ in any objectively appreciable way from the Protestant form of Christianity she adhered to and practised in Ethiopia. There is no evidence that the applicant practised Christianity in [City 1], either privately or publicly when she was living there.  At hearing the applicant’s position was that she had not experienced persecution on religious grounds in Ethiopia. The applicant at hearing accepted many Ethiopians are practising Christians.

12. In S2 the applicant asserted that when she is not working, she attends church in Australia every Sunday, she is devoted to her faith and she reads the bible regularly. At hearing the applicant repeated the substance of this evidence.

13. The evidence is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant’s Christian belief and religious practises would differ materially from the Christian beliefs and practises she previously adhered to in Ethiopia, if she is removed to Ethiopia now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. It is relevant to repeat here that the applicant was not subjected to persecution for reasons of her Christian beliefs or practises in Ethiopia.

14. At hearing the applicant claimed that at present there are many problems in Ethiopia relating to religion. The applicant is in regular contact with her mother who lives in Jimma, in Oromia State.  The applicant communicates with her Aunty in Addis Ababa, and other close relatives residing in Jimma. There is no evidence of any of these persons warning the applicant that religious persecution is a matter that would pose a realistic threat to the applicant’s wellbeing, or that it is something the applicant should be concerned about. Furthermore, the applicant did not adduce evidence from her relatives in Ethiopia about current circumstances in Jimma, Oromia State, and Addis Ababa in support of, and to particularise her general evidence about facing religious persecution in Ethiopia.

15. The evidence suggests the applicant practised Christian openly in Ethiopia, so it is reasonable to apprehend her close relatives would be aware she is Christian. It is also reasonable to expect they would have reported any appreciable risk to the applicant of persecution for reasons of religion if any such risk would pose a real chance of harm to the applicant if she were to reside in Jimma, Addis Ababa, or Ethiopia.

16. In S2 the applicant referenced the incidents in Ethiopia that founded her fear of persecution for reasons of religion. The applicant contends in S2 that she knows that just recently, hundreds of Christians were murdered at a Church situated near the border of Ethiopia and Eretria. The applicant’s evidence does not establish when she learnt of the event, when it is said to have occurred, or who carried out the attack. Country information provided by the applicant reports an event like the event described by the applicant. That event occurred in January 2021, in Tigray State. Reportedly it was carried out by forces from neighbouring Eritrea. Neither the applicant’s evidence nor the country information indicates whether the forces from Eritrea were state military forces, state actors, terrorists, or an armed group acting on some specific regional grievance, or ethnic rivals. Relevantly, DFAT country information refers to interethnic violence in regional areas in Ethiopia being problematic and the government is acting to quell it.

17. The applicant’s evidence in this regard, lacking in relevant specifics as it is, considered in conjunction with the country information report provided by the applicant about an attack in January 2021 on a Christian church, indicates that in S2 the applicant may be referring to a written report she has become aware of about this event. At hearing the applicant accepted she had accessed country information in preparing her case on review.

18. It seems the 2021 attack on the church that the applicant may have had in mind was carried out by unidentified forces from a neighbouring country, namely Eritrea. The attack may have been performed for any number of reasons including religious persecution. Considering the attack was carried out by forces from a neighbouring state, the attack may have been motivated by military, or political objectives and not as a response to the religious belief of the persons killed. It may have been motivated by interethnic rivalry, or carryover grievances from the past military conflict between Ethiopia and Eretria.

19. The applicant also claims that extremists commit arson attacks on houses that belong to Christians and steal their property. The applicant did not specify the source of this information and when she became aware of it.  The applicant’s evidence is general, it lacks particularity: it does not identify when or where the events occurred, or the frequency of the events she had in mind. In evidence, the applicant did not give details about the alleged extremists, or their motivations. For example, the events may have been motivated by anti-Christian sentiment or, they may have been motivated by interethnic rivalries or other reasons unrelated to religion. The attack may have been carried out by armed criminal gangs motivated by profit or by some motivation apart from religion. Relevantly, DFAT country information reports that armed gangs operate in some border regions of Ethiopia and interethnic violence occurs in certain border regions. DFAT country information also reports that armed OLF factions have engaged in criminal activities, including extorting businesses and robbing banks in western Oromia. The applicant’s evidence is vague, general in its terms and lacking in material specificity.

20. In considering the applicant’s evidence and the material aspects of the country information provided by the applicant, including the DFAT country information relating to inter-religious violence, the Tribunal is not satisfied the events the applicant attributes in S2 to extremists, being events that the applicant claims contributed to engendering her fear of being persecuted for reasons of religion, were acts motivated by religious intolerance or that the applicant believes the acts were carried out for religious reasons.

