1811082 (Refugee)

[2021] AATA 2667

1811082 (Refugee) [2021] AATA 2667 (12 May 2021)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:  Migration & Refugee Division

CASE NUMBER:  1811082

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                  Ethiopia

MEMBER:Peter Haag

DATE:12 May 2021

PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne

DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s.36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act1958.

Statement made on 12 May 2021 at 4:43pm

CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Ethiopia – political opinion – anti-government protestor –  member of Ginbot 7 – race – Oromo – particular social group – single mother of Amhara or Oromo or mixed ethnicity – arrested, interrogated and imprisoned – victim of domestic violence – threats of violence by former husband – prevalence of domestic violence – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H, 5J, 5K, 5L, 5LA, 36, 65, 499
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2

CASES
MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Application for review – refusal of protection visa

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (‘the Minister’) on 11 April 2018 to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (‘the Act’).

2. The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of Ethiopia, applied for the visa on 24 February 2017. The delegate refused to grant the visa as they were not satisfied that the applicant is a refugee, or that there exists a real risk of the applicant suffering harm upon her return to Ethiopia.

   Criteria for a protection visa

3. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b) or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

4. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.

5. A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s.5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s.5H(1)(b).

6. Under s.5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss.5J(2)–(6) and ss.5K–5LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

7. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s.36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss.36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

   Mandatory considerations

8. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (‘DFAT’) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

   CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

9. The following issues arise for determination by the Tribunal in relation to the present review application:

   (a)  whether the applicant meets the refugee criterion;

   (b)  whether the applicant alternatively meets the complementary protection criterion.

10. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be remitted.

11. The applicant provided to the Tribunal a copy of the record of the decision of the delegate made on 11 April 2018. The Tribunal has read that decision.

12. The applicant was born on [date] in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. These facts are well established by the documentation the applicant provided to the Department, including her passport. There is no evidence before the Tribunal that indicates the applicant’s passport is a bogus document. The Tribunal is satisfied the applicant is a citizen of Ethiopia. The Tribunal is also satisfied the applicant is a national of Ethiopia, and that Ethiopia is the applicant’s ‘receiving country’ for the purposes of s.36(2)(aa) of the Act.

13. The evidence does not demonstrate the applicant has a right to enter and reside in a country other than Ethiopia, accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied the applicant is not excluded from protection under the laws of Australia by s.36(3) of the Act.

14. The Tribunal convened a hearing to consider the merits of the review application on 13 April 2021. The applicant participated at the hearing before the Tribunal in person and, was assisted by an interpreter in the English and Amharic languages, who also participated in person. The applicant was assisted in the hearing by her representative.

    Applicant’s background

15. The applicant states that she was married [in] January 2017. Her husband was not included in her application for a protection visa.

16. The applicant’s sister resides in Australia and is an Australian citizen.

17. The applicant stated that she is of mixed ethnicity because her family predecessors are from the Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups, is Christian in terms of faith, and is able to speak, read and write Amharic and English.

18. The applicant first arrived in Australia [in] January 2017 at [age] years of age.

19. The applicant arrived on a Class FA 600 Visitor visa, which was set to expire [in] March 2017.

20. On 24 February 2017, the applicant applied for a protection visa. The application was lodged approximately one month after the applicant first arrived in Australia.

    Protection claims

21. In seeking protection, the applicant claims:

    ·     She was a member of the organising committee of a protest directed at her university because student conditions were objectionable;

    ·     That protest morphed into an anti-government protest after instigation from student spies from the government, and she was arrested and detained;

    ·     While detained, she was interrogated by a Tigrian officer who beat her and told her that Tigrians will rule Ethiopia for the next hundred years;

    ·     The same officer threatened to sexually assault her;

    ·     The security officers were mostly Tigrian and looked down on other ethnic groups;

    ·     She was sentenced to one month’s imprisonment for her role in the protest;

    ·     Through a person she met in prison she became an active member of a Ginbot 7 cell, her main role was to convince her friends to support Ginbot 7;

    ·     She later encouraged people to protest against the government, and it became common knowledge amongst her friends that she worked for Ginbot 7;

    ·     She then came to Australia to visit her sister;

    ·     The government arrests people of interest at the airport, though the applicant was able to leave freely;

    ·     If she returns to Ethiopia, she will be detained, tortured, and disappeared due to her support of Ginbot 7;

    ·     Ginbot 7 is banned by the Ethiopian authorities and classified as a terrorist organisation;

    ·     She could be imprisoned without a trial under the state of emergency in Ethiopia;

    ·     She did not seek help within Ethiopia as it is the authorities that are persecuting her, and they will not help her or other supporters of Ginbot 7;

    ·     She did not try to relocate within Ethiopia as the government security forces are everywhere and will put her life at risk;

    ·     The authorities know who she was working with in Ethiopia, and two of her Ginbot 7 cell members have been arrested;

    ·     Since departing Ethiopia, security forces have gone to her house and asked where she is now; located items that demonstrate she is an active member of Ginbot 7;

    ·     She cannot relocate within Ethiopia as people will ask her who she is and why she moved. Those people will then report her to the authorities;

    ·     She attended a Ginbot 7 support group meeting in Melbourne and will participate in that group’s future activities.

    ·     She is actively involved in two groups in Melbourne both of which serve to promote the interests of the Amhara people in Australia and Ethiopia;

    ·     In recent times the level of violence in Ethiopia has increased and armed Oromo gangs, and other ethnic groups threaten or inflict serious harm on Amhara people in Addis Ababa, and in other parts of Ethiopia too, where Amhara people are significantly outnumbered by Oromo people;

    ·     The applicant cannot relocate to Amhara State because violence against women there is widespread and the applicant fears she would be targeted and raped or otherwise sexually assaulted because she is a single mother.

    ·     Amara people suffer discrimination in employment and are being forced out of their employment by Oromo people who run the councils in Addis Ababa.

    ·     In Ethiopia she would join social and political groups that seek to advance the rights of Amhara people thereby increasing her risk of being targeted by Oromo people.

    ·     She married in Ethiopia according to the civil and religious laws of that country; her husband resides overseas; against his will she divorced him under Australian law;

    ·     The applicant is pregnant with the child of an Australian citizen she plans to marry shortly;

    ·     She suffered serious violence within her marriage;

    ·     Her ex-husband has threatened to cause her serious harm if she returns to Ethiopia;

    ·     The father of her child has resided in Australia for 20 years and is well established in his employment; he will not relocate with the applicant and her child to Ethiopia.

    COUNTRY INFORMATION

22. DFAT published a report on Ethiopia on 12 August 2020. That report provides the following information relevant to the applicant’s review:

    RECENT HISTORY

    Ethiopia, formerly Abyssinia, is a multi-ethnic federal republic in East Africa. Ethiopia is Africa’s oldest independent country — with the exception of a five-year Italian occupation (1936-41), it was never colonised. In 1974, a Communist military junta known as the Derg (‘Committee’) overthrew the long-serving Emperor, Haile Selassie, and abolished Ethiopia’s monarchy, the House of Solomon, which dated to antiquity.

    The Derg pursued policies of nationalisation and collectivisation, and Ethiopia descended into civil war between junta and rebel forces. Between 1976 and 1978, the Derg killed thousands of its opponents (the campaign of ‘Red Terror’). Rebel forces from the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a multi-ethnic alliance led by the Tigrayan people, ousted the Derg in 1991, ending Ethiopia’s civil war. The Derg’s leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, was granted asylum in Zimbabwe. The EPRDF and its successor, the Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP), have ruled Ethiopia since. In 1993, Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia and established its own state, rendering Ethiopia landlocked. A border dispute between the two countries triggered a two-year war (1998-2000), in which 100,000 people were killed (see Security Situation). Ethiopia is one of the most drought-prone countries in the world. Drought-induced famines in 1973-74 and 1984-85 resulted in more than 1 million deaths. Its capital city, Addis Ababa, is a major diplomatic hub, as seat of the African Union and the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

    Ethiopia held its first multi-party elections in May 1995. The EPRDF won this and all other subsequent elections, bringing stability and economic growth but restricting political dissent and media and civic freedoms for most of its time in power. The EPRDF was disbanded in December 2019  Ethnic Tigrayans, a minority, wielded outsized influence during most of the EPRDF’s rule, fostering resentment among the considerably larger Amhara and, in particular, Oromo ethnic groups. Meles Zenawi, a Tigrayan who led the removal of the Derg, served as prime minister from 1995 until his death in 2012. Zenawi was succeeded by his deputy, Hailemariam Desalegn, an ethnic Wolayta — Ethiopia’s first peaceful transition of power in modern times.

    Large-scale anti-government protests beginning in 2014, centred in Oromia and, later, Amhara states, prompted the declaration of a State of Emergency, under which over 20,000 people were arrested and 1,000 killed (see 2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency). Protesters demanded greater political rights, leading to the resignation, in February 2018, of Prime Minister Desalegn. His successor and current prime minister, Abiy Ahmed (appointed in April 2018), embarked on an ambitious reform agenda, and the human rights situation has improved significantly under his watch. Among other reforms, Abiy has lifted restrictions on freedom of expression, released political prisoners, removed terrorist designations of previously-exiled opposition groups, expanded the space for civil society, and initiated reform of legislation used previously to arrest and prosecute government critics. In parallel, Abiy has pursued high-profile diplomatic initiatives across East Africa. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for his peacebuilding efforts with Eritrea, culminating in the signing of an agreement to formally end their war. Abiy is Ethiopia’s first prime minister from the Oromo ethnic group.

    After an initial period where violence subsided significantly, ethno-nationalism, inter-ethnic clashes and associated displacement again increased, though not nearly to the levels witnessed preceding Abiy’s election. Abiy’s reform agenda has met some resistance, and his government was the subject of a purported coup attempt in June 2019. Abiy had committed to holding free and fair elections in 2020, although these have been postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak in the country. Abiy declared a five-month State of Emergency on 8 April 2020 in response to the outbreak. The State of Emergency, while valid only until September 2020, limits some human rights, particularly those around association and movement. While these reflect the types of restrictions in place internationally, there is scope for abuse. However, the response has generally been accepted as necessary by opposition parties who see it as proportionate to the threat posed by COVID-19.

    DEMOGRAPHY
    The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) estimates Ethiopia’s population at 110 million, with an average annual growth rate of 2.5 per cent in the period 2010-2019. Among African countries, only Nigeria is more populous. Ethiopia’s population is concentrated in the north and centre of the country (the ‘Ethiopian highlands’). Ethiopia has a young population — around 70 per cent is under the age of 30 (including nearly 40 per cent under 14). Only 4 per cent of Ethiopians are aged 65 or older. The median age is 18. Approximately 80 per cent of the population lives in rural areas.

    Ethiopia is ethnically and linguistically diverse, comprising more than 80 different ethnic groups and 100 languages. According to the most recent national census (2007), 10 ethnic groups have a population of 1 million people or more. The Oromo constitute the single largest, at 34.5 per cent of the population, followed by the Amhara (26.9 per cent), Somali (6.2 per cent), Tigrayan (6.1 per cent), Sidama (4 per cent) and Gurage (2.5 per cent) peoples. More recent figures are unavailable — a new census has been postponed repeatedly, most recently in 2019 (owing to large-scale internal displacement). Amharic is the official national language, although the government flagged in March 2020 its intention to grant similar status to the Oromiffa, Afar, Somali and Tigrinya languages. These languages already enjoy official status in the regional states in which they predominate. English is widely taught and spoken.

    Oromia is the most populous of Ethiopia’s states, with around 37 per cent of the total population, followed by Amhara (23.3 per cent) and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP – 20.4 per cent). Somali and Tigray states, respectively, account for 6 per cent and 5.8 per cent of Ethiopia’s population. Addis Ababa is Ethiopia’s largest city, with a population of around 4.5 million. As Ethiopia’s administrative and commercial capital, Addis Ababa attracts migrants from across the country and has a multi-ethnic character. Inter-ethnic marriage is common in Addis Ababa and urban centres. It is less common in rural areas.

    POLITICAL SYSTEM
    Ethiopia’s current constitution was adopted in December 1994 and came into force in August 1995. It established a federal system of regional states delineated according to settlement patterns, language and identity (i.e. ethnicity). This method of delineation essentially makes Ethiopia an ‘ethnic federation’, whereby the largest ethnic groups administer their own states and operate with considerable autonomy from the federal government.

    Ethiopia had nine states at the time of publication: (1) Afar; (2) Amhara; (3) Benishangul-Gumuz; (4) Gambela; (5) Harari; (6) Oromia; (7) Somali; (8) SNNP; and (9) Tigray. A 10th state, for the Sidama people, is in the process of being established, following the successful passage of a referendum on regional statehood in November 2019 (see Security Situation). States have their own legislative assemblies (kilili); its members are popularly elected. Under the constitution, states have the authority to, inter alia, enact and implement state laws; formulate economic, social and development policies; administer land and other natural resources in accordance with federal laws; levy and collect taxes and administer a state budget; and establish and administer a state police force. For administrative purposes, states are divided into districts (woredas) and neighbourhoods (kebeles). A kebele is the smallest unit of local government in Ethiopia. Representatives of woredas and kebeles are popularly elected. The federal government administers Addis Ababa (in addition to being the federal capital, Addis Ababa is the capital of surrounding Oromia State), Dira Dawa and Harar.

    Ethiopia has a bicameral federal parliament, consisting of the House of Peoples’ Representatives (lower chamber, 547 seats) and the House of the Federation (upper chamber, 153 seats). Members of the House of Peoples’ Representatives are elected by popular vote to five-year terms. State assemblies elect members of the House of the Federation, also to five-year terms. The constitution mandates that each recognised ‘Nation, Nationality, and People’ of Ethiopia be represented by one member in the House of the Federation, and one additional member for every million people of its population.

    The President is the head of state, and is elected jointly by both chambers of parliament to a six-year term (for a maximum of two terms). The incumbent, H.E. Mrs Sahle Work-Zewde, was elected in October 2018. The role of president is largely ceremonial. Most power is vested in the prime minister, who serves as the head of government and commander-in-chief of the national armed forces. The prime minister is chosen by the party with most seats in parliament. It is a constitutional requirement to hold national and state elections every five years.

    Political parties have existed in Ethiopia since the overthrow of the Derg in 1991, although the ability of parties not belonging to, or affiliated with, the EPRDF to operate freely was circumscribed. The EPRDF and affiliated parties controlled all tiers of government from 1991 to December 2019, when the EPRDF dissolved and reorganised as the Ethiopian Prosperity Party. The EPRDF was a coalition of four parties representing Ethiopia’s most powerful ethnic communities: (1) the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which founded the EPRDF and led the ouster of the Derg; (2) the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), formerly the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation, or OPDO; (3) the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), formerly the Amhara National Democratic Movement, or ANDM; and (4) the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM). The EPRDF had an estimated 8 million members.

    The EPRDF was overwhelmingly voted into power in 1995, Ethiopia’s first democratic election. It was re-elected in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015, although international observers alleged voter irregularities in these elections. Opposition parties made significant gains at the 2005 election, winning 174 of 547 seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives (the EPRDF took 327 seats) on a record voter turnout of 90 per cent. Opposition parties, led by the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD, also known as Qinjit), disputed the result and launched large-scale protests in Addis Ababa. These turned violent — clashes with government forces left nearly 200 protesters dead. Around 4,000 people were arrested, including opposition leaders. In response, the EPRDF restricted the space for political opposition. In July 2007, 30 opposition leaders were handed life sentences for their participation in the 2005 protests, but were immediately pardoned. In 2009, parliament adopted the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (the ATP), under which large numbers of political opponents, journalists and activists were arrested, effectively hobbling political opposition to the EPRDF (see also Political Opinion (Actual or imputed)). The EPRDF and affiliated parties won 546 of 547 seats in the 2010 national election, and all 547 seats in the 2015 election. The EPRDF and affiliated parties won 1,966 of 1,987 seats in the 2015 regional elections, thus retaining control of all states. National and regional elections were scheduled for 29 August 2020, but have been postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak.

    Ethiopia has witnessed significant changes in the political operating environment since April 2018. Restrictions on political opposition have eased significantly since April 2018, and political parties are able to operate more freely, particularly in Addis Ababa. To date, over 130 political parties have declared their intention to contest the forthcoming national election. Most are organised along ethnic lines.

    In June 2018, federal parliament removed Ginbot 7 (Amharic for ‘May 15’, the date of the disputed 2005 election), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) from its list of terrorist organisations. The parties, which maintained armed wings and were committed to the overthrow of the EPRDF through militant means from their bases in Eritrea, were designated as terrorist organisations in June 2011. Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF have since returned from exile and now participate in the political process. Other major opposition movements include the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (also known as Medrek) and Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (known as Ezema). Medrek is a coalition of four parties: the Ethiopian Socialist Democratic Party (ESDP), the Arena for Sovereignty and Democracy, the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). Ezema was formed in May 2019 through the merger of several opposition parties, including Ginbot 7, the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), the Semayawi Party (known as the Blue Party) and Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ, also known as Andinet, the successor party of the CUD/Qinjit). Some political parties promote openly nationalist platforms. Ezema is one of the few political parties that is not ethnic based.

    The Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP), formed in December 2019, merged into a single national party three of the four parties that previously formed the EPRDF (the ODP, ADP and SEPDM). The EPP also includes the former Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), the Benishangul-Gumuz People’s Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF), the Ethiopian Somali People’s Democratic Party (ESPDP), the Gambela People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM) and the Harari National League (HNL). The ANDP, BGPDUF, ESPDP, GPDM and HNL previously governed Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, Gambela and Harari states, respectively. They were affiliated to – but not formally part of – the EPRDF. Prime Minister Abiy justified the formation of the Ethiopian Prosperity Party on national unity grounds, claiming it would buttress efforts to move away from ethnic-based identity politics and toward ‘pan-Ethiopianism’. The TPLF, which traditionally dominated decision-making within the EPRDF but felt marginalised under Abiy, opposed the merger and refused to join the EPP. The TPLF is seeking new alliances ahead of the next elections. These elections were planned for August 2020 but have now been indefinitely postponed due to COVID-19.

    Parliament adopted a new electoral law in August 2019. Among other things, the law bars serving public servants from contesting elections and increases the threshold for the formation of political parties. Under the new law, 10,000 signatures are required to form a national political party (up from 1,500), and 4,000 signatures for a regional party (up from 750). The law also establishes a framework for resolving electoral disputes countrywide. In March 2019, 107 political parties signed a code of conduct with the federal government to work towards free and fair elections in 2020. The Abiy Government has sought to strengthen the independence of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). In November 2018, it appointed Birtukan Mideksa – a high-profile dissident who previously led the UDJ and was imprisoned for her role in the 2005 protests – as NEBE Chair. On 31 March 2020, NEBE announced it could not hold general elections as scheduled on 29 August 2020 due to the COVID-19 outbreak. Constitutionally, elections must be held by the end of the Ethiopian Calendar year on 6 September 2020. Having declared this no longer possible, the Government is consulting opposition parties, and assessing its constitutional options.

    DFAT assesses there has been a shift toward political plurality since April 2018. DFAT assesses there is a level of political commitment at the federal level to open the space for opposition political parties and to stage free and fair multi-party elections when possible. Opposition parties were actively preparing for the August 2020 elections before they were postponed but the pressure put on the system by the COVID-19 pandemic, along with the drought and locust plague, will test Abiy’s commitment to Ethiopia’s new principles, and opposition parties’ commitment to collaboration.

    HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
    Article 10 of the constitution stipulates human rights and freedoms are inviolable and inalienable, and all human and democratic rights of Ethiopia’s citizens (and peoples) shall be respected. The constitution recognises the right to freedom of thought, expression, assembly, association, conscience and religion.

    Ethiopia is a State Party to seven of the nine core international human rights treaties: the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (and its optional protocols on the involvement of children in armed conflict and the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography); and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Ethiopia is not a signatory to the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Article 9 of the constitution stipulates that all international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land.

    Chapter Three of the constitution sets out a series of fundamental rights and freedoms, including: the right to life, security of person and liberty; a prohibition against inhuman treatment; freedom of religion, belief and opinion; the right of assembly, demonstration and petition; freedom of association; and freedom of movement. In practice, application of these provisions has been uneven, particularly before April 2018, when laws such as the ATP were widely used to detain government critics (see Political Opinion (Actual or imputed) and Media). The human rights situation has improved significantly since April 2018, and parliament adopted a revised ATP on 2 January 2020. The new legislation is significantly more human rights-compliant than the 2009 proclamation but has still drawn criticism from groups, including Amnesty International (see Political Opinion (Actual or Imputed)).

    Ethiopia participated in the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process in 2009, 2014 and 2019. Of the 327 recommendations it received as part of its most recent UPR (May 2019), Ethiopia accepted 270. It has committed to reviewing visit requests from UN special procedure mandate holders. The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression visited Ethiopia in December 2019 — the first visit by a special procedure mandate holder since 2006. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights visited Ethiopia in May 2017 and April 2018.

    Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
    The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was established in 2000 with a mandate to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the constitution. This includes advising the federal government on the compliance of national laws with international human rights standards; delivering training to the military, police, prison officials and public servants; and monitoring federal and regional prisons, including through unannounced visits. The EHRC has the power to investigate allegations of human rights violations that are not currently before the courts, including by summoning parties and analysing evidence, and to make recommendations to relevant state institutions. The EHRC has branches in every regional state. It also operates legal aid centres in collaboration with universities and civil society. The EHRC receives government funding and is accountable to parliament, which appoints its commissioners. Traditionally, the EHRC has lacked capacity and independence and rarely investigated alleged human rights violations by government forces. A local source told DFAT that the EHRC had not lived up to its mandate.

    The Global Alliance for National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) assesses the EHRC as being partially compliant with the Paris Principles, the international standard for national human rights institutions (the EHRC was last assessed in 2013). In making its assessment, the GANHRI noted that the EHRC had not provided any advice to the government on laws that impact on human rights, including the ATP and the Charities and Societies Proclamation (2009) (see Human Rights Organisations).

    The EHRC has a complaints mechanism, and receives about 1,000 complaints annually. These range from domestic violence, workplace discrimination and labour disputes to enforced disappearances, ill treatment in detention and mass killings. DFAT understands the EHRC plans to publish its findings from all future investigations. Budgetary constraints are an ongoing challenge, and hamper its ability to attract and retain qualified staff, and, in turn, to monitor and investigate complaints of human rights violations.

    The current federal government has undertaken to reform and strengthen the capacity and independence of the EHRC. It is reviewing the law establishing the EHRC, with a view to strengthening its mandate. The review is ongoing. A new Chief Commissioner, Daniel Bekele, was appointed in July 2019. Bekele is a high-profile human rights activist who was jailed for his work with the NGO Action Aid Ethiopia and, following his release, went into exile, where he held senior positions at Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

    SECURITY SITUATION
    The security situation has deteriorated in parts of the country since 2018. Inter-ethnic clashes – invariably over land and other resources – have increased significantly, particularly in the West Guji Zone of Oromia State and along the Oromia-Somali, Oromia-Benishangul-Gumuz, and Amhara-Tigray state borders.

    Inter-ethnic clashes have caused death, the destruction of property and large-scale internal displacement — Ethiopia recorded the most conflict-related internal displacement in the world in 2018 (see Internally- Displaced People). Ethnic militias have proliferated in the states, and weapons are readily available. Addis Ababa has largely been immune from this instability to date. Inter-ethnic clashes along the border between Oromia and Somali states have displaced more than 1 million people since 2017. Clashes have subsided, but continue to flare up sporadically. In August 2018, the federal government deployed forces to quell riots in Jijiga, the capital of Somali State, and surrounding areas. The riots were triggered by the arrest of the state president, and involved the targeting of non-Somalis and Christians (see Religion). At least 30 people died and 140,000 were displaced. Youths loyal to the former state president, belonging to a group called the Heego, were behind the riots. The security situation in Somali State has improved significantly since (see Somalis). In February 2019, federal parliament adopted a proclamation establishing a national reconciliation commission to promote dialogue and encourage resolution of inter-ethnic disputes.

    The return from exile of previously-banned groups and individuals has catalysed unrest in Oromia State. In September 2018, the return of the OLF provoked intra-Oromo clashes and the targeting of homes and businesses belonging to non-Oromos. At least 70 people were killed and 15,000 displaced. The OLF has yet to disarm completely, and some OLF factions engage in armed clashes with government forces, particularly in western areas of Oromia State. Armed OLF factions have reportedly engaged in criminal activities, including extorting businesses and conducting bank robberies in western Oromia. In October 2019, at least 86 people died during riots triggered by claims – made via Facebook – that the federal government was endangering the personal security of Jawar Mohammed, a prominent Oromo activist and founder of the Oromo Media Network (OMN). Jawar, an advocate for greater rights for the Oromo people who was previously allied to Prime Minister Abiy (but who is now a prominent critic), helped organise from his US base the 2014-18 protests that precipitated the resignation of the previous government. Jawar returned to Ethiopia in August 2018.

    Jawar was rearrested on 30 June 2020 during renewed unrest, chiefly in Oromia State but also in the capital Addis Ababa. The unrest followed the 29 June murder of popular Oromo singer and activist Hachalu Hundessa, a former political prisoner who rose to become one of the country’s biggest music stars and a voice for the Oromo ethnic group. International media reported that more than 230 people, including almost a dozen members of the security forces, were killed in the unrest, and an internet blackout was imposed. Nearly 5,000 people were arrested on various charges, including several prominent Oromo leaders and journalists, among them Jawar. The Attorney-General announced that the premises of three media outlets (including Jawar’s Oromia Media Network) had been searched on suspicion of ‘incitement to racial or religious hatred’. The Prime Minister’s Office stated in a press release on 10 July 2020 that, ‘contrary to erroneous reporting’, calm had returned to Addis Ababa and affected areas of Oromia State.

    In June 2019, the chief of staff of the National Defence Force (head of the military), General Seare Mekonnen, and the president of Amhara State, Ambachew Mekonnen, were assassinated in concurrent events in Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar (Amhara State). Both were allied to Prime Minister Abiy, who characterised the assassinations as a failed coup attempt. The alleged ringleader, Brigadier General Asaminew Tsige, the chief of security in Amhara State, was killed by government forces. Tsige, who had advocated for greater regional autonomy, had been pardoned and released from prison in 2018 (he was serving a life sentence for his alleged involvement in a failed 2009 coup attempt by Ginbot 7). Federal government forces were deployed to Amhara State and Addis Ababa, and a weeklong internet blackout was imposed nationally, in the wake of the alleged coup. Abiy was earlier the subject of a grenade attack at a progovernment rally in Addis Ababa. The authorities described the June 2018 incident as a failed assassination attempt, and five people were charged with terrorism offences. The attack killed two people and injured more than 100.

    SNNP experienced major civil unrest in July 2019, after the federal government delayed a referendum on whether the Sidama people – the largest ethnic group in SNNP and the fifth-largest in Ethiopia overall – should secede from SNNP and create their own regional state. Clashes between Sidama protesters and government forces ensued, and ethnic minorities were targeted, leaving over 50 people dead. A State of Emergency was put in place in SNNP (though never publicly declared) and the military and federal police were deployed to restore order. The situation in SNNP has since stabilised. A referendum was held in November 2019, where the Sidama voted overwhelmingly in favour of regional statehood (the process of establishing a separate state for the Sidama was ongoing at the time of publication). SNNP is the most diverse of Ethiopia’s states, comprising over 45 ethnic groups. At least 10 other ethnic groups, including the Wolayta, have since flagged their intention to pursue their own regional states, a right guaranteed by the constitution (see Race/Nationality).

    Border areas with neighbouring countries are extremely unstable. Non-state armed groups, including bandits, operate along Ethiopia’s borders with Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. Inter-tribal clashes, including across national borders, and skirmishes between non-state armed groups and government forces are common in these areas (in April 2016, members of the Murle people in South Sudan attacked a number of villages in Gambela State, killing 200 people). The risk of violent robbery and kidnapping in border areas is high. The terrorist group Al-Shabaab, based in Somalia, reportedly maintains a presence in areas close to the Ethiopian border.

    DFAT assesses that, outside of national and state border areas, the government controls the security situation, and Ethiopia tends to be safer than most of its neighbours. DFAT assesses Addis Ababa to be particularly stable, and it continues to attract migrants from other parts of the country in search of economic opportunities. Nevertheless, the rule of law has deteriorated in some regional states and several non-state armed groups have emerged to advance the interests of their ethnic group. The situation along regional state borders can be particularly unstable. DFAT assesses that, with Ethiopia’s democratic opening presenting opportunities for the expression of previously-suppressed historical grievances and ethnic-based clashes increasing across the country, people who constitute ethnic minorities in regional states face a growing risk of physical violence. This risk is more pronounced during times of civil unrest.