21. The applicant also claims in S2 that many areas of Ethiopia are unsafe for Christians and that Christians are killed in those areas, and they are also killed in and around Addis Ababa. These claims are general and lacking in material specificity. The applicant did not specify in her evidence at hearing the areas she says are unsafe for Christians except Addis Ababa, nor did the applicant specify the areas around Addis Ababa that are unsafe, or where and when the contemplated events occurred. The applicant gave no evidence about whether the areas she had in mind are continuing to experience anti-Christian attacks and any government response to those events.

22. DFAT country information provided by the applicant to the Tribunal, refers to violent events that happened in September 2018. At that time the return of the OLF, an Oromo representative organisation, provoked intra-Oromo clashes and the targeting of homes and businesses belonging to non-Oromos. These events may be consistent with the applicant’s evidence about property damage and theft, but the causes are reported to be political; it is not reported the events were motivated for reason of religion, although the Tribunal recognises the perpetrators and victim’s may be supporters of the OLF and Christian.  This view follows from country information. The DFAT country information indicates that Ethiopian society is deeply religious: 43.5 per cent of the population are Ethiopian Orthodox and 18.5 per cent are Protestant. According to the DFAT report ‘recent data is hard to come by, roughly similar numbers of Oromos practise Islam and Christianity (both Orthodox and Protestant).’

23. In submissions dated 27 April 2021, it is submitted the murder on 29 June 2020 of a famous Oromo singer and activist triggered at least 500 Ethiopian Christians being killed by Muslim extremists. In this regard the submission refers to certain country information.

24. The DFAT country information reports this event. During unrest chiefly in Oromia State and Addis Ababa, which followed the murder of the highly popular Oromo singer and activist, Hachalu Hundessa, 230 people were killed, including a dozen members of the security forces. An internet black out was imposed. Jawar Mohammed, a prominent Oromo activist and media owner was arrested on 30 June 2020. The premises of three media outlets were searched on the grounds of ‘incitement to racial or religious hatred.’

25. According to DFAT country information in respect of the widespread unrest associated with the death of the Oromo singer, and the arrest of the media owner, the Prime Minister’s Office stated in a press release on 10 July 2020 that: ‘“contrary to erroneous reporting” calm had returned to Addis Ababa and affected areas of Oromia State.’ 

26. DFAT country information also reports that the rule of law has deteriorated in some regional states and several non-state armed groups have emerged to advance interests of their ethnic group. Nevertheless, DFAT assesses Addis Ababa to be particularly stable, and it continues to attract migrants from other parts of the country in search of economic opportunities.

27. The social and political instability that followed the murder of the Oromo singer in June 2020, and the surrounding events referred to in the DFAT country information, seem to be the events the applicant refers to in S2, and contemplated in her evidence. The country information indicates the unrest may have been motivated by political influences, rather than for reasons of political opinion. The Tribunal is not satisfied those events were caused by systematic anti-Christian conduct in Ethiopia, or Oromia State and Addis Ababa in particular.

28. DFAT information demonstrates that Ethiopia has a history of religious diversity, and different religions have traditionally co-existed peacefully. The government does not have a policy that discriminates on religious grounds. However, attacks on places of worship increased between 2018 and 2019 when mostly Muslims attacked and killed about 100 people, mostly Christians.  Some of these attacks occurred in Somali State. Thirty Christian churches, primarily Orthodox Tewahedo churches, were attacked in mostly Muslim areas. It is relevant to be reminded the applicant is not a member of the Orthodox Tewahedo Church, and that she is a born-again Christian.

29. The Tribunal accepts incidents of violence against mostly Orthodox Christian Churches in some areas of Ethiopia have occurred. Nevertheless, according to DFAT country information, attacks on places of worship are rare overall. Historically, the two largest religious groups, Orthodox Christian and Muslims, generally respect each other’s right to practise their faith, despite a low level of distrust. Interfaith marriage is common in Addis Ababa. People openly observe different faiths and attend their respective places of worship without being harassed or being harmed.

30. DFAT assesses there is a low risk of official and societal discrimination or violence based on religion, including in the case of religions with small followings. DFAT assesses that people can practise their religious beliefs freely and openly in Ethiopia.  

31. The applicant does not claim that she practices a form of Christianity that, because of any particular practice, would give rise to a real chance of her being persecuted. The DFAT country information does not refer to born-again Christians being persecuted.

32. In so far as there may be a material variation between the DFAT country information report, and other country information filed by the applicant, the Tribunal prefers the DFAT country information.

33. In considering the evidence as a whole that is material to the issue of persecution for reasons of religion, and after having regard to the county information, the evidence is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that there is a real chance the applicant would be subjected to serious harm for reasons of religion if she is removed to Ethiopia now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

34. The applicant claims she will be subjected to serious harm in Ethiopia because she is an Oromo woman, and because she is a woman.