    RACE/NATIONALITY
    Article 25 of the constitution stipulates all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection regardless of race, nationality, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status. Article 46 of the constitution provides the basis for Ethiopia’s states to be delimited ‘on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned’. In effect, this involves the creation of states that are broadly consistent with the geographic locations of major ethnic groups. Traditionally, ethnically-motivated societal violence has been rare, although ethnic-based clashes have increased since 2018 (see Security Situation), fuelled largely by competition for resources and enabled, in part, by the lifting of restrictions on freedom of expression and an associated rise in hate speech and misinformation (see Media). With the exception of the ethnic Anuak people of Gambela State, most ethnic groups in Ethiopia are indistinguishable by their physical appearance, partly as a result of inter-marriage.

    Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic society, and ethnic groups enjoy extensive rights. Under the Ethiopian Constitution every ‘nation, nationality and people’ (a reference to all ethnic groupings which constitute Ethiopia) has the right to speak their language and promote their culture. Every nation, nationality and people also has the constitutional right to self-determination, including the right to regional statehood within Ethiopia’s federal system — a right recently asserted by the Sidama (see Security Situation). Several conditions must be met for regional statehood, including: approval by a two-thirds majority of the members of the relevant state legislature; and a majority vote in a referendum organised by the federal government (the referendum must be organised within one-year of the request for regional statehood being received).

    All major ethnic groups are represented in the federal government and bureaucracy, and political parties represent the interests of Ethiopia’s various ethnic groups. DFAT assesses official discrimination – including systematic state-sanctioned discrimination, denial of public services and higher detention rates – based on race and/or ethnicity is rare. This assessment is consistent with the constitutional prohibitions on discrimination, and reflects the need for governments to maintain their legitimacy through inclusiveness, given Ethiopia’s ethnic diversity. Different ethnic groups have a history of co-existence in Addis Ababa, and discrimination on ethnic grounds is not common there. One source described ethnicity as a ‘non-factor’ in Addis Ababa — most people consider themselves from Addis Ababa as opposed to a particular ethnic group. Violence based on ethnicity is not common in Addis Ababa, but is a growing concern in regional states. Interethnic relations have deteriorated since 2018, and DFAT assesses the situation for ethnic minorities at the regional state-level is increasingly challenging, and they face a growing risk of violence at the hands of the majority community.

    Societal discrimination based on ethnicity can occur, but is predominantly in the form of positive discrimination in favour of a particular ethnic group rather than active discrimination against people of a different race or ethnicity. Official policies can limit opportunities for some groups; for example, the use of Oromiffa as the language of instruction in schools in Oromia State can limit opportunities for ethnic Oromos in the public sector if they do not also speak Amharic and English. Similarly, ethnic groups that constitute a minority within regional states are at a disadvantage from a linguistic perspective, insofar as their languages do not enjoy official status in those states.

    Amharas
    The Amhara people are the second-largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, at 26.9 per cent of the population. While they reside predominantly in Amhara State, ethnic Amharas are present throughout Ethiopia, with significant populations in Oromia and SNNP states (2 million and 420,000, respectively). Nearly 1.3 million Amharas were residing in Addis Ababa at the time of the 2007 census, making them the singlelargest ethnic group in the capital. Most Amharas are Orthodox Christian. Their language, Amharic, is the official national language. The Amhara governed Ethiopia for the longest period before the EPRDF came to power in 1991, including during military rule and the era of the monarchy. Like the Oromo, the Amhara felt marginalised by the Tigray under the EPRDF, and protests in Amhara State helped catalyse the resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn in February 2018. Similarly to the Oromo, Amhara nationalism has increased with Ethiopia’s democratic opening and lifting of restrictions on freedom of expression.

    The Amhara are represented politically at the federal level, including in the current federal government and the senior ranks of the public service and the military (until recently Amharic was the sole working language of the federal bureaucracy). Roughly a quarter of lower house members in Federal Parliament are elected from Amhara State. The current federal president is an ethnic Amhara, and the Amhara were second only to the Oromo in their representation in the Council of Ministers at the time of publication. Political parties representing Amhara interests are active. DFAT assesses the arrest of Amharas during the 2014-18 anti-government protests was not ethnically motivated, but reflected the then-federal government’s sensitivity to political opposition. DFAT assesses Amharas face a low risk of official discrimination based on their ethnicity, including with respect to employment in the public sector. The Amhara have been the subject of ethnic-based attacks in states where they do not constitute a majority, particularly in Benishangul-Gumuz. DFAT assesses that, like most other groups, Amharas face a moderate risk of violence in areas or states where they are a minority.

    POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED)
    The constitution enshrines extensive protections in relation to political opinion. Article 25 provides for equality under the law, without discrimination on the grounds of political or other opinion; Article 29 provides for freedom of expression; Article 30 provides for freedom of assembly, peaceful demonstration and petition; Article 31 provides for freedom of association; and Article 38 provides for the right to vote, be elected and be a member of a political organisation regardless of colour, race, nation, nationality, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion. Organisations formed in violation of appropriate laws and/or with the intent to subvert the constitutional order are prohibited. Organisers of large public gatherings must notify the authorities 48 hours in advance and obtain a permit.

    In practice, political freedoms were significantly curtailed before April 2018. Members of opposition groups, human rights activists, and independent commentators such as journalists and bloggers who opposed the government’s policies were regularly harassed and detained. The ATP was used extensively to restrict political freedoms and arrest and prosecute government critics, particularly individuals with suspected affiliations to proscribed groups Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF. Against this background, many opposition leaders and dissidents left Ethiopia. Individuals who were not members of the EPRDF reportedly faced discrimination in public sector employment, including impediments to career progression. Antigovernment protests were often dispersed through force, and participants arrested.

    Freedom of political expression has expanded since 2018. More than 10,000 political prisoners have been released since 2018 (a process initiated by the Desalegn Government), including senior opposition leaders Andargachew Tsege of Ginbot 7 and Merera Gudina and Bekele Gerba of the OFC. In June 2018, parliament lifted its terrorist designations of Ginbot 7, the OLF and the ONLF. These groups subsequently renounced armed struggle and returned to Ethiopia, where they operate as registered political parties. In July 2018, federal parliament amnestied thousands of individuals charged with treason and other crimes against the state. This has enabled high-profile opposition figures, including Berhanu Nega of Ginbot 7, to return from exile and resume their political activities. According to the federal government, over 13,000 people have been released under the amnesty law. Political opposition parties now operate with greater freedom, although some report intimidation and obstacles to holding rallies due to a lack of protection in regional states. In January and February 2020, over 100 OLF supporters were reportedly arrested across Oromia State, while some members of the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) – an opposition party formed in 2018 that espouses Amhara nationalism – were detained in connection to the alleged coup attempt in June 2019 (see Security Situation). DFAT is unable to verify if these arrests were politically motivated. A local source involved in politics told DFAT they were able to express their political views freely without fear of arrest and prosecution. Anti-government protests are common — in January 2020, largescale anti-government protests took place in Amhara State in relation to the abduction of 27 ethnic Amhara university students in Oromia State. Protesters accused Prime Minister Abiy of not doing enough to secure the students’ release.

    In June 2018, the government established an Advisory Council for Legal and Justice Affairs comprising independent legal professionals to review and recommend reforms to laws that had been used to restrict political, civic and press freedoms (namely, the ATP, the Charities and Societies Proclamation, and the Freedom of Information and Mass Media Proclamation). The Advisory Council has a three-year mandate. The Charities and Societies Proclamation was repealed and replaced by the Organization of Civil Society Proclamation in February 2019 (see Human Rights Organisations). The new law is in operation, and has been well received by civil society organisations. A revision of the ATP was adopted on 2 January 2020. It is a significant improvement on the previous ATP but has still drawn criticism from civil society groups, including Amnesty International, who fear it could still be used against those critical of government. Replacement legislation for the Freedom of Information and Mass Media Proclamation was before federal parliament at the time of publication. While these laws remain in force, they have been used only sporadically since April 2018.

    Human rights organisations have particularly welcomed the government’s commitment to review and revise the ATP, which was widely considered to fall short of international human rights standards. The old ATP contained a broad definition of ‘terrorist acts’, and was used extensively to arrest and prosecute critics of government policy before April 2018. Under the ATP, detainees could be held without charge for 28-day periods up to a maximum period of four months. In practice, many were held for considerably longer. Bail was not available for persons charged with terrorism offences. Those charged under the ATP can face up to 20 years’ imprisonment.

    Under the new ATP, a person must incite terrorist acts to be prosecuted (rather than simply ‘encouraging terrorism’) and workers’ rights to strike have been strengthened (illegal strikes that affected public services used to be classed as terrorist acts). However, Amnesty International believes opportunities to abuse power still remain. For example, the proclamation criminalises ‘intimidation to commit a terrorist act’.

    According to the federal government, about 300 people were arrested in connection to the alleged coup attempt in June 2018 (see Security Situation). DFAT understands a significantly higher number of people were arrested, including activists, journalists, government officials and members of the NaMA. The majority of arrests occurred in Amhara State; over 40 were detained in Addis Ababa. Most were subsequently released, including 22 in October 2019. A total of 58 people (45 in Amhara State and 13 in Addis Ababa) were charged under the ATP. In February 2020, the federal government said it had dropped charges ‘for the national good’ against some individuals – including NaMA members – suspected of involvement in the alleged attempt, as part of a broader pardon of high-profile detainees.

    Local sources told DFAT that, traditionally, being a member of the EPRDF increased one’s chances of gaining employment in the public sector and earning subsequent promotions, including in the judiciary, police, and public schools and universities. DFAT heard anecdotally that, while the practice of ruling party members being advantaged in public sector employment and promotions persisted, it was not as pronounced under the current federal government.

    DFAT assesses tolerance for political dissent has increased considerably since April 2018. Opposition political parties are able to organise and operate significantly more freely, particularly in Addis Ababa, and their members face a low risk of harassment, arrest and detention by virtue of their political affiliations and views. DFAT assesses Ethiopians can openly criticise the ruling party.

    2014-18 Protests and State of Emergency
    Ethiopia witnessed large-scale anti-government protests from 2014 to 2018 in Oromia and Amhara states (which, collectively, account for 60 per cent of Ethiopia’s population). The protests began in Oromia State (Ethiopia’s most populous) in April 2014, triggered by the federal government’s plan to expand the municipal boundaries of Addis Ababa into Oromia State, which it abuts. The federal government justified the Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan on the grounds it was necessary to cater for the rapid growth of the capital; critics claimed the encroachment would displace Oromo farmers and result in land seizures. The protests were put down through force, but re-emerged in November 2015. The government scrapped the Master Plan in January 2016; however, protests intensified across Oromia State and evolved into calls for greater political rights and the release of ethnic Oromo political prisoners. The Qeerroo, an Oromo youth movement, was at the forefront of these protests. Parallel protests emerged in neighbouring Amhara State in July 2016 (Ethiopia’s second-most populous state), triggered by historical Amhara grievances over the loss of traditional Amhara land stemming from the demarcation of the border between Amhara and
    Tigray states. Like in Oromia State, the protests in Amhara State morphed into calls for broader reform. The protests in Oromia and Amhara states saw violent confrontations between government forces and protesters, including the use of live bullets.

    The federal government declared a countrywide State of Emergency in October 2016 after protesters torched farms and businesses (a State of Emergency is constitutionally permissible in the event of a breakdown in law and order that threatens the constitutional order and is beyond the capacity of regular law enforcement agencies to control. It must be approved by a two-thirds majority in the House of Peoples’ Representatives within 15 days of being declared). The State of Emergency gave authorities broad powers to detain people and search private property without court orders, limit travel and the right to association and protest, and impose curfews and media restrictions (including on social media). The practical effect of the State of Emergency was to formalise and expand practices that were largely already in place. The State of Emergency was lifted in August 2017, but reinstated in February 2018, following the resignation of Prime Minister Desalegn. The State of Emergency was subsequently lifted in June 2018, two months ahead of schedule.

    DFAT understands the authorities arrested and detained around 26,000 people under the State of Emergency. This number includes journalists, bloggers, opposition party members and large numbers of people who were thought to have participated in anti-government protests, including children. Arrests and detentions were not limited to protest organisers or high-profile opponents of the government. Large numbers of detainees were subjected to a ‘rehabilitation and re-education’ program, mostly low profile participants who were released following their completion of the program (see Arbitrary Arrest and Detention). Some of those arrested under the State of Emergency claim to have been tortured (see Torture). The majority of those arrested and imprisoned for their participation in the protests have since been released. Over 1,000 civilians are estimated to have died during the course of the protests. Anti-government protests can and do occur.

    DFAT assesses that, since April 2018, participants in peaceful protests face a low risk of arrest and detention. DFAT further assesses that participants in peaceful protests, including organisers, are likely to be of little ongoing interest to the authorities.

    CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
    PUNISHMENT
    Article 18 of the constitution affords Ethiopians the right to protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 424 of the Criminal Code prohibits treatment of prisoners or suspects ‘in an improper or brutal manner, or in a manner which is incompatible with human dignity’. Such acts are punishable with up to 10 years’ imprisonment.

    In practice, prisoners have reported incidents of physical punishment. There are credible reports of individuals detained in connection to the 2014-18 protests and/or for suspected affiliations to previously outlawed opposition groups being mistreated, including being subjected to beatings, overcrowding, extreme heat, lack of water and solitary confinement. The current federal government has committed to addressing such abuses as part of its wide-reaching reform agenda (see Detention and Prison).

    Arbitrary Arrest and Detention

    The constitution stipulates that no person may be subject to arbitrary arrest and detained without charge or conviction. Under the Criminal Code, ‘unlawful arrest or detention’ is punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment. In practice, before April 2018 critics of the federal government were regularly detained on arbitrary grounds and often held for extended periods without charge. Under the State of Emergency, effective from October 2016-August 2017 and then from February-June 2018, authorities were allowed to arrest and detain individuals without a court warrant and hold detainees for longer than proscribed under normal regulations. According to the US Department of State, security forces went door-to-door after some protests, and arrested and arbitrarily detained opposition party members and supporters, whom they accused of inciting violence.

    There are fewer reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions since the change in federal government in April 2018 and the lifting of the State of Emergency. Some members of the OLF and the NaMA claim to have been the subject of arbitrary arrest and detention (in connection to the failed June 2019 coup attempt in the case of the NaMA) (see Political Opinion (Actual or Imputed)).

    In September 2018, security forces detained 3,000 people in Oromia State and Addis Ababa in response to rising criminality. Those arrested included individuals found gambling and – despite not constituting criminal offences– smoking shisha (a tobacco mix smoked in a water pipe) and consuming khat. Most were subsequently released.

    Successive governments have detained people – primarily youth – for ‘rehabilitation and re-education’ purposes in military-run camps. This includes people involved in the 2014-18 protests. About 1,200 people – detained in connection to the September 2018 unrest in Oromia State that accompanied the return from exile of the OLF – were sent for rehabilitation at a military facility. Most have since completed their rehabilitation and been released. Rehabilitation occurs outside of the judicial process — those undergoing rehabilitation are not charged and prosecuted. Amnesty International reports that rehabilitation processes continued throughout 2019. DFAT understands rehabilitation can last between one and several months, and includes education and physical exercise components. DFAT understands that rehabilitation does not involve torture or other forms of ill-treatment. Those undergoing rehabilitation are released without charge on completion of their program. The authorities claim rehabilitation boosts the employment prospects of those who undergo it and supports national unity.

    Women
    Article 35 of the constitution enshrines a range of rights for women, including: equality with men in the enjoyment of constitutional rights and protections; equal rights in marriage; the entitlement to affirmative measures to remedy the historical legacy of inequality and discrimination against women and to enable women to participate in society equally with men; the right to maternity leave at full pay; equal rights with the respect to the use, transfer, administration and control of land and the inheritance of property; equal rights in employment, including in relation to pay and promotion; and the right of access to family planning education, information and capacity. Article 34 stipulates that marriage can be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. Gender equality is a priority for the current federal government.

    Ethiopia scores highly in international rankings for gender equality in political participation. In October 2018, Ethiopia elected a female president (the only African female head of state at the time of publication). In parallel, Prime Minister Abiy appointed women to half of all positions in the Council of Ministers, including the ministers of defence, trade and industry, and peace (with the latter responsible for overseeing the federal police and all civilian intelligence agencies). Abiy has also appointed women to head the Supreme Court and the NEBE. Women hold 37.3 per cent of seats in the current federal parliament. Some state legislatures have an even higher representation of women. The World Economic Forum ranks Ethiopia 82nd out of 153 countries in its 2020 Global Gender Gap Index, including 16th for political participation (ahead of the likes of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Switzerland and the UK).

    Local sources told DFAT that, while women’s political participation has increased, the situation for the average Ethiopian woman remains challenging. Women aged 15-24 have higher literacy rates than men, but girls are more likely to be out of school than boys, particularly in rural areas (see Education). Women typically have fewer employment opportunities than men, in both urban and rural areas, and their participation in the labour force (at 74.2 per cent) is significantly lower than that of men (86.5 per cent). This is influenced by a number of factors, including societal discrimination, traditional norms and attitudes regarding gender roles, and women’s generally lower levels of educational attainment. Early marriage is widespread, and negatively impacts the ability of girls to attain an education and participate in the labour force (see Children). DFAT heard that it is common in rural areas for young girls to be married off in order to ease the financial burden on the girl’s family, particularly during times of drought. Women often lack financial independence, particularly in rural areas. Ethiopia ranks 125th out of 153 countries for economic participation and 140th for educational attainment in the 2020 Global Gender Gap Index.

    According to local sources, access to sexual reproductive health services is limited. The fertility rate is 3.9 children per woman, but regional variations exist (the fertility rate in Somali State is 7.1). Abortion is allowed in some circumstances, including: where the life and physical health of the woman is at risk; in instances of rape, incest and foetal impairment; if a woman has physical or mental disabilities; or if she is younger than 18 years of age. Most abortions now occur in health facilities. Local sources told DFAT that, while professional abortion services exist, women often do not know where to find them. Abortion carries significant social stigma.

    DFAT heard anecdotally that divorce is not uncommon in urban areas and divorce rates are increasing overall. Women’s growing economic independence in urban areas and the availability of legal aid services and courts were cited as contributory factors. Being a single woman or seeking divorce from one’s husband is widely accepted in major urban areas and carries less social stigma compared to rural areas. According to local sources, single or divorced women may face greater economic challenges but not societal discrimination in urban areas.

    Gender-Based Violence
    Gender-based violence is a criminal offence punishable by up to 20 years’ imprisonment. In practice, the law is rarely enforced. Marital rape is not explicitly prohibited. A local source told DFAT the authorities largely consider events behind closed doors to be private matters.

    Gender-based violence is widespread in Ethiopia. Typically, gender-based violence is intimatepartner based and occurs in domestic settings. Local sources told DFAT gender-based violence is a countrywide phenomenon that occurs across all ethnic groups and religions. An Ethiopian Demographic Health Survey from 2016 found that 23 per cent of women aged 15-49 had experienced physical violence, and 10 per cent had experienced sexual violence. A 2018 academic study found almost half of women had experienced gender-based violence in their lifetimes. According to the UNDP, 28 per cent of women aged 15 and older have experienced intimate partner violence. DFAT heard anecdotally violence against women is most prevalent in Afar and Somali states, where the vast majority of the population is Muslim and the family legislative framework is based on traditional practices and sharia law (see Judiciary). Local sources told DFAT refugee and IDP women and girls are particularly vulnerable to gender-based violence, including, in the case of Gambela State, rape perpetrated by men making cross-border incursions from South Sudan.