35. At hearing the applicant acknowledged in evidence that the government that has been in power since 2018 is not the government that was in power when she was living in Ethiopia. This part of the applicant’s evidence reflects the DFAT country information report she provided to the Tribunal.

36. The applicant is aware that former members of the OLF and OLF parties joined the government after she left Ethiopia, and members of the OLF returning from overseas agreed to work with the government, but they subsequently abandoned that agreement, according to the applicant.  The applicant is aware the current leader of the government is an Oromo person. The applicant claimed in evidence the current government is no different from the previous government; and the previous government discriminated against Oromos and targeted and harmed them because they were Oromos. To the contrary, DFAT country information indicates the current government is a reformist coalition government that has greatly expanded the space for participation in legitimate mainstream political activities. It also indicates peaceful political protest and opposition to government is allowed. Registered political parties can participate in mainstream political activities. Considering the country information as a whole, including DFAT country information, the Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s evidence that there is no material difference between the past repressive government and the present government.  

1. In submissions the applicant relied on six reported incidents that occurred between November 2020 and March 2021. Each incident involved Oromo people being killed by members of the military or police or both. The incidents are contained in Report 55 of the Oromo Support Group.  The Tribunal is unable to be satisfied of the extent to which this reporting by the Oromo Support Group about Oromos is accurate and objective.

2. DFAT country information reports that Oromos bore the brunt of the anti-government protests from 2014 to 2018 and the associated arrests and detentions. Since 2018, under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy, and a new governing party, the Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP), dissidents, including exiled members of the banned OLF have been welcomed back into society and many have entered mainstream politics.  The OLF is now a registered political party that is preparing to contest the next federal election. Oromo influence at the federal level has expanded significantly since the 2018 election of Prime Minister Abiy. However, a section of the armed wing of the OLF has not given up its arms and continues to be active.  Oromos have instigated interethnic violence.

3. DFAT assesses that individuals who are part of, or have links to, armed OLF factions engaged in criminal activities and clashes with government forces are likely to be of interest to the authorities, and to face a moderate risk of arrest and detention. Considered in context all the country information reports of the killing and detention of Oromos may be reasonably explained by the relevant persons being directly or indirectly linked to armed factions of the OLF engaged in criminal activities and clashes with government forces, rather than being victimised because of their ethnicity.

4. DFAT assesses the risk of persecution is low for OLF members who participate peacefully in the political processes. DFAT also assesses that Oromos face a low risk of official discrimination based on their ethnicity, including with respect to employment in the public sector.

5. The applicant claims she will be harmed by the military and the police because she is Oromo and a woman. In this regard the relevant DFAT country information and the other country information provided by the applicant has been considered by the Tribunal.

6. DFAT assesses that excluding Addis Ababa, Oromos face a moderate risk of violence in areas or states where they constitute a minority. Oromos constitute the single largest ethnic group in Ethiopia and they are concentrated in Oromia State. Oromo is the most populous state, comprising around 27 percent of the total population.

7. Having considered all the written material the applicant provided to the Department and the Tribunal, including the country information and related submissions, and the applicant’s evidence, while accepting the applicant’s lack of a university qualification is likely to make it more difficult for her to obtain employment, the evidence is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal the existence of a real chance the applicant would: suffer significant economic hardship that threatens her capacity to subsist; that she would be denied access to basic services, where the denial threatens her capacity to subsist; that she would be subjected to denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens her capacity to subsist, if she is removed to Ethiopia now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. It is relevant to reiterate here that the Tribunal does not accept the applicant was excluded from university for reason of her being an Oromo person.

8. DFAT assesses that under the current federal government, failed asylum seekers face a low risk of harm on their return to Ethiopia, including those who sought asylum on political grounds. 

9. The applicant claims she is more likely to be harmed and persecuted in Ethiopia because she is a woman who is single, with ageing parents who are unable to protect her.  The applicant is [age] years of age. In support of this claim, the applicant in S2 said an unidentified person known to her sister told her sister about an occasion when someone tried to rape and sexually abuse her. The applicant’s sister at some unspecified time informed the applicant of this allegation. The applicant did not adduce evidence from her sister or her unnamed friend about this incident, otherwise substantiate her claim: and the Tribunal gives little weight to the evidence. 

10. The applicant claims in S2 that much of the violence against women is being carried out by members of the military and police and they will not protect her, and the government will not protect her because they are the wrongdoers and she is a woman.