    Societal norms and a lack of financial independence mean violence against women is under-reported, and victims generally do not seek legal remedies, particularly in rural areas. According to reports, men widely consider hitting or beating their wife to be justified in certain circumstances, including where a wife has burned her husband’s food, argued with him, left the house without telling him, neglected the children or refused to have sexual intercourse with him. A local source told DFAT there was an acceptance among many women to tolerate domestic violence and submit to the sexual desires of their husbands.

    The authorities have taken measures to combat gender-based violence. In 2010, the federal government developed a Strategic Plan for an Integrated and Multi-Sectoral Response to Violence against Women and Children and Child Justice in Ethiopia. Protection units for women and children operate in some police stations and prosecution offices, and there are special benches dealing specifically with violence against women in federal and regional courts. The government has committed to establishing a free hotline service for victims of gender-based violence. According to local sources, there are 11 shelters countrywide for women escaping domestic violence. Shelters typically accommodate between 20 and 50 women. A woman can stay in a shelter for a maximum of 1.5 years. Shelters include counselling services and childcare centres, allowing women to bring their children and to pursue employment. Some shelters are government-run, while some are administered by NGOs with UN support. Some local charities provide financial assistance to victims of physical and sexual abuse. One such charity, Agar, operates in Addis Ababa and Oromia and Amhara states.

    Local sources told DFAT that, while services for victims of gender-based violence exist, including shelters, they are insufficient. Demand for shelters is reportedly increasing, particularly among younger women, but they remain scarce — space constraints mean women are often turned away. Of the 11 shelters currently in operation, three are located in Addis Ababa, and only one in Oromia State (covering a population of over 30 million). There are no shelters in Afar, Gambela and Somali states. DFAT heard anecdotally that reporting of gender-based violence is increasing, but remains low overall, largely due to women’s economic dependence on men.

    DFAT assesses women in Ethiopia face a high risk of domestic violence and sexual harassment. Sexual assault, including spousal rape, is common. DFAT assesses support services for women escaping from domestic violence have improved but are insufficient overall.

    STATE PROTECTION
    Ethiopia has an extensive security and intelligence apparatus, a legacy of its previous political systems. The state exercises control over most of the country, and it has largely been effective in maintaining law and order and protecting the population from major crimes, including terrorism. The security and intelligence apparatus was used in the past to monitor and suppress dissent, and had a history of using force to quell instances of unrest, including large-scale anti-government protests.

    Prime Minister Abiy has sought to impose greater discipline and accountability on the security forces, including by punishing past wrongdoings, as part of broader efforts to strengthen the professionalism and civilian oversight of the security forces (local sources claim this has had a deterrent effect on government forces). According to the national report it submitted ahead of its most recent UPR (May 2019), the federal government is developing legislation on police use of force and accountability, and plans to establish an independent mechanism to which complaints of ill-treatment by security and law enforcement authorities can be submitted, but this is not yet legislated. Regional state governments are making parallel efforts to reform law enforcement at the state level. A proliferation of ethnic-based militias since 2018 has challenged state authority and eroded the rule of law in some parts of the country, particularly in western Oromia State.

    Government forces have shown greater restraint toward protesters since April 2018. Local sources told DFAT that non-state actors now posed a greater threat to safety than did government forces. In a report presented to federal parliament in January 2020, the EHRC claimed that human rights violations committed by government forces had declined, with most violations now perpetrated by non-state actors.

    DFAT assesses that, overall, federal and regional security forces are largely effective at maintaining law and order and in providing protection from threats by non-state actors, particularly in major urban centres. However, DFAT assesses that the emergence of armed, invariably ethnic-based non-state actors has increasingly challenged the state’s monopoly on the use of force and its concomitant ability to provide protection in remote areas and along borders separating Ethiopia’s regional states.

    Intelligence Services
    Ethiopia has a highly capable domestic intelligence system. The NISS is an autonomous federal government office, in theory accountable to the Minister for Peace, but in practice directly accountable to the prime minister. While reliable data on the size of the NISS is not available, it is broadly considered to have a strong capacity to monitor the activities of persons of interest in Ethiopia, and high priority areas along its borders. A civilian monitoring and reporting system supports the intelligence network, whereby individuals report on the activities of others in their community or household. The current federal government is working to strengthen the NISS’ independence from political interference. Abiy replaced the NISS’ senior leadership in June 2018, and over 30 senior NISS officials, including its former deputy head, have been arrested for allegedly overseeing human rights violations of prisoners and suspects, including abduction and torture (NISS’ former head has also been charged, but evaded arrest to date). Under proposed legislation currently before parliament, the NISS will be renamed the National Information Center.

    The federal government operates a separate cyber-intelligence and security organisation, the Information Network Security Agency (INSA). INSA’s role includes investigating threats to national security, combatting cyber-crime and preventing cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure.

    The Ethiopian intelligence agencies are highly capable. DFAT assesses that individuals considered a threat to national security are unlikely to escape their attention within Ethiopia. Security and intelligence services operate across Ethiopia. DFAT assesses that an individual who is of interest to the authorities is unlikely to be able to avoid attracting official attention by relocating within Ethiopia.

    TREATMENT OF RETURNEES
    Article 32 of the constitution stipulates that Ethiopian nationals have the right to return to the country. Ethiopia has a large diaspora. About 5 million Ethiopians live outside of the country, with large concentrations in the US and the Middle East. Members of the diaspora return to Ethiopia regularly and contribute to the economy, including through remittances. Prime Minister Abiy has encouraged former dissidents to return from abroad and participate in his reform agenda. Many have done so, including members of opposition movements previously designated as terrorist organisations (see Political System).

    DFAT understands there have been instances of individuals who were seeking asylum abroad discontinuing their protection claims and returning to Ethiopia. Some returnees are now active in politics and civil society. Former political prisoners have returned from exile to head the EHRC and the NEBE.

    The authorities have typically welcomed voluntary returnees to Ethiopia, including, since April 2018, government critics and opponents. DFAT assesses that returnees, including failed asylum seekers and/or government critics and opponents, face a low risk of monitoring, harassment, detention and official discrimination. While the authorities have significant intelligence-gathering capabilities and are likely to be aware of major anti-government protest activity undertaken in other countries and online, DFAT assesses that people who openly criticise the ruling party while they are outside of Ethiopia face a low risk of official harm on their return to Ethiopia.

    DFAT assesses that, under the current federal government, failed asylum seekers face a low risk of harm on their return to Ethiopia, including where they sought asylum on political grounds.

    Exit and Entry Procedures
    Ethiopians travelling internationally by air are subject to security and identification checks at the airport, and immigration stations at airports have photograph and fingerprinting facilities. Ethiopian passports are machine-readable and have a range of security features (see Documentation). Biometric security measures linked to national databases apply at formal entry and exit points across the country. The NISS has primary responsibility for intelligence and border security processes.

    An exit visa is not required to depart Ethiopia, and Article 32 of the constitution stipulates that Ethiopian nationals have the right to leave the country at any time. In practice, there have been some instances of individuals being prevented from exiting the country. From 2013 to 2018, Ethiopia prohibited its citizens from travelling to the Gulf region in search of work. The travel ban was imposed to prevent the exploitation and abuse of unskilled and female domestic workers. It was lifted after Ethiopia signed bilateral agreements with several Gulf countries to protect the rights of Ethiopian workers. A Certificate of Good Conduct (‘police clearance certificate’) is required when a person seeks to emigrate from Ethiopia (see Police Clearance Certificates).

    Refugee considerations

1. The applicant claims she is a refugee because she faces a real chance of being persecuted for reasons of political opinion. This claim is premised on three contentions:

   ·As a consequence of the applicant discussing current affairs and engaging in a protest as a university student in Ethiopia she is currently regarded by the authorities to be a person holding anti-government beliefs, who will express anti-government opinions and participate in anti-government activities;

   ·In January 2014,  after completing her studies in a regional university, she was again residing with her family in Addis Ababa when she became an active member of a banned political group named Ginbot 7;

   ·In Australia the applicant has actively worked through her membership of two organisations in Melbourne to advance the welfare and rights of Amharas in Australia and Ethiopia, and she would continue those activities in Ethiopia.

2. After considering the contents of the applicant’s statement made in 2017 in support of her application for protection; the contents of her application for protection; answers given in her Department interview; Statutory Declaration dated 12 April 2021; the photographic materials submitted to the Department and the Tribunal; and the applicant’s evidence at hearing, the Tribunal is not persuaded the applicant faces a real chance of being persecuted for reasons of political opinion. The Tribunal will now give its reasons for that decision.

1. The Tribunal is satisfied the applicant discussed current affairs and political matters with fellow students during her university years. These discussions occurred during a period of considerable political and social unrest in Ethiopia, that much is clear from the country information that appears earlier in this decision. The evidence indicates the applicant, along with other students, was arrested in 2013 because of her involvement in a student street march that, from her point of view, was an expression of objection to the poor quality food and inadequate water supplies provided to students on campus.

2. The protest morphed into a demonstration of general dissatisfaction with the government, in addition to the purpose for which the applicant assisted in the organisation of the demonstration, being to publicly express objection to the quality of food and the inadequate water supplies. Police intervened; the applicant was arrested along with other demonstrators. After a court proceeding in which the applicant was sentenced to one month’s imprisonment, the applicant was released [in] December 2013.

3. According to the evidence which the Tribunal accepts, the applicant was interrogated by police, intimidated, slapped and struck twice on her back with a baton. According to the evidence the purpose of the interrogation was to determine whether the applicant was involved in either Ginbot 7, a group described by the applicant as a non-ethnic based opposition party that Amharas students were suspected of supporting; or the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an ethnic based political group Oromo students were suspected of supporting.