11. According to DFAT country information, Ethiopia scores highly in international rankings for gender equality in political participation. In 2018 Ethiopia elected a female president. Women are well represented in the Council of Ministers including defence and the judiciary. Nevertheless, women generally have fewer opportunities than men in employment and participation in the labour force.  These circumstances are influenced by several factors including societal discrimination, traditional norms and attitudes regarding gender roles, and women’s generally lower level of educational attainment. Single women may face greater economic challenges but not societal discrimination in urban areas.

12. The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s evidence, including S1, S2 and the evidence in the PV application forms, about the applicant being a single Oromo woman and what the applicant said about her parents being elderly and unable to protect her.  

13. Having considered the country information, including the DFAT country information that reports on the circumstances facing Oromos, and women generally in Ethiopia, and the applicant’s evidence, including S1 and S2 and the PV application forms, the evidence is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the applicant as a single Oromo women in Ethiopia faces, for that reason, a real chance of  being subjected to serious harm, including sexual violence, that is systematic in the sense of non-random and discriminatory conduct.

14. Furthermore, the evidence considered as whole is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal the existence of a real chance that the applicant would be subjected to serious harm because she is single women or an Oromo woman if she is removed to Ethiopia now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

15. Based on the whole of the materially relevant evidence before the Tribunal, the Tribunal finds the evidence is insufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal the existence of a real chance the applicant would be subjected to serious harm for reasons of race, religion, membership of a particular social group, political opinion, or for any other s 5J(1)(a) reason, if she is removed to Ethiopia now or in the foreseeable future.

16. Consequently, the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons specified in s 5J(1) of the Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant meets the definition of refugee as set out is s 5H of the Act.

    Complementary protection

17. The Tribunal now turns to whether the applicant satisfies the criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. A person will meet that criterion if there are ‘substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant, a non-citizen, being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm’.

18. The test for ‘real risk’ is the same as that for the ‘real chance’ test in the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a).[3]

    [3] MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505.

19. Pursuant to s 36(2A), a person will suffer significant harm if:

    (a)they will be arbitrarily deprived of their life; or

    (b)the death penalty will be carried out on them; or

    (c)they will be subjected to torture; or

    (d)they will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

    (e)they will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

20. In applying the decision in MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 201 FCR 505, [246] [297] [342], the Tribunal accepts the ‘real risk’ test is the same as the ‘real chance’ test in the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. Therefore, for the reasons outlined above the Tribunal is not satisfied that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed to Ethiopia, there is a real risk the applicant will suffer significant harm as defined in s 36(2A).

21. Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant meets the criterion in s 36(2)(aa).

    FINDINGS

22. Having considered the applicant’s claims individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant is a refugee for the purposes of the Act, and therefore the applicant is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugee Convention. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2)(a).

23. Furthermore, having considered the applicant’s claims individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa).

24. There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s 36(2) of the Act based on being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy any of the criteria in s 36(2).

    DECISION

25. The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa.

    Peter Haag
    Member

    
    

    ATTACHMENT  -  Extract from Migration Act 1958

    5 (1) Interpretation

    …

    cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:

    (a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or

    (b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;

    but does not include an act or omission:

    (c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

    (d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

    …

    degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:

    (a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

    (b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

    …

    torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:

    (a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or

    (b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or

    (c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or

    (d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or

    (e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;

    but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

    …

    receiving country,  in relation to a non-citizen, means:

    (a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or

    (b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.

    …

    5H    Meaning of refugee

    (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:

    (a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or

    (b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.

    Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.

    …

    5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution

    (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:

    (a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and

    (b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and

    (c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.

    Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.

    (2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.

    Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.

    (3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:

    (a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or

    (b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or

    (c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:

    (i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;

    (ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;

    (iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;

    (iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;

    (v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;

    (vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

    (4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):

    (a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and

    (b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and

    (c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

    (5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:

    (a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;

    (b)     significant physical harassment of the person;

    (c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;

    (d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

    (e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

    (f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.

    (6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

    5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family

    For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:

    (a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and

    (b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:

    (i)the first person has ever experienced; or

    (ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

    where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.

    Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

    5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family

    For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:

    (a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and

    (b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and

    (c)     any of the following apply:

    (i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;

    (ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;

    (iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

    (d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

    5LA Effective protection measures

    (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:

    (a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:

    (i)the relevant State; or

    (ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

    (b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.

    (2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:

    (a)     the person can access the protection; and

    (b)     the protection is durable; and

    (c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.

    …

    36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act

    …

    (2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

    (a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

    (aa)  a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or

    (b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

    (i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and

    (ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

    (c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

    (i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and

    (ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

    (2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:

    (a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

    (b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or

    (c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or

    (d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

    (e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

    (2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:

    (a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

    (b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

    (c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.

    …