4. The evidence indicates the applicant was not interrogated on the basis that she was known to be a political activist working to incite students or people in the broader community to agitate against the government. The interrogation, as described by the applicant, seems to have been directed towards establishing whether the applicant was a member of a banned political group such as Ginbot 7 or the OLF, or that she was at that time a significant anti-government political activist.

1. The evidence does not satisfy the Tribunal that the authorities regarded the applicant, at the time she was released from custody, to be a person who posed a political threat to the Government. Having regard to this conclusion, and the time that has passed between her release from custody, and in the absence of evidence that demonstrates the authorities currently have an interest in the applicant, the Tribunal gives little weight in this review to the events of  2014.

1. The applicant claims that through a person she met in custody she joined Ginbot 7, and became part of a small, secret cell of political activists in that organisation. It stands to reason that because Ginbot 7 was classified as a terrorist organisation pursuant to the law of Ethiopia at that time, that it was a secret organisation, with protocols in place that served to protect its members from identification by the authorities. The applicant’s evidence is consistent with the country information to this effect. The applicant gives evidence that the members of her cell met regularly at various locations and used first names only; she acknowledges that those names were probably pseudonyms. The applicant claims that her membership of Ginbot 7 became known to the authorities after she left Ethiopia and arrived in Australia [in] January 2017 to enjoy a holiday in Melbourne with her sister and her family.

1. The applicant’s claim to be a known member of Ginbot 7 is largely based on her evidence that [in] February 2017 her then husband informed her in a telephone call that members of the state security apparatus searched the matrimonial home and confiscated [documents] prepared for a street rally that was scheduled to take place on 21 August 2016. Members of Ginbot 7, including the applicant, were actively encouraging members of the community to attend the rally. The [documents] confiscated from the applicant’s home were provided to her by [Ginbot 7].

1. In evidence to the Tribunal the applicant elaborated on the documents that were seized from her home by the security officials. She claimed the documents included handwritten notes she made of aspects of topics discussed in various clandestine meetings she had with members of Ginbot 7. Bearing in mind Ginbot 7 was classed as a terrorist organisation, and for that reason its members were at continuous risk of arrest; the Tribunal finds it unlikely that the applicant, as a member of that organisation, would have participated in clandestine meetings of that organisation and made, retained, and stored in her home a written record of matters discussed in those meetings.

1. Additionally, the Tribunal finds it unlikely that the applicant would have kept at home [paraphernalia] with the potential to connect her to an organisational role in an anti-government rally; a rally she asserts she was promoting as a member of Ginbot 7. This view is compounded by the applicant’s written evidence that it was widely known amongst her friends and other people who knew her that she was a member of Ginbot 7.

1. Furthermore, if the material the applicant claims was present in the residence she occupied with her husband, and it was of sufficient interest to the security officials for them to seize it, it is likely the applicant’s husband would have been under immediate suspicion of being actively involved in an anti-government organisation, arrested and interrogated. It is unlikely he would have been free to report the raid search and property seizure to the applicant in Australia a day or so after it occurred and warn her not to return to Ethiopia.

1. The foregoing evidence and related considerations leave the Tribunal unpersuaded that the applicant was a member of Ginbot 7, or that she was involved in political activities in Ethiopia of such a nature that the authorities are likely to have imputed to her membership of Ginbot 7.

1. The applicant also claims she is a member of two incorporated associations in [Australia]: [Organisation 1], and [Organisation 2]. The applicant claims that if she is removed to Ethiopia she will continue to engage in activities of the same character as the activity she engages in as a member of those [associations].

1. As evidence in support of her claim to be a member of those associations she provided a letter signed by a responsible officeholder of each of the associations. The Tribunal is satisfied the applicant is an active member of both of those associations.

1. The evidence demonstrates that as a member of [Organisation 1], the applicant has been actively involved in promoting Amhara cultural values and institutions through fundraising activities, organising cultural events, holiday events and mentoring new members of the organisation, along with providing food and beverages to people who attend various activities organised by the association.

1. The applicant’s evidence about her involvement in [Organisation 1] and the contents of the [Organisation 1] document, indicates the applicant’s activities in that organisation are focused on advancing the welfare and cultural heritage of the Amharas, including providing welfare relief to Amharas in Ethiopia.

1. The Tribunal accepts the applicant is an active member of [Organisation 2]. The letter from that organisation upon which the applicant places reliance on this review demonstrates the applicant is providing welfare support to Ethiopian women in Australia need of that support. The Tribunal is not satisfied that this work is political activity or that it would expose the applicant to any risk of harm in Ethiopia.

1. The Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant’s involvement in either of the associations in Australia would attract the adverse attention of government authorities if she were removed to Ethiopia.

1. Additionally, the Tribunal is not satisfied that if the applicant were to perform in Ethiopia work equivalent to the work she performs as a member of either or both organisations, that her activities would attract adverse attention from the authorities in Ethiopia, or that her activities would expose her to any risk of persecution in Ethiopia.

1. The president of [Organisation 1] asserts in his letter to the Tribunal that the current government of Ethiopia is an ethnic based government that is directing its attention to kidnapping and eliminating Amhara people who oppose the repression of the Amharas. The applicant, in her evidence contends the government of Ethiopia does not govern in the interests of Amharas; that Amharas in government including former members of Ginbot 7, serve their own interests and do not serve the interests of the Amharas.

1. Additionally, the applicant contends the government, which includes Amharas, is providing to the Oromo people, sniper rifles and bombs to enable them to go about murdering Amharas. Without more evidence to substantiate these claims made by the president of [Organisation 1] and the applicant, and having regard to the country information about the active participation in government of former leaders of Ginbot 7, and that the current government is a unity government which includes political organisations which represent the Amhara people, however imperfect the government may be, the Tribunal is not satisfied it is arming and inciting Oromo gangs or other outlaw gangs to target, abduct, or kill Amhara political activists, or Amhara people for the reason they are Amhara, or they lawfully engage in political activism for the betterment of Amhara people in Ethiopia.

1. The Tribunal notes the applicant’s evidence about her open political activity in Australia includes photographs of her participating in a rally in Melbourne said by the applicant to have been organised by the Oromo community. The rally was said to be protesting about government forces killing innocent Oromo people. The applicant, contends these photographs and her participation in this rally is evidence of her being associated with political movements labelled as terrorists by the government, and that she is likely to be persecuted in Ethiopia because of her involvement in this Oromo, as distinct from Amhara, related protest.

1. In correspondence submitted to the Department along with the photographs, the applicant further explains the significance her involvement in the street rally. She claims that through her mother’s side of her family she belongs to the Oromo Community and through her activities as part of the Oromo ethnic group, she is likely to be targeted upon her return to Ethiopia, and to be persecuted for that reason. Relevantly, the Tribunal notes the rally took place in March 2018.

1. The applicant also claimed in evidence that she met in Melbourne with the leader of Ginbot 7 and that she attended a meeting in a hall where he was present. The applicant accepts Ginbot 7 was dissolved and no longer exists.

1. According to the country information and the applicant’s evidence the current government in Ethiopia is a national unity government, established under a new and reformist Prime Minister, Mr Abiy. The Abiy government declassified Ginbot 7 as a terrorist organisation. According to the DFAT country information quoted above, former leaders and members of Ginbot 7 joined the mainstream political process, and leaders of the principal ethnic groups in Ethiopia, including Oromo and Amhara peoples formed the Ethiopian Prosperity Party, and that party now governs Ethiopia and all these developments have taken place well after the applicant left Ethiopia.

1. On balance, and having regard to the applicant’s evidence and relevant country information, the Tribunal finds the applicant’s claim that political leaders, who were formerly leaders of Ginbot 7, or the leadership of the political parties, or groups that represent Ethiopian government, both state and federal, who represent Oromos and Amhara, are only interested in serving their own personal interests to be unpersuasive.

1. The Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s involvement in the March 2018 political rally in Melbourne, or her meeting with the person the applicant claims was the leader of Ginbot 7, or her involvement in either of the two associations mentioned earlier in this decision, or her political activities and welfare activities in Melbourne, considered individually or cumulatively mean the applicant faces a real chance that if she returns to Ethiopia she will be persecuted for reasons of political opinion or her mixed ethnicity, being Oromo and Amhara.

1. The applicant has given evidence that family friends and relatives suffered intimidation, loss of business patronage, a cousin’s house was the subject of an arson attack, and property was confiscated for the reason it was owned by an Amhara or someone who has spoken out against the abuse of Amharas. The evidence is general, lacks specificity sufficient for the Tribunal to be satisfied that if the activity complained of in fact occurred, that it was necessarily related to the ethnicity of the people concerned, or that those events constitute persuasive evidence that the applicant would suffer similar harm if she were living in Addis Ababa: the city in which the applicant will reside if she is removed to Ethiopia.

1. The applicant has provided to the Tribunal photographs depicting what is said to be graffiti threatening to kill Amharas; and, a photograph of what appears to be a burnt building. The photographs are non-specific, on their face they do not necessarily relate to Addis Ababa. It is not possible to identify the location of places depicted in the photographs, the date on which they were taken, or other relevant context. Accordingly, the Tribunal gives little weight to the photographs.

2. It is evident that if the applicant is removed to Ethiopia she is most likely reside in Addis Ababa with her mother. The applicant communicates with her mother and last spoke to her as part of her observance of Easter. The applicant’s evidence about whether she would live with her mother in Ethiopia was equivocal, but considered on balance, the Tribunal is satisfied the applicant and her child would be able to live with her mother, in her mother’s own home in Addis Ababa.

1. The applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal and her work history in Ethiopia, makes it likely the applicant, who holds a [Bachelor] degree and who worked for [employer], a government [employer], for three years before she arrived in Australia, faces sound prospects of returning to the workforce in Ethiopia, if that be her choice. The Tribunal is not persuaded the applicant will be denied employment in Addis Ababa because she is a woman, single mother or because of her ethnicity.

1. According to the applicant’s evidence she has never been exposed to harm on the streets in Ethiopia, or sexual violence outside her marriage.

1. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of being persecuted because she is a member of a social group, comprising women in Ethiopia, or because of her ethnicity combined with the fact that she is a single woman, if she were removed to Ethiopia and lived in Addis Ababa. This conclusion has considered the applicant’s evidence, and the DFAT country information relevant to the circumstances in Addis Ababa pertaining to single women, different ethnicities, the applicant’s educational attainments and her apparently successful experience of employment in Ethiopia.

1. Additionally, the applicant claims as a single woman and the mother of a young child, who is both Oromo  and Amhara, that for those reasons, she is likely to be sexually assaulted and otherwise physically harmed as she goes about her daily life in Addis Ababa. This claim is not consistent with the country information which indicates that divorce from one’s husband, and being a single woman is widely accepted in major urban areas and carries less social stigma compared to rural areas. Whilst single or divorced women may face greater economic challenges, that doesn’t also mean they will face societal discrimination in urban areas.  Nevertheless, the applicant’s evidence in this regard was general in nature, and when it is considered in the context of the country information, and the applicant’s educational and work history, including that she went about her daily life in Ethiopia without suffering physical harm or sexual violence outside her marriage, the Tribunal finds the applicant’s evidence in this regard unpersuasive. The Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant faces a real chance of significant harm or reason of her membership of the social group, being a single mother of Amhara or Oromo or mixed ethnicity residing in Addis Ababa.

1. Based on the foregoing evidence and considerations the Tribunal is not satisfied of the existence of a real chance for reasons of race, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, that the applicant would suffer serious harm if she is removed to Ethiopia now or in the foreseeable future.

1. Having considered the applicant’s claims individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant is a refugee for the purposes of the Act, and therefore the applicant is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s.36(2)(a).

   Complementary protection

2. Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), the Tribunal now considerers the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa).

1. In applying the decision in MIAC v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505, [246] [297] [342], the Tribunal accepts the ‘real risk’ test is the same as the ‘real chance’ test in the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(aa) of the Act.

1. For the reasons set out below, the Tribunal finds the applicant has established the existence of a real risk her former husband would inflict significant harm on her if she is removed to Ethiopia now, or in the foreseeable future. More specifically, the Tribunal is satisfied there is a real risk the applicant will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment by her former husband if she is returned to Ethiopia. The Tribunal will now give its reasons for decision.

1. The applicant claims that she fears she will be assaulted and or killed by her former husband if she is removed to Ethiopia.

1. Since the applicant commenced living in Australia her relationship with her husband has broken down. The applicant is now engaged to be married to an Australian citizen and she is pregnant with their child.

1. Whilst the applicant was residing in Australia she informed her then husband that their marriage was at an end and that she wanted him to agree to a divorce. He repeatedly refused her requests to consent to a divorce. Consequently, the applicant engaged court processes in Australia that enabled her to, [in] February 2021, obtain a divorce order in the Family Court of Australia, that took effect on that date thereby terminating the marriage between the applicant and her husband. The applicant provided a copy of the order to the Tribunal.

1. This order was made under Australian law notwithstanding the fact that the applicant and the husband married in Ethiopia pursuant to the civil and secular laws of Ethiopia.

1. According to the evidence, the applicant’s husband does not accept the divorce in the face of his objection to it. He considers the divorce in Australia contrary to his will, to be personally humiliating and demeaning.

1. According to the evidence the applicant’s husband is of the opinion that his then wife committed adultery in Australia, and this perception adds to his sense of humiliation in the eyes of their friends and family, and the wider community in Addis Ababa.

1. According to the applicant’s evidence her former husband is of the opinion that her behaviour in Australia in connection with other men, and the fact that she chose to divorce him in Australia, ruined his life. According to the applicant’s evidence her husband’s anger has been compounded by the fact of her new relationship and pregnancy. There were no children born from the relationship between the applicant and her former husband.

1. The applicant provided copies of two emails which purport to have been sent by the applicant’s husband to the applicant in May 2020. According to the applicant’s evidence both emails were sent by her former husband. In both emails the applicant’s former husband threatens that he will cause her harm. The Tribunal accepts the emails were authored and sent by the applicant’s former husband.

1. In the first email the applicant’s husband threatens that he will burn the property that they acquired together, property she left with him, and that next time he sees the applicant he will set fire to her.

1. In the second email the applicant’s former husband remarks on the fact that the applicant blocked him on social media. He informed the applicant it was futile to block him because he was already part of her social media network under a different identity. In this email the applicant’s former husband threatens to keep her under surveillance, to stalk her, and it is a seriously menacing message.

1. Considered in combination, these emails give rise to a justifiable sense of fear in the applicant, that her husband is not and will not accept being divorced by the applicant, and that he intends to cause her grave injury.

1. The applicant has further supported her claim that she is at risk of suffering harm at the hands of her former husband if she returns to Ethiopia, with a letter from her school friend [Ms A], a resident of Ethiopia. The letter is dated 7 April 2021. The applicant’s former husband speaks to Ms [A] about the applicant. He makes it clear that he is still extremely angry about the divorce; believes that the applicant had ‘messed his life’ and, in return, he intends to ‘mess [up] her life’ and in the process demonstrate his manhood to her. Ms [A] states that she has no doubt the applicant’s husband intends to hurt her.

1. The foregoing evidence relevant to the applicant’s husband’s present intention, supports the applicant’s evidence at hearing, that within their marriage she was treated by her husband as a chattel, sexually dominated by him irrespective of whether she was consenting.

1. The applicant’s evidence about her treatment by her husband within their marriage is consistent with country information reflected in the DFAT country information extracted in this decision.

1. The Tribunal notes that considerable progress has been made in Ethiopia, to support through law reform, women’s participation in all aspects of political, business, and social life, and that sex crimes against women inside and outside marriage are punishable by lengthy periods of imprisonment. Nevertheless, the Tribunal also notes that according to the country information sexual violence against women in marriage in particular is underreported, and that the prevalence of domestic violence against women, including sexual violence, is a matter of grave concern to the authorities in Ethiopia.

1. The Tribunal notes that the applicant’s former husband is working as a [Occupation 1] in [Country 1]; that his family resides in Addis Ababa;  that he returns to Addis Ababa periodically; and, that it is highly probable he will return to Addis Ababa to live, upon completion of his [Occupation 1] work in [Country 1].

1. On balance, the Tribunal accepts the applicant’s evidence that her former husband regarded her as his chattel during their marriage, that he subjected her to physical violence including sexual violence during the marriage, that he threatened to set fire to her; that he will seek her out if she were removed to Addis Ababa; and, that there is a real risk that he will subject the applicant to punishment and degrading treatment, if the applicant is removed to Ethiopia now or in the foreseeable future.

1. The Tribunal accepts that if the applicant were removed to Ethiopia, that the father of the child, an Australian citizen, would not give up his established life in Australia to emigrate to Ethiopia with the applicant and their baby.

1. The Tribunal accepts the applicant is likely to reside in Addis Ababa with her mother.

1. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s educational qualifications and work experience mean the best chance of gaining employment to support herself and her child would be found in Addis Ababa. The Tribunal accepts the applicant would need to be self-supporting in Ethiopia.

1. The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s evidence and the submissions of the representative that it would be unreasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area in Ethiopia, away from Addis Ababa, the mother’s home, and employment opportunities, as a single mother with a young child, in order to escape the real risk that she will suffer significant harm at the hands of her former husband.

1. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant’s former husband would learn through social contacts in Addis Ababa that the applicant had resumed living there, if the applicant were removed to Ethiopia now or in the foreseeable future.

1. Consistent with DFAT country information, and having regard to the evidence, the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant would be able to obtain from the authorities in Ethiopia sufficient protection, such that there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm from her former husband. This finding derives from the evidence that satisfies the Tribunal there is a real risk the applicant’s former husband holds a present and continuing intention to subject the applicant to degrading treatment or punishment for divorcing him against his will, being pregnant with another man’s child; and, according to his belief ruining his life.

1. Accordingly, the Tribunal is persuaded that the applicant satisfies the requirements of s.36(2)(aa) of the Act, and that the applicant satisfies the requirements for complementary protection under Australian law.

   FINDINGS

2. Having considered the applicant’s claims individually and cumulatively, and for the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations because the applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a) of the Act.

1. Having considered the applicant’s claims individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa) of the Act.

   DECISION

2. The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s.36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act1958.

Peter Haag

Member

ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958

5 (1) Interpretation

…

cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:

(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or

(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;

but does not include an act or omission:

(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

…

degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:

(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

…

receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:

(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or

(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.

…

torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:

(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or

(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or

(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or

(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or

(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;

but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

…

5H    Meaning of refugee

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:

(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or

(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.

Note:   For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.

…

5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:

(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and

(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and

(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.

Note:   For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.

(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.

Note:   For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.

(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:

(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or

(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or

(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:

·(i)             alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;

·(ii)            conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;

·(iii)           alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;

·(iv)           conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;

·(v)            enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;

·(vi)           alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):

(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and

(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and

(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:

(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;

(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;

(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;

(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.

(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family

For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:

(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear of persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and

(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:

·(i)             the first person has ever experienced; or

·(ii)            any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear of persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.

Note:   Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family

For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:

(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and

(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and

(c)     any of the following apply:

·(i)             the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;

·(ii)            the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;

·(iii)           the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

5LA Effective protection measures

(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:

(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:

·(i)             the relevant State; or

·(ii)            a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.

(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:

(a)     the person can access the protection; and

(b)     the protection is durable; and

(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.

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36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act

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(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

(aa)  a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

·(i)             is mentioned in paragraph (a); and

·(ii)            holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

·(i)             is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and

·(ii)            holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:

(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or

(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or

(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:

(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.

